TO WHAT EXTENT IS IT VALID TO SEE THE INDIAN MUTINY AS A RELIGIOUS REVOLT?

The question whether or not the Indian mutiny could be defined as a religious revolt has been the subject of debate amongst many scholars worldwide. Dalrymple, one of the modern writers and historians, claimed ‘In the rebels' own papers, they refer over and again to their uprising being a war of religion. There were no doubt a multitude of private grievances, but it is now unambiguously clear that the rebels saw themselves as fighting a war to preserve their religion, and articulated it as such.’, insisting on defining the mutiny as war of religion. But his over-analysis of literature review has created a sort of paralysis of insight into the event. To categorise the 1857 uprising as merely a religious movement is over-simplification of what happened in those days. It was a symbiosis of many factors, including the religious revolt as a consequence of change in the British attitude in many areas.

Change in attitude of the British brought great impact on the already settled and balanced religious situation in India, introducing the evangelical Christianity and utilitarianism. Keay, by the mid 1th century, claimed ‘the Orientalist ideal of government conforming to Indian traditions had been obliterated by a compound of cold utilitarian logic, cloying Christian ideology and molten free trade evangelism.’ British ignorance is obvious, but interesting enough, they were not discouraged by the discontent amongst the population. By 1832 there were 58 Church Missionary Society representatives active in India and many aggressive missionaries likewise Midgeley John Jennings in Delhi. William Wilberforce, earlier known as a MP against slavery, declared missionary access to India to be ‘the greatest of all causes’. Moreover, supporters of this religious revival got key posts in government. Even Bahadur Shah seemed not to bother with this evident religious compulsion, causing disaprovement in the Muslim community; according to Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, ‘Many of the Delhi moulvies and their followers considered the king to be little better than a heretic. They were of the opinion that it was not right to pray in the mosques to which he was in the habit of going and which were under his patronage’. This obvious religious pressure created insecurity not only among the normal population, but also in the military forces – sepoys in few areas. They witnessed evangelical army officers like Colonel Wheeler in Barrackpore openly preaching the gospel and many high caste sepoys misinterpreted the presence of missionaries in India from 1813 onwards as a sign of official attempts at a conversion policy, thus creating great tension. Sepoys’ discontent is rather important, because they were the majority of British Army. Therefore the cartridges controversy was of great significance; new rifle was issues to sepoys, supposably greased with tallow or lard, producing a spark that led to the Uprising. But sepoys were not the only ones fighting the rebellion; Wahhabi ‘ghazis’ were warriors of the faith, extreme Muslims, fighting the holy war. Dalrymple argues that they were converged on Delhi, to support Bahadur Shah II, which is truth but not in a sense that he is trying to present. As it has been mentioned, Zafar, Bahadur Shah’s pen name, was not praised in the Muslim community. Therefore it is obvious that jihads did fight a holy war to some extent, but the fact that Zafar was their central figure, shows that religion was not as much important as fighting the British itself.

With start of the Uprising, did rebels express their discontent with the religious pressure by massacring Europeans, Eurasians and Christian converts who did not manage to flee to Meerut when British lost control over Delhi. One of the first victims was Chaman Lal, Indian convert to Christianity. He was a Hindu doctor, earlier in service of Bahadur Shah. On the other side, Abdullah Beg, a British who was a

former EIC soldier, was not only spared but he was fighting against the British till the end of rebellion, once he converted into Islam. To conclude, this final example and all mentioned before show that religion did play a considerably big role in the rebellion, but nevertheless there were few other factors without which religion on itself would not be enough to unite north of the India and two totally different religions.

What really caused the rebellion is the overall change in British attitudes. With the decline in the number of White Mughals, Indian people were excluded from the all important decision making and also a gap was created, causing the level of intolerance and misunderstanding of each other’s culture go up. Idea of utilitarianism had a great significance, and one of the first changes was forbidding of the tradition called suttee or in other words, widow burning. British saw themselves as superior, with higher knowledge and position than Indians. Michael Woods puts it ‘from now on British dominion in India, was not only to be about making money, but about changing India’ and Saul David claimed ‘attitude of many British officers – ‘appallingly disrespectful’ ‘. Belief that Indian culture is worth nothing comparing to the European was rather common and therefore the relations between collaborators and British were weakened.

Other than Anglicisation, there was also the policy of Governor General Dalhouise who amongst many other controversial decisions produced ‘the doctrine of lapse’. This doctrine left rulers stateless and without any title, because it forbid Indian tradition of adoption of heir if the ruler did not have any children. The whole point of the doctrine was giving an excuse to British for their annexations. One of those annexation was Oudh; according to Keay ‘since the days of Clive, its rulers had been the Company’s allies, graciously accepting a succession of territorial and financial demands and provding much of the manpower for the Company’s Bengal Army’. With its annexation, Dalhouise created discontent amongst the sepoys from Oudh; 1/3 of Bengal Army from Oudh thus great number of sepoys were ready for the rebellion. The doctrine of lapse was applicable even for the royal family, moreover, Bahadur Shah was disregarded as King of Delhi and his image removed from the coinage. According to Dalrymple, ‘the British created a situation where no one in the imperial family had anything to lose’ and obviously that is why they did accept to be the centre of rebellion.

Finally, a important factor for the rebellion was the economic discontent in the countryside. To all the sepoys, no matter which casta they belonged to, wages were reduced. They were expected to serve outside of EIC territories, even overseas and did not get any bonus. Metcalf argues ‘the land revenue system generated an enduring discontent’ and it is true that the taxes were abnormally high comparing to the small income that was constantly reducing. Therefore, neither Indians had to lose anything with a rebellion, considering the fact they were crippled.

To conclude, statement that the Indian mutiny was religious revolt is truthful according to Dalrymple, but this can be argued. His analysis based on materials that exist from time of Indian mutiny, misses the nature of entire Indian society. He has failed to look into the societal basis of the concerns cited in those materials and his categorisation of 1857 movement as primarily religious is straitjacket and naive. Indian society has been a complex religio-politico mix and apparent religious movement has overriding political concerns. More truthful statement was made by Ferguson, ‘the clash of civilisations had begun’.