Download - Transportation document
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
1/31
Transportation
Definition
Contract of Transportation One whereby a certain person or
association of persons obligate themselves to transport
persons, things or news from one place to another for a fixed
price.
Crisostomo v. CA, gr no. 138334 - By definition, acontract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain
person or association of persons obligate themselves to transportpersons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed
price. Such person or association of persons are regarded as
carriers and are classified as private or special carriers and
common or public carriers. It is obvious from the above definition
that respondent (travel agency) is not an entity engaged in the
business of transporting either passengers or goods and is
therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did
not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another
since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel
arrangements in their behalf. Respondents services as a travel
agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or
visas as well as booking customers for tours.
Parties:1. carrier or conductor - one who binds himself to transport
persons, things, or news as the case may be or one employed in or
engaged in the business of carrying goods for others for hire
2. consignee - is the person to whom the shipment is to be
delivered to whether by land, sea or air.
3. shipper - one who gives rise to the contract of transportation by
agreeing to deliver the things or news to be transported, or to
present his own person or those of other or others in the case of
transportation of passengers
Persons or corporations who undertake to transport or
convey goods, property, or persons from one place to another,
gratuitously or for hire, and are classified as private or special
carriers and common or public carriers.
Common Carrier
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering
their services to the public. (ARTICLE 1732, NCC)
Private Carrier
Those who transport or undertake to transport in a particular
instance for hire or reward.
Classification:
1. As to object: (1) things; (2) persons; (3) news
2. As to place of travel: (1) land; (2) water; (3) air
When is a contract of carriage perfected?
As to Goods
Art. 1736 NCCThe extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from
the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them,
without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738.
Article 355, COGSA
The liability of the carrier shall begin from the moment he
receives the merchandise, in person or through a person entrusted
therewith in the place indicated for their reception.
As to Passengers
Dangwa Transportaion Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 95582 -by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection
pertaining to such a contractual relation.
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation V. CA, G.R. No. 84458 - Theduty of the common carrier commence from the moment the
person who purchases the ticket from the carrier presents himself
at the proper place and in a proper manner to be transported. The
relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has
been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel
owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not
ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his
destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises.
China Airlines V. CA, G.R. No. 129988 When CALconfirmed the reservations of private respondents, a contract of
carriage arose between CAL and private respondents
Alitalia Airways v. CA - when an airline issues a ticket to apassenger confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, acontract of carriage arises. The passenger then has every right to
expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date.
Japan Airlines v. Simangan, G.R. No. 170141 - Thatrespondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from JAL and was
issued the corresponding boarding pass is uncontroverted. His
plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles
were subjected to rigid immigration and security procedure. After
passing through said immigration and security procedure, he was
allowed by JAL to enter its airplane to fly to Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. via Narita, Japan. Concisely, there was a contract of carriage
between JAL and respondent.
Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804 -a contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment
Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premisesof the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection
under a contractual relation
Laws Governing Contract of Transportation
Coastwise Shipping.1. New Civil Code primary law
2. Code of Commerce governs suppletorily in the absence of Civil
Code provisions
Carriage from Foreign Ports to Philippine Ports1. New Civil Code primary law
2. Code of Commerce all matters not regulated by the Civil Code
3. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act suppletorily to the Civil Code
Carriage from Philippine Port to Foreign Ports1. the laws of the country to which the goods are to betransported
Overland Transportation1. Civil Code primary law
2. Code of Commerce suppletorily
Air Transportation1. Civil Code
2. Code of Commerce
3. For International Carriage Warsaw Convention
Law on Common Carrier
Articles 1732-1766, Civil Code
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
2/31
Articles 349-379, Code of Commerce
Civil Code Provisions on Common Carrier
Definition Article 1732
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Common carriers vs. Private carriers:
the common carrier holds himself out in common, thatis, to all persons who choose to employ him, as ready to carry For
hire; no one can be a common carrier unless he has held himself
out to the public as a carrier in such a manner as to render him
liable to an action if he should refuse to carry for anyone who
wished to employ him
the private carrier agrees in some special case with some private
individual to carry for hire
a common carrier is bound to carry all who offer suchgoods as it is accustomed to carry and tender reasonable
compensation
a private carrier is not bound to carry for any reason, unless it
enter into a special agreement to do so for carrying them a common carrier is a public service and is thereforesubject to regulation
a private carrier does not hold itself out as engaged in the business
for the public, and is therefore not subject to regulation as a
common carrier
the diligence required for a common carrier isextraordinary diligence
the diligence required for a private carrier is ordinary diligence
Test for a common carrier:
(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for
others as a public employment, and must hold himself out as
ready to engage in the transportation of goods for persons
generally as a business, and not a casual occupation.(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his
business is confined.
(3) He must undertake to carry by the methods by which his
business is conducted, and over his established roads.
(4) The transportation must be for hire.
The true test is whether the given undertaking is a part of the
business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the
general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent
of the business actually transacted, or the no. and character of the
conveyances used in the employment (the test is therefore the
character of the business actually carried on by the carrier.)
Characteristics of common carriers:(1) The common carrier undertakes to carry for all people
indifferently; he holds himself out as ready to engage in the
transportation of goods for hire as a public employment and not
as a casual occupation, and he undertakes to carry for all persons
indifferently, within the limits of his capacity and the sphere of the
business required of him, so that he is bound to serve all who
apply and is liable for refusal, without sufficient reason, to do so
(2) The common carrier cannot lawfully decline to accept a
particular class of goods for carriage to the prejudice of the traffic
in those goods
Exception: for some sufficient reason, where the discrimination in
such goods is reasonable and necessary (substantial grounds)
(3) No monopoly is favored - the Commission has the power to say
what is a reasonable compensation to the utility and to make
reasonable rules and regulations for the convenience of the
traveling public and to enforce them
(4) Public convenience - for the best interests of the public
Diligence required of Common Carriers Articles 1733, 1755, 1756
Cases on Common Carriers and Extraordinary Diligence
De Guzman v. CA. gr no. 47822 - Under Article 1745 (6),a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed to
divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts of
strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or
robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force." We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is
attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."
Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance, gr no. 148496 - Theextraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered
for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow
the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or destruction of
the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires
common carriers to render service with the greatest skill andforesight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature
and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise
due care in the handling and stowage, including such methods as
their nature requires. The rule is that if the improper packing or,
in this case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known to the
carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation,
but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or
exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of
liability for damage resulting therefrom. In this case, petitioner
accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent
defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of
petitioner to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in
the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from
liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art.1735 holds.
Asia Lighterage v. CA, gr no. 147246 - Common carriersare bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods transported by them. They are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of
negligence in the case of loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence. There are, however, exceptions to this
rule. Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances
when the presumption of negligence does not attach:
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or
civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in
the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
In the case at bar, the barge completely sank after its towing bits
broke, resulting in the total loss of its cargo but petitioner failed to
prove that the typhoon is the proximate and only cause of the loss
of the goods, and that it has exercised due diligence before, during
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
3/31
and after the occurrence of the typhoon to prevent or minimize
the loss. The evidence showed that, even before the towing bits of
the barge broke, it had already previously sustained damage when
it hit a sunken object while docked at the Engineering Island. It
even suffered a hole. Thus, when petitioner persisted to proceed
with the voyage, it recklessly exposed the cargo to further
damage. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot invoke the occurrence
of the typhoon as force majeure to escape liability for the loss
sustained by the private respondent because the
officers/employees themselves of petitioner admitted that when
the towing bits of the vessel broke that caused its sinking and the
total loss of the cargo upon reaching the Pasig River, it was no
longer affected by the typhoon. The typhoon then is not the
proximate cause of the loss of the cargo; a human factor, i.e.,
negligence had intervened.
Philippine American General Insurance Company v. PKSShipping Co., gr no. 149038 - found that the loss of the goods was
sufficiently established as having been due to fortuitous event,
negating any liability on the part of PKS Shipping to the shipper.
Article 1733 of the Civil Code requires common carriers to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they
carry. In case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, and the burden of proving otherwise rests onthem. From the testimonies and sworn marine protests of the
respective vessel masters of Limar I and MT Iron Eagle, that there
was no way by which the barges or the tugboats crew could have
prevented the sinking of Limar I. The vessel was suddenly tossed
by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and
buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of
water into the barges hatches.
Schmitz Transport And Brokerage v. Transport Venture,gr no. 150255 - As for petitioner, for it to be relieved of liability, it
should, following Article 1739 of the Civil Code, prove that it
exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before,
during and after the occurrence of the storm in order that it may
be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods.
Loadstar Shipping Co. v. Pioneer Asia Insurance, gr no.157481 - As a common carrier, petitioner is required to observeextraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it
transports. When the goods placed in its care are lost, petitioner is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.
Petitioner therefore has the burden of proving that it observed
extraordinary diligence in order to avoid responsibility for the lost
cargo.
Cebu Salvage v. Philippine Home Assurance, gr no.15043 - From the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence over the goods they transport according to the
circumstances of each case. In the event of loss of the goods,
common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove that this
was brought about by the causes specified in Article 1734 of theCivil Code. In all other cases, common carriers are presumed to be
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence. Petitioner was the one which
contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had
control over what vessel it would use. All throughout its dealings
with MCCII, it represented itself as a common carrier. The fact that
it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the
contract of carriage did not negate its character and duties as a
common carrier. The MCCII (respondents subrogor) could not be
reasonably expected to inquire about the ownership of the vessels
which petitioner carrier offered to utilize. As a practical matter, it
is very difficult and often impossible for the general public to
enforce its rights of action under a contract of carriage if it should
be required to know who the actual owner of the vessel is. In fact,
in this case, the voyage charter itself denominated petitioner as
the "owner/operator" of the vessel.
Philippine Charter Insurance v. Unknown Owner of theVessel M/V National Honor, et al, gr no. 161833 The petitioner
failed to adduce any evidence to counter that of respondent ICTSI.
The petitioner failed to rebut the testimony of Dauz, that the
crates were sealed and that the contents thereof could not be
seen from the outside. While it is true that the crate contained
machineries and spare parts, it cannot thereby be concluded that
the respondents knew or should have known that the middle
wooden batten had a hole, or that it was not strong enough to
bear the weight of the shipment.
There is no showing in the Bill of Lading that the shipment was in
good order or condition when the carrier received the cargo, or
that the three wooden battens under the flooring of the cargo
were not defective or insufficient or inadequate. On the other
hand, under Bill of Lading No. NSGPBSML512565 issued by the
respondent NSCP and accepted by the petitioner, the latter
represented and warranted that the goods were properly packed,
and disclosed in writing the condition, nature, qual ity or
characteristic that may cause damage, injury or detriment to the
goods. Absent any signs on the shipment requiring theplacement of a sling cable in the mid-portion of the crate, the
respondent ICTSI was not obliged to do so.
The statement in the Bill of Lading, that the shipment was in
apparent good condition, is sufficient to sustain a finding of
absence of defects in the merchandise. Case law has it that such
statement will create a prima facie presumption only as to the
external condition and not to that not open to inspection.
Relevant Cases on Private Carriers
1. National Steel Corp. V. CA, gr no. 112287 - Article 1732 of the
Civil Code defines a common carrier as persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public. It hasbeen held that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of
passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail
themselves of its transportation service for a fee. A carrier which
does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private
carrier. Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special
agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out to carry
goods for the general public. The most typical, although not the
only form of private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime
contract by which the charterer, a party other than the ship
owner, obtains the use and service of all or some part of a ship for
a period of time or a voyage or voyages.In the instant case, it is
undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general
public. As found by the Regional Trial Court, it carried passengers
or goods only for those it chose under a special contract ofcharter party. As correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals,
the MV Vlasons I was not a common but a private carrier.
Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including
their respective liability for damage to the cargo, are determined
primarily by stipulations in their contract of private carriage or
charter party.
2. Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc., vs. Court of
Appeals and Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation - in a contract of
private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a
contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not
involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
4/31
Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public
cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial
goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy
embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter
party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers.
3. Lea Mer Industries v. Malayan Insurance, gr no. 161745 -
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods, or both -- by land, water, or air -- when this service is
offered to the public for compensation. Petitioner is clearly a
common carrier, because it offers to the public its business of
transporting goods through its vessels.
Thus, the Court corrects the trial courts finding that petitioner
became a private carrier when Vulcan chartered it. Charter parties
are classified as contracts of demise (or bareboat) and
affreightment, which are distinguished as follows:
Under the demise or bareboat charter of the vessel, the
charterer will generally be considered as owner for the voyage or
service stipulated. The charterer mans the vessel with his own
people and becomes, in effect, the owner pro hac vice, subject to
liability to others for damages caused by negligence. To create a
demise, the owner of a vessel must completely and exclusively
relinquish possession, command and navigation thereof to thecharterer; anything short of such a complete transfer is a contract
of affreightment (time or voyage charter party) or not a charter
party at all.
The distinction is significant, because a demise or bareboat
charter indicates a business undertaking that is private in
character.
Consequently, the rights and obligations of the parties
to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their
stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.
The Contract in the present case was one of affreightment, as
shown by the fact that it was petitioners crew that manned the
tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII. Necessarily,
petitioner was a common carrier, and the pertinent law governs
the present factual circumstances.
Vigilance over Goods
Articles 1733-1753, Civil Code
Checked in baggages Art. 1733-1754
ARTICLE 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and
7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ARTICLE 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due
to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
ARTICLE 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed
or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.
ARTICLE 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common
carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in
the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738.
ARTICLE 1737. The common carriers duty to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods remains in
full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner has made use of the
right of stoppage in transitu.
ARTICLE 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier
continues to be operative even during the time the goods are
stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination,
until the consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods
and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them orotherwise dispose of them.
ARTICLE 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted
from responsibility, the natural disaster must have been the
proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common
carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss
before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm or other
natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be
exempted from liability for the loss, destruction, or deterioration
of the goods. The same duty is incumbent upon the common
carrier in case of an act of the public enemy referred to in article
1734, No. 2.
ARTICLE 1740. If the common carrier negligently incurs in delay intransporting the goods, a natural disaster shall not free such
carrier from responsibility.
ARTICLE 1741. If the shipper or owner merely contributed to the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, the proximate
cause thereof being the negligence of the common carrier, the
latter shall be liable in damages, which however, shall be equitably
reduced.
ARTICLE 1742. Even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods should be caused by the character of the goods, or the
faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the common
carrier must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.
ARTICLE 1743. If through the order of public authority the goods
are seized or destroyed, the common carrier is not responsible,
provided said public authority had power to issue the order.
ARTICLE 1744. A stipulation between the common carrier and the
shipper or owner limiting the liability of the former for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods to a degree less than
extraordinary diligence shall be valid, provided it be:
(1) In writing, signed by the shipper or owner;
(2) Supported by a valuable consideration other than the service
rendered by the common carrier; and
(3) Reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy.
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
5/31
ARTICLE 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be
considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or
shipper;
(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods;
(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the
custody of the goods;
(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence
less than that of a good father of a family, or of a man of ordinary
prudence in the vigilance over the movables transported;
(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts
or omission of his or its employees;
(6) That the common carriers liability for acts committed by
thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible
threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of goods on account of the defective
condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment
used in the contract of carriage.
ARTICLE 1746. An agreement limiting the common carriers
liability may be annulled by the shipper or owner if the commoncarrier refused to carry the goods unless the former agreed to
such stipulation.
ARTICLE 1747. If the common carrier, without just cause, delays
the transportation of the goods or changes the stipulated or usual
route, the contract limiting the common carriers liability cannot
be availed of in case of the loss, destruction, or deterioration of
the goods.
ARTICLE 1748. An agreement limiting the common carriers
liability for delay on account of strikes or riots is valid.
ARTICLE 1749. A stipulation that the common carriers liability is
limited to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading,unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.
ARTICLE 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by
the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of
the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the
circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
ARTICLE 1751. The fact that the common carrier has no competitor
along the line or route, or a part thereof, to which the contract
refers shall be taken into consideration on the question of
whether or not a stipulation limiting the common carriers liability
is reasonable, just and in consonance with public policy.
ARTICLE 1752. Even when there is an agreement limiting theliability of the common carrier in the vigilance over the goods, the
common carrier is disputably presumed to have been negligent in
case of their loss, destruction or deterioration.
ARTICLE 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be
transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for
their loss, destruction or deterioration.
Hand-carried baggages Articles 1988, 2000-2008 NCC
Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by the travelers in hotels or
inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or
inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that
notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the effects
brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they take
the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes
advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects.
Art. 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two preceding
articles shall include the loss of, or injury to the personal property
of the guests caused by the servants or employees of the keepers
of hotels or inns as well as strangers; but not that which may
proceed from any force majeure. The fact that travellers are
constrained to rely on the vigilance of the keeper of the hotels or
inns shall be considered in determining the degree of care
required of him.
Art. 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the hotel
is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of
arms or through an irresistible force.
Art. 2002. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if the
loss is due to the acts of the guest, his family, servants or visitors,
or if the loss arises from the character of the things brought into
the hotel.
Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from
responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable
for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the
hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the
former as set forth in articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or
diminished shall be void.
Art. 2004. The hotel-keeper has a right to retain the things brought
into the hotel by the guest, as a security for credits on account of
lodging, and supplies usually furnished to hotel guests.
Art. 2005. A judicial deposit or sequestration takes place when an
attachment or seizure of property in litigation is ordered.
Art. 2006. Movable as well as immovable property may be the
object of sequestration.
Art. 2007. The depositary of property or objects sequestrated
cannot be relieved of his responsibility until the controversy which
gave rise thereto has come to an end, unless the court so orders.
Art. 2008. The depositary of property sequestrated is bound to
comply, with respect to the same, with all the obligations of a
good father of a family.
Presumption on Negligence Art. 1734 When Presumption of negligence does not arise Art1734; Read with Arts. 1735, 1739, 1741, 1740, 1742, 1743
Stipulations Limiting Carriers Liability
Stipulation printed bill of lading limiting the carriers
liability for loss or damage or destruction of a cargo to certain
sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a higher or greater
value is sanction by law (Art 1749) provided such stipulations are
reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely
and fairly agreed upon. (Everett Steamship Corp Vs CA. 297 SCRA
496, 98)
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly
stipulate that responsibility rests the charterer, exempting the
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
6/31
carrier from liability for loss or damage of the cargo caused even
by the employees negligence. (Valenzuela Hardwood vs CA, 274
SCRA 642, 97)
Valid Stipulations (Art 1744)
a. in writing and signed by the shipperb. supported by valuable consideration other than theservice rendered by the carrier and
c. reasonable, just, fair and not contrary to law, moral andpublic policy etc
d. delay caused by riots or strikes (Art 1748)Void Stipulations (Art 1745)
a. goods are transported at the risk of the ownersb. not liable for any loss, damages or destructionc. need not to observe any diligence in the custody of thegoods
d. exercise diligence less than required of a good father ofthe family or men of ordinary prudence in the vigilance of the
goods
e. not responsible for acts or omission of its employee(except as stipulated in private carrier)
f. not responsible for act of robbers or thieves who did notact with grave, irresistible force, threat or violenceg. not responsible for loss, destruction or deterioration ofgoods on account of the defective condition of the carriers
equipments
Void because they are unjust, unreasonable and contrary to
law, customs, morale, public policy or public order.
Relevant Cases: Vigilance over Goods
1. Delsan Transport Lines v. American Home Assurance, gr. No.
149019, August 15, 2006 Delsans argument that it should
not be held liable for the loss of diesel oil due to
backflow because the same had already been actually
and legally delivered to Caltex at the time it entered the shore
tank holds no water. It had been settled that the subject cargowas still in the custody of Delsan because the discharging thereof
has not yet been finished when the backflow occurred. Since the
discharging of the cargo into the depot has not yet been
completed at the time of the spillage when the backflow occurred,
there is no reason to imply that there was actual delivery of the
cargo to the consignee. Delsan is straining the issue by insisting
that when the diesel oil entered into the tank of Caltex on shore,
there was legally, at that moment, a complete delivery thereof to
Caltex. To be sure, the extraordinary responsibility of common
carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in
the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation
until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by
the carrier to the consignee, or to a person who has the right to
receive them. The discharging of oil products to Caltex Bulk Depothas not yet been finished, Delsan still has the duty to guard and to
preserve the cargo. The carrier still has in it the responsibility to
guard and preserve the goods, a duty incident to its having the
goods transported.
To recapitulate, common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. The mere proof of delivery of
goods in good order to the carrier, and their arrival in the place of
destination in bad order, make out a prima facie case against the
carrier, so that if no explanation is given as to how the injury
occurred, the carrier must be held responsible. It is incumbent
upon the carrier to prove that the loss was due to accident or
some other circumstances inconsistent with its liability.
2. Belgian Overseas Chartering v. Philippine First Insurance, gr no.
143133 - mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a
common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their
destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence
against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how
the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods
happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.
3. Central Shipping Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, gr no.
150751 - Even if the weather encountered by the ship is to be
deemed a natural disaster under Article 1739 of the Civil Code,
petitioner failed to show that such natural disaster or calamity was
the proximate and only cause of the loss. Human agency must be
entirely excluded from the cause of injury or loss. In other words,
the damaging effects blamed on the event or phenomenon must
not have been caused, contributed to, or worsened by the
presence of human participation. The defense of fortuitous event
or natural disaster cannot be successfully made when the injury
could have been avoided by human precaution. Hence, if a
common carrier fails to exercise due diligence -- or that ordinarycare that the circumstances of the particular case demand -- to
prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the
occurrence of the natural disaster, the carrier shall be deemed to
have been negligent. The loss or injury is not, in a legal sense, due
to a natural disaster under Article 1734(1).
4. Regional Container Lines of Singapore v. The Netherlands
Insurance Co., gr no. 168151 - A common carrier is presumed to
have been negligent if it fails to prove that it exercised
extraordinary vigilance over the goods it transported. When the
goods shipped are either lost or arrived in damaged condition, a
presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that
diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence
to hold it liable. To overcome the presumption of negligence, thecommon carrier must establish by adequate proof that it exercised
extraordinary diligence over the goods. It must do more than
merely show that some other party could be responsible for the
damage.
In the present case, RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to prove that
they did exercise that degree of diligence required by law over the
goods they transported. There is sufficient evidence showing that
the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated container
van, as recorded in the temperature chart, occurred after the
cargo had been discharged from the vessel and was already under
the custody of the arrastre operator, ICTSI. This evidence,
however, does not disprove that the condenser fan which
caused the fluctuation of the temperature in the refrigerated
container was not damaged while the cargo was being unloadedfrom the ship. It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that
cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the custody
of the carrier; RCL and EDSA Shipping failed to dispute this.
5. Philippine American General Insurance Co. v. MCG Marine
Services, March 8, 2002 - The findings of the Board of Marine
Inquiry indicate that the attendance of strong winds and huge
waves while the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G was sailing through
Cortes, Surigao del Norte on March 3, 1987 was indeed
fortuitous. A fortuitous event has been defined as one which could
not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, is inevitable. An event
is considered fortuitous if the following elements concur:
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
7/31
xxx (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or
the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be
independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee
the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must
be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free
from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor. xxx
In the case at bar, it was adequately shown that before the M/V
Peatheray Patrick-G left the port of Mandaue City, the Captain
confirmed with the Coast Guard that the weather condition would
permit the safe travel of the vessel to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Thus,
he could not be expected to have foreseen the unfavorable
weather condition that awaited the vessel in Cortes, Surigao del
Sur. It was the presence of the strong winds and enormous waves
which caused the vessel to list, keel over, and consequently lose
the cargo contained therein. The appellate court likewise found
that there was no negligence on the part of the crew of the M/V
Peatheray Patrick-G, citing the following portion of the decision of
the Board of Marine Inquiry. Since the presence of strong winds
and enormous waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March 3, 1987
was shown to be the proximate and only cause of the sinking of
the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G and the loss of the cargo belongingto San Miguel Corporation, private respondents cannot be held
liable for the said loss.
6. FGU Insurance v. CA, gr no. 137775 - Art. 1739. In order that the
common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural
disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss.
However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to
prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence
of flood, storm, or other natural disaster in order that the common
carrier may be exempted from liability for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods . . .
Caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical insofar
as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events thatcould not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
It is therefore not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be
one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
In this case, the calamity which caused the loss of the cargoes was
not unforeseen nor was it unavoidable. In fact, the other vessels
in the port of San Jose, Antique, managed to transfer to another
place, a circumstance which prompted SMCs District Sales
Supervisor to request that the D/B Lucio be likewise transferred,
but to no avail. The D/B Lucio had no engine and could not
maneuver by itself. Even if ANCOs representatives wanted to
transfer it, they no longer had any means to do so as the tugboat
M/T ANCO had already departed, leaving the barge to its own
devices. The captain of the tugboat should have had the foresightnot to leave the barge alone considering the pending storm.
While the loss of the cargoes was admittedly caused by the
typhoon Sisang, a natural disaster, ANCO could not escape liability
to respondent SMC. The records clearly show the failure of
petitioners representatives to exercise the extraordinary degree
of diligence mandated by law. To be exempted from
responsibility, the natural disaster should have been the
proximate and only cause of the loss. There must have been no
contributory negligence on the part of the common carrier. As
held in the case of Limpangco Sons v. Yangco Steamship Co.:
. . . To be exempt from liability because of an act of God, the tug
must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by
which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. For,
although the immediate or proximate cause of the loss in any
given instance may have been what is termed an act of God, yet, if
the tug unnecessarily exposed the two to such accident by any
culpable act or omission of its own, it is not excused.
Therefore, as correctly pointed out by the appellate court, there
was blatant negligence on the part of M/T ANCOs crewmembers,
first in leaving the engine-less barge D/B Lucio at the mercy of the
storm without the assistance of the tugboat, and again in failing to
heed the request of SMCs representatives to have the barge
transferred to a safer place, as was done by the other vessels in
the port; thus, making said blatant negligence the proximate cause
of the loss of the cargoes.
7. Sulpicio Lines v. First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corporation, gr
no. 140349 - Petitioner-carrier contends that its liability, if any, is
only to the extent of the cargo damage or loss and should not
include the lack of fitness of the shipment for transport to
Singapore due to the damaged packing. This is erroneous.
Petitioner-carrier seems to belabor under the misapprehension
that a distinction must be made between the cargo packaging and
the contents of the cargo. According to it, damage to the
packaging is not tantamount to damage to the cargo. It must be
stressed that in the case at bar, the damage sustained by thepackaging of the cargo while in petitioner-carriers custody
resulted in its unfitness to be transported to its consignee in
Singapore. Such failure to ship the cargo to its final destination
because of the ruined packaging, indeed, resulted in damages on
the part of the owner of the goods.
The falling of the crate during the unloading is evidence of
petitioner-carriers negligence in handling the cargo. As a
common carrier, it is expected to observe extraordinary diligence
in the handling of goods placed in its possession for transport. The
standard of extraordinary diligence imposed upon common
carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary diligence, i.e., the diligence of a
good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations
between members of society. A common carrier is bound totransport its cargo and its passengers safely "as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, with due regard to all circumstances. The
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered
for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow
the required precaution for avoiding the damage to, or destruction
of, the goods entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. It
requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill
and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to
exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including such
methods as their nature requires.
Thus, when the shipment suffered damages as it was being
unloaded, petitioner-carrier is presumed to have been negligent inthe handling of the damaged cargo. Under Articles 1735 and
1752 of the Civil Code, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently in case the goods
transported by them are lost, destroyed or had deteriorated. To
overcome the presumption of liability for loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods under Article 1735, the common carrier
must prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required
in Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner-carrier miserably failed to adduce any shred of evidence
of the required extraordinary diligence to overcome the
presumption that it was negligent in transporting the cargo.
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
8/31
8. Savellano v. Northwest Airlines, gr no. 151783, - Petitioners
contract of carriage with Northwest was for the San Francisco-
Tokyo(Narita)-Manila flights scheduled for October 27, 1991. This
itinerary was not followed when the aircraft used for the first
segment of the journey developed engine trouble. Petitioners
stress that they are questioning, not the cancellation of the
original itinerary, but its substitution, which they allegedly had not
contracted for or agreed to. They insist that, like the other
passengers of the distressed flight, they had the right to be placed
on Flight 27, which had a connecting flight from Japan to
Manila. They add that in being treated differently and shabbily,
they were being discriminated against.
A contract is the law between the parties. Thus, in determining
whether petitioners rights were violated, we must look into its
provisions, which are printed on the airline ticket. Condition 9 in
the agreement states that a x x x carrier may without notice
substitute alternate carriers or aircraft, and may alter or omit
stopping places shown on the ticket in case of necessity. x x x.
The basis of the Complaint was the way respondent allegedly
treated petitioners like puppets that could be shuttled to Manila
via Los Angeles and Seoul without their consent. Undeniably, it
did not take the time to explain how it would be meeting its
contractual obligation to transport them to their final
destination. Its employees merely hustled the confusedpetitioners into boarding one plane after another without giving
the latter a choice from other courses of action that were
available. It unilaterally decided on the most expedient way for
them to reach their final destination.
After an examination of the conditions printed on the airline
ticket, we find nothing there authorizing Northwest to decide
unilaterally, after the distressed flight landed in Seattle, what
other stopping places petitioners should take and when they
should fly. True, Condition 9 on the ticket allowed respondent to
substitute alternate carriers or aircraft without notice. However,
nothing there permits shuttling passengers -- without so much as a
by your-leave -- to stopping places that they have not been
previously notified of, much less agreed to or been prepared
for. Substituting aircrafts or carriers without notice is entirelydifferent from changing stopping places or connecting cities
without notice.
The ambiguities in the contract, being one of adhesion, should be
construed against the party that caused its preparation -- in this
case, respondent. Since the conditions enumerated on the ticket
do not specifically allow it to change stopping places or to fly the
passengers to alternate connecting cities without consulting them,
then it must be construed to mean that such unilateral change was
not permitted.
Furthermore, the change in petitioners flight itinerary does not
fall under the situation covered by the phrase may alter or omit
stopping places shown on the ticket in case of necessity. A case of
necessity must first be proven. The burden of proving it
necessarily fell on respondent. This responsibility it failed todischarge.
Petitioners do not question the stop in Seattle, so we will not
delve into this matter. The airplane engine trouble that developed
during the flight bound for Tokyo from San Francisco definitely
merited the necessity of landing the plane at some place for
repair -- in this case, Seattle -- but not that of shuttling petitioners
to other connecting points thereafter without their consent.
Northwest failed to show a case of necessity for changing the
stopping place from Tokyo to Los Angeles and Seoul. It is a fact
that some of the passengers on the distressed flight continued on
to the Tokyo (Narita) connecting place. No explanation
whatsoever was given to petitioners as to why they were not
similarly allowed to do so. It may be that the Northwest
connecting flight from Seattle to Tokyo to Manila could no longer
accommodate them. Yet it may also be that there were other
carriers that could have accommodated them for these sectors of
their journey, and whose route they might have preferred to the
more circuitous one unilaterally chosen for them by respondent.
In the absence of evidence as to the actual situation, the Court is
hard pressed to determine if there was a case of necessity
sanctioning the alteration of the Tokyo stopping place in the case
of petitioners. Thus, we hold that in the absence of a
demonstrated necessity thereof and their rerouting to Los Angeles
and Seoul as stopping places without their consent, respondent
committed a breach of the contract of carriage.
Explosion of tire:
Yobido v. CA, gr no. 113003 - Under the circumstances of this
case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a
fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was
entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly
mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought
and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality,
resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five
days use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident causedeither by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of
its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from
liability for damages.
Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in
case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
death or injury resulting from an accident. This Court has had
occasion to state:
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good
because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone
does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No
evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to
adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the
jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to causeaccidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been
caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by
the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time
of the accident.
Duration of Common Carriers Liability Articles 1736-1738 NCC
Stipulations Limiting Common Carriers Liability Articles 1744-1754 NCC
Safety of passengers
Nature of Obligation of Common Carriers
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengerssafely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
Liability of Common Carriers and Presumption of Negligence
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Stipulations limiting common carriers liability
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
9/31
Art. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of
passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be
dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of
notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.
Effect of gratuitous carriage
Art. 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation
limiting the common carrier's liability for negligence is valid, but
not for willful acts or gross negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the
common carrier's liability.
Liability for acts of carriers employees
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries
to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employees.
Art. 1760. The common carrier's responsibility prescribed in the
preceding article cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by
the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.
Contributory Negligence
Art. 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid injury to himself.
Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not
bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the proximate
cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the
amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.
Liability for acts of co-passengers and strangers
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by
a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a familycould have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Damages
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be
awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning
Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be
awarded with the title XVIII of this book concerning damages.
Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by
the breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 2197. Damages may be:
(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated;
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
Articles Related on Actual or compensatory damages
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise diligence
of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting
from the act or omission in question.
Indemnity for death
(See Article 2206) The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict
used to be pegged at P3,000, based on Article 2206 of the Civil
Code. However, the amount has been gradually increased through
the years because of the declining value of our currency. At
present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.
Loss of Earning CapacityComputation of loss of earning capacity is based on life expectancy
of deceased, not of heir.
The award for loss of earning capacity is based on two factors:
(1) the number of years on which the computation of damages is
based and
(2) the rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed. The
first factor refers to the life expectancy, which takes into
consideration the nature of the victims work, lifestyle, age and
state of health prior to the accident. The second refers to the
victims earning capacity minus the necessary living expenses.
Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the
earnings of the deceased which the beneficiary would have
received the net earnings of the deceased.
Moral Damages
Moral damages include moral suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. They may be recovered
in the cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Anent a
breach of a contract of common carriage, moral damages may be
awarded if the common carrier acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, as in the
instant case, in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the New Civil Code. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap
results in the death of a passenger, and (2) where it is proved that
the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, even if death does not
result.
Exemplary Damages
Exemplary damages is not a matter of right. It is imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In contracts and
quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be awarded if the
defendant acted in a wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. It cannot, however, be considered as a matter
of right; the court having to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated. Before the court may consider an award for
exemplary damages, the plaintiff must first show that he is
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
10/31
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages; but it is
not necessary that he prove the monetary value thereof.
Attorneys Fees
Although attorneys fees are generally not recoverable, a party can
be held liable for such if exemplary damages are awarded (Article
2208, New Civil Code). The award of damages as well as
attorneys fees lies upon the discretion of the court in the context
of the facts and circumstances of each case, and this judicial
discretion is largely addressed towards tempering any tendency to
award excessive damages so much so that it stands vulnerable to
and actually magnetizes, attacks as to its being a result of passion,
prejudice or corruption.
The law authorizes recovery of attorney's fees where the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third person or to incur expenses to protect his interest, or
where the court deems it just and equitable.
Relevant Cases on Safety of Passengers:
R. Transport Corporation v. Pante, gr no. 162104 - Underthe Civil Code, common carriers, like petitioner bus company, from
the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of thepassengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.28
They are bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles
1733 and 1755."
Further, Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that "[c]ommon
carriers are liable for the death or injury to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority orin violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of
the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees."
In this case, the testimonial evidence of respondent showed that
petitioner, through its bus driver, failed to observe extraordinary
diligence, and was, therefore, negligent in transporting the
passengers of the bus safely to Gapan, Nueva Ecija on January 27,
1995, since the bus bumped a tree and a house, and caused
physical injuries to respondent. Article 1759 of the Civil Code
explicitly states that the common carrier is liable for the death or
injury to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees, and that such liability does not cease upon proof that
the common carrier exercised all the diligence of a good father ofa family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Hence,
even if petitioner was able to prove that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its bus driver, it is still liable to respondent for the physical injuries
he sustained due to the vehicular accident.
PAL V. CA GR NO. 123238 - Private respondents andpetitioner entered into a contract of air carriage when the former
purchased two plane tickets from the latter. Under this contract,
petitioner obliged itself (1) to transport Deanna and Nikolai, as
unaccompanied minors, on 2 May 1980 from Manila to San
Francisco through one of its planes, Flight 106; and (2) upon the
arrival of Deanna and Nikolai in San Francisco Airport on 3 May
1980, to transport them on that same day from San Francisco to
Los Angeles via a connecting flight on United Airways 996. As it
was, petitioner failed to transport Deanna and Nikolai from San
Francisco to Los Angeles on the day of their arrival at San
Francisco. The staff of United Airways 996 refused to take aboard
Deanna and Nikolai for their connecting flight to Los Angeles
because petitioner's personnel in San Francisco could not produce
the indemnity bond accomplished and submitted by private
respondents. Thus, Deanna and Nikolai were stranded in San
Francisco and were forced to stay there overnight. It was only on
the following day that Deanna and Nikolai were able to leave San
Francisco and arrive at Los Angeles via another airline, Western
Airlines. Clearly then, petitioner breached its contract of carriage
with private respondents.
When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a
particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The
passenger has every right to expect that he be transported on that
flight and on that date, and it becomes the airline's obligation to
carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination without
delay. If the passenger is not so transported or if in the process of
transporting, he dies or is injured, the carrier may be held liable
for a breach of contract of carriage.
Calalas v. CA, gr no. 122039 - It is immaterial that theproximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the
truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard
to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption ofnegligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755
of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof.
The driver of jeepney did not carry safely as far as human care
and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755. First, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in
a diagonal angle. The petitioner's driver took in more passengersthan the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. These are
violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Therefore,
there is no assumption of risk by the passenger.
Victory Liner, Inc. v. CA, GR no. 159636 - Anent thesecond issue, petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of
contract of carriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is
presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent
when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_162104_2009.html#fnt28 -
7/29/2019 Transportation document
11/31
rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault
or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
exercised extraordinary diligence.
In the instant case, there is no evidence to rebut the statutory
presumption that the proximate cause of Marie Graces death was
the negligence of petitioner. Hence, the courts below correctly
ruled that petitioner was guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
Bachelor Express, Inc. v. CA, gr no. 159636 - The runningamuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident
as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers
such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving
each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter
and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the
passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the
context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident
was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove
that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such
accident.
Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, gr no. 145804 Asecurity guard assaulted Navidad, which caused the latter to fall
on the tracks. LRTA contended that it was an act of a stranger that
could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA added that
the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis
because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro
Transit and not of the LRTA. The law requires common carriers to
carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a
common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it
not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions
render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on
account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise
of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury,
the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or
negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show,
the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception
from the general rule that negligence must be proved.The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of
an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In
either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Fortune Express v. CA, gr no. 119756 - Art. 1763 of theCivil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other
passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have
prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of
the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by
Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro
that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the
petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of
petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the
necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to
protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its
employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the
safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting
their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as
metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been
employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights.
The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito
because there was already a warning by the PC.
No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased.
The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two
Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus andthe jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed
men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the
bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the
driver of the bus by pleading for his life.
Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, gr no. 28589 -Filipino passenger who went to relieve himself was berated by the
captain for coming back late to the plane and was called a
monkey. Held: A passenger is entitled to courteous treatment
from the carrier and its EEs and failure of the common carrier to
comply with this obligation will entitle the passenger to damages.
The relation between common carrier and passenger involves
special and peculiar obligations and duties, differing in kind and
degree, from those of almost every legal or contractual relation.On account of the peculiar situation of the parties, the law implies
a promise and imposes upon the CC the corresponding duty of
protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the CC is under
the absolute duty of protecting his passengers from assault or
insult by himself or his servants. A contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the CC's employees naturally could give ground for
an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the CC'semployees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the
part of its employees towards a passenger gives the latter an
action for damages against the CC.
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v.Phoenix Assurance, gr no. 162467 - There is a distinction between
an arrastre and a stevedore. Arrastre, a Spanish word which refers
to hauling of cargo, comprehends the handling of cargo on the
wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper
-
7/29/2019 Transportation document
12/31
and the ship's tackle. The responsibility of the arrastre operator
lasts until the delivery of the cargo to the consignee. The service is
usually performed by longshoremen. On the other hand,
stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the
vessel or between the ship's tackle and the holds of the vessel. The
responsibility of the stevedore ends upon the loading and stowing
of the cargo in the vessel.
It is not disputed that Mindanao Terminal was performing purely
stevedoring function while the private respondent in
the Summa case was performing arrastre function. In the present
case, Mindanao Terminal, as a stevedore, was only charged with
the loading and stowing of the cargoes from the pier to the ships
cargo hold; it was never the custodian of the shipment of Del
Monte Produce. A stevedore is not a common carrier for it does
not transport goods or passengers; it is not akin to a
warehouseman for it does not store goods for profit. The loading
and stowing of cargoes would not have a far reaching public
ramification as that of a common carrier and a warehouseman;
the public is adequately protected by our laws on contract and on
quasi-delict. The public policy considerations in legally imposing
upon a common carrier or a warehouseman a higher degree of
diligence is not present in a stevedoring outfit which mainly
provides labor in loading and stowing of cargoes for its clients.
Liability of Successive Air Carriers
1. British Airways v. CA, gr no. 121824 - The contract of
transportation was exclusively between the passenger and
common carrier BA. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to
Hong Kong log of the formers journey to PAL, as its subcontractor
or agent. Conditions of contracts were one of continuous air
transportation. Well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible
for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable
for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its
negligent act. When an action is based on breach of contract of
carriage, the passenger can only sue BA and not PAL, since the
latter was not a party in the contract.
2. American Airlines v. CA, gr no. 116044-45 - The contract of
carriage between the private respondent and Singapore Airlinesalthough performed by different carriers under a series of airline
tickets, including that issued by the petitioner, constitutes a single
operation. Members of the IATA are under a general pool
partnership agreement wherein they act as agent of each other in
the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket
sales worldwide and at the same time provide passengers easy
access to airlines which are otherwise inaccessible in some parts of
the world. Booking and reservation among airline members are
allowed even by telephone and it has become an accepted
practice among them. A member airline which enters into a
contract of carriage consisting of a series of trips to be performed
by different carriers is authorized to receive the fare for the whole
trip and through the required process of interline settlement of
accounts by way of the IATA clearing house an airline is dulycompensated for the segment of the trip serviced.
Thus, when the petitioner accepted the unused portion of the
conjunction tickets, entered it in the IATA clearing house and
undertook to transport the private respondent over the route
covered by the unused portion of the conjunction tickets, i e .,
Geneva to New York, the petitioner tacitly recognized its
commitment under the IATA pool arrangement to act as agent of
the principal contracting airline, Singapore Airlines, as to the
segment of the trip the petitioner agreed to undertake. As such,
the petitioner thereby assumed the obligation to take the place of
the carrier originally designated in the original conjunction ticket.
The petitioner's argument that it is not a designated carrier in the
original conjunction tickets and that it issued its own ticket is not
decisive of its liability. The new ticket was simply a replacement
for the unused portion of the conjunction ticket, both tickets being
for the same amount of US$2,760 and having the same points of
departure and destination. By constituting itself as an agent of the
principal carrier the petitioner's undertaking should be taken as
part of a single operation under the contract of carriage executed
by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines in Manila.
3. China Airlines v. Chiok, gr no. 152122 - A common carrier has a
peculiar relationship with and an exacting responsibility to its
passengers. For reasons of public interest and policy, the ticket-
issuing airline acts as principal in a contract of carriage and is thus
liable for the acts and the omissions of any errant carrier to which
it may have endorsed any sector of the entire, continuous trip.
Involuntary upgrading of seats to first class
Cathay Pacific v. Vasquez, GR 150843 - they had priority for
upgrading of their seat accommodation at no extra cost when an
opportunity arises. But, just like other privileges, such priority
could be waived. The Vazquezes should have been consulted first
whether they wanted to avail themselves of the privilege or would
consent to a change of seat accommodation before their seat
assignments were given to other passengers. Normally, one
would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for it would mean abetter accommodation. But, whatever their reason was and
however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline
the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they
had booke