the political side of social program evaluation ministry of social development mexico gonzalo...
TRANSCRIPT
The political side of social program
evaluation
Ministry of Social Development MEXICO
Gonzalo Hernández Licona
Objective Analyse the institutional challenges facing Mexico,
specifically SEDESOL, in constructing a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system.
How can we institutionalize an M&E system? The political constraints and challenges
How can we go beyond the impact evaluation of Oportunidades?: More programs evaluated in a regular basis Constructing a Results-based management system Insert M&E within the Social Policy process
Outline Analytical framework
What type of M&E system we’re aiming for?
The need of creating and designing institutions in order to build an M&E system
What have we done and what’s next?
Conclusions
Social Policy Identification of social
problems and objectives
Analysis
Program design Program operation and
resources Budget
Monitoring and Evaluation
Evaluation: why and how Helps re-designing and
improving programs
Supports efficient use of public funds
Adds objective and technical elements to the social policy debate
Promotes Transparency and social accountability
Emphasis on results We need to measure
indicators …but consider qualitative evaluations
(Long run) impact evaluation and (frequent) monitoring of every day operation
External (and good) evaluators
Objective and useful evaluations: search for program’s stakeholders cooperation and participation
Decision taking Firm Social Program ProcessI. Identifying benefits
II. Measuring Impact
III. Information
IV. Who should evaluate?
V. Monitoring
VI. Who demands evaluations?
VII. What do we do with the results?
Well-beingpoverty health infrastructure income nutrition perceptioneducation social cap. satisfaction
I-C. IRR What would have happened without.. .? Counter-factual
In order to know the
whole process
It doesn’t work usually looking for results
Profits
Owners; share-holders
Efficient use of information
Results: what for?
Not clear Public resources
In general preciseThe firm pays for it
Lots of information Who pays for it?
The firm itselfExternal auditors
The programExternal evaluators
I. Identifying benefits
Precise Rules of Operation Better rules now Still problems due to the fear for auditors
We still have social programs that have only political objectives: Opciones productivas, PET, Acuerdos para el Campo: Vivienda
rural, adultos mayores del campo
II. Measuring Impact: How? Guidelines for the annual Evaluation of
Programs issued in 2002 by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Audit (Contraloría) The guideline indicates the need to measure impact in
every program every year Very ambitious... …but helpful in the short run to accelerate the creation of a
culture of evaluation Pressure from donors
Progresa CIMO Probecat..
II. Measuring Impact: Promoting long-run impact evaluations
External support: technical and financial (WB, IDB, Conacyt, international academics)
At least 9 impact evaluations in SEDESOL Progresa-Oportunidades 1997-2004 Liconsa fortified milk Microsimulation: Oportunidades, Liconsa, Diconsa Food program Micro-regions Strategy Habitat Housing program Tu Casa Coahuila State’s Piso Firme Jóvenes con Oportunidades
II. Measuring Impact: The politics of the evaluation design Progresa: Centralized program with relatively
little participation from beneficiaries or local authorities: it favoured randomization.
Decentralized programs sometimes should seek for other methodologies
An experimental design requires political support We tried to include in the SDL the possibility to
have randomization, when feasible.
III. Information From the institutional point of view it is not clear who
should pay for the information The program? Sedesol? Hacienda? Donors?
Sometimes programs hide information from evaluators
Next step: La Contraloría
IV. Who should evaluate? Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación
External Evaluators National evaluators
International evaluators not allowed sometimes Creation in 2002 of the Under Secretariat of Planning,
Prospective and Evaluation Social Development Law
External evaluators The SDL explicitly bans consulting firms from evaluating
social programs
IV. Who should evaluate?: The Human capital of External evaluators Not enough (good) evaluators
Impact evaluation Monitoring
A good evaluator should be able to evaluate a program with the existing ingredients: experiments are rare.
Impact vs Monitoring Seminars (impact evaluation, monitoring, qualitative
evaluation, power calculations, etc.) We’re promoting partnerships between national and
international evaluators
IV. Who should evaluate?: The bidding process The bidding process favours the cheapest proposal
Public universities don’t have to go through the
bidding process Monopolies
Excess transparency Changing the external institution every year Annual contracts
Incentives to present good results in order to evaluate again in the future
V. Monitoring There is no obligation to do this Indicators demanded by Hacienda, Función
Pública, Presidencia, Congress, with little management purpose: Highly inefficient
International support: WB, IDB Create a true Results-based management system for every
program New Dirección General de Evaluación y Monitoreo
de Programas Sociales, in order to promote internally the construction of a monitoring system
VI. Who demands evaluations?
1. International donors IDB support: the need for evaluation Receptive authorities: Levy, Gómez de León
Internal battle (técnicos vs rudos)
2. The opposition in Congress Since 2000, Congress demands annual external evaluations for
every public program. Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación (PEF) In 1999 the PRI was not a majority in Congress The opposition feared the use of social programs for the 2000
election There were good and reasonable academics in Government
VI. Who demands evaluations?
The Social Development Law (2003-2004),
institutionalizes the evaluation process National Council for the Evaluation of Social Policy Evaluation of programs not only in Sedesol Poverty measurement We’re including in the Social Development Law (SDL)
the obligation to evaluate every new federal program Law of Transparency and Public Access to Information
Democracy
VII. What do we do with the results? In the past almost nothing
The results were useful to Progresa in order to survive, but it was not useful for the everyday management
A “small” institutional change: Our internal indicator % of programs evaluated every year % of external recommendations attended by programs The weaknesses and recommendations (summary) are officially
sent to every program manager The programs have to give an official answer on what actions
will they implement The office of internal affairs (contraloría interna), demands to
see proofs of the actions taken every year
VII. What do we do with the results? Evaluations are taken more into consideration
Better reports by evaluators
Programs make changes
Evaluations became this year a tool for the budget
process within Sedesol We still need to link more closely (and formally,
evaluations with the budget process)
VIII. The politics of the evaluation process: very important If we aim for an objective but yet useful M&E, we
need to take into account stakeholders We need the participation of stakeholders
involved with evaluations The DGEM published internal rules for the
evaluation process: In the process operators should participate in TORs,
analysis and reviewing sessions of developed work Continuous dialogue with external agents DGEM runs the party
Decision taking Marks Social Program ProcessI. Identifying benefits
II. Measuring Impact
III. Information
IV. Who should evaluate?
V. Monitoring
VI. Who demands evaluations?
VII. What do we do with the results?
Well-beingpoverty health infrastructure income nutrition perceptioneducation social cap. satisfaction
What would have happened without.. .? Counter-factual
It doesn’t work usually looking for results
Results: what for?
Not clear Public resources
Lots of information Who pays for it?
The programExternal evaluators
?
?
?
?
Conclusions The Evaluation must be part of the Social Policy
process Building a Monitoring and Evaluation System is a
political task, that requires technical elements It is important to institutionalize the process and
take into consideration the program’s stakeholders for the evaluation process
In Mexico, it is crucial to build-up on the evaluators, policy-makers and congress official’s technical abilities
Too many programs, not many evaluations
Between 1990 and 2002 Mexico spent almost 550 billion dollars in social policy
There were very few evaluations: Probecat, Liconsa, Diconsa, Progresa
The market itself doesn’t solve the need for evaluation in social programs