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THEWORLDISNOTENOUGH

Derrida

lthough the earth does not occupy a central place in Jacques Derrida’swritings, his last seminar is all about theworld.More exactly, it is about thedestructionoftheworldthatresultsfromthedeathofeachsingularlivingbeing

and the disappearance of the world necessary for ethics. Derrida begins hisexplorationoftherecedingworldbyfollowinginthefootstepsofRobinsonCrusoeasheretracesthemoverandagainonthedesert island.Derridatakesupthequestionofwhatisanisland,andhisanalysisofRobinsonCrusoerevolvesaroundthewaysinwhichtheislandbothisandisnotdeserted,aswellasRobinsonCrusoe’sambivalentrelation to the island,hisattractionandrepulsion.AlthoughDerrida isnot thinkingof“this island earth,” imagining the Earth as an island, isolated and alone, floatingagainst the vast sea of space, as the astronauts did, conjures the ambivalentreactions he attributes to all islands. In The Beast and the Sovereign Volume II,Derridaasks,“Whydoesoneloveislands?Whydoesonenot loveislands?Whydosomepeopleloveislandswhileothersdonotloveislands,somepeopledreamingofthem,seeking themout, inhabiting them, takingrefugeon them,andothersavoidingthem, even fleeing them instead of taking refuge on them?” (Derrida 2011, 64).Hecontinues this line of question, asking what is it that one flees or seeks when oneescapes from, or takes refuge on, an island. He proposes that we find theseseeminglycontradictorydesires in thesameperson,even in“thesamedesire”(69).Wearebothattractedtoandrepulsedbyislands,caughtbetween“insularophiliaandinsularophobia.” But what is an island that it provokes this “double contradictorymovement of attraction and allergy?” (69). While Derrida doesn’t answer thesequestions head-on, he does suggest that the logic of autoimmunity is operating infiguresofislandsasisolatedorinsularandcircularorround,floatingaloneassolitaryandunique.FollowingHeidegger’sdiscussionofsolitude,Derridafinds in islandsthedouble senses of being alone as being lonely and isolated, on the one hand, andbeing unique and singular, on the other. Certainly, these two senses of “alone” areoperativeinreactionstoseeingthephotographsofEarthfromspace.InthecaseofRobinson Crusoe, this autoimmunity shows up in his desire to leave his family,particularlytogetawayfromhisfather’sauthority,andthestiflingconventionsofhishomecountry,onlytoattempttorecreatethatauthorityandthoseconventionsonthe

island.Likeawheelturninginonitself,RobinsonCrusoebecomestheverythingheistrying to escape. In conjunction with his analysis of Robinson Crusoe, Derridaassociatesautoimmunitywiththewheel turningon itsaxis.Thewheel isnot justanycirclebecause,liketheEarth,itturnsarounditsownaxis.LiketheEarth,thewheelisnotstationary.And,likethewheelinDerrida’saccount,theEarthitself,spinningonitsaxis, triggersanautoimmune response insofaras imagesof theEarthasan island,beautifulandblue, floatingalone in thedarknessofspace,areboth threateningandreassuring. Circular shapes and circular movements such as Robinson Crusoe’sislandandhiscircumnavigationsof it,alongwithhiswheel,appearasmetaphorsforthereturn toself thathisshipwreck instigates,whichsignal furtherparallelswith themetaphorofEarthasisland.

Recall that images of Earth lead us to see the Earth both as our amazinglysingularhomeandasa tiny insignificantpeabarelyvisible fromspace.TheviewofEarthfromspacemakesusbothwanttoprotectourvulnerableandfragileplanetandtoescapefromthisinsignificantspeckintheuniverse.Itmakesusfeelsimultaneouslyspecialand inconsequential.This is thedoublesenseof the lonelinessofEarth; it isallaloneintheuniverseandyetunique,alonelinessthatresonateswithHeidegger’snotionof solitudeasbeingaloneas inwithout othersandbeingaloneas inwithoutequal. This double desire is the ambivalent desire that Derrida associates withislands,bothwantingtotakerefugeandwantingtoflee.

Recall too that the media reports immediately following the Apollo missions’imagesofEarthfromspacearefullofrhetoricof“returninghome,”returningtoself,of man’s finding himself, of man becoming his “true self,” and so on. The iconicimages of Earth from space becamemetaphors for man’s homecoming, united onone planet as “brothers in eternal cold,” and symbols forman overcoming his ownworsttendenciesinordertomasterhimself.InthewordsofTime,thehopeofApollo8’s mission is that “as man has conquered the seas, the air, and other naturalobstacles, he has also at each stage, in a small way, conquered part of himself.Therein lies the hope and the ultimate promise of his latest conquest” (Time 1969,17).Or,inthemoreoptimistictonesofArchibaldMacLeish,“manmayatlastbecomehimself”(MacLeish1968).

Given that the Apollo missions that transmitted the first images of Earth fromspacewere products of the coldwar,MacLeish’s remark about brothers in eternalcoldmighttakeonadifferenthue.Indeed,aswehaveseenthespaceprogramwasdriven by the conflicting rhetoric of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The Apollomissionswere both attempts at “winning” the coldwar and putting “America First,”andyet theyweresoldasmissions forallmankind, intended tounitehumanbeingsacross theglobe.Onesmall step forman,onegiant leap formankind.The tensionbetweennationalismandcosmopolitanismhasbeena leitmotif inourdiscussionsofboth Kant and Arendt. Derrida’s intervention in this debate is well known. For, hisdiscussion of cosmopolitanism revolves around the notion of hospitality, which heextends beyond the Kantian conditional hospitality, insisting on unconditionalhospitalityandtherightofrefuge.Andyethealsocontendsthatcosmopolitanism,or

what he calls cosmopolitics, necessarily puts into tension unconditional andconditionalhospitality (Derrida2001,4,5).ForDerrida, there isambivalenceat theheartofhospitality.

Wehaveseentheambivalenceinherentinhospitality—ambivalencebetweenhostandhostage,betweenhospitalityandhostility—asitismanifestintherhetoricaroundtheApollomoonmissionsandthefirstphotographsofEarthfromspace.Ontheonehand,thesemissionswerepartofamilitaryoperationtosecuretheearthfromhostileenemies; on the other hand, they were seen as benefiting all humankind, unitingmankind as “brothers”who share a commonworld and commongoals. In termsofDerrida’sanalysisofhospitality,itisclearthatimplicitinthewelcominggestureofthecosmopolitanrhetoricofunitingallofhumankindistheaffirmationofthetechnologicalsuperiority of theUnited States and its concern to dominate not only the earth butalso space. As the “victor” in the cold war, America was in the position to extendhospitalitytotherestoftheworld.AsDerridapointsout,hospitalityisnotonlyaboutgenerosity,butalsoalwaysaboutcontrolandmasteryofwhatonetakestobeone’sown home (17). The ambivalence surrounding the Apollomissions and reactions tothem resonateswith imaging theearthasan island,asNASAdidwhen itpublishedtheglossyphoto-filledbookThisIslandEarthshortlyafterApollo17’smissiontothemoon.

Theambivalenceofhospitalityresonateswiththeambivalenceofislands,whetherit is“thisislandEarth”orRobinsonCrusoe’sisland.InthecaseofRobinsonCrusoe,he longs for human companionshipmore than anything else on his deserted island.And yet, when he discovers the footprint in the sand, he is terrified and longs forsolitude. He both wants, and fears, company on his island. The supposedly“deserted”natureofhisisland“home”isthreatenedbythe“savages”hewitnessesonthebeach.He isboth fascinatedandrepulsedby thesestrangersand intendstokillor enslave them. He wants to flee the island, yet he returns to the island, whichrepresentsboth the terrorofsolitudeand theblissfulparadiseofsolitude.RobinsonCrusoe’s ambivalent relationship to his island is akin to the ambivalence witnessedaftertheApollomissions,namelytheterrorofoursolitudeonearthandtheabsoluteuniquenessofourearthlyparadiseinthevastemptinessofspace.

As we have seen, Kant identifies the earth with an inhospitable hospitality thatechoesman’sasocialsociabilityandpoints to thissameambivalence.ForKant, thegoalofperpetualpeacethroughuniversalhospitalityistoovercomethisambivalenceforthesakeofequilibriumthatbringspeace,evenifthisgoalisonlyaregulativeidealand cannever beachieved.Derridagoes furtherwhenheargues that hospitality ismore than a Kantian regulative ideal precisely because there is an internalcontradiction inherentwithin the very notionof hospitality itself (Derrida2000, 149).Hepointstothiscontradictioninthisquestion:“Ingivingaright,ifIcanputitlikethat,to unconditional hospitality, how can one give place to a determined, limitable, anddelimitable—inaword,toacalculable—rightorlaw?”(147–149).Inotherwords,theprinciple grounding all conditional hospitality, namely unconditional hospitality, is atodds with its practice. For, what makes hospitality unconditional not only makes

hostility possible, but also inevitable insofar as ultimately there is no calculus withwhichwedeterminehowtodistinguishonefromtheother.Thethreattounconditionalhospitality does not come fromoutside, but rather from inside.Hospitality operatesaccordingtotheautoimmunelogicdistinctiveofallappealstotheselforsovereignty.In other words, if, or insofar as, hospitality is granted by one to an other, itsunconditionality is already comprised. Indeed, the very terms self and other areproblematicifourgoalisunconditionalhospitality;butthesetermsarerequiredbyournotion of hospitality insofar as we imagine that someone has the power to extendhospitality to another. And yet this very power acts as a condition that preventshospitalityfrombeingunconditional.

Thuswemustbevigilantinwatchingforthethreattounconditionalhospitalityfromwithin our attempts at hospitality themselves.Wemust bewatchful for theways inwhich extending hospitalitymay also extend hostility or extending hospitality to onemay exclude another. If we cannot ground unconditional hospitality on a universalprinciplethatdoesnotalsoalwaysundermineitself,thenwehaveonlythegroundlessgroundthat is, inourterms,theearth itself.Wemustextendhospitalitybecausewemustcoexist.Andwemustcoexistbecauseweall—all livingbeings—haveauniqueandsingularbondtotheearth.Theearthisourhome.Andyet,asDerridapointsout,“home” is precisely what is at stake in hospitality. The “problem of hospitality,” hesays,“isalwaysaboutansweringforadwellingplace,forone’sidentity,one’sspace,one’slimits,fortheethosasabode,habitation,house,hearth,family,home”(Derrida2000,149–151).

Because hospitality is associated with home as ethos, “ethics is hospitality”(Derrida2001,17).Andyetethicsashospitalityorhospitalityasethicspointstothetensionbetweenethics,sounderstood,andpolitics. Indeed,onewayofarticulatingthecontradictioninternaltothenotionofhospitalityisintermsoftheconflictbetweenethics and politics. Ethics of hospitality demands that we welcome every singularbeinginitssingularity—alreadythewordsweand itsbelietheimpossibilityofsuchademand—and politics, even a politics of hospitality, demands that we develop auniversalprincipleofhospitalitythatappliestoall,effacingthesingularityrequiredbyethics.Inotherwords,ethicsdemandsconsiderationofthesingularityofeachuniquebeing, while politics requires universal rules and principles that apply equally to all.Hospitality,then,mustbesynonymouswithethicsandyetexceedpoliticsandmorals,ifbymoralswemeanprinciplesthatwecanapplytoaction.

In Arendt’s terms, we might say that the right to have rights can never begrounded in anypractical right; furthermore, the right to have rights is at oddswithany practical policy that grants rights insofar as “rights” are themselves alwayslimited, granted by some to some and never by all to all.1 Kant recognizes thisproblem in his complicated justification for private property on the commonpossessionof thesurfaceof theearthand theassumedsocialcontract that followsfromit.Indeed,allparticularrightsandthelegalprescriptionsthatcircumscribethemcannot touchwhat grounds the right to have rights,which is the value of each onewithin the plurality of human beings. Moreover, if rights are based on belonging,

whether to a nation-state or an international community, ultimately they must begroundedontheearth.Insofarasallhumanandnonhumanlivingbeingsmustliveonearth,theybelongtotheearth,andanyrighttohaverightsmustbegroundedontheearth.We could say, then, that both unconditional hospitality and the right to haverights are grounded on what, in Heideggerian terms, wemight call the groundlessground of the earth.2 But, once we make this move, we must also extend theArendtianrighttohaverightstoalllivingbeings,andperhapsbeyond,insofaraseachone isvaluable,evenessential to, thepluralityorbiodiversityofourcohabitationonearth.3AsDerridaremindsus,hospitalityisalsoabouthomeandbelonging.HerewepushArendt’snotionof the right tohave rights towardDerrida’sextensionofKant’snotionofhospitalitywhenweask:Towhomdoestheearthbelong,ifalllivingbeingsnecessarilyandsingularlybelongtoit?Who’shomeisit, ifallofusbynecessitylivehere?

The ambivalence inherent in hospitality speaks to ambivalence in the concept ofhome,whichiscomplicated,tosaytheleast,whenweconsiderearthasourhome.If“ethics ishospitality,” thenethics isabouthome,notonlybecausehomeandethicsshareacommonGreekroot,ethos,butalso,andmoreover,becausestrugglesoverhomeandhospitalityareat theheartofour relationship toothers,particularlywhenconsideringtheearthashomeandourrelationshiptononhumanbeings.“Insofarasithastodowithethos,”saysDerrida,“that is, theresidence,one’shome,thefamiliarplaceofdwelling,inasmuchasitisamannerofbeingthere,themannerinwhichwerelate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, ethics ishospitality, ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality”(2001, 16–17). And yet Derrida argues that the history of hospitality bears out itsambivalenceinsofarasitisahistoryofviolenceandhostility.Beingathomewiththeother,evenwiththeotherwithinoneself,raisesthespecteroftheuncanny,whichcanprovokeviolence.Or,inthebestofcases,perhapspoeticaffirmationofeachonecanbecomethe loveof theworldandof theearth throughwhichwevalueeach life,notonly insofaras itcontributes topluralityandbiodiversity,which,asArendtputs it, isthe law of the earth, but also insofar as the singularity of eachmakes up aworld,perhapseven theworld.Certainly,whenweconsiderearthashome,weencounterthe uncanny at every turn, whether it is the uncanny strangeness of other animalcreatures or the uncanny strangeness of the earth itself as seen from space, andtheseexperiencesfilluswithambivalentdesires.Doesourfascinationwiththeothertip over into abjection and lead us to violence? Or, can it lead us to appreciatedifference and what Heidegger calls the awesome or mystery of this uncannyencounter?Perhapsthroughpoeticaffirmationwecanpointtothegroundlessgroundof hospitality and the right to have rights,which necessarilymove us out of politicsandmorals,with their rulesand laws,and towardanethicsofearth,anethics thatcanguidepracticalmoralityandpoliticalaction.

Taking us further than Kant, Arendt, or Heidegger, Derrida embraces acosmopolitanismbased on the radical singularity of each living being.WithDerrida,we move from Kant’s universalism through Arendt’s pluralism to the absolute

singularity of each as not only a world, but also the world. Derrida takes up thequestion “what is the world?” in the context of reading Daniel Defoe’s RobinsonCrusoe together with Martin Heidegger’s Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics:World,Finitude,Solitude.4 Following inHeidegger’s footsteps,Derridaexplores theconnections betweenworld, finitude, and solitude through the vehicle of RobinsonCrusoe’sisolationonhisdesertislandwherehelivedforyearsasifheweretheonlyman on earth—that is, until he found that fateful footprint, human, all too human.ChallengingbothHeidegger’sthesisthatanimalsarepoorinworldwhilehumansareworld-building, along with Robinson Crusoe’s sovereign reign over his island homeandall itsbeastly—or,moreaccurately,beastie—inhabitants,Derrida suggests thateachsingular livingbeing inhabits itsownsolitaryworld, itsowndesert island.Evenwhilestaking thisclaim,however,Derridaattacks thesovereigntygranted tohumanbeingsaloneinbothHeidegger’sseminarandRobinsonCrusoebymakingthedoublemovementfamiliarfromhisearlierwork.Forexample,inTheAnimalThatThereforeIAm, on the one hand, animals may possess reason or language or the ability torespond,orwhateverothercharacteristicweusuallyreserveforhumansalone,and,on the other hand, we cannot be certain that human beings possess thesecharacteristics or abilities that supposedly distinguish us so clearly from otheranimals.5InTheBeastandtheSovereign,VolumeII,Derridamakesasimilardoublemovewhenheclaimsboth,on theonehand, thatanimalsshareourworldandmaybe world-building and, on the other, that we cannot be certain that human beingsshareaworld or areworld-building (at least not inHeidegger’s senseas set apartfromanimals).AsisolatedasRobinsonCrusoeisonhisdesertisland,itturnsoutthathisislandisnotasdesertedashethinks.Heisalone,butstillradicallydependentonothers. This chapter traces the ethical implications of Derrida’s seeminglycontradictoryclaimsthatwebothshareaworldandthateachsingularbeing,likeanisland,isaworlduntoitself.ForDerrida,ethicsbeginswheretheworldends.Thisisto say, that ethics begins outside of any set of rules or principles, any commonlanguage or grammar, any shared culture or traditions. It begins in the ethicalobligationtoasingularother.Thisobligationtothesingularityoftheotheristheforceoftheethicalbind.Yetthisbindcanonlybelivedandfeltwithinsomesharedworld.LikeHeidegger’searth that juts through theworld, theethicalbindbetweensingularbeingsjutsthroughoursharedworldandshattersitandyettherebysheltersit.

DEATHASSUCH

Derrida’s investigation of world in The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II ismotivated byHeidegger’s claim that the stone is worldless (Weltlos), the animal ispoor inworld(Weltarm),andhumanbeingsareworld-building(Weltbildend).Asweknow,Heidegger’scomparativeanalysisofanimalsandhumansrevolvesaroundthequestionofhavingornothavingworld.ForHeidegger,humansclearlyhave it,whileanimalsdonot,quite.Morespecifically,animalsdohavearelation to theworld,but

nottotheworldassuch.Humans,ontheotherhand,haverelationstoboththeworldandtheworldassuch.DerridachallengesHeidegger’snotionthatDaseinhasaccessto the world as such any more than animals do. He asks, “Have you ever comeacross the world as such?” (Derrida 2011, 268). As he does elsewhere, Derridaquestions Heidegger’s confidence both that animals do not have access to the assuch and that Dasein does.6 Although there are several texts in which DerridacriticizesHeidegger’spositiononanimals,TheBeastandtheSovereign,VolumeIIisnotonly themostsustainedanalysisofTheFundamentalConceptsofMetaphysicsbut also goes beyond others in terms of the focus on the world. It is clear fromHeidegger’s comparative analysis in the seminar that he is trying to answer thequestions What is world? What is finitude? What is solitude? In other words,Heidegger’s goal is not to write a treatise on animals, but rather to determineDasein’s relationship to theworld.Animalsarepedagogical tools thatheusesalongthe way (cf. Oliver 2010). Appropriately, then, Derrida’s critical engagement withHeidegger’sseminarrevolvesaroundtheworldasmuchasitdoesaroundanimals.

Noteworthy,however,inDerrida’sanalysisofHeidegger’sFundamentalConceptsis how quickly his discussion ofworld and the animal’s relation toworld leads to adiscussionofdeath.Indeed,itisstrikingthat,inoverthreehundredpages,Heideggermentionstheanimal’srelationtodeathonlyonce,at theendofchapter5,wherehemakes his famous pronouncement: “Because captivation belongs to the essence ofthe animal, the animal cannot die in the sense inwhich dying is ascribed to humanbeingsbutcanonlycometoanend”(Heidegger1995[1929–1930],267).7Whileitistrue that this pronouncement echoes similar claims that Heidegger makes in othertexts, in Fundamental Concepts he is more concerned with distinguishing animalbehavior from human comportment and the way in which the animal’s “disinhibitingring,”ashecalls it,prevents it fromcomporting itselfand in turnfromaccessingtheworld as such.8 Given that Heidegger barely mentions death in FundamentalConcepts, how, then, does it come to dominate Derrida’s discussion of this text inTheBeastandtheSovereign?Certainly,wemightthinkthatDerrida’sfocusondeathiswarrantedbythecentralityofthenotionofbeing-toward-deathinBeingandTime.Thismight justifywhyDerrida linksHeidegger’s longmeditationonvariousmoodsofphilosophical inquiry—includingboredom,nostalgia,andmelancholy—todeath.Mostobviously, the finitude of Heidegger’s subtitle for his seminar—World, Finitude,Solitude—impliesdeath.Yet, aswewill see,Derridadoesnotmake theseobviousmoves.Rather,hemovesfromworldtodeath,notthroughananalysisofHeideggeron finitude,butbyacertainsubstitutionordisplacementofa fragment fromNovaliscentral toHeidegger’smeditationonworldandphilosophy fora fragment fromPaulCelan,whichseemstohauntDerridathroughoutthistextandothers.9

HeideggerquotesNovalis, “Philosophy is reallyhomesickness,anurge [Trieb] tobeathomeeverywhere” (1995 [1929–1930],5).Heidegger interprets this fragmentasmeaning that philosophy does not want to be at home here or there or even ineveryplace,but rather in theworldasawhole: “This iswherewearedriven inourhomesickness: to being as a whole. Our very being is this restlessness.We have

somehowalwaysalreadydeparted toward thiswhole” (5–6).Derrida translatesandcommentson thispassage: “It is toward this [hehas justnamed theworld:what isthe world? Reply:], toward this (Dahin), toward Being as a whole (zum Sein imGanzen)—it is that towardwhichwe are driven (getrieben) in our nostalgia…. Thenostalgic push or drive is what, basically, far from pushing us toward this or that,IthacaorEngland,iswhatpushesustowardeverything,towardtheworldasentirety”(2011,101,brackets intheoriginal).Derridaconcludesthis interludeonHeidegger’snostalgiaby relating it to the fragment fromCelan: “\DieWelt ist fort, ichmußdichtragen (The world is far away, I must carry you; 104). Novalis’s philosophicalhomesicknesshasbecomeCelan’sdistantworldthatobligatescarryingtheother.

As we will see, this line of poetry becomes the axis around which Derrida’sanalysis of world, death, and ethics revolves. Through this poetic fragmentHeidegger’sworld as the totality of beingsbecomesDerrida’sworld far away.Andfinitudebecomesnot justour relationship toourownmortality,butourbeing towardthe death of the other (even the other in ourselves). Solitude, which for Heideggermakesus both aloneandunique, forDerridabecomes the singularity of each livingbeinginsofaraswebothdoanddonotsharetheworld.ThroughtheCelanfragment,DerridatranslatesHeidegger’sWorld,Finitude,Solitudeintoabsenceofworld,deathas always the death of the other, and the singular ethical responsibility that bothseparatesus from theworldandbindsus to it.10Repeatedly returning to theCelanfragment,Derrida’s seminar suggests that ethics beginswhere theworld ends andviceversa;theendoftheworldisthebeginningofethics.Myobligationtoyou,totheother, starts where the world ends, when it is faraway and gone. And, when “theworld isgone, Imustcarryyou.”Diewelt ist fort, ichmußdichtragen.Heidegger’sWorld,Finitude,SolitudebecomesDerrida’sWorldlessness,Death,Responsibility.

THEPOETICAXISOFETHICS

The firstmentionof this line fromCelan’spoem(“VastGlowingVault”) inTheBeastandtheSovereign,VolumeII is insession1whenDerrida laysouthismain thesesforthecourseintheformofthreequestions/sentences:1.Whatisanisland?2.Thebeasts are not alone. 3.What do beasts andmen have in common? (2011, 3–8).Then,inanswertothethirdquestion,Derridasetsoutthreeresponses;anditisherethatheappeals to theCelanpoem.Derridaoutlines threepossible trueanswers tothequestionofwhatbeastsandmenhaveincommon:1.animalsandhumansinhabitthesameworld,whichhequalifiesasthesame“objective”world,eveniftheydonothavethesameexperienceofthoseobjects;2.animalsandhumansdonotinhabitthesame world, “for the human world will never be purely and simply identical to theworldof animals”; and3. no individual animal or individual human inhabits the sameworld as any other (9). The third and most radical claim is the one that Derridaelaboratesatlength,callingthepoetryofCelanashiswitness.11

Describing the implications of this thesis, Derrida says, “betweenmyworld and

any other world there is first the space and the time of an infinite difference, aninterruption that is incommensurablewithallattempts tomakeapassage,abridge,an isthmus, all attempts at communication, translation, trope, and transfer that thedesire forworldor thewantofaworld, thebeingwantingaworldwill try topose,impose,propose,stabilize.Thereisnoworld,thereareonlyislands”(9).Thisradicalhypothesis—that there is no commonworld and that each living being is separatedfromeveryotherlikeanisland—isimmediatelyfollowedbythefirstappealtoCelan’spoem.12 Derrida suggests his claim that there is no world, only islands, is aninterpretationoftheCelanfragment.Whileitmaybemoreobviouswhyhewouldsaythatthislineofpoetrycanbeinterpretedtomeanthatthereisnoworld—theworldisgone—it is lessclearwhy itcanbe interpreted tomeanthatevery livingbeing isanisland,especiallygiventhatthepoemstillincludesthepronounsIandyou.Aswewillsee, this performative paradox, which announces the end of the world, even whilemaintainingIandyouandarelationshipbetweenthetwo,becomesthecruxofoneofDerrida’s riffson theway inwhichwebothdo,anddonot, shareacommonworldwithotherlivingbeings,includingandperhapsespeciallyotherhumanbeings.

Derrida suggests that althoughwemaynot knowwhat itmeans to inhabit or tocohabit, we do know that all living creatures die and therefore are mortal.Furthermore,althoughalllivingthingsmaynotinhabitorcohabitthesameworld,theyare all finite. In spite of the differences between worlds—so many unbridgeableislands—Derridaassertsthatthereisonethingaboutwhichwecanbecertain,oratleast believe, namely, that all living beings die. Life is defined in terms of death, adefinitionthatDerridacomestoassociatewithHeidegger.Derridaagaintakesupthequestion of what animals and humans share and answers “that all living beings,humansandanimals,haveacertainexperienceofwhatwecalldeath”(11).Wemaynot share a world, but all living beings share mortality. And, although we may notknowhow todefinedeath, “wecanbelieve that these livingbeingshave incommonthefinitudeoftheirlife,andtherefore,amongotherfeaturesoffinitude,theirmortalityintheplacetheyinhabit,whetheronecallsthatplaceworldorearth”(10).

AlthoughinthemanyiterationsofthelinefromCelanthatmarkDerrida’sseminarheoftenmentionsbirth,itisdeaththatcomestoinhabitit.ThusitisthroughtheCelanfragmentthatdeathinsertsitselfintotheworld.ThroughtheCelanfragment,wehavemoved from Heidegger’s discussion of the relation between world, finitude, andsolitudetoadiscussionofdeath,darewesay,assuch.Itisinteresting,however,thatHeideggeranalyzesfinitudeintermsofsolituderatherthanintermsofdeathperse.For Heidegger, the fact that we are finite makes each one of us unique. And, asDerrida points out,Heidegger knowingly equivocates on themeaning of solitude asbeing alone, which can mean either without company or without equal as inexceptional.Daseinisaloneintermsofbeingtheonlybeingwithaccesstotheworld(or Being) as such. Indeed, what sets apart Dasein as world-building is thisuniquenessorsolitude,whatHeideggersometimescallsindividuality(e.g.,Heidegger1995[1929–1930],§39).ForHeidegger,stonesareworldlessbecausetheyarenotuniqueindividuals—allstonesarealike.Andwhileanimalsaremoreindividuatedthan

stones,stilltheyarenotuniqueindividualsinthewaythathumanbeingsare,atleastaccordingtoHeidegger.InTheFundamentalConcepts,however, it isnotdeath—ora relationship to it—that determineswhether or not one has a relation to world assuch.Infact,itisuncannyhowlittleHeideggerspeaksofdeathinatextthatincludesfinitudeinitstitle.Yetperhapsitismoreuncannythattheworldassuchistakenoverbydeathassuch inDerrida’s retracingofHeidegger’ssteps,particularly insofarasDerrida criticizes Heidegger for choosing this very path (cf. Derrida 2011, 90–91).For, Derrida’s next mention of the Celan fragment in his seminar appears as anindirect translationof theNovalis fragment.Derrida identifies theNovalis line—whichhe paraphrases as “philosophizing as an experience of nostalgia, as philosophysufferingfromaconstitutionalsicknessthatwouldbehomesickness”—withRobinsonCrusoe’snostalgia(atfirstforEnglandandeventuallyforhisisland)“fortheworldhehas lost (dieWelt ist fort,asCelanwouldsay)” (32,secondparenthetical remark inoriginal). We could say, translated into Celan’s language (“as Celan would say”),Novalis’sand/orHeidegger’s,nostalgiabecomesnotonlytheseeminglyunbridgeabledistancefromtheworld(“theworldisfaraway”)butalsoanethicalobligationtotheother (“Imust carry you”). Indeed, both the turn toward death and the turn towardethicsinTheBeastandtheSovereign,VolumeIIrevolvearoundthisoneline,thelastline, fromCelan’spoem“Grosse,Glühende,Wölbung” (“Vast,glowingvault”).13Thisline of poetry, repeated in nearly every session, is not only the axis around whichDerrida binds the unlikely duo Crusoe-Heidegger but also it is a performance of acertainpoeticworld-makingthatDerridaproposesasacounterbalancetosovereignworld-building.Poeticworld-makingechoesthedistinctionDerridadrewinTheBeastand the Sovereign, Volume I between poetic majesty and sovereign majesty (cf.Oliver2013)and,wemight say, is resonantwith theshift inHeidegger fromworld-building topoeticdwelling,analyzed in the lastchapter.Derrida’s turn fromworld todeathmarksboththenecessityofthepoeticandoftheethical.

DOANIMALSDIE?

By insertingCelanbetweenRobinsonCrusoeandHeidegger,Derridaopensup thepossibility ofman’s ownworldlessness, if not akin to the stone’s, just as absolute.Likeandunlikethestone,“[w]eareweltlos”(2011,9).DerridafocusesonthelackorprivationofworldinDasein’suniquecapacityforworld-buildingbyturninghisattentionto Heidegger’s profound boredom and melancholy. He finds an absent world inDasein’smelancholysolitudeastheonlybeingwiththisuniqueresponsibilitytocarrytheweightoftheworld.Thisprivationisasprofoundasthatoftheanimal’ssupposedpoverty in world. Humans, then, are just as deprived of world as animals, if notnecessarily in the sameway.And, althoughDerrida is clear that “melancholy is notnostalgia,”hesays, “there isbetween these twoaffectsanaffinity,ananalogy, thatdependsatleastonthefactthatthesetwosufferingssufferfromalack,aprivation,evena bereavement” (111). Like andunlike theanimals,weare deprivedofworld.

Likeandunlikestones,weareworldless.Ultimately,whatrendersusworldlessanddeprived is death, but not Heidegger’s being toward our own death. Rather whatrendersusworldlessisbeingtowardthedeathoftheother(evenif,aswewillsee,that other happens to be one’s self). Once wemove from the self-centered beingtowardourowndeath to theother-centeredbeing toward thedeathof theother, itbecomeseasierto“see”theeffectsofdeathandmourningintheanimalkingdom.

Ifhumanstooaredeprivedofworld,howcanwebesurethatwehaveaccesstotheworldassuchandanimalsdonot?Howcanwebesurethatwehaveaccesstodeath as such and animals do not? For Derrida, these questions are intimatelyconnected. Death and world come together. Derrida takes issue with Heidegger’sconfidence that we have access to theworld, the Being and beings, and death assuch,andthatanimalsdonot:“whatseemsmoreproblematicstill tomyeyesistheconfidencewithwhichHeideggerattributesdyingproperlyspeakingtohumanDasein,access or relation to death properly speaking and to dying as such” (116, myemphasis).Ashedoeswithotherphilosophers throughout thehistoryof philosophywhoareconfident individing theworld intohumansandanimals,Derridachallengesthiscertainty frombothsides, thesideof theanimalandthesideof thehuman.Wecouldsaythatheexposesthesephilosophersasconfidencemen,conmen,whohavepulled thewool over our eyes about animals and our separation from them for toolongnow.

InTheBeastandtheSovereign,VolumeII,DerridarepeatsandextendssomeofhisanalysisofHeideggeronanimals fromhisearlierwork.Herehe focuseson theproblematicnotionthathumanbeingshaveaccesstodeathassuchwhileanimalsdonot.Within the familiar doublemovement of bothaffirming that animalsmayhavearelation todeathanddenying thathumanshavearelation todeathassuch,Derridaattacks the human-animal binary on many fronts (if not frontally, as he says). Inaddition to arguing that human beings are also worldless and deprived of world,Derrida suggests that onHeidegger’s analysis we are driven by something outsideourselves,muchlikeanimalsaresupposedlydrivenbyinstinctsorbenumbedbytheir“disinhibiting rings” (e.g., Heidegger 1995 [1929–1930], 269–270).14 Taking up theNovalis fragment “Philosophy is reallyhomesickness,anurge [Trieb] tobeat homeeverywhere,”DerridatroublesthisTriebthatdrivesus.Triebcanmeanurge,driveorinstinct; and on Derrida’s reading, our very being is caught up—or gripped asHeideggerwouldsay—by thisdrive.Derridasays thatDasein “isnotonlynostalgia,but a compulsivenostalgia, a drive (andDasein is thusessentially a drive, aTrieb)that pushes it to be everywhere at home” (2011, 107, parenthesis in original).Dasein’s Trieb or drive determines its relation to the world just as much as ananimal’sTrieborinstinctdeterminesitsrelationtotheworld.

Derrida also challenges the circularity of Heidegger’s argument that animals donotdie.Ofcourse,Heideggeradmitsthatphilosophynecessarilygoesincircles.But,Derrida argues that this particular circle follows a “paradoxical sequence,” namely,“having insisted on the fact that death, the moment of death, is the ‘touchstone’(Prüfstein)ofeveryquestionon theessenceof life,here isHeideggeraffirming that

theanimalcannotdie,properlyspeaking,butonlycometoanend”(115).Clearlytheanimalisalive,and,accordingtoDerrida,Heideggerdefineslifeintermsoftheabilitytodie;at thesame time,heclaims that theanimaldoesnotdie,properlyspeaking.Heideggerinsiststhatonlyhumansareproperlymortal(Steirblich)and,whilehumanbeingsdie(Sterben),animalsonlyend(Verenden).ItisatthispointthatDerridacallsinto question Heidegger’s confidence: “I hang on to this curious non-sequitur thatconsistsindefininganimalitybylife,lifebythepossibilityofdeath,andyet,andyet,indenyingdyingproperlyspeakingtotheanimal.ButwhatseemsmoreproblematicstilltomyeyesistheconfidencewithwhichHeideggerattributesdyingproperlyspeakingtohumanDasein,accessorrelationtodeathproperlyspeakingandtodyingassuch”(116).Tobe fair,Heidegger, asalways, givesdifferentmeanings todeath anddie.Moreover,whatisatstakeistodie,properlyspeaking,assuch. Inotherwords,forHeidegger,justasanimalshavearelationtotheworldbutnottotheworldassuch,theydie,buttheydonothavearelationtodeathassuch.Animalsaremortal in thesensethatall livingbeingsaremortal,but, forHeidegger,onlyhumanbeingsrealizethatalllivingbeingsaremortal;onlyhumanbeingshavearelationtodeathasdeath.

At this point, Derrida moves his challenge to the other side, so to speak, nowquestioning how human beings have a relation to death as such. Just as in TheAnimalThatThereforeIAmheismoreinterestedintroublingthisotherside,thesideofthehumanandourconfidenceinourownabilities,thanininsistingthatanimalstoohavethoseabilities.Althoughheclaimsthat,tovariousdegrees,animalsdohavethenumerouscharacteristicsandabilitiesattributedtohumans,heismoreconcernedtoshow thathumansdonotpossessorown theseverycharacteristicsandabilities inthewaythatphilosophersmaintainthattheydo,forexample,assuch.Heasks,howdoweaccessdeath? It isn’tenough just tosay theworddeathor toseeanother’sdeathor to imagineone’sowndeath inorder forone toaccesshisorherdeathassuch. Imaging one’s own death is always an exercise in also imaging one’s ownsurvival.Whenwe thinkofourowndeath,wenecessarily imagineourselves lookingat ourdeadbodies.Soweare split in two, bothdeadandsurviving, viewingdeathfromthevantagepointoftheliving;webecomeothertoourselves.ThisleadsDerridato conclude, “our thoughts of death are always, structurally, thoughts of survival”(117). Furthermore,Derrida argues that at death—whatever that is—our bodies donotbelongtous,butrathertotheotherorothers.Itistheotherwhodecideswhattodo with my remains. My corpse/corpus is in the hands of the other alone (117).Derridamaintainsthatthislackof“habeascorpus,”orhavingone’sownbody,beginsbeforedeath;deathisjustthemostextremeandradicalcaseoftheotherhavingmyremains,mybody.

Through some poeticworld-making of his own,as if following Robinson CrusoeandHeidegger,Derridacomes tosettleondeathasdefinitiveofworld.The lossofworldisconstitutivefor“having”world.Atthecenterofallworld-building,then,isthisloss of world, which in the end makes all world-building a fictional, if sometimesdelusional,endeavor.Usinga linefromanotherpoet,JohnDonne—whoperhapsnotcoincidently is famous for saying “noman is an island”—Derrida suggests that the

verystructureoftheHeideggerianassuch(whichdistinguishesusfromtheanimals)is oneof loss andprivation, evendeath.Derrida quotesDonne’s “HolySonnets”: “IruntoDeathandDeathmeetsmeasfast,/AndallmyPleasuresarelikeYesterday.”Andhegoesontosuggestvarious interpretationsof this line,whichculminate inthehypothesis,“pleasureisbornonlyofthemourning,ofenjoymentasmourning.Andnotany mourning and any memory of death, but the mourning of myself” (52). AgainDerrida links the mourning and melancholy invoked in the poetic fragment toHeidegger’s invocation of Novalis on philosophy as nostalgia or homesickness. Hesuggests that the structure of pleasure is that it is already in the past, alreadynostalgia forpleasure.Bothdeathandpleasureareneverpresentbutonly insomepast futureor futurepast, thefutureanterior, itwillhavebeenpleasure, itwillhavebeenmydeath.Withoutmourninganddeath,thereisnopleasure:“Withoutmourning,and themourning ofmyself, themourning ofmy ‘I am present,’ therewould be nopleasure. Therewould never even be an ‘I am’ a consciousness” (53).Pleasure assuch,likedeathassuch,cannotexistinthepresent,isneverpresent,butalwaysonlythenostalgiaforwhatisgone.Itisgonebeforeitispresent.

Theverystructureof theassuch, then, isnostalgic; it isalwaysa lookbackatbeings,fromelsewhere,anothertime,anotherplaceawayfromhome;theassuchishomesickness itself. Put simply, in order to think pleasure—my pleasure as Iexperienceit—Ihavetoremovemyselffromit,andimagineitassuch.Conversely,bysodoing,Ihavekilledpleasure.ThemomentthatIstarttothink“thisispleasurable,”pleasure isgone,and Iamalreadymourning itspassing. Insofarasmypleasure isfrom yesterday, as the poet says, then it is from the other and not my own: “Mypleasureisfromyesterdayon,byyesterdayaltered,comefromtheother,thecomingof the other” (53–54). The structure of desire is always from and for the other.Furthermore,returningtoRobinsonCrusoe,whocannottellhisfootprintfromthatofanother,wemightask:Canweeverbesurethatourpleasureisourownandnotthatof another?15 Even, as Derrida says, another myself—perhaps that one who tookgreat pleasure in eating Captain Crunch as a ten year old. As Freud, Foucault,Derrida,andvariousfeministshavetaughtus,inyetanothersenseourdesirescomefromothers,fromthetraditionsandinstitutionsofourculture.Nomanisanisland.

“THEREISNOWORLD,THEREAREONLYISLANDS”

Yet,aswehaveseen,Derridaconcludeshis three theses, “there isnoworld, thereareonly islands,”suggestingnotonlythateverymanisanislandbutalsothateverybeast, and perhaps every living being, is an island, radically separated from everyother.SohowcanwereconcilethesetwostrandsinDerrida’sthought?Namelythattheselfisconstitutedthroughtheother,ononehand,andthateachsingularbeingisunique to thepoint that itsdeath is theendof theworld,on theotherhand.Again,Derridamakesacertaindoublemovement inorder tocircumnavigate theseeminglyoppositional,evencontradictory,claimsthatnomanisanislandandeverymanisan

island, that we are radically interdependent and that we are radically singular, thatrelationalitypermeatesevery livingbeingand thatalterity inhabitsevery livingbeing.And again, rather than either/or, Derrida gives us both/and. Every living being isfundamentally relational and interdependent and yet, at the same time, each issingularandunique.Furthermore,thesingularityofeachcomesthroughtheotherandothers.

Theanswertothequestion“doweshareacommonworld?”thenisbothyesandno. We both share a common world and we don’t. Each living being has its ownworld,andyetcommoncodes(orlanguages,inthecaseofhumans)assumethatweshareaworld.Derridaarguesthatevenadeclarationofwarassumesthepossibilityof peace insofar as it is adeclarationaddressed toanother; all language, includingdeclarationsofwar,comesfromtheotherandothersandisaddressedtothem.TheBig-OOtherislanguageorcodesthemselves,therealmofthesymbolicandmeaningthat transcends every individual. The little-o other or others are those other beingswho teachus codesand languageand towhomweaddressourselves, evenwhenwearetalkingtoourselves.Nomatterwhatwesay—includingthatthereisnoworldor“theworld isgone/faraway”—weassumethere isenoughofasharedworldthatthese statements will be heard and understood by another. In this sense, to echoWittgenstein,thereisnoprivatelanguage.AsDerridadescribesthetensionbetweentheconstativeand theperformativedimensionsof language in thecaseofdeclaringthatwedonotshareaworld,theconstativeindicatesthatthereisnoworldwhiletheperformativeassumesthatthereisone(2011,259).Derridaarguesthateventheuseofthewordworldinthephrase“theworldisfaraway”assumes“thattheaddresseeand the signatory of the statement share a language and comprehension of what‘world’means, inhabit the sameworldenough to be able to hearwith one and thesameearandsaywithoneandthesamevoiceDieWeltistFort,sothatthemomentatwhich thisphrase isspoken theworld isstill there”and that the two interlocutors“cohabit the same world” (259, my emphasis). It is noteworthy that even wheninsistingthatwedoshareaworld,atleastenoughofaworldtoassumethatwecanspeaktoeachother,andperhapsunderstandeachother,Derridainvokesimagesofwarandlossofworld,anideatowhichwewillreturn.

Traces, codes, rituals, tools,and tracks, in thecaseofanimals,and languages,rituals, tools, and tracks, in the case of humans, operate as what Derrida calls“stabilizingapparatuses” (dispositifsstablilisants) or “prostheses” throughwhich thefictionofthecommonorsharedworldiscreated.InhisthirdthesisDerridasays,“thedifferencebetweenoneworldandanotherwillremainalwaysunbridgeable,becausethe community of theworld is always constructed, simulated by a set of stabilizingapparatuses,moreor lessstable, then,andnevernatural, language in thebroadestsense,codesoftracesbeingdesigned,amongalllivingbeings,toconstructaunityoftheworldthatisalwaysdeconstructible,nowhereandnevergiveninnature”(8–9).Inthe very passage where Derrida sets out his most radical thesis, that there is noworld, only islands, healsoproposes that there is a commonworld constructedbystabilizingapparatuses suchas codesand language, amongothers.Nosoonerhas

hesaidthatthedifferencebetweenonelivingbeingandanotherisunbridgeablethanhe says thatwe have constructed bridges, so to speak, that enable us to share aworld,evenifitisnot“giveninnature.”

Justbecausesomethingisnotgiveninnature,however,doesnotmakeitunrealor nonexistent. Just because something is constructed, and therefore can bedeconstructed,doesnotmake itunrealornonexistent.To thecontrary,aswehavelearnedfromDerrida,perhapsaboveallothers,theveryappealtonatureandwhatisgiven in nature is a construct that can be deconstructed (cf. Oliver 2013).Furthermore, just because something is constructed and deconstructable does notmeanthatwecannotshareit.Infact,justasanydeclarationisaddressedtoanother,so is any construction, which means that these stabilizing structures assume acommonworld.

Ofcourse,thisiswhatDerridaisarguing,namelythatourstabilizingstructuresorapparatuses assume a common world. In addition, he claims that they create thefictionofasharedworld.Yet,wemightask,inthecaseoftheworld,isn’tthisfictionprecisely what we mean by reality? If byworld we mean the experience of livingbeings,certainly livingbeingsshare timeandspacewithother livingbeings.Yet theworldisconstantlychangingasnewlifeformsare“bornanddie.”Moreover,wehavecome to think that living beings themselves change and evolve through time andspace.Theinteractionbetweenlivingbeingsandtheirenvironmentandeachotheriscomplicated, to the point that scientists constantly readjust their theories about theworld and its reality.What is real?We can never be sure that we know.We cannever be confident to the point of becoming con artists, conning ourselves intobelieving that our certainty is absolute. This kind of confidence easily becomesdogmatismandfundamentalism,which leadtoa toooftenviolentcollisionofworlds.Dowesharethesameworldorthesamereality?Theanswernecessarilywillbeyesandno.Andsayingthatthereisnoworld innaturemerelydisplacesthequestionofwhether or not we inhabit a common world onto the question of what appears innature;whilesayingthattheworldisafictionmerelydisplacesthequestionontothequestionofwhatisthedifferencebetweenfictionandreality.

Derrida’s appeal to the assumption of a common world inherent in theperformanceofallsignification, includingcodesandlanguages(andperhapsanythingthatcanleaveatrace),hasmoretractionwhenitcomestothinkingaboutwhetherornotthereisasharedworld.Inotherwords,ifdeconstructionwarnsusagainstbinaryoppositionssuchasnatureandculture,or realityand fiction, italso teachesus thattheperformativedimensionoflanguagecanbeatoddswiththeconstativedimensionin telling ways. In this case, any claim that the world does not exist—or that it isfarawayoreven that it is fictional—assumes that there isaworldweshare,one inwhich suchstatementsmakesense.Whatever the statusof the claims themselves,their utterance presupposes that we do share the world with others. Thus Derridaarguesboththateachindividuallifeissingularanduniqueandthatwesharetheworldwithotherlivingbeings.

ASTHEWHEELTURNS

As we have seen, Derrida goes further than this when he suggests that ourexperiencealwaysandonlycomesthroughtheOtherandotherswhenhediscussesthe linefromJohnDunne“mypleasure is likeyesterday.”Thereflectivegesturethatgivesusourexperienceas such, insofaras that ispossible, comes from theother,both in the sense of other people (little-o others) and symbolic systems ofrepresentation(Big-OOthers).Intermsoftheworld,Derridaarguesthatone’ssenseofoneselfasauniqueindividualcomesthroughwhathecalls the“prosthesis”of theworld.16DiscussingRobinsonCrusoe,DerridaanalyzesCrusoe’sattemptstoreinventthewheelasametaphorofsortsforeveryindividualbeingmakingitswayinaworldthat it did not choose, paradoxically making that world its own by following in thefootstepsofothers.Thewheelbecomesa figure forallautos, includingautomobile,auto-affection, automatic, autobiography, and even autoimmunity, which in turnbecomesafigurefordeconstructionitself.Thewheel,saysDerrida,“turnsonitsown[touteseule]…byturningonitself”(2011,78).Thisphrasehasmanymeaningsthatare appropriate to Derrida’s analysis of the ipseity of each individual that comesthroughitsrelationwithothers.First,tosaythatitturnsonitsowncouldmeanthatitmovesitselfasinauto-motion,automation,orautomobile.Italsomeansthat it turnsby itself, all alone, or that it turns itself on, as in auto-affection. But it does so byturningonitself,whichcouldmeanagainthatitturnsitselfon.Oritcouldmeanthatitturns on itself in the senseof turning against itself such that every auto-affection isalso an auto-destruction. In other words, its automation is also an auto-destructsequence. As thewheel turns, the ipseity of self is put intomotion as self-moving,auto-affecting,andultimatelyauto-destructing.

The wheel, then, comes to stand for this revolution from automation to auto-destruction thatDerrida identifieswith autoimmunity.With autoimmunity the immunesystemthat issupposedtoprotect theorganismturnson itselfanddestroys it. Inasense the organism becomes allergic to itself. Derrida sees this autoimmune self-destructive logic at work in both Robinson Crusoe and Heidegger’s seminar,particularly in relation to thedivide theysetupbetweenanimalsand themselvesashuman, thebeastand thesovereign. It isas if there isamechanism in the text thatturnsonitself.That istosay,thesamemechanismthatturnsonthetextturnsonit,or theaxisaroundwhich it revolves isalso thatwhichdestroys it. In thiscase, thataxisissovereignty.Thereturntoselfthatistheaxisaroundwhichthesetextsrevolveinvolvesalossofself,evenadestructionofacertainsovereignself.

For example, Robinson Crusoe attempts to make himself independent from hisparentsandhomelandbygoing tosea.Throughhisvoyageheassertshis individualsovereignty. When shipwrecked, he attempts to reinvent himself to suit his newsurrounding,buthedoessoonlybyholdingontotheverytraditionsthathesoughttoescape, evidenced by his repeated invocations of his parents’ warning andadmonitionsandhisturntothebibleandprayer.DerridareadsRobinsonCrusoeasalessoninlearninghowtoprayor,moreprecisely,learningyetagainhowtopray.17

DerridaclaimsthattheverypaternallawRobinsonCrusoeistryingtoescapereturnstohimbothtoprotectandtothreatenhim.ThelawofthefatherreturnsasprotectioninsofarasRobinsonCrusoeattempts torecreate iton the islandwithhimselfas thesovereign (insisting onwearing clothes and detesting cannibalism so as tomaintainhis status as a civilizedEnglishman); it returns to threaten him in the figures of theearth, thewild animals, and the savage cannibals that threaten to devour him alive(85). Just as Robinson Crusoe’s invention of the wheel (a potter’s wheel) is areinvention,sotoohisinventionofhimselfisareinventioninthesensethathissenseof himself and his actions always return to him fromoutside, fromothers, from theworld(the“prosthesis”oftheworld).Inthisregard,theturningtowardisalwaysalsoaturningagainstone’sself.Inventingandreinventingtheself,then,atthesametime,turnsonunderminingtheself,insofarasthatturningdependsontheprosthesisoftheworld,whichinterruptsillusionsofself-relianceandindependence(85).DerridagoesontodiscussanuncannypassageinwhichRobinsonCrusoehearshisparrotcallinghisnameandat firstdoesn’t recognize thevoiceas thepsittacismofhisownauto-appellation, which also foreshadows the uncanny moment when he is unsure ofwhetherthefootprintinthesandissomeoneelse’sorhisown.Perhaps,likeawheel,heisjustturningincircles.RobinsonCrusoecomestohimselffromtheoutside,fromthe prostheses that he creates (his tools, his talking parrot, his journal, his prayersandrituals).

In terms of Heidegger’s seminar, Derrida suggests that there is the sameautoimmune logic at work. Heidegger sets out to answer the question what is theworldand,inordertodoso,mustlosetheworld.Thereflectivemovementoftheassuch, taking the world as such, rips one from anything that might be immediateexperienceof,or in, theworld,amove that leads tonostalgiaandmelancholyoverwhathasbeenlostandcannotberegained.AndyetDerridaarguesthateveryreturnto theselfnecessarily follows thedestructive logicwhereby finding theself requireslosing the self. The supposedly sovereign self necessarily erects it sovereignty bydividing itself and thereby undermining its sovereign unity. On the one hand, thesovereignty of the self is created only through interaction with the world and isthereforenotsovereignbutinfactdependentupontheworld.Ontheotherhand,theevidenceofsovereigntyappearsonly in theworldastheproductsorremainsof theself and therefore the self is again dependent upon what is outside itself. In otherwords,theveryoperationsthatconstructthesovereigntyof theself, its ipseity,alsodestroy it (see 2011, 88). Individuality, ipseity, comes through the world and theprosthetics through which it constructs that world. The autonomous, automotivesovereign self is split in its origin (and therefore neither so autonomous norautomotiveasitthinks).Iftheworldistheproductofstabilizingapparatuses,soareindividuality,ego,andevencogito.

While it seems clear from Derrida’s analysis that our sense of ourselves asautonomous individuals comes through these stabilizing structuresandapparatuses,what is less clear is the relationship between the production of the illusion ofsovereign autonomous individuality and the singularity of each unique living being.

Significantly, the former is antithetical to ethics while the later is the beginning ofethics.Iftheprosthesesofandintheworldshoreuptheego,doesn’tthesingularityofeachputitbeyondtheseshoresandseparateitsuchthat“thereisnoworld,thereareonlyislands”?HowcanwereconcilethetensionbetweenDerrida’sinsistencethateachlivingbeingissingularandunique—anisland—andatthesametimethatipseityalwayscomes through theotheror theworld? Indeed,whatdoesDerridameanby“world” if he can say both that there is noworld and, at the same time, claim thateach individual returns to itself through the world? Or, as he says, that theperformativeutterance“thereisnoworld”assumesacommonworld?

Michael Naas answers this question by distinguishing between singularity as auniqueopeningonto theworldand individuality as theegoor ipseity that closesofftheworld (Naas2014).Whileeachsingularity is radicallyseparated fromallothers,individual identity isaproductof thestabilizingapparatusesortheprosthesesof theworld. We could go further and say that the ego or individual identity is itself astabilizingapparatusproduced likeotherprostheses inorder toartificiallysupport it.Naas suggests that the differencebetween singularity and individuality/ipseity is thedifference between opening onto the world from the point of one’s singularity andclosingoneselfoff to theworld fromwithin the illusionofself-containedautonomy.18WhenDerridainvokesfiguresof islands,hereferstosingularityasitopensontotheworld, whereas when he analyzes ipseity he refers to the individuated ego as itclosesitselfofftotheworld.

For Derrida, what wemight call our everyday notion of ourselves as individualswith constant identities over time is produced through the prostheses of theworld;this identity returns to us through theworld and its stabilizing structures, especiallythrough language (cf. Naas 2014). Thus insofar as each individual identity comesthrough thecommonworld it isneitheruniquenorsingular.These identitystructuresarethesameforeveryone.Butwhatisirreplaceableandsingularineachlivingbeingis “ultimately a certain relation to time, to an unrepeatable, unique time and thus arelationtoanunforeseeablefuture”(Naas2014,51).Wemightaddthatthissingularrelation is not only to time but also to place or location such that each living being“occupies”or “has”auniqueexperienceof theworld.Althougheachofus reliesonthe stabilizing structures of language, tradition, and rituals to think of ourselves asself-identical,at thesametime,eachofushasauniqueposition inrelationto thosestructures insofaraseachofusoccupiesadifferent timeandplace.No twobeingsare in thesameplaceat thesame time.So it isnot thateachbeing isunique in itssubstance, but rather in its location in time and space.Resonantwith anArendtianemphasis on natality,Derrida says, “What is absolutely new is not this, rather thanthat; it is the fact that itarrivesonlyonce. It iswhat ismarkedbyadate (auniquemoment and place), and it is always a birth or death that a date dates” (Derrida2002,104).19

Analyzing thesepassages fromDerrida inwhichhespeaks to theuniquenessofthe timeandplaceof each livingbeing insofar as each is born (hatched, spawned,etc.)anddies,NaasarguesDerrida’sclaimthatthereisnoworld,onlyislandsisnot

solipsistic when we realize the distinction between individual identity and uniquesingularityas thedifferencebetweenthe“I,”orego,andwhatwemight looselycalllived experience, or witnessing to that experience. More precisely, we have noaccesstotheexperienceoftheotherexceptthroughtestimonytoitbytheotherwhosaystous,“believeme,”thisishowIfeel.Sincewecannotperceiveinadirectwayhowthisotherfeels—whatgoesoninsideherhead—wemusttakeherwordonfaith.Appealing toDerrida’s useof “faith” and “miracle” to describe this interruption fromtheother thatconstitutes thesocialbond,Naasargues,“everything in theworldcanperhaps be accounted for by the laws of nature or causality except this appeal[“believe me”], which opens up the world like a miracle and can only be affirmedthroughakindofelementaryfaith”(Naas2014,52).Andthisfaithinothersisthegluethat holds together the social bond. The “miracle” is that we can build bridgesbetweenislandsthroughtestimonyandcommunication,whichisalwaysaresponsetothe interruption of/from the other. It might seem that relying on testimony as theinterruption from the other that connects one singular being to another excludesnonhumananimalsandother life-forms.ButNaassuggeststhat testimonycanmeanany traceofanother, including traces leftbynonhumananimals.20Every livingbeingleaves a trace, a kind of testimony,which is addressed to and can be received byanother.

THEENDOFTHEWORLD

But,whatdoesitmeanthateachbirthistheoriginoftheworldandeachdeathistheendoftheworld?WhatdoesDerridameanthateachlifeisnotjustaworldbutalsothe world? In his forward to the collection of eulogies for various friends, entitledChaquefoisunique,lafindumonde(Each/everytimeunique,theendoftheworld),Derridaannouncesatthebeginning:“Each/everytime,deathdeclarestheendoftheworld in totality, theendofeach/everypossibleworld,andeach/everytime, theendoftheworldasauniquetotality:thusirreplaceable,andthusinfinite”(Derrida2003b,9).21Andheconcludes,“death itself, ifsuchathingexists, leavesnoplaceatall fortheslightestchance,nor forareplacement,nor for thesurvivalof thisoneandonly,uniqueworld”(2003b,11).22Again,heendswiththeCelanfragment,DieWeltistfort,ich muss dich tragen, indicating his own obligation to carry his lost friends (orperhaps their remains) after the end of the world that is the end of each of theiruniquelives.

ThroughoutThe Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II, Derrida repeats this ideathateachdeath is theendof theworld, thewholeworld, andnot just theendofaworld.Oneof themoststrikingpassagescomes late in theseminar,after theU.S.-leadinvasionofIraqin2003,whenDerridainsiststhatallwarisworldwarandeachlostlifeistheendoftheworld:

Andineverywar,atstakefromnowonisanendoftheworld…andatstakeisanendoftheworld(DieWeltistfort),inthesensethatwhatisthreatenedisnot only this always infinite death of each and every one (for example of agiven soldier or a given singular civilian), that individual death I’ve often saidwaseachtimetheendoftheworld,theend,thewholeendoftheworld(DieWeltistfort),notaparticularendofthisorthatworld,oftheworldofsoandso, of this one or that one, male or female, of this solider, this civilian, thisman, thiswoman, thischild,but theendof theworld ingeneral, theabsoluteend of theworld—at stake is the end of theworld (DieWelt ist fort) in thesense thatwhat is threatened, in thisor thatwar, is therefore theendof theworld,thedestructionoftheworld,ofanypossibleworld.

(2011,259–260)

Thereareseveral rhetoricalelements thataresignificant in this longpassage.First,there is Derrida’s insistence that each death is the end of the world and that warthreatensthedestructionnot justofaworldamongothers,butoftheworldandanypossibleworld; in otherwords,war always threatens to end lives and thusworlds,eventheworld,butnow,withthethreatofglobalwar,warthreatenstoendthewholeworld and any possibility of world. The rhetorical force of the passage, however,comes from the repetitionof theCelanpoem fragment,whichappearsasa refrain,repeated three times. In theparagraph following thispassage,hequotes ita fourthtime, “more thaneverDieWelt ist fort, [that] thepoets,more thanever,more rarethanever,aremoretouchedbytruththanthepoliticians,priestsandsoldiers”(260).Aswecontinuetosee,Derrida’sanalysisoftheworldturnsaroundthislinefromthepoetCelan.Hereagainhelinksthisfragmenttoourethicalobligationinthefaceofadisappearingworld: “what there is tobear,as theresponsibilityof theother, for theother, must be borne where the world itself is going away” (260). Shortly, we willreturn to theethical obligation suggestedbypoetry.But, for now, let’s explorehowtheconnectionbetween theworldanddeathhasbecomeaconnectionbetween theworldandwar,as ifonlyby imagingtheendof thewholeworldcanwethinkof theworldasawholeorassuch.

Liketheshotsofemptystreetsanddesertedcitiesthatrepresentthedeathofallof lifeonearthat theendofStanleyKramer’s1959nuclearapocalypsefilmOn theBeach,wecanonlyimaginetheendoftheworld,whetherofourownpersonalworldor the whole world, as postapocalyptic survivors watching what happens after theend.Justasthecamerafilmingaftertheendbetraystheexistenceofasurvivor,ourimaginaryimagesofourowndeathortheendoftheworldondisplayinafilmmakemanifest the structural necessity of the position of witness or spectator in all ourthoughts of our own finitude. In Freudian terms we might say that our own deathbecomesa fetishofsorts insofaraswebothbelieve in itanddonotbelieve in itatthesametime.Everyinvocationofourowndeathtakesonthe“asif”structureofthefetish:Iknowthatmydeathisinevitable,butIactasifitisnot.ForDerrida,whathecalls“thephantasm”ofthis“livingdeath,”associatedwithRobinsonCrusoe’sterrorof

beingburiedaliveorswallowedupbybeastsorcannibals, is“the inconceivable, thecontradictory,theunthinkable,theimpossible,”namelytheendoftheworld,whichis,atthesametime,“named,desired,apprehended”(148).This“as if”canbeeitheradenialthroughwhichwearrogantlygiveourselvesthe“righttotheworldassuch,”or,aswewillsee, itcanbeapoeticandcreativegiftof theworldforanother(cf.260,268).23

Derrida argues that what is at stake in all contemporary wars is “the institutionandtheappropriationoftheworld,theworldorder,noless”(259).Asweseeinthislongpassage,hemaintainsthat“theinterpretationandfutureofthetotalityofbeings,of theworldand the livingbeings that inhabit it” areat stake in everywar.Allwar,then,isideological, inthatthecombatantsarenotjustvyingforterritoryoracertainpartoftheearthbutalsofortheirwayoflifeandbeliefs,whichistosaytheirworld.InArendtiantermswecouldsaythatallcontemporarywarsare“totalwar”insofarasthey are battles over whose worldview will dominate. Holy wars spurred on byfundamentalistdoctrinesandslogansarebattlesoverhowtointerprettheworldandwhichworldorderwillprevail.Thisistosaythatwhatisatstakeinwaristheanswertothequestion“Whatistheworld?”Allwars,then,areworldwars.

Partiestothesewarsspeakandactasiftheycananswerthatquestiononceandforall,asiftheyhavearighttotheworldassuch.Theyactasiftheyhavetheright,as Arendt says of Eichmann, to determine with whom to share the world and theearth. Indeed, theverynotionof theworldassuchcanplay into therhetoricofonehomogeneousworldvieworworldorderforthetotalityofbeingsassuch.Thisisnot,however,whatHeideggermeanswhenhe talksabout theworldassuch,which isastructural possibility forDasein. Still, this structural possibility to take the totality ofbeingsasthewholeoftheworldcaneasilybecometheasifofdenialthatdisavowsthevastarrayofdifferencesthatmightfillinthecontentofthatemptystructure.TheasifofdenialworksalongwiththeillusionofsovereigntyasmasterythatDerridahasworkedtoundercutthroughouttheseminar:weactasifwewerethemastersofourown destinies and the lords of the totality of beings; we act as if we can controlourselves and other beings, especially nonhuman being, but including other humanbeings, through violence in the name of our own worldview masquerading as thewholeworldassuch.Weactasifwecancontrolourownviolenceandput it in theserviceof lofty ideals in thenameofwhichwedestroyworlds inorder to save theworld from them. In otherwords, threatenedbyworlds andworldviews thatwedonotshare,weannihilate them in thenameofourownworld,whichwe insist isTHEworld, theoneandonlyworld.Wedenyboth themultiplicityofworlds,whatArendtcalls plurality, and the singularity of each in the name of “universal” principles thatbecome the rallying cries for war, for example, “democracy,” “freedom,” and even,possibly,“cosmopolitanism.”

Whenmanbelieveshecanmaster the forcesof theuniverse,ormasterhisownviolence, he becomes a stranger to himself, a stranger to his ownUnheimlichkeit.Thisiswhenthehypothetical(fictional)asifbecomesthedogmatic(metaphysical)is.And this is the ultimate weapon of mass destruction (insofar as it is behind the

deploymentofmost, ifnotall,others). If,asDerridasuggests, there isnoworldassuch, thenhowmightwecreativelypursuetheworld inwaysthatavoidthedangersof fundamentalism? In Derridean terms we might ask, what is in excess ofsovereignty? Given that sovereignty itself is excess—the most, the highest, theabsolute—what does it mean to think of something other in excess of excess (cf.279)? Is thereany formof sovereignty that couldworkagainst theviolenceofbothstatesovereigntyastheright to let liveorput todeathand individualsovereigntyasmastery?Relatedly, intermsoftheproblematicoftheworld,wemightask,“ifthereis no common world, but only islands, how can we communicate or build bridgesbetween islands”? This question is especially relevant if the assumption of oneuniversalworldispartandparcelofdogmaticfundamentalisms.How,then,arewetonavigate this quandary wherein we both need a shared world for the sake ofcommunicationandlivingtogether,cohabiting,andweneedtoacknowledgethateachliving being is singularly unique such that each one inhabits its ownworld or,moreradically, is the world? Again, Derrida insists that rather than either/or—either weshare a common world or we don’t—the answer is both/and—we both share acommonworld andwedon’t. Each singular being is an island radically cut off fromevery other and yet we build bridges all the time, particularly through language,broadly speaking (so broadly that it can include the codes, rituals, and tracks ofnonhumanlifeforms).24

Language, broadly construed, both assumes and provides a common sharedworld, a world created as a protection against the anxiety that comes from therealization that there is no common world and no commonmeaning. Paradoxically,then, languagebothmakesandunmakestheworld. Itmakestheworld insofaras itprovides thestabilizingapparatuses throughwhichwebridge islandsandcreate theillusionofacommonworld. It unmakes theworld insofaras itsuntranslatabilityanddissemination undermine its stabilizing function and open up the world to an infinitevarietyofpossibleworlds.Derridacallspretendingoractingas ifwegive thesamemeaning to signs or words, including the wordworld, a “life insurance policy,” “anagreementinheritedovermillenniabetweenlivingbeings,”“analwayslabile,arbitrary,conventional and artificial, historical, non-natural contract, to ensure for oneself thebest,andthereforethe longestsurvivalbyasystemof life insurancescountingwithprobabilitiesandincludingaclausethatonepretend,thatonemakeasif,signingtheinsurancepolicy” (267).Wesignon to thebelief thatweall inhabit thesameworld,theoneandonlyworld,asa life insurancepolicy.As it turnsout,however,perhapslikeall life insurancepolicies, itoperatesaccording toanautoimmune logicwherebywhatissupposedtoprotectusalsodestroysus.Aswehaveseen,thebeliefinoneand only one world, or even a common world that allows us to live together andcohabit,alsocanleadtowarwhenanindividualorastategivesitselftherighttotheworldassuch,which is tosay, the right todetermine the futureandmeaningof theworld.

MAKINGANDUNMAKINGTHEWORLD,POETICALLY

Again,wemustask,isthereanyalternativetosovereignworld-makingthatbecomesworldtaking?Derridaindicatesthatthereisanalternativeformofsovereigntythatisinexcessofpoliticalsovereigntywith itssuperlativepower.Poeticsovereignty,whatin The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I, Derrida calls “poetic majesty,” worksagainst political sovereignty and the will tomastery.25 As he points out,majesty isfromtheLatinmajestas,whichmeanssovereignty(2011,82).ThusDerridausesoneform of sovereignty against another, poetic majesty against sovereign majesty.Whereassovereignmajestyerectsitselfasthemost,thegrandest,andthesupremepower,poeticmajestyopensontoanuncannyothernessthatunseatsanysuchself-certainty. Poetic majesty or the majesty of art is used against political majesty toshowhowpoliticalmajesty is itself an art form, a performance, or a fiction. Poeticmajestyopensitselfuptotheasifintheabsenceofanyabsoluteandcertainworld.Unlike political sovereignty and thewill tomastery, poetic sovereignty avows ratherthandisavowstheasif,whichistosay,thefictionalstatusoftheworlditcreates.

InThe Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I, Derrida goes further and suggeststhat poetic majesty gives us a chance, however precarious, however slight, ofavoidingthedeadlyselfaggrandizingfictionofpoliticalsovereigntythatpresentsitselfasTheTruthoftheWorld.26Poeticrevolutiondisruptsthetimeofpoliticalsovereigntybygiving time to theother, the timeof theuncanny,whichunsettlesself-certaintyofany“Ican.”Whereastheperformanceofpoliticalsovereigntyclaimstopossess thepower of the “I can” master the world, the performance of poetry undoes thesovereign “I can” through the ambiguity and necessary openness of language andinterpretation that make multiple worlds possible. The world itself becomes theproduct of poetic majesty: the world as a poem calling out for interpretation andreinterpretation. This poetic revolution in the time of the living present ruptures thepresent as self-presence and reveals an absence at its heart, the absence of theworldassuch.Forexample,sciencecanbeseenasasearchforthetruth,oritcanbe seen as an ongoing interpretation of codes—what we might call the poetry ofnature.

Reminiscent of Julia Kristeva’s revolution in poetic language, Derrida’s poeticmajesty reveals the performative dimension of language operating even inproclamationsofsovereignpowerordeclarationsofwar.ForKristeva,therevolutionin poetic language happens when poetic forms of language display their means ofproduction,includingtheirperformativedimensionandtheirmateriality;thatistosay,poeticlanguageputsondisplaytheverystructures,forms,andtechniquesitusestocreateaworld.Aswehaveseen,Derridaarguesthatthereisaperformative“pearl”at the heart of the constative oyster in any declaration of war that assumes thepossibility of peace through a common or sharedworld and language (2011, 259).Language itself becomes the possibility of theworld, shared or not; language itselfbecomesthebridgebetweenworlds,aprecariousandshiftingbridge,neversecure,but possible. Language, broadly speaking, “lightly” crosses the uncrossable

differenceandprovidesabridgebetweenone islandandanother,however lightandfragile this bridge may be (cf. 267). Perhaps we should say addressability andresponse-abilityratherthanlanguagesinceusuallywethinkthatlanguageisreservedfor man alone. Addressability and response-ability are not unique to man, but aremanifestinvariouswaysinmost,ifnotall, livingbeings.Most,ifnotall, livingbeingsrespondtoothers,andmanyalsoaddressthemselvestoothers.ElsewhereIcallthisaddress and response structure witnessing. More recently, Cynthia Willett hasnamedit “call and response” precisely in order to conjure nonhuman voices (Willett2014,9–17).

Calling Celan as his witness, Derrida claims that the world is a word, aconvention, that doesnot exist as such, andwhen those conventionsdisappear theworldisgoneandImustcarryyou(cf.2011,266).Innearlyevery,ifnotevery,placewhereDerrida talksabout theendof theworld,or thedeathofeachsingular livingbeingasnot just theendofaworldbut of theworld, he invokes this one line fromCelan.Indeed,heappealstothisbitofpoetrytomakehiscasesomanytimesthatinmostplacesheneedonlyuseafragmentofthefragment,oneclauseortheother,orjust oneword, fort (gone) or tragen (carry), to conjure the entire fragment with itsworld so far away that I must carry you. In fact, he cites all or part of the Celanfragment no less than forty-four times throughout the seminar, in nearly everysession.Howdoesthisoneline,fromapoemthatDerridanevercitesinitsentirety,cometostandinfortheworldanditsabsence?

Toanswerthatquestion,weneedtakeadetourthroughDerrida’sanalysisoftheentirepoemin“RamsUninterruptedDialogue—BetweenTwoInfinites,thePoem,”hishomage toHans-GeorgGadamer (2005b). ThereDerrida invokes this same line atthebeginningofthesecondsection,afterdiscussinghis“dialogue”withGadamerandendingthefirstsectionwithmelancholymusingsonthedeathofafriendasthenatureof friendship wherein one friend is doomed from the start to face the death of theother.Derridasaysthatthesurvivorisleftto“carrytheworldoftheother,whichIsaywithoutthefacilityofahyperbole.Theworldaftertheendoftheworld”(2005b,140).GivenDerrida’ssometimeappealtowhathecalls“hyperbolicethics,” it issignificantthatheinsiststhatcallingthedeathofeachuniquelivingbeing“theendoftheworld”andnotjusttheendofaworldisnothyperbole.27Thisisnotagestureofhyperbolicethics. Without hyperbole then, Derrida contends, “each time, and each timesingularly,each time irreplaceably,each time infinitely,death isnothing less thananendof theworld….Deathmarkseach time,each time indefianceofarithmetic, theabsoluteendoftheoneandonlyworld,ofthatwhicheachopensasaoneandonlyworld, the end of the unique world, the end of the totality of what is or can bepresentedas theoriginof theworld foranyunique livingbeing,be ithumanornot”(140).

Inthispassage,Derridaclaimsthateachdeathisunique,thatitistheendofbothaworld(“notonlyoneendamongothers”)andtheworldandnotmerelysomethingorsomeone in the world. Hemaintains that each deathmarks in time the end of theworld,not just theendofaworldora life.Recall thatelsewhereDerridadescribes

the singularity of each life asmarked by time,more specifically, by a date or twodates:abirthdateandadeathdate.Thesedatesandtimesmarkthislifeasunique.Thephraseinthepassagejustquoted,“Eachtimeindefianceofarithmetic”suggestsnotonly that the timeof lifeanddeathdefies the clock timeof datesand timesonbirthanddeathcertificatesbutalsothatdeathsareimmeasurable,incomparable,andthusnotamatterofdeathtolls.28Oneisenoughtomake—ortake—thewholeworld.Returning toourquestion toArendt, howmanydoes it take tomakeupaworldorplurality,Derridawould answer, only one.Each living beingoffers a uniqueopeningontotheoneandonlyworld.Andyeteachdeathalsobringstheendof“thetotalityofwhat isorcanbepresentedas theoriginof theworld” (140).Oneway to interpretthisclaimisthateachdeathinterruptstheworldandrendersinoperativeitsstabilizingstructures,thatistosay,whatmakesitbothaandtheworld.Facedwiththedeathofafriendorfamilymember,thestructuresthathadmadesenseoftheworld,thathadallowedus to live in it together,disappear. In thissensewe faceeachdeathalone.Derridasays,“Thesurvivor,then,remainsalone.Beyondtheworldoftheother,heisalsoinsomefashionbeyondorbeforetheworlditself.Intheworldoutsidetheworldanddeprivedoftheworld”(140).Ratherthanguaranteeouraccesstoworld,death,deathassuch,shatterstheworldandleavesus,perhapslikeHeidegger’sanimals,orevenhisstones,deprivedofworld.

ThisisthepointatwhichDerridamakestheethicalmoveandagaincallsCelanashis witness. When the stabilizing apparatuses that hold the world together breakdownanddeathrenderstheminoperative,therearenowords,rules,morals,rituals,ortraditionsthatcansupporttheweightofdeath.Thesurvivormustfendforhimself.And yet, in this worldless place, the nonplace of facing the death of the other, thesurvivor must carry that weight himself. He is responsible for carrying the otherforwardinthisworldlessworld.Heis“assignedtocarryboththeotherandhisworld,theotherand theworld that havedisappeared, responsiblewithoutworld (weltlos),without thegroundofanyworld, thenceforth, inaworldwithoutworld,as ifwithoutearthbeyondtheendoftheworld”(140,myemphasis).Withoutground,asifwithoutearth,tostandon,responsibilitycarrieson.Withoutworld,asifwithoutearthtoo.

Thus, if worlds are associated with cultural traditions, rituals, and conventions(whetherhumanornonhuman),earth isassociatedwithourembodiedconnection tolife and home. In other words, to bewithout world is to bewithout the codes andmores that govern our societies. To be without earth is to be without the veryconditions of possibility for life itself. If ethics begins where the world ends, thismeans ethics is beyond the conventions of culture. But to say that we are as ifwithoutearth is to say thatweareas ifwithout the verybodiesandwhat sustainsthem that keep us alive. To bewithout world is to step into the voidwhere ethicaldecisionscannotbemadebasedonaccepted rulesorconventions. Ifdecisionsaremademerelyintermsof“followingorders,”oractingonlawsortraditions,thentheyareunthinking.Whentakentotheextreme,weendupwithEichmann.Ethics,then,isalwaysnecessarilybeyondworld;atleastitrequiresactingasifwehadnoworldtofall back on, imaging that theworld is gone and Imust carry you. But even ethics

cannot takeusbeyondearth.Forwhatwould itmean to actas ifwe did not havebodies and were not earthlings?More to the point, what could be themeaning ofethicsinthissciencefictionfantasy?Whatdoesethosmeandisconnectedfromearth.

Thus, the as if in “as if without earth” signals a turn to hyperbole, even tohyperbolic ethics. If world is associated with human worldviews and humanconventions,wecan imagineaworldwithoutworld.But, given thatall lifeexistsbyvirtue of the earth, we can only imagineas if without earth. In order to conjure animage that speaks to this terrible responsibility, even impossible responsibility, weimagine ourselves not only worldless but also as if without the earth itself, whichsignals thehyperbolicethical turn.Thispoeticas ifmakesall themorevividwhat itmeans to face the death of the otherwithout anything to support theweight of theworld that bears down on the survivor whomust bear it. Enter poetry, specificallyCelan’s“DieWelt ist fort, ichmußdichtragen”(140). Immediatelyafter invokingtheas if—“as if without earth beyond the end of theworld”—Derrida again appeals toCelan,as if the ethical turn needs to call the poet as witness:more precisely, thepoetwhowitnessedtheendoftheworldthatwastheHolocaust.

Thepoem “wanders,” saysDerrida—perhaps likeaplanet, sinceashe remindsus,theGreekplanetesmeanswandering—“but inasecretlyregulatedfashion,fromone referent to another—destined to outlive, in an ‘infinite process’, thedeciphermentsofanyreadertocome”(146).Thepoemis likeanytrace inthat it iscut off fromany originalmeaning or authorial intent, “an unfortunate orphan,”which“always remainsanappeal (Anspruch) to theother,even if only to the inaccessibleotherinoneself….Evenwherethepoemnamesunreadability,itsownunreadability,italsodeclaretheunreadabilityoftheworld”(147).Derridasuggeststhatthroughthiswandering fromonemeaning toanotherwithin theuniverseof language (theOther)andmoving among possible future readers (the others), the world opens onto thisradicalundecidability that theybothshare—thepoemand theworld.And this is thegift of thinking, thegift of thepoeticas if, as if theworldhasconstantly renewablemeaning.Neither thepoetnor thepoem issovereignover thepossiblemeaningsofthe poem. Rather, it is destined to wander, not aimlessly or without meaning, butwithoutanysettelosorfixedmeaning.

In this regard, the poeticas if is not the as if of a Kantian regulative ideal (cf.Derrida2011,269).29Itisnotaimingforperfectionortheoneandonlytruemeaningor correct interpretation. It is not perfectible in theKantian sense of getting better.So,too,thepoeticasifisneithertheasifnorassuchofphilosophy.Itisneithertheanalogical as if nor the metaphysical as such of Platonic or Heideggerianphilosophy.30Derridapositionsthepoeticasifasacounterweighttothephilosophicalas if insofar as the poetic as if avows its fictional status rather than disavows it.Unlikethephilosophicalasif thatpresents itselfas the truth—theoneandonly truthof theworld—the poeticas if puts on display the allegorical,mythical, and fictionalprocessofmakingworlds—eventheworld—throughsignifyingsystems,whatDerridacalledstabilizingapparatuses.Unlikethephilosophicalasifandassuchthatclaimtolift theveilandreveal theworldas it is, thepoeticas if suggestsawandering truth

only throughveiling; theshroud is theworld,and, ifanything, itshowsthatwhat liesbehindorbeyondisabsence,lack,andvoid.Likethephilosophicalasifandassuch,poetrystepsintothisvoid,but,unlikephilosophy,ratherthanpretendtofill it,poetrysupportsthevoidandcarriesusthroughit.

Thepoeticasifallowsustoactasifweinhabitthesameworld,asifcohabitationis possible. And yet poetry is also where this phantasm of cohabitation comes upagainst its limit insofar as it shows the multivocity of language and languages, theuntranslatability from one island to another, which, at the same time, demandstranslationand interpretation.Thepoeticasif simultaneouslydisplays thesingularityof each and the absence of one common world and the possibility of bridging thisabyss,howeverslightlyandprecariously, tocreate thepossibilityofasharedworldorat least thepossibilityofaddressand response-ability thatallowsus toactas ifthe world is inhabitable and cohabitable. When we find ourselves worldless—as ifwithoutearthbeyondtheendoftheworld—thewanderingofthepoeticasifmustdotheheavylifting inthefaceofthisabsentworld.Thisdoesnotmeanthat itcan,butonly that itmust. Against theKantianought impliescan, Derrida leaves us with anought that not only does not imply can but alsomay imply cannot. Each onemustattempttotranslatewhatcannotbetranslated;inasense,eachonemustattempttotranslatetheethicalintothemoral,theunconditionalintotheconditioned,totranslatethe singularity and irreplaceability of every other, every living being, into universalprinciples(2005b,162).Ethicsmustbetranslatedintotheworldaftertheendoftheworld and where there is no world. The ethical obligation, then, is an impossibleobligation,onethatbeginswhentheworldends.Ifitwerepossible,thatistosayifitwere doable and within the power of the sovereign I can, it would be moral rulefollowingratherthanethicaldecisionmaking.31 Inotherwords, itwouldbeathingofthe world that can be understood and carried out by sovereign rationality and will,according to moral principles explicable to all rational beings. Yet, where there isethical obligation, there is no world, but only the face-to-face relationship thatobligatesonesingularbeingtoanother.Thisradicalresponsibilityinterruptstheworld,it jutsthroughtheworldandshattersthegrounduponwhichwestandtogether.Andin that momentmy responsibility for you, for the other, is as singular as the otherherself.Derridadescribesthissingularobligationwithoutworldoralibi:“AssoonasIamobliged,fromtheinstantwhenIamobligatedtoyou,whenIowe,whenIoweittoyou,oweittomyselftocarryyou,assoonasIspeaktoyouandamresponsibleforyou,forbeforeyou,therecannolonger,essentially,beanyworld.Noworldcananylongersupportus,serveasmediation,asground,asearth,asfoundation,orasalibi…withoutearthlyorworldlyground, theresponsibility forwhichImustrespondinfrontofyouforyou”(158).

To say that there is noworld is to say that therearenomoral codes, universalprinciples, common languages, rational structures, religious doctrines, traditions, orconventionstowhichonecanappeal inthefaceoftheethicalobligationtoanother.Theethicalobligationbringsusfacetofacewiththeother,asLévinaswouldsay,andthis encounter takes us beyond the world of stabilizing apparatuses. There is no

apparatus,nomachine,formakingethicaldecisions.Rather,therespondentisalonein his responsibility to the other and for the other outside of any possible world,withoutalibi.Livinguptoone’sethicalresponsibilitiestotheothermeansbeingaloneandwithoutworld.Forwithintheworldwefindmoralsandprinciples,butwedonotfind ethical obligation in the sense invoked by Lévinasian insomnia or Derrideanhyperbolicethics.Moralcodesmakeiteasiertodoourdutybyprescribingitforus.Ethicaldecisions,ontheotherhand,arethosethatkeepusawakeatnightandforceus to step out of comfortable rule following. Ethics demands that we vigilantly andcontinuallytrytoavoidbecomingmerelyansweringmachinesandinsteadrespondtothecallofandfromtheother.Unlikemoralitythatisdecidedonceandforall—whatisright is right forall time—ethicsrequiresus todwell in theundecidablespaceof theimpossibility of knowing what is right and yet being obligated to do it nonetheless.Only then does responsibility become radical enough to open up the possibility notjustofaworldbutalsomoreimportantlyofajustworld.

Ethically we are alone and yet not alone. Again, we have moved beyond thedisjunctionofeither/orandmoved toward theconjunctionofboth/and:wearealoneandwearenotalone.Thehyperbolicurgencyofethicscomesfrombehavingasifwearealone,withoutworld,facingthedecisionofalifetimeandourownresponsibilitytoandfromtheother.But,at thesametime,wearebyvirtueof theotherandothers.There is no “I” without the ethical call from others or without the stabilizingapparatusesof theOther,most especially language.This is to say that the “I,” theself, isaresponsetothecallofothers.Andthisresponse-abilitycomesfromothersand is then addressed to others. Still, Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics of singularresponsibility in front of the worldlessness of the world is not some heroicindividualismwhereby,likeHercules,wetakeontheweightoftheworld.Andyetthatweightissquarelyonourshoulders.

“THEPOETHOISTSNOFLAGS”

It is noteworthy that Derrida names his engagement with Celan, “Rams,” after theanimalnamedinthepoem.Ashepointsout,ramsareoftenthesacrificialanimalsofchoicethroughouttheOldTestament.Morespecifically,theram’shorn,theshofar,isassociatedwithboth the JewishNewYearand thedayof atonement; thusDerridaproposesthattheramstandsforboththebeginningandtheendoftheworld(2005b,156).InCelan’spoemthereisanimagebrandedbetweentheram’shorns,perhapsthe imageof thepoem itself,which is followedbyacharging force,perhapsof theram himself, which Derrida interprets as the rebellion of all scapegoats, allsubstitutes,allvictimsofholocaust,humanandnonhuman(156–157).Thechargeofthissacrificialramisaimedagainstitspersecutorsandagainstsacrificeitself,tothepoint, Derrida argues, of wanting “to put an end to their common world” (157).PerhapslikeHannahArendt,whoclaimsthatnoonewantstoshareacommonworldwith Eichmann, this ram does not want to share the world if that world is one of

holocaust.Derridainterpretsthepoem’svastglowingvaultofblackstarsasthehomeofthe

zodiac sign of the ram in the poem. Yet this vast glowing vault with the swarm ofblackstarspushingthemselvesoutandawaycanalsobereadasanexplosion, thebigbang,perhapstheoriginortheendoftheworld.Therammightbethedestructiveforceresultingfromthisexplosionthatleadstotheendoftheworld.The“I”maybethepoem itself: “Ibrand this image,between thehorns… Imustcarryyou.” “You”mightbe thepoethimself,whorelieson thepoemtocarryhimafter theendof theworld,after theholocaust.Thepoemmayofferprotection,asslightas it is,againstthe destruction of theworld. This is theway that Celan describes language. In hisBremenspeechCelansuggeststhatlanguageiswhatremainsaftereveryholocaust.It iswhatsurvives.Languagesurvivesthedeathoftheother.Andit is languagethatenablesonetocarrythatother,perhapscarryhimforwardbyinterpretinghispoetry.The poem too is dependent on the other (cf. 159). The meaning of the poem isentrusted to the other. Poetry, perhapsmore than other forms of language,makestheneed for interpretationapparent. It callsout for interpretation.And itsmeaningschangewith timeandcontext.Poetry, likeall language, isalwaysaddressed to theother,butitsformmakestheneedforanactivereaderorlistenermoreapparentthansomeotherformsoflanguage.

Celandescribeshispoetryasamovementtowardtheother,towardaresponsiveand responsible other thatmightmake it possible to inhabit theworld. If, asCelandescribes it, language iswhat survives against loss, then it operates as a buoy, ofsorts,ontheseasoftraumaandtorment,eventuallywashingashore,likeamessageinabottle,inthehopesthattheshoreisinhabitedanditwillbetakenup.Writingnotonlyassumeshabitation, it creates it; that is tosay, it createsaworld inhabitedbyothers who can listen and hear. Thus Celan describes poetry as a going towards:toward this inhabited shore, toward the other.32 In this sense poetry creates andrecreates the witnessing structure of address and response that supports thepossibilityofsubjectiveandintersubjectivelife.

Celan’spoetry, then,canbereadasanattempttorecreateanaddresseeinthefaceof thebrutalityof theSecondWorldWar.33ShoshanaFelmangoes furtherandargues that his poetry is engaged in the project not only of seeking a responsivelistenerbutalsoofaddressabilityitself.Sheclaimsthathe“transformspoetryfromanaestheticartformintoaninherentandunprecedentedtestimonialprojectofaddress”(1992,38).FelmansaysthatinCelan’spoetry“thebreakageoftheverseenactsthebreakageof theworld” (25). In thisbrokenworld,asDerridarepeatedly insists, thefundamentalrelationshipisoneofresponsibility:Theworldisgone,Imustcarryyou.There is no sovereign “I can,” but only an “I must.” Where the world ends,responsibility begins. Resonant with Derrida’s own analyses of Celan throughoutSovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan, Hans-Georg Gadameremphasizes the ways in which Celan’s poems challenge the sovereignty of thesubject. He describes the poetic word as a cosmic event that establishes its ownauthoritybeyondthatofitsauthor.Thepoeticwordisonethateventhepoetcannot

possess. For this reason, Gadamer says, “The poet hoists no flags” (1997, 221).Language has authority, but it does not belong to anyone. No one can claim theauthorityofthetrace.Ifthetrace“belongs”toanyone,it“belongs”totheother.

Immanuel Lévinas too sees in Celan a poet of otherness par excellence. LikeGadamer and Derrida, Lévinas suggests that Celan’s poetry challenges thesovereigntyoftheself(1978,19).Ifthereisareturntoselfthroughthepoem,itisasstranger,foreigner,oruncannyotherness.Thisstrangenessisthestrangenessoftheother, of the self, and of man himself: “Strangeness of man—one touches manoutsideofallrootednessanddomestication.Homelessnessbecomesthehumanityofman—and not his denigration in the forgotteness of Being and the triumph oftechnique” (Lévinas1978,19).Wecouldsay thatpoetryhelpsus tobeathome inour homelessness and, at the same time, makes what we take to be home andfamiliar uncanny. Positioning Celan’s poetry as a counterweight to Heidegger’semphasis on the home of man in the house of Being, which is language, LévinasembracesCelanasafellowtraveleronan“adventurewheretheIdedicatesitselftothepoemsoastomeettheotherinthenon-place…anativelandthathasnoneedto be a birthplace” (1978, 20,my emphasis). InvokingHeidegger’s notion of nativeground,Lévinassuggeststhatthisnativegroundneednotbecomenationalismbasedonbirthplace.Rather,poetryconjuresanativelandotherwise.Poeticlanguageallowsustoplantourselves in languageasahomelesshome,awandering thatmakesourhomeeverywhereandnowhere.AsacounterpointtoHeidegger’snotionthatmanisthe shepherd of Being, Lévinas finds in Celan, a Jewish Holocaust survivor, a“significancewhichsignifies for thehumanassuch,ofwhichJudaism isanextremepossibility—tothepointoftheimpossibility—abreakwiththenaivetéoftheshepherd,theherald,themessengerofBeing”(1978,20).ForLévinas,Celan’spoetrysignalsagoingtowardtheotherthatisaradicalbreakwiththeisolatedphilosopheronapaththroughhisfamiliarforest.Thispoeticwanderingisnotteleological;itdoesnothaveagoal or anendpoint.Following themetaphorofmeridian inCelan’s speechby thatname,Lévinasdescribestheadventureofpoetryas“thecircularityofthemeridian—perfected trajectory of thismovementwithout return—,which is the ‘finality withoutend’ofthepoeticmovement.PoeticmovementopensupthepossibilityoftheinfinitemovementtowardstheotherthatcreatestheworldasifIwerereunitedwithmyselfthere”(1978,20).

Forhispart,inhisfewproseworks,Celantalksof“theworld-openuniquenessofgreat poetry” and a language of the earth that is “without I and without You,” alanguagespokenbysticksandstones(1986,57,19–20).Twodifferentlanguages:alanguage of the world and a language of the earth. The language of the worldcontinually and repeatedly conjures I and You, while the language of the earth isbeyond such distinctions, the language spoken by sticks and stones. And, “thelanguagethatcountshere,”isthelanguageofglaciers,mountainsandstones(Celan1986,19).Yetperhapsthesetwodifferent languagesareasessentiallyrelatedas IandYou, infinitely addressed to each other, forming and reforming the fragilemapbetweenislands,amapthatleadsusnotwherewewanttogo,buttotheotherness

ofwhereweoughttogo.Celanendshisspeech,“TheMeridian,”describingwhathefinds following themap of poetry: “I find something as immaterial as language, yetearthly,terrestrial, intheshapeofacirclewhich,viabothpoles,rejoinsitselfandonthe way serenely crosses even the tropics: I find … a meridian” (1986, 55). Ameridianisanimaginarycirclethatbisectsthepolesofacelestialbodyfromnorthtosouthandeffectivelyslicesitintwo,likeIandYou,orearthandworld.Likeapoem,orlanguageitself,themeridianisanimaginarymarkerwecanusetoorientourselvesontheplanet,butnot justanyplanet,on theearth.Theearth isournative land,ourhereandeverywhere,theonlyplacethatwecanlive.AsLévinassaysof“Meridian,”“nativelandonthemeridian—whichistosay:aherewhichisalsotheeverywhere,awandering and expatriation, to the point of depaganisation. Is the earth habitableotherwise?”(1978,20).

Istheearthhabitableotherwise?Thisquestioncouldsuggesteitherthat theonlyway to inhabit the earth is through poetry, or languageas awandering, or thatweneed to search forways of inhabiting the earth otherwise, otherwise thanBeing orotherwise than being the self-same and autonomous origin of sovereignty. Whatwoulditmeantoinhabittheearthotherwisethansovereignly?Otherwisethanlordingoveritasthemastersofthetotalityofbeings?Orevenotherwisethantheshepherdsof being, tending it likea ram?Bothour possible interpretations leaveushomelesswanderersmaking ourway on the earth by enveloping it in variousworlds createdthroughthefabricoflanguage,notasasystemofmeaningsomuchasanaddresstothe other, an address that conjures addressability itself. “I cannot see any basicdifference between a handshake and poem,” writes Celan to Hans Bender (1986,26).Thepoembecomesawelcominggesturethat invitesresponse.Thepoemasaform of hospitality that both assumes and creates the possibility for response-ablecohabitation.Theearth isonlyhabitablewith theaddressabilityand response-abilityfrom/tootherswithwhomwecohabit, even thosewhodon’t (literally) readorwritepoetry. This habitability as cohabitability is not, however, unique to human beings.Animalstoorespondtoothersandtheenvironment,andwithouttheirresponse-abilityand the ability to address themselves, broadly speaking, to others, whether theirfellows,otherspecies,ortheirenvironment,theearthwouldnotbehabitable.Inotherwords, the earth is habitable only by virtue of sharedworlds, even if thoseworldsshift, change, and never completely coincide. Insofar as every living being leaves atrace,asDerridamightsay,andinsofarasmanyofthemlearntoreadthetracesofothers,inacertainsense,theytoodwellpoetically.Theytoolearntointerpretsigns,makesigns,andcreateworldsforthemselvesandothersontheearth.

ETHICSBEGINSWHERETHEWORLDENDS

It is telling that Derrida ends his analysis of Celan’s poem in “Rams UninterruptedDialogue—BetweenTwoInfinites,thePoem”withaturntoHeidegger’sthreethesesontheworldlessnessofthestone,thepovertyofworldoftheanimal,andtheworld-

building of the human, commenting that “nothing appears to me more problematicthan these theses” (2005b,163).Hegoeson toaskwhat, if theworld isgone, theFort-seinof theworld,exceedsanyandallof these threepossibilities.Hesuggeststhattheverythoughtoftheworldmustberethought“fromthisfort,andthisfortitselffromthe ‘ichmußdichtragen’” (163).Theworldmustbe thought fromtheabsenceof the world as it relates to our ethical obligations to others, that is to say, ourobligations face-to-face with others without the mediation of the world or anystabilizingapparatusesthattellushowtobehave.Wemustactasifwearecreatingtheworldanew,reinventingthewheel.And,yet, todosoethicallydemandsthatwedonotcreateaslordsormastersoftheworldortheearth,butrather,ascaretakerswhoacknowledgeourdependenceontheother.Howdowebeginthistask?Derridaanswers at the very end ofRams, “I would have begun by recalling howmuchweneedtheotherandhowmuchwewillstillneedhim,needtocarryhim,tobecarriedbyhim, therewherehespeaks, inusbeforeus…‘fornoonebears this lifealone’”(163).34Nomanisanisland.

The end of the world is the beginning of ethics. This is because, unlike moralcodesorlaws,rulesordoctrines,ethicsisnotintheworld.Rather,italwaysexceedsthe world. It is always a remainder left over after the world is gone. OnDerrida’sreadingoftheCelanfragment,ethicsfollowsfromtheabsenceoftheworld.Indeed,in“Rams,”Derridareadsthetwoclausesofthelastlineofthepoemasaconditionalphrase, if the world is gone, then I must carry you. But, he suggests that theconditional is reversible, if Imustcarryyou, then theworld isgone (158). In logicalterms, this reversibility of the conditional if-then signals the most binding kind ofrelationshipofnecessaryandsufficientcausality.Yet insofaras thesetermsarenotpresentedwithina logical argument, but rather inananalysisof apoem,andmoregenerally of the poetic as if,wemight interpret the force of the bind as the ethicalbindof ahyperbolic ethics.Theurgencyandvigilance requiredbyhyperbolic ethicsare signaled in this poetic as if there were no world, not even any earth. ThegroundlessImustcomesfromhere.Ethicsbeginswheretheworldends.

FollowingLévinas,Derridamaintains that theethicalobligationcomesbefore theegoorcogito.Hesays, “Before Iam, Icarry.Beforebeingme, Icarry theother. Icarryyouandmustdoso,Ioweittoyou”(162).Ononelevelwecouldsaythatoursenseofourselvesas individualscomes from theother. In termsofTheBeast andtheSovereign,theegoandcogitocomethroughtheprosthesisoftheworld,throughthosestabilizingstructures,mostespeciallysignification,throughtheBig-Oandlittle-oothersofmeaningandotherlivingbeings.Inasense,welearnwhoweareandentertheworldthroughtheseothers.Thisisjustastrueforothercreaturesasitisforus.Eachofuscomesintotheworldanew,bornforthefirst time,reinventingthewheel,sotospeak.

Contra a certain Heidegger, Derrida suggests that our Being-in-the-World asworld builders (Weltbildend) is not what is definitive of the uniqueness or solitaryfinitudeofDasein.Rather,itisourbeingworldlessinthefaceoftheotherthatbringsustotheworldasresponsiblefortheworldoftheotherinfrontoftheabsenceofthe

world. This is not Heidegger’s being-toward-death, which defines the finitude ofauthenticDasein.Rather,itisbeing-toward-the-death-of-the-other,whetherthisotheristheOtheroftheWorldanditsstabilizingapparatusesorthedeathofanotherlivingbeing. Indeed, the death of another living being, onewho is close, friend or family,whether human or beloved nonhuman, rents the world. Even the various traditions,religions, and rituals around death cannot translate or carry theweight of the loss,whichDerridainsistsisnotliketheendoftheworldbutistheendoftheworld.Withthelossofalovedonethereisnoworldlefttosupportsuchgrief,yetthereisstilltheresponsibilitytotheothertocarryhim/her/it,perhapsonlyinmemory.

Thisbeingtowardthedeathoftheother,however,isnotuniquetohumanbeingsalone.All livingbeingssurviveandaresurvivedbyothersclosetothem.And,asweknow,somenonhumanbeingsalsohaveelaborateritualsarounddeathandmourning;theyhavetheirownstabilizingapparatusestocopewiththeendof theworldthat isthedeathoftheother.35Forexample,itisnowwellknownthatelephantsmourntheirdeadwithelaborate rituals that goon for years: “Whenanelephant dies, its familymembers engage in intense mourning and burial rituals, conducting weeklong vigilsoverthebody,carefullycoveringitwithearthandbrush,revisitingthebonesforyearsafterward, caressing the bones with their trunks, often taking turns rubbing theirtrunksalongtheteethofaskull’s lower jaw, theway livingelephantsdo ingreeting”(Siebert2006,4;seealsoNichols2013).Inaddition,elephants“haveamemorythatfarsurpassesoursandspansa lifetime[seventyyears].Theygrievedeeply for lostloved ones, even shedding tears and suffering depression” (Sheldrick 2012). Lastyear, twoherdsofwildSouthAfricanelephantstraveledfor twelvehourstovisit thehouseofelephantconservationistLawrenceAnthonyuponhisdeath.Anthony’sfamilyhasnoideahowtheelephants,mostofwhomhesavedandthenreturnedtothewild,knewhe had died.But,within days of his death, two herds arrivedwithin a day ofeachother,both insingle fileas if ina funeralprocession,andstayedat thehouse,perhapsinvigil,fortwodaysbeforereturningtothebush.36

Elephantspossessmanyof thecharacteristics traditionally reserved forhumans,including memory, mirror self-recognition, self-awareness, emotions, attachment,social bonds, mourning, stress, trauma, communication, humor, and other complexbehaviors and social structures.37 Neuroscientists have established changes inelephants’ brains after trauma, and they have discovered that elephants have an“extremely largeandconvolutedhippocampusthat is responsible formediating long-term social memory” (Bradshaw and Shore 2007, 432; Siebert 2011). Bradshawreportsthatelephantsdisplaysymptomsofposttraumaticstressthatresemblethoseofhumans,especiallywhenasyoungsterstheywitnessthemassacreoftheirfamilies(Bradshaw2004;seealsoSiebert2011).

Studiesshowthatstructuresintheelephantbrainarestrikinglysimilartothoseinhumans.MRIscansofanelephant’sbrainsuggestalargehippocampus,thecomponentinthemammalianbrainlinkedtomemoryandanimportantpartofitslimbicsystem,whichisinvolvedinprocessingemotions.Theelephantbrain

has also been shown to possess an abundance of the specialized neuronsknown as spindle cells, which are thought to be associated with self-awareness, empathy, and social awareness in humans.Elephantshaveevenpassed themirror testof self-recognition, somethingonlyhumans,andsomegreatapesanddolphins,hadbeenknowntodo.

(SIEBERT2011,54)

Someofthesestudiessuggestthatelephantshaveevenbetterlong-termmemories,particularly socialmemories, thanhumans (cf.Sheldrick2012).Given their capacityformemoryandemotion,oneresearcherconcludes,“morethananyotherquality,theelephantisthoughtofashavingunderstandingofdeath.Grievingandmourningritualsare an integral part of elephant culture” (Bradshaw 2004, 147). Is it possible thatelephantsunderstanddeathbetter thanwedo?Perhaps it is they,andnotus,whohavearelationtodeathassuch?

Derrida’sanalysis inTheBeastandtheSovereignallowsforthispossibilityevenas itchallenges theHeideggeriancertainty thathumanbeingshaveaccess todeathassuch.Unsettlinganyconclusionsabouttheworldassuch,callingCelan’spoetryaswitness,Derrida repeats the litanyofanabsentworld, faraway,gone, that carrieswith itsveryabsence theethicalobligation toeachsingularother livingbeingasnotonly a world but also the world. Can we learn to share the earth with those withwhom we do not even share a world? Perhaps by taking up our singular ethicalresponsibility toevery livingcreatureasif to theworld itself—asif to theveryearthitself—wemayhopetolearntoinhabitandcohabittheearth.Perhapsifwetreatthedeathofeach livingbeingas theendofnot justaworld,butof theworld,wemayhopeforpeace,oratleasttheendofholocaust.Iftheabsenceoftheworldassuchgives rise to ethical obligations to the other, we may hope to move beyonddogmatismand fundamentalismand towardswhatwemightcallpoetic toleranceofdifferentworlds.Ifpoeticsovereignty,orthepowerofinterpretation,replacespoliticalsovereignty,orthepowerofthewill,perhapswemightbegintogiveupourillusionsofmastery and start to appreciate poetry in the codes, rituals, and tracks of eachsingular livingbeing.Forthepowerof interpretationisbasedonanacknowledgmentthateveryinterpretationisprovisionalbecausemeaningisfluidandcomesintobeingonlythroughrelationships,inthespaceandtimebetweensingularbeings,andevokesthemiracleofcommunicationbetweenislandsoracrossworlds.

What happens when we return our gaze from the “vast, glowing vault with theswarmofblackstarspushingthemselvesoutandaway”andbacktowardtheEarth,whichfromthatvantagepointlookssosingularlybeautifulandyetsoincrediblysmall?Evenif“theworld isgone,” theEarthremains.Thuswecanfoundtheethical importof“Imustcarryyou”onthegroundlessgroundoftheearth,insofarasitremainsourone and only home. In the whole of that vast, glowing vault, the Earth is the onlyplanetthatsustainsusandeverylivingbeingthatwehaveheretoforeencountered.Ifthesingularityofeachlivingbeingobligatesustorespondtoitinawaythatopensupratherthanclosesoffitsworldanditsabilitytorespond,thencertainlythesingularity

ofourplanetobligatesustorespondtoit inawaythatopensratherthanclosesoffresponse. Indeed,oursingularbondto theearthandtootherearthlingsmaybethegroundlessgroundofethicsthatnotonlymovesbeyondmoralityandpoliticsbutalsonourishes them insofar as they offer us principleswithwhich to share the earth ashomeandacknowledgethatwebelongtotheearth,alongwitheveryotherearthling.Perhaps the threat of disappearing worlds, whether human or nonhuman—a threatthat is increasingexponentiallybecauseofman-madepollution—canreturnustotheEarthandanearthboundethicsbymakingusrealize thateven ifwedonotshareaworld,wedoshareaplanet.