the sustainability of health spending growth glenn follette louise sheiner federal reserve board
TRANSCRIPT
The Sustainability of Health Spending Growth
Glenn Follette Louise Sheiner
Federal Reserve Board
Historically, spending growth on health has exceeded that of consumption
Health Spending As a Share of Consumption
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Perc
en
t
Health Spending Projections
• Since 1970, per capita health spending has grown an average of 2-1/2 percentage points faster than per capita GDP.
• Obviously, health spending cannot continue to grow faster than consumption (or GDP) forever.
• Until 2001, Medicare Trustees assumed per capita health care spending growth would slow to the rate of per capita GDP growth.
• Since 2001, Trustees have assumed that per capita health care spending growth would slow to a rate 1 percentage point faster than per capita GDP. This has been called the assumption of 1 percentage point excess cost growth.
Sustainability of Excess Cost Growth from a Macroeconomic Perspective
• Any rate of excess cost growth will eventually crowd out all of GDP and will be unsustainable.
• One rationale for the Trustees’ assumptions for the next 75 years is that, even with such cost growth, real per capita non-health consumption continues to grow, although slower than per capita GDP. No absolute crowd-out of non-health consumption.
• Note that what matters for real crowd-out is the share of health spending in consumption:– In particular, crowd-out occurs when the share of health
spending in consumption is equal to the ratio of the growth rate of income divided by the growth rate of health spending.
1 percent excess cost growth and 1.5 percent per capita GDP growth, crowd-out starts to occur when health
spending reaches 60% of consumption
Excess Growth = 1.0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
year
Th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f 2
00
0 $
PCE health other
Health Share--excess growth =1.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
With 1.5 percent excess cost growth, crowd-out starts when health spending reaches 50% of consumption.
Health share--excess growth =1.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
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80
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100
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
Excess Growth = 1.5
0
20
40
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120
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
year
Th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f 2
00
0 $
PCE health other
With 2.0 percent excess cost growth, crowd-out begins at 43% of consumption.
Health Share--excess growth =2.0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
Excess Growth = 2.0
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100
year
Th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f 2
00
0 $
PCE health other
Crowding out criteria suggests 1 percent excess growth is upper bound over the
century
• Under baseline macroeconomic projections, health spending reaches 40% of consumption by 2080; just getting close to real crowd-out.
• With 1.5 percent excess cost growth, health spending would reach 67% of consumption – crowd-out has begun.
• With 2 percent excess cost growth, health spending would reach 93% of consumption – non-health consumption is declining rapidly.
Sustainability of Excess Cost Growth from a
More Microeconomic Perspective • On average, real consumption continues to grow even
with 1 percent excess cost growth. But, is this true across groups? – Low-income might already spend a larger share of income on
health spending, which would lead to earlier crowd out.– Elderly or others with high medical expenses might also already
have larger share of income on health spending.
• Projection of 1 percent excess cost growth assumes that only force driving health care cost growth in future will be exogenous technological growth.– Implicitly assumes that insurance markets and public sector
involvement in health care remain stable. Is this reasonable? Or will increases in health spending itself engender changes in public and private insurance?
Health Spending by Income QuintileNonelderly
0
1000
2000
3000
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Pe
r c
ap
ita
, 20
04
$ Lowest
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Highest
Elderly
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Per
cap
ita,
200
4 $ Lowest
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Highest
Health Spending as a Share of Income
Elderly
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
150%
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Lowest
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Highest
Nonelderly
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Lowest
Quintile 2
Quintile 3
Quintile 4
Highest
Private health spending as a share of income has been relatively flat
Non-elderly
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1 2 3 4 5
Quintlie
Per
cen
t o
f in
com
e
1970
1977
1987
1996
2002
Elderly
0%5%
10%15%20%25%30%35%
1 2 3 4 5
Quintle
Per
cen
t o
f in
com
e
1970
1977
1987
1996
2002
Share of Health Paid by Public Sector
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1970 2002 1970 2002
ElderlyNonelderly
1
2
3
4
5
Simulations
• We took 2002 data of the distribution of income and public and private health spending for elderly and non-elderly
• We projected them forward to 2080 using 1 percent excess growth, maintaining 2002 public share of health spending adjusted for Medicare drug benefit
Simulation Results
• Under 1 percent excess cost growth assumption, private shares of spending increase over time, but most quintiles do not reach the point where private health spending is 60% of income and starts to crowd out other consumption.– This is because the public share of health spending is
very high, particularly for elderly. • Note that, even under these conditions, many individuals
will face real crowd-out, because we don’t have perfect insurance (i.e., private health spending will still rise if you get sick).
Health Care Spending as a Share of Income
Total Private
2002 2080 2002 2080
Non-elderly
1 46 131 16 44
2 18 51 12 34
3 11 33 10 27
4 8 23 7 20
5 5 13 4 12
Elderly
1 132 377 33 89
2 67 191 21 46
3 40 113 16 36
4 25 72 11 25
5 12 35 5 12
Caveats
– Note that this exercise does not take into account the taxes necessary to finance the large rise in public health spending built into the baseline.
• If these taxes were to be levied predominantly on top 2 or 3 quintiles, then health spending might still not crowd out other spending.
• But if these taxes were more evenly distributed, then lower-income groups would likely face real crowd out (since increased taxes would crowd out non-health spending).
History of Public Response
• History indicates that there will be more pressure on public spending than this. Public spending tends to increase as health spending burden increases. – One reasonable view of recent history is that public
spending increases to keep private spending constant as a share of income.
– Another approach is to examine the relationship between the public share of spending and the total burden on health spending.
Private share of income stays relatively constant while public role grows
Health Spending Share of Income Lowest Quintile, Nonelderly
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Total Private Public
Health Spending Share of Income Lowest Quintile, Elderly
0%
50%
100%
150%
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Total Private Public
Public share is larger when health spending is a higher share of income
Public Health Spending Responsiveness, Non-elderly
0
10
20
30
40
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60
70
0 10 20 30 40 50
Total Health Spending as a Share of Income, by Quintiles over Time
Pu
bli
c S
har
e o
f H
ealt
h S
pen
din
g
Public Health Spending Responsiveness, Elderly
20
30
40
50
60
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80
90
0 50 100 150
Total Health Spending as a Share of Income, by Quintiles over Time
Pu
bli
c S
har
e o
f H
ealt
h S
pen
din
g
Simulation: Public Share Rises Above Baseline
• To get an idea of the potential costs were this trend to continue, we simulate two alternatives:– Alternative A: We raise public spending to keep private spending
for elderly and non-elderly constant at 2002 level.– Alternative B: We estimate public spending via a regression
analysis of past trends.
• Chart shows the additional government spending necessary for these alternatives. – Alternative A: By 2030 and thereafter, public health spending
would be 50 percent higher than baseline.
• Alternative B: By 2030, public health spending would be 16 percent higher than baseline; by 2080: it would be 30 percent above baseline.
Alternative Projections for Medicare and Medicaid Spending
0
5
10
15
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25
30
2005 2030 2055 2080
Per
cen
t o
f G
DP
Baseline Constant share Regression
Structure of Insurance • One striking fact is that the share of out-of-pocket spending as a share of
income has been very flat over time.
• This has been accomplished by a significant decline in the share of health spending that is financed through out-of-pocket payments.
• A lower out-of-pocket share of health spending might be a reasonable response to increasing health costs: A constant share might make health care unaffordable and/or provide too little insurance.
– Implicit baseline assumptions: out-of-pocket payments constant share of health spending.
– Alternative assumption: out-of-pocket shares continue to decline over time. Under this assumption, out-of-pocket spending as a share of health spending is halved by 2050, and about 40 percent by 2080.
• Assuming price elasticity of health spending is .2, alternative assumption would raise spending by 3% in 2030, 9% in 2050, and 12% in 2080.
• This increase in health spending would raise public spending by the same percentages.
Out-of-pocket expenses have been stable as a share of income, except among poor elderly
(Medicare drug benefit will help reverse this)Non-elderly
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
1 2 3 4 5
Income Quintile
1970
1977
1987
1996
2002
Elderly
0%2%4%6%8%
10%12%14%16%18%20%
1 2 3 4 5
Income Quintile
1970
1977
1987
1996
2002
Out-of-pocket share of health spending has declined
Out-of-Pocket Shares of Health Spending, Elderly
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Year
Lowest Quintile 2 Quintile 3
Quintile 4 Highest
Out-of-Pocket Shares of Health Spending, Non-elderly
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
1970 1977 1987 1996 2002
Year
Lowest Quintile 2 Quintile 3
Quintile 4 Highest
Conclusions
• From a macroeconomic perspective, 1 percent excess cost growth is feasible although difficult.
• From a microeconomic perspective, 1 percent seems more problematic.– Because public share of spending is so large, most income
groups will not face crowd out non-health consumption.– However, federal health spending, already difficult to sustain in
baseline, will likely face additional demands.– Also, higher health costs will likely raise demands for more
complete insurance, giving rise to further health spending pressures (or making it even harder to achieve 1 percent).