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Nationalities Papers, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1996

THE POLITICS OF THE CONQUEST OF THECAUCASUS, 1855-1864

Willis Brooks

The study of politics is popular in Russian history; the examination of Russianpolitics in its regions is not, at least, not yet. The spectrum of interpretations aboutautocratic politics includes the parading of litanies of imperial arbitrariness and/ormanipulation of interest groups against each other, incidents of ministerial incapacityto restrain the autocrat, examples of the inordinate power of favorites, the failure toestablish regularizing institutions that would restrain autocrats, and a series ofinteresting categories including such wonderfully suggestive terms as "free floaters"proposed in Alfred Rieber's important article on the subject.1 Whether one is weddedto the notion that tsars decided all in the nineteenth century, or advocate somescheme that emphasizes the plurality of conflicting interests at play in decision-making, however, the pattern of scholarly production suggests that regional politicshas been of secondary importance, and that in any event documentation often is lack-ing; in short, such approaches are not seen as ideal lines of inquiry. This article seeksto make a contribution to the debate about the politics of autocrats by examining alocalized question where documentation is rather complete and where ministerial/bureaucratic lines may be traced fairly closely, in an attempt to shed added light onRussia's leadership in a time of great crisis, specifically the aftermath of thehumiliating defeat in the Crimean War and the tension surrounding the preparationsand implementation of the Emancipation and other reforms. To be specific as wellas anticipatory, it is argued that there are regional questions of great national, indeedinternational, importance to autocrats, that the Caucasus was so recognized in thepost-Crimean War period, and that those involved in the region affected policydecisions in ways that rivaled, as well as displaced, senior officials in the capital.

I. Background

As the Crimean War wound down in the winter of 1855-1856, and Russia's defeatbecame an accepted reality by Alexander II, prospects to complete the half-centurylong struggle to pacify the Caucasus seemed distant, incalculable and perhapsuncertain, the more so because the allies showed some determination to includeterritorial questions about the Caucasus in the peace settlement.2 In little more thanthree years, however, the mountaineers (gortsy) were defeated, their legendary leaderShamil' captured, and Eastern Caucasus subdued.3 The conquest of the WesternCaucasus, generally dated as 1864, remained only a bloody formality.

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How could leading foreign and Russian authorities have so wildly miscalculated?How could the Russian army perform so badly in one area and so well in another?More to the point, why would a tsar presiding over a totally humiliated military anda financially endangered state reject conventional wisdom and risk enormous man-power and financial resources on such an unpromising project? While the militarycampaigns that led to the final pacification of the Caucasus are well known, thedecisions that put the Russian army on the offensive immediately after their failureto defend their homeland, and subsequent decisions that led to that conquest, havenot been examined closely. This article therefore attempts to examine a specificissue, the decision-making that led to the post-Crimean War subjugation of theCaucasus, to see what relevance an outlying region may have for a better understand-ing of autocratic politics.

Tsarist management of attempts to pacify the Caucasus and to integrate the regioninto the Russian empire may be dated at least from 1801, when the annexation ofGeorgia crystallized Russian power in that region, creating new Russian territorialboundaries and raising unique political, legal, economic, military, and culturalproblems. But the subsequent period was not one of clear or abiding imperialpolicies: intermittent alterations between brutal suppression and rather passiveadministration failed to accomplish Russia's imperial goals, finally convincing afrustrated Nicholas I to endorse an 1833 report that simplisticly argued for a policythat would force the native inhabitants to "speak, think, and feel Russian."4 Annualexpeditions planned from St. Petersburg optimistically projected rapid pacificationthrough conquest until the mid-1840s, when Nicholas admitted the failure of such apolicy by appointing Count M. S. Vorontsov to a newly created vice-regency andleaving this extraordinarily competent favorite to plot a more systematic (and patient)route to the same goal.5 During the Crimean War Vorontsov's successor, GeneralN. N. Murav'ev, largely remained passive, though with military forces considerablyenlarged to resist an allied expedition that never materialized. In short, the Caucasuswas recognized as of great importance to the empire in peace and war, but recentfailures in the region, plus more pressing national problems, had forced the autocratto entrust the local commander (viceroy) with considerably greater individualresponsibility and initiative than generally was allowed imperial administrators.

II. The Decision to Campaign

On the eve of the signing of the Treaty of Paris ending the Crimean War, MajorGeneral D. A. Miliutin, future war minister who at the time was attached to the suiteof War Minister Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, submitted a memorandum to his superiorrecommending that all supplementary forces assigned to the Caucasus during the warbe attached to the regular command to attempt a decisive military campaign againstthe gortsy.6 As Miliutin anticipated, based on his service with the (future) tsar on theBaltic defense committee earlier in the war, Alexander read the memorandum and,

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attracted by the extraordinary political and other benefits that could accrue from amilitary victory, circulated Miliutin's proposal to Murav'ev and to several other highmilitary commanders, including Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, a close confidant whorecently had returned from duty as head of the Left Flank of the CaucasianCommand.7 Only Murav'ev opposed, but only Bariatinskii seized the initiativeby writing his own additional proposal that gave concrete direction to Miliutin'sgeneral plan. While Miliutin's memorandum had only vaguely projected a series ofmilitary campaigns until the conquest could be completed as a result of continuouspressure on the mountain tribesmen, Bariatinskii specified areas for concentratedeffort and types of units to carry out the fighting. Alexander invited Miliutin andothers to comment on Bariatinskii's plan of action, and Miliutin wrote two morememoranda supporting Bariatinskii (and criticizing Murav'ev's response), whileBariatinskii submitted follow-up memoranda and engaged in correspondence withAlexander's newly appointed war minister, General N. O. Sukhozanet.8 The latterseems to have resisted the idea of a Caucasian campaign primarily because Alexan-der had just instructed him to reduce the size of the army and to cut militaryexpenditures, which new military ventures would prevent him from accomplishing.If Alexander's eventual decision to appoint Bariatinskii to carry out his plan ofconquest, with substantively increased powers for his new viceroy both for indepen-dent decision-making and for direct access to himself, followed an apparently logicalprogression within the military from an aide's initial proposal to the imperialdecision, it also had been done without any mention of international complications(such as foreign aid to the gortsy) and, more immediately, was in conflict withexplicit instructions he, Alexander, was giving his war minister almost at the sametime.

Alexander II bluntly penciled his decision in early May on one of Sukhozanet'sreports: "I oppose that [plan supported by Sukhozanet], and completely agree withthe view of Prince Bariatinskii."9 Though details were worked out only duringAlexander's coronation in July and August, a crucially important point is that thereis no evidence that Alexander consulted either the minister of foreign affairs or offinances during this period—obvious, if not dangerous, oversights.10

Though it is not possible to be sure of all aspects of Alexander's thinking at thistime, it is probable that he endorsed the Miliutin/Bariatinskii plan as rapidly as he didin part because their ideas about administration and local rule in the Caucasus closelycoincided with established imperial patterns. For example, Miliutin's original mem-orandum had emphasized that administrative measures were important adjuncts toforce of arms, not only to complete the military conquest but also, in words thatNicholas I would have approved, "to achieve that moral influence which constitutesthe basis of a true and complete subjugation of the [native] peoples."11 Miliutin wroteconfidently that trade with mountain tribesmen, educational institutions, and theintroduction of Christianity in the Caucasus all could contribute substantively to thegeneral effort to subjugate the region and integrate it fully within the empire, and

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Bariatinskii's memoranda written at this time echoed the same general themes, whichclosely coincided with Alexander's own views.

In short, within weeks after a major international defeat that had resulted in nearfiscal bankruptcy and aroused Alexander II to curb military expenditures by reducingthe army almost by one-half and to raise the question of abolishing serfdom, theemperor nevertheless was receptive to an expensive and risky military venture thatwould, if successful, increase national unity and begin to restore internationalprestige; but if it failed, as all precedent suggested it would, the result was likely toadd considerable political and economic stress to Russia's already strained govern-ment and society. In any event, Alexander acted rapidly and, it should be acknowl-edged, although in selecting Bariatinskii he was choosing a favorite, Bariatinskii wasan experienced and successful military commander who had drawn up a detailed andrational plan of action that included the naming of Miliutin as his chief of staff.

III. The Politics of Continuous Campaigning, 1856-1859

For the next two years Alexander bolstered the possibility of military success bygranting Bariatinskii direct access to himself and assuring necessary financial andmilitary resources to carry out the plan. Beginning in the fall of 1856 the Russianmilitary began a series of almost constant activity against Shamir's forces and whichalmost immediately forced the gortsy onto the defensive. At the same time, however,Alexander gave quite specific instructions to the war minister to carry out awide-ranging demobilization, including major cost cutting and reduction in forces. Infact, pressed to reduce expenditures while nearly one-third of his ministry's budgetlay beyond his control in the Caucasus, Sukhozanet persuaded the emperor to put offuntil 1857 two small military operations Bariatinskii had planned for the fall of 1856and for which Alexander originally had given his approval. In spite of suchinterference by the war minister, by late 1857 Bariatinskii had achieved substantialresults, including the occupation of previously unpacified areas and the introductionof a major administrative reorganization that significantly improved both militaryefficiency and civil control. The military strategy had proved sound, and the tacticalcommanders maneuvered brilliantly in execution.12

Nevertheless, the national financial crisis eventually forced Alexander to recon-sider his strong commitment to the conquest of the Caucasus. Whenever Bariatinskiifailed to get the support he sought, however, he invariably accused others, especiallySukhozanet, of undermining his position, for favorites of the throne knew better thanto blame the emperor for their problems; and Alexander's commitments in theCaucasus soon were questioned by more than the war minister. According toMiliutin, Bariatinskii became so upset by Sukhozanet's and other ministers' com-plaints which threatened to infringe on his own power that as early as the end of1856 he appealed to Alexander to issue a command through the Senate forbiddinganyone to have any dealings with Caucasus affairs without his knowledge and

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approval.13 Alexander balked at this, and instructed the chairman of the CaucasusCommittee to try to pacify Bariatinskii by an explanation of Sukhozanet's difficultposition in the capital:

Our deficit in 1857 will rise to eighty million rubles silver. Such, or nearly such a sum,will continue in 1858. Therefore every effort is being made to curtail expenditures. They[the war minister and Minister of Finances P. F. Brok] are thinking most of all about thereduction of land forces and sea forces. The poor War Minister flails about like a fish outof water, not knowing what to expect.14

When Bariatinskii remained unmoved, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich,Bariatinskii's most powerful supporter in Caucasian affairs in St. Petersburg, alsowrote Bariatinskii about the financial crisis, followed by vividly detailed letters fromhis aide, A. V. Golovnin, to Miliutin.15 At this point Alexander formed a committeeto review the war minister's budget, even empowering it to make cuts, in an attemptboth to compel Bariatinskii to work through regular channels and to reassure him thatSt. Petersburg officials were able to make rational decisions for the good of theempire. But Bariatinskii's response was to continue to appeal directly to Alexander,and even to propose new projects. Sukhozanet wrote the viceroy, enumerating theirmany conflicts in the preceding months and affirming his right to involve himself inall affairs affecting the War Ministry, concluding: "It is not I breaking laws given byyou, but you [who] intends to subvert the activities of the minister to your desires."16

The Sukhozanet-Bariatinskii confrontation became so embittered by mid-1857 thatthe Emperor felt compelled to intervene. In a barely veiled warning to Bariatinskii,Alexander defended Sukhozanet:

N'oubliez pas, dans la haute position ou ma confiance vous a place1, que le pays et lestroupes qui sont sous vos ordres font partie de la grande patrie, or en ayant en vue leurbien etre, ne perdez pas de vue le Men general}1

This imperial appeal, which also included a request to Bariatinskii to reduce militaryoperations "for a year or two," was immediately resisted by the viceroy, who wrotein reply, "The essence of this important matter consists in doing nothing wasteful;where future benefits are anticipated, one need not fear the investment of capital."18

Miliutin's memoirs describe similar faulty communication between Bariatinskiiand Sukhozanet at this time:

In the letters of General Sukhozanet to Prince Bariatinskii, in clumsy, almost illiteratelanguage, there was no evidence of ill-will; [there was] even a bit of good nature. Butquite frequently perceptible in Prince Bariatinskii's letters was a warning against theMinistry, a suspicion of his [Sukhozanet's] animosity toward the Caucasus.19

After Alexander intervened, Miliutin continued,

Only the tone of their correspondence softened; in essence, previous mutual distrust andtension remained. Sukhozanet, like the majority of St. Petersburg officials, continued to

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view Bariatinskii as an egotist who, using the disposition of the Tsar, was assuming thepersonal power of a satrap, and for his own glory was ready to destroy the state.20

Bariatinskii turned to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich for support, but this timewas rebuffed there, too, and fumed, "Either use increased means in this region ftocomplete the conquest] or call it off forever. With half measures we only create anulcer which is draining the best juices of the state."21

The loss of support of this powerful ally and Bariatinskii's continuing conflict withthe war minister, who soon after recommended the withdrawal of those military unitstransferred to the Caucasus at the outset of the Crimean War, occurred at a criticaljuncture. Any reduction of military operations would have given hope to Shamir thatthe Russians once again were wavering in their policy, and would have created gravedoubts among those tribes contemplating defection to Russian protection, not tomention confusing the newly pacified tribesmen about Russian intentions. Moreover,having completed the initial phase of his strategy of conquest Bariatinskii felt heneeded imperial support more than ever for future military and civil plans, which, asa result of another Alexandrine decision, now had to be reviewed by a battery ofministries as well as by the emperor himself.

In late 1857 Bariatinskii decided to send Miliutin to St. Petersburg to gain supportfor a series of projects, and the detailed, almost daily, correspondence between thetwo offers a unique record of the decision-making process at this time.22 Moststriking were Alexander's approval to reorganize the administration of the militaryin the Caucasus (which later became a model for Miliutin's district reform in themid-1860s), his ordering of Sukhozanet to ship the first 10,000 rifles bought fromabroad to the Caucasus, and his leaving the Crimean War supplemental forces in theCaucasus a while longer. There were minor defeats: Minister of Foreign AffairsPrince A. M. Gorchakov now became a factor when he dissuaded Alexander fromestablishing naval units in the Black Sea that would keep Turkish and Britishmaterial aid from the gortsy, a foreign interference that had existed for decades butno longer (if ever) constituted a major threat; and Sukhozanet and other ministers andhigh-ranking officials talked the emperor out of funding certain trade and irrigationprojects, railroad construction, and colonization of the Eastern Caucasus withCossacks. Though Bariatinskii had not considered these latter projects essential atthis time, he continued to appeal to Alexander for their funding, undoubtedly toavoid regular ministerial review as well as to prove his ability to stand outside anynormal bureaucratic process.

It is also important to emphasize that in Miliutin Bariatinskii had a willing andcompetent instrument. After Miliutin's visit to St. Petersburg in fall 1857, forexample, Golovnin complained to Bariatinskii about his behavior:

[Miliutin] arrived here fascinated with the Caucasus like a twenty-year-old youth capti-vated with his sweetheart and demanding impossible expenditures from his poor mother,central Russia, sick, ravaged, taken advantage of by ignorant and incompetent doctors, for

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gifts for the use of this beautiful foreign thing which has bewitched him and whichundoubtedly will betray him many times.23

Bariatinskii shrugged off such complaints, determined that continued military suc-cess was the best guarantee of imperial favor, and in 1858-1859 sped up his originaltimetable to defeat Shamn".

Despite these successes, dangerous foreign entanglements in Europe in early 1859led to Alexander's suggestion that Bariatinskii might arrange some compromise withShamil'.24 Fearing that Alexander would withdraw troops from the Caucasus to meetthis new threat, Bariatinskii wrote Alexander of still another new plan he hadformulated to hasten the final defeat of Shamil', and asked permission to explain itin' person in the capital. Alexander acceded and, over Sukhozanet's objections,approved Bariatinskii's campaign plan that in fact led directly to the capture ofShamil', which effectively ended Russian military conquest in the Eastern Cauca-sus.25 Alexander's response was predictable: Bariatinskii was promoted to fieldmarshal, a rank held at that time by no other Russian general, and Miliutin and otherofficers (and soldiers) were promoted and awarded medals and money gifts. Theconquest of the Western Caucasus required additional time and imperial support, butwas not in doubt after ShanuT's capture: Bariatinskii had learned that the mosteffective strategy to defeat the gortsy was first to overcome the St. Petersburgbureaucrats.

IV. Conclusions

The conquest of the Caucasus, an exceptional military accomplishment, provides astriking example of the nature of politics early in the reign of Alexander II and ofthe military, political, and economic importance of the region for the empire as awhole. While this brief article cannot trace all the relevant threads in this complexcase study, one is struck by several aspects of autocratic politics. Though not spelledout in detail in these pages it is apparent that Alexander was rather ignorant ofmilitary affairs, offset in this case (not in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878) byhis selection of the highly competent Bariatinskii. Having named this favorite to aposition of considerable and diverse significance for the empire, Alexander's failureto consult with all the relevant ministers, especially the ministers of foreign affairsand finances, is instructive about his decision-making, as was, in turn, his subsequentwillingness to be persuaded by their arguments without seeking Bariatinskii's views.In addition to being swayed by Sukhozanet into making certain alterations ofBariatinskii's initial plan, he showed on another occasion just how little he under-stood Bariatinskii's plan and its progress by threatening the whole venture on therecommendation of a minister of foreign affairs who, however skilled, had nomilitary expertise.

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Alexander's apparent unconcern for fiscal realities also seems remarkable. Thoughhis closest and most responsible advisers constantly reminded him that Russia'sfinancial weakness had been a major factor compelling Russia to end the CrimeanWar and, by extension, had forced the state to act with extraordinary fiscal caution,Alexander ignored those officials regularly in making decisions related to theconquest of the Caucasus. Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich could do little morethan anguish in his diary about Russia's desperate financial situation, as in his entryfor 22 December 1859, when he wrote: "I spoke with Sasha [Alexander II] aboutState expenditures and about the deficit. He is in total illusion and does not realizeour terrible position."26

Alexander's reliance on favorites is confirmed in three examples. On the one hand,Bariatinskii used his prior close relationship to build on Miliutin's memorandum andpersuade the tsar to grant him great personal power as well as the ability to decidehow vast sums of money and human resources would be employed. In addition,Bariatinskii as favorite was able to interfere in the conduct of other ministries'business. He also ignored their pleas for fiscal and administrative responsibility.Finally, Bariatinskii was able to use his position to overturn decisions other ministershad persuaded Alexander to make, most strikingly in the field of foreign affairs.

Nor could the Grand Duke, his aides, or other interested parties, either throughofficial memoranda or by personal correspondence with Bariatinskii and/or Miliutin,persuade either one to desist from their determination to gain their way with theemperor. Indeed, while "domination" is not the appropriate word when discussingthe relationship between a confidant and a Russian autocrat, one is struck byAlexander's frequent failure—unwillingness may be a better term—to force Bariatin-skii to work with Sukhozanet or in other ways to place restraints on the former'sbehavior. As a result, for several years an emperor's favorite in the distant Caucasusvirtually decided matters of critical significance for the Russian empire against theadvice of the emperor's highest officials. Even if Alexander's commitment to engagein the Caucasus campaign—a major conflict—was remarkable in itself in theaftermath of the Crimean War defeat, what is more surprising was that he alloweda regional official, Bariatinskii, to affect significant imperial policy decisions.Traditionally, scholars have assumed that major policies were formulated only in St.Petersburg by officials presumably driven by overall imperial concerns.

Moreover, the results had a ripple effect. The military conquest, and especially theadministrative control subsequently introduced into the region, gave Russia a greatermeasure of security on its southern boundary and in that sense contributed to therestoration of Russia's international military and diplomatic prestige in the aftermathof the Crimean disaster. Measuring success in administrative, military or diplomaticaffairs always is tricky business, but in this case it is clear that Western militaryspecialists who were confident that the Caucasus was unconquerable for the foresee-able future must have been impressed, especially by the speed and efficiency withwhich campaigns were carried out by an army that had just performed so poorly in

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the Crimea. Of course, it would be appropriate to note that the Russian forces in theCaucasus were hardly tested in the Crimean War, but in the case of the Caucasusthey undoubtedly based their opinions on past Russian military fortunes, which theyhad been following closely for decades. In addition, while French, English and, ofcourse, Turkish sympathy (and selfish motives) continued throughout this period,assistance to the local mountain peoples declined. In the case of England, it devolvedto private initiatives; in France's, Russia frequently protested French interferencewhich was minimal in this period, itself a certain sign of Russian confidence if notof French respect. No one expected the Turks to surrender interest in the region, buttheir involvement was limited by the Peace of Paris (along with continued Alliedsympathies for the Turks as restraints on the Russians) to occasional gun runners andreligious exhortations and, perhaps more significant for the long run, by theirworking closely with the Russians when tens of thousands of tribesmen emigratedfrom Russia to Turkey in the late 1850s-early 1860s.27

Any assertion of military or diplomatic success in the Caucasus in this period,however, would have to share that claim with Russia's handling of the Polishrebellion and its military expansion into Central Asia, which coincided with the latteryears of this period and which had dramatic effects in Western Europe's appreciationof Russia's international goals. In the former case, to be sure, the military did notalways act with efficiency, but Russia did gain strong Prussian support (viz.Gorchakov-Alvensleben convention); and, after some diplomatic huffing, Englandand France backed off from active Polish assistance. Russian diplomatic achieve-ments were, in part, made easier by the military conquest in the Caucasus.28 In thecase of Central Asia—a new area of contentious competition—it was obvious to allthat Russia's final victory in the Caucasus opened the way to expansion in theneighboring khanates. Russian reconnaissances of Central Asia had been underwayfor several decades, and one such expedition actually jumped off from the Caucasusafter consultation with Bariatinskii in Tiflis in January 1858.29 The conclusion of theCaucasian war undoubtedly aroused respect (read, fear about trade opportunitiesmore than anything else) in England as to the intentions of an expansionist emperorwhose hands were now freer to contemplate future moves with greater confidence inhis military.

To conclude, Bariatinskii's behavior was not as remarkable as his achievement.Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich (no uncritical admirer either of his brother or ofNicholas I) five days after recording the quoted frustration over Alexander's inabilityto handle financial questions in a sensible manner, noted in his diary: "Bariatinskiiarrived this morning. I immediately went to the Winter Palace to see him and foundhim with the Empress. I sincerely love and respect him."30 One of the mostoutspoken would-be reformers of this period obviously had accepted the rules of the"favorite" game and admired its most successful player. Autocracy lived by suchrules, and as shown by this case study, used that power in the distant Caucasus togain a victory of great imperial, indeed international, proportions.

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NOTES

1. Alfred J. Rieber, "Bureaucratic Politics in Imperial Russia," Social Science History 2:4(Summer 1978), 399-413. S. Frederick Starr, 'Tsarist Government: the Imperial Dimension"in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York, 1978), 3-38,is another insightful overview, directed more specifically at the general problem of Russianimperialism. Questions of imperial decision-making have been addressed most notably byRieber in his The Politics of Autocracy. Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii,1857-1864 (The Hague, 1966). Older works, even John F. Baddeley's classic The RussianConquest of the Caucasus (New York, 1908), as an example close to the subject of this study,ignored how and why successive tsars determined their policies in the Caucasus.

Russian colonialism and imperialism have been major topics of historiographical dispute,especially in recent times, but Marc Raeff, writing in 1971, lamented that "[t]he first difficultyconfronting a historian who wishes to analyze the evolution of attitudes and policies towardthe nationalities in the Empire before the middle of the nineteenth century is the paucity ofboth historiography and published sources." Marc Raeff, "Patterns of Russian Imperial PolicyToward the Nationalities" in Edward Allworth, ed., Soviet Nationality Problems (New York,1971), 23. Soviet historiography was too diverse to characterize briefly, but two points maybe noted: rarely did Soviet scholars address questions of decision-making, except in connec-tion with Russia's foreign affairs, and often the Caucasus and Central Asia were paired foranalysis. For recent examples, see N. S. Kiniapina, M. M. Bliev, and V. V. Degoev, Kavkazi Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii. Vtoraia polovina XVIII-80-e gody XIX v.(Moscow, 1984), and the same authors, "Sovremennaia burzhuaznaia istoriografiia politikiRossii na Kavkaze i v Srednei Azii v XIX veke," Voprosy istorii (1988), No. 4, 37-53.

2. Such was the view of prospects for the conquest by N. N. Murav'ev, current viceroy of theregion, Count M. S. Vorontsov, his predecessor, and other military experts on the area. Seealso D. I. Romanovskii, "General-fel'dmarshal kniaz' A. I. Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaia voina.1815-1879 gg.," Russkaia starina 30 (1881), 247-318, and Winfried Baumgart, The Peace ofParis 1856. Studies in War, Diplomacy, and Peacemaking (Santa Barbara, 1981), 111-112, forBritish determination to follow up the terms of Austria's December 1855 ultimatum to Russiathat included discussion of the future control of the Caucasus.

3. See Baddeley, passim, and Otchet namestnika Kavkazskago i glavnokomanduiushchagoKavkazskoi armiei (1857, 1858, 1859) (Tiflis, 1861), Bariatinskii's self-congratulatory 1859report to Alexander, which relates the general course of the conquest. Many passages ofA. L. Zisserman's three-volume biography, Fel'dmarshal kniaz' Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatin-skii, 1815-1879 (Moscow, 1888-1891) are barely veiled paraphrases of this report.

4. Kolonial'naia politika rossiiskogo tsarizma v Azerbaidzhane v 20-60 gg. XIX v., part 1(Moscow-Leningrad, 1936), 280.

5. See my essay, "Nicholas I as Reformer: Russian Attempts to Conquer the Caucasus,1825-1855" in Ivo Banac et al., eds., Nation and Ideology (Boulder, CO, 1981), 227-263, forgeneral background, and Laurens H. Rhinelander, Jr., "Viceroy Vorontsov's Administration ofthe Caucasus" in Ronald G. Suny, ed., Transcaucasia. Nationalism and Social Change (AnnArbor, 1983), 87-108, fora somewhat differing appreciation of Vorontsov's accomplishments.

6. "O plane budushchikh deistvii na Kavkaze," draft in Miliutin's handwriting. Russkaiagosudarstvennaia biblioteka, Otdel rukopisei, fund 169 [D. A. Miliutin], box 19.39, 4 sheets.Except where noted otherwise, subsequent archival references are from this fund. Miliutin hadsubmitted a very similar memorandum in August 1854, but it had been ignored.

7. P. O. Bobrovskii, "Imperator Aleksandr II i ego pervye shagi k pokoreniiu Kavkaza (Epizodiz istorii velikoi Kavkazskoi voiny)," Voennyi sbornik 234:4 (April 1897), 203-215.

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8. "O sredstvakh k ustraneniiu sushchestvuiushchikh neudobstv v nachal'stvovanii voiskami naKavkaze," box 19.8, [May] 1856, 3 sheets, and "O nekotorykh administrativnykh merakh votnoshenii k pokornym plemenam Kavkaza," box 19.9, [May] 1856, 4 sheets, both drafts inMiliutin's hand. The latter memorandum is published in full in Zisserman 2:part 2, 26-29, buterroneously attributed as a report of Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, Sukhozanet's predecessor asWar Minister. Bariatinskii's memoranda are printed on pages 13-18 and 30-35.

9. Miliutin's memoirs give the best description of the memoranda and of Bariatinskii's successfulopposition to Murav'ev's pessimistic views about future Russian action in the Caucasus. Box9.1, sheets 35-41; the quote is on sheet 48. See also Bobrovskii, 208-210, and Romanovskii,"General-fel'dmarshal," especially 307-313.

10. "Zapjski Vasiliia Antonovicha Insarskago," Russkaia starina 84 (August 1895), 25. Furtherconfirmation that the Caucasus was seen solely as an "internal problem" may be extrapolatedfrom the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs survey of its nineteenth-century activities,Ocherk istorii ministerstva inostrannykh del 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902), makes nomention of the Caucasus in the reign of Alexander II, though many other regions arementioned, most notably Russia's expansion into Central Asia.

11. "O nekotorykh, loc. cit.12. One of the privileges Bariatinskii used most often was to bypass Sukhozanet when purging

weak officers (shipping them back to Sukhozanet for reassignment), replacing them, withAlexander's approval and, again, without Sukhozanet's involvement, with men he knew andrespected from earlier service in the region.

13. Box 13.2, sheet 61.14. Letter of 20 March 1857 from Vladimir Petrovich Butkov to Bariatinskii, as quoted in box

13.2, sheet 36.15. See box 61.26 for Golovnin's letters to Miliutin in this period.16. Zisserman, 67. Letter of 15 May 1857.17. Rieber, The Politics of Autocracy, 105. Letter dated 20 May 1857. Emphasis in original.18. Zisserman, 77. Letter of 4 June 1857.19. Box 13.2, sheet 61. Zisserman'S biography contains a large part of this correspondence, as

does Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei, 12 (Tiflis, 1904), but theletters in the latter reference often are edited without acknowledgement.

20. Box 13.2, sheet 66.21. Zisserman, 108-109. Letter dated 24 June 1857.22. The correspondence is extant in the Miliutin archive, and published with minor omissions in

Zisserman, 142-169.23. Zisserman, 115-116. Letter of 10/22 December 1857.24. Rieber, 129. See also Alexander's 28 July 1859 letter to Bariatinskii, 130-131, in which

Alexander repeats the possible desirability of a negotiated settlement with Shami F. Theimmediate cause of the latter letter was the report of the Russian ambassador in Constantinoplethat Shamir's agents there had stated that Shamir was willing to enter into peace negotiations.Both Gorchakov and Sukhozanet also wrote Bariatinskii recommending acceptance ofShamil"s offer. Zisserman, 268-270. Gorchakov's letter emphasized the dangerous politicalsituation in Western Europe and reported that Alexander already had instructed the Russianambassador in Constantinople to agree to negotiations, with Bariatinskii empowered to workout any settlement, but Bariatinskii opposed any agreement with ShamiF, even if he shouldescape the siege Russian forces had begun at his mountain retreat. See Bariatinskii's letter toGorchakov, 269-270. Miliutin's memoirs, box 13.3, sheets 52-52 overleaf and 55, suggest thatAlexander did not understand how close Bariatinskii was to final victory, thinking it was onlyanother minor expedition with many more needed before final conquest.

25. Zisserman, 206-210, provides details, including relevant correspondence.

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26. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Russkoi federatsii (GARF, formerly TsGAOR), fund 722 (GrandDuke Konstantin Nikolaevich), index 1, item 91, sheet 109 overleaf. Entry of 22 December1858.

27. See my article, "Russia's Conquest and Pacification of the Caucasus: Relocation Becomes APogrom in the Post-Crimean War Period" in Nationalities Papers, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December1995), pp. 675-686.

28. For a general assessment of Russian diplomacy related to the Polish question in and around1863, see S. S. Tatishchev Imperator Aleksandr II. Ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie I (St. Petersburg,1903), especially chapter 17.

29. In fact, in his memoirs Miliutin quotes a letter from Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich toBariatinskii, hand carried to the viceroy by N. V. Khanykov, the head of the expedition, thatalso refers to the mission as an opportunity to use British troubles in India to achieve Russiangoals: box 13.2, sheet 133); see also Seymour Becker Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia:Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, MA, 1968), especially chapter 1. Becker, 14,traces Russian expansion to pre-Petrine times, and in the late 1850s stood "on the threshold"of the region and considered "further Russian advance ... inevitable." The exploits in the FarEast of N. N. Murav'ev (soon to be rewarded in part by the hyphenated "Amurskii")unaddressed in this article, offer a contemporary parallel example of much that has beenpresented here. See, for example, Tatishchev, 1:275-78, for suggestive details.

30. GARF, fund 722, inventory 1, item 91, sheet 110 overleaf.

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