SPEA UNDERGRADUATE HONORS THESIS

Transboundary Water Conflict

The US-Mexican Case Along the Rio Grande

Jesse I. Martinez Spring 2013

Faculty Mentor John Karaagac

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SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT: THE U.S.-MEXICAN

CASE ALONG THE RIO GRANDE

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELORS OF SCIENCE IN

POLICY ANALYSIS

BY

JESSE I. MARTINEZ

BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA

APRIL 2013

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Abstract

Although 70% of the surface of the Earth is covered by water, 97.5% of it is saltwater. Saltwater

requires a difficult, expensive, and altogether impractical desalinization process to become usable. This

leaves 2.5% of the Earth’s water that is actually consumable. Physical limitations on consumable water

foreshadow intense competition for a resource neither producible nor substitutable.

When World Bank Vice President Ismail Seregeldin stated, “the wars of the next century will be

about water,” he expressed a point of view including assumptions regarding the ability of states to engage

in cooperation or conflict. Seregeldin’s prediction is clearly not without merit. However, it is only one

theory within a broad field of international relations known as hydropolitics that attempts to understand,

explain, and predict the role of water in state decision-making and how national choices to secure water

resources affect the global order. Hydropolitical relations are exacerbated in regions most vulnerable to

water scarcity such as the Mekong Delta in Asia, the Jordan River in the Middle East, the Nile River in

Africa to name a few.

North America presents a particularly interesting example of water relations. U.S.-Mexican

hydropolitics date as far back as the late 19th century when access to the Rio Grande was a contentious

issue along the Southwestern border of the United States. The Rio Grande continues to play an important

factor in transboundary water relations, a subset of hydropolitics, between the two states.

This paper will incorporate hydropolitical literature regarding conflict to infer whether U.S.-

Mexican transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande exhibit escalating conflict, cooperation, or

“eternal conflict,” conflict that will remain static throughout time. The analysis will distinguish the

international and domestic stakeholders of each country to understand who is affected at each level, what

their motivations include, and finally, what policy dimensions the literature suggests are achievable.

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ABSTRACT 0

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 2

Hydropolitics and Water Scarcity: Limited Supply for Unlimited Demand 2

Literature Review: Contextualizing Transboundary Water Relations 3 Theory #1: Conflict as a result of Scarcity 3 Theory #2: Cooperation as a result of Scarcity 4 Theory #3: Conflict & Cooperation as a result of Scarcity 5

The Spectrum of Conflict Analysis: From ‘Water Wars’ to ‘Water Interaction’ 7

SECTION 2: U.S.-MEXICAN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RELATIONS 8

Past to Present 8

Problem Identification: Conflict along the Rio Grande 10

SECTION 3: CONFLICT ALONG THE RIO GRANDE 11

The Unit of Analysis 12 The International Boundary & Water Commission 12

The Dimensions of Conflict 13 Citizen Sensitivity 13 Issue-linkage Strategy 14

SECTION 4: REEVALUATING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S.-MEXICAN TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RELATIONS 17

Pre-TWINS Framework 17

The Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus 17 Conclusion 19

APPENDIX 20

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Section 1: Introduction

Hydropolitics and Water Scarcity: Limited Supply for Unlimited Demand

Earth is endowed with a finite amount of freshwater which today is under greater strain

as exponential population growth leaves less water for more people. Consequentially, wealthy

and developing countries alike turn to the sea to harvest otherwise unusable saltwater into

potable freshwater via desalination technology hoping to mitigate water shortages. The

desalination process, however, is expensive, environmentally destructive, and an altogether

impractical panacea to solve the problem. Thus, water scarcity foreshadows competition between

states and nations for access to an irreproducible and unsubstitutable resource. When we talk

about water scarcity, we inevitably talk about water conflict.

Hydropolitics, defined as the “politics of water,”1 is a new academic endeavor that

analyzes the intricacies associated with water scarcity. It is by nature interdisciplinary and

incorporates fields including hydrology, international relations, international law, and philosophy

to understand the political dynamics between two or more water sharing states2. There exists a

plethora of definitions for “hydropolitics,” so for the purpose of this analysis, it is described as

“conflict and co-operation; involving states as the main actors; and taking place in shared

international river basins”3.

The hydropolitical research analyzed in this paper focuses on transboundary water

conflict, defined as conflict that arises between riparian states. Research on this conflict primarily

consists of case studies that analyze water scarcity within historically volatile states and regions.

1 Ariel Dinar et al., Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007), 154. 2 States that fall under this category are also referred to as riparians 3 Anthony Turton and Roland Henwood, eds., Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective (Pretoria: African Water Issues Research Unit, 2002), 15.

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Literature Review: Contextualizing Transboundary Water Relations

Theory #1: Conflict as a result of Scarcity

Thomas Homer-Dixon is among the first hydropolitical scholars to analyze the link

between resource scarcity and violent conflict. His research at the Trudeau Center for Peace and

Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto focused on the link between water scarcity and

acute transboundary conflict (Strategies for Studying Causation in Complex Ecological-Political

Systems 1995 and On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict 1999).

At the Trudeau Center, Homer-Dixon produced case studies that analyzed water scarcity in high-

stress regions including Pakistan, Haiti, and Mexico. In his 1994 case study, “Environmental

Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” he hypothesized that environmental

scarcity will inevitably lead to violent conflict (Figure 1). He posits that the nature of this

conflict will, “[tend] to be persistent, diffuse, and sub-national,” and that, “[i]ts frequency will

probably jump sharply in the next decades as scarcities rapidly worsen in many parts of the

world” 4.

The scenario hypothesized by Homer-Dixon is often sensationalized as the “water wars”

narrative. It suggests that as water scarcity continues to grow worse, regions with historically

poor relations will be tempted to resort to armed conflict in order to secure water resources.

Although Homer-Dixon cautioned against, “[slipping] into environmental determinism,”5 the

overemphasis his research places on violent conflict and the lack of credit6 given to the

institutional capability of transboundary states to mitigate conflict constrains the applicability of

his research.

4 Thomas Homer-Dixon F., “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 5-40. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid.

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Despite theoretical shortcomings, Homer-Dixon’s research is an invaluable first step to

understand hydropolitics. His work contextualizes the severity of water scarcity in high-stress

regions and represents a conceptual shift of understanding conflict. Subsequent hydropolitical

research, however, questions whether Homer-Dixon’s theory places too much significance on

instances of conflict without duly considering those of cooperation.

Theory #2: Cooperation as a result of Scarcity

Aaron Wolf, Shira Yoffe, and the Department of Geosciences at Oregon State University

(OSU), mark a paradigm shift in hydropolitical conflict analysis. The OSU group, in

collaboration with the Northwest Alliance for Computational, study the empirical relationship

between water scarcity and violent water conflict through data-intensive methods. One of their

biggest contributions, the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), was created “to

aid in the assessment of the process of water conflict prevention and resolution”7 and adds depth

to hydropolitical analysis by exploring instances of water cooperation. Another contribution, the

“International Freshwater Treaties Database,” (IFTD), documents over 450 instances of

transboundary water-related agreements from 1820 – 2007 to distinguish the number of instances

of cooperation versus violent conflict. The TFDD and IFTD provide hydropolitical research

something it previously lacked: comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the frequency

of violent conflict versus cooperative arrangements.

The Basins at Risk Project (BAR), Yoffe’s dissertation under Wolf, similarly sought to,

“[provide] a quantitative, global scale exploration of the relationship between freshwater and

7 Aaron Wolf T., Lynette Silvia, and Jennifer Veilleux C., “Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database,” Program in Water Conflict Management and Transformation, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/.

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conflict,” and to infer, “whether…theories and claims hold true”8. Yoffe concludes her

dissertation by flatly debunking the “water wars” narrative: “International relations over shared

freshwater resources were overwhelmingly cooperative. Although conflicts over water occurred,

violent conflict was rare and far outweighed by the number of international water agreements”9.

The OSU group use the TFDD and BAR projects to conclude that not only has freshwater

scarcity between states and nations rarely lead to armed conflict but has in fact historically lead

to cooperation10. The group highlight the institutional resiliency of transboundary states and

dispel the myth that water scarcity necessarily leads to acute conflict. While the TFDD and BAR

projects excel at recognizing the propensity of transboundary states to engage in cooperative

arrangements, they are ineffective tools to measure the level of genuine cooperation that exists

within these cooperative arrangements. By solely focusing on instances of cooperation without

modeling the level of cooperation, the TFDD and BAR projects bind hydropolitics into a bipolar

system of analysis where cooperation is sought as a means to an end.

Theory #3: Conflict & Cooperation as a result of Scarcity

Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi provide a profound expansion of the either-or

paradigm of conflict analysis that is poorly modeled by the previous two conceptual frameworks.

They argue that a framework that fails to identify the levels of conflict and cooperation between

transboundary states risks oversimplifying complex nuances within cooperative arrangements.

Zeitoun and Mirumachi propose renaming “transboundary water conflict” to

“transboundary water interaction” in order to move away from the “paradigm that any conflict is

8 Shira Yoffe, Aaron T. Wolf, Mark Giordano “Chapter 4 Conflict and Cooperation Over International Freshwater Resources” (PhD diss., Oregon State University, 2001), 65, http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/basins_at_risk/bar/BAR_chapter4.pdf 9 Ibid. 122. 10 Ibid.

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‘bad’ and that all forms of cooperation are ‘good’”11. They further recommend utilizing a tool

developed by Mirumachi: the Transboundary Water Interaction NexuS (TWINS) matrix of

conflict and cooperation for a deeper assessment of hydropolitical relations (Figure 2). The

TWINS matrix models the levels of conflict and cooperation that exist within cooperative

agreements and helps untangle presumptive paradoxes of “cooperation versus conflict,” when

analyzing the hydropolitical behavior of states.

The use of a matrix to model hydropolitical dynamics between two states allows the user

to identity complex instances where conflict and cooperation may concurrently exist. The matrix

consists of 5 X 4 cells where the x-scale represents ‘cooperation intensity’ on a continuum

ranging from low to high and the y-scale represents ‘conflict intensity’ using the same

continuum. On the x-scale, the intensity of cooperation ranges from low “confrontation of issue,”

moving into “ad hoc,” “technical” “risk-averting,” forms of cooperation and culminating with

high “risk-taking” cooperation. On the y-scale, the intensity of conflict ranges from low “non-

politicized” conflict towards “politicized,” “securitized/ opportunitised,” and culminates with

high “violised” conflict intensity.

Zeitoun and Mirumachi are certainly not the first to realize the multifaceted complexities

present in transboundary water relations, however, they are the first who attempt to identify and

understand them via a framework. The superior ability of the matrix to model conflict and

cooperation reflects the matrix’s ability to categorize social, institutional, and political nuances

that exist between riparian relations.

The TWINS matrix is the new paradigm for transboundary water analysis. It corrects

transboundary water relation myopia that previously limited the scope of conflict analysis to a

11 Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, “Transboundary Water Interaction I,” International Environmental Agreements 8 (3 September 2008): 297.

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bipolar conflict-or-cooperation versus conflict-and-cooperation perspective. More importantly,

the matrix allows critical analysis of current relations accepted as “cooperative” in order to re-

evaluate whether such arrangements are truly robust.

The Spectrum of Conflict Analysis: From ‘Water Wars’ to ‘Water Interaction’

I have outlined three theories of transboundary water conflict. Although by no means

exhaustive, these are the most prominent and well-established theories that explain water

scarcity, conflict, and cooperation. Here, these theories are grouped into a spectrum of conflict

analysis where the theories gain greater contextualization regarding the concept of conflict and

also gain the ability to incorporate institutional dynamics in order to understand transboundary

water relations.

In this first section, I introduced the concept of hydropolitics and remarked that when we

talk about water scarcity we invariably talk about water conflict. Next, I discussed three theories

of transboundary water conflict and classified them along a spectrum of conflict analysis. This

spectrum begins at the “water wars” narrative that speculates water scarcity will lead to acute

conflict within particularly volatile regions. The next theory highlights the historical tendency of

states to engage in cooperative agreements rather than resort to violent conflict. Finally, the last

theory suggests that transboundary water relations are best understood through the TWINS

matrix framework that simultaneously analyzes instances of both conflict and cooperation.

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Section 2: U.S.-Mexican Transboundary Water Relations

Past to Present

The Rio Grande spans 1,900 miles12 beginning in Colorado, traveling through New

Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border before it empties into the Gulf of Mexico. Riparian

relations along the Rio Grande date back to the sale of Mexican territory to the United States

following Mexico’s defeat in the Mexican-American War. The agricultural development and

successive economic boom during the late 19th century along the river made it clear that the river

would play an important dynamic in US-Mexican relations for decades to come.

Among the first instance of conflict along the Rio Grande occurred in 1895 when Mexico

protested that water diversions within the U.S. were affecting the flow at Mexico’s expense. To

settle the issue, the U.S. requested the legal opinion of Attorney General Judson Harmon.

Harmon’s decision, referred to as the “Harmon Doctrine,” ruled that the U.S. had “absolute

sovereignty” within its borders and had no obligation to curtail its water use. The U.S., as the

dominant country and upstream beneficiary of the Rio Grande, thus had the option to apply the

doctrine to all transboundary rivers between Mexico. Based on diplomatic and economic

dynamics beyond the scope of this analysis, however, Harmon’s legal opinion was largely

ignored. U.S.-Mexican transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande improved thereafter,

largely as a result of proactive engagements of cooperation between both countries.

In 1944, after several boundary treaties were created to delineate territory and access to

river basins between the U.S. and Mexico, the two countries signed one comprehensive “Water

12 U.S. Department of Interior, Geological Survey, Largest Rivers in the United States, by J.C. Kramer, open-file report, U.S. Geological Survey, pt. 87, serial 242 (Washington, DC, 1990).

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Treaty”13. The treaty united numerous individual treaties concerning the Rio Grande, the

Colorado, and the Tijuana rivers under one administrative agency: the International Boundary

and Water Commission. There is an incredible abundance of information regarding all three

rivers, however, this analysis focuses on the transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande.

The terms of water allocation and distribution specifically along the Rio Grande are explained by

Shlomi et al: “The U.S. is to receive one-third of the flow reaching the Rio Grande from

specified Mexican tributaries, provided that this is not to be less than 431,721,000 cubic meters

annually”14. Mexico receives the rest of the flows after accounting for the U.S. allowance.

Mexico allocates a larger proportion of water flows from the Rio Grande to the U.S. than it

receives; however, the U.S. similarly delivers a larger sum of water flow from the Colorado

River than it receives.

During the 1990s, an “extraordinary clause” was implemented to reflect the demographic

and environmental changes along the Rio Grande15. The clause allows Mexico to deliver less

water than its legal obligations in a five-year cycle but requires that it make up the deficit over

the next five years. Since the clause was instituted, Mexico has fulfilled its obligations only once

and is currently indebted to the United States. In the same year, the treaty was also amended to

“rehabilitate” the quality of the Rio Grande and reduce the salinity. Minute 28216 was established

to “control the salinity problem in the waters of the Lower Rio Grande”17.

The institutionalization of conflict along the Rio Grande through the IBWC has proved to

13 Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 14 Ariel Dinar et al., Bridges Over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation (New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2007), 164. 15 Allie Alexis Umoff, AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1944 U.S.-MEXICO WATER TREATY: ITS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, Environs: Environmental Law and Policy Journal, Volume 32, Number 1, Fall 2008, 69. 16 U.S. International Boundary and Water Commission, Report of the Principal Engineers Regarding the need to Rehabilitate the Saline Waters Disposal System for Control of the Salinity Problem in the Waters of the Lower Rio Grande, prepared by Principal Engineers, El Paso, TX, 1990. 17 Ibid.

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be a resilient method to address the violent consequences of water scarcity. Both nations

continue to work in unison to address concerns of water quality and quantity. The current

framework between the U.S. and Mexico is a useful system to alleviate conflict; however, it

would be counterproductive for future U.S.-Mexican hydropolitical relations to presume that all

measures undertaken by the IBWC, the primary instrument of cooperation, are solely responsible

for increasing the level of cooperation among the stakeholders between the two countries. The

analysis presented hereafter argues that hydropolitical relations between the U.S. and Mexico

along the Rio Grande are oversimplified and will use the TWINS matrix to demonstrate that

transboundary water relations exhibit particularly dynamic instances of transboundary conflict.

Problem Identification: Conflict along the Rio Grande

The majority of case studies that are the basis for hydropolitical theory occur in regions

where access to water is historically volatile such as the Mekong Delta, the Nile, and the Jordan

rivers. Thus, the aim of hydropolitical studies within these volatile regions has tended a) to

analyze the extent to which water scarcity could exacerbate existing riparian relations,

particularly militarily, and b) to devise a framework for cooperation that institutionalizes

cooperation between riparians in order to prevent or end conflict over water resources.

The case along the Rio Grande is different for several reasons. The most significant

difference is that the U.S. and Mexico have a very limited history of violent transboundary

aggressions and enjoy a relationship that is largely positive. Despite indications of high water

stress along the Rio Grande (Figure 3), the institutionalization of conflict via the IBWC

reinforces cooperation rather than division. In fact, Shlomi et al. refer to transboundary water

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relations between the U.S. and Mexico as “good, even if not perfect”18.

The purpose of analyzing the transboundary water relationship along the Rio Grande is to

explore the nuances that make the U.S.-Mexican relationship “not perfect.” The analysis of the

cooperative framework along the Rio Grande is oversimplified, overestimates the degree of

cooperation, and does not adequately consider unconventional sources of conflict. This reflects

two problems: the propensity to classify any form of cooperation as ‘good’ and the lack of

institutional capacity to adapt to demographic and geological change. This negatively affects the

ability of policy makers within the United States and Mexico to gauge problems and craft

effective solutions.

In this section, I provided a brief history of riparian relations between the U.S. and

Mexico. I argue that even though the U.S. and Mexico exhibit many characteristics of a

cooperative relationship, the current institutional arrangement oversimplifies cooperation, fails to

consider more dynamic features of institutional conflict, and as a result, is not sensitive enough

to identify problems that may exist between stakeholders along the Rio Grande. The next section

explores the complex sources of conflict and analyzes the main stakeholders behind U.S.-

Mexican riparian relations using the IBWC as the unit of analysis.

Section 3: Conflict along the Rio Grande

This section uses the institutional framework for cooperation, the IBWC, as the unit of

analysis to identify stakeholders who either ease or exacerbate conflict or cooperation along the

Rio Grande.

18 Dinar, Ariel, et al. "Hydropolitics and International Relations." Bridges over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2007. 68. Print.

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The Unit of Analysis

The International Boundary & Water Commission19

The establishment of the IBWC in 1944 created a bilateral, territory-delineating agency

tasked to, “[apply] the boundary and water treaties between the U.S. and Mexico,” and to

“[settle] differences that may arise in their application”20. The commission derives its legal

mandate from the Water Treaty and has historically focused on the technical aspects of

transboundary water management. As a bilateral international body, its authority and jurisdiction

supersedes national law. This allows the IBWC to ideally operate outside of regional political or

cultural dynamics that may otherwise hamper the agency’s effectiveness.

The IBWC is composed of both a U.S. and Mexican section. The U.S. headquarters are

located in El Paso, Texas and the Mexican section in Cuidad Juarez, Mexico. The head

commissioners of each country are referred to as Engineer Commissioners and recommendations

for institutional change, known as ‘minutes’, require the approval of each respective government.

The IBWC primarily deals with technical issues of infrastructure, pollution, conservation, water

distribution, floor protection, and water quality standards along the Rio Grande, the Colorado,

and the Tijuana rivers. These functions can be broken up into three categories21: liaison,

adjudication, and administration functions, as demonstrated in Table 1.

The IBWC has gained a positive reputation for its, “technical efficiency, procedural

19 The United States of America. The State Department. The International Boundary and Water Commission. The History of the International Boundary and Water Commission. The International Boundary and Water Commission, n.d. Web. 20 Ibid. 21 Stephen Mumme, “U.S.-Mexican Groundwater Problems: Bilateral Prospects and Implications,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 22, no. 2 (1980): 31.

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conservatism, and diplomatic skill,”22 and is largely portrayed as a model for transforming

transboundary water conflict into cooperation. The Commission has cultivated a reputation of

conservative institutional change within the IBWC, due to its “jurisdiction and functions [being]

narrowly conceived and carefully defined so as not to conflict with those of domestic agencies in

each conflict”23.

As the foremost authority on transboundary river management, it is expected to address

and mitigate the impending consequences of population growth and increasing water stress along

the Rio Grande. Yet demographic and geological changes along the Rio Grande today pose

immense challenges for the conservative institutional capacity of the IBWC. The next section

demonstrates that despite its reputation the commission may not possess the institutional

capability to adapt to demographic and geographic changes along the Rio Grande.

The Dimensions of Conflict

Citizen Sensitivity

Citizens affected by water scarcity along the Rio Grande exemplify significant defects of

the current cooperative arrangement. Citizens face an institutional framework that has failed to

modernize water management techniques and that continues to overlook public participation.

These deficiencies show that although the IBWC successfully internalizes violent conflict and

other major instances of transboundary volatility it has failed to adopt changes that are receptive

to the new demographic and geological status quo along the Rio Grande.

In Tamaulipas, Mexico, citizens are forced to cope with severe freshwater constraints.

22 Mumme, Stephen. “Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A Critical Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico.” Natural Resources Journal 33 (1993): 93-119. 23 Ibid.

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Matamoros, Tamaulipas, the last city along the Rio Grande before it empties into the Gulf of

Mexico, surprisingly saw their river run dry June 2000. Indeed, hydrological modeling of this

region suggests that Tamaulipas will continue to experience severe droughts that constrain the

availability of freshwater to the city (Figure 4).

This region requires exceptional changes to its water management system, which the

current cooperative arrangement fails to provide, in order to adapt to a consistently arid Rio

Grande. Currently, the IBWC focuses its attention on supply-side water allocation practices and

increasing the availability of water resources. Casey Walsh, anthropologist at the University of

California at Santa Barbara, explains the new paradigm of demand-side water management in

one of the Mexico’s most water scarce states. Tamaulipas first began to experiment with a

decentralized water management approach in 2008, instituting the Programa Cultura del Agua

(PCA) or the “Water Culture Program.” This program, initiated by the municipal Junta de Agua

y Drenaje (The Water and Drainage Council), is crafted to “work through the public schools to

teach children to value, monitor, and enforce water efficiency.24” Although highly altruistic, the

program underscores the dire need of water management institutions to influence new sets of

behaviors that the IBWC has been unable to foster.

The IBWC rarely engages in proactive instances of water management. It is difficult to

imagine the commission crafting a minute designed to change the institutional focus of the

agency from water allocation to water conservation. Unfortunately, this is precisely the focus

that many of states along the Rio Grande (Figure 3) require.

Issue-linkage Strategy

Issue-linkage is a diplomatic strategy that allows states to “make concessions on issues

24 Casey Walsh, “Managing Urban Water Demand in Neoliberal Northern Mexico,” Human Organization 70, no. 1 (2011): 54-62.

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they care little about in exchange for gains on matters that are of greater political or economic

importance to them”25. Itay Fischendler’s analysis explains, however, that the use of this strategy

within transboundary water relations may prove difficult to maintain due to the “inherent

uncertainty” associated with natural resources such as water. The consequences of issue-linkage

include short and long-term instances of conflict between the U.S. and Mexico. Long-term

consequences are paid particular attention as they reflect conflict that is endemic within the

cooperative arrangement between the U.S. and Mexico and may be modeled using the TWINS

matrix.

The linkage strategy was adopted during the early 20th century as a way to expedite past

diplomatic deficiencies between both countries. Mexico, worrying that the U.S. as the upstream

riparian would limit the flow of the Colorado in the future, sought to establish a cooperative

arrangement to link the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers. Mexico’s goal was to produce a

mutually desirable allocative outcome: Mexico would allot greater flows of the Rio Grande to

the U.S. in exchange for greater flows from the U.S. along the Colorado. Further, in exchange for

linking the rivers together, Mexico agreed to back the establishment of the U.N. The U.S.,

engaged in a ‘Good Neighbor’ foreign policy during this period, stood to gain greater

international prestige.

Transboundary water relations have benefited from a “stable and reciprocal regime that is

difficult to overturn,”26 and that institutionalizes cooperation to prevent conflict, however, the

linkage strategy has also undermined the framework’s overall efficacy and has concealed

25 Itay Fischendler “The Short-Term and Long-Term Ramifications of Linkages Involving Natural Resources; the US - Mexico Transboundary Water Case,”Environmental and Planning C: Government and Policy 22 (2004): 633-50. 26 Ibid.

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instances of institutional conflict. Changes along the Rio Grande have increased the

unpredictability of conditions that the linkage strategy relies upon to satisfy the stakeholders.

The problems of the issue-linkage strategy are illustrated by the short and long-term

consequences that the strategy is responsible for harboring. The short-term consequences,

described by Fischendler as “delays in [related] negotiations, engendering domestic

opposition…on the basis of alleged threats to sovereignty from linked water sources,”27 are

instances of historic conflict that reflect the practical difficulty of using one institution for three

river basins. The long-term consequences highlight the current problems that the cooperative

arrangement struggles to mitigate. These problems include what Fischendler terms “managerial

legacies.” The first legacy deals with the problem of the water trade off between the Rio Grande

and the Colorado. Fischendler notes that the current trade off between both rivers reflects, “an

agreement concluded during a period characterized by a low level of development along the Rio

Grande and high water flows,”28. Since then, demographic and geological conditions have vastly

changed and the ability of Mexico complying with its water obligations is no longer the case.

The second managerial legacy of the linkage strategy reflects fundamentally entrenched

conflict created at the onset of the linkage strategy. As Fischendler describes, “…neither nation

has an incentive to renegotiate the treaty in order to adapt the linkage to new hydrological

conditions, because so many issues that were once contentious could be reopened,”29.

Renegotiation of the treaty is out of the question unless both countries are willing to risk

destabilizing their relative gains along both rivers. Thus, the strategy of linking the Colorado

and Rio Grande represents a complex dilemma that pits political constraints against necessary

solutions.

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

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Section 4: Reevaluating Transboundary Water Conflict:

Implications for Future U.S.-Mexican Transboundary Water

Relations

Pre-TWINS Framework

Prior to the TWINS Matrix, hydropolitical literature primarily focused on the link

between either conflict or cooperation that resulted from water scarcity. Homer-Dixon’s research

emphasizes the role of scarcity as a catalyst for institutional, political, and societal conflict and

theorizes that the instability will stoke acute wars to secure such a vital resource. He

contextualizes this violent premise, however, by maintaining that it is only likely to occur in

regions where political volatility is the historic norm. The U.S. and Mexico have no such history.

Wolf, Yoffe and the OSU group are largely credited with debunking the “water wars”

narrative. Based on the TFDD, the IFTD and the BAR projects, Wolf et al. theorize that

problems of transboundary water scarcity will be mitigated through cooperative arrangements.

Here, cooperation is understood to be constructive and leading to facilitation of even greater

degrees of cooperation. One of the main drawbacks of analyzing transboundary water relations

through this framework is the binary classification of cooperation as good and conflict as bad.

The databases established by the OSU group fail to adequately identify nonconventional

instances of institutional conflict and limit the framework’s applicability along the Rio Grande.

The Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus

The TWINS Matrix is best at identifying instances of “cooperation that is not pretty.”

Here, Zeitoun and Mirumachi move away from the old paradigm that “international agreements

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are generally seen as the pinnacle of cooperation,”30 and establish a framework designed to

gauge the levels of conflict and cooperation within an institutional framework. Both authors

further note that “some conflict” may even be a necessary prerequisite for “real” cooperation31.

The issue of institutional insensitivity to the water management needs of citizens along

the Rio Grande highlights Zeitoun and Mirumachi’s point that, “aspects of cooperation- such as

treaties, river basin organizations or regimes – may reinforce [conflict],”32. The changing nature

of the Rio Grande demands rapid and proactive solutions in order to effectively mitigate the new

geographic status quo. It is not clear that the IBWC can simultaneously focus on water allocation

and water conservation.

The legacy of the issue-linkage strategy highlights one of the most severe instances of

conflict within a cooperative framework. It is clear that linking the Rio Grande to the two other

rivers may have been a favorable action when the population along the rivers was relatively light.

The acceleration of economic activity and the swell of the population along the Rio Grande

should have been taken into consideration when all three rivers were linked, however, this was

not the case. As a result, the very essence of the 1944 Water Treaty is built on shaky ground.

Opening up the treaty for renegotiation is hard to imagine, as both nations would choose to

reformat previous conditions that are no longer political or economically convenient. Thus, the

institutional framework designed to facilitate cooperation between both countries now runs the

risk of institutionalizing conflict.

Transboundary water relations along the Rio Grande represent complex instances of

conflict and cooperation. The TWINS matrix analyzes these dynamics in order to determine the

30 Mark Zeitoun and Naho Mirumachi, “Transboundary Water Interaction I,” International Environmental Agreements 8 (3 September 2008): 297. 31 Ibid 32 Ibid.

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levels of conflict or cooperation that exist within the arrangement and to determine the

institutional resiliency that is or is not present. The significance of the levels of conflict or

cooperation described by the matrix is that it allows more accurate assessment of problems and

forces users of the matrix to critically probe a relationship assumed to be cooperative.

Conclusion

Hydropolitical relations between the U.S. and Mexico are generally understood to enjoy

high degrees of cooperation. This analysis has demonstrated that the level of cooperation is much

more important and difficult to recognize than the mere presence of a cooperative framework. To

rephrase a quote from Yoffe,33 the mere presence of cooperation does not signify the absence of

conflict. In fact, in the case of transboundary water relations between the U.S. and Mexico, the

presence of cooperation may actually be facilitating conflict.

The primary instrument for conflict mitigation along the Rio Grande, the IBWC, has a

well established reputation. The commission’s technical efficiency, procedural conservatism, and

diplomatic skill are consistently referenced as the ideal institutional model for transforming

conflict into cooperation. This positive reputation may lead policy-makers without prior

knowledge of the institution’s dynamics to assume that the IBWC suffers little problems.

Demographic and geographic challenges today threaten to render the IBWC obsolete as it

struggles to react to rapid demographic and geological challenges.

33 “The absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict.”

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Appendix

Figure 1: Thomas Homer-Dixon's "Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity"

Figure 2: TWINS Matrix

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Figure 3: Water Risk along the Rio Grande

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Figure 4: Projected Change of Physical Risk to Quantity and Quality of Rio Grande in Tamaulipas, Mexico

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Table 1: Functions, Legal Derivatives, & Purpose of the IBWC Framework

Function Purpose Derives Legal Capacity From

Liaison Information Sharing Article 24 Section A, E, G

Adjudication Power to mediate problems brought forth by Engineer Commissioners

Article 24 Section D

Administration Tasks the IBWC with legal obligations and enforceability

Article 24 Section C

al., Ariel Dinar et. Bridges over Water: Understanding Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and

Cooperation. Vol. 3. 5 vols. Energy and Resource Economics, Edited by World Scientific. New Jersey: World Scientific 2007.

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