THOMASAQUINAS

COMMENTARY ON THE

NICOMACHEAN

ETHICS of ARISTOTLE

BILINGUAL EDITION

volume 2BOOKS 6 10

translated byC. I. Litzinger, O.P.

Reprinted fromhttp://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Ethics.htm

BOOK VI

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

LECTURE 1Right Reason

Chapter 1

I. HE SPEAKS OF WHAT HE PROPOSES.

A. He states that we must discuss right reason. 1109

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But since we previously said that weought to choose a mean, rejecting excessand defect, and that the mean isdetermined according to right reason, wemay now make a division of right reason.

B. He shows what we must discuss about it.

A He shows what can be understood from the things that were saidbefore. 1110

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In all habits previously considered and inother matters, there is some mark onwhich the man who possesses rightreason keeps his eye, straining andrelaxing and this is the limit of themiddle courses that we say are a meanbetween excess and defect in accord withright reason.

B He discloses that this is not sufficient. 1111

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It is true indeed to say this, but nothingis made clear by it. In all occupations inwhich science is at work, it is true to saythat neither too much nor too little oughtto be done or passed over but what is

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moderate and as reason determines. Buta man possessing only this knowledgewill not know how to proceed further, forinstance, what remedies must be givenfor the body, if someone suggests that itshould be whatever medical art, aspossessed by the doctor, prescribes.

C He infers what should be added. 1112

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For this reason, not only must this truestatement be made about the habits ofthe soul but also the nature of rightreason and its limits must be determined.

C. He continues with what precedes. 1113

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We have, however, already divided thevirtues of the soul, stating that some aremoral and others intellectual. The moralvirtues we have discussed, and the otherswe will now treat, after first speaking ofthe soul.

II. HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION.

A. He explains what is to be discussed about the soul.

A He resumes the division of the parts of the soul. 1114

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We said before that there are two partsof the soul: rational and irrational.

B He subdivides one member.

1. HE PROPOSES THE DIVISION. 1115

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Now we will speak of the rational part inthe same way. Let us suppose two partsof the rational soul: one by which weconsider the kind of things whoseprinciples cannot be otherwise the otherby which we consider contingent things.

2. HE EXPLAINS THE MEMBERS OF THE DIVISION.

a. He explains the aforementioned division by thisreasoning. 1116

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To the objects, which differ in kind,correspond different kinds of parts of thesoul,

b. He explains the major proposition. 1117

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since indeed the knowledge of the objectsexists (in the parts) according to acertain species and reality.

3. HE NAMES THE MEMBERS OF THE DIVISION. 1118-1123

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Let one of these be called scientific butthe other estimative, for deliberating andestimating are the same. No onedeliberates about things that do not takeplace any other way. Therefore theestimative element is one part of therational soul.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Quia autem existimus prius dicentes etcetera. Postquam philosophusdeterminavit de virtutibus moralibus, inhoc sexto libro determinat de

1109. After the Philosopher has completedthe explanation of the moral virtues, he beginsin the sixth book to explain the intellectualvirtues. First [I] by way of introduction, he

intellectualibus. Et primo prooemialiterdicit de quo est intentio. Secundodeterminat propositum, ibi, prius quidemigitur dictum est et cetera. Circaprimum tria facit. Primo dicit quoddicendum est de ratione recta. Secundoostendit quid de ea dicendum sit, ibi: inomnibus enim dictis habitibus etc. tertiocontinuat se ad praecedentia, ibi, animaeautem virtutes et cetera. Dicit ergoprimo quod, quia supra in secundodictum est quod in virtutibus moralibus,de quibus supra actum est, oporteteligere medium et praetermitteresuperabundantiam et defectum mediumautem determinatur secundum rationemrectam, ut in II habitum est, consequensest ut (hoc), scilicet rationem rectam etvirtutem intellectualem, quae estrectitudo rationis, dividamus in suasspecies, sicut et supra divisimus virtutesmorales.

speaks of what he proposes. Then [II], at Wesaid before etc., he explains his proposition.On the first point he does three things.Initially [I, A], he states that we must discussright reason. Next [I, B], at In all habitspreviously considered etc., he shows what wemust discuss about it. Last [I, C], at Wehave, however, already divided etc., hecontinues with what precedes. He says firstthat it was stated before (317) we mustchoose a mean, and reject excess and defect inthe moral virtues that we have just discussed(245-1108) that the mean is determinedaccording to right reason, as was decided inthe second book (322). Consequently, weshould divide right reason, an intellectualvirtue that is rectitude of the reason, into itsspecies, as in a similar fashion we havealready divided the moral virtues.

Deinde cum dicit: in omnibus enim dictisetc., ostendit quid dicendum sit deratione recta. Et circa hoc tria facit.Primo ostendit quid de ratione rectahaberi possit per ea quae supra dictasunt secundo ostendit quod hoc nonsufficit, ibi, est autem dicere quidem etcetera. Tertio concludit quid oporteatamplius dicere, ibi, propter quod oportetet cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod inomnibus praedictis habitibus, id est invirtutibus moralibus, sicut et in aliisrebus, puta in artificialibus, est aliquidquasi signum ad quod respicit ille quihabet rectam rationem: et sic intendit etremittit, id est addit vel minuit, etconsiderat per hoc signum quis estterminus medietatum, idest quomododebeat determinari medietas inunaquaque virtute, quas quidem

1110. Then [I, B ], at In all habits previouslyconsidered he shows what has to bediscussed about right reason. On this point hedoes three things. First [I, B, A] he showswhat can be understood from the things thatwere said before. Next [I, B, B] at It is trueindeed etc., he discloses that this is notsufficient. Last [I, B, C], at For this reasonetc., he infers what should be added. He saysfirst that in all habits previously considered,i.e., the moral virtuesas in other things, forexample, the artisticthere is an object, as itwere a mark, on which the man with rightreason keeps his eye and according to this hestrives and makes modifications (i.e., he addsor subtracts) or considers by this mark whatthe limit of the middle course is, how it oughtto be ascertained in each virtue. Such a middlecourse we say is a certain mean betweenexcess and defect, and in accord with right

medietates dicimus esse quoddammedium inter superabundantiam etdefectum, et hoc secundum rationemrectam. Hoc autem signum quod estvirtuoso sicut regula artifici, est id quoddecet et convenit, a quo non oportetdeficere nec ultra addere. Et hoc estmedium virtutis: quae quidem supra insecundo manifestata sunt.

reason. This mark, holding for the virtuousman the place of a rule for the craftsman, iswhat is becoming and fitting, that which wemust not fall short of, nor add to this is themean of virtue. These matters have beenclarified in the second book (327).

Deinde cum dicit: est autem dicere etc.,ostendit quod hoc non sufficitcognoscere circa rationem rectam. Etdicit quod id quod dictum est, est quidemverum, sed non est sufficientermanifestum prout requiritur ad usumrationis rectae. Est enim id quod dictumest, quoddam commune quod verificaturin omnibus humanis studiis in quibushomines secundum scientiam practicamoperantur, puta in militia et medicina etquibuscumque negotiis. In quibusomnibus verum est dicere, quod nequeplura neque pauciora oportet aut facereaut negligere, sed ea quae medio modose habent et secundum quod recta ratiodeterminat sed solum ille qui hoccommune habet, non propter hoc scietamplius procedere ad operandum. Putasi quaerenti qualia oportet dari adsanandum corpus, aliquis responderetquod illa debent dari quae praecipit arsmedicinae et ille qui habet hanc artem,scilicet medicus non propter hocinterrogans sciret quid deberet dareinfirmo. Sic autem se habet ratio rectaprudentiae in moralibus, sicut rectaratio artis in artificialibus: unde patetquod non sufficit id quod dictum est.

1111. Next [ 1, B, B] at It is true, he showsthat it is not enough to know this about rightreason. He states that what was said (1110)is certainly true but does not make sufficientlyclear what is required for the use of rightreason it is something common verified in allhuman occupations in which men operateaccording to a practical science, for instance,in strategy, medicine, and the variousprofessions. In all these it is true to say thatneither too much nor too little ought to bedone or passed over but that which holds themiddle and is in accord with what rightreason determines. But the man, whoconsiders the common feature alone, will notknow how to proceed to action by reason ofthis generality. If a person were to ask whatought to be given to restore bodily health, andsomeone advised him to give what isprescribed by medical art and by one who hasthis art, i.e., a doctor, the interrogator wouldnot know from such information whatmedicine the sick man needs. But as the rightplan of prudence is the guide in moral mattersso the right plan of art is the guide in art.Hence it is evident that the principle discussedis insufficient.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod oportetetc., concludit quod simili ratione circahabitus animae (oportet quod) non

1112. At For this reason [I, B, C] heconcludes by like reasoning that a generalstatement on the souls habits is insufficient a

solum vere dicatur aliquid in communi,sed quod distincte determinetur quae sitratio recta et quis sit terminus, idestdefinitio rationis rectae vel etiamsecundum quid ratio recta determinaripossit.

precise definition of the limits of right reasonand its norm must be determined.

Deinde cum dicit: animae autem virtutesetc., continuat se ad praecedentia. Etdicit quod cum supra in fine Idiviserimus virtutes animae hoc modoquod quasdam diximus esse morales,quasdam intellectuales ex quo demoralibus determinatum est, restatquod determinemus de reliquis, id est deintellectualibus, secundum quas ipsaratio rectificatur: ita tamen quod priusaliqua dicenda sunt de ipsa anima, sinecuius cognitione non possunt cognoscianimae virtutes, ut supra in fine primidictum est.

1113. Then [I, C], at We have, however,already divided etc., he continues, with aprevious discussion. He says that in makingthe division at the end of the first book (234),we spoke of the virtues of the soul as beingeither intellectual or moral. Since we havecompleted the investigation of the moralvirtues (245-1108), it remains for us toexamine the intellectual virtues in accord withwhich reason itself is regulated, prefacing thiswith a discussion of certain things about thesoul (for without this knowledge the virtuesof the soul cannot be known), as was notedpreviously at the end of the first book (228).

Deinde cum dicit: prius quidem igituretc., incipit prosequi propositum. Etprimo determinat quae dicenda sunt deanima. Secundo prosequitur devirtutibus intellectualibus, ibi,sumendum ergo utriusque horum etcetera. Circa primum duo facit: primoresumit divisionem partium animaesupra positam in fine primi. Secundosubdividit alterum membrum, ibi, nuncautem de rationem habente et cetera.Dicit ergo primo, quod prius dictum estquod duae sunt partes animae: una quaeest habens rationem et alia quae estirrationalis. Dictum est autem supraquod id quod est rationem habens peressentiam, perficitur per virtutesintellectuales id autem quod estirrationale, participans tamen ratione,perficitur per virtutes morales.

1114. Next [II], at We said before, hebegins to follow up his proposition. First [II,A] he explains what is to be discussed aboutthe soul. Then [Lect. 2, (II), B] at We must,then etc., he pursues the intellectual virtues(B. 1139 a 16). On the initial point he doesthree things. First [II, A, A] he resumes thedivision of the parts of the soul givenpreviously at the end of the first book. Second[II, A, B], at Now we will etc., he subdividesone member. He says first it was previouslystated that there are two parts of the soul:one is rational, the other irrational. It hasbeen explained before (243) that the partwhich is essentially rational is perfected by theintellectual virtues. But the irrational part,which, however, participates in rationality, isperfected by the moral virtues.

Deinde cum dicit: nunc autem etc.,subdividit alterum membrum praedictaedivisionis. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primoproponit divisionem. Secundo probat, ibi,ad ea enim quae genere altera et cetera.Tertio imponit nomina membrisdivisionis, ibi, dicatur autem et cetera.Dicit ergo primo quod, quia nuncintendimus de virtutibus intellectualibusquae perficiunt partem animaerationalem, ideo ad distinguendumvirtutes intellectuales oportet dividererationem habens eodem modo quo supradivisimus partes animae non quasi exprincipali intentione, sed secundum quodsufficit ad propositum. Supponatur ergoquod pars rationalis dividatur in duas:una quidem est per quam speculamurilla entia, scilicet necessaria, quorumprincipia non possunt aliter se habere,alia autem pars (est) per quamspeculamur contingentia.

1115. At Now we will [II, A, B] hesubdivides one member of this division. Onthis point he does three things. First [ B 1]he proposes the division. Next [B, 2], at Tothe objects, which differ etc. he explains themembers of the division. Last [ B, 3 1, atLet one of these be called etc., he names themembers of the division. He says first that,since we have in mind the intellectual virtuesthat perfect the rational part of the soul, inorder to distinguish the intellectual virtues wemust divide the rational part in the same wayas we have previously divided the parts of thesoul (229)not as it were by reason of itsprincipal aspect but in a way sufficient for ourpurpose. Let us suppose, then, that the organof reason is divided into two parts: one bywhich we consider those necessary thingswhose principles cannot be otherwise theother, by which we consider contingentthings.

Deinde cum dicit ad ea enim quae generealtera etc., probat praemissamdivisionem tali ratione. Ad obiecta quaedifferunt genere necesse est quoddiversa genera partium animaeadaptentur. Manifestum est autem quodcontingens et necessarium differuntgenere, sicut habetur de corruptibili etincorruptibili decimo metaphysicaerelinquitur ergo quod sit diversumgenus partium animae rationalis quocognoscit necessaria et contingentia.

1116. Then [B, 2], at To the objects, whichdiffer, he explains the afore-mentioneddivision by this reasoning [2, a]. It isnecessary that different kinds of parts of thesoul should correspond to objects differing inkind. But obviously the contingent and thenecessary differ in kind, as is notedconcerning the corruptible and incorruptiblein the tenth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 15,1058 b 26 sq. St. Th. Lect. 12, 2136-2145).Therefore we conclude that by adifferentiation of parts the rational soulknows necessary and contingent things.

Maiorem autem propositionem probatibi: si quidem secundum similitudinem etcetera. Et hoc tali ratione. Partibusanimae inest cognitio secundum quodhabent similitudinem quamdam ad res

1117. Next [2, b], at since indeed? heexplains the major proposition in this way.Knowledge exists in parts of the soulaccording as they have a certain likeness tothe things known. By this we do not mean

cognitas non quidem ita quod rescognita sit actu in natura potentiaecognoscentis, sicut Empedocles posuitquod terra terram cognoscimus, igneignem, et sic de aliis: sed inquantumquaelibet potentia animae secundumsuam proprietatem est proportionata adtalia cognoscenda, sicut visus adcognoscendos colores et auditus adcognoscendos sonos. Sed eorum quaesunt invicem similia et proportionata esteadem ratio distinctionis. Ergo, sicutcognita per rationem genere differunt,ita et partes animae rationalis.

that the thing actually known is in thesubstance of the knowing faculty (asEmpedocles held: that we know earth byearth, fire by fire, and so on) but inasmuch aseach power of the soul according to itspeculiar nature is proportioned to knowobjects of this kind, as sight to see color andhearing to perceive sound. But in things thatare similar and proportioned to one anotherthe same reason for distinction exists.Therefore, as the things known by reasondiffer in kind, so also the parts of the rationalsoul differ.

Deinde cum dicit: dicatur autem etc.,imponit nomina praedictis partibus. Etdicit quod praedictarum partiumrationalis animae una quidem quaespeculatur necessaria potest diciscientificum genus animae, quia scientiade necessariis est alia autem pars potestdici rationativa, secundum quodratiocinari et consiliari pro eodemsumitur. Nominat enim consiliumquamdam inquisitionem nondumdeterminatam, sicut et ratiocinatio.Quae quidem indeterminatio maximeaccidit circa contingentia, de quibus solisest consilium. Nullus enim consiliatur dehis quae non contingit aliter se haberesic ergo sequitur quod ratiocinativum situna pars animae rationem habentis.

1118. At Let one of these be called [B, 3],he names the afore-mentioned parts. He saysthat, of these parts of the rational soul, theone that considers necessary things may becalled the scientific kind of soul because itsknowledge is of the necessary. But anotherpart may be called the estimative kind(ratiocinativa) according as estimating anddeliberating are taken for the same thing. Hecalls deliberation a certain inquiry not yetconcluded, like argumentation. Thisindetermination of mind happens especially inregard to contingent things that are the onlysubjects of deliberation, for no one deliberatesabout things that take place in one fixed mode.So, then, it follows that the estimativeelement is one part of the rational soul.

Videtur autem quod philosophus hicdeterminat, dubitationem habere. Ipseenim in tertio de anima distinguitintellectum in duo, scilicet in agens etpossibile: et dicit quod agens est quo estomnia facere, possibilis autem est quoest omnia fieri. Sic ergo tam intellectusagens quam possibilis secundumpropriam rationem ad omnia se habet.

1119. What the Philosopher here determinesseems to be doubtful. In the third book DeAnima (Ch. 4, 429 a 10 sq. St. Th. Lect. 7,671 sq.) he divides the intellect into two parts,viz., the active and the potential. He says thatthe active intellect is the power of operatingon all things and the potential, the power ofbecoming all things. So, then, both the activeintellect and the potential by their very nature

Esset ergo contra rationem utriusqueintellectus, si alia pars animae essetquae intelligit necessaria et quaeintelligit contingentia.

are in touch with all things. Therefore, itwould be contrary to the nature of eachintellect, if there was one part of the soul thatunderstood necessary things, and anothercontingent things.

Rursum, verum necessarium et verumcontingens videntur se habere sicutperfectum et imperfectum in genere veri.Eadem autem potentia animaecognoscimus perfecta et imperfecta ineodem genere, sicut visus lucida ettenebrosa: multo igitur magis eadempotentia intellectiva cognoscitnecessaria et contingentia.

1120. Again, the true in necessary matterand the true in contingent matter resembleperfect and imperfect in the genus of what istrue. But by the same power of the soul weknow both perfect and imperfect things of thesame genus, for example, sight perceivesbright and dark objects. Much more, then, thesame intellective power knows necessary andcontingent things.

Item, universalius se habet intellectus adintelligibilia quam sensus ad sensibilia.Quanto enim aliqua virtus est altior,tanto est magis unita. Sensus autemvisus percipit et incorruptibilia, scilicetcaelestia corpora, et corruptibilia,scilicet inferiora: quibus proportionaliterrespondere videntur necessarium etcontingens: multo igitur magis eademintellectiva potentia cognoscitnecessaria et contingentia.

1121. Likewise, the intellect touchesintelligible objects in a more universal waythan the senses touch sensible objects. Nowthe nobler the power the more united is itsactivity. But the sense of sight shares in bothincorruptible (heavenly) bodies andcorruptible (lower) bodies, to which thenecessary and contingent proportionatelycorrespond. For a far greater reason, then,the intellective power knows both necessaryand contingent.

Videtur etiam et probatio quam inducit,efficax non esse. Non enim quaelibetdiversitas generis in obiectis requiritdiversas potentias, alioquin non eadempotentia visiva videremus plantas et aliaanimalia, sed sola illa diversitas quaerespicit formalem rationem obiecti: putasi esset diversum genus coloris velluminis, oporteret esse diversaspotentias visivas. Obiectum autemintellectus proprium est quod quid est,quod est commune omnibus etsubstantiis et accidentibus, licet noneodem modo. Unde et eadem intellectiva

1122. Moreover, the proof that he presentsdoes not seem to be convincing. Not everydifference in the classification of the objectrequires different powers (otherwise we wouldnot see plants and other animals by the samepower of sight) but that difference regardingthe formal reason of the object. For instance,if there were a different genus of color or lightthere would have to be different powers ofsight. But the proper object of the intellect isthat which exists, something common to allsubstances and accidents, although not in thesame way. Hence we know both substancesand accidents by the same intellective power.

potentia cognoscimus substantias etaccidentia. Pari ergo ratione diversitasgeneris necessariorum et contingentiumnon requirit diversas potentiasintellectivas.

Therefore, by the same token the difference inthe classification of necessary and contingentthings does not require different intellectivepowers.

Haec autem dubitatio de facili solvitur siquis consideret quod contingentiadupliciter cognosci possunt. Uno modosecundum rationes universales aliomodo secundum quod sunt inparticulari. Universales quidem igiturrationes contingentium immutabilessunt, et secundum hoc de hisdemonstrationes dantur et ad scientiasdemonstrativas pertinet eorum cognitio.Non enim scientia naturalis est solum derebus necessariis et incorruptibilibus,sed etiam de rebus corruptibilibus etcontingentibus. Unde patet quodcontingentia sic considerata ad eandempartem animae intellectivae pertinent adquam et necessaria, quam philosophusvocat hic scientificum et sic proceduntrationes inductae. Alio modo possuntaccipi contingentia secundum quod suntin particulari: et sic variabilia sunt neccadit supra ea intellectus nisimediantibus potentiis sensitivis. Unde etinter partes animae sensitivas ponituruna potentia quae dicitur ratioparticularis, sive vis cogitativa, quae estcollativa intentionum particularium sicautem accipit hic philosophuscontingentia: ita enim cadunt subconsilio et operatione. Et propter hoc addiversas partes animae rationalispertinere dicit necessaria etcontingentia, sicut universaliaspeculabilia et particularia operabilia.

1123. This doubt is easily solved byconsidering that contingent things can beunderstood in two ways: in one way accordingto their universal concepts (rationes), in theother way as they are in the concrete.Accordingly, the universal concepts ofcontingent things are immutable. In this waydemonstrations are given about contingentthings, and the knowledge of them belongs tothe demonstrative sciences. Natural science isconcerned not only with necessary andincorruptible things but also with corruptibleand contingent things. Hence it is evidentthat contingent things considered in this waybelong to the same part of the intellective soul(called scientific by the Philosopher) asnecessary things, and the reasons presentedproceed with this understanding. In the otherway contingent things can be taken as theyare in the real order. Thus understood theyare variable and do not fall under the intellectexcept by means of the sensitive powers. So,among the parts of the sensitive soul we placea power called particular reason or thesensory power of judgment, which collatesparticular impressions. It is in this sense thatthe Philosopher here understands contingentthings, for thus they are objects of counseland operation. For this reason he says thatnecessary and contingent things, likespeculative universals and individual operablethings, belong to different parts of therational soul.

LECTURE 2Function Proper to Each Part of the Soul

Chapter 1

B. He considers the particular intellectual virtues.

A He investigates the ways of understanding the intellectual virtues.

1. HE PROPOSES THE COMMON NOTION OF VIRTUE. 1124-1125

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We must, then, ascertain what is the mostexcellent habit of each of these parts, for this istheir virtue.

Chapter 2

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But virtue is directed to the work that isproper.

2. HE INQUIRES WHAT THE GOOD OF THE RATIONAL SOULIS IN REGARD TO EACH PART.

a. He shows what the principles of human acts are.

i. He proposes three ingredients that are called principlesof human acts. 1126

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Three things in the soul seem to have powerover action and truth: the senses, intellect, andappetitive faculty.

ii. He excludes one of them. 1127

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But one of these, viz., the senses is not aprinciple of any action. This is obvious becausedumb animals have senses but do not share inaction.

iii. He shows how the remaining two can harmonize.

x. HE SHOWS HOW THEIR ACTIONS AREPROPORTIONABLE. 1128

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Now, affirmation and negation are in the mind,and corresponding to these in the appetitivefaculty are pursuit and flight.

y. HE SHOWS HOW THESE ACTIONS... ARE INAGREEMENT. 1129

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Therefore, since moral virtue is a habit of freechoice, and choice is the appetitive facultydeliberating, then reason must be true and theappetitive faculty right if choice is to be goodand the same things that reason affirms, theappetitive faculty pursues. Hence this mind andits truth are practical.

b. He seeks what the proper work of reason is.

i. He shows how each part is related to truth. 1130-1132

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However, it is the function of the speculativemind (but not the practical) as it operates ingood or faulty fashion, to express truth andfalsity. This belongs to every intellect but thegood of the practical intellect is truthconformable to a right appetitive faculty.

ii. He shows how each part is related to action.

x. HE EXPLAINS THAT THE MIND IS A PRINCIPLEOF ACTION. 1133-1134

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Choice, then, is a principle of action, and so ofmotion but not as a final cause. But, for choiceitself the principles are the appetitive facultyand the reason which is terminative. Hencechoice does not exist without intellect andmind, nor without moral habit, for good andbad actions cannot exist without the intellector mind and moral disposition.

y. HE SHOWS OF WHAT MIND HE SPEAKS.

aa. He explains the proposition. 1135-1136

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Still, mind itself does not move any thing, butthe mind that has a purpose and is practicaldoes so, for it governs even the operationwhich fashions some product. Indeed everyworker produces for the sake of something heis not induced to act for an end in general butfor a particular thing made for some use hedoes not act merely for the sake of acting. Thegood action itself is an end but the appetitivefaculty is for some particular end.

bb. He infers a corollary. 1137

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Therefore, choice is either the appetitiveintellect or the intellective faculty of appetition,and man is this kind of principle.

z. HE EXPLAINS ABOUT WHAT KIND OF OBJECTSTHE MIND IS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. 1138-1139

What has already taken place is not now an

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object of choice, e.g., no one now chooses tohave captured Ilion. Nor does anyone giveadvice about something past, but about afuture and contingent event. It is not possiblethat what has taken place did not occur.Therefore Agathon was right, for God lacksonly thisto undo things already done.

c. He draws the conclusion he sought to establish. 1140

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In any case the work of each of the intellectsparts is the knowledge of the truth.

3. HE INFERS THE NATURE AND QUALITY OF THEVIRTUES OF EACH PART. 1141

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These habits according to which each partespecially manifests the truth are the virtues ofboth divisions of the intellect.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Sumendum ergo utriusque horum etcetera. Postquam philosophusdistinxit partes animae rationemhabentis secundum quod estnecessarium ad propositum, hicincipit agere de ipsis virtutibusintellectualibus quibus utraque parsanimae rationalis perficitur. Et primodeterminat de singulis intellectualiumvirtutum. Secundo movet quamdamdubitationem de utilitate ipsarum, ibi,dubitabit autem utique aliquis etcetera. Circa primum duo facit.

1124. After the Philosopher has divided theparts of the rational soul as required for hispurpose, he now begins to examine theintellectual virtues themselves by which eachpart of the rational soul is perfected. First [B] heconsiders the particular intellectual virtues.Then [Lect. 10, I], at Someone may raise adoubt etc. (B. 1143 b 17), he expresses a certaindoubt about their utility. On the first point hedoes two things. First [A] he investigates theways of understanding the intellectual virtues.Next [Lect. 3], at Introducing again the subjectetc. (B. 1139 b 14), he sets himself to examine

Primo investigat rationes accipiendivirtutes intellectuales. Secundoincipit de eis agere, ibi, incipientesigitur superius et cetera. Circaprimum tria facit. Primo proponitcommunem rationem virtutis, proutin primo dictum est, quod virtusalicuius est, quae opus eius bonumreddit. Secundo inquirit quid sitbonum opus animae rationemhabentis, quantum ad utramquepartem, ibi: tria autem sunt in animaet cetera. Tertio concludit quae velquales sint virtutes utriusque partis,ibi, secundum quos igitur et cetera.

them. On the initial point he does three things.First [A, 1 ] he proposes the common notion ofvirtue as stated in the beginning (65, 81): thatwhich renders the work of a thing good is itsvirtue. Then [A, 2], at Three things in the souletc., he inquires what the good of the rationalsoul is in regard to each part. Last [A, 3], atThese habits according to which etc., he infersthe nature and quality of the virtues of each part.

Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo positaesunt duae partes rationem habentis,cui attribuuntur virtutesintellectuales, sumendum est, quis estoptimus habitus utriusquepraedictarum partium, quia talishabitus necesse est quod sit virtusutriusque partis. Dictum est autemsupra, quod virtus uniuscuiusque reideterminatur ad proprium opus, quodscilicet bene perficitur secundumvirtutem. Hic autem dicitur optimushabitus, quo optime perficitur aliquodopus.

1125. He says first that, because we haveassigned two parts of the rational soul (to whichthe intellectual virtues are ascribed), we mustunderstand which is the most excellent habit ofeach of these two parts. The reason is that eachhabit is necessarily a virtue of each part. It hasbeen noted (308, 536) that the virtue ofanything is directed to its characteristicoperation, for this is perfected by virtue. Such ahabit would be best when it insures that anaction is performed in the best way.

Deinde cum dicit: tria autem sunt inanima etc., inquirit quid sit propriumopus utriusque praedictarumpartium. Et circa hoc tria facit.Primo ostendit, quae sint principiapropriorum actuum hominis secundoinquirit quid sit proprium opusrationis, ibi, speculativae autemmentis et cetera. Tertio infertconclusionem intentam, ibi,utrarumque utique et cetera. Circaprimum tria facit. Primo proponit

1126. Then [A, 2 ], at Three things in thesoul, he inquires what the proper good of eachof these parts is. On this point he does threethings. First [2, a] he shows what the principlesof human acts are. Next [2, b], at However, it isthe function etc., he seeks what the proper workof reason is. Last [2, c], at In any case the worketc., he draws the conclusion he sought toestablish. On the initial point he does threethings. First [a, i] he proposes three ingredientsthat are called principles of human acts. Then [a,ii], at But one of these etc., he excludes one of

tria, quae videntur esse principiahumanorum actuum secundoexcludit unum eorum, ibi, horumautem sensus et cetera. Tertioostendit, quomodo duo reliquaadinvicem concordare possunt, ibi,est autem, quod in mente et cetera.Circa primum considerandum est,quod duo opera videntur esse propriahomini, scilicet cognitio veritatis etactus: inquantum scilicet homo agittamquam dominus proprii actus etnon sicut actus vel ductus ab alio.Super haec igitur duo videnturhabere dominium et potestatem, triaquae sunt in anima, scilicet sensus etintellectus et appetitus. His enimtribus moventur animalia, ut diciturin tertio de anima.

them. Finally [a, iii], at Now, affirmation andnegation etc., he shows how the remaining twocan harmonize with each other. In regard to thefirst we must consider that two works are said tobe proper to man, namely, knowledge of truthand action, inasmuch as man assumes masteryof his own action (and as moved or led bysomething). Over these two, then three things inthe soul: senses, intellect, and appetitive faculty,seem to have mastery and power. It is by thesame three that animals move themselves, aswas noted in the third book De Anima (Ch. 10,433 a 9 sq. St. Th. Lect. 15, 818-819).

Deinde cum dicit: horum autem etc.,excludit ab eo, quod dictum est, unumeorum, scilicet sensum. Et de veritatequidem manifestum est, quod nonpertinet neque ad sensum neque adappetitum, proponit autem ulterius,quod inter praedicta tria, sensusnullius actus principium est, eoscilicet modo, ut per sensum haberipossit dominium actus. Quod quidemmanifestum est per hoc, quod bestiaehabent quidem sensum, non tamencommunicant aliquem actum, quianon habent dominium sui actus. Nonenim a seipsis agunt, sed moventurinstinctu naturae.

1127. Next [a, ii], at But one of these, heexcludes one of them, viz., the senses, fromfurther consideration. It is certainly obvious thattruth pertains neither to the senses nor to theappetitive faculty. He adds further that one ofthe three, the senses, is not a principle of anyaction, in such a way that mastery of the actioncan be established. This is clear from the factthat dumb animals have senses but do not havesocial action because they are not masters oftheir own action they do not operate fromthemselves but are moved by natural instinct.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem quod inmente etc., ostendit quomodo operaduorum reliquorum, scilicetintellectus et appetitus, possintadinvicem concordare. Et primoostendit quomodo eorum actus sunt

1128. At Now, affirmation and negation, [a,iii], he shows how the work of the remainingtwo, namely, intellect and appetitive faculty, canharmonize one with the other. First [a, iii, x] heshows how their actions are proportionable. Injudging, the intellect has two actions, viz.,

sibi proportionales. Intellectus enimin iudicando habet duos actus, scilicetaffirmationem qua assentit vero, etnegationem qua dissentit a falso.Quibus duobus respondent duoproportionaliter in vi appetitiva,scilicet persecutio qua appetitustendit in bonum et inhaeret ei, et fugaqua recedit a malo et dissentit ei. Etsecundum hoc intellectus et appetituspossunt conformari, inquantum idquod intellectus affirmat bonumappetitus prosequitur, et id quodintellectus negat esse bonumappetitus fugit.

affirmation by which it assents to what is true,and negation by which it dissents from what isfalse. To these two correspond proportionatelytwo acts in the appetitive faculty, namely,pursuit by which the appetitive faculty tends andadheres to good, and flight by which itwithdraws and dissents from evil. In this mannerthe intellect and the appetitive faculty can bebrought into harmony inasmuch as what theintellect declares good the appetitive facultypursues, and what the intellect denies to be goodthe appetitive faculty seeks to avoid.

Secundo ibi: quare quia moralis etc.,quia concludit quomodo in moralibusvirtutibus praedicti actus intellectuset appetitus sibi concordant. Virtusenim moralis est habitus electivus, utdictum est in secundo. Electio autemest appetitus consiliativus, inquantum scilicet appetitus accipitquod praeconsiliatum est, ut dictumest in tertio. Consiliari autem estactus unius partis rationis, ut suprahabitum est. Quia igitur adelectionem concurrit et ratio etappetitus si electio debeat esse bona,quod requiritur ad rationem virtutismoralis, oportet quod et ratio sitvera, et appetitus sit rectus, itascilicet quod eadem quae ratio dicitidest affirmat, appetitus prosequatur.Ad hoc enim quod sit perfectio inactu, oportet quod nullumprincipiorum eius sit imperfectum.Sed haec mens, scilicet ratio quae sicconcordat appetitui recto, et veritaseius, est practica.

1129. Then [a, iii, y], at Therefore, since moralvirtue, he shows how these actions of theintellect and appetitive facultytouching themoral virtuesare in agreement. Moral virtue isa habit of free choice, as was said in the secondbook (305, 308, 382). Choice is the appetitivefaculty deliberating inasmuch as the appetitivefaculty takes what was pre-considered, as wasstated in the third book (435, 436, 457). But tocounsel is an act of one part of the reason, aswas previously shown (473, 476, 482, 1118).Since then reason and appetitive faculty concurin choice, if choice ought to be goodthis isrequired for the nature of a moral virtuethereason must be true and the appetitive facultyright, so that the same thing which reasondeclares or affirms, the appetitive facultypursues. In order that there be perfection inaction it is necessary that none of its principlesbe imperfect. But this intellect or reason (whichharmonizes in this way with the right appetitivefaculty) and its truth are practical.

Deinde cum dicit speculativae autem 1130. Next [2, b], at However, it is the

mentis etc., ostendit quid sit opusrationem habentis, secundumutramque partem. Et primo ostenditquomodo utraque pars se habeat adveritatem secundo quomodo utraquepars se habeat ad actum, ibi, actusquidem igitur et cetera. Dicit ergoprimo quod bene et male mentis, idestintellectus vel rationis, quae estspeculativa, et non practica, consistitsimpliciter in vero et falso ita scilicetquod verum absolutum est bonumeius, et falsum absolutum est malumipsius. Dicere enim verum et falsumest opus pertinens ad quemlibetintellectum. Sed bonum practiciintellectus non est veritas absoluta,sed veritas confesse se habens, idestconcorditer ad appetitum rectum,sicut ostensum est, quod sic virtutesmorales concordant.

function he explains what the work of therational soul is in terms of each part. First [b, i]he shows how each part is related to truth. Then[b, ii], at Choice, then, is etc., he shows howeach part is related to action. He says first thatthe work of a good or faulty mind (i.e., intellector reason), in the speculative rather thanpractical order, consists simply in the true andfalse, in such a way that the absolutely true is itsgood and the absolutely false is its evil. Toexpress the true and the false is an essentialfunction of every intellect. But the good of thepractical intellect is not absolute truth but theconformable truth, i.e., corresponding to aright appetitive faculty, as has been shown 022,326, 548), because on this point the moralvirtues are united.

Videtur autem hic esse quoddamdubium. Nam si veritas intellectuspractici determinatur incomparatione ad appetitum rectum,appetitus autem rectitudodeterminatur per hoc quod consonatrationi verae, ut prius dictum est,sequetur quaedam circulatio in dictisdeterminationibus. Et ideo dicendumest, quod appetitus est finis et eorumquae sunt ad finem: finis autemdeterminatus est homini a natura, utsupra in III habitum est. Ea autemquae sunt ad finem, non sunt nobisdeterminata a natura, sed perrationem investigantur sic ergomanifestum est quod rectitudoappetitus per respectum ad finem estmensura veritatis in ratione practica.Et secundum hoc determinaturveritas rationis practicae secundum

1131. However, there seems to be some difficultyhere. If the truth of the practical intellect isdetermined by comparison with a right appetitivefaculty and the rectitude of the appetitive facultyis determined by the fact that it agrees withright reason, as was previously shown, anapparent vicious circle results from thesestatements. Therefore, we must say that the endand the means pertain to the appetitive faculty,but the end is determined for man by nature, aswas shown in the third book (524, 525). On thecontrary, the means are not determined for us bynature but are to be investigated by reason. So itis obvious that rectitude of the appetitive facultyin regard to the end is the measure of truth forthe practical reason. According to this the truthof the practical reason is determined byagreement with a right appetitive faculty. Butthe truth of the practical reason itself is the rulefor the rectitude of the appetitive faculty inregard to the means. According to this, then, the

concordiam ad appetitum rectum.Ipsa autem veritas rationis practicaeest regula rectitudinis appetitus,circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ideosecundum hoc dicitur appetitusrectus qui persequitur quae veraratio dicit.

appetitive faculty is called right inasmuch as itpursues the things that reason calls true.

Videtur etiam hic esse dubium de hoc,quod prosequitur de speculativo etpractico intellectu quasi de duabuspartibus supra positis, scilicetscientifico et ratiocinativo, cumtamen supra dixit esse diversaspartes animae scientificum etrationativum, quod de intellectuspeculativo et practico ipse negat inIII de anima. Dicendum est ergo quodintellectus practicus principiumquidem habet in universaliconsideratione, et secundum hoc estidem subiecto cum speculativo, sedterminatur eius consideratio inparticulari operabili. Undephilosophus dicit in tertio de anima,quod ratio universalis non movet sineparticulari, et secundum hocrationativum ponitur diversa parsanimae a scientifico.

1132. A further confusion arises here from themanner in which he connects the speculative andpractical intellectas with the two parts givenabove (1118): the scientific and the estimativesince he stated previously (1123) that thescientific and estimative were different parts, athing he denies about the speculative andpractical intellect in the third book De Anima(Ch. 10, 433 a 15 sq. St. Th. Lect. 15, 820-821). Therefore, we must say that the practicalintellect has a beginning in a universalconsideration and, according to this, is the samein subject with the speculative, but itsconsideration terminates in an individualoperable thing. Hence the Philosopher says inthe third book De Anima (Ch. 11, 434 a 16 sq.St. Th. Lect. 16, 845-846) that universal reasondoes not move without the particular. In thisway the estimative is considered a different partfrom the scientific.

Deinde cum dicit: actus quidem igituretc., ostendit quomodo utraque ratiose habeat ad actum. Et circa hoc triafacit. Primo ostendit quod mens estprincipium actus secundo quae mens,ibi: mens autem ipsa et cetera. Tertioostendit circa qualia mens sitprincipium actus, ibi: non est autemeligibile et cetera. Concludit ergoprimo ex his quae supra dicta sunt,quod ex quo electio est appetitusconsiliativus, sequitur, quod sit actusprincipium unde motus, idest per

1133. At Choice, then, is the principle [b, ii], heshows that each reason has a relation to action.On this point he does three things. First [ii, x] heexplains that the mind is a principle of action.Second [ii, y], at Still, mind itself etc., he showsof what mind he speaks. Third [ii, z], at Whathas already taken place, he explains about whatkinds of objects the mind is the active principle.First he concludes from what was just said(1129) that because choice is the appetitivefaculty deliberating, consequently it is a principleof action, and so of motion, i.e., in the manner ofan efficient cause but not for the sake of

modum causae efficientis, sed noncuius gratia, idest per modum causaefinalis. Dictum est enim in tertio deanima, quod appetitus est movens inanimalibus. Sed ipsius electionis suntprincipia appetitus et ratio quae estgratia alicuius, id est quae ordinaturad aliquod operabile sicut ad finem.Est enim electio appetitus eorumquae sunt ad finem. Unde ratioproponens finem, et ex eo procedensad ratiocinandum et appetitustendens in finem comparantur adelectionem per modum causae. Etinde est, quod electio dependet et abintellectu sive mente et ab habitumorali, qui perficit vim appetitivam,ita quod non est sine utroque eorum.

something, i.e., in the manner of a final cause.We have already said in the third book De Anima(Ch. 10, 433 b 27-31 St. Th. Lect. 15, 836-837)that the appetitive faculty is a source ofmovement in animals. But, for choice itself theprinciples are the appetitive faculty and thereason that is purposive, i.e., which is ordered toa practical thing as to an end, for the choice ofthe appetitive faculty is concerned with thethings that are for the end. Hence reasonproposing an end and thereupon proceeding tothink discursively about it, and the appetitivefaculty tending to the end, are compared tochoice as a cause. So it is that choice depends onthe intellect (or mind) and on the moral habitthat perfects the appetitive power in such a waythat it does not exist without either of them.

Et hoc probat per signum. Effectusenim electionis est actio, ut dictumest. Actio autem bona et contrariumin actione, idest mala actio, nonpotest esse sine mente et more, id estsine morali quacumque dispositionead appetitum pertinente. Unde necelectio bona vel mala est sine menteet more.

1134. He gives a sign in proof of this, for theeffect of choice is action, as was pointed out. Butthe action that is good, and its direct opposite inaction (i.e., the action that is evil) cannot existwithout the mind and disposition or moralcondition, i.e., some inclination belonging to theappetitive faculty. Hence neither does choice,good or bad, exist without disposition and mind.

Deinde cum dicit: mens autem ipsaetc., ostendit, quae mens vel ratio sitprincipium actus. Et primo ostenditpropositum. Secundo infert quoddamcorollarium ex dictis, ibi, propterquod, vel appetitivus et cetera. Dicitergo primo, quod quamvis mens sitprincipium actus, tamen mens ipsa,secundum se absolute considerataidest ratio speculativa, nihil movet,quia nihil dicit de imitabili etfugiendo, ut dicitur in III de anima, etsic non est principium alicuius actussed solum illa quae est gratia huius,

1135- Then [ii, y], at Still, mind itself, heshows what mind or reason is the principle ofaction. First [y, aa] he explains the proposition.Next [y, bb], at Therefore, choice is either etc.,he infers a corollary from what has beendiscussed. He says first that, although the mindis a principle of action, nevertheless the mindsimply considered in itself (or the speculativereason) does not move anything because itprescribes nothing about pursuit or flight, aswas stated in the third book De Anima (Ch. 9,432 b 27-33 St. Th. Lect. 14, 812-815), Henceit is not the speculative mind that is a principle ofaction but the mind having a purpose or ordained

idest quae ordinatur ad aliquodparticulare operabile sicut ad finemet haec est mens vel ratio practica,quae quidem non solum principaturactivae operationi, quae non transitin exteriorem materiam, sed manet inagente ut concupiscere et irasci: sedetiam factivae, quae transit inexteriorem materiam sicut urere etsecare.

to an individual operable thing as an end. This isthe practical reason or mind, and it governs notonly active operation, which does not pass intoexternal matter but remains in the agentlikedesiring and becoming angrybut also factiveoperation which does pass into external matterburning and cutting for instance.

Et hoc probat per hoc, quod omnisfaciens, puta faber aut aedificator,facit suum opus gratia huius, idestpropter finem, et non propter finemin universali, sed ad aliquidparticulare quod est factum, idestconstitutum in exteriori materia,puta cultellus, aut domus et non estfinis aliquid actum, idest aliquidagibile in agente existens, puta recteconcupiscere aut irasci facit etiamomnis faciens propter aliquid factumquod est alicuius, id est quod habetaliquem usum, sicut usus domus esthabitatio et talis quidem est finisfacientis, scilicet factum et nonactum. Ideo autem non actum, quiain agibilibus ipsa bona actio est finis,puta bene concupiscere vel beneirasci. Et sicut mens practica estgratia huius finis vel facti velactionis, ita etiam appetitus estalicuius particularis finis.

1136. He proves this by the fact that everyworker, say the carpenter or builder, makes hisproduct for the sake of something, i.e., for an endnot an abstract one but with a view to someparticular thing that is made or established inexternal matter, for instance, a knife or a house.Moreover, the end is not something done, i.e., apracticable thing existing in the agent, likerightly desiring or becoming angry. Everyworker acts for the sake of something belongingto a thing, i.e., which has some use, as -the use ofa house is habitation. This then is the end of theworker, viz., something made and not a thingdone, Therefore, it is not something done, sincein immanent actions the good action itself is theend, for example, rightly desiring or justlybecoming angry. As the practical mind is for thesake of this end, either a thing made or an action,so also the appetitive faculty is for the sake ofsome particular end.

Deinde cum dicit propter quod etc.,infert quoddam corollarium expraemissis. Quia enim electio estprincipium actus et electionisprincipia sunt appetitus et ratio siveintellectus aut mens, quae medianteelectione sunt principia actus,consequens est quod electio vel sit

1137. Next [y, bb], at Therefore, choice iseither, he draws a corollary from the premises.Because choice is a principle of action, and theprinciples of choice are the appetitive faculty andreason (i.e., intellect or mind), which by means ofchoice are principles of action, it follows thatchoice is of the appetitive intellect (in such a waythat choice is essentially an act of the intellect

intellectus appetitivus, ita scilicetquod electio sit essentialiter actusintellectus, secundum quod ordinatappetitum vel sit appetitusintellectivus, ita scilicet quod electiosit essentialiter actus appetitus,secundum quod dirigitur abintellectu. Et hoc verius est: quodpatet ex obiectis. Obiectum enimelectionis est bonum et malum, sicutet appetitus non autem verum etfalsum, quae pertinent ad intellectum.Et tale principium est homo, scilicetagens, eligendo per intellectum etappetitum.

according as it orders the appetitive faculty) or itis of the intellective faculty of appetition (in sucha way that choice is essentially an act of theappetitive faculty according as it is directed bythe intellect). The latter is nearer the truth, as isclear from the objects. The object of choice, asalso of the appetitive faculty, is good and evil butnot true and false which pertain to the intellectas such. A principle of this kind is man, viz., anagent choosing by means of intellect andappetitive faculty.

Deinde cum dicit: non est autemeligibile etc., ostendit circa qualiamens sit principium actus perelectionem. Et dicit quod nihil factum,idest nullum praeteritum est eligibile,sicut nullus eligit Ilion, idest Troiamfuisse captam. Cuius ratio est, quiaelectio est appetitus praeconsiliati, utdictum est. Nullus enim consiliatur defacto, id est de praeterito, sed defuturo. Et hoc probat: consilium nonest nisi de aliquo contingenti, utsupra habitum est. Factum autem idest praeteritum, non est contingens,quia non contingit ipsum non fieri,idest quod non sit factum et ad hocinducit verbum Agathonis qui rectedixit: quod solo isto posse privaturDeus, ut faciat ingenita, id est nonfacta quae sunt facta. Et hoc rectedixit.

1138. At What has already taken place [ii, z]he explains the kinds of objects the mind isconcerned with as the principle of action bypower of choice. He says that nothing over anddone with, i.e., nothing past is an object ofchoice, for instance, no one chooses Ilion, that is,to have captured Troy. The reason is that choicebelongs to the deliberating faculty of appetition,as already noted (1129, 1133). But no one takescounsel about something done, i.e., about a pastevent but about a future and contingent one. Heproves this from the fact that counsel is givenonly about a contingent event, as shownpreviously (460-472). Now what was done is notcontingent, since it is not possible that the thingbecomes undone, i.e., that it did not take place.Here he introduces the words of Agathon whorightly remarked: God lacks only this power tocause things to be unproduced, i.e., not to bemade which are already made. This was wellsaid.

Necesse est enim quod potestaticuiuslibet causae subsit omne illudquod potest contineri sub proprioobiecto virtutis eius, sicut ignis

1139. Everything that can be contained underthe proper object of any causes capacity isnecessarily subjected to the influence of thatcause, for instance, fire can heat anything

potest calefacere omne calefactibile.Virtus autem Dei, qui est universaliscausa entium, extendit se ad totumens: unde solum illud subtrahiturdivinae potestati quod repugnatrationi entis, hoc est quod implicatcontradictionem et tale est quodfactum est non fuisse. Eiusdem enimrationis est aliquid esse dum est, etfuisse dum fuit et non esse quod est,et non fuisse quod fuit.

capable of becoming hot. But the power of God,who is the universal cause of being, extends tothe totality of being. Hence that only iswithdrawn from the divine power which isinconsistent with the nature of being, assomething which implies a contradiction. That athing done be undone is of this kind, because itinvolves the same formality I for a thing to be(i.e., will be) while it is, and to have been (i.e.,was to have been) while it was and for what is,not to be-and what was, not to have been.

Deinde cum dicit utrarumque utiqueetc., concludit ex praemissis, quodcognitio veritatis est proprium opusutrarumque particularum intellectus,scilicet practici et speculativi, velscientifici et ratiocinativi.

1140. Next [2, c], at In any case the work, heinfers from the premises that knowledge of thetruth is the work of each part of the intellect,namely, the practical and the speculative or thescientific and the estimative (ratiocinativi).

Deinde cum dicit secundum quosigitur etc., concludit ultimum, quodilli habitus sunt virtutes ambabuspartibus intellectus secundum quoscontingit verum dicere quod estbonum intellectivae partis.

1141. Then [A, 31, at Those habits accordingto which, he deduces lastly that those habits bywhich the truththe good of the intellective partis manifested, are virtues of both divisions ofthe intellect.

LECTURE 3

An Enumeration of the Intellectual VirtuesEvery Science Can Be Taught

Chapter 3

I. HE DISCUSSES THE PRINCIPAL INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

A. He enumerates the intellectual virtues. 1142-1143

. , '

Introducing again the subject treatedabove, let us discuss it further. There arefive habits by which the soul expresses thetruth by affirming or denying. They are:art, science, prudence, wisdom, and

.

understanding but not suspicion andopinion, which can express falsehood.

B. He discusses each of them.

A He discusses ... them.

1. HE DISCUSSES THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUESPERFECTING THE INTELLECT REGARDING THE THINGS...DERIVED FROM PRINCIPLES.

a. The science which perfects the intellect in regard tonecessary things.

i. Science on the part of the matter. 1144-1146

, , . , , ' ' , , . . , ' .

From this then it can be made clear whatscience is, if it is proper to science to knowwith certitude and not followapproximations to the truth. Indeed we allsuppose that what we know scientificallycannot be in any other way. Butcontingent things are not of this kind, forwhen they pass from observation it is notknown whether they exist or not. Theobject of science then concerns necessity,and therefore is eternal, becauseeverything that is of necessity withoutqualification is eternal. Eternal things,however, are unproduced andindestructible.

ii. (Science) on the part of the cause. 1147-1149

, . , ' , .

Besides, every science can be taught andevery object of science can be learned. Butall teaching comes about by reason ofprevious knowledge, as we have indicatedin the Analytics one kind is by induction,the other by syllogism. Induction thengives us a first principle and a universal

, . , . , , , . .

assent, but the syllogism proceeds fromuniversals. Therefore, there are principlesfrom which the syllogism proceedsprinciples not derived from the syllogism,and consequently arising from induction.Science then is a demonstrative habithaving all the other requirementsdetermined in the Analytics. When a manknows scientifically, he assents to andunderstands principles in some wayindeed, if he does not know them morethan the conclusion, then he has scienceonly incidentally. In this way, therefore,the question of science has been settled.

b. The habits perfecting the intellect in regard to contingentthings.

i. He shows that there are two habits concerned withcontingent things. 1150-1152

' ' . ' .

The contingent is both something to bemade and something to be done andmaking is one thing and action another.We assent to these things even by proofsoutside the science. For this reason thehabit that is active under reasonsguidance is different from the habit that isproductive through reason. Likewiseaction and making are not containedunder one another, for action is notmaking, nor is making action.

ii. He defines one of these (habits).

x. FIRST HE DEFINES ART IN ITSELF.

aa. He shows what art is. 1153

Chapter 4

' , , , .

However, since architecture is a kind ofart and also a kind of habit productivethrough reason, and no art is found that isnot a habit of this sort and again there isno such habit that is not an art, art thenwill be the same as a habit concerned withmaking, under the guidance of truereason.

bb. He shows what the subject matter of art is.

a He proposes the subject matter of art. 1154-1155

,

But every art is concerned withrealization, an artifact and observation itconsiders particularly how contingentthings may be made, and indicates thattheir principle is in the craftsman but notin the thing made.

b. He shows from what things art differsaccording to its subject matter.

a. IN RELATION TO DIVINESCIENCES. 1156

,

Art, however, does not deal with thingsthat exist necessarily or come into beingby necessity

b. TO NATURAL SCIENCE. 1157

.

nor with things that are according tonature, for they have these principles inthemselves.

c. (TO) PRUDENCE. 1158

, ' .

Since making and action differ from oneanother, art necessarily directs makingand not action.

c He shows with what it agrees in subjectmatter. 1159

,

.

In some manner art and chance areconcerned with the same things, asAgathon remarked: Art highly esteemschance, and chance art.

y. SECOND (HE DEFINES ART) BYCOMPARISON WITH ITS OPPOSITE. 1160

, , , ' , .

Art then, as was previously noted, is akind of habit productive under theguidance of genuine reason On thecontrary, however, unskillfulness is ahabit productive under the guidance ofincorrect reason operating on contingentmatter.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

Incipientes igitur superius et cetera.Postquam philosophus investigavitrationem secundum quam accipiendaesunt intellectuales virtutes, hic iamincipit de ipsis intellectualibus virtutibusdeterminare. Et primo determinat devirtutibus intellectualibus principalibus.Secundo de virtutibus quibusdamadiunctis uni earum, scilicet prudentiae,ibi, oportet autem assumere et cetera.Circa primum duo facit. Primoenumerat intellectuales virtutes.Secundo determinat de singulis earum,ibi, scientia quidem igitur quid est et

1142. After the Philosopher has investigatedthe way in which the intellectual virtues areto be understood, he begins now to discuss theintellectual virtues themselves. First [I] hediscusses the principal intellectual virtues.Then [Lect. 8], at Now we must consideretc. (B.1142 a 32), he defines certain virtuesconnected with one of them, namely,prudence. On the initial point he does twothings. First [A] he enumerates theintellectual virtues. Next [B], at From thisthen it can be made clear etc., he discusseseach of them. He says firstafter the way ofunderstanding the intellectual virtues has

cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quoposita est ratio accipiendi virtutesintellectuales, debemus rursus incipereab eo quod superius determinatum est,ut sic tractemus de ipsis intellectualibusvirtutibus.

been givenwe ought to begin again fromwhat has been settled before (1115), so thatwe may treat the intellectual virtuesthemselves.

Dictum est enim prius, quod virtutesintellectuales sunt habitus, quibusanima dicit verum. Sunt autem quinquenumero quibus anima semper dicitverum vel affirmando vel negando:scilicet ars, scientia, prudentia, sapientiaet intellectus. Unde patet quod istaquinque sunt virtutes intellectuales. Abhorum autem numero excluditsuspicionem, quae per aliquasconiecturas habetur de aliquibusparticularibus factis et opinionem quaeper probabiles rationes habetur dealiquibus universalibus. Quamvis enimper ista duo quandoque verum dicaturtamen contingit quod eis quandoquedicitur falsum, quod est malumintellectus, sicut verum est bonumipsius est autem contra rationemvirtutis ut sit principium mali actus. Etsic patet quod suspicio et opinio nonpossunt dici intellectuales virtutes.

1143. It was previously pointed out (1125)that the intellectual virtues are habits bywhich the soul expresses the truth. But thereare five habits by which the soul alwaysexpresses the truth by either affirming ordenying, viz., art, science, prudence, wisdom,and understanding. Clearly then these are thefive intellectual virtues. He omits suspicion,which is brought about by some conjecturesconcerning any particular facts, and opinion,which is brought about by some conjecturesconcerning any general things. Althoughthese two sometimes do express the truth,nevertheless at other times it happens thatthey express falsehood, which is the evil of theintellect just as truth is the good of theintellect. But it is contrary to the nature ofvirtue to be the principle of an evil act.Obviously then suspicion and opinion cannotbe called intellectual virtues.

Deinde cum dicit: scientia quidem igituretc., determinat de virtutibusintellectualibus enumeratis. Et primodeterminat de singulis earum secundoostendit quae sit principalior inter eas,ibi, et quemadmodum caput habens etcetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primodeterminat de virtutibus intellectualibusperficientibus intellectum circa ea quaesunt ex principiis. Secundo determinatde habitibus intellectualibusperficientibus intellectum circa primaprincipia, ibi, quia scientia de

1144. Then [B], at From this then it can bemade clear, he determines the intellectualvirtues just enumerated. First [A] hediscusses each of them. Next [Lect. 6], at Ashaving supremacy (B. 1141 a 20), he showswhich is the principal one among them. Onthe initial point he proceeds in two ways. First[1] he discusses the intellectual virtuesperfecting the intellect regarding the thingswhich are derived from principles. Second[Lect. 5], at Since science is an evaluationetc. (B. 1140 b 31), he discusses theintellectual habits perfecting the intellect in

universalibus et cetera. Circa primumduo facit. Primo determinat de scientiaquae perficit intellectum circanecessaria. Secundo de habitibusperficientibus intellectum circacontingentia, ibi: contingentis autemaliter habere et cetera. Circa primumduo facit. Primo notificat scientiam exparte materiae. Secundo ex partecausae, ibi, adhuc docibilis omnis etcetera.

regard to first principles. On the first point hedoes two things. Initially [a] he defines thescience which perfects the intellect in regardto necessary things. Then [b], at Thecontingent is both etc., he defines the habitsperfecting the intellect in regard to contingentthings. On the initial point he does two things.First [a, i] he explains science on the part ofthe matter. Next [a, ii], at Besides, everyscience can be taught etc., he explains it onthe part of the cause.

Dicit ergo primo, quod manifestumpotest esse quid sit scientia ex his quaedicentur, si oportet per certitudinemscientiam cognoscere, et non sequisimilitudines, secundum quas scilicetquandoque similitudinarie dicimus scireetiam sensibilia de quibus certi sumus.Sed certa ratio scientiae hinc accipitur,quod omnes suspicamur de eo quodscimus quod non contingit illud aliter sehabere: alioquin non esset certitudoscientis, sed dubitatio opinantis.Huiusmodi autem certitudo, quodscilicet non possit aliter esse, non potesthaberi circa contingentia aliter sehabere. Tunc enim solum potest de eiscertitudo haberi cum cadunt sub sensu.Sed quando fiunt extra speculari, idestquando desinunt videri vel sentiri, tunclatent utrum sint vel non sint, sicutpatet circa hoc quod est sortem sedere.Sic ergo patet quod omne scibile est exnecessitate. Ex quo concludit quod sitaeternum quia omnia quae suntsimpliciter ex necessitate, sunt aeterna.Huiusmodi autem neque generanturneque corrumpuntur. Talia ergo sunt dequibus est scientia.

1145. He affirms first that it can be madeclear what science is from what has been saidif it is proper to science to know with certitudeand not follow approximations to the truth,for in this latter way we are sometimes said toknow sensible things about which we arecertain. But a well-founded notion of scienceis taken from the fact that we all agree thatwhat we know cannot be in any other wayotherwise we would have the doubt of theguesser and not the certitude of the knower.However, certitude of this kind, viz., thatcannot be in any other way, is not possibleabout things that can be in some other way,for in that case certitude can be attainedabout them only when they fall under thesenses. But when they pass from observation,that is, cease to be seen or felt, then theirexistence or non-existence escapes us, as isobvious in the fact that Socrates is sitting. Itis evident then that everything known byscience is of necessity. From this he infersthat it is eternal because everything which isof necessity without qualification is eternal.But things of this kind are neither producednor destroyed. Therefore, it is about suchthings that science is concerned.

Potest autem et de generabilibus etcorruptibilibus esse aliqua scientia, puta

1146. There can even be a science aboutproducible and perishable things, for example,

naturalis non tamen secundumparticularia quae generationi etcorruptioni subduntur, sed secundumrationes universales quae sunt exnecessitate et semper.

natural science yet it cannot be based onparticulars that are subject to generation anddestruction, but on universal reasons whichare necessary and eternal.

Deinde cum dicit: adhuc docibilis etc.,notificat scientiam per causam. Et dicitquod omnis scientia videtur essedocibilis, id est potens doceri unde in Imetaphysicae dicitur quod signumscientis est posse docere. Per id enimquod est actu reducitur alterum depotentia in actum. Et eadem rationeomne scibile est discibile ab eo, scilicetqui est potentia sciens. Oportet autemquod omnis doctrina seu disciplina fiatex aliquibus praecognitis, sicut dictumest in principio posteriorumanalyticorum. Non enim possumusdevenire in cognitionem alicuius ignotinisi per aliquod notum.

1147. Next [a, ii], at Besides, every science,he explains science by its cause, saying thatevery science seems to be teachable. Hence itis stated in the first book of the Metaphysics(Ch. 2, 982 a 14 St. Th. Lect. 2, 39) that acharacteristic of the one possessing science ishis ability to teach, for a thing is led frompotency to actuality by another which isactual. For the same reason every knowablething can be learned by a man who has thepotentiality. But all teaching or science mustcome about by reason of some previousknowledge, as was indicated in the beginningof the Posterior Analytics (Bk. I, Ch. 1, 71 aSt. Th. Lect. 1, 8). We cannot arrive at theknowledge of an unknown thing except bymeans of something known.

Est autem duplex doctrina expraecognitis: una quidem perinductionem, alia vero per syllogismum.Inductio autem inducitur adcognoscendum aliquod principium etaliquod universale in quod devenimusper experimenta singularium, ut diciturin principio metaphysicae sed exuniversalibus principiis praedicto modopraecognitis procedit syllogismus. Sicergo patet quod sunt quaedam principiaex quibus syllogismus procedit, quae nonnotificantur per syllogismum, alioquinprocederetur in infinitum in principiissyllogismorum, quod est impossibile utprobatur in primo posteriorum. Sic ergorelinquitur quod principiorum syllogismisit inductio. Non autem quilibet

1148. There is a twofold teaching by means ofthings known: one by induction and the otherby syllogism. Induction leads us to perceivesome principle and something universal atwhich we arrive by experiments withsingulars, as is noted in the first book of theMetaphysics (Ch. 1, 980 b 25-981 a 12 St.Th. Lect. 1, 17-19). But the syllogismproceeds from universal principles previouslyknown in the aforementioned manner.Therefore, it is evident from this that thereare certain principles from which thesyllogism proceeds and which are not attestedas accurate by the syllogism. Otherwise therewould be a process to infinity in the principlesof syllogisms-which is impossible, as is provedin the first book of the Posterior Analytics(Ch. 3, 72 b 25-73 a 20 St. Th. Lect. 8, 68-

syllogismus est disciplinalis, quasifaciens scire, sed solus demonstrativus,qui ex necessariis necessaria concludit.

75. Ch. 19-22, 81 b 10-84 b 2 St. Th. 31-35,255-307). So then it remains that theprinciple of the syllogism is induction. But notevery syllogism is productive of knowledge,i.e., causes science, but only thedemonstrative, which infers necessary thingsfrom the necessary.

Sic ergo manifestum est quod scientiaest habitus demonstrativus, idest exdemonstratione causatus, observatisomnibus illis quaecumque circascientiam demonstrativam determinatasunt in posterioribus analyticis. Oportetenim, ad hoc quod aliquis sciat, quodprincipia ex quibus scit (sint) peraliquem modum credita et cognita etiammagis quam conclusiones quae sciuntur.Alioquin non per se, sed per accidenshabebit scientiam, inquantum scilicetpotest contingere quod istamconclusionem sciat per quaedam aliaprincipia et non per ista quae non magiscognoscit quam conclusionem. Oportetenim quod causa sit potior effectu. Undeid quod est causa cognoscendi oportetesse magis notum. Et ita per huncmodum determinatum est de scientia.

1149, So, obviously, science is ademonstrative habit, i.e., produced bydemonstration, taking into considerationwhat has been noted about science in thePosterior Analytics. In order that a man mayhave science it is necessary that the principlesby which he knows be assented to in someway and understood even more than theconclusions which are known. Otherwise hewill not have science per se but onlyincidentally, inasmuch as it can happen thathe knows this conclusion through certainother principles and not through these whichhe does not know better than the conclusion.The cause, certainly, must be more powerfulthan the effect. Hence that which is the causeof knowing must be more known. In this waythen the question of science has been settled.

Deinde cum dicit contingentis autemetc., determinat de habitibus quiperficiunt intellectum circa contingentia.Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostenditduos esse habitus circa contingentia.Secundo determinat de uno eorum,scilicet de arte, ibi, quia autemaedificativa et cetera. Tertio determinatde altero, scilicet de prudentia, ibi: deprudentia autem sic utique et cetera.Dicit ergo primo, quod contingens aliterse habere dividitur in duo, quia aliquideius est agibile et aliquid est factibile,quod quidem cognoscitur per hoc quod

1150. Next [b], at The contingent is both hedefines the habits which perfect the intellect inregard to contingent things. On this point hedoes three things. First [b, i] he shows thatthere are two habits concerned withcontingent things. Second [b, ii], atHowever, since architecture etc., he definesone of these. Third [Lect. 4], at Let us nowinvestigate etc., he defines the other, viz.,prudence. He says first that the contingent isdivided into two sections: something to bedone, and something to be made. Thus weknow that the one is an action and the other amaking.

alterum est factio et alterum est actio.

Et his possumus assentire per rationesexteriores, idest per ea quae determinatasunt extra istam scientiam, scilicet in IXmetaphysicae ibi enim ostensa estdifferentia inter actionem et factionem.Nam actio dicitur operatio manens inipso agente, sicut videre, intelligere etvelle, factio autem dicitur operatiotransiens in exteriorem materiam adaliquid formandum ex ea, sicutaedificare, urere et secare. Quia ergohabitus distinguuntur secundumobiecta, consequens est quod habitus quiest activus cum ratione, scilicetprudentia, sit alius ab habitu factivo quiest cum ratione qui est ars et quod unuseorum non contineatur sub alio, sicutneque actio et factio continentur subinvicem, quia neque actio est factio,neque factio est actio. Distinguunturenim oppositis differentiis, ut ex dictispatet.

1151. We can assent to these things byexternal reasons, i.e., by what has beendetermined outside this science, viz., in theninth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 8, 1050 a23-1050 b St. Th. Lect. 8, 1862-1865).There the difference between action andmaking has been explained. Action is anoperation remaining in the agent, like seeing,understanding, and willing. But making is anoperation passing into external matter tofashion something out of it, like constructingand sawing. Since habits are distinguishedaccording to the object, it follows that thehabit that is active by means of reason, i.e.,prudence, is different from the habit that isproductive through reason, i.e., art. It followsalso that one of these is not contained underthe other, as action and making are notcontained under one another, since neither isaction making nor is making action. They aredistinguished by opposing differences, as isclear from what has just been said.

Est autem considerandum quod quiacontingentium cognitio non potesthabere certitudinem veritatisrepellentem falsitatem, ideo quantum adsolam cognitionem pertinet,contingentia praetermittuntur abintellectu qui perficitur per cognitionemveritatis. Est autem utiliscontingentium cognitio secundum quodest directiva humanae operationis quaecirca contingentia est. Et ideocontingentia divisit tractans deintellectualibus virtutibus solumsecundum quod subiiciuntur humanaeoperationi. Unde et solae scientiaepracticae sunt circa contingentia,inquantum contingentia sunt, scilicet inparticulari. Scientiae autem speculativae

1152. We must consider that the knowledgeof contingent things cannot possess thetruths certitude rejecting untruth.Therefore, where there is question ofknowledge alone, contingent things arepassed over by the intellect which is perfectedby the knowledge of the truth. But theknowledge of the contingent is usefulaccording as it gives direction to humanoperation which is concerned with what iscontingent. For that reason he makes thedivision of contingent thingswhen treatingthe intellectual virtuesonly as they aresubject to human operation. Hence, also, onlythe practical sciences are concerned withcontingent things precisely as they arecontingent, viz., in the area of the particular.The speculative sciences, on the other hand,

non sunt circa contingentia nisisecundum rationes universales, ut supradictum est.

do not deal with contingent things exceptaccording to universal reasons, as was notedbefore (1146).

Deinde cum dicit: quia autemaedificativa etc., determinat de arte. Etprimo de ipsa arte secundum se secundode arte per comparationem adoppositum eius, ibi, ars quidem igitur etcetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primoostendit quid sit ars. Secundo quae sitartis materia, ibi, est autem ars omnis etcetera. Primum manifestat perinductionem. Videmus enim quodaedificativa est ars quaedam, et iterumquod est habitus quidam ad faciendumaliquid cum ratione. Et nulla arsinvenitur cui hoc non conveniat, quodscilicet sit habitus factivus cum ratione,neque invenitur talis habitus factivus,scilicet cum ratione, qui non sit ars.Unde manifestum est quod idem est arset habitus factivus cum vera ratione.

1153. Then [b, ii], at However, sincearchitecture, he defines art. First [ii, x] hedefines art in itself, and second [ii, y] at Artthen etc., by comparison with its opposite.On the initial point he does two things. First[x, aa] he shows what art is. Next [x, bb], atBut every art is concerned etc., he showswhat the subject matter of art is. He makesthe first point by induction. We seearchitecture as a kind of art, and also as akind of habit for making something throughreason. Likewise, every art is so constitutedthat it is a habit, concerned with making,under the guidance of reason. Likewise, noproductive habit of this kind, i.e., directed byreason, is found which is not an art. Hence itis evident that art is the same as a habitconcerned with making under the guidance oftrue reason.

Deinde cum dicit: est autem ars etc.,determinat materiam artis. Et circa hoctria facit: primo ponit artis materiamsecundo ostendit a quibus differatsecundum suam materiam, ibi, nequeenim de his etc. tertio ostendit cum quoconveniat in materia, ibi, et secundummodum quemdam et cetera. Circamateriam autem artis duo estconsiderare, scilicet ipsam actionemartificis quae per artem dirigitur, etopus quod est per artem factum. Estautem triplex operatio artis. Primaquidem est considerare qualiter aliquidsit faciendum. Secunda autem estoperari circa materiam exteriorem.Tertia autem est constituere ipsumopus. Et ideo dicit quod omnis ars est

1154. Next [x, bb], at But every art, heconsiders the subject matter of art. On thispoint he does three things. First [bb, a] heproposes the subject matter of art. Second[bb, b], at Art, however, does not, he showsfrom what things art differs according to itssubject matter. Third [bb, c], at In somemanner etc., he shows with what it agrees insubject matter. We should consider twothings about the subject matter of art: thevery operation of the craftsman which isdirected by the art, and the productmanufactured. Now, there is a threefoldoperation of art: the first is to consider howan artifact is to be produced the second is tooperate on the external matter the third is toaccomplish the work itself. For this reason hesays that every art is concerned with the

circa generationem, id est circaconstitutionem et complementum operis,quod primo ponit tamquam finem artis:et est etiam circa artificiare, id est circaoperationem artis qua disponitmateriam, et est etiam circa speculariqualiter aliquid fiat per artem.

creation, or the achievement and completionof the work which he places as the end of art.It is concerned also with the artistic, i.e., withthe operation of art that disposes thematerial, and with observing how a thing maybe made by art.

Ex parte vero ipsius operis duo estconsiderare. Quorum primum est quodea quae fiunt per artem humanam suntcontingentia esse et non esse. Quodpatet ex hoc, quod quando fiuntincipiunt esse de novo. Secundum estquod principium generationisartificialium operum est in solo facientequasi extrinsecum ab eis, sed non infacto quasi intrinsecum.

1155. On the part of the work itself we shouldconsider two things. The first of these is thatthe things that are made by art arecontingent-can be or not be. This is evidentfrom the fact that when they are made theybegin to be in a new form. The second is thatthe principle of the creation of artistic worksis in the craftsman alone, as it were, insomething extrinsic to the artifact but is notin the thing made as something intrinsic to it.

Deinde cum dicit neque enim de his etc.,manifestat quod dictum est, ostendensdifferentiam artis ad tria. Primo quidemad scientias divinas et mathematicas,quae sunt de his quae ex necessitatesunt vel fiunt, de quibus non est ars.

1156. Then [bb, b], at Art, however, doesnot, he explains what was just said (1154-1155), showing how art differs from threeother areas of knowledge. First [b, A] inrelation to the divine sciences andmathematics dealing with those things thatexist or come into being by necessity aboutthese subjects there is no art.

Secundo ibi: neque de his etc., ostenditdifferentiam ad scientiam naturalem,quae est de his quae sunt secundumnaturam, de quibus non est ars. Habentenim ea, quae sunt secundum naturam,in seipsis principium motus, ut dicitur inII physicorum, quod non competitoperibus artis, ut dictum est.

1157. Next [b, B], at nor with things, heshows the difference in relation to naturalscience which treats of those things that areaccording to nature, and about which there isno art. The things that are according tonature have the principle of motion inthemselves, as was stated in the second bookof the Physics (Ch. 1, 192 b 15 St. Th. Lect.1, 142). This does not belong, to the works ofart, as we just pointed out (1155).

Tertio ibi: quia autem etc., ostenditdifferentiam artis ad prudentiam. Etdicit, quod quia actio et factio suntaltera invicem, necesse est quod ars sit

1158. Third [b, c], at Since making, heshows how art differs from prudence. He saysthat since action and making differ from oneanother, art is restricted to giving directions

factionis directiva et non actionis, cuiusest directiva prudentia.

to making and not to action that prudencedirects.

Deinde cum dicit: et secundum modumquendam etc., ostendit cum quoconveniat ars in materia. Et dicit quodfortuna et ars sunt circa eademsecundum aliquem modum utraqueenim est circa ea quae fiunt perintellectum sed ars cum ratione,fortuna sine ratione. Et hancconvenientiam Agathon designavitdicens, quod ars dilexit fortunam, etfortuna artem, inquantum scilicet inmateria conveniunt.

1159. At In some manner [bb, c], he showsthat with which art is in material agreement.He says that chance and art have to do withthose things that are done by intellect: art incompany with reason, and chance withoutreason. Agathon indicated this agreementwhen he said that art values chance andchance art, inasmuch as they agree in matter.

Deinde cum dicit: ars quidem igitur etc.,determinat de arte per comparationemad eius oppositum. Et dicit, quod sicutars, ut praedictum est, est quidamhabitus factivus cum vera ratione, itaathennia, id est inertia, e contrario esthabitus factivus cum ratione falsa circacontingens aliter se habere.

1160. Then [ii, y], at Art then, he considersart by comparison with its opposite. He saysthat as artthis was previously noted (1153)is a certain habit concerned with makingunder the guidance of true reason, soatechnia or unskillfulness, on the contrary, isa habit concerned with making directed byincorrect reason regarding what iscontingent.

LECTURE 4Prudence

Chapter 5

I. HE SHOWS WHAT PRUDENCE IS.

A. He shows the nature of prudence.

A He shows who is prudent.

1. HE DETERMINES THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE. 1161

, .

Let us now investigate prudence in thisway, considering who are called prudent.

2. HE SHOWS WHO ARE PRUDENT. 1162

, , , , .

It seems to pertain to the prudent manthat he can give good advice about propergoods useful not for one aspect of lifeasan example, what are useful for health orbodily strengthbut for the benefit of thetotal life of man.

3. HE MAKES KNOWN WHAT HE SAID, BY A SIGN. 1163

' , , . .

A sign of this is that we call men prudentin a particular matter when they canrightly conclude what is useful for adetermined good end in things that do notbelong to art. Therefore, a man will beabsolutely prudent who gives advice aboutthe whole of life.

B He shows what prudence is.

1. HE GIVES THE DEFINITION.

a. He shows... the difference between prudence and otherhabits given above. 1164-1165

' , .' ', ' , , ,

But no one takes counsel about thingsthat either are incapable of being in anyother way or are not within his power.Therefore, let us consider that sciencecomes about by demonstration, and ademonstration is not possible in thingswhose principles can be in some otherway--otherwise all the conclusions couldbe different also, that b counsel is notabout matters which are necessarily so.

, , ' .

Prudence then will be neither a sciencenor an art. It is not a science because thething to be done is contingent it is not anart because the genus of action andmaking differ.

b. He infers the definition of prudence. 1166

.

It remains, therefore, that prudence is agenuine habit concerned with actionunder the guidance of reason, dealingwith things good and bad for man.

c. He assigns the reason for a statement he has made. 1167

, .

Indeed the end of making is somethingother than itself. Th