the role of authority

volume11,no.7 march2011

The Role of Authority

Scott HershovitzUniversity of Michigan Law School

© 2011 ScottHershovitz <www.philosophersimprint.org/011007/>

T he most influential account of authority—Joseph Raz’sserviceconception—isanaccountoftheroleofauthority.Mostphilosophersholdthatauthority(ofthepracticalsort)consists

inarighttorule,suchthatsubjectsareobligatedtoobey.1Buttheydis-agreeoverwhatittakesforapersontoqualifyasanauthorityinthatsense.Raz’sansweriscapturedinthenormal justification thesis,whichsaysthatapersonhasauthorityoveranotherifherorderswouldhelpthatpersonconformbetter to reason’s requirements thansheother-wisewould.Healsoarguesforthedependence thesis,theviewthatanauthority’sordersshouldbebasedonreasonsthatindependentlyap-plytothosesubjecttothem.OnRaz’saccount,authoritiesprovideaservice:Theyhelpsubjectsconformtoreason.Thatistheirrole,theirjob,theirpoint.2

Ormaybenot.Theserviceconceptionisunderattack.Oneincreas-inglycommonobjectionisthatthenormaljustificationthesisfailstocapture the conditions of political authority. Though this objectionmighttakemanyforms,onewaytoputitisthatthecapacitytohelpsubjects conform to reason does not ground political authority be-causepoliticalauthoritieshaveotherrolestoplay.Anotherprominentobjectionposesamorefundamentalchallengetothenormaljustifica-tionthesis.StephenDarwallarguesthatthefactthatapersonwouldconformbettertoreason’srequirementsbyfollowinganother’sorderscannot establish the second person’s authority because it is insuffi-cienttogroundeitherarighttoruleoranobligationtoobey.

I ampersuaded thatbothobjectionsare sound.Raz iswrong tothinkthattheroleofauthorityistohelpsubjectsconformtoreason,andheiswrongtothinkthataclaimtoauthoritycanbejustifiedbyan

1. JosephRaz, “AuthorityandJustification”, inAuthority,ed. JosephRaz(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,1990),115–141.RobertLadensonisthemostprominentdissenter;hearguesthatpoliticalauthorityconsistsinarighttorule,buthedeniesthatsubjectsareunderanobligationtoobey.Seehis“InDefenseofaHobbesianConceptionofLaw”,inRaz,Authority,32–55.

2. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 56 (“[Thenormaljustificationthesisandthedependencethesis]articulatetheserviceconceptionofthefunctionofauthorities,thatis,theviewthattheirroleandprimarynormalfunctionistoservethegoverned.”).

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true,authorityandreasonarenotincompatible:onemustactonthebalanceofnon-excludedreasons,andanauthoritativeorderdoesnotrequireotherwise.

The preemption thesis tells uswhat an authoritative order does,butitdoesnottelluswhichclaimstoauthorityarelegitimate(or,ifyouprefer,whichauthoritiesare legitimate).That is, itdoesnot telluswhoseordershavethepowertopreempt.Razanswersthatques-tionwiththenormaljustificationthesis:“Thenormalandprimarywaytoestablishthatapersonshouldbeacknowledgedtohaveauthorityoveranotherpersoninvolvesshowingthattheallegedsubjectislikelybetterto[conform]withreasonswhichapplytohim(otherthantheallegedauthoritativedirectives)ifheacceptsthedirectivesoftheal-leged authority as authoritatively binding, and tries to follow them,thanifhetriestofollowthereasonswhichapplytohimdirectly.”6Thatisamouthful,buttheideaissimple:aclaimtoauthorityislegitimateifthesubjectwouldbetterconformtoreasonbyfollowingtheallegedauthority’s orders than by deciding what to do on her own. Therearemanywaysanauthoritymighthelpasubjectconformtoreason.Among themore important tools in an authority’s kit are expertise,freedomfrombias,andanabilitytosolvecoordinationproblems.7

One final thesis rounds out the service conception. The normaljustificationthesistellsusthatthelegitimacyofanauthorityrestsonits ability to help subjects conform better to reason’s requirementsthantheyotherwisewould.Itishardtoseehowanauthoritywouldachievethataimwithout taking intoaccount thereasonsthatapplytoitssubjects.Thus,Raz’sdependencethesis:“Allauthoritativedirec-tivesshouldbebased,amongotherfactors,onreasonswhichapplytosubjectsof thosedirectivesandwhichbearonthecircumstances

(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1994),214.

6. Ibid.ForreasonsexplainedinScottHershovitz,“Legitimacy,Democracy,andRazianAuthority”,Legal Theory 9 (2003): 201–220, 206, I have substituted‘conform’whereRazoriginallyhad‘comply’.

7. Thesearethefirst,second,andfifthentriesonRaz’slistof“commonreasonscapableofestablishing the legitimacyofanauthority”.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,75.

abilitytodischargethatrole.IfIamright,westandinneedofanewaccountofauthority.Inthesecondhalfofthispaper,Imakeaprelimi-naryattempttosketchone.Thekeymoveistodirectourattentiontorolesthatpeopleplay,ratherthanrolesthatauthorityplays.Thatmaysoundmysterious,butIshallleaveitsofornow.Beforewedevelopanewaccountofauthority,wemustputRaz’storest.

I. The Service Conception of Authority

To understand the service conception, it helps to start where Razdid—withapurportedparadoxaboutthecompatibilityofreasonandauthority.Razputstheproblemthisway:

Tobesubjectedtoauthority,itisargued,isincompatiblewithreason,forreasonrequiresthatoneshouldalwaysactonthebalanceofreasonsofwhichoneisaware.Itisofthenatureofauthoritythatitrequiressubmissionevenwhenonethinksthatwhatisrequiredisagainstreason.Therefore,submissiontoauthorityisirrational.3

In responding to thisallegedparadox,Razobserves thatone isnotnecessarilyrequiredtoactonthebalanceofallthereasonsofwhichoneisaware.Thisisbecausesomereasonsexcludeothersaspropergroundsforaction.Authoritativeorders,Razargues,arecompound;theyarebothfirst-orderreasonstoactastheorderrequiresandsec-ond-orderexclusionaryreasonsnottoacton(atleastsome)counter-vailingconsiderations.4Razcapturestheexclusionaryeffectofauthor-itativeorders inhispreemption thesis: “The fact thananauthority re-quiresperformanceofanactionisareasonforitsperformancewhichisnottobeaddedtoallotherrelevantreasonswhendecidingwhattodo,butshouldreplacesomeofthem.”5Ifthepreemptionthesisis

3. JosephRaz,The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality(Oxford:Claren-donPress,1979),3.Anotherparadoxhasitthatauthorityisincompatiblewithautonomy.Razoffersessentiallythesameanswertoboth.

4. Ibid.,21–27.

5. JosephRaz,Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics



lives.13Thosevaluesaresoimportant,Isuggested,thatwehavereasontopreferdemocracyevenifdecisionstakenbyothermeansmightbesuperior.14

This isnot theplace to rehash thosearguments.15Whether I amrightaboutdemocracyornot,thenormaljustificationthesisisblindtothepossibilitythatanauthority’slegitimacymaydependasmuchonhowitmakesdecisionsasonwhatthosedecisionsare.Inapplyingthethesis,oneaskswhethersubjectswillbetterconformtoreasonbyfol-lowinganauthority’sdirectives;onedoesnotinquireintotheprocessthatshapestheauthority’sorders.Yetwhenwedebatethelegitimacyofapoliticalauthority,wespendalotoftimediscussingproceduralmatters:eligibilitytovote,qualificationsforoffice,campaignfinance,transparencyofdecision-making,andsoon.Perhapstheseconversa-tionsaremisguided.That,however,isasubstantivequestionofpoliti-calmorality.Ourtheoryofauthorityshouldnotruleoutthepossibil-itythatlegitimacydependsonprocess,inadditionto(orinsteadof)substance.Thisistheproceduralist objectiontothenormaljustificationthesis.16

Thoughitisnotalwayspresentedthisway,theproceduralistobjec-tionchallengesthefundamentalclaimoftheserviceconception—thatthe roleof authority is tohelp subjects conform to reason.Political

13. SeeScott J.Shapiro, “Authority”, inThe Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law,eds.JulesColemanandScottShapiro(Oxford:OxfordUni-versityPress,2002),382–439,437–438.

14. OfcourseIhavemuchcompanyhere.Arnesonprovidesahelpfulguidetosucharguments.Seehis“DemocracyisNotIntrinsicallyJust”,41–42,andthesourcescitedintheaccompanyingnotes.

15. Foraskepticallookatargumentslikethese,seeibid.,48–58.

16. Forotherversionsoftheproceduralistobjection,seeSamanthaBesson,“De-mocracy, Law andAuthority”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2005): 89–99;ThomasChristiano,“TheAuthorityofDemocracy”,Journal of Political Philoso-phy12(2004):266–290;JeremyWaldron,“AuthorityforOfficials”, inRights, Culture, and the Law: Themes From the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, eds.LukasH.Meyeretal. (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),45–70,63–66;andShapiro,“Authority”,431–39.Forarelatedargument,seeAndreiMarmor,“Authority,Equality,andDemocracy”, Ratio Juris 18 (2005): 315–345,esp.317–18,342–44.

coveredby thedirectives.”8 Taken together, thenormal justificationthesisandthedependencethesisarticulateavisionoftheroleofau-thority:anauthorityconsiders thereasons thatapply to itssubjectsandissuesordersthathelpthemconformbettertothosereasonsthantheycouldontheirown.9

II. The Proceduralist Objection

Razpresentsthenormaljustificationthesisasatestforthelegitimacyofanauthorityofanysort.Itcanbeusedtojudgeadoctor’sauthorityoveranurse,aconductor’sauthorityoverplayersinherorchestra,andthestate’sauthorityoveritscitizens.ThegeneralityofRaz’saccountisattractive,butitmaybeaviceasmuchasavirtue.Considerthis:manythinkthatdemocracieshavespecialclaimsontheallegianceoftheircitizens,yettheserviceconceptiondoesnotadmitsuchanargument.Tobe counted legitimateby thenormal justification thesis, ademo-craticauthority,likeanyother,mustissuedirectivesthathelpsubjectsconformtoreason.Democracies,onRaz’sview,havealeguponotherpoliticalarrangementsonlytotheextenttheyproducebetterresults.10

Wemight think,however, thatwell-constructeddemocraciescanclaimlegitimacyonothergrounds.Inanearlieressay,Iarguedthatinapoliticalcommunity,makingdecisionstogetherisoftenmoreimpor-tantthangettingthemright.11Resolvingconflictthroughdemocraticprocedures expresses and respects our “status as political equals”12 aswellasourshared interest inautonomouslycontrollingourown

8. Raz,Ethics in the Public Domain, 214.Razargues for thedependence thesisindependentlyofthenormaljustificationthesisandpreemptionthesis,butIfinditmorenaturaltothinkofitasfollowingfromthem.

9. SeeRaz,The Morality of Freedom,55–56.

10. Razhasgoodcompanyhere.See,e. g.,RichardArneson,“DemocracyisNotIntrinsically Just”, in Justice and Democracy, eds.KeithDowdingetal. (Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),40–58.

11. Hershovitz,“Legitimacy,Democracy,andRazianAuthority”,216–219.

12. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,Democracy and Disagreement (Cam-bridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1996),18.



authority’s legitimacy should not be “judged exclusively, or maybeevenprimarily,by itsoutput,butratherby its input.”23Moreover,wecanthinkthatprocedurematterswithoutdenyingthatademocraticregimewhichgovernspoorlylackslegitimacy.Indeed,therearestrongreasons to think thatanadequate test for the legitimacyofpoliticalauthoritywilltakeintoaccountmattersofprocedureandsubstance.24

Raz’s second response to the proceduralist objection ismore in-triguing.Itsproponents,hesays,“underestimate”theserviceconcep-tion’s “suppleness”.25 Democratic governments, he declares, may infact“enjoysomequalifiedorlimitedauthority…becauseoftheirabil-itytogiveexpressiontopeople’sstandingasfreeautonomousagents,or[becauseof]whateverothervaluestheyserve.”26Atfirstglance,itis difficult to seewhat Raz couldmean, as the normal justificationthesisassessestheinstrumentalvalueofanauthority’sdirectives,nottheproceduresthatgiverisetothem.ThekeytounderstandingRaz’sclaimliesintwoexamplesheoffers.“Somepeoplebelieve,”hesays,“thatonehasadutytoobeyanyonewhoiselectedbyamajority…Ifthatissoitsimplyshowsthattheconditionsoftheserviceconceptionaremetregardinganyonewhoissoelected.”27Likewise,ifmembersofacertaingrouphaveadutyarisingfromhistoricalcircumstancestoobeyaparticularinstitution,Razclaims,thenormaljustificationthesisissatisfiedbecause“[b]yobeyingthat…institution,oneisdischarg-ingthatduty.”28

WecangeneralizethepointbehindRaz’sexamplesasfollows:Ifonehasadutytoobeyanauthority,theauthoritysatisfiesthenormaljustificationthesisbecauseobediencehelpsonetoconformbettertothereasonsonehas(whichex hypothesimandateobedience)thanone

23. Shapiro,“Authority”,434.

24. SeeChristiano,“TheAuthorityofDemocracy”.

25. Raz,“TheProblemofAuthority:RevisitingtheServiceConception”,1030.

26. Ibid.,1031n.20.

27. Ibid.,1031.

28. Ibid.,1030.

authorities, a proceduralist might say, have a different role to play.TheyrespondtowhatJeremyWaldronhascalledthecircumstances of politics —“thefeltneedamongthemembersofacertaingroupforacommonframeworkordecisionorcourseofactiononsomematter,eveninthefaceofdisagreementaboutwhatthatframework,decisionoractionshouldbe.”17Theroleofapoliticalauthority,onthisview,istoarbitratedisputesamongsubjectsfairly,inwaysthatrespecttheirautonomyandfundamentalequality.18Itwouldbewonderfulif,inthecourseofdoingso,politicalauthoritiesalsohelpedsubjectsconformtoreason,butthatisnottheirprimarypurpose,andtheirlegitimacydoesnotdependontheirdoingso.Apoliticalauthoritymaybelegiti-mateevenifitfailstoplaytheroleRaz’saccountenvisions,anditmaylacklegitimacynotwithstandingthefactthatitplaysitwell.19

Razhasrecentlyofferedtworesponsestotheproceduralistobjec-tion.First,hesays,“[i]tis…noaccident”thathis“accountofauthoritymakesnospecialreferencetodemocraticauthority.”20Thisisbecauseheconsidersit“ofvitalimportancethatwe…notfallpreyto…demo-craticrhetoric,andmaintainaclear-sightedandcriticalperspectiveonthenatureofdemocraticinstitutions.”21Wemust,Razsays,“acknowl-edgethepossibilitythatwhatpassfordemocraticregimescouldcom-pletelylacklegitimacy.”22

OfcourseRazisright.Anynewspaperreaderknowsthatelectionsdonotguaranteegoodgovernment; far from it.Butwecan sustaina clear-sightedviewof real-worlddemocracieswithout abandoningtheproceduralist thought,wellputbyScottShapiro, thatapolitical

17. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999),102.

18. SeeShapiro,“Authority”,432–433.

19. Whichistosay,satisfactionofthenormaljustificationmaybeneitherneces-sarynorsufficientforlegitimateauthority.

20.SeeJosephRaz,“TheProblemofAuthority:RevisitingtheServiceConcep-tion”, Minnesota Law Review90(2003):1003–1044,1031.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.



conformbettertoreasonbyfollowingordersisaconsequenceoftheauthority’slegitimacy,notthegroundofit.Ofcoursepeoplewhoareunderaduty tocomplywith thedirectivesofanauthoritywill con-formbettertoreasonbydoingsothanbynot.Thequestioniswhatcouldmakeitthecasethatpeopleareundersuchaduty.Thenormaljustificationthesis,asRaznowconstruesit,provideslittleguidance.31

PerhapsRaziswillingtoacceptapyrrhicvictoryovertheprocedur-alistobjection.Remember thatheconceivedtheserviceconceptionpartlyinresponsetotheclaimthatauthorityandreasonareincompat-ible.Notso,saidRaz,becausesometimesreasondemandsthatoneobeyanauthority, rather thanacton thebalanceof all the reasonsofwhichoneisaware.Whetherreasondemandsobediencetoanau-thorityinvirtueofitsinputsoroutputs,thefactthatreasondemandsobedienceshowsthatreasonandauthorityarecompatible.Thatisallthatisnecessarytorefutetheparadoxofauthority,andperhapsthatisallthatRazwantshisaccounttodo.

IfRazwantsustoreadthenormal justificationthesis tosaythatoneoughttoobeyanauthoritywheneverreasondemandsthatonedoso,Iseenopossibleobjection.ButIalsodonotseethetheoreticalappeal.Iaminclinedtostickwiththenarrowerreadingofthenormaljustificationthesis,whichkeysanauthority’s legitimacyto itsabilitytohelpsubjectsconformtoreasonsthatbearonthematterathand.32

31. Whenthethesisissatisfieddirectly,ratherthanderivativelybythesatisfac-tionofsomeothertestforlegitimacy,itmaydosomeexplanatorywork.Inthosecases(i. e.,theonesthatsatisfythenarrowerreadingofthethesis),theauthority’slegitimacyisstraightforwardlyaconsequenceofitsabilitytohelpsubjectsconformto reason.That iswhy I say that thenormal justificationthesis,asRaznowconstruesit,isnearlyempty,ratherthanwhollyso.DavidEnochhelpfullypressedmeonthispoint.

32. Inconversation,severalpeoplehaveproposedthatRazhasnotrevisedhisunderstandingof thenormal justificationthesis—thathisnewgloss is thesameastheold.Ifindthatsuggestionbaffling.Thenormaljustificationthesisissocalledbecause,accordingtoRaz,itarticulatesthe“normalandprimary”wayofjustifyingauthority,andRazhaslongmarkedsomejustificationsasdeviant.SeeThe Morality of Freedom,56.Yet,onRaz’snewreading, thenor-maljustificationthesisissatisfiedbyanyjustificationforauthority.Thus,itisnolongerpossibletodistinguishbetweenauthoritiesjustifiedondeviantgroundsandthosethatsatisfythenormaljustificationthesis.Inotherwords,

otherwisewould.On this understandingof thenormal justificationthesis, the proceduralist objection loses its force. If people are obli-gated toobey thedirectivesofwell constituteddemocraticpoliticalauthorities(astheproceduralistcontends),thentheywillbettercon-formtothereasonstheyhave(whichex hypothesimandateobedience)byfollowingtheauthority’sdirectivesthanbygoingitalone.

But notice this: Raz’s new approach blunts the proceduralist ob-jectiononlyattheexpenseofmakingthenormaljustificationthesisnearlyempty.Todecidewhetherthethesisissatisfied,itisnolongerenough to determine whether compliance with authoritative direc-tiveswillallowasubjecttoconformbettertothereasonsshehason the matter the directive regards.Wecannolongerdecidewhether,forex-ample,financialregulationsareauthoritativebyaskingifbankswouldconformbettertowhatreasonrequiresofthemintheirfinancialac-tivities by following the regulations than by governing their affairsontheirown.Wemustalsoconsider,inthiscaseandineveryother,whetherafurthercriterionoflegitimacy(notspecifiedbythenormaljustification thesis)gives rise toaduty for thesubject tocomply, ir-respectiveof the instrumentalvalueof theauthority’sdirectives.Sounderstood,thenormaljustificationthesisceasestobeacompetitorwithothertheoriesoflegitimacy;instead,itsubsumesanytheoryoflegitimacythatturnsouttobetrue.29

Thebestthatcanbesaidofthenormaljustificationthesis,onthisview,isthatitreportsaverygeneraltruthaboutlegitimateauthorities(i. e.,subjectswilldobetterwithrespecttoreasonbyconformingtotheirdirectives).However,Razhasgranderambitions for thethesisthanthat.Hepresentsitasananswertothequestion“Howcaniteverbethatonepersonhasadutytosubjectone’swillandjudgmenttothoseofanother?”30Butthenormaljustificationthesishardlyanswersthatquestionifitcanbesatisfiedsimplybecauseanauthoritypassessomeother test for legitimacy. In those cases, the fact that subjects

29.ForanotherversionofthisobjectiontoRaz’snewview,seeHershovitz,“Le-gitimacy,Democracy,andRazianAuthority”,219–220.

30.Raz,“TheProblemofAuthority:RevisitingtheServiceConception”,1012.



III. Darwall’s Objection

Theproceduralist objection says that political authoritiesmayhaverolestoplaybeyondhelpingsubjectsconformtoreason.Butevenifthatistrue,itseemsequallytruethathelpingpeopletodowhatrea-sonrequiresisagoodroleforanauthoritytoplay.Thus,onemightthinkthatwhennootherroletakespriority,authoritymaybeground-edinanabilitytohelpsubjectsconformtoreason.Butitturnsoutthatis wrong. StephenDarwall has developed an objection to Raz’s ac-countofauthoritythatposesamorefundamentalchallengethantheproceduralistobjection.Satisfactionofthenormaljustificationthesis,Darwallargues,doesnotestablishauthorityunderanycircumstance,becauseitisinsufficienttogroundarighttoruleoranobligationtoobey.

Darwalldistinguishesthreetheses:I. IfBwoulddobetter in complyingwith indepen-

dently existing reasonswere B to treatA’s direc-tivesaspre-emptivereasons,thenBhassufficientreasonsototreatA’sdirectives.

II. IfBwoulddobetter in complyingwith indepen-dently existing reasonswere B to treatA’s direc-tives as pre-emptive reasons, thenA’s directivesactuallyaresuchpre-emptivereasonsforB.

III. IfBwoulddobetter in complyingwith indepen-dently existing reasonswere B to treatA’s direc-tivesaspre-emptivereasons,thenAhasauthoritywithrespecttoB.34

Forpurposesofargument,Darwallstipulatesthatthefirstandsecondthesesaretrue.ButDarwallsaysthethirdthesis,whichisessentiallythenormaljustificationthesis,isfalse.DarwalldrawsononeofRaz’sexamplestomakehiscase.

34. StephenDarwall,“Authorityandsecond-personalreasonsforacting”,inRea-sonsforAction,eds.DavidSobelandStevenWall(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),150.

Thatreadingleavestheserviceconceptionsubjecttotheprocedural-istobjection.Butasweshallseelaterthenormaljustificationthesis,readnarrowly,mayplayapartinanewaccountofauthoritythatisnotsubjecttothatobjection.

Beforewemoveon,itisworthpausingtoconsidertheimpacttheproceduralistobjectionhasonthedependencethesis.Thatthesis,youwillrecall,holdsthatanauthorityshouldbaseitsdecisionsatleastinpartonreasonsthatindependentlyapplytosubjectsandbearonthematterathand.Aswesawearlier,thatmakessenseifanauthority’sroleistohelpsubjectsconformtothosereasons.Butif,astheprocedural-istcontends,someauthoritieshaveotherrolestoplay,theargumentin favorof thedependencethesis loses its force,at leastas to them.Moreover,Raz’sattempttosavethenormaljustificationthesishangsthedependence thesisout todry.Raznowallows thatanauthoritymaybe legitimate for reasonswhollyunrelated to itsability tohelpsubjectsconformtoreasononthemattersitsdirectiveregard.Thatal-lowanceunderminesthebestcaseforthedependencethesis—thatanauthority’s legitimacyturnsonhelpingsubjectsconformto“reasons…whichbearonthecircumstancescoveredby[its]directives”.33AsIsaid,thenormaljustificationthesismayplayapartinanaccountofauthoritythatavoidstheproceduralistobjection,andthedependencethesismighttoo.Beforewegetthere,however,anotherobjectiontotheserviceconceptionwarrantsourattention.

there isno reason to call it thenormal justification thesis.Moreover,Raz’sindependencecondition—whichdenieslegitimacytoanauthoritythatsatis-fiesthenormaljustificationthesisifitismoreimportantthatasubjectmakeadecisionforherselfthanmakeitwell—isonlynecessaryifoneunderstandsthenormaljustificationthesistobekeyedtoreasonsthatbearonthesubjectofthedecision.Ifonetakesthewiderviewandtreatsthethesisasencom-passingreasonsabouthowtomakedecisions,theindependenceconditionis superfluous, as thenormal justification thesis is never satisfiedwhen itwouldbetriggered.Ontheindependencecondition,seeRaz,“TheProblemofAuthority:RevisitingtheServiceConception”,1014–1016.

33. Raz,Ethics in the Public Domain,214.



Inadraftpaper,RazhasmadeastunningconcessiontoDarwall’sargument:“[N]olegitimateauthority,”hesays,“canbebasedonsupe-riorknowledgealone.”39RazappearstohavebeenpersuadedonthisscorebyanotherexampleDarwalldeploys.Darwallimaginesthathehasreasontoprovideforhisretirementandthathewilldosobestbyfollowingthedirectivesofafinancialexpert.Hereagain,itseemsthatDarwallhasreasontotreatthefinancialexpertasifshehasauthorityoverhim,butitdoesnotappearshehasrighttorule,orDarwallanobligation toobey.Razconcedes that there isnogenuineauthorityhere,butthereasonhegivesissurprising.Razarguesthatauthorityislackingbecausethenormaljustificationthesisisnotsatisfied.OncethefinancialexperttellsDarwallwhatheoughttodo,Razobserves,Darwallknowsjustaswellasshedoeshowheoughttoinvest.ThusDarwallwillnotdobetterbyfollowingherdirectivesthanbydecidingonhisown,ashecantakeaccountofherexpertopinion.40

ThoughRaznolongerdefendstheclaimthatsuperiorknowledgegrounds authority, hedoes endeavor todefendhis accountwith re-specttoaclassofcaseshesaysdosatisfythenormaljustificationthe-sis—thosewhereknowing“thatthisorthatisthebetterthingtodois[not]independentofinstructingpeopletodothisorthat.”41Razhasinmindinstancesinwhich“whatmakestheactionbestisitsroleinaco-ordinationscheme,andtheco-ordinationschemeistheonetofollowbecauseit istheonetheauthorityinstructedpeopletofollow.”42 If IunderstandRazcorrectly,hisnewviewisthatthenormaljustification

39. JosephRaz, “ThePossibilityofPartiality” (unpublishedmanuscript,Colum-biaUniversity),21,availableathttp://josephnraz.googlepages.com/ThePos-sibilityofPartiality-temp.pdf.Razhasgenerouslyagreedtoallowmetoquotefromanddiscussthisearly,incompletedraft.Ofcourse,cautionisinorderasthedraftmaynotreflecthisconsideredviews.

40.Raz’s argumentassumes thatDarwall knows that theperson issuingdirec-tives isafinancialexpertand thathe isdisposed todefer toherexpertise.Otherwise, he may still do better complying with her directives than hewoulddecidingforhimself.

41. Raz,“ThePossibilityofPartiality”,20.

42. Ibid.

Razasksustoimaginethat“JohnisanexpertonChinesecooking,”andthatifone“want[s]nothingbuttopreparethebestChinesemeal… then [one] should just follow John’s instructions.”35Darwall addsthissupposition:Aperson,callherSara,“hasnoreasontodoanythingotherthanpreparethebestChinesemeal.”36Ifthatisso,John’sinstruc-tionscreatepreemptivereasonsforSara.ButthatdoesnotmeanthatJohnhasauthorityoverSara,inthesensethathehasarighttoruleandSaraanobligationtoobey.Darwallexplainsasfollows:

Ofcourse,[Sara]wouldbefoolishnottofollow[John’s]instructions.But if [she]didn’t it isdifficult to seewhyJohnwouldhaveanystandingtocomplainorotherwisehold[Sara]toaccount.Razsaysthatthosewithpracticalauthority “have the right to replace people’s own judg-mentonthemeritsofthecase.”ButwhatrightcouldJohnhave insuchacase?…It follows fromourstipulationsthatJohn’sinstructionsarenotmereadvice;theyprovidepre-emptivereasons.ButitishardtoseehowthatgivesJohnanyrightto[Sara’s]compliancewithhisdirectivesor[Sara]anyobligationtocomplywiththem.37

WemightputDarwall’spointthisway:Sarahasreasontoactas ifJohnhasauthorityoverher.ButonthesefactsthereisnoreasontothinkJohnactuallyhasarighttoruleandSaraanobligationtoobey.More-over,therearepracticaldifferencesbetweenitsmerelybeingrationalforSaratoactasifJohnhasauthorityandhisactuallyhavingit.OnlyifJohnactuallyhasarighttorulewillSara’sfailuretoobeyconferonhimthespecialstandingtoseekredressthatbelongstowhohasbeenwronged.38

35. SeeRaz,The Morality of Freedom,64.

36.Darwall,“Authorityandsecond-personalreasonsforacting”,151.

37. Ibid.,151.

38.Darwall’sobjectionechoesanobjectionDonReganraisedmanyyearsago.SeeDonaldH.Regan,“AuthorityandValue:ReflectionsonRaz’sMoralityofFreedom”, Southern California Law Review62(1989):995–1096.



oftheauthoritytodirectitssubjects,whichrightisitselfintheinter-estofthosesubjects,eachandeveryoneofthem.Itisinamannerofspeakingadutyyouowetoyourselfbecause—according to theser-viceconception—theauthorityisyourservant,andindefyingityoufailyourself.”46IfIunderstandthesepassages,Raz’sargumentrunslikethis:ToshowthatJohnhasarighttoSara’sobedience,wemustshowthathehasaninterestinSara’sdoingasheinstructs.Johnhasaninter-estinbeingagoodauthority.Tobeagoodauthority,JohnmusthelpSaraconformtoreason.HehelpsSaraconformtoreasononlyifshefollowshisorders.Thus,JohnhasaninterestinSara’sobediencethatisderivativeofhisinterestinbeingagoodauthority.

Ifindthisargumentperplexing.Razpaintsapictureinwhichanauthorityhasintereststhatarederivativeoftheinterestsofitssubjects,sothatifitisintheinterestofsubjectstoobey,itisintheinterestoftheauthoritytobeobeyed.ButRazhaslongrejectedthe“claimthatauthoritiesshouldalwaysactintheinterestoftheirsubjects.”47Rather,hehasargued, thatauthoritativeorders “should reflect reasons thatapplytotheirsubjects,buttheyneednotbereasonsadvancingtheirinterests.”48(Heofferstheexampleofamilitarycommanderwhoor-dershissoldierstochargeahill,puttingtheirreasonstodefendtheircountryabovetheirpersonalinterests.)49Thus,apremiseinRaz’sar-gument—that“therightoftheauthoritytodirectitssubjects…isitselfintheinterestofthosesubjects”50—seems,byhisownlights,wrong.

Butsupposewemovepastthatandassumethatsubjectshaveaninterestinobeyingauthoritiesthatcanhelpthemconformtoreason,andthatthoseauthoritieshaveaderivativeinterestintheirsubjects’obedience.Raz’sresponsetoDarwallisstillperplexing,asitissubjecttoDarwall’sobjection:ThatJohnhasaninterestinSara’sobedience

46. Ibid.

47. Raz,The Morality of Freedom,48.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.,43,48.

50.Raz,“ThePossibilityofPartiality”,18.

thesisissatisfiedonlywheretheactofinstructioninpartdeterminesthattheinstructedactistherightthingtodo.Thatitisbesttoinvestmoney for one’s retirement in a certain index fund is true indepen-dentlyofwhetheronehasbeeninstructedtoinvestinthatfund.Thatitisbesttodriveontherightsideoftheroadistrueonlyinvirtueofthefactthatone’shavingbeensoinstructedmakesitlikelythatotherswilltoo.

ThoughIhavedoubtsaboutRaz’sconcession,43thereisnoharminrestrictingourattentiontothesetofcasesthathenowsayssatisfythenormal justification thesis.Darwall’s objectionposes the same chal-lengewhether theground forauthority isexpertiseorcoordination.Toseethis,supposethelegislatureissuesadirectiverequiringevery-onetodriveontherightsideoftheroad.Ofcourse,onewouldbefool-ishnottofollowit;mosteveryoneelsewill.Thus,oneoughttotreatthelegislature’sinstructionasifitisbinding.ButthepointofDarwall’sargumentisthatthefactthatoneisjustifiedintreatingadirectiveasifitisbindingdoesnotentailthatitactuallyisso.Toestablishthatthereisauthorityinthesecases,Razmustexplainhowitisthatanauthorityacquirestherighttobindsubjectssimplyinvirtueofthefactthattheywouldbefoolishnottotreatitasifithadthatright.

Raz’sdraftcontainsasketchofanargument thataims todo justthat.Raz thinks that foraperson tohavea right, shemusthavean“interest…sufficienttogroundadutytoprotectorsecurethatinterestina significantway.”44Thus,he takes the taskofestablishing thatapersonhasarighttoruletocallforshowingthatthepersonhasanin-terestinasubject’sobedience.Whatinterestwilldothetrick?AsRazsees it, “[T]herightsofauthoritiesover theirsubjectsdonotderivefromtheinterestsofthepeopleinauthority.Rathertheyderivefromtheinterestsoftheauthority,whichistobeagoodauthority.”45Further,hesays,the“[d]uty…owedto[an]authority…arisesoutoftheright

43. Seeabove,note40.

44. Raz,“ThePossibilityofPartiality”,9.

45. Ibid.,18.



question-beggingbysayingthatJohnhasaninterestinbeingagoodauthority, not becausehe is an authority, but becausehehas an in-terestinbeinganauthority.(Presumablyonewhohasaninterestinbeinganauthorityalsohasaninterestinbeingagoodone.)55Butonthelimitedfactswehave,thereisnoreasontothinkthatJohnhasanyinterestwhatsoeverinbeinganauthorityforSara.True,hewouldbeagoodauthorityforher,butthatdoesnotentailthatitisinhisinter-est tobe so.Suppose thatamongmycolleagues, Iwouldmake thebestDean.ThatdoesnotentailthatIhaveaninterestinbeingDean.Indeed,beingappointedDeanmightbeagainstmyinterests,evenifIwouldbegoodatit.WeconfrontasimilarproblemifwetrytosaveRaz’sargumentbypositingthatwhenhereferstothe“interestsofanauthority”,hemeanstheinterestofade facto authority,ratherthanalegitimateone. Itmightbe true thatonewhohasde facto authorityoughttoaimatbeingagoodauthority,thoughIdoubtthatitalwaysthecase.Butevenso,itdoesnotfollowthatitisintheinterestofallthosewhohavede factoauthoritytoexerciseitwell.IfIhappentofindmyselfDean,myinterestsmightbebestservedbyflubbingthejobsobadlyIgetrelievedofthepost.

Raz’sresponsetoDarwall’sobjectionisbesetbyproblems,butanalternativeapproachmight seemmorepromising.According to thenormaljustificationthesis,asubjectisobligatedtoobeyanauthorityifdoingsowouldhelpherconformtoreasonbetter thansheother-wisewould.Darwallpointsoutthatthefactthatitisrationalforasub-jecttofollowordersdoesnotentailthatsheisobligatedtodoso.Butsupposewerevisethenormaljustificationthesistosaythatoneisob-ligatedtoobeyanauthorityifdoingsowouldhelponedischargeone’spreexistingobligationsbetter.56Wemightbeabletogetanobligationoutifweputanobligationin.57

55. Forexample,BarackObamahadaninterestinbeingPresidentbeforehebe-camePresident.Presumably,healso thenhadan interest inbeingagoodPresident.

56.Darwall,“Authorityandsecond-personalreasonsforacting”,151.

57. SeeBernardWilliams,Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana

doesnotentailthathehasarighttoit.IpresumethatRazwouldagree,ashesaysthattohavearight,onemusthaveaninterest“sufficienttogroundadutytoprotectorsecurethatinterestinasignificantway.”51 Thus,showingthatJohnhasaninterestinSara’sobediencedoesnotestablishthathehasarighttoit,evenonRaz’spicture.Razhasnever“offeredageneralcharacterizationofwhatit takesfortheinterestofapersontobesufficientgroundingforadutytoprotectorpromoteit.”52Sufficiencyherecannotbeamatterofweightalone,bothbecausethere isno reason to think that anauthority’s interest inobedienceis necessarilyweighty, and becausemanyweighty interests are notprotectedbyrights.53Thus,theintereststhataresufficienttogroundrightsmustbedifferentinkindfromtheintereststhatarenot.ButRazdoesnotexplainwhyanauthority’sderivativeinterest inasubject’sobedienceisthekindthatgroundsaright.Inthebestcasescenario,Raz’sanswertoDarwallisincomplete.HecannotbejudgedtohaveovercomeDarwall’sobjectionuntilheshowsthatthekindofinterestanauthorityhasinasubject’sobedienceestablishesarighttoit.

Unfortunately, I do not think we are in best-case–scenario terri-toryhere,asRaz’sresponsetoDarwallhasaflawquiteapartfromthefact that it tooseemssubject toDarwall’sobjection.Raz’sargumentisquestion-beggingatthecrucialstep.Razsaysthattherightsofanauthoritydonotderivefromthepersonalinterestsofthoseinauthor-ity,butrather“fromtheinterestsoftheauthority,whichistobeagoodauthority.”54Butoneonlyhasthe“interestsoftheauthority”ifoneis theauthority,andthatisofcoursewhatisunderdebate.ToestablishJohn’sauthorityoverSarawecannotappealtoaninterestweattributetohimonthegroundthatheisanauthority.However,thatisjustwhatRaz’sargumentdoes.

Raz might try to escape the charge that his argument is

51. Ibid.,9.

52. Ibid.

53. Forexample,whenIproposedtomywife,Ihadastronginterestinhersaying“yes”,butnorightthatshedoso.

54. Ibid.



however,thatDarwallandRazaretalkingpastoneanotherbecausetheyconstruethecomponentsofauthoritydifferently.Infact,Ithinkthisiswhatisgoingon,butdiagnosisofthedisagreementdoesnotaidRaz’scase.

Onemightthinkthatapersonwhopossessesaright torulehasaclaimontheobedienceofthoseagainstwhomtheyholdtheright.Thatis,Ithink,themostnaturalinterpretationofthephrase,anditistheonethatDarwalladoptswhenhespeaksoftherightofanauthor-itytoasubject’scompliance.Razsometimesappearstohavethesameview:hesaysthatauthorityinvolvesan“appealtocompliance”which“makessensepreciselybecauseitisaninvocationofthedutytoobey.”58 ButRazultimately construes the right to rule as “amoral power toissueobligation-orduty-imposingdirectives”,notasaclaimonsub-jects.59That interpretationplaces theChinese-cookingexample inadifferent light.Recall that John isanexpert inChinesecookingandSarahasreasontodonothingbutcookthebestChinesemeal.DarwallstipulatesthatJohn’sdirectionsarepreemptivereasonsforSara,buthearguesthatauthorityislacking.ForRaz,however,theballgameisoveronceDarwallstipulates that John’s instructionsarepreemptivereasons.ThisisbecauseRazunderstandsobligationsinessentiallythesamewayasDarwallunderstandspreemptivereasons:botharecom-poundsoffirst-order reasons foractionandsecond-orderexclusion-aryreasons.60SoinassumingthatJohn’sinstructionsarepreemptivereasonsforSara,DarwallhasassumedthatJohnhasthepowerRaz

58.Raz,The Morality of Freedom,26.

59. Stephen Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation” (unpublishedmanuscript,UniversityofPennsylvania),5,availableathttp://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/05/34/35/alpc2009perrypaper.pdf.SeealsoRaz,The Authority of Law,16–20.

60.InRaz’sterminology,obligationsarecategoricalprotectedreasons.AndRazmeansbyprotectedreasonswhatDarwallmeansbypreemptivereasons.SeeJ.Raz,“PromisesandObligations”,inLaw, Morality, and Society: Essays in Hon-our of H.L.A. Hart, eds.P.M.S.Hacker and J.Raz (Oxford:ClarendonPress1977),210–228;StephenDarwall,“AuthorityandReasons:ExclusionaryandSecond-Personal”,Ethics120(2010):257–278.

Unfortunatelythisstrategyisdoomedtofail, too.Gobacktothefinancial expert. Presumably,Darwall doesnot justhave reasons toadoptagoodplanforretirement;hehasanobligationtodoso.Thus,itmightseemthatifafinancialexpert’s instructionscouldhelpDar-walldischargethisobligationbetterthanheotherwisewould,Darwallwouldbeobligatedtofollowthem(obligation-in,obligation-out).Per-haps,buttheobligationDarwallhasinthisscenarioisnotowedtothefinancialadvisor.Theunderlyingobligationtoplanforhisretirementis (presumably)owedtohis family. Itmaybe that todischarge thatobligation,Darwallisobligatedtoseekassistancefromanexpert,butgiventhattherearemanypeoplewhocouldhelp,thereisnoreasontothinkthatheisobligatedtofollowtheinstructionsofanyparticularexpert.And even ifDarwall had suchuniquefinancial circumstanc-esthatonlyonepersonhadtheexpertisetoplanhisretirement,wewouldstillfallshortofestablishingthatperson’sauthorityoverhim.Rememberthatauthorityconsists inarighttoruleandacorrelatedobligationtoobey.HerewewouldhaveanobligationonthepartofDarwalltoobey,butonepointedinthewrongdirection,withnocor-relatedright to rule for thefinancialadviser.Darwall’s familymightdemand thathe follow thefinancial expert’s instructions,but thefi-nancialexpertwouldhavenoclaimonhisobedience.Ifthereisales-sonhere,itisthatanaccountofauthoritymustaddressthenormativestatusofbothrulerandruled.

IV. Raz as a Revisionist

WeareclosetobeingabletoconcludethatDarwall’sobjectionisfataltoRaz’saccount,butthereisoneavenueofresponsewehaveyettoconsider.Tothispoint,wehaveleftthenotionsofarighttoruleandanobligationtoobeyunanalyzed.WehaveproceededasifRazandDarwallarejoiningissueonthequestionwhethersatisfactionofthenormaljustificationthesisgivesrisetothetwinnedpair.Itispossible,

Press, 1985), 181 (discussing “theobligation-out, obligation-in principle”). SeealsoStephenDarwall,The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Ac-countability(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2006),59andn.33.



Perhapsrevisionisinorder.Somethinkthatwecannotgiveanac-countofauthoritythattakesthetraditionalnotionsofarighttoruleandanobligation toobeyseriously.66 Iamnot ready togiveupyet.TherestofthispaperisanattempttoelaboratetheordinaryconceptofauthorityinawaythatavoidsboththeproceduralistobjectionandDarwall’s.

V. Roles of Authority

IampersuadedthatRaziswrongtothinkthattheroleofauthorityis tohelpsubjectsconformtoreason,andthathe iswrongtothinkthatanabilitytoplaythatroleissufficienttoestablishauthority.Thus,weneedanewstart.Idonotthinkitpromisingtocastaboutforanalternativerolethatauthoritymightplay.Itmaybetruethatauthor-ityalwayshassomeroletoplay,butDarwall’sobjectionsuggeststhatthecapacitytoplayarolecannotgroundauthority.Evenifsomeoneiswellsuitedtotheroleandproposestoplayit,wecanalwaysask,“Whyisthatyourroletoplay?”Thisistruewhetherornottheroleinquestion ishelping subjects conform to reason, arbitratingdisputes,orsomethingelseentirely.Moreover,thetake-homelessonofthepro-ceduralistobjectionisthatdifferentsortsofauthoritiesplaydifferentroles.Thus,wecannotbuildageneralaccountofauthorityonaclaimabouttheroleauthorityplays.Ido,however,thinkthatthekeytoun-derstandingauthority lies inroles,but it is inroles thatpeopleplay,notinrolesthatauthorityplays.Authorityisafeatureofrolesembed-dedinpractices.Tojustifyauthority,weneedtojustifythepracticesinwhichrolesofauthorityareembedded.

Takeparentalauthorityasanexample.67Supposeweareaskedto

66.SeeRegan,“AuthorityandValue:ReflectionsonRaz’sMoralityofFreedom”, 1020.

67.Parentalauthoritymayseemanoddexample,duetochildren’sdiminishedrationality.Thus,onemightworrythatademonstrationthatparentalauthor-itycanbejustifiedtellsuslittleaboutothersortsofauthority.Perhaps,buttheaimhereisnottojustifyparentalauthority.Rather,itistodevelopastrategyfordoingso,and thestrategycanbe transposed toothercontexts,even ifargumentsinsupportofparentalauthoritycannotbe.

thinksauthorityconsistsin—thepowertoissueobligation-imposingdirectives.61

AsDarwallacknowledges,Raz’saccount ismoreplausible ifonethinksofitasanaccountofpreemptivereasons.62Theproblemcomesinthinkingthatanaccountofamoralpowertocreatepreemptiverea-sonsamountstoanaccountofauthority.AsJulesColemanobserves,forRaz,authority involves “a relationshipbetween reasonsandper-sons”,whereas the “ordinarynotionofauthority… isa relationshipprimarily betweenor amongpersons.”63When a right to rule is un-derstoodasaclaimonasubject’sobedience,itstructuresarelation-shipbetweenpeople:thesubjectowesobedience,whichtheauthorityhasstandingtodemand;disobedienceisgroundforcomplaint,ifnotpunishment.Incontrast,whentherighttoruleisunderstoodsimplyas amoralpower to changeothers’ reasons, it doesnot structure arelationshipamongpeople.ThatIhaveamoralpowertochangeyourreasonsdoesnotwarrantmymakinganydemandsonyou,norgiveyouanyobligationstome.Intriguingly,Razhassuggestedthatsomeobligationsare“constituentelementsofspecialhumanrelations(hus-band-wife,parent-child,leader-led)”whoseexistenceisgroundedinthe“intrinsicdesirabilityofformsoflifeinwhichpeoplecreateorac-knowledgespecialbondsbetweenthem.”64However,whenitcomesto analyzing authority,Razdoesnot follow throughon this sugges-tion.65He leaves the relationship between authority and subject bythewayside,andbecausehedoes,hisaccountofauthorityislessanelaborationoftheordinaryconceptthanarevisionofit.

61. IhavebeenhelpedherebyconversationwithJohnGardner.

62.SeeDarwall, “Authorityandsecond-personal reasons foracting”, 153.How-ever,DarwallthinksthathisstipulationthatJohn’sdirectivescreatepreemp-tivereasonsisfalse.SeeDarwall,“AuthorityandReasons:ExclusionaryandSecond-Personal”.

63. JulesL.Coleman,“BeyondExclusiveLegalPositivism”,(unpublishedmanu-script,YaleUniversity),18.

64.Raz,“PromisesandObligations”,228.

65. TheaccountofauthorityIsketchinthenextsectiontakesupRaz’ssuggestion.



beonlylooselyrelated(ifatall)tothequestionwhetherthechildismorallyboundbythoseorders.Andsettingthataside,Darwall’sob-jectionrearsitheadyetagain.Thatitisdesirableforaparenttomakedemandsonherchilddoesnotestablishherauthority todoso.AsDarwallputsit,“Themostthat[desirability]cangroundisthedesiretobeabletodemandsomething,notanydemand…itself.”70

Wecannotgroundparentalauthorityintheinstrumentalvalueofparents’makingdemandsorofchildren’sdoingastheyaretold.Themostthatinstrumentalvaluecanexplainiswhyparentsandchildrenshouldbehaveasifparentshaveauthority;itdoesnotestablishthatparentsactuallyhavearighttoruleandchildrenanobligationtoobey.Soweneedanewstrategy.Letusstartwiththisobservation:‘Parent’and‘child’aredescriptionsofpeoplethatstandincertainbiological,social,orlegalrelationshipstooneanother.But‘parent’and‘child’alsonamerolesthatareembeddedinapractice.Actually,theynamerolesthatareembeddedinmanypractices,butletusfocusonjustone—thefamily.Familiesarestructuredbyroles—parent,child,brother,sister,uncle,aunt,etc.Roleshavenormativeattributes—rights,powers,ob-ligations, and so on.71 Some roles’ normative attributes include thecomponentsofauthority.Parents,aspartoftheirrole,havearighttorule;children,aspartoftheirs,anobligationtoobey.Inthepracticeweareimagining(butwhichshouldbefamiliar),itisbuiltinthatpar-entshaveauthorityovertheirchildren.

Of course the fact that there is apractice inwhichparentshaveauthorityovertheirchildrendoesnotestablishthataparentalclaimtoauthorityisjustified.Thepractice,afterall,maynotbe.Herewecandrawthedistinctionbetweende factoandlegitimate(orde jure)author-ity.Tosaythatonepersonhasde factoauthorityoveranotheristosaythatbothparticipateinapracticewhoserolesaresuchthatthefirstpersonhasarighttoruleandthesecondanobligationtoobey.Aper-sonwithde factoauthorityalsohaslegitimateauthorityifthepractice

70.Darwall,The Second Person Standpoint,312.

71. IhavebeeninfluencedinthissectionbyMichaelO.Hardimon,“RoleObliga-tions”, Journal of Philosophy 91(1994):333–363.

explainwhyamotherhasauthorityoverherten-year–olddaughter.WemightbetemptedtogiveaRaziananswer:Sheknowsbetter.Thedaughterwillconformbettertoreason’srequirementsbyfollowingor-ders(brushyourteeth,gotobedat8p.m.,don’ttalktostrangers)thanbydecidinghowtoactonherown.ButtheRaziananswerprovestoomuch. If relative competency establishedparental authority, a greatmanyadults (nearlyall, in fact)wouldhaveparentalauthorityoveranygivenchild.Typically,ofcourse,onlyoneortwodo.HereweseeanotherchallengeforRaz’saccount:Ifseveralpeopleareabletoplayarole,weneedamethodofchoosingamongthem.Itisnotclearthatthenormal justification thesiscanaccount for the fact thatchildrenaresubjecttotheauthorityoftheirparents,nottotheauthorityofallthosewhocouldparentwell.68Evenifwecouldovercometheprob-lemoftyingchildrentotheirparents,theRazianexplanationfacesafurther, andmoredecisive, problem—Darwall’s objection.Adaugh-termaybe foolishnot to followhermother’sorders,but that isnotenoughtoestablishthemother’sauthority.

AnalternativestrategyforjustifyingparentalauthorityinvertsRaz’s.Insteadoffocusingonthechild’sreasonstodoastheparentsays,wemightfocusontheparent’sreasonstomakedemands.Parentshavereasons to promote their children’s wellbeing, and parental author-ityhelpsthemdoso.Thus,wemightsay,parentswilldobetterwithrespect to the reasons thatapply to them if theymakedemandsontheirchildren,andthisgivesusareasontorecognizethemashavingtheauthoritytomakedemands.ThisapproachfaresbetterthantheRazianstrategy,inthatittiesparticularparentstoparticularchildren.69 But ithas itsownproblems.De factoauthority isprobablysufficienttopromoteachild’swelfare.Nodoubtparentingwellrequiressomesuccesssecuringcompliancewithone’sorders,butsuccessatthatmay

68.Childrenareoftensubjecttotheauthorityofotheradults,butcompetencecannotgroundateacherorbabysitter’sauthorityanymorethanaparent’s.

69.Thisassumesthatparentshavereasonstopromotetheirownchildren’swel-fare,separateandapartfromthereasonstheyhavetopromotethewelfareofchildrengenerally.



ismandatory,such that theyarenot free toreject theroles that thepracticeassignsthem.Hereagain,theinstrumentalvalueoftheprac-ticemayplayapartinshowingthatitismorallyobligatorythatpeopleparticipateinit.However,Darwall’sobjectionteachesthatthedesir-abilityof participating in apractice that structures a relationshipofauthorityisnotbyitselfsufficienttogroundanobligationtodoso.Weneedtolocatethesourceoftheobligationelsewhere.

With these thoughts inmind,wecanagain takeup thequestionwhetherandhowparentalauthoritycanbejustified.Ishallfocusonthe second strategy—showing that it ismandatory for parents andchildren(understoodherebiologically,socially,or legally) topartici-pateinapracticethatassignsthemtherolesofparentandchild.Thisisbecausethefirststrategyoftencollapsesintothesecond.Inchoos-ingtooccupyarole,onemaybecomeobligatedtooccupyit,atleastforawhile.(Anadoptiveparentcannotjustcastoffresponsibilityforherchild.)Whenthatisnottrue,thenormativeconsequencesofoc-cupyingarolearetenuous,asoneisfreetoleaveit.

Thisisnottheplaceforafulldefenseofparentalauthority,andIwouldnotprejudgewhetherthereisone.ButIdowanttosketchhowtheargumentmightworkandnotesomehurdlesthat itwouldface.Tothispoint,Ihavespokenasifthereisasinglepracticecalled“thefamily”,butofcourse‘family’isafamilyresemblanceconcept.Familiesdifferacrossandwithindifferentcultures,andtherolesinvolvedvaryintheirnormativeattributes.Familialrolesalsoshiftasthepeopleoc-cupying themage. Identifying the rightsanddutiesassociatedwiththeroles isan interpretiveendeavor,sensitiveboth tohowfamiliesaroundhereoperate,butperhapsevenmoretohowthisfamilyoper-ates,asthepracticeallowscustomization.72Thereisnoguaranteethat

72. Iusethephrase‘interpretiveendeavor’becauseIaminclinedtothinkoftheprocess as akin to theoneRonaldDworkindescribes inLaw’s Empire (Ox-ford:HartPublishing,1986),45–86.Ifidentifyingthecontentofrolesisaninterpretiveendeavorof that sort, theprocess isnotwholly separate fromjustifyingtheroles.Ihavenotpresentedthingsthiswayinthetext,however,becauseIdonotwanttotakeaviewhereonwhetherweshouldbepositivistsoranti-positivistsaboutpracticesthatinvolverolesofauthority.

andtheirparticipationinitis,insomesense,justified.Thechallengeistofigureoutwhatkindofjustificationisnecessaryforsociallyconsti-tutedrolestohavegenuinenormativebite.Whendopeopleactuallyhavetherightsanddutiesassociatedwithrolestheyoccupy?

WehavetotreadcarefullyherebecausewedonotwanttogiveananswerthatissubjecttoDarwall’sobjection.Wecannot,forexample,show that the roles in a practice that structure a relationshipof au-thorityhavegenuinenormativebitemerelybyshowingthatpeoplewouldbebetteroff if theyoccupiedthoseroles.Thatachildwoulddobetterbyfollowinghermother’sordersisreason,aswehaveseen,forthechildtotreathermotherasifshehasauthority,butitdoesnotestablishthemother’sauthority.Toputthepointanotherway,thatitwouldbefoolishnottooccupyaroledoesnotestablishthatonehastherightsanddutiesassociatedwithit.

ToovercomeDarwall’sobjection,wecanadoptoneoftwostrate-gies. If apractice ismorallypermissibleandpeoplehavechosen toparticipateinit,thenitmakessensetoattributetherightsanddutiesassociatedwiththerolesinthepracticetothepeopleoccupyingthem.Thinkhereofpeoplewhohavejoinedasoccerclub,knowingthatof-ficersintheclubhavetherighttosetduesanddecidewheregamesshallbeplayed.Ofcourse, the instrumentalvalueofapracticemayplayapartindeterminingwhetheritismorallypermissible.However,thisapproachavoidsDarwall’sobjectionbecauseourattributionoftherightsandresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththerolesdoesnotdependsolelyontheinstrumentalvalueofthepractice.Itdependsaswellonpeople’s choice tooccupy the relevant roles, andon theabsenceofanymoralconsiderationsthatnegateortrumpeithertheinstrumentalvalueofthepracticeorthechoicetoparticipateinit.

Thealternativestrategycoverscaseswherepeoplehavenotcho-sentoparticipateintherelevantpractice.Perhapstheydonotpartici-pateinitatall,orperhapstheydo,butnotbychoice.Inthosecases,itwillnotbeenoughtoshowthatthepracticeismorallypermissible.Toascribethenormativeattributesassociatedwithrolestopeoplewhohavenotchosentooccupythem,wemustshowthattheirparticipation



isdifferent fromthecaseofaparentwho inherits responsibility forchildrenfromadeceasedsibling.)Onepossibilityisthatparentsandchildren have associative obligations, of the sort described by Ron-aldDworkin.Thatwoulddependonwhether the families inwhichtheyfindthemselvesarecommunitiesthatshowequalconcernandrespect for theirmembers.74Associativeobligationsarenot roleob-ligations,astheyarepremisedonmembershipinasocialgroup,notonoccupancyof a role.75 But onemighthave an associativeobliga-tion, arisingoutofmembership in a community, toparticipate in apracticeof that community that assignsonea role towhich furtherobligationsattach.Anotherpossibilityisthatwecangroundanobli-gationthroughacontractualistargumentthataimsattheconclusionthatparentsandchildrencannotreasonablyrejectparticipatinginapracticethatassignsthemthoseroles.Anargumentofthatformmightemphasizethatanintrinsicgood—adistinctiveformoflove—isreal-izableonlyinthecontextofaparent-childrelationship.Surelythereareotherargumentstopursueaswell.Itbearsnotethatanyconclu-sionthatparentsandchildrenareobligatedtoparticipateinapracticethatassignsthemthoseroleswillbedefeasible.Aparentmightvacateherroleifshefindssomeoneelsesuitabletooccupyit;achildmightrejectherroleifherparentisabusive.And,importantly,weshouldnotlosesightofthefactthatinsomefamiliestherolesofparentandchildaresopoorlyconstituted,orsothoroughlyabused,thatpeoplearenotobligatedtooccupythem.76

Ifwefind that parents and children are obligated to occupy therolesofparentandchild,weareclosetoshowingthatparentshaveauthorityoverchildren,butwearenotnecessarilythereyet.Wearefinished if theparentandchild inquestionactuallyoccupy their re-spectiveroles.Inthatcase,theparent’sde factoauthorityislegitimate(i. e., the roleshavegenuinenormativebite), onaccountof the fact

74. SeeDworkin,Law’s Empire,196–216.

75. SeeHardimon,“RoleObligations”,335.

76.Seeibid.,350andn.28.

wewillformaclearpictureoftherightsanddutiesthatattachtofamil-ialroles,astheymaybedifficulttodiscernorevenindeterminate.Butifwefindthatrelationsbetweentworolesarestructuredsothatonepersonhasarighttoruleandanotheranobligationtoobey,wewillhaveidentifiedrolesofauthorityandsubject.73

Oncewehaveahandleonthenormativeattributesoftherolesofparentandchild,wecanaskwhetherparticipationinapracticestruc-turedbythoserolesismandatory,giventheavailableoptions.Thelastphrase is important,because itmightbemandatory forparentsandchildreninonecommunitytoparticipateinaformofthepractice,not-withstandingthatfactthatsomeothercommunityhasabetterversion.Oratamorefine-grainedlevel,itmightbemandatoryforapersontooccupy the roleofdaughter inher family,even though thearrange-mentofrolesinafamilydownthestreetissuperior.Whichisnottosaythatpeopledonothavechoicesabouthowroles intheir familyarestructured.Ofcoursetheydo,butchangeishard,andtheoptionsavailablearelikelypath-dependent.

Anargumentthatparentsandchildrenareobligatedtoparticipateinapracticethatassignsthemtherolesofparentandchildmighttakemanyforms.Thoughthereareexceptions,familiesarenotvoluntaryassociations.Childrenarebornintoafamilyoradoptedbyone.Manyparentschoosetherole,butmanydonot,eitherbecausetheydidnotplan to have children of their own, or because circumstances havethrustothers’childrenuponthem.Forparentsthatchoose,wemightgroundanobligationtooccupytheroleintheircommitmenttodoso.Butweneedanargumentofanothersortforchildren,andformanyparentstoo.

Idonothaveaquickargumenttooffer,anditisnotclearthatthereisageneralone. (Thecaseofaparentwhohasachildaccidentally

73. Therelationsbetweensuchroleswillbecaptured,inpart,byRaz’spreemp-tionthesis:ordersissuedbyapartywitharighttorulewillbefirst-orderrea-sonsforactionandexclusionaryreasonsnottoactonotherconsiderations.Razhasthisaspectofthestructureofauthorityright,andhisanswertotheparadoxsurroundingthecompatibilityofreasonandauthorityissound,eventhoughtheserviceconceptionisnot.



preparethebestChinesemeal.That,aswehaveseen,isnotenoughtoestablish John’sauthorityoverSara.Butsuppose that John is theexecutivechefandSaraa linecook inaChinese restaurant. In thatcase,JohnandSaraareparticipatinginapracticestructuredbyroles,whichitiseasytoimaginehavetheattributesofauthority(i. e., arighttoruleandanobligationtoobey).Iftherolesaresostructured,thequestionwemustaskiswhetherJohnandSaraareobligatedtopar-ticipateinthepractice.Importantly,SaraandJohn’sparticipationmaybemandatoryasaresultoftheirchoicetoworkinthekitchen.UnlessSarahassignedup,itseemsunlikelysheisobligatedtoobeyJohn’sin-structions.78Hercommitmentgroundsherobligation.Acommitmentofthissortisnot,ofcourse,forever.Saracanwithdrawfromherroleaslinecook,butperhapsnotimmediately,anduntilshedoes,shemustoccupytherole,withitsattendantobligations.

The upshot of the last example is thatwe cannow see the partthatconsentplaysinjustifyingauthority.Razfamouslyrejectsconsentasabasisfortheauthorityofthestate,takingtheviewthatconsentis likely tobeeffectiveonly if thenormal justificationthesis issatis-fied.79But therearemanyareasof lifewhereweareboundtoobeyothersbecausewehavesignedup toapractice thatassignsus thatrole.Consentisneitheranecessarynorasufficientconditionforre-gardingapersonassubject toauthority. It isnotnecessarybecausetherearepracticesthatweareobligatedtoparticipateinevenifwehavenotchosenthem.Itisnotsufficientbecauseconsentaloneisnotenough—thepracticethepersonhassignedupformustbevaluablesuchthatcommitmentcreatesanobligation.80However,consent(or,

78.Sarawasnotbornintotheroleoflinecook,soifshehasnotsignedupforit,shehasbeenforcedintoit.Itisdifficulttoimagineajustificationforaprac-ticethatforcespeopleintotheroleoflinecook.

79.Raz,Ethics in the Public Domain,Ch.16.

80.Thevalue inquestionmightbeeither instrumentalor intrinsic. IntheChi-nese-cookingcase,thevalueislikelyinstrumental:thepracticeinwhichtheexecutivechefhasauthorityhelpsgetgoodfoodtothetable.Whereconsentplaysaroleintheparent-childcase,asinadoption,thereareinstrumentalandintrinsicvaluesinplay.Thepracticeinwhichaparenthasauthorityis

thatparticipationinthepracticeismandatory.However,onewhoisobligatedtooccupyarolemayfailtodoso,andwhenthathappens,weareleftwithaquestionastowhethersuchapersonhastherightsanddutiesassociatedwiththeroletheyhavewrongfullyrejected.(Ineffect,thequestionhereiswhetheronecanhavelegitimateauthoritywithouthavingde facto authority.)Wecansafelyattributeanobliga-tion toobey to thosewhoareobligated tooccupy the roleof child,whetherornottheyoccupyit.Thisisbecause,ingeneral,onecannotavoidtheobligationsofaroleoneisobligatedtooccupybyrefusingtoinhabitit.Incontrast,wecannotattributearighttoruletoaparentwhoisobligatedtooccupytheroleofparentyetdoesnot,asoneonlyhastherights,powers,andprivilegesassociatedwitharoleifoneoc-cupies it.Adeadbeatdadretainsafather’sobligationtosupporthischild,butheisnotfullyafather,andcannotclaimtherightsandpow-ersthatcomewiththerole.Thus,toshowthataparenthasauthorityoverachild,weneedtoshowthatsheactuallyoccupiestherole.

Itisatrickyquestionwhatonemustdotooccupyarole,andIshallsaylessthantheissuemeritshere.Somerolesareoccupiedthroughceremonial acts—oaths, investiture, and the like.Others, includingtheroleofparent,areinhabitedinformally.Clearly,oneneednotiden-tifywitharoletooccupyit(onecanbealienatedfromone’srole),nordoesonehavetodischargealloftherole’sobligations.Buttooccupyaroleonemustmakesomeefforttoactastherolerequires;thedifficultquestionsarewhatkindofeffortandhowmuch.Itisalsopossiblethatonemusteitherholdoneselfoutasoccupyingtheroleorbetakenbyotherstodoso.77

Wehavespentalotoftimeonparentalauthority,buttheapproachwedevelopediseasilygeneralized.ReturntoJohnandSara.Onthethinstorywehavebeenconsidering,allweknowisthatJohnisanexpertinChinesecookingandthatSarahasreasontodonothingbut

77. ThislastconditionbearsclosesimilaritytoRaz’sclaimthat“[a]personneedsmore thanpower (as influence) to havede facto authority.Hemust eitherclaimthathehaslegitimateauthorityorbeheldbyotherstohavelegitimateauthority”(Raz,The Authority of Law,9).



Thus, thequestionwhether thereare legitimatepoliticalauthoritiesdependsbothon the roles involved inpoliticalpracticeandon thejustificationswemightgive for those roles.Thatquestion,however,mustbeleftforanotherday.

VI. Why Roles?

Indiscussingtheproceduralistobjection,IcomplainedthatRaz’sma-neuveringmadethenormaljustificationthesisnearlyempty,asitnowamountstotheclaimoneisobligatedtoobeyanauthorityifreasondemandsthatonedoso.ButnowIhavecomeawfullyclosetosayingthesame thing. Ihavesaid thatone isobligated toobeyanauthor-ity if one isobligated toparticipate in apractice that assignsonearole,anattributeofwhichisanobligationtoobey.IhaveusedmorewordsthanRaz,butitisnotclearthatmyviewisanylessempty,foritmightbeellipticallydescribedasfollows:Oneisobligatedtoobeyanauthorityifreasondemandsonedoso.So,whyalltherigmaroleaboutroles?

Well,firstitisimportanttonotethatmyaccountofauthorityhasmoremodestaimsthanRaz’s.Aswesawattheoutset,theservicecon-ceptionisanaccountoftheroleofauthority—inRaz’sview,helpingpeopleconformtoreason.ThatroleisreflectedinthetestRazpres-entsforevaluatingwhetheronepersonhasauthorityoveranother.Idonotthinkthatauthorityhasacharacteristicroletoplay,andasaconsequence, Idonot thinkthatwecandevelopageneral test thatwill telluswhetheronepersonhasauthorityoveranother.Myaimistodescribethesortofargumentonemightusetojustifyauthority.Thus, itmatters thatmyviewisonlythesameasRaz’swhenstatedelliptically.

Puttingtheproblemintermsofroleshelpsinthreeways.First,itencouragesustoseethewholefield.Thecomponentsofauthority—arighttoruleandanobligationtoobey—donotexhausttherolestowhichtheyattach.Inadditiontotheirrighttomakedemandsonchil-dren,parentshavepowersandobligations.Astothelatter,theyareat aminimum required to love and support their children. Perhaps

asIprefer,commitment)isoftenanineliminablepartofthestoryofwhyonepersonissubjecttotheauthorityofanother.Moreover,apartfrom the state and family,most roles of authority are embedded inpractices thatpeople signup for.That suggests that themost readyroutearoundDarwall’sobjectionwilloftenbetoshowthatthoseoc-cupyingrolesofauthorityandsubjectcommittedtoparticipateinthepracticeassigningthemthoseroles.

Commitmentis,ofcourse,notapromisingwayaroundDarwall’sobjectionwhenitcomestopoliticalauthority.Tojustifypoliticalau-thority,weneedtoshowthatpeopleareobligatedtooccupyrolestheyareborninto,ratherthanonestheychoose.Thefirststepistoidentifythenormativeattributesoftherolesinvolvedinthepoliticalpractice,sothatweknowwhatweareattemptingtojustify.Itispossiblethatthe rolesof state and citizen encompass the componentsof author-ity—arighttoruleandanobligationtoobey.Theproceduralistobjec-tionproceedsasiftheydo,butsuggeststhatifthepracticeinvolvingthoserolesisjustified,itmaybeonthegroundthatordersarearrivedatthroughanappropriateprocess,ratherthanonthegroundthattheyarehelpfultosubjects.Butitisalsopossiblethattherolesinapoliti-calpracticearestructureddifferently,sothattheysharesomethingincommonwiththefinancial-advisorcaseconsideredabove.There,re-call,weconcludedthatDarwallhaddutiestohischildrentodoasthefinancialadvisorinstructed,butthefinancialadvisorhadnorighttohiscompliance.Similarly,theroleofcitizeninamoderndemocracymayencompassanobligation to fellowcitizens to followtheedictsthat result fromdemocraticdecisionprocedures,withoutconferringonanyonearighttodotheinstructing.Wherethatistrue,andwherethe roles are justified,wewould not have political authority in theclassicsense,thoughwewouldhaveanobligationtoobeythelaw.81

valuablebothbecauseitaidsintheupbringingofchildrenandbecauseanintrinsicgood—adistinctivekindoflove—isrealizableonlyinthecontextofaparent-childrelationship.

81. If thisseemsodd,notethatmuchdemocratictheorydeniesthedistinctionbetweenrulerandruledthatliesattheheartoftheconceptofauthority.



thoughtthatsomepeopleareentitledtorulebecausetheyarenatu-rallysuperiorbybirth.Theonlypersonalattributewhichseemsevena candidate for grounding practical authority is the one Raz drawson—theabilitytodirectothers’behaviorbetterthantheycanthem-selves.But,aswehavealreadyseen,thatisnotenough.Authorityat-tachestoroles,nottopeople.83

Whatthenofthehoaryexampleofthepassengerwhoseizestheinitiativeanddirectspeopletolifeboatsonasinkingship?Clearlyoth-erpassengersoughttodoasshesays,ifshecanfillthedesperateneedforcoordinatedaction.Sothismightseemlikeacounterexample—aninstanceofauthority that isnotattached toa role inapractice.Butthat is too fast.Aswehaveseen,notevery instance inwhichsome-oneoughttodoassomeoneelseinstructsinvolvesauthority.Sotoo,Ithink,withourpassengerwhoseizescontrol.Thosesheisbossingaroundmaywellbeobligated to followorders,but theirobligationrunstootherpassengers,nottothepersonwhohastakencharge,ex-ceptinhercapacityasafellowpassenger.Shehasnospecialstandingtocomplainaboutthosewhoignoreherinstructionsoverandabovethestandingeverypassengerhas.

Finally,itisworthemphasizingthatauthorityisafeatureofrolesbecausepeoplecancometoidentifywiththem.AsMichaelHardimonexplains, a person identifieswith a role if she “conceive[s] of [her-self]assomeoneforwhomthenormsoftherolefunctionasreasons.”84 Thus,ifyouareaparentwhoidentifieswiththerole,thefactthatthis

83.Darwallsayswehavetheauthoritytomakethedemandsofdailylife—getoutofmyway,getoffmyfoot—invirtueofourmembership inthemoralcommunity.SeeDarwall,The Second-Person Standpoint. It isnot clear tomethat“authority”ishereusedinthesamesensewehavebeenusingit.Practicalauthorityseemstoconsistinsomethingmorestablethantherighttomakeone-offdemandslike“Getoffmyfoot.”Butifthereisonlyonesenseofau-thorityinplay,wecanmodifythethoughtthatauthorityattachestoroles,notpersons:wemighthavelimitedauthorityoveroneanothermerelyinvirtueofourpersonhood—youmaydemandthatIgetoffyourfoot,butnotthatIpreparemyricethreadnoodlesasyouinstruct—whilemoreextensive,non-reciprocalauthorityattachestorolesembeddedinpractices.

84.Hardimon,“RoleObligations”,358.

wecouldjustifythenormativerelationsbetweenparentsandchildrenpiecemeal,butitseemsbothmorenaturalandlessdauntingtojustifythe roles in theirentirety.Aparent’sobligation to loveandsupporta childmakesher authorityover the child considerably less jarringthanitmightbeotherwise.Indeed,failuretoloveandsupportachildmayvitiateaparent’sclaimtoauthority.82Moreover,itseemsunlikelythatthestorywewouldtellaboutparentalpowers(e. g.,topunishormakemedicaldecisions)couldbe isolatedfromthestorywewouldtellaboutparentalobligations.

Anotherreasontoviewauthoritythroughtheprismofrolesisthatdoingsounderscoresthatauthorityisnotafeatureoftheworldapartfromourpractices.IfJohnhasauthorityoverSara,wecanalwaysre-describethat fact intermsofroles—thechefhasauthorityoverthecook,thegeneralhasauthorityovertheprivate,thebosshasauthorityovertheemployee,etc.Thenormaljustificationthesisallowsthatyoumighthaveauthorityovermesimplyinvirtueofthefactthatyoucandirectmybehaviorbetter than I canmyself.That strikesmeas seri-ouslywrong.IfJohn,ourexpertinChinesecooking,wandersintoamediocreChineserestaurantandstartsbarkingordersatthecooks,itisentirelyreasonabletoejecthimfromthekitchen,notwithstandingthefactthatthecookshavereasonstopreparegoodfoodandwouldbenefit fromJohn’s instruction.Helpingcooks in thatkitchen isnotJohn’sroletoplay,atleastnotuntilsomeoneinviteshimin.Inthefaceofaclaimtoauthority,onecanalwaysask,“Whatrightdoyouhavetomakedemandsonme?”“I’mJohn”isnotanadequateanswer,noris“Iknowbetterthanyou.”But“I’myourboss”mightbe.Rolesstructurerelationshipsofauthority.

Thismarksanimportantdifferencebetweentheoreticalandprac-ticalauthority.IfyouknowmorethanIdo,youcangivemereasonsforbelief,whateverourplaceinthesocialhierarchy.Atheoreticalau-thorityneednotoccupyaroleofauthority. Incontrast,nopersonalattributecangroundpracticalauthority.Welongagoabandonedthe

82.Aparentwhodoesnotloveandsupportherchildisnotfullyoccupyingtherole.



personhasarighttomakedemandsonyouorthatyouhaveanobli-gationtocomply.However,nowthatwehavebuiltupanalternativepictureofauthority,wecanaccommodatetheinsightthatunderliesthenormaljustificationthesis.

Insomepractices,theroleofauthorityis,asRazsays,tohelpsub-jectsconformtoreason,andonemaynothaveauthorityinthatkindofpracticeunlessonecanplaythatrole.Coachingoftenfitsthismod-el.Atenniscoach’sauthorityoveranadultathleteisconditionalonwhetherher instructionsarehelpful.That isnot theonlycondition;otherwise,peoplewouldbesubjecttotheauthorityofintermeddlingtennis coaches.Tobe subject toa tennis coach’sauthority, anadultmusthavesignedupforthelessons.Butif,havingsignedup,onedis-covers that the coach’s instructionsareofnohelp, then the coach’sclaimtoauthorityisvitiated.Thereisnolongeranobligationtodoasthecoachcommands,forthepracticeinwhichoneissoobligatedhaslostitspoint.Theupshotisthatiftheroleofauthorityinapracticeishelpingpeopleconformtoreason,satisfactionofthenormaljustifica-tion thesismaybe a conditionof one’s possessing authoritywithinthatpractice.Inthatrespect,thenormaljustificationthesishasaroletoplayinarole-basedaccountofauthority.87

VIII. Conclusion

Raz’s account of authority is an account of the role of authority, inthatitisanaccountofthepointorfunctionofauthority.Butauthoritydoesnothaveacharacteristicroletoplay,andevenifitdid,theabil-itytoplayaroleisnot,byitself,sufficienttoestablishauthority.Theaimof thisessayhasbeen to shiftour focus fromroles thatauthor-ity plays to roles that peopleplay—whichwe can also call roles of87.Thenormal justification thesisdoesnot,however,exhausta role-basedac-

countofauthority.Onerecurringthemeofthispaperhasbeenthatauthori-tiesmayhaverolestoplaybesideshelpingsubjectconformtoreason.Whenweconsideredtheproceduralistobjection,forexample,wenotedthatsomethinkthattheroleofademocraticauthority istoarbitratedisputesamongsubjectsfairly.Whenweconsideredparentalauthority,wenotedthepossibil-itythatthejustificationfortherolesofparentandchildliesinthedistinctiveformoflovethatisavailabletopeoplewhooccupythoseroles.

issomethingparentsdo(inthenormativesense)willgiveyouarea-sonfordoingit.85Roleidentificationisimportantbecausetherolesweidentifywithmediateourinteractionwiththeworld.Weactasaduti-fulsonwould,orasaresponsibleparentwould.Wecan(andsome-timesshould)stepbackandaskwhetherweoughttooccupytheroleswedo,butmuchofthetimeweare(andprobablyshouldbe)engagedwith, rather thandetached from, the roleswe inhabit. Foronewhoidentifieswitharole,occupyingitisitsownreasonfordischargingtheobligationsoftherole,separateandapartfromthereasonsthatjustifytherole.AsHardimonputsit,

If,forexample,Iamateacher,thefactthatIamateachergivesmeareasonforgradingasetofpaperswhenIamtiredandit is lateatnight.ThefactthatIsignedonfortheroleofteachergivesmeonereasonforcarryingoutitstasks.ThefactthatIamateachergivesmeanother.86

Sotoowithrolesofauthority.Aprivatemayfollowasergeant’sordersbecausehesignedupformilitaryservice,buthemayalsofollowor-dersbecauseheisaprivate,andthatiswhatprivatesdo.Recognizingthatauthorityattachestorolesallowsustoappreciatethatonemightobey a parent, chef, or conductor because one is a daughter, cook,orcellist.

VII. Reviving the Normal Justification Thesis

Darwall’sobjectionteachesusthatsatisfactionofthenormaljustifica-tionthesisdoesnotestablishauthority.ButRaz’stheoryofauthorityhasbeeninfluentialinpartbecausethenormaljustificationthesisar-ticulatessomethingthatseemsright,ifdefeasiblyso:Peopleoughttofollowanother’sinstructionsifdoingsowillhelpthemconformbettertoreason.TheproblemforRaz’saccountisthatheover-claims.Tosaythatitisrationalforyoutodoassomeoneelseordersisnottosaythat

85. IborrowedthissentencefromHardimon,substituting‘parent’for‘judge’.Seeibid.

86. Ibid.,360.



authority—suchaschef,teacher,andparent.Tojustifyauthority,weneedtojustifythepracticesinwhichrolesofauthorityplayapart.88

88.ThankstoMikeAllers,EliBest,SarahBuss,JulesColeman,SteveDarwall,BillEdmundson,DavidEnoch, JohnGardner,DanielHalberstam,DonHerzog,AndreiMarmor, Stephen Perry, Richard Primus, Peter Railton,DonRegan,DaleSmith,EkowYankah,andespeciallyScottShapiroforhelpfulcommentsandconversations.Tworefereesforthisjournalmadevaluablesuggestionsaswell.Ialsobenefitedfromdiscussionwithparticipantsinthe2009Ana-lyticLegalPhilosophyConferenceatKing’sCollege,London.Finally,thankstoLesGreen,FredSchauer,GeorgeLetsas,NicosStavropoulos,andtheotherparticipants in the 2007Oxford-UCLColloquium in Legal Philosophy forfeedbackonanearlyancestorofthispaper.

the role of authority

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