theories and empirical studies of international institutions

8/2/2019 Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/theories-and-empirical-studies-of-international-institutions 1/30

Theories and Empirical Studies of International InstitutionsAuthor(s): Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. SimmonsReviewed work(s):Source: International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty:Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998), pp. 729-757Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601356 .

Accessed: 08/03/2012 21:28

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International

Organization.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601356?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601356?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress



Theories ndEmpirical tudiesof nternationalnstitutions

Lisa L. Martin ndBethA. Simmons

The roleof nternationalnstitutionsas been entralo the tudy fworld olitics tleast ince he onclusionfWorldWar I.Muchofthis esearch as, ndcontinuestobe, pioneeredn thepages of nternationalrganization.n this rticlewe takestock fpastwork n nternationalnstitutions,race he volution f major hemesinscholarshipver ime, ndhighlightreasfor roductiveewresearch. urcen-tral rguments that esearchhouldncreasinglyurn othe uestionfhow nstitu-tionsmatternshapinghebehavior f mportantctorsnworld olitics.Newre-search ffortshould mphasize bservablemplicationsfalternativeheoriesf

institutions.e advocate pproachingnternationalnstitutionss both he bject fstrategichoice nd constraintn actors' ehavior,n dea that s familiaroschol-arsofdomesticnstitutionsuthas beenneglectednmuch fthedebatebetweenrealist nd nstitutionalistcholars f nternationalelations.

The article s organizednto hreemajor ections. he first ection rovides nanalytical eview f thedevelopmentfstudies f nternationalnstitutions.romthe eginning,he agesof O havebeenfilledwithnsightfultudies f nstitutions,in somecases asking uestions onsistent ith heresearch gendawe proposenthis ssay.But the ack of a disciplinaryoundationn theearlyyearsmeant hat

manygood insights eresimplyost,not ntegratedntoother cholars' esearch.With heprofessionalizationf thediscipline incethe ate 1950s, cholarshipninternationalnstitutionsasbecomemore heoreticallynformed,nd empiricale-searchhasbegunmore ftenoconformosocial-scientifictandardsfevidence,with esults hat rovide oth aution nd nspirationor utureesearch. neofthemost onsequentialevelopmentsor urunderstandingf nternationalnstitutionscame nthe arly 970s,when newgenerationf scholars eveloped nsightshatopened p nquiry eyondhat fformalrganizations,rovidingntellectualridge-heads othe tudyf nstitutionsore enerally.

Our thanks or ommentsnprevious ersions o toMarcBusch,PeterKatzenstein,ob Keohane,SteveKrasner,ndparticipantsntheO fiftiethnniversaryssue onference.

Internationalrganization2, 4,Autumn998,pp.729-757? 1998byThe10 FoundationndtheMassachusettsnstitutefTechnology



730 Intemationalrganization

The second ection xplicitlyddresses theme hat risesfrom hereview fscholarshipninstitutions:hethernternationalolitics eeds o be treateds sui

generis,with ts owntheories ndapproacheshat redistinct rom ther ields fpoliticalcience, rwhethertfruitfullyandraw ntheoriesfdomesticolitics. sourreview hows, evelopmentsnstudies fAmericanolitics, uch s studies fvoting nd coalitional ehavior, ave oftennfluencedheway that cholars p-proachedntemationalnstitutions.ostofthese ffortsid notpayoffwithmajorinsights.hefunctionalistpproacho nstitutionsdoptednthe1980s wed ittle otheoriesfdomesticolitics, rawingmore n economicmodels. oday,we see thependulumwinging ack, s more cholarsurno modernheoriesnitially evel-

oped ostudyomestic olitical henomenasee HelenMilner's rticlenthis ssue).Here,we assesswhetherhese ew ttemptsre ikelyobeanymore uccessfulhanpreviousfforts.

The third ection urns o theproblemfresearchgendas.Where oesscholar-shipon internationalnstitutionso next?Ourprimaryrgumentnthis ection sthat ttentioneeds o focus nhow,notustwhether,nternationalnstitutionsat-terforworld olitics. oo often ver he ast decade and a half hefocalpoint fdebate as beencrudelyichotomous:nstitutionsatter,rthey o not.Thisshap-ingof theagendahas obscuredmoreproductivendinterestinguestions bout

variationnthe ypes nddegree f nstitutionalffects,ariationshatwere nfactwelldocumentednthe esstheoreticalutwell-researchedase studies ftheour-nal's earliest ears. fcourse,we donot uggest returno diographicnstitutionalanalysis. ather, esuggest numberf ines f heoreticallynformednalysishatmay eadtoresearchhat oth sksbetteruestions nd s more ubject oempiricaltesting.hesepaths ncludemore erious nalysis f thedistributionalffectsfinstitutions,he elationetweennternationalnstitutionsnddomestic olitics,heproblemfunanticipatedonsequences,nd typologyf nstitutionalffects.

The Evolution fan Idea:Institutionsn nternationalolitics

Early tudies f henstitutionalizationfthe ostwarWorld

The"poles"ofrealism nd dealism-ofwhichmuch s made ngraduateeminars-had ittle o do with hehighly racticalrganizationalnalysis hat ominatedhepagesof O inthe irstecades fterhewar. hefocus f ttention as on howwellthesenewly stablishednstitutionsettheproblemshat heyweredesigned osolve.On this core, ew cholarlyccountswereoverly ptimistic.verwhelmedbythemagnitudef thepolitical nd economic econstructionffort,ew udgedpostwarrganizationss upto the ask.Central o this ebatewas a highlyealisticunderstandinghat nternationaloliticswould hape nd imit he ffectivenessfpostwarnstitutions;irtuallyo onepredictedhat hesewould riumphverpoli-



Internationalnstitutions 31

tics.TheUN,' theGeneralAgreementn Tariffsnd Trade GATT),2 he nterna-tionalMonetaryund3 all were he ubject fhighlyriticaleview.

A numberf mportanttudies rappled xplicitly ith hempactfthese nstitu-tions n thepoliciesof themajor owers nd theoutcomes or he entral oliticalandmilitaryompetitionetweenhem. heanswers, redictably,ere erivedromlittlemore han nformedounterfactualeasoning,ut hey isplayed sensitivityothebroad ange fpossible mpactshat nstitutionsuch s theLeagueandtheUNcouldhaveonthemajor owers.ntheir xaminationfthe dealofcollective ecu-rity, owardC. Johnsonnd Gerhart iemeyerquarelynquirednto herolethatnorms, ackedby organizationsuchas theUN, play naffectingtates' ehavior.They skedwhethertateswere prepared o use force r the hreatf force or hesakeofpublic awandorder atherhan or he akeof their ationaldvantagenrelation o that f othertates.... Howhasthebehavior fstates eenaffectedythese tandards?"4hough ltimatelyore onfidentnthe alance fpower hannnorms mbodiednthe ule f aw, hese cholarswere orrecto pushfor mecha-nism hatmight xplain he ffectsf nstitutionsn behavior: We cannot laim ohave earnedmuch bout heLeague experimentntilwe knowhow t has affectedtheproblemfharnessingndcontrollinghefactorsfforce nd their ole n therelationsfpower."'5

A flurryfstudiesnthe arly 950s suggested ossible nswers. ointingo theU.S. role ndecolonizationndmilitaryid forKorea, ollective nstitutionseresaid to raise U.S. "consciousness fbroader ssues" thatmight ffect mericaninterestsndthereby ake heU.S. more esponsiveo world pinion.6 y subject-ingpolicies o globalscrutiny-amechanism otunlike hose f transparencyndreputationentral o the iteraturenthe1980s-the UN was viewed s having adan admittedly arginal)ffectnsomeofthemost entralssuesofworld olitics.

Though acking he laborate heoreticalpparatusfcurrentesearch,arly tud-iesofpostwar rganizationsadmany f he ame nsightshat ave nformedmod-

em" institutionalism.aralleling uch ontemporaryrgumentn the orm fcoop-eration,7ne study s early s 1949 argued hatmultilateralismas precludedncaseswhereherewere ignificantargainingdvantagesnddiscriminationdvan-tages fproceedingilaterally.8oreshadowingore heoreticallyophisticatedreat-ments f informal ersusformalgreements,9tudies f GATTas early s 1954recognizedhat omeagreementsain strengthhroughheirnformal ature, nd

1. See Goodrich 947, 18; Fox 1951; Hoffmann956; Claude 1963; and Malin 1947.But for he

optimisticiew, ee Bloomfield 960.2. Gorter 954.3. See Knorr 948; ndKindleberger95 a.4. JohnsonndNiemeyer 954, 7.5. Niemeyer 952, 58 italics dded).6. Cohen1951.For parallel nalysis f nstitutionalffectsn Soviet ehavior,ee Rudzinski 951.7. See Oye 1992; ndMartin 992b.8. Little 949.9. Lipson1991.



732 Internationalrganization

prescient f theregimes iteratureiewed hevalue of GATT as "a focalpoint nwhichmany ivergentiewson appropriateommercialolicy onverge."0Lack-

ing theoreticalook n which ohang hese bservations,ndwithoutprofession-alized criticalmassofscholars odevelop hese nsights, anymportantindingswere nly ediscoveredndadvancedmore han wodecades ater.

Nowhere s thismore rue han n the rediscoveryf therelationshipetweeninternationalnstitutionsnddomestic olitics. he idea thatnternationalnstitu-tions an nfluencetate ehavior yacting hroughomestic oliticalhannels asrecognized yscholarswritingn themid-1950s. efeiringo theexample f theInternationalinanceCorporation,. E. Mateckiwrote hatnternationalrganiza-tions ould be "idea generatingenters"with he bilityo set nmotion ationalforces hat irectlynfluencehemakingfnationalolicy.IReflectingn the ffortsof theCouncilofEuropeto gain acceptance f its visionforEurope nnationalcapitals, n early tudy yA. GlennMowerspointed utthe onscious trategyfdirectobbyingf national overnmentshroughational arliaments.12 ndin afascinatingtudy f therole oftheSecurity ouncil ninfluencingutch olonialpolicy,Whitneyerkinsointedothe rucialnteractionetweenuthoritativenter-national ecisions nddemocraticolitics: By defiancefthe ecurity ouncil heDutch lerted owerfulmonitors ho alliedtheir trengthith omestic orcesn

requiringhem o ive uptoprinciplesofdecolonization]."3

"Inthis ype f nter-action etween emocraticovernmentsnd theUN emerge omeof the ssentialelementsfa world olitical rocess."4Anticipatingmechanismornstitutionaleffectshat averecentlyesurfacedncontemporarytudies, econcluded hat Therole f heUNis toexert ressuresesigned oenable he osernpublic entimentoaccept he onsequencesf ts oss." 5Thisresearchpproach eflectedn effortoflesh utthemechanismsywhich hepolicies ndperspectivesf internationalinstitutionsouldwork hroughational olitics.

In short,heearlypostwar iteraturen internationalnstitutions,hilehighly

focused nformalrganizations,as far ess naiveand egalistic,more oliticallysensitivend nsightfulhan t soften iven redit or eing. arlynsightsncludedthe ecognitionhat henature f henternationalolitical ystem rovided contextfor he ffectivenessf nternationalnstitutions,hatnstitutionalffectivenesshouldbe subject oempiricalnvestigation,nd that laborate rganizationaltructuresnot lways hebest pproachoachievingnternationalooperation. oreover,hebestof this arly iteratureas concerned otmerelywithwhethernternationalinstitutionsad an impact, uthowonemighthinkbout mechanismor heireffects.ransparency,eputation,nd egitimacys well as domestic olitical res-

suresweresuggestednvarious trands fthought.ut therewas no conceptual

10. Gorter 954,1, 8.11. Matecki 956.12. Mowers 964.13. Perkins 958, 0.14. Ibid., 6.15. Ibid., 2




frameworkhat ould ie hese nsightsogether;orwas there systematicompara-tive nterpriseo check or heir egularity.ather,notheresearchgenda, eplete

with ancymethodologicalools mportedrom merican olitics,was to demotethese uestionsn favor fan only artiallyruitfulxaminationfthe nternaloli-tics f nternationalrganizations.

The nfluencefBehavioralism:PoliticsWithinnternationalnstitutions

Iffewthoughtnternationalrganization ould iberate heworld rom olitics,targuablyecame mportanto understandhohaspowernthese rganizationsndhowthat owerwas being xercised. specially ince heuseofthevetohad appar-entlyenderedhe ecurityouncil oothless,oncernegan ofocus n the evelop-ment f rules nd normsntheGeneralAssembly.hesupposed specter" f blocvotingnthat orum-increasinglyfconcern oAmericancholars ndpolicymak-ers s theCold War xtendedtsgelid each-became centraloncern.16

This debate ookwhat ppears oday o be an odd early irection.erhaps ue tonew and excitingwork nU.S. legislative ehavior,heresearch rogramuicklybecamefocused n how to describe atternsfvotingn the GeneralAssembly,

without systematicttempto sort ut theusefulnessf thevoting ehaviorp-proach. espitewarningshat he nternationalystem as fundamentallyifferentfrom omestic olitical ystems,17his esearch rogramasily ccepted hat otingintheUN was a proxy or ower nthat nstitution.ertainlyherewere keptics:Rupert merson nd nisL. Claude, or xample, autionedhat otingnan nterna-tional odydoes nothave the amefunctions ina democraticallylected arlia-ment; n internationalonferences a negotiatingather han legislative ody.Votingnsuch situation,hey oted,wasunlikelyoplay deliberativeole, incesuchvoteswerenomore han ropagandafforts.18ewofthese tudies xplicitly

defendedheirssumptionhatGeneral ssemblyesolutionsomehowmatteredotheconduct f worldpolitics.But the fascination ith he method or nalyzingvoting ehavior vercame airly eadilyhe aution hat hedomestic-internationallogic hould e subject oclosescrutiny. oreover,hehopeofprovidingnexplic-itly oliticallegislative)model nspired yAmericanoliticsmayhavebeen reac-tion gainsthe verly anarchic"ystemsnalysis fthe ate1950s.19

Much f hiswork anbe traced irectlyodevelopmentsnthe tudyfAmericanpolitics. ayward lker ndBruceRussett'studynternationaloliticsntheGen-

16. For one of the arliest tudies fbloc voting,ee Ball 1951.For a study ocusing rimarilynthebehavior f theCommonwealthountries,eeCarter 950.Concernwith he nfluencef theCommon-wealth rew s former ritisholoniesgained ndependencend membershipn theearly1960s. SeeMillar1962.

17. Hoffmann960,1-4.18. Emerson ndClaude 1952.See also Jebb 952.19. Alker ndRussett 965,145, xplicitlyeferoLiska 1957 ndKaplan 1957.They rgue hat [i]t

is simply rroneous o think f internationalolitics s anarchic, haotic, nd utterly nlikenationalpolitics." lker ndRussett 965,147.




eralAssembly,or xample, cknowledgedthat tudies f theAmerican oliticalprocess yRobert ahl,DuncanMacrae,20ndDavidTruman ere heoreticallynd

methodologicallyuggestivefways nwhich oll-call ata ouldbe usedto test orthe xistence f pluralisticolitical rocessna quasi-legislativenternationalrga-nization."'21nfluenced y JamesMarch22nd Robert ahl, this tudy ought ounderstandariousnfluencesn UNvoting ehavior cross ssue reas nwhich hedimensionsfpower nd nfluence ere ikely o differ.ertainly,ne factornflu-encing his esearchgendawas thepriorityiven oreproduciblend "objective"formsf ocialscience; he ocus nGeneral ssemblyoting asacknowledgedobe an artifactfthe vailabilityffairlyomplete otingecords.23

Largely elated othefermentnAmerican otingtudies, oliticswithin heUNdominatedhe esearchgendaformost fthedecadefromhemid-1960s. entralwas the oncern oexplainwhy ertain ountries ad a tendencyovote ogether,ovotenblocs, r oformlegislativeoalitions."24lsoobviouslynspired yAmeri-can politics, nother ranch f nquiryocused n thedeterminantsfsuccessfullyrunningor lective N office.25uchofthis iteratureasmethodologicallyatherthan onceptuallyriven ndhighlynductive ith espect o itsmajor mpiricalfindings.26ittle ffortasmade oexplorehe xtentowhich he oncept frepre-sentationrthewinningfelectionsnthedomesticettingouldtravelmeaning-

fullyoan ntemationalnstitution.heresearchrogramost team nder eavy irefromcholarswhodemanded strongerustificationorfocusingn theGeneralAssemblys a microcosmorworld olitics.27

Partiallynresponse o thecritique hat he GeneralAssemblywas hardlyhecenterfworld olitics,ndpartiallynfluencedy anotherrendnAmericanoli-ticsgrowingutof the tudyfbureaucraticolitics ndpolitical ystems,notherresearchathwas taken yRobert ox andHaroldJacobson'studyfeight pecial-izedagencieswithinheUN.28 n their dited olume, he ocuswas on the tructureandprocess f nfluencessociatedwith hese nstitutionsnd their utputs,ather

than n their ormalharacter. eflectingnce again a major hreadnAmericanpolitics, heunderlyingssumption as that nternationalrganizationsould befruitfullynalyzeds distinctolitical ystemsnwhich necould race utpatternsof nfluence:Thelegalandformalharacterndthe ontentf thedecision s lessimportanthan hebalance fforces hattexpressesndthe nclinationhattgivesto the urtherirectionfevents."29

20. MacRae1958.21. Alker ndRussett 965,vii.

22. March 955.23. On objectivity,ee Alker ndRussett 965, -3; on availabilityfdata ee p. 19.24. See Riggs 1958;Hovet1958;Keohane1967, 1969;WeigertndRiggs 1969;Gareau1970;Alker

1970;Volgy 973; ndHarbert 976.25. SeeVolgyndQuistgard 974;andSingerndSensenig 963.26. See,for xample, ieselbach 960.27. Fortwo ystematiceviews fthe uantitativeesearchn theUN and nternationalrganizations,

see Riggs tal. 1970; andAlger 970.28. Cox andJacobson 973.29. Ibid.




Thework f Cox andJacobson lso encouragedhe tudyf nternationalrgani-zations o consider more ransgovernmentalodelof theirnfluences. hereas

other esearchnspired y behavioralismypicallyssumed unifiedmodel f stateinterestsnd actors, hisworkfocused n transgovernmentaloalitions nvolvingparts fgovernmentsndparts f nternationalrganizations.neof hemostmpor-tant nsights enerated as highly onsonant ith evelopmentsn transgovemmen-tal relationshat ad come on the ntellectualcene n the1970s:30heobservationthat nechannelhroughhichnternationalrganizationsould ffecttate olicieswas throughhepotentiallliances hat ouldformetweennternationalureaucra-cies anddomesticressure roups tthenationalevel.31 lthoughhiswas an nter-esting nsight,ndcase studies ended o confirmhe mportancefsuch"transna-tional oalitions" or olicy mplementation,heirffectnpolicy ormulationemainsunclear.32eanwhile,he ssuesfacinghe nternationalommunityhanged rasti-cally nthe arly1970s,giving ise o a newapproacho the tudy f nternationalinstitutions,iscussed n the ollowingection.

Finally, strandfresearchtimulatedyErnst aas's "neofunctionalpproach"to ntegrationlso eft tellingmarkn the tudyf mpiricalffectsf nternationalinstitutionsn the1970s.Neofunctionalismscribed dynamicole to individualsand nterestroupsn the rocess f ntegratingluralistommunities.33yvirtuef

their articipationnthepolicymakingrocess fan ntegratingommunity,nterestgroups ndother articipants erehypothesizedo "learn" about herewards fsuch nvolvementnd undergo ttitudinalhangesnclininghem avorablyowardthe ntegrativeystem. ccordingoHaas, "politicalntegrations the rocesswherebyactors hift heiroyalties,xpectations,ndpoliticalctivitiesoward newcenter,whose nstitutionsossess rdemandurisdictionver reexistingational tates."4The implicationsor mpirical esearch n such nstitutionsere readily rawn:thosewhoparticipaten nternationalrganizationshould xhibit ltered ttitudestoward heir sefulnessndeffectiveness.

Americanolitics rovided et nother ethodologicalnstrumenthat ovetailednicelywithwhatwas thoughto be an empiricallyestable ropositionfHaas'stheory: urvey esearch! rom he ate 1950sinto heearly 1980s,a plethora fstudieslied o stablish hethernternationalrganizationsould ontributeo "learn-ing,"whetherognitiveraffective.35he attitudesf civilservants,36olitical p-pointees,ndevennationalegislators37ere crutinizedor vidence hat he engthornature f their ssociationwith arious inds f ntemationalrganizationsadinduced ttitudinalhange. he mpactfmethods rom mericanoliticswasobvi-

30. Keohane ndNye 1974.31. See Cox 1969, 25; andCox andJacobson 973, 14.32. See,for xample, ussell1973; ndKeohane1978.33. See Haas 1958;andPentland 973.34. Haas 1958,10.35. See Kelman1962; Alger1965; and Jacobson 967. See also Wolf1974,352-53; and Volgy nd

Quistgard 975.36. See Ernst 978;andPeck 1979.37. See Bonham 970; Kerr 973;Riggs1977; ndKarns 977.




ous: in somecases,indicators ereused that recisely aralleled he "thermom-eters" sedbytheNational pinion urvey esearch roject.

Three roblems edeviled his esearchpproach oryears. irst,tfailed opro-duceconsensusnthe ffectf nternationalnstitutionsnattitudes.38econd, tti-tudeswerenever econnected ith utcomes,olicies, ractions.39hird, esearch-erswere never ble to overcome heproblem frecruitmentias,which tselfaccounted ormost fthepositivettitudeseldbypersonnelssociatedwith nter-nationalnstitutions.s neofunctionalisms a theoreticalrientationostfavor verthe ourse fthe1970s nd ntegrativenternationalrganizationsuch s theEuro-peanCommunityndtheUN seemed ostagnatenthe aceofgrowing orld rob-lemsbeyondheirurview,his esearchrogrameclined, houghoday versionspursued rimarilyn studies hat ttempto documentmass attitudesoward heEuropean nion.

PoliticsBeyond ormalOrganizations:TheRiseof nternationalegimes

As thestudy f internationalnstitutionsrogressedver thepost-WorldWar Iyears, hegulf etweennternationalolitics ndformalrganizationrrangements

began oopen nways hatwerenot asytoreconcile. hemajor nternationalon-flict or rising enerationf cholars-theVietnamWar-ragedbeyond he ormaldeclarationsftheUN. Two decadesofpredictable onetaryelations nder heBrettonWoods nstitutionsere shatteredya unilateral ecisionbytheUnitedStatesn 1971toclose thegold window nd ater ofloathedollar. he riseof theOrganizationf Petroleumxportingountries nd their pparentower oupsetpreviouslynderstoodrrangementsith especto oilpricing ndavailabilityookplaceoutside he tructureftraditionalnternationalrganizations,s didconsum-ers'responseaternthedecade.Forsome, he roper ormativeesponseeemed o

be tostrengthennternationalrganizationsodeal with ising roblemsf nterde-pendence.40thersmore amiliar ith he ublic hoice iteraturerguedhat properextensionfpropertyights,argelynderwaynareas uch senvironmentalrotec-tion, atherhan formal xtensionfsupranationaluthorityer e,was the nswerto olving roblemsf ollectivection.41verall, ewdoubted hatnternationalifewas"organized," ut,ncreasingly,tbecame pparenthatmuch f he arlierocus

38. Studies hat ailed oconfirmxpectationsf ttitudinalhangenclude iverson 973; ndBonham1970.A few tudies venfound egativempactsn attitudesue to ssociation ithnternationalrgani-zations: mith 973;andPendergast976.

39. To the xtent hat uch ssociations ffectedutcomes,he esults eregenerallynnocuous.ee,for xample,Mathiason 972.

40. Brown ndFabian,for xample,modestlyall for "a comprehensiveceanauthority,n outerspaceprojectsgency, globalweatherndclimate rganization,nd an nternationalcientificommis-sion nglobal esourcesnd echnologies."eeBrown ndFabian1975.See alsoRuggie 972, 90,891;andGosovic ndRuggie1976.

41. Conybeare 980.




on formal tructuresnd multilateralreaty-basedgreements,specially heUN,hadbeenoverdrawn.42

The events f the arly1970s gave riseto the tudy f "internationalegimes,"defineds rules, orms, rinciples,ndprocedureshat ocus xpectationsegardingintemationalehavior. learly,he egimesmovementepresentedn effortosubsti-tute nunderstandingf nternationalrganizationithnunderstandingf nterna-tional overnance ore roadly.43t also demoted he tudyf nternationalrgani-zations s actors: riorothe tudyf nternationalegimesn nquirynto he ffectsof nternationalnstitutionseantnquiringntohoweffectivelyparticulargencyperformedtsob,for xample,he fficiencyithwhichheWorld ealthOrganiza-

tionvaccinatedheworld'sneedy hildren.44hen egimes nalystsookedfor f-fects,hesewereunderstoodo be outcomesnfluencedya constellationf rulesratherhan asks erformedy collectiventernationalgency.

But ust what ffectsegimes nalysis ought o uncover aschanged s there-search rogramas unfolded.45firstollective fforty he cholarlyommunityoaddress egime ffects asprimarilynterestedn thedistributiveonsequencesfthenorms f he nternationalood egime,rguinghatt simportantoconsiderhe"ways nwhich heglobal ood egimeffects.. wealth, ower, utonomy,ommu-nity, utritionalell-being, . . and sometimes hysicalurvival."46 n thisview,

regime effects" ere obe reckonednterms f he istributiveonsequencesf hebehaviorf myriadfproducers,istributors,ndconsumers,nd, na minor ay,byinternationalrganizationsnd state ureaucracies.ertainly,herewas inthisearlyvolume ittle houghthat egimesweresomehow fficientr efficiency-improvingutcomes, s later heorizingould mply; ather,hefoodregimewascharacterizedy"broad ndendemicnadequacies," hich rethe esult fnationalpolicies hat re"internationallyargainednd oordinated.. bymultilateralgree-ment runilateralictate."47

Furtheresearchn nternationalegimesmoved hinkingnthreemportantirec-

tions. irst, istributiveonsequences oon fellfrom he enter f considerationsresearchegan ofocus n how nternationalegimesrecreatedndtransformednthe irstlaceaswellas the ehavioral onsequencesfnormsrrules,48atherhanthedistributiveonsequences fbehavior tself.We argue ater hat ttentionodistlibutivessues ughtoberestored.)econd,none thoughot ominant)trand

42. On skepticismegardinghe entralityf theGATTregime,ee Strange 988. On thedecliningimportancef "public nternationalgencies" ngeneralnd he AOinparticular,eeMcLin 1979.

43. See,for xample, opkins ndPuchala1978, specially 98.44. Hoole 1977.The focus n nternationalrganizationss actors rovidingollective r redistribu-

tivegoodshas a longhistory.ee Kindleberger951a;Ascher 952;Wood1952; Loveday1953; Sharp1953; ndGregg 966.

45. We focushereon effects fintemationalegimes ecause, s argued ater,we think his s thequestion nwhich uture esearch hould oncentrate.or a review f theories hat urporto explaininternationalegimes,ee HaggardndSimmons 987.

46. Hopkins ndPuchala1978, 98.47. Ibid., 15-16.48. Krasner 983b,ntroductionnd onclusion.




ofresearch,ttentiono thenormativespects f nternationalegimesed naturallytoconsiderationfthe ubjectivemeaningf uchnorms ndto a research aradigm

thatwas nsympathy ith evelopmentsn constructivistchools fthought.49Seethe ssaybyMartha innemorendKathrynikkinkn this ssueof O.)

Third, ythemid- 980s xplanationsf nternationalegimes ecame ntertwinedwith xplanationsf nternationalooperation oregenerally.he work f RobertKeohaneespecially rewfrom unctionalistpproacheshat mphasizedhe effi-ciency easons or ules ndagreementsmong egime articipants.50ased on ra-tionalityssumptionshared ya growingiteraturenpolitical conomy,his e-search ought o showthat nternationalnstitutionsrovided wayfor tates o

overcome roblemsfcollective ction, igh ransactionosts, nd nformationefi-cits r symmetries.his pproach asproducednumberf nsights,hichwe willdiscuss nd extendater. ut tsanalytical ite-derivedfromtsfocus n states sunified ational ctors-waspurchasedtthe xpense f earliernsights elatingotransnationaloalitionsnd, specially,omestic olitics. urthermore,he trengthofthis pproach as argely een ts bilityoexplain he reation nd maintenanceof nternationalnstitutions.t has been weaker ndelineatingheirffectsn statebehavior ndotherignificantutcomes,n ssueto whichwe willreturn.

Thisweakness pened hewayfor n importantealist ounterthrustnthe ate

1980s: thechallenge oshowthat nternationalnstitutionsffect tate ehaviornany ignificantay. omerealists, articularlyeorealists,aisedogical nd mpiri-cal objections o the nstitutionalistesearchgenda.On the ogical side, JosephGrieco5I ndJohnMearsheimerrgued hat elative-gainsoncerns reventtatesfromntensiveooperation.heessence ftheir rgument as that ince he enefitsofcooperationouldbe translatedntomilitarydvantages,tateswouldbe fearfulthat uchbenefits oulddisproportionatelylow opotentialdversariesnd there-forewouldbe reluctantocooperaten substantial,ustained ays.Responses y

Duncan Snidal andRobert owell showed hat, ven f states idput substantialweight n suchrelative-gainsoncerns,he ircumstancesnderwhich heywouldgreatlynhibitooperation erequite imited.Mearsheimer,n hisextensivehal-lenge o nstitutionalism,lsoarguedhat he mpiricalvidence howinghat nsti-tutionshanged atternsf tate ehavior asweak, speciallynthe reaof ecurityaffairs. hilewemight isputehe xtremeonclusions rawn yMearsheimer,etake eriouslyischallengeoprovide trongermpiricalvidence.n the hird ec-tion fthis rticlewesuggestines f nstitutionalistnalysishat hould end hem-selves origorousmpiricalesting,voidingomeofthe nferentialrapsndfalla-

cies thatMearsheimerndother ealists ave dentified.52

49. See Haas 1983; ndRuggie1972.50. Keohane1984.51. See Grieco1988; ndMearsheimer994.52. See Snidal 1991; ndPowell 1991.See also Baldwin1993.




Institutions crosstheLevel-of-Analysisivide:Insights rom omesticPolitics

Earlystudies f internationalnstitutionsereoftenmotivatedytheattemptoapplynewmethods sed nthe tudyfdomestic olitics. s ustreviewed,tudiesofvoting ehaviorn theGeneralAssembly,lectoraluccess ntheUN governingstructure,nd urveys egardingttitudinalhange s a result f nternationalrgani-zation xperiencereall prime xamples. imilar tudies ontinue oday, or x-ample,n calculations fpowerndexes ormembertates ftheEuropean nion.53These pproachesavenot, owever, eenwidelynfluentialecentlyndhavebeensubject otrenchantriticisms.54nspite f hisess-than-promisingxperience,chol-arstoday returningnceagain o models fdomesticolitics osuggest ewques-tions nd approaches o thestudy finternationalnstitutions.n this ection,webrieflyonsider hetherhese ew pproachesremoreikely obearfruit.

We find easons o be relativelyptimisticbouttoday's ttemptso transportmodels cross evelsofanalysis,s long s such ttemptsreundertakenith omecaution.nparticular,e see substantialotentialn ookingttheoriesfdomesticinstitutionshat rerootednnoncooperativeame theory. ationalistheoriesfinstitutionshat all nto he ategoryfthe new nstitutionalism"aveapplicabil-

ity tboth hedomesticnd nternationalevels.Virtuallyll the arly ttemptsoapply echniquesnd researchtrategiesrom omestic olitics othe nternationallevel were mplicitlyasedon theassumptionhat greementsmong ctors reenforceable.ndeed, hiswas the nly ssumptionnderwhich tmade ense o ookat thepolitics hat nderlay otingnd decisionmakingn nternationalnstitutionsat all. Models that ssume hat greementsillbe enforcedya neutral hird artyareespeciallynappropriateor he nternationaletting;alculating oting owerntheGeneral ssemblyna world funenforceablegreements ayhavemore hanpassing esemblanceoarrangingeck hairs nthe itanic. hus,t snot urprising

that hesemodelshavenothadgreatnfluence hen ransportedo the nternationallevel.However,ecentmodels fdomesticnstitutionss a rule raw,ftenxplicitly,n

noncooperativeame heory.he basicassumptionsfnoncooperativeame heoryare hat ctors rerational,trategic,ndopportunistic,ndthat ooutside ctorwillstep n to enforcegreements.herefore,greementshatwill make a differencemust e self-enforcing.heseconditionsreremarkablyimilar otheusualcharac-terizationf nternationaloliticss a situationf narchynd elf-help.55s long smodels se the amebasicassumptionsbout henature f actors ndtheir nviron-

ment,hepotentialor earning crossthe evel-of-analysisivide ould be enor-mous.

53. Hosli 1993.54. GarrettndTsebelis 996.55. Waltz 979.




As oneexample, onsiderwhat nternationalelationscholarsmightearn romlooking t currentebates n thenature f egislativenstitutions.56nalogouslyo

howrealist heory ortraystateswith mixturefcommon nd onflictingnterestsbut without upranational nforcement,hese models treat egislators s self-interested,ndividualisticctorsn a situation here heymust ooperatewith neanotheroachievemutual enefits.57hey skhow egislatorsnder hese onditionsmight onstructnstitutions-suchs committeesrparties-that ill llowthem oreachgoals such s reelection.58imilarly,nternationalelationscholars re nter-estednhow states rother ntitiesesign nstitutionalormsorganizations,roce-dures,nformalooperativerrangements,reatyrrangements)hat ssist n the e-alization f heirbjectives.hepointsnot, smuch f he arlieriteraturessumed,that legislativectivity"tthenternationalevel s interestinger e. The power fthe nalogy ests olely n how ctorshoose trategiesocopewith imilartrategicenvironments.ngeneral, esuggesthatmore rogressanbe madebydrawingutthe spects fdomestic olitics hat recharacterizedy attemptsocooperate yactorswithmixedmotives,whocannot urn asilyto externalnforcement,ndapplyinghemelectivelyothe tudyf nternationalelations.

The debate bout egislative rganization,hichwe arguemayprovide nsightsinto nternationalnstitutionsore enerally,asbeenroughlyrganizednto con-

trast etweennformationalnddistributionalodels.nformationalodels oncen-trate n theways nwhichegislativetructuresllow egislatorso earn bout hepolicies hey readopting,hus voidingnefficientutcomes.59esearchers avearguedhat roperlytructuredegislativeommitteesanefficientlyignalnforma-tion bout he ffectsfproposed olicies o thefloor, ndthat nformationalon-cerns anexplain oth hepatternfappointmentf egislatorsocommitteesndthedecisionmakingules nderwhich ommitteesperate. llofthese laimshavestimulatedntensempiricalnvestigation,hich as beenchallenged ythedistri-butional erspectiveiscussed ater.nformationalodels anbeusedtoextend nd

clarifyrgumentsn the nternationaliteraturehat tress heroleof nstitutionsntheprovisionf nformation,s Keohanehasargued,nd n the earning rocess,sErnst ndPeterHaas have mphasized. hey an eadtopredictionsbout he ondi-tionsunderwhich nternationalnstitutionsaneffectivelyrovide olicy-relevantinformationostates,bout hekinds f nstitutionshat anproviderediblenfor-mation,nd bout he ffectsf uch nformationrovisionnpatternsf tate ehav-ior.Anexample f an ssuearea where hese ffects ighteprominents environ-

56. The work n egislativenstitutionss ustone example fthe pplicationfnoncooperativeametheoryodomesticnstitutions.ut ince t sa particularlyell-developediterature,e concentraten there,without ishing o mply hat his s the nlybranch f research n domesticnstitutionshatmayhave nterestingnalogies o nternationalnstitutions.

57. Shepsle ndWeingast 995.58. Althoughmuch f thework n legislative rganizationoncentratesntheAmerican ontext,n

recent ears reative ffortsave been made to develop uch models n non-U.S. ettings.ee Huber1996b;Tsebelis ndMoney1995;RamseyerndRosenbluth993; G. Cox 1987;andShugart ndCarey1992.

59. See Gilligan ndKrehbiel 990; ndKrehbiel 991.




mentalnstitutions,here t s highlyikely hat he bility forganizationsoprovidereliable, redible nformationbout he ffectsf human ctivitiesn the nviron-

ment s a keyfactornexplaininghe uccess r failure fnegotiationsn environ-mental reaties. nother ossible pplicationmight e the reation f nternationalfinancialnstitutions,uch s theBankfor nternationalettlements,n original unc-tion fwhichwas toprovide rediblenformationo marketsn German reditwor-thiness.60 ithinhe uropean nion, heCommission'sole s a relativelyndepen-dent ollector fpolicy-relevantnformations a plausible xplanationor ts bilitytoexercise onsiderablenfluenceverpolicy utcomes.61

Distributional odels, ntheother and, ssume hat nformations not ll thatproblematic.nstead, hey oncentraten thefact hat egislatorsre heterogeneousintheir astes, aring ifferentiallybout arious ssues.62 chievingmutual ains,nthisframework, eanscutting eals thatwill stick crossdifferentssues. Sinceexchangesfvotes annotlways esimultaneous,egislatorsavedeveloped truc-tures uchas committeesndagenda-settingules hat llow them oputtogethermajoritiesn the ssues fmost ntense articularisticnterestothem. his tructureprovides redictionsbout he istributionfbenefitso ndividualegislators.istri-butional enefitslow hroughppointmentopowerfulegislativeommittees.ikeresearchersnthe nformationalradition,hose n thedistributionalraditionave

used suchmodels oexplain ndpredict arious spects f egislative rganization.Forexample, hey rgue hat ommitteesillbe composed fpreferenceutliers-thoseegislators ho aremostntenselybout articularssues-and that uch om-mittees illbegrantedgenda-settingower,whichsnecessaryokeep ross-issuedealsfromnravelingn the loor. istributionalodelsmaybe especially sefulnexploringn a rigorousashion he oleof nternationalnstitutionsnfacilitatingrhampering utually eneficialssue inkages hat ave been an importantesearchagendan nternationalelations.63

The debate etweennformationalnddistributionalodels f egislative rgani-

zationhas beenhighly roductive,nboth heoreticalndempiricalerms.t hasprovided ew nsightsnto he ypes fproblemsonfrontedy egislators,he ypesofsolutionsvailable othem,nd theroleof nstitutionsndemocracies. n theempiricalide, thasgeneratedplethorafalternativebservablemplications,orexample,bout he ompositionf ongressionalommitteesr he onditionsnderwhich ctorsgain gatekeepingr amendmentower. mpirical esearch n bothsideshas edtodeep nsightsbouthowthe tructuref nstitutions,uch s legisla-tivecommittees,nfluencesheir bility o help ndividualsvercome ollective-action roblems,ndthe onditions nderwhichndividuals illbewilling o del-

egatesubstantial ecision-makinguthorityo such institutions.othtypesofquestionsrehighlyelevantndessentialo anunderstandingfthe oleof nstitu-tions n nternationaloliticss well.Forexample,he nformationalodel uggests

60. Simmons 993.61. See Haas 1989;andBemauer 995.62. WeingastndMarshall 988.63. On ssue inkage,ee Stein1980; andMartin 992c.




thatnstitutionshould e mostnfluentialnpromotingooperation hen hey rerelativelyndependent,expert" ources f nformationnd when uch nformation

is scarce nd valuable o states.We should xpect hismodel o be mostuseful ninternationalssue reas haracterizedy nformationsymmetriesr nthe evelop-ment fexpert nowledgesuchas financialndbanking egulation).he distribu-tionalmodel redictshatnstitutionsillbemost uccessfulnallowing or rediblecross-issue ealsbetween tateswhen hosewith hemost ntense nterestn anyparticularssuedominate olicymakingn that imension ndwhen nstitutionalmechanismsnhibittates romenegingncross-issueeals,even fperformanceondifferentimensionssnot imultaneous.nstitutionshatryocopewith nviron-mental rotectionnddevelopmenteeds nthe ame

package suchsUNCED andtheAgenda21 program) rovide plausible xample.Forourinterests,nother

strikingnalogy etweenhe nternationalrena ndthe egislativeiteratures thedegree owhichhe ermsf he ebate-informationersus istribution-reflectheemergingebate bout he ignificancef nternationalnstitutions.

In many ssential espects heproblems acedbyindividualegislatorsmirrorthose acedby ndividualtates nthe nternationalystem.ndividual ctors acesituationsnwhich heymust ooperatenorder o achievebenefits ut also facetemptationsodefect romooperativerrangements.o externaluthorityxists o

enforceooperativegreements;heymust eself-enforcing.elf-enforcementakestheformf exclusion rom hebenefitsfcooperation,coercivemeasure.Giventhese nalogies, here s every eason oexpect hat omeof themethods,nsights,and results fthesenewstudies f egislatorsouldusefullynform ewstudies finternationalnstitutions,nspite fthe actthat egislatorsusually) perate n amoredensely nstitutionalizednvironment.64oregenerally,ationalist odels finstitutionshat ave beendevelopedndomesticettingsave thepotentialo betranslatedo the nternationalevel. As longas we areconsidering ixed-motivesituationsn which ctorsmust ooperaten order o pursue heir bjectives,he

incentives o constructnstitutionso structurend encourage ooperation resimilar.

How InstitutionsMatter

Since he1 80s,work n nternationalnstitutionsas beendefined or hemost artbythedemand hat cholars espond o a realist genda: oprove hat nstitutionshave significantffectnstate ehavior.While tructuringhedebate n thisman-

nermayhavestimulatedirect heoreticalonfrontation,t hasalso obscured omeimportantndtractableesearchaths.Allowing ealism osetthe esearchgendahas meant hatmodels f nternationalnstitutionsaverarelyaken omestic oli-

64. One could makea similar rgumentbout domestic heories fdelegation. ee Epstein ndO'Halloran1997;Lohmann ndO'Halloran1994; ndLupia andMcCubbins 994.The analogy etweenpoliticians eciding odelegate uthorityobureaucratsr committeesndstates elegatinguthorityointermationalnstitutionss strong.




tics seriously,reatinghe state s a unit.The debatehas also beenreduced o adichotomy:ithernstitutionsatter rthey o not. nsufficientttentionasbeen

given othemechanismshrough hichwe mightxpectnstitutionalffectsowork.Institutionalists,nresponseo realism, ave treatednstitutionsargelys indepen-dent ariables, hileplaying own arliernsightshat nternationalnstitutionsrethemselvesheobjects fstrategictate hoice.Treatingnstitutionss dependentvariables as mistakenlyeen understoods an implicitdmission hat hey reepiphenomenal,ith o ndependentffectnpatternsfbehavior.65

Althought has been mportantogobeyondmerelyxplaininghe xistence finternationalnstitutions,roductive ew inesof researchmergef we accept hatinstitutionsresimultaneously auses and effects; hats, institutionsre both heobjects f state hoice andconsequential.n a rationalist,quilibriumramework,this tatementsobvious ndunexceptionable:tates hoose nddesignnstitutions.States o sobecause hey ace ertainroblemshat an be resolved hroughnstitu-tionalmechanisms.hey hoose nstitutionsecauseoftheirntendedffects. nceconstructed,nstitutionsillconstrainndshapebehavior,venas they recon-stantlyhallengedndreformedytheirmembertates.n this ection, e outlinenumberf ines fresearchhat howpromiseo take sbeyond he dotheymatterordon't hey" tructurefresearchn nternationalnstitutions.

Thefollowingesearchgenda s firmlyn the ationalistradition.lthoughhisapproachllowsfor ubstantialariationnpatternsfpreferencesveroutcomes,and ndeed rovides redictionsbout utcomes asedonexogenoushangensuchpreferences,tprovideselativelyittlexplanatoryeverage ith espectothe ourcesofchange n suchpreferences. fewwords n howthis genda s related o theconstructivistesearch rogram-maye inorder. o thedegree hat onstructivistapproachesrove owerfultmakinghangesnactors' undamentaloals endog-enous, rovidingefutableypothesesbout he onditionsor uch hange,he on-structivistndrationalistpproacheswill be complementary.lthoughationalist

approachesregenerallyowerfulor xplaining owpolicypreferenceshangewhen xternalonstraintsr nformationonditionshange, lternativepproaches,such as constructivism,renecessary or xplainingmorefundamental,nternalchanges n actors'goals.However, herationalistesearch rogram as much ocontributevenwithouttrongheoriesbout he easons or hangenactors'goals.One of thecore nsightsf theories f strategicnteractions that, egardlessfactors' pecificreferences,heywilltend ofacegenericypes fcooperationrob-lemsover ndover gain.Many ituationsiverise o ncentiveso renege ndealsor tobehave n time-inconsistentaysthatmake ctors appynthe hort unbut

regretfulnthe ongrun. ikewise,many ituationsfstrategicnteractioniveriseto benefitsromooperation,nd conflictsverhowto divideupthis urpluswillplague ooperativefforts.hus, onsiderationsfhowtopreventheatingndhowtoresolvedistributionalonflict,o givetwoprominentxamples, recentral otheories fcooperationegardlessf thespecific oals of actors.Rationalistp-

65. Mearsheimer994.




proaches re powerful ecausethey uggest bservablemplicationsboutpatternsof ooperationn the aceof uchdilemmas,ven bsent hekind fprecisenforma-

tion boutpreferenceshat cholars esire.t s tosuchdilemmashatwe now turnour ttention.

Collaboration VersusCoordinationProblems

Themostproductivenstitutionalistesearchgenda hus ar ninternationalela-tions as been he ationalist-functionalistgenda, riginatingithKeohane'sAfterHegemony ndSteveKrasner's dited olume n nternationalegimes.66hisworkwas nformedya fundamentallymportantnsight,nspired ythemetaphorfthePrisoners'DilemmaPD). Individuallyational ction ystates ould mpedemutu-allybeneficialooperation.nstitutionsouldbe effectiveo thedegree hat heyallowedstates o avoid short-termemptationsorenege, hus ealizing vailablemutual enefits.

Someauthors,ecognizinghat D was onlyonetype fcollective-actionrob-lem, rew distinctionetween ollaborationnd oordinationroblems.67ollabo-ration roblems,ikePD, arecharacterizedy ndividualncentivesodefectnd heexistencefequilibriahat re notPareto ptimal. hus, heproblemtates ace n

this ituations finding aysto bindthemselvesnd othersn order o reach hePareto rontier.ncontrast,oordinationames recharacterizedythe xistence fmultiple areto-optimalquilibria.heproblemtates ace nthis ituations not oavoidtemptationsodefect,ut o choose mong hese quilibria.uchchoicemaybe relativelyimple nd resolved y dentificationf a focalpoint,f the quilibriaare not harplyifferentiatedrom ne anothern terms f thedistributionf ben-efits.68ut somecoordinationames, iketheparadigmaticattle ftheSexes, n-volvemultiplequilibriaverwhich he ctors avestronglyivergentreferences.Initially, ost uthorsrgued hat nstitutionsouldhave ittleffectn patternsf

state ehaviorn coordinationames, redictingubstantialnstitutionalffectsnlyin collaborationituations.nterestingly,hese rgumentsed both oexpectationsabout nstitutionalffectsn state ehavior nd o statencentivesodelegateuthor-ityto institutions,onsistent ith he kindofequilibriumnalysiswe findmostpromisingor utureesearch.

As the ogicofmodern ame theory as become moredeeply ntegratedntointernationalelationsheory,nd as authors averecognizedhe imitationsfthecollaboration-coordinationistinction,e havebegun o eework hatntegratesheefficiencyoncernsssociatedwith ollaborationndthedistributionaloncernss-

sociatedwith oordination.rasnermade seminalontributionothis ine f naly-sis.69 e arguedhatwhen tates re ttemptingocooperate ith neanother,chiev-ing fficiencyains-reachinghe areto rontier-isnly neof he hallengeshey

66. See Keohane 984; ndKrasner 983b.67. See Snidal1985a;Stein1983; ndMartin 992b.68. GarrettndWeingast 993.69. Krasner 991.




face ndoften ot hemost ifficultne.Many quilibriamay xist long he aretofrontier,nd specifyingne of these s the ocusof cooperation,hroughargaining

andthe xercise f tate ower, ominatesmpiricalxamples f nternationaloop-eration. rasner'snsightsperfectlyompatible ith he olk heoremsfnoncoop-erative ame theoryhat howthat epeated lay of a PD-type amegivesrisetomany-infact, nfinite-equilibria.hus,repetitionransformsollaborationrob-lems nto oordinationroblems.n most ircumstances,tates ave imultaneouslytoworrybout eachingfficientutcomesndresolvingistributionalonflict.

Oncewe recognize hisfact, urapproach ointernationalnstitutionsecomesbothmore omplex nd more loselyrelated o traditionalnternationalelationsconcerns boutpower ndbargaining.o be effective,nstitutionsannotmerelyresolve ollaborationroblemshrough onitoringndother nformationalunc-tions. heymust lsoprovide mechanismor esolvingistributionalonflict.orexample,nstitutionsayconstructocalpoints,dentifyingne possible quilib-rium s thedefaultr "obvious"one,thus educingtate-to-stateargainingboutthechoiceof a particularatternfoutcomes. he role of theEuropean ourt fJusticeECJ),discussed lsewherenthis rticle,s capturednpart ythis ype fconstructedocal-pointnalysis. heBasle Banking ommittee'sole ndevisinginternationaltandardsor rudentialanking racticesimilarlyelped o coordi-

natenational egulations here numberf plausible olutionswere available.70Where tates ear hat hebenefitsfcooperationredisproportionatelylowingoothers,nstitutionsan provide eliable nformationboutstatebehavior nd therealized enefitsfcooperationoallay uchfears. rade nstitutionserform anyfunctions;ne functionhat ould tandmore nalyticalcrutinys theprovisionfsuch nformationbout hedistributionf benefitsmongmembers. nother ayinstitutionsouldmitigateistributionalonflictsto "keep ccount" fdeals truck,compromises ade, ndgains chieved, articularlyncomplexmulti-issuenstitu-tions.The networksreatedwithin hesupranationalnstitutionsftheEuropean

Union, or xample, rovide henecessarycopefor ssue-linkagend nstitutionalmemoryoperformhefunctionfassuringhat ll members,ver ime, chievereasonablyair hare fthebenefitsfcooperation.71nless heproblemfequilib-rium electionsresolved,ll the hird-partyonitoringn theworldwillnot llowfor tablenternationalooperation.

Thus, promisingineofresearch ill nvolve ringingistributionalssuesbackinto he tudy f nternationalnstitutions,ssues hatwere n fact hefocus fsomeofthe arly egimesiteratureiscussed arlier.nstitutionsay nteract ith istri-butional onflictn a numberfways.Mostsimply,hey eflectndsolidifyettle-

ments fdistributionalonflicthat ave beenestablishedhrough ore raditionalmeans. hesemeansncludehe xercise f state ower,whichKrasnermphasizes,market ominance,ndalternative ethods fbargaininguchas making radesacross ssues.72n this erspective,nstitutionsanmake differencef heyock na

70. Simmons 998.71. Pollack1997.72. Fearon 994a.




particularquilibrium,rovidingtability.utratherhanmerelyeflectingowernan epiphenomenalashion,s realistswouldhave t, nstitutionsnthis ormulation

preventotentialhallengersrom nderminingxisting atternsfcooperation,x-plaining hy owerfultatesmay hoose o nstitutionalizehese atternsatherhanrelyingolely n ad hoc cooperation.

Institutionsay lso serve less controversialignaling unction,herefore ini-mizing argainingosts.Thiswouldbe the aseif nstitutionsonstructocalpointsor fthey rimarilyeep account f thepatternfbenefitsver ime, s discussedearlier.n either ase, they ffectivelyncrease athdependence. nce a particularequilibriumschosen,nstitutionsock t n.Researchingheways nwhich nstitu-tions o this-how dothey nhance ath ependence,ndunderwhat onditions?-wouldbe intriguing.ormativeuestions lso rise o the opofthe genda ncewerecognize he ock-in ole of institutions.f theydo in fact olidify patternfcooperationreferredythemost owerful, eshould uestionhe thical tatus finstitutions,urningur ttentiono equity,s wellas efficiency,uestions.

In themost raditional,tate-centricerms,nstitutionseflectnd enhance tatepower; nTonyEvans and PeterWilson'swords, hey re "arenasfor cting utpower elations."73n theother nd ofthespectrum,e maywant o ask aboutsituationsnwhich nstitutionslaya more ctiverole nresolving istributional

conflict.erhapsnstitutionsometimeso more hanock nequilibriahosenhroughthe xercise f state ower, aving n ndependentartnthe election fequilibria.Such nargumentas beenmademost learlynthe aseofthe CJ.Here,GeoffreyGarrettndBarryR. Weingast ind hat here rea numberfways nwhich heEuropean ommunityouldhave realized tsgoal of completinghe nternal ar-ket.74he ECJmade bigdifferencenthe ourse fEuropeanntegrationecause twas able toconstructfocalpoint y choosing ne of thesemechanisms,hat fmutual ecognition.hischoice had clear distributionalmplicationsutwas ac-cepted ymember tates ecause twas a Paretomprovementverthereversion

point ffailingocompletehe nternal arket. distinctesearch raditionmpha-sizesthe egitimizingole hatnternationalnstitutionsanplay nfocal-pointelec-tion. omescholars oint utthatnstitutionallynd egally nshrinedocalpointscangaina highdegree f egitimacyoth nternationallynddomestically.75hislegitimacy,nturn,as mportantolitical onsequences.6

To develop researchgendaonhow nstitutionsesolveproblemsfmultipleequilibrianddistribution,ewouldhavetobuildon these nsightso ask condi-tional uestions.When restates, articularlyhepowerful, illingo turn he rob-lem ofequilibriumelection verto an institution? hatkinds f nstitutionsre

mostikely operformhis unctionffectively-thosehatre trategicrthose hat

73. Evans ndWilson 992.74. Garrettnd Weingast 993. They lso argue hat hemultiple quilibriawerenot harply istin-

guished rom ne anothern terms f efficiencynddo not oncentraten distributionalonflictmongequilibria. heyhavebeen riticizedn these oints. ee Burley ndMattli 993.

75. See Franck 990; andPeck 1996, 37.76. Claude 1966, 67.




are naive;those hat ely npolitical ecisionmakingrthose hat elyheavily nrelativelyndependentxpertsnd/orudicialprocesses; hose hat roadly eflecthe

membershipf the nstitutionr those hat re dominated y thepowerful? nderwhat onditionsre constructedocalpoints ikely o gain nternationalecognitionand acceptance? verall,bringinghe traditionalnternationalelations ocusondistributionalonflictack nto he tudyf nternationalnstitutionsolds he oten-tial forgeneratingesearchableuestions hat re bothpositive nd normativennature.

Internationalnstitutionsnd Domestic olitics

In allowing heir genda o be defined yrespondingo the ealist hallenge,nstitu-tionalists ave generally eglected heroleofdomestic olitics. tateshavebeentreateds rational nitaryctors nd assigned referencesndbeliefs. his frame-work as beenproductivenallowing s tooutlinehebroadways nwhich nstitu-tions anchange atternsfbehavior.ut nprivileginghe tate s anactor, e haveneglectedheways n which ther ctors n nternationaloliticsmight se institu-tionsa centralnsight f earlier tudies f transgovernmentalrganization)ndtheways n whichhenaturer nterestsfthe tate tself repotentiallyhanged ythe

actions f nstitutionsan implicationfthe arlyneofunctionalistiterature).erewe outline few ines ofanalysis hat houldbe fruitfulor ntegratingomesticpolitics ndinternationalnstitutionsn a systematic anner, atherhan reatingdomestic olitics s a residual ategoryfexplanation.ecausethe ines fanalysisherehave foundationsn specific nalytical rameworksith xplicit ssumptions,applyinghem othe roblem f nternationalnstitutionshould esultnproductiveresearch aths, ather hanmerely heproliferationf possible "explanatoryari-ables" that ascharacterizedany ttemptso ntegrateomestic oliticsnd nter-national elations. e should ote hat ringingomestic olitics ack nto he tudyof nternationalnstitutionss an agenda hat hould e understoods analyticallydistinctrom hat fapplyingnstitutionalistodels evelopednthedomesticet-ting othe nternationalevel, nagenda ddressedlsewherenthis rticle.

As wewillargue, neofthemore undamentalays n which nternationalnsti-tutionsanchange tate ehaviorsby ubstitutingor omesticractices.fpoliciesformerlyadebydomesticnstitutionsrenowmadeon the nternationalevel, t sreasonableoexpect ubstantialhangesn thepatternsf world olitics. hree e-lated uestions re entralounderstandinghe elations etween omesticnd nter-

nationalnstitutions.irst,nderwhat onditions ightomesticctors ewillingosubstitutenternationalordomestic nstitutions?econd,areparticularomesticactors egularlydvantaged ythe bilityotransferolicymakinguthorityotheinternationalevel?Third,owhat xtentan nternationalnstitutionalecisionsndrules e enforcedydomesticnstitutions,ndwhat rethe mplicationsor ompli-ance?Thesequestionsre ied ogethery he ssumptionhat omesticctorsnten-tionally elegate olicymakinguthorityo the nternationalevelwhen his ctionfurthersursuitftheirnterests.




Domestic nstitutionsan at times e a barrier o therealization f benefits orsociety s a whole.Failures f domesticnstitutionsan arise hrough number f

mechanisms.erhapsmost bviously,omesticnstitutionsan be captured ypref-erence utliers hoholdpolicyhostage otheir emands. ecent esearchuggeststhat hismay e the ase with espect othe ettlementf erritorialisputes etweenborderingtatesnsomeregions: epeated ailure o ratifyorder greementsnthelegislatures one ofthemost mportantomestic olitical onditionsssociatedwiththewillingnessf states o submit heir isputes o nternationalrbitration.77oregenerally,his ituations likely o arisewhen ome ctors, uch s those ooking orparticularisticenefits,indteasier oorganize han oactorsmore oncerned iththewelfare fthe verage itizen. uch s the story ften old bout rade olicy.Import-competingroducersndothers ith n nterestnprotectionistoliciesmayfindteasier oorganize han hosewhofavor ree rade, coalitionfexportersndconsumers.hisdifferentialbilityoorganize illbias policynfavor fprotection,decreasing verallwelfare. ransferringhe policymakingrocess o the nterna-tionalevel,where xportersan see that hey ave stakenorganizationn order ogain he peningfforeign arkets,anfacilitate more venhandedepresentationof nterests.hose ctorswhohave hemost ogain romursuitfgeneral elfare-such sexecutiveslected y national onstituency-willhow hemost nterestn

turningo nternationalnstitutionsnderuch ircumstances.uditholdsteinro-vides nanalysis long hese ineswhen he explains heparadox ftheU.S. presi-dent greeingo bilateral ispute-resolutionanels n theU.S.-CanadaFreeTradeAct FTA), nspite fthe act hat hese anels redictablyecide ases na way hattends odeny rotectionoU.S. producers.78

We canidentifyther ncentivesordomestic ctors o transferolicymakingothe nternationalevel. One common roblemwith nstitutionshat re under hecontrol fpolitical ctors s that ftime-inconsistentreferences.lthoughunninganunexpectedlyighevelof nflationodaymaybringmmediateenefitsopoliti-

ciansupfor eelection,or xample, llowingmonetaryolicy o bemadebypoliti-cians will ntroducewelfare-decreasingnflationaryiastothe conomy. uttingadditionalonstraintsnpolicy, or xample, y oining systemffixedxchangerates ra commonurrencyrea, anprovide mechanismoovercomehis ime-inconsistencyroblem,s argued y proponentsf a single uropean urrency.ngeneral,fpursuitfgains ver ime nvolves hort-termacrifices,urningo nter-nationalnstitutionsanbe an attractiveption or omestic olicymakers.

A second ndrelateduestionbout omestic oliticss whetherarticularindsof actorswillregularlyee anadvantagenturningo the nternationalevel.At the

simplestevel, tseems ikely hat internationalist"ctors-thoseheavily ngagedin nternationalransactions,79hosewho share henorms f nternationalociety,80

77. Simmons 998.78. See Goldstein 996; andGilligan 997.79. Frieden 991.80. Sikkink 993a.




or thosewhohave a stake n a transnationalrglobalresource81will haveaninterestnturningo the nternationalevel.Thismay specially e the ase when

suchgroups rparties reconsistentlyna minorityositionndomestic olitics.Drawing n these deas,we couldbegin odevelophypothesesbout hekinds fdomesticnterestroups hatwillmost avorransferringome uthorityothenter-nationalevel.

Certain omesticnstitutionalctorsmayalso have a tendencyo benefit rominternational-levelolicymaking.ne suchactor,which s justbeginningo enterpoliticalcientists'analysisf nternationalnstitutions,stheudiciary.ncreasingly,internationalgreementsre egal nform. hismeans hathey ften re nterpretedbydomesticourts,ndthatudgescanuse internationalaw as a basisonwhich omakeudgments.82ecause nternationalawprovides hisparticularctorwith nadditionalesourceywhich opursuegendas,whetherureaucraticr deological,wemightxpect hatheudiciaryngeneralends obesympathetico nternationalinstitutions.

Overall, s we work owardmore ophisticatedpecificationfthe ausalmecha-nisms hrough hichnstitutionsan nfluenceehavior, e willhavetopay muchmore ttentionodomesticoliticshan tudies f nternationalnstitutionsave husfar. hedevelopmentfgeneralheoriesfdomesticolitics rovidesnopeningor

systematicevelopmentfpropositionsbout omesticctors.We no onger eed otreat hedomesticevel as merely he ource fstate references,or s a residualcategoryoexplain nomalies rpatternsfvariationhat annot e explained yinternationalactors.nstead,we canmove oward enuinelynteractiveheories fdomesticoliticsnd nternationalnstitutions,pecifyinghe onditionsnderwhichcertainctors re ikely opreferhat olicy e madeon the nternationalevel.Thisfocus llowsustospecifyonditionsikely o ead tothedelegationfpolicymakingauthorityothe nternationalevel, omeofwhichwehaveoutlined ere.

Unanticipatedonsequences

Ina rationalistramework,nstitutionsreboth he bject fstate hoice ndconse-quential. he ink hat ies hese wo spects f nstitutionsogether,nd allowstheanalyst o developrefutableropositionsbout nstitutionsithinn equilibriumframework,s the bilityfactors oanticipatehe onsequencesfparticularypesofinstitutions.orexample,n thepreceding iscussion fdomestic olitics,weassumed onsistentlyhat omesticctorswere ble togaugewith omedegree faccuracyheways nwhichworking ithinnternationalnstitutionsouldaffect

theirbilityopursueheirmaterial r deational oals.Therationalistpproach tandsndistinctionoa historicalrsociological p-

proach o nstitutions.83hese pproacheseeinstitutionssmore eeply ootednd

81. Young1979.82. SeeAlter 996; ndConforti993.83. See Steinmo, helen, ndLongstreth992;andPierson 996b.Historicalnstitutionalismtresses

the ath-dependentaturef nstitutions,xplaining hy pparentlynefficientnstitutionsersist. ocio-




draw ttentionotheir nanticipatedonsequences. lthough e may uestion hethermany nternationalnstitutionseachthe same degree f "taken-for-grantedness"

thatwe see ndomestic olitics r smaller-scaleocialrelations,tseems ndeniablethat hey ometimes aveeffectshat urpriseheirmembertates.t s importantodifferentiateetween nintendedndunanticipatedffects.ffectsmaybe antici-patedbut unintended.orexample,t is generally xpected hat rrangementsolower herateof inflation ill ead to somewhat igherevels of unemployment.Thus,higher nemployments an anticipated,lthough nintended,onsequence fstringent onetaryolicies. t is bestunderstoods a price ctors re sometimeswillingo bear ogain hebenefitsf ow nflation.uchunintendedut nticipatedconsequencesf nstitutionsresentittle hallenge o a rationalistpproach, ince

they itneatlynto typical ost-benefitnalysis.Genuinely nanticipatedffects,however, resent larger hallenge.

Specific xamples f pparentlynanticipatedonsequencesf nternationalnsti-tutionsrenotdifficultofind. tates hat elieved hat uman-rightsccordswerenothingutmeaninglesscraps fpaper ound hemselvesurprisedythe bilityftransnationalctors o usethese ommitmentso force overnmentsochange heirpolicies.84nthe uropean ommunity,ew nticipatedhat heECJwouldhave hewidespreadnfluencenpolicy hatthas.85 rimeMinister argarethatcher asapparentlyuite urprisedtthe esults fagreeingochange otinguleswithinhe

European ommunity,uch s the doptionfqualified-majorityoting, hich heacceptedn the ingle uropean ct.86

How might rationalistpproach eal with hese vents?One productivep-proachmighte toattemptospecifyhe onditionsnderwhich nanticipatedon-sequences remostikely. his pecificationould t east llowusto suggest hena simple ationalist odelwillprovideubstantialxplanatoryeveragendwhen tmight ecomenecessaryo integratehe nsightsf other choolsof thought.funanticipatedonsequencesominateolitical utcomes, ewouldhave o draw nalternativeso rationalist odelsna way hat oesfar eyond sing hem s a waytospecify referencesndgoals.Here,webegin pecifyinghen nanticipatedon-sequences remostikely oconfoundatternsf nternationalooperation.

Inductively,t ppearshathangesnsecondaryules-thats,rules bout ules-are thechangesmost ikely o work nunexpected ays.Changes nvoting uleswithin n institution,or xample, an giverise to newcoalitions ndpreviouslysuppressedxpressionsf nterest,eading ounpredictedolicy utcomes. hangesindecision-makingroceduresan have evenmorewidespreadndunexpectedf-fects fthey penthepolicyprocess oinput rom ew actors.Manyexamples f

unanticipatedonsequencesrisefrom ecision-makingrocedureshat rovidec-cess to nongovernmentalndtransnationalctors, s, for xample,Kathrynik-

logical nstitutionalismmphasizes he ocial nature f nstitutions,tressingheir ole n definingndi-viduals' dentitiesndthe act hatmany mportantnstitutionsome o be taken or rantedndthereforenot een s susceptibleo reform.

84. Sikkink 993a.85. Burley ndMattli 993.86. Moravcsik 991.




kink'swork as shown.87oth s sources fnew nformationnd as strategicctorsin their wnright,uchgroups re often ble to use newpoints f accessto gain

unexpectedeverage verpolicy. hangesn decision-makinguleswillhavewide-spread ffectsn a varietyf substantiveules nd arethusmore ikely o haveunanticipatedffects noutcomeshan hangesnsubstantiveules hemselves.fthis bservations correct, e should eemore nanticipatedonsequencesn situa-tions hat averelativelyomplexndpermutableecondaryules, uch s legalizedinstitutions.raditionaltate-to-stateargaining ith unitveto,whichhas littlesecondaryule tructure,hould rovideess opportunityor onstatectors rcoali-tions ftheweak o nfluenceutcomes nexpectedly.

One questionhat ftenrises, speciallynthe nternationalrena,s why overn-

ments rewilling o livewithunanticipatedutcomes.After ll, participationninternationalnstitutionss voluntary.funpleasantnd unexpectedutcomes re-quentlyccur, tates s sovereignctors etain herighto pull outof nstitutions.Whymightheyhoose oremainn?Thetrivialnswers that he enefitsfremain-ing n aregreaterhan he osts.But we can turnhis nswernto omethingon-trivial ythinkingbout he onditions hen nstitutionalemberships likely oprovide hegreatestenefits.omeof thesehave been spelled ut nfunctionalisttheory.eohane rgues hat hedemand or nternationalnstitutionsillbegreatestunder onditionsf nterdependence,hen tates ace a densenetworkfrelations

with neanotherndwhere nformations somewhatcarce.88 ecouldgeneralizethat tates re east ikely o bewillingowithdrawrom n nstitutionnthe aceofunanticipatedonsequences hen hey redealingwith ssues hat xhibitncreasingreturnsoscale,which,nturn, reate onditionsfpathdependence. onsider hecreationfregionalradingrrangementsnthe1990s.Thesearrangementsrovidetheirmembers ith conomic enefits,ndthose nthe utside fthe rrangementsfindhemselvesosing nvestmentndtrading pportunities.e thereforeee east-ernEuropean, aribbean,nd other tates lamoringo becomemembersf therelevant egional radingrrangements.his s a goodexample fhow ncreasingreturnso scale create high emand or nstitutionalembership.nder hese on-ditions,tseems ikely hat hese tateswillbewillingoputupwith highevelofunexpectedutcomes efore heywould seriouslyonsiderwithdrawingrom ninstitution.owever, his xample egs he uestionfwhetherradegreementsrelikely o have substantialnanticipatedffects. hey reonly ikely o do so inthecase ofrapid echnologicalhange r arge nternationalconomic hocks, uch sthe il shocks fthe1 70s.

Tvpology f nstitutional ffects

Aswe turnur ttentionotheproblemfhow,notustwhether,nternationalnsti-tutionsmatter,t becomes ssential ounderstandlternative echanismshroughwhich nstitutionsightxert heir ffects.oprod ur hinkingnthis irection,e

87. Sikkink 993a.88. Keohane1983a.




introducepreliminaryypologyf nstitutionalffects.he reasoning ehind histypologys that ifferentnstitutions,r perhaps imilarnstitutionsn differentet-

tings, illhavedifferentypes feffects.pecifyinghese ffects illnot nly llowus to developbetternsightsnto he ausal mechanismsnderlyinghe nteractionbetween nstitutionsnd states r societies. t will also provide ormore establepropositionsbouthow and whenwe should xpectnstitutionso exert ubstantialeffectsn behavior.

The typology e suggest s analyticallynformedut imsfirsto provide lan-guagefor escribingatternsfchange n state ehaviorfter reation fan nterna-tional nstitution.erewe spelloutthe ypologyndpresent ome llustrativex-amples. henext tepwillbeto ink he ypologyocausalprocesses,ndwe suggestsomepreliminarydeasalong hese ines.We begin y uggestingwo ypes f nsti-tutionalffects:onvergencenddivergenceffects.fcourse, henullhypothesissthat nstitutionsaveno effect. evelopmentfa clearernalytical ramework ayforce s toconsider ituationsn whichwe combine ffects: or xample, erhapssome types f states re subject o convergenceffectsndothers o divergenceeffects.

Webeginwith onvergenceffects,ince he ogicof most ationalist,conomis-tic,and functionalistheories f internationalnstitutionseads us to expect uch

effects.hesemodels ositgoalsthat tates ind t difficultoachieve n theirwn,whetheror easons f ime-inconsistentreferences,ollective-actionroblems,ld-fashioned omestic olitical talemate,r other ailures f unilateraltate ction.nthis unctionalistogic, tates urno nternationalnstitutionsoresolve uchprob-lems; nstitutionsllowthem oachievebenefitsnavailablehroughnilateralc-tion fexistingtate tructures.unctionalistnalysis ees nternationalnstitutionsas importantecausethey elpstates o solve problems.Manyof theseproblemshavetheir ootsnthe ailuresfdomesticnstitutions,ndtheir esolutionnvolvesturningometypes fauthorityver o the nternationalevel. Once policy s del-

egated o an internationalnstitution,tatebehaviorwillconverge:members illtend oadopt imilarmonetary,rade,rdefense olicies.

Whathasbeenmissing rom unctionalistccounts f nstitutionalizations thesystematiconnectionetween omestic olitical onditionsnd ncentiveso con-structnd omplywith nternationalnstitutions.utoncewerecognizehat nterna-tionalnstitutionsaymake differenceecause hey ffectivelyubstituteor o-mesticpracticesmaking olicy decisions, etting olicy goals, or undertakingmonitoringctivities),urattentionurnso thedomestic olitical onditionshatmake uch ubstitutionreasonable olicy lternative.fdomesticnstitutionsre

the ource f persistentolicyfailure,fthey omehow reventherealization fsocietal references,r f heynterfereith he ursuitfmutual enefits ith therstates, urningunctionsverto the nternationalevel canenhancenationalwel-fare.89 onetary olicy s a prime xampleof this ogic.Other xamplesmight

89. Somewould rgue hat his rocess s antidemocratic.ee Vaubel1986.However, uch nargu-ment ests nweakfoundations.irst,tassumes hat omesticnstitutionsrenecessarilyesponsiveo




include rade olicy,fdomestic rade olicy nstitutionsrecaptured yprotection-ists;or environmentalolicy, f domesticnstitutionsncourage short-termather

than long-termerspectiven the roblem. hinkingbout he ogicof ubstitutionrequiresmuchmore ttentiono inefficientomestic olitics hanmost unctionaltheories aveprovided o date.

A classic example f nternationalnstitutionscting s substitutesordomesticinstitutionsnd thereforeaving onvergenceffectsies in argumentsboutwhyhigh-inflationtates uch s Italymighthoose o nter he uropeanMonetary nion(EMU).90High nflations a publicbad, eading o ower verallwelfare han owinflation. owever, he short-termenefitso politicians rom llowing purts funanticipatednflation ake t difficulto achieve ow rates f nflationnless nsti-tutionshat etmonetaryolicy re ndependentfpoliticalnfluence.91hus, rans-ferringuthorityo an nstitutionhat s relativelynsulatedromolitical nfluence,andthat tself as a preferenceorow nflation,anprovideverallwelfare enefitsfor he ountry.his s the ogic that eads a stateike taly otake heunusual tep(for relativelyich, eveloped ountry)f ransfen-ingcore spect f overeignty-control ver he urrency-to European entral ank.

Given hisogicofdelegation,tateshat ecomemembersf he MU should eea convergencentheir ates f nflation.92lthoughhedebate ages mong cono-

mistsboutwhetherhe uropeanMonetaryystem as nfactworkedn thisman-ner,93heres little oubt hat ne ofthemajormotivationsormonetarynion s forhigh-inflationtates o "import" ow German ates f nflation,eading o similarinflationates nall member tates.fwe looked t thevariationninflationatesprior o entryntomonetarynionor nto monetaryystemmore enerally),ndcomparedt to inflationates fterntry, e should ee a decline n the evel ofvariation.

Although onetarynions a prominentnd ntriguingxample f convergenceeffects,ecan magine similarynamicnotherssue reas s well.Environmental

institutionshouldeadtoconvergencef environmentalndicators,uch s carbondioxide missions.94uman-rightsnstitutionsctings substituteshouldeadmem-bers oadopt ncreasinglyimilar uman-rightsractices.ven f full onvergencedoesnot ccur,hemajor ffectf n nstitutionhatsactings a substituteillbetobringtate racticesmore loselyn inewith ne another.

A convergenceffectouldbemeasurednd dentifiedydecreased ariationnrelevantndicatorsfstate ractices, hethernflationates, ollution,rhuman-

national references.or thekinds f reasons ust discussed, uchas time-inconsistentreferences,rinstitutionalapture,his ssumptions often alse. econd, he rgumentssumes hat nternationalnsti-tutionsre necessarily ore ifficultomonitor,onstrain,nd nfluencehan omesticnstitutions.l-though hismaybe a reasonablessumptionor omekinds f societal ctors nd some states,t s notuniversallyrue.

90. For contrastingrgumentnthe ogicofEMU, see Gruber 996.91. Rogoff 985.92. FratiannindvonHagen1992.93. See Giavazzi ndGiovannini989;andWeber 991.94. Levy 1993.




- Inflationates rior o ntryntomonetarynion. Inflationatesfterntry ith convergenceffect

- - Inflationates fterntry ith divergenceffect

ct \\

Italy Spain France Germnany

FIGURE 1. International nstitutions ith onvergence r divergence ffects

rightsbuses.Theexistence fa convergenceffectould lsobe identifiedhrough

graphical eans. igure gives n example. n the -axis, tates re rrayednorderoftheir erformancenthe utcome imension,ay nflationates. heserates reindicated n they-axis.The solid ine ndicates nflationatesprior o entryntomonetarynion. tssteep lope ndicates hat he tates xhibit ubstantialariationin nflationates. he dottedinerepresentshe utcome fmonetarynion ctingssubstitute,ausing onvergencen nflationates. hemore hallow lope ndicatesless variationhan bserved efore ntryntomonetarynion.

The notion hatnternationalnstitutionsightubstituteor omestic nesunder-lies functionalistheories f nstitutions.owever, omeempirical ork n the f-

fects f nstitutionsas found patternuitedifferentrom he onvergencef out-comes predicted y sucha mechanism.nstead, ome authors ave found hat heprimaryffectf nstitutionss toexaggerate reexistingatternsfbehavior. orexample, ndrewMoravcsik asfound,na regional omparisonfhuman-rightsinstitutions,hat hesenstitutionsnly ed to animprovementnpracticesnthosestates hat lready xhibited high evelofrespect orhuman ights.95hus,WestEuropean tates, hrough articipationn institutions,ave mprovedheir lreadyverygoodhuman-rightsecords, hereas atinAmericantates, ccordingo hisevidence,how ittlempactf nstitutionalarticipation.

Thispatternuggestshat nternationalnstitutionsometimeseadtodivergenceof state ractices,neffectomplementingndmagnifyingreexistingendenciesratherhan verridinghem.n this ase, nstitutionsillhavea divergenceffect.This ffectesults hen tateswhose nitial racticealls ar romnstitutionaluide-lineswill show ittle hange rom ehavior, hereas hosenear heguidelinesmove

95. Moravcsik 995.




even loser othem.ncontrast,convergenceffectppearswhen nstitutionsxerttheir reatestnfluencen preciselyhose tateswhosebehavior eviates ubstan-

tially romnstitutionalorms. ivergences likely o emergewhen nstitutionsx-aggerateomesticallyeneratedendenciesf state ehaviorrwhen hey rimarilymimic omesticnstitutions.nne-Marielaughter as arguedomethinglong heselines npointingut hat iberal tates re he nesmost ikely o create ndabidebyrelativelyiberalnternationalnstitutions.96ccording o this ogic, iberal nstitu-tionswill hange he ehaviorf iberal tates utnot lliberal nes, eading odiver-gence f state ehavior.

Adivergenceffect eans hat hose tates hat lready ome lose to nstitutionalnormswillmovefurtheroward hem,whereas hebehavior f those hat eviatefrom uchnormswillremain nchanged.f we were o develop measure f statebehavior, e would ee a divergenceffectnincreased ariation f state ehaviorafternstitutionalreation.Wecanalso llustrateivergenceffectsraphically,s inFigure1.Here, nstitutionalffectsesultna steeperine, ndicatingreater iver-gence n therelevantutcome ariable. or ease of comparison, econtinue ousetheEMU-inflationxample.Althoughuch n outcome eemsunlikelynpractice,for hesakeofargument e could magine hatmonetarynion hat llowedfordecentralized,nconstrainediscalpolicymaking hileprovidingdditional e-

sources o covernational ebts ouldlead to such a perverse utcome.Another,perhapsmoreplausible, xample f a divergenceffects inthe areaofoverseasdevelopmentid. nthe1 70s,OECD countriesgreed odevote setpercentageftheirGDP,0.7 percent,odevelopmentssistance. lthoughomecountries avecome losetoprovidinghis evelof id anduse the arget igures a tool ndomesticdebates, thers avewholly eglectedhis argetnd nstead ecreasedhepercent-ageoftheir ationalncome hathey evote oforeignid.

Ifthis ypologyrovides usefulwayto describe lternativenstitutionalffects,thenext hallenges tobegin o linkup thesepatternsfbehavior o alternative

causalmechanisms.hisproject ppears romising,ndweoutline reliminarydeashere.As suggestedarlier,nstitutionshatead toconvergencef tate ehaviorinkup nicely o thefunctionalistpproachhathasdominatedtudies finternationalinstitutions,egimes,nd organizationsver he astfifteenears.n this ituation,thefailure f domesticnstitutionsr of unilateraltate ction reates ncentivesorely n nternationalechanisms.hekinds fproblemshatwould rompttates ouse nternationalnstitutionshateadtoconvergencefbehavior rerelatively ellunderstood.heyncludeime-inconsistencyroblemshat reatencentivesor tatesto bind hemselvesnd collective-actionroblems mong tates rwithin olities.

Whenstates urn o internationalnstitutionss the result f suchproblems,ndwhen hese nstitutionsreoperatings intended, e wouldexpect o see conver-gence f tate ehavior.

Theconditionshatwouldprompttates o use nstitutionshatead to divergenceof behaviorrenot s well understood. e canbeginbynotinghat tates acing

96. Slaughter 995.




collective-actionroblems,uch s a PD or a coordinationame,wouldbe unlikelytorely n an nstitutionhat xaggeratedifferencesn tate ehavior. hefundamen-

tal problemnsuch ases is tocreatencentives or tates o adopt imilar olicies:free rade,tringentiscal olicies, rms ontrol,nd so on.97n such situation,ninstitutionhat ed to ncreased ivergencefstate racticewouldquickly ecomeirrelevants statesgnoredts onstraints.hus, ne nitialxpectations thatnstitu-tions houldnot ead to divergencen situations here ncentives xistto adoptsimilarolicies, s when trongxternalitiesodivergentrunilateraltate ehaviorexist. erhaps his elps s understandhywe appear osee somedivergenceffectsinthehuman-rightsssue rea.Although uman ightsre matterfconcernroundtheglobe,human-rightsractices sually o not nvolve hekinds fexternalities

and ncentivesor trategicnteractionhat xist n ssue areas uch s the nviron-mentrmonetaryolicy.98

However,ackofexternalitiesoesnotprovide direct nswer o why ivergencewould ccur. ounderstandhis ffect,t s likely hatwe needtoconsider omesticpolitics,eturningsto anargument ade arliernthis rticle.nternationalgree-ments,venthosewithoutnforcement echanismsuchas theOECD aid target,can provide hooks"bywhichnterestroupshat avorhe nternationalgreementcanincreaseheirnfluencen thedomesticgenda.Forexample,nScandinaviancountriesheOECD target as become potent rguing ointnparliamentarye-

bates. n stateswithout well-organizedroup ograbonto hishook, r nthosewith more losedpolitical rocess,greements ithoutnforcementechanismsor substantialressurerom ther tates ocomply reunlikelyohaveanyeffect.These ontrastingomesticolitical ynamicsre ikelyogiverise odivergencefstate ehaviormongmembersfthe nstitution.

A rationalistesearchgendafor he tudyf nternationalnstitutionssrich ndpromising.hisagendabegins yrecognizinghat,nequilibrium,nstitutionsreboth auses andeffects,ndthat mpiricalesearchers ust egin oconsider he

questionfhow nstitutions

atter,ot

ustwhetherheyo.

Thinkingnthese ermsturns ur ttentionotheproblemf how nstitutionsight esolve argainingnd

distributionalonflicts wellas themore ecognized roblemsfcheating.t forcesus to differentiatenticipatedrom nanticipatedffectsfinstitutionsnd toaskabout heconditions nderwhich nanticipatedffectsre most ikely. ationalisttheories rovide mechanism orbringingomestic oliticsmore ystematicallyinto he tudyf nternationalnstitutions,narea ofresearch hat as been lightedbythedevelopmentf thefield hus ar. inally, rationalistpproach llowsus to

97. Theremaybe somecoordinationituations,or xample, omediscussed ySimmons,n whichthe olutionothe oordinationroblem oesnot nvolve doption f imilarolicies y llstates ut leardivision fresponsibilitiesmong tates. ee Simmons 994.The BrettonWoods ystems,or xample,coordinatedtate ehavior ycreatingxpectationshat heUnited tateswouldbehave ifferentlyromothermembersf he ystem.

98. Donnelly urveyshe andscape fhuman ightsegimes. ee Donnelly 986.Theremay e excep-tions o the eneralizationhat nternationaltrategicnteractionn human ightssminimal,or xample,when evere uman-rightsbuses ead to massive efugeelows. hiskind f ogic ould ead to testablepropositions ithin he ssue area,for xample, hat nstitutionshould unctionifferentlyhen uchexternalitiesxist han nder normal" ircumstances.




begindifferentiatingetween ifferentypes f nstitutionalffectsnddevelopingrefutableropositionsbout he onditions nderwhichwe are most ikely o ob-

serve uch ffects.

Conclusions

Studies f nternationalnstitutionsavevariedntheir heoreticalophisticationndfrequencyver ime uthaveremained staple f nternationalelations esearchand thepagesof10 overthe ast fifty ears. n this rticlewe have examined hedevelopmentf these tudiesndoutlined omepromisingirectionsor uturee-

search n internationalnstitutions.arlystudies f institutionsereverymuchproblem-driven,ocusing n the problems f thepostwarworld hat ome hopedinternationalrganizationsould olve.Althoughnbalance ealisticnd nsightful,the esults fthese tudies ailed ocumulate,ikely ue to the ackofa disciplinaryor theoreticalrameworknwhich osituatehe tudies. more cientificpproachshowed tself n a newerwave of work n institutions,rawing n methods ndmodels fAmericanolitics. utbecause hesemodelswerengeneral oorlyuitedto therealities f nternationalolitics, hey ailed ogenerateubstantialew n-sights.t was notuntil he1980s,with hedevelopmentfwork n international

regimesndfunctionalistheories,hat more rogressiveesearchrogramn nsti-tutionsrose.

Onefailingf he urrentesearch rogram,owever,asbeen ts ntense ocus nprovinghat nstitutionsatter, ithout ufficientttentiono constructingell-delineated ausal mechanismsr explaining ariationn institutionalffects.Weconsider woapproacheshatmightmoveresearch eyond his mpasse. irst,weask whetherpplyingecentmodels f domestic oliticsmight emore uccessfulthan avepast ttempts. e findcopefor ptimism ere, incemodernheoriesfdomesticnstitutionsypicallyraw n similarssumptionsf unenforceablegree-ments ndopportunisticehaviory ndividualshat haracterize ostworkn nter-national elations.inally, e turno somemore pecificesearchirectionshat relikelyogiverise o mportantndtestable ropositions.hese ncludemore arefulconsiderationf distributionalssues, heroleofdomestic olitics, nanticipatedconsequences,nd typologyf nstitutionalffects.

As we considernternationalnstitutionss both bjects fstrategichoiceandconsequential,llowing hemo serve s both ependentnd ndependentariablesin ourmodels, hepotentialor ncreasingurunderstandingf nstitutionsnd of

internationaloliticsngeneral s substantial,s preliminarympiricalworkhasbegun o show. heearliest ork n nternationalnstitutionsroducednsightshatfailed o addupto much ecause fthe ack ofananalyticalrameworknwhich osituatehesensights;henextgenerationf workhadthebenefitf such frame-work, utone thatwaspoorlyuited o the ask thand. nthis rticle, ehopetohave dentifiedinesofresearchhatwillcombine hebest fbothworlds: heoreti-

theories and empirical studies of international institutions

Documents