the power of russian gas · europe & “a new industrial revolution” kyoto lisbon moscow 20%...
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Clingendael International Energy Programme www.clingendael.nl/ciep
The Power of Russian Gas
Jacques de JongJacobs Energy Conference
13-15 december 2007 Bremen
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Content:• EU’s need for Russian gas• Russian gas potentials• Infrastructure issues• The role of Gazprom (or the
Kremlin?)• EU reactions
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Gas imports 2030
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EU gas supplier diversifcation; what next?
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EU-27 S/D balance 2015 bcm/a
2006 2010 2015Demand 532,0 580,0 629,0Supplies
UKNL
Other EUNorway
Algeria/pipeLybia/pipe
LNGCall on Russia
83,4 68,0 40,077,7 70,0 60,056,1 58,0 48,085,5 105,1 120,036,0 45,0 52,07,7 8,0 8,0
52,0 100-130 50-130
130 99-126 171-251
Source; CIEP
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EU’s gas encirclement Gazprom
SonatrachCaspian,
Iran, Gazprom ?
LNGWorld market
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LNG: regas versus liquefaction1000 bcm
versus 600 bcm
Source: IEA Natural gas Market review 2007
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Increasing importance of LNG imports… but for Europe export pipelines also very important
0
20
40
60
80
100BCFDBCFD
North AmericaNorth America EuropeEurope Asia PacificAsia Pacific
Local ProductionLocal Production
Long PipelinesLong Pipelines
2000
2000
2030
2030
LNGLNG
Source: ExxonMobilOutlook 2005
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New Infrastructure towards the EU-27(bcm/a)
Pipelines, existing (2006), under
construction/planned (2015)• Russia
– EU-2006: 176– 2015: -FRG +55, Bulgaria +30
• Norway– EU-2006: 128– 2015: UK +11, TBD:<20, Swe/DK:+8
• Algeria– EU-2006: 40 – 2015: Spain +13, Italy +13
• Lybia– EU-2006: 9
• Iran/Caspian– 2015: Bulgaria 23
LNG regas capacity Likely/possible
Belgium 6,5 9,1 9,1 France 15,6 23,9 26,4-59,4
UK 9,0 44,0 49,7-54,7NL 0,0 1,0 17,0-27,0
Italy 3,5 16,5 23,5-47,5Spain 50,5 57,3 64,3
Portugal 5,5 5,5-8,5 5,5-8,5Greece 2,6 2,6 2,6Ireland 0,0 0,0 2,5Croatia 0,0 0,0 10,0Germany 0,0 5,0 10,0
2007 2010 2015
Total 93,2; 159,8-167,8; 198-299,5 Total (2006) 344 – (2015) + 92-173
Conclusion:• LNG-regas sufficient to meet
expected demand • E-W pipelines insufficient to meet
high calls on Russia
Source; CIEP
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Major Russian gas basins
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Russian Gas Production
WEO 2006
WEO 2007:production
700 bcm, 2015820 bcm, 2030
Dom. Use416, 2015470, 2030
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Main Directions of Russian Gas Supply, bcm
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
bcm
Russia Europe CIS North-East Asia Atlantic LNG
Source: ERI RAS (Moscow)
Growing role of domestic market
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
bcm
Import
Far East
Eastern Siberia
Other EuropeanregionsShtokman
Southern region
Tomsk region
Yamal
BolshehetskayaVpadinaOb and Taz Bay
Nadym Pur Taz
Growing role of import
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Russian gas supply outlook
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Source: WEFA
Impact of market Impact of market liberalisationliberalisation
Uncertain gas demandUncertain gas demand
Increase of Increase of competitioncompetition
EU policy on gas EU policy on gas supply sources supply sources diversificationdiversification
Key question for Russia Key question for Russia –– security of demandsecurity of demand
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Russian gas to the EU
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Gas pipeline supply infrastructure to EU
Nordstream project
Nabucco project South stream ?
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South Stream: viable?
Map source: ENI & Gazprom
• Cost of construction? (Involvement of Gazprom and ENI suggests that the costs would be excessive…)
• Where’s the gas?
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Russian Govt. Proposed FE Oil & Gas Pipelines
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Russian Oil & Gas pipelines toEurope
Running the E-W gas grid
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Who runs Gazprom?
Gazprom-building
White House(Russian Parliament)
Rosneft-building
Gazprom-building: no exit
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Who runs the Kremlin?
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Yamal-Europe
Nord StreamBrotherhood
upstream
downstream
midstream
Blue StreamSouth Stream
Gazprom Export Strategy in the Value Chain
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Gazprom & production
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How much money is required to develop new gas production areas?
Gazprom’s estimates of Yamal Peninsula gas field development costs(billion USD in current US dollars)
Source: Gazprom’s “Complex program of Yamal Peninsula gas fields industrial development”, 2002; Vladimir Milov
1,0
5,5
7,2
17,6
48,1
85,4
0 50 100
A lloca ted for Bov a n en ko a n dKh a r a sa v ey in 2 007
A u x ilia r y in fr a str u ctu r e
Obska y a a n d Ta zov ska y aba y s a n d Ka r a sea g a s fields
Bov a n en ko a n d Kh a r a sa v eyg a s fields
Ya m a l-m a in la n d g a str a n spor ta t ion sy stem
Tota l in v estm en ts r equ ir ed
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Will Gazprom invest enough in new gas field development to address the supply challenge?
Structure of Structure of Gazprom’sGazprom’s investment program for 2007 (billion USD)investment program for 2007 (billion USD)
Source: Gazprom’s board of directors decisions of January, May, August 2007; Vladimir Milov
5,3
4,5
6,4 10,6
1,0
1,1
1,8
0 5 10 15 20
Other purposes
Yamal Peninsula gas fields
Shtokman and Prirazlomnoye
Upstream - current region ofproduction
Main gas transport projects
Financial investments (acquisitionsof companies)
A ppr ov ed in Ja n u a r y 2 007
Recen t a m en dm en ts
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Midstream – Gazprom & gas-pipes
Political motives: more Russian leverage – transitcountries (Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia)
Political motives: Transitcountry leverage diminishes via uncoupling non-gas packages
Economic motives: Caspian & Iranian competitors: keep them out of the EU-market
Pipeline equity: create added values
Source: Keohane en Nye Jr. 1977; CIEP- analysis
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Midstream – create st/mt overcapacity in pipelines
Totaal Nord Stream South Stream Yamal-Europe Oekraïne-transit
Max.
200
261
55
18
30
18
140
Gazprom capacity and volume to Europe until 2015 (bcm/a)
60• Planned additional
pipelinecapacity toEurope
• Growth exportvolumes limited according estimates
• Expected 2015 overcapacity of 60 bcm
Source: Gazprom; RPI; Global Insight;CIEP analysise
Pipeline capaciyMax. gasvolume Gazprom
to Europe
Overcapacity
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ST-contractsLT-contracts
94,6%
5,4%
99,1%
0,9%
Gazprom sales on ST & LT EU markets, 2003
Gazprom sales on ST & LT EU markets, 2006
•Substantial growth gasvolumes in spot-markets
•LT-contracts remain basis for security of demand & supply
Source: Gazprom, Gazprom Marketing & Trading; CIEP analysis
Midstream: Gazprom interest in st-markets
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Indirect Gazprom selling to strategic partners on wholesale markets
Direct Gazprom selling via:
• strategic European joint ventures (such as Wingas)
• full control in greenfield investments (Gazprom Marketing & Trading) or acquisition(Pennine Natural Gas, NGSS)
Source:H.W. de Jong 1989; CIEP analysis
Downstream & export strategy
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Gazprom exportstrategy‘bet on more horses’
midstream
downstream
– Create overcapacity to have options to switch gas flows
– These options add value to Gazprom investments and diminish transit-copuntry leverages.
– Monopolise Eurasian gascorridors
– Use options from global gasmarket-developments– Create additional options for growth – Prepare for further globalising and liberalsing
gasmarkets, in Europe and elsewhere
Gazprom strategy follows economic theory; fully in line with past corprate strategies oil industry:
how to grow in mature marketsSource:H.W. de Jong 1989;
CIEP analysis
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Mr Barosso,Do you seethe road toan (external)EU energyPolicy?
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EU Energy package 2007An Energy policy for
Europe & “a new industrial revolution”
Kyoto LisbonMoscow
20% • less CO-2
• more energy efficiency
• RES-share
in 2020
Welfare gainsOutstanding issues:
No full complianceAccess & unbundling
L.t. contractsinfrastructures
Internal solidarity:-- diversify away from hc’s-- more interconnectionsExternal energy policy:
-- one voice-- dialogue & cooperation
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One voice in International Energy Policy
• What vision, what strategy….• Who’s voice:
– Kyoto leaderships?– Mandelson/Piebalgs + 27 watchdogs– Troika– Eurogroup-model– Solana– The new EU president?
• Stability or presidency-priority settings
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How to face the RussianPosition, …..
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All eastern gasvia Gazprom?...
Scope for bilateral deals ?
Gas upstream competition & downstream deals
Gazprom-Sonatrach Cooperation ? Doha, april 2007: gas
cartel to come ?
Southstream, Northstream
Shtokman
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The ring strategy
shtokman
North Stream
South Stream
The two sides of the Ring:
The Russian leverage?
The European catchers?
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Conclusions
• Politics & energy, the two sides of the same coin…..
• Gazprom strategies: industrial logics• EU policy developing &
developing…..
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