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Publication: TODAY, p 14Date: 7April 2011Headline: Room for religion in public discourse

Room for religion in public discourseWhy, in some situations, it makes sense to le t religious citizens speak up on their convictionsTANSEDW HON

A the end ofa philosophy of lawcoursethat I taught,a student told methat hisonly regret was that "ieligion was kept onthe sidelines". He felt it could add some-thing to the topics discussed. But he un-derstoodthat it might lead to "irresolvabledifferences and controversy".

The idea that religion is an ultra-sen-sitivetopic best avoided is ingrainedintheSingaporean mindset.

When religiouscitizensengagein pub-licdiscoursethat leads to public decisionsand laws,others fear they makeargumentssupportable onlyby religiousworldviews.Intractable debates result. Governmentmightend up pronouncingonthe rightnessof one religiousview over another.

Moreover, public decisions and lawsaffect everyone in our muitirreligious de-mocracy. If they are supportable only byreligiousviews,arenot the.religiousimpos-ingtheir viewson the rest of societywhichmay not share such views?

When several persons from the samechurch won executivecommittee seats atthe annual general meeting of the Asso-ciationof Women forAction and Research(Aware) in 2009 and were opposed tothe manner Aware conducted its sexual-ity education in schools, the public wereconcerned about the appropriate role ofreligious persons and groups.

This concern also arose in the 2007debate over whether section 377A of thePenal Code, which prohibits acts of grossindecency between males, should be re-pealed.Somesaythe prohibition isjustifi-able only on religious grounds.

The Government's approach is thatof sensitivity, neutrality and consultation.The pronouncement of our ConstitutionalCommission in 1966 that Singapore is a"democraticsecularstate" isaffirmedintheDeclarationofReligiousHarmony.TheGov-ernment recognisesthe vitality of religiousharmonyin our multi-religious nation.

Its call for sensitivity is bolstered bylaws such as the Maintenance of ReligiousHarmony Act and sections 298 and 298Aof the Penal Code.

These laws regulate, among other.things, acts that cause feelings of enmity,

Treating a particular religionas authoritative withoutconsideration of anything elseis out. But excluding religiouspersons cuts off th e majorityof Singaporeans who regardthemselves as religious.Unless a state is anti-religion,why should having a religionba r on e from public discourse?hatred or ill-will between different reli-giousgroups.

The secular nature of the state meanslawsandpoliciesareneither dictatedbytheviewsof anyreligiousgroupnorjustified byreligiousauthority.Religion,however,oftencontributes to the mores of societies.Assuch, he Governmentreceivesthe views ofreligiousgroupsasinterested parties,forex-ample, in relation to the integrated resorts.HOW SHOULD RELIGIONFEATURE IN PUBLIC DISCOURSE?Given ourcommitment to democracy,pla-ralism and the secularnature of our state,what argument is legitimatein public dis-course which leads to laws and decisionsthat affect everyone?

First, treating a particular religion asauthoritative withoutconsiderationof any-thing else is out.

Second, excluding religious personscuts off the majority of Singaporeans whoregard themselves as religious. Unless astate is anti-religion, why should havinga religion bar one from publicdiscourse?

Third, denying someone the right toparticipate in public discourse if she is re-ligiouslymotivated or influenced does notmake sense. We reasonably expect peopleto treat their religionsmore seriously thanhobbies.

Furthermore,as Columbia Law Schoolprofessor Kent Greenawalt suggests, it ishard to determine how a religious personwould decidean issue if.sheonly refers topublicly accessible reasons and personalnon-religious bases and detaches her reli-giousbases from the analysis.

We might think those who are reli-giously motivated are unlikely to changetheirmindsonan issue.whereas thosewhobeginwith personal non-religious motiva-tions are open to reason. Prof Creenawaltnotes that thisdistinctionis"overblownn, sthe latter might not be open to argumentsto the contrary while the former might be.

The late Hanrard professor John Rawlssuggestswerefraiifromdecidingbasicques-tions of justice by comprehensivedoctrinesoftruth,which includeconceptionsofwhatis of value in human life. Examples includereligious worldviews and secular doctrinessuch asJohn Mill's idealof individuality.

Instead, rely on "public reason". Offerfair terms of cooperation to others. Proposewhat is most reasonable to us. We mustalso think the proposed terms are at leastreasonable for others as free and equalcitizens to accept.

But how does one know what is "reason-able* or "fair" without reference to standardsof truth in comprehensive doctrines? Oxfordprofessor John Finnis thinks Prof Rawls'sapproach results in basic questions beingremitted to hunches, as one is not allowedto resolve them by reference to what is true.THEABORTION EXAMPLEOnwhetherlawssbuld permitabortion,forexample,ProfRawlsassertsthat womenwhoreject the claimthat foetuseshave a right tolifefromconceptionarenot"unreasonable".

Prof Finnissuggeststhat medicalscienceshows the difference between the unbornand the newborn to be no more and no lessthan the difference between being insideand outside the mother's body. He thinksit is arbitrary to deny the unborn the rightsof freeand equal citizens- ights accordedto newborns- y allowingwomen toabortthem FollowingfromProf Finnis's view, it isnot true that the only reasons forrestrictiveabortion lawsare religious in nature.

ProfGreenawalt,ontheotherhand,thinksthat sciencecan trace the growth of the un-born, but does not resolve its moral status.Permissiveabortionlawssettle hemetaphysi-cal questionof themoralstatusoftheunbornby deciding that an unborn is not worthy ofthesameproteaionasanewbornSuchmeta-physicalquestionsareinfactanswereddiffer-entlyby different religious and non-religiousconvictions,.by reference to reasons that arenotnecessarily publicly accessible.

Prof Greenawalt thinks that if publiclyaccessible reasons and shared premisescan't resolve such issues, the religious andthe non-religious are both reachingbeyondsuch grounds in law-making. All may relyupon their convictions while committed toa secular democracy, although realistically,lawswouldbechangedonlywith substantialsupport.

Allowingreligiouscitizens o participateaccording to their religious convictions insuch situations may be as sensible as al-lowing non-religious citizensto participateaccording otheirpersonal convictions.Afterall, what grounds democracyand the verybelief that'we should not imposeon othersisa metaphysicalbelief inequalmoralworth.

Religious or not, we may share thesepremises,which may well be quite beyondthe realm of publicly accessible reasons. wDrTan Seow Hon is an associateprofessorof law at theSingaporeManagementUniversity.Shewasa panellistyesterdayat theAsiajournalism Forum-instituteofpolicy StudiesConference on Reportingreligion: Dilemmas ofpublic discourse.