the plotinian fall of the soul in st. augustine

THE PLOTINIAN FALL OF THE SOUL IN ST. AUGUSTINEAuthor(s): ROBERT J. O'CONNELLSource: Traditio, Vol. 19 (1963), pp. 1-35Published by: Fordham UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27830741 .Accessed: 07/03/2014 17:02

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THE PLOTINIAN FALL OF THE SOUL IN ST. AUGUSTINE*

By ROBERT j. O'CONNELL, S.j.

In a preceding article,1 we have tried to show that important features of the relationship between St. Augustine and Plotinus still call for some in

vestigation: that, in fact, one of the latter's most telling treatises (Ennead VI 4-5) had hitherto virtually escaped the notice of those interested in tracing his influence on Augustine's thought. To one possible implication of that

study we alluded only briefly, but its importance for the history of Christian

spirituality impels our returning to it now. Augustine, we suggested, from his earliest extant writings up to and including the Confessions, may well have been thinking in terms of a Plotinian fall of the soul into the body.2

There may seem to be a certain temerity in this proposal, and yet it is not

entirely without precedent. Jens N?rregaard, in that sober, careful study of Augustine's conversion3 which still ranks as one of the most commendable efforts at understanding his early thought, found himself obliged to en tertain just this hypothesis.4 And H. de Leusse, starting from a study of Marius Victorinus' doctrine on the soul, notes that the Plotinian teaching uncovered in that author finds echoes scattered through the writings of the

young Augustine.5 The list of Plotinian treatises which N?rregaard claimed Augustine read

has, in the meantime, been called into question,6 and indeed, the debate on the topic of Augustine's Neo-Platonism has advanced considerably since

* For convenient reference we abbreviate the following works as indicated: Augustinus

Magister (3 vols.), Acts of the Augustinian Congress,! Paris, 1954, = AM, I, II, III depend

ing on the volume. Real-Encyklopaedie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Pauly-Wis sowa-Kroll-Witt er, Stuttgart, 1894ff., = RE. Biblioth?que Augustinienne series of uvres

de Saint Augustin, Paris, 1933ff., = BA plus series-number of the volume (e.g. A 6). An

cient Christian Writers series, Westminster, Md., 1946ff. = ACW plus the volume-number

(e.g. ACW 22). In citing from Augustine's works we regularly omit the chapter numbers,

except where indispensable (as in the De civitate Dei), citing only book and section: so,

e.g., Confessions 5.10.19 shortens to Conf. 5.19. 1 'Ennead VI 4-5 in the Works of Saint Augustine/ in Revue des ?tudes Augustiniennes,

9 (1963) 1-39. 2 See the conclusion of the above article, 39. 3

Augustins Bekehrung (T?bingen 1923). Henceforth cited as Bekehrung. 4 Ibid. 238. He immediately appends that Augustine subsequently interprets this theory

in the light of Genesis. The question is, to what extent does Augustine interpret Genesis

in the light of this theory? 5 H. de Leusse, 'Le Probl?me de la pr?existence des ?mes chez Marius Victorinus Afer,'

Recherches de science religieuse 29 (1939) 197-239, esp. 198 and 236ff. 6

By Fr. Paul Henry, Plotin et l'Occident (Louvain 1934) 66-7., henceforth: Plotin.


2 traditio

the publication of his work.7 No one, on the other hand, has shown that

Augustine read any of Marius Victorinus' work aside from some translations of the Enneads, so that de Leusse's indications can hardly be said to have met with an enthusiastic reception.

But if the door is open to a more extensive Plotinian influence on Augustine's thought than has generally been held tenable in recent years, and if, moreover, the "pattern-method" we advocated in our former article is a valid one for

uncovering such influence, then the discussion may enter a new phase, and the question whether Augustine really held the fall of the soul that these authors found in his writings calls for serious reconsideration.

Gilson's Rejection of the 'Fall'

The presence of such a doctrine in Augustine's writings has been firmly rejected by no less a scholar than Etienne Gilson in his near-classic work, Introduction ? ?tude de saint-Augustin.8 If we examine the terms of his

position here, our objective is far from shining at his expense: he abides our

question, surely. The position he articulates is by no means hasty or ill-con

ceived; it is well thought out, ably argued, and lucid enough to lay bare the

key issues. Gilson starts from Augustine's categorical refusal to regard the

body and the entire sensible universe in terms which he understands as Or

igen's: as a place of punishment for souls which once pre-existed in heaven,

sinned, and were plunged into the body as the result of that sin:

Il y a dans cette conception de l'homme un pessimisme latent qui r?

pugne profond?ment ? la pens?e d'Augustin. Certes, il a toujours insist? sur la transcendence hi?rarchique absolue de l'?me par rapport au corps,

mais il n'a jamais admis, et il a m?me repouss? avec horreur l'hypoth?se d'une humanit? dont les corps ne seraient qu'autant de prisons. Tel que le con?oit Orig?ne, l'univers sensible en g?n?ral et le corps humain en

particulier ont ?t? cr??s comme des lieux et des instruments de supplice;

pour Augustin, tout ce que Dieu a fait est bon; le corps a donc ?t? cr??

pour sa bont? intrins?que et non comme une cons?quence ou un ch?timent

du p?ch?; l'?me, enfin, ne saurait y ?tre pr?cipit?e comme dans une pri

son, mais selon la description que nous venons d'en donner, elle s'unit

? lui par amour, comme une force ordonnatrice et conservatrice qui l'anime et le meut du dedans.9

7 For a recent summary on this question?though perhaps slanted in some regards toward

a Porphyrian hypothesis?see J.J. O'Meara,'Augustine and Neo-Platonism' Recherches

Augustiniennes I (Paris 1958) 91-111. 8

(2d ed. Paris 1943) 67ff. Henceforth: Introduction. We cite from this work rather than

from its recent American translation, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York 1960) since this latter is doubtless less accessible than the former, which it reproduces without significant change.

9 Ibid.


THE PLOTINIAN FALL OF THE SOUL 3

Gilson goes on to support his view by appeal to two major texts on the

question. The first occurs in Book XI of the De ciuitate Dei where Augustine expresses his astonishment that a man as versed as Origen in the litterae ecclesiasticae could put forth the theory he there describes.10 The second occurs in Letter 166, written to Jerome, and there astonishment has become the horror to which Gilson alludes.11

Now the first factor of uncertainty in all this is the relative lateness of these texts: they both date from the year 415, some twenty-nine years after Au

gustine's conversion.12 And the period between 386 and 415 was a critical one in Occidental Christianity, precisely in regard to the theory which con cerns us here. For during these years there broke forth the first anti-Origenist crisis in the West.13

The Anti-Origenist Controversy: Chronology

It must be remembered in this connection that Origen's glory shone with out eclipse practically up to the end of the fourth century; that Jerome him

self, so soon to become the standard-bearer of the opposition to his ideas, could rank him in 381 as the most eminent of the church's teachers after the

Apostles themselves, and as late as 392 enthusiastically enshrine him in his De viris Mus tribus. Ambrose, who has been called the Bishop of the West of his time, exploited his exegetical works with neither stint nor scruple,14 and there is good reason to think that up until 399?perhaps after the term

ination of the Confessions?Augustine remained ignorant of the details of

Origen's error.15 If, therefore, we admit Augustine's own professed ignorance of the litterae ecclesiasticae during several years after his conversion,16 his

10 De civ. Dei 11.23. 1-2. 11 Ep. 166.9. 27. 12 See G. Bardy, La cit? de Dieu, A 35 (Paris 1959) 10, . 1; and Goldbacher's discussion

of chronology in the Vienna edition of Augustine's letters, GSEL 58.44. 13 For the details on this controversy see P. de Labriolle, in L'histoire de l'?glise (Fliche

Martin) III, De la Mort de Th?odose ? l'?lection de Gr?goire le Grand (Paris 1947) Chapter II 31-46; and his principal source, F. Cavallera, Saint J?r?me (2 vols., Louvain 1922) esp.

I, 193-286. Henceforth: J?r?me. 14 See F. H. Dudden, The Life and Times of St. Ambrose (2 vols, [pagination continuous]

Oxford 1935) 2,457, Henceforth: Ambrose-. 15 See Ep. 67 to Jerome, which is clearly a request for information. Cavallera, J?r?me

II 48 (see the text which corrects the approximation given in the table on the same page)

prefers 399 as the date of this letter. 16 See especially his plea to Valerius for time to study, Ep. 21.3 (date: 391). More directly

touching our question, De libero arbitrio 3.59. F.J. Thonnard, A 6, (2d ed. 1952) 126,

dates this book in the neighborhood of 395, nine years after his conversion. See also G.

Bardy's remarks, ibid. 495-9 and in Les r?visions, A 12 (1950) 567. This latter work is a

precious mine of information, particularly on the chronology of the Saint's works.


4 traditio

confidence in Ambrose's orthodoxy, and the general reputation which Origen

enjoyed up to the turn of the century, it must be left open at least as a pos

sibility that Augustine could once, in perfectly good faith, have held an Or

igenist doctrine which he later repudiated.

Augustine: Pre-existenge and the four Hypotheses on the Soul

But the question only sharpens if we juxtapose two concessions Gilson

has made in the course of his study. The first allows that in his early works

Augustine appears to have held the pre-existence of the soul;17 the second

admits that of the four hypotheses presented in the third book of the De

libero arbitrio concerning the origin of the soul, Augustine never chose one

to the exclusion of the others, since *la foi n'en condamne aucune ... et aucune

n'est impos?e comme certaine par la raison.'18 The book in question seems

to date from 395,19 in which case the possibilities as Augustine sees them at

that advanced date are the following:

There are these four opinions about the soul: that it comes by genera

tion, that it is newly created when each person is born, that souls which

pre-exist elsewhere are sent by God into the bodies of those who are born,

or that they come down (labantur) of their own will. We should not lightly accept any of these opinions. Either this question has not yet been worked out and decided by Catholic commentators on Scripture, because of its ob

scurity and difficulty, or if this has been done, these works have not yet come into my hands. At all events, our faith must keep us from holding anything about the substance of the Creator which is false or unworthy of Him.20

Notice in passing that it would be difficult to find a more appropriate term

for the Plotinian expression of the fall ? a e ?a e

? than the labantur

which expresses Augustine's fourth hypothesis.21 His avowal of ignorance

respecting any litterae ecclesiasticae which might settle the question, is also

interesting.22 But coupled with his tendency to think of the soul as pre-exist

ing, it is clear that Augustine's personal choice must lie between the last

two hypotheses: which raises the question, what does the fourth hypothesis mean?

17 Introduction, 94-5. 18 Ibid. 68.

19 See note 16 supra. 20 De lib. arb. 3.59, translation: Dom Mark Pontifex, AGW 22, (Westminster 1955). 21 It contains both the senses of 'deviate' and 'fall' conveyed by the Greek term. For

the occurrence of the latter in a locus which there is good reason to think Augustine read

(cf. our article, cited supra n. 1), see Ennead YI 5.12.16. 22 The terms (a divinorum librorum catholicis tractoribus) are different, but the substance

recalls his complaints against Origen, De civ. Dei 11.23.1-2.



To arrive at any clarity on this issue, it would be indispensable to illuminate the entire context, thereby reviving a controversy whose flames still slumber.23 For that context bristles with difficulties, not to say with confusion: and we would suggest that Augustine is not entirely exempt from responsibility on the latter score. What seems beyond question is the fact that Augustine is here discussing two troubling aspects of human existence, our ignorance, and our difficulty in doing good.24 He begins by assuring his readers that these two aspects of our life are surely a punishment, and, since God is just, punishment for some sin.25 The purpose which brings him to examine the four hypotheses is, accordingly, that of proving that however the soul is con ceived as having arrived in this vale of tears, God's justice is beyond reproach.26 Now this is how he reasons respecting the fourth hypothesis:

But if souls existing elsewhere are not sent by the Lord God, but come of their own accord to dwell in bodies, we can easily see that whatever

ignorance and difficulty result from the action of their own will, the Creator is in no way to blame. Even if He had sent them Himself, since

He did not deprive them ... of their freedom to beg and seek and strive ...

He would therefore be utterly without blame.27

God's justice, therefore, is put beyond man's complaint. But the hypothesis is none other than that of a voluntary fall of the soul into the body, into ig norance and difficulty, into a place of punishment. The divine Justice is

uncompromised precisely because the soul has chosen freely and consequently deserves everything that follows from that free choice. One can only infer that this choice is itself the sin for which the soul is punished, the sin preced ing birth in this life on account of which it is embodied in a sensible universe: the essence of what Augustine much later found to be Origen's position.

Consider now the difference between the third and fourth hypothesis: either God has sent the soul without fault on its part, or the soul has sinned.

Starting from his pre-existence position, which of these two must Augustine choose? His way of appending a hasty quandoquidem etiamsi eas ipse misisset28

23 The controversy dates from the publication of an article by Fr. Y. de Montcheuil

Recherches de science religieuse 23 (1933), (reprinted in his M?langes th?ologiques (Paris 1946)

93-111, in answer to Fr. Charles Boyer's 'Dieu pouvait-il cr?er l'homme dans l'?tat d'ignoran ce et de difficult?/ Gregorianum 11 (1930) 32-57. In 1954 it still showed no signs of abat

ing: see the contributions of Trap?, Boyer, Le Bouriier, De Lubac to Augustinus Magister, and the discussion, AM III 247-61.

24 De lib. arb. 3.53. Compare the question as put by Evodius, ibid. 1.23. 25 Ibid. 3.51, 52, 54. 26 See Ibid. 3.53: ut quiescant, et adversus Deum murmurare d?sistant; also his treamtent

of each of the hypotheses, ibid. 54-8 and the summary-conclusion, 59: we should not think

(sentire) aliud de ilio [seil, creatore] quam est. 27 Ibid. 3.58 . 28 Ibid.


6 traditio

'even if He had sent them Himself ? to his treatment of the fourth

hypothesis, is at least suggestive: the misisset seems to put us momentarily back into the framework of the third hypothesis, which has already been

thoroughly treated: why go back to it? Now it may just be that Augustine is not back-tracking at all. The distinc

tion between these two hypotheses may in his mind not be a disjunction after all; he may not feel either obliged or entitled to choose one to the exclusion of the other. The good Plotinian, in fact, cannot choose between the soul's

falling and being sent; for one of the peculiarities of Plotinus' doctrine consists in holding firmly to both ends of that chain and trying to persuade us that the apparent opposition is, in the final analysis, illusory.

And yet, the objection comes, that opposition is quite real: and here we cannot but agree. That agreement leads us to examine another element of Gilson's text, cited above. 'Pour Augustin,' he assures us, 'tout ce que Dieu a fait est bon; le corps a donc ?t? cr?? pour sa bont? intrins?que et non comme une cons?quence ou un ch?timent du p?ch?.

' We have underlined the terms

which show a passage of the author's thought from the properly historical

plane to the level of inference: an inference which shows the sure philosophic instinct which is at work, for these two views are, in fact, hardly compatible. Can it be that Augustine's thought at this point suffers from a lack of co herence ?

The possibility must be left open, at least for the moment. The justification of chess, it has been said, lies in the fact that even grand masters make mistakes; one might suggest by a distant analogy that it must sometimes be the business of the historian of philosophy to transcribe faithfully the inner contradictions

which his philosophic instinct ? and admiration ? would tempt him to

suppress. If Augustine's thought is not entirely coherent on the situation of the embodied soul, he was not the first to suffer under that stigma....

The Incoherence of Plotinian Doctrine on the Soul

For it is precisely that doctrine of the soul, fallen, yet at the same time sent, into a world which is simultaneously bad and beautiful, which led Br?hier to speak of an 'undeniable contradiction' in Plotinus' thought.29 It arose from his desire to remain a faithful exponent of the Platonic tradition in its entirety. In his basic work on the subject, Ennead IV 8, on The Soul's

Descent into the Body he begins with a careful summary of the two conflict

29 La philosophie de Plotin (Paris 1928) 68. The entire chapter, pp. 47-69, is valuable for an understanding of the diverse tensions in Plotinus' theory of the soul.

30 Sixth in the chronological order, this treatise is relatively early.



ing sides of Plato's thought on the soul's immersion in the sensible universe,31 before proceeding to his own effort of reconciliation. The pessimistic accent found in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus, whereby some

' fault

' of its own has

plunged the soul into matter, is balanced by the more optimistic view of the

Timaeus, where the demiurge, out of goodness, 'sends" the soul down into the sensible universe to impart beauty to it, by conferring on it the intelligible perfection of the Ideas.

Plotinus is, therefore, conscious of the ambivalence in the master's thought, and that from the very beginning of his philosophical activity.32 He refuses the privilege of taking a one-sided view of the matter33

? at least on the

plane of reflective thought; but reflection and affectivity do not always har monize. Thus there is a possibility that the

' shift of accent

' wrhich is generally

admitted in Plotinus' thought only complicates that original ambivalence,

allowing the pessimistic accent to dominate toward the beginning, and gradu ally to give way to the more Stoic optimism which characterizes his riper work.34 The turning point in this development Harder has placed at the moment when Plotinus realized that his earlier views gave entirely too much

encouragement to the Gnostics who for a considerable time became the target of his fiercest opposition.35 Thus, in his later works, he points much more to the beauty of the sensible world, which so reflects the goodness of God and the perfection of the Ideas that it must rightly be called God's 'youngest child,' indeed, the 'manifest god.'36 The soul, consequently, is 'sent' to confer beauty on this world: does it follow that it has not sinned and 'fallen' into that world? Not in the least; the two theses remain true and still require reconciliation, or, in Br?hier's term, perpetuate the undeniable contradiction. And Plotinus must constantly renew his effort to show that fault is integrated into the necessary operation of the immutable laws of the universe, that the

31 Ibid. 1, entire. 32 See note 30, supra.

33 As many of his predecessors seem to have done, opting for either the pessimistic or the

optimistic position. See A.J. Festugi?re, La r?v?lation d'Herm?s Trism?giste 2 (Paris 1953) 63-96. This attempt at reconciliation is already a first hallmark of the Plotinian theory.

34 See H. Schwyzer, RE s.v. ' Plotinos' 547-8; but see also H.C. Puech, 'Plotin et les Gnos

tiques,' Sources de Plotin, Entretiens sur l'Antiquit? Classique, Fondation Hardt, V; hence

forth, Sources (Vand uvres-G?n?ve 1960) 159-174; also the subsequent discusi?n, 175-190,

esp. 183. Compare ibid. E. R. Dodds' study, 'Numenius and Ammonius' 1-32 (discussion,

33-61). The resulting picture is one of more decided development than Schwyzer was prepared to admit when writing his article for RE. Its direction generally is away from a semi

Gnostic dualism toward a more Stoic optimism. Unaware of this development, and taking his Plotinus without regard for chronology, Augustine shows the tensions even more clearly,

perhaps, than the Plotinus of any given treatise. 35 Sources 185. 36 Enn. V 8.12.9. This treatise dates from Plotinus' anti-Gnostic period, see loc. cit. . 35.


8 traditio

soul's liberty and cosmic necessity are really one and the same, and finally, that we are fallen because we desired to fall, but that mute, spontaneous desire is itself put in us by the Logos which irresistibly rules our falls and our returns.37

The very lucidity of Gilson's estimate of the situation, then, was sufficient reason for examining his position. His analysis suggests that if there is in coherence in Augustine's thought, that incoherence is the very one which troubled Plotinus, giving his doctrine a characteristic set of inner tensions, which may serve to make it all the more identifiable if we find it reproduced in Augustine.

Comparison of Plotinus and Augustine: Method and Purpose

The fact that Plotinus' doctrine on this point is so characteristic entitles us to what some might consider a methodological shortcut. Instead of first

proving, treatise by treatise, that Augustine read the Enneads we are about to invoke as points of comparison between his and Plotinian doctrine, we

mean to expose the two doctrines, highlighting their parallel patterns of

complexity and inner tension, and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions on the question of direct dependence on Plotinus. We intend to facilitate that conclusion somewhat by presenting precise portions from a limited number of Plotinian treatises, placing them in parallel with

Augustinian texts whose direct dependence on the the Plotinian treatise

appears highly probable, at times almost transparent. This suggestion of diiect dependence, however, we prefer to treat as a confirmation of our prim ary conclusion: that Augustine's doctrine of the soul and its situation in the

body is, whatever its direct source, faithfully Plotinian. There should be no difficulty against our invoking Enneads I 6, V 1, III

2-3 and IV 3: Augustine refers explicitly to them in the De civitate Dei and the grounds are excellent for thinking that he read them before his writ

ings at Cassiciacum.38 G. Verbeke has presented strong evidence for linking the De immortalitate animae with Ennead IV 7, on the Immortality of the

Soul,Z9 and additional evidence could be adduced to corroborate his view.40

37 77 \7 ? ; + ? Dlntinnc rohirnc + +V.io nnHl?nrt ?^nKlow, ^ 77??, O 19 OC?tt JZjli?L. iV O. O "XiLii". J. IU Ulllu? l^luill? Ulli] llVkLllllg pl UUlVlll Ali J_rfil.it.. XXX . lU.?^ll.

and IV 3.12-13. Note that the latter two treatises are expressly referred to in De civ. Dei; see Henry, Plotin, 122-3.

38 See our article, cited above, n. 1, especially nn. 14 and 15. 39

'Spiritualit? et immortalit? de l'?me chez saint Augustin' AM I 329-34. 40 A number of additional arguments (besides those listed by Verbeke) occur in suggestive

parallel in both treatises: note particularly the curious argument concerning sleep in Erin.

IV 7. 85 and De imm. animae 23. The question deserves a special study, which would be


the plotinian fall of the soul 9

Treatise I, 4, on Happiness, also lays claim on our attention.41 We have,

finally, called attention in a preceding article42 to the importance of Ennead VI 4-5, the twin-treatise on omnipresence.

We would suggest that in addition to the above, Augustine shows convinc

ing signs of having read and assimilated Enneads III 7 (On Eternity and Time), IV 8 (On the Soul9s Descent into the Body), and V 8, (On Intellectual Beauty).

We propose, however, to use them as additional (though at times pivotal) points of comparison, without insisting here on the mass of evidence which could be brought forward for direct dependence.43

Augustine and the Doctrine of Ennead IV 8

The Dialogues of Cassiciacum are richly sown with enigmatic reflections on the soul's condition in the body; difficult to understand outside of a doctrine of the fall of the soul into the body, they often become easy and obvious in the light of Plotinian teaching. The various terms which describe the soul in its fallen condition, for example,

? oblita, demersa, implicata, progressa among them44

? echo the little Neo-Platonic lexicon of the soul's fallen con

dition which Plotinus presents in his opening section of Ennead IV 8.45 More

significant, perhaps, is the division among souls whereby some seem 'less fallen' than others; like Plotinus, Augustine holds for a diversified fall which

explains why certain souls can mount to the ' vision

' more easily than others.46

very revealing on Augustine's working methods and perhaps also on his philosophic forma

tion. Plotinus, for example, combats the entelechy and harmony theories of the soul with

parallel arguments (ibid. 84 and 85); this seems to have led Augustine to assume (ibid. 17

that they were one and the same theory). 41 See Henry, Plotin, 138. Taking as a hypothesis that Augustine read this treatise be

fore Gassiciacum would, we suggest, illuminate some obscurities in those writings. 42 Art. cit. . 1, supra. 43 Or, if preferred, our method could be construed after the hypothetical fashion suggested

in n. 41. The fact that these treatises help explain obscurities in Augustine's text and in

the movement of his thought (without, however, deforming it) would itself constitute evi

dence of their relevance, to be confirmed, if possible, by further data of a more philological nature. See the methodological remarks in our former article, pp. 4-5 and nn. 21, 26, and

31. 44 Such expressions abound at Gassiciacum, see for example De ord. 1. 29 and 2. 30-1;

De b. vita 1-5; and J.J. O'Meara's edition of Against the Academics, AGW 12, notes 8 and 9

to Book 1, with references. 45 Enn. IV 8.1. 46 Cf. Enn. IV 8.5.17-29 and De b. vita 3-5 (three classes of souls) and Sol. 1. 23-25 (two

classes). Note especially Sol. 1.23, those in the higher class nec doctore indigent, sed sola

f?rtasse admonitione. His credere, sperare, amare satis est. But the notions of faith, hope and charity (ibid. 12-14) bear careful examination.


10 TRADITIO

For both authors, this ascent must start with the exercise of that Platonic

reminiscence which revives the soul's former contact with the higher world,47 and Augustine's early emphasis on the purifying value of the disciplinae liberales almost certainly stems from a Plotinian understanding of the intel

lectualist nature of this 'return of the soul.'48 Our reference treatise for the doctrine just exposed has been Ennead IV 8.

And the key term which Plotinus there uses to describe the soul's ideal station is a , drawn from Plato's Timaeus,^ and a classic expression in Neo

Platonism. Theiler has ably shown the importance of that notion in Augustine's works, at the same time endeavoring to demonstrate that Augustine found

it, not in Plotinus, but in Porphyry.50 His uncompromising repudiation of

Plotinus as in any measure a direct source for Augustine's doctrine has met

with almost universal rejection, even on the part of those sympathetic toward the hypothesis that Augustine was exposed to Porphyrian readings in addition to those he admittedly made in Plotinus.51 However, the evidence for these

readings, as occurring before the De consensu evang?list?mra, remains entirely indirect,52 whereas the circle of Plotinian treatises scholars have seen fit to

add to Augustine's early reading-list is once again expanding. Had Augustine drawn the notion of a from Plotinus, then, where would he have

found it?

Oddly enough, in only two loci. The first of them is in Ennead III 2-3, on Providence, which we know he read, but where the notion is found without

extended development.53 Its only other occurrence is in Ennead IV 8,54 where

47 Enn. IV 8.4.29-30. Cf. Sol. 2 entire, but especially 34-5. 48 This is particularly clear in Sol. 2, where the reminiscence theory is in close connection

with the ascent through the disciplinae, 34-5. It explains much of the De ordine's concentra

tion on the ordo studiorum, 2.14-17 and especially 30-31 where its connection with the re

gressus animae is stressed. 49 Enn. IV 8.7.1-11, esp. line 5. 50

Porphyrios und Augustin (Halle 1933)17ff. Henceforth: Porphyrios. 51 See for example, O'Meara in ACW 12. 22-3 and notes; P. Courcelle, Les Lettres Grec

ques en Occident (2d ed. Paris 1948) 159ff. 52

Consisting of inferring Porphyrian influence for themes in Augustine's early works

which the aging bishop later associates with Porphyry. See our article (cited note 1, above)

especially note 39, and also O'Meara, ACW 12, note 110 of the Introduction and the cita

tions given there. Note how importantly O'Meara features the fuga a corpore theme in this

regard. 53 See Enn. Ill 2.9.20, where Plotinus is concerned to show that the universality of Pro

vidence does not deprive man of responsibility for his actions. 54 Enn. IV 8.7.5. Here its connection is different from the above, as we shall shortly

see. We are indebted to Mr. G. Pollet for this information on the occurrence of the

a notion in Plotinus, information he was enabled to furnish thanks to his researches

toward a Plotinian Lexicon.


the plotinian fall of the soul 11

Plotinus describes the soul's position in reality as an intermediate one, be tween the pure intelligibles and the sensible realm, such that it pertains to her very nature to govern and order the sensible world, communicating to it the perfection she draws from her contemplation of the ideas. This function, he is careful to note, she can fulfill while remaining entirely recollected in

contemplation, enfolded in the unity of the universal soul, with which she is fundamentally at one. Her government of the sensible world does not necessitate her entering 'into,' engaging in intimate contact with it. Like the entourage of a king who never leaves his palace, she can govern that world 'from afar.'

The 'De genesi contra manichaeos' and the soul's 'medietas'

As revealing on Augustine's anthropology as Ennead IV 8 is on Plotinus', is that little-studied, perhaps because highly disconcerting work, the De Genesi contra Manichaeos. Here, Augustine's 'spiritual exegesis' permits him to take extraordinary liberties with what is often the most obvious meaning of the scriptural text, something of which he seems at times uncomfortably aware. He justifies his resort to the transferred sense with a number of reasons,

laying particular stress on the need to explain Genesis in a manner 'worthy of God,'55 and therefore calculated to retort the 'sacrilegious' expos? of the same work proposed by the Manichees.56 His sincerity in all this, his 'Catholic

spirit,' is beyond question, for his model in exegetical method is most prob ably Ambrose, whose 'subjective, capricous, arbitrary' interpretation suc

ceeded, as Dudden puts it, in making virtually 'anything mean anything.'57 The point, however, is this: for such an arbitrary application of spiritual exegesis the literal and obvious sense of Genesis can hardly be said to be norma tive. And yet, some normative outlook must be sought to explain the mean

ing Augustine manages to 'put into' the terms of the sacred text. That normative outlook, we would suggest, is identifiably Plotinian: beneath

the verba of the sacred author, Augustine succeeds in unearthing the res of the Enneads. And it is the doctrine of Ennead IV 8 which persuades him to reduce the scriptural author's very substantial Eve to a mere exemplum a kind of symbolic figure standing for the inferior, sensible, 'animal part,,'

55 See especially De Genesi contra Manichaeos 2.3. (henceforth: De Genesi.) 56 Ibid, and 2.19, where his spiritual exegesis has purged Genesis of the

' sacrilegious

'

Manichaean interpretation whereby it was God who encouraged carnal intercourse in para

dise; cf. his ingenious theory of copulatio spiritalis, ibid. 1.30. 57 See Dudden, Ambrose, Vol. 2, 459. See also ibid. 458 for the principle o? digna Deo; and

cf. P. Roller?, ' La Expositio evangelii secundum Lucani di Ambroggio come fonte della

essegesi', Agostiniana (Turin 1958) esp. 14-17; 129-132; 137-40.


12 TRADITIO

subject to the 'virile' ratio; she is accomodata ad obtemperandum, while the

governing ratio must itself remain in constant contemplative contact with and submission to subsistent Wisdom.58 This hierarchic position of the soul

Augustine describes in the pregnant term medietas animi, taking his starting point from the happy coincidence that Genesis speaks of the two trees situated in medio paradisi:

Ennead IV 8.

7. 1-17 : e a - , , ?? a ,

a e Lvov e e e a , a a e e a a -

e a a ?a e a e , a a a a a a , e a a e e , ... ... a e

e a a , e a e

a a , e e a e a , a

a e a e a a , a a ?a e e a

a a , e e a a a a a -

, a e e e i e e a a e

' , a e a

a a a e a a a , - a e a a e e e

a I a e a? al a , a a

e e e e a , a a a e e -

a I a e ? ? e ?v a . -

a e a e a ? a a e a

a a e e a, e e -

a e a a .

De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 2.

12: Productum autem ex terra om

ne illud lignum accipimus omne illud gaudium spiritale; id est, supereminere terram, et non involvi atque obrui ter

renarum cupiditatum implicamentis.

Lignum autem vitae plantatum in me

dio paradisi, sapientiam illam signifi cat, qua oportet ut intelligat anima, in meditullio quodam rerum se esse or

dinatam, ut quamvis subjectam sibi habeat omnem naturam corpoream,

supra se tarnen esse intelligat naturam

Dei: et neque in dexteram declinet, sibi arrogando quod non est, neque ad sinistram per negligentiam, contem

nendo quod est; et hoc est lignum vitae plantatum in medio paradisi.

Ligno autem scientiae boni et mali, ipsa item medietas animae et ordinata

integrit?s significatur, nam et ipsum lignum in medio paradisi plantatum est; et ideo lignum dignoscentiae boni et mali dicitur, quia si anima quae d?bet in ea quae anteriora sunt se ex

tendere, id est in Deum, et ea quae

posteriora sunt oblivisci (Phil. 3.13) id est, corp?reas voluptates, ad seip sam, deserto Deo conversa fuerit, et

sua potentia tamquam sine Deo frui voluerit, intumescit superbia, quod est

58 De Genesi 1. 30; cf. 1.27-28, allegorical interpretation of the creation of man and woman.

To what extent is the animalis pars truly a 'part' of a substantial and individual man?

The Platonic passage from e to and back when speaking of the ' parts' of the soul

bids us be cautious; and the symbolic atmosphere which is all-pervasive here warns us

that Augustine may not be using the term in a sense which seems most immediately obvious

to us. How settle the question? By examining the rest of the work and assigning to this

ambiguous phrase a meaning consonant with the obvious meaning of the whole. We shall see

that the functional relationship between the ratio and the animalis pars is manifestly Neo

Platonic.


THE PLOT I NI AN FALL OF THE SOUL 13

initium omnis peccati. Et cum hoc

ejus peccatum poena fuerit consecuta,

experiendo discit quid intersit inter bo

num quod deseruit, et malum in quod cecidit. Et hoc ei erit gustasse de

fructu arboris dignoscentiae boni et

mali. . . .

Now the most significant similarity between these texts is one of doctrinal

pattern: Plotinus' key term, a , is translated by the term medietas

animi, which Augustine paraphrases with the explanation that the soul is 'ordered' in meditullio quodam rerum (cf. a e ...).

The paragraph from the De Genesi then presents a finely compressed statement of the doctrine presented in Ennead IV 8: the soul must supereminere, retain her natural relation of governor of the sensible world, without letting it de

generate into an involvi, obrui, an implicatio (cf. e e ) earthly pleasures. Her gaudium should remain spiritale, and Augustine has already explained this as referring to the delights of intellectual contemplation,59 exactly in accordance with Plotinus' mind on the matter. So firmly has he

grasped the doctrine concerned, he can re-express it in terms reminiscent of various other treatises, reminding us that the things in this spiritual world

really exist, those in the sensible universe not 'existing' in the true sense

of that term so that the dextera-sinistra couple furnishes a semi-biblical hook for a perfectly Plotinian insight.60 The spiritual is, for both thinkers what is prior, ante, while the corporeal is posterior, post,61 in a realm which the soul should school herself to forget in order to revive that other kind of

memory, the Platonic reminiscence of the intelligible: again, good Plotinian doctrine.62 The notion of an aversio whereby the soul has 'deserted' God,

59 De Genesi 1.30: the spiritual marriage of 'man' and 'woman,' symbolizing the rational

and sensible parts of human nature, was to bring forth spirituelles foetus immortalium gaudio rum. It must be remembered that Augustine has already made the soul part of that "spir itual creation" which is symbolized by the viridi agri (2.4) which is irrigated by the intel

ligible light of the Verbum (2.6). 60 Cf. Conf. 7.16-17, where Augustine's first step in his reflections on the libri platonieomm

is in terms of this classic Platonic distinction. 61 See, for example, Augustine's allusion to the hierarchy of beings in Conf. 3.9, the priora

opera Dei being the spiritalia, while the corporeal universe implicitly receives the denomi

nation of posteriora. The same distinction can be found frequently in Plotinus, but especially relevant to Augustine's paradise image is its use in Enn. V 8.12-13, where the notions of

inferiority and (natural, not temporal) posteriority are linked. 62 As contained in Enn. IV 3.25ff., which Augustine read, and which K. Winkler finds

active at Cassiciacum: see 'La Th?orie augustinienne de la m?moire ? son point de d?part/ AM I. 511-19.


14 traditio

shows Augustine already beginning to read this treatise in the light of Ennead VI 4-5, a practice which climaxes in the Confessions.63

The doctrinal pattern, then, is identical in both texts: was the one modelled on the other? An indication making this probable is found at the end of

Augustine's exegesis of the verse in question. Why should Augustine insert that peculiar assurance, one that seems to have nothing to do with his exeget ical task at the moment, concerning the profit the soul can draw from her fallen existence? The spiritual meaning of 'tasting the fruit of knowledge of good and evil' provides a starting point, but one whose meaning must be slightly adjusted by the interpretation he gives it. The fall has a positive side: the soul can gain an experiential and comparative knowledge of the

good she has deserted. We shall see that this parallelism of association points to an identity of problematic in both authors;64 but it is, at the same time, bizarre enough, arbitrary enough in the context which is Augustine's here. Its explanation becomes easy, however, once we admit it was suggested by the same reminder occurring in the same context in Plotinus' Ennead IV 8.

Ennead IV 3 and the Properties of the 'Fallen' State

For Augustine, the initium of the fault lies in superbia; which reminds us that for Plotinus as well, the fault which can disturb this delicate balance is a desire whereby the soul tires of being with the intelligible whole, and

wishes to be ' on her own

' ? ad seipsam, as Augustine puts it. The result of this desire, Plotinus explains in the same treatise, is that the soul retires into herself, leaves the whole-soul to become isolated and partial, a fragment capable of surveying and dealing only with fragments: notably, with that part of the corporeal universe which she chooses to be her own body.65 Thus she

plunges into the very heart of the sensible universe, becomes sunk in sense, enters into contact with a part which becomes her own, and entirely preoccupies her. This preoccupation, immersion, intimate contact

? in Augustine's term, this involvi, obrui, implicatio as distinct from her former supereminentiam

?

63 See our previous article, cited in note 1, above. As might be expected, there are moments

and therefore works of Augustine in which one or other treatise of Plotinus seems to dominate

his attention. 64 We shall see shortly that Augustine shares the problematic which explains the occur

rence of this anomalous passage in a deeper sense than mere textual rapprochements could

ever do it; at the same time, however, that problematic is never clearer than in the Plotinian

text which here served to remind Augustine of the need to 'justify' the fall.

\ 65 See Enn. IV 8.4.11-28: we have merely summarized it here. 66 Ibid.; and cf. the text cited above . 12, in parallel with Enn. IV 8.



is what weakens the soul, draws her attention away from the vision of intelli

gible truth, and constitutes her fallen state.67 To the mechanism of that fall we shall return shortly; but for the moment

it must be remarked that one term in various forms suffices to describe man's fallen state which Augustine sees as ensuing post peccatimi, in contrast with the soul's existence ante peccatum.68 It is a vita mortalis, mors vit?lis; it is

hujus vitae mortalit?s, or, in more condensed form, it is, when compared with the alia vita, simply mors.10 Augustine may well have found Plotinian en

couragement for selecting this term to capsule the properties of our fallen

situation;71 what is more manifest is that Plotinus, rather than Genesis, war

ranted his treating as consequences of our fall a number of elements which

67 Plotinus, therefore, would reject the thought of the soul's 'pure' spirituality; the soul

preserves a natural relation with the body and the sensible universe, but one which makes

it ideally present 'to' (not 'in') that universe, present in an absent sort of way. 68 Note the distinction: whereas the anima is the subject of peccatum (De Genesi 2.5:

antequam anima peccaret), the term homo seems more appropriate to our fallen condition:

only after that fall was there a homo labor?ns in terra, (ibid). Though obliged by the sacred

text to admit man as created from the clay of the earth, Augustine seems to reduce the

force of that admission with the immediate reminder that this was before he was transported into paradise, ut a Verbo Dei consummaretur (ibid. 2.10.) This seems to mean that man's

creation was itself completed by that consummation, so that the normative divine idea

of man is that of a spiritual creature. Hence Augustine can say that the basic flaw of the

Manichaean anthropology arises from its starting point: multum errent qui post peccatum consid?rent hominem, cum in hujus vitae mortalitatem damnatus est-, (ibid. 1.29). Add that

we look forward to a renovatio, a liberatio which Augustine terms a commutatio in angelicam

form?m (ibid. 1.29; 2.32), in virtue of which, by following the spiritual Adam, Christ, we

become once more the spiritual creation, the viride agri, having been restored to the paradise which we lost by sin (2.10). Cf. De quant, animae 78, where the soul is naturally par angelo, and inferior only in consequence of sin.

69 Conf. 1.7. Note the context: Augustine admits: nescio unde venerim hue; cf. ibid. 9:

die mihi, utrum alicui iam aetati meae mortuae successerit infantia mea ... fuine alicubi aut

aliquisl Thus, in a doubt which may be resolved as the Confessions proceeds, he leaves

the question open: Ibid. 10, he praises God de primordiis ET infantia mea, quae non memini. 70 Cf. De Genesi 1.29; (for other variations, ibid. 1.19. 26; 2.15, 38, 40). Compare De

lib. arb. 2.53, the culminating definition of sin, and De Genesi 2.15 where a similar com

pression is achieved, the term mors now standing for the entire complex of fallen-condition

properties. 71 Cf. Enn. IV 7.11 and ibid. 9, line 23, where the term is applied to wood and stone in

contrast with the soul. Augustine's distinction De imm. animae 16, between anima

animata-exanime, with the latter then termed mortuum, seems an echo of this terminology. See also the coincidental but striking grouping of the same terms (wood, stone, death) in

the Plotinian original of Augustine's death-bed quotation, Enn. I 4.7.20-26: 'One that

sets great store by wood and stones, or, Zeus ! by mortality among mortals, cannot yet be the proficient, whose estimate of death, we hold, must be that it is better than life in the

body. '

Such verbal correspondences mean very little to us; there is much evidence to suggest that they meant a great deal to Augustine.


16 TRADITIO

the Hebrew author unquestionably thought proper to man as God created him: thus, labor,72 carnal procreation,73 the need to resort to sense knowledge, language, symbolic communication of all sorts,74 the opacity of a body which

makes concealment and simulation possible,75 none of these, in Augustine's view, were proper to man (or, more exactly the soul) as originally intended; all such things came upon us quia post peccatum mortales facti sumus. Again, a comparison with Ennead IV 3, which we know Augustine read, makes the structured correspondence of teaching almost transparent:

Ennead IV 3.

18. 1-4 : e a ?? a e e a a a e -

e a ; * e a a - e e a e a

a -

a a ? e . . .

9-22 : e e a?e ? e e e a ?a e e ae

- V e a a e a -

a a e , a e e a e - a a e a a , e e a a e e a . e

a , I a , a e e -

a , al a a

a a ' a e a .

" a e a

e a ' a ? -

e a a e - a a, e e a e

?

a e e a e a a a a a

' a e a e

1 a ? e e ,

e 'a a

a a 9 a e

^ De Genesi contra Manichaeos 2.

! 30: Hoc ipsum enim quod in hac vita quisque natus, difficultatem in veniendi veritatis habet ex corrupti

toli corpore. .. et Spinae ac tribuli sunt

punctiones tortuosarum quaestionum ...

Et quoniam necessitate jam per hos

oculos et per has aures de ipsa veritate

admonemur, et difficile est resistere

phantasmatibus... in ista ergo per

plexitate, cujus vultus non sudet ut

manducet panem suum?

5: Ante peccatum vero ... irrigabat

[Deus creaturam spiritalem] fonte in

teriore, loquens in intellectum ejus, ut

non extrinsecus verba exciperet ... sed

fonte suo, hoc est, de intimis suis

manante veritate, satiaretur.

6. Et ideo labor?ns jam in terra ne

cessariam habet .. .doctrinam de huma

nis verbis_Nam propterillam Domi

nus noster ... imbrem sancii Evangelii ... infudit... ut forinsecus non quaerat

pluviam_Homini laboranti in terra, id est, in peccatorum aridi tate consti

tu? [intelligitur] necessariam esse de humanis verbis divinam doctrinam,

tanquam de nubibus pluviam.

72 De Genesi 2.15. 78 Ibid. 1.30. 74 Ibid. 2.5, 6; cited below. 75 Ibid. 2.32, cited below, . 17. 7? See note 68, supra.



e . 9 E e I a e a a a a e ? ?

' a *

e e e a a a a a a

a a e e ? e a -

, a a e e a I e e e .

32: ?eque enim in Ulis corporibus coelestibus sic later e cogitationes cre

dendum est, quemadmodum in his cor

poribus latent: sed sicut nonnullis mo

tus anirnorum apparent in vultu et ma

xime in oculis, sic in ilia perspicuitate ac simplicitate coelestium corporum omnes omnino motus animi latere non

arbitror. Itaque illi merebuntur habi

tationem illam et commutationem in

angelicam form?m, qui ... nulla men

tiuntur.

The adjustments Augustine has worked here are all in function of his

exegetical task and of the modification of problematic imposed by his Christian

preoccupations. None of them, however, can hide the fact that the inner

logic of Plotinus' position has been grasped with admirable acuity. Thus, the use of reasoning is due to difficulties, perplexities, which are symbolized by the 'thorns and thistles' of 'this life': e a a. This 'labor' Augustine assures us, is what the author of Genesis must mean by Adam's punishment. In the higher sphere of existence, (e e , e ), all our knowledge

was poured into us by that fons spoken of in Genesis, one that interiorly ir

rigated the viride agri which symbolizes the spiritual creation77 ? and at

this point the Augustinian manans reproduces Ficinus' translation of the Plotinian . Having lost contact with this interior font, the soul must turn outwards in its pursuit of truth:78 human words, all the work of

communication, symbol, advice and consultation (and this for Augustine includes the entire regime of scriptural, prophetic and apostolic authority), all these are consequences of the peccatum animae, the fall from paradise. Remarkable is the fact that both authors entertain the idea of a body in the

paradisiac state, though a body of a transparency (perspicuitas, simplicitas, cf. a a a a)79 such that everyone's inner thoughts are immediate

ly known to his companions there, no concealment or simulation being possible.80 And it is significant that both describe this reciprocal awareness

77 De Genesi 2.10. 78 We have tried to show (art. cit. note 1, above, pp. 28-37) that in the Confessions Augustine

most often uses the Plotinian image of the 'Head' (Enn, VI 5.7.1-14)as the imaginative

backdrop of this intus-foras distinction. At this point in his career, however, and dealing with the analogous but not identical concept of the intima, the corresponding image is drawn

rather from Enn. Ill 7, as we shall shortly see. Gf. note 68, above. 79 Gf. also the a of Plotinus' description of the fall in Enn. VI 4.14.25. Mackenna

renders the term suggestively with the phrase: 'We have lost that first simplicity, we are

become the dual thing.' (Italics ours). 80 De Genesi 2.23 develops this link between the "tunics of mortality" and the resulting

possibility of dissimulation and hypocrisy.


18 traditio

in identical analogies, namely, the expressiveness of the human visage ( a ) and of the human eye ( a ).

Now the parallel just cited proves at least that Augustine's evaluation of these properties of human existence faithfully echoes Plotinus'; the fact that we know from other evidence that he did read this treatise, and the

tight pattern whereby he reproduces the same interconnected scheme of

consequences, make it highly probable that he had this passage clearly in mind (if not before his eyes) when writing his Genesis commentary.

We are not, therefore, in the world of 'pure spirits': the commutatio in

angelicam formam means that the soul will once again don a celestial body it once had. We are entitled to think of this corpus codeste as a body, and

yet in a sense quite different from our ordinary use of the term.81 It would

hardly be just, therefore, to speak of paradisiac man as truly 'incarnate' ?

certainly, the robust author of Genesis would hardly have recognized the Adam he wrote about.

The Soul never 'entirely' fallen

The soul, therefore, retains even in paradise her natural relation to the sensible: it is a radical degeneration of that relation which constitutes its

fallen state. And yet (and here Plotinus admits he is advancing a personal opinion) the soul is never entirely fallen. His final suggestion in Ennead IV 8 would have it that the soul's highest portion remains in unbroken contact

with the intelligible order, still engaged in contemplation.82 Of this highest activity, our everyday consciousness would seem to bear not the slightest trace. The objection from experience, therefore, is a normal one, and Plo tinus must contend with it. In Ennead V 8 (on Intellectual Beauty) one of his hearers poses the question squarely: how can the soul be in [the realm of intellectual] beauty, and yet fail to see it?83

That question, allowing for modifications of problematic,84 is entirely anal

ogous to the difficulty which faces Augustine in the De musica. For both

81 This seems the force of Plotinus' a a where Henry-Schwyzer (accepting Vitringa's

reading) place it. Gf. Erin. V. 8.3. 21ff. for Plotinus' acceptance of corporeality in heaven; here he seems to warn that that body will not be the kind familiar to our ordinary experience. Mackenna probably (

' though they may occupy bodies in the heavenly region ') and Br?hier cer

tainly ('tant qu'elles ont leur corps dans le ciel') work from a different positioning of a a . 82 Enn. IV 8.8.1-9: Plotinus offers the suggestion with the admission that it 'clashes

with the general view. '

This is, in fact, one of the most characteristic and personal of Plo

tinus' views on the soul and her fallen condition, making all the more significant the traces

of the same theory in Augustine. 83 Enn. V 8.11. 19-20.

84 In De musica 6.7-8, Augustine is trying to show how much of the illusory there is in

our everyday impression that the body can act upon the soul in its fallen state: such a ca



authors admit that sense experiences would at times vividly persuade us

that we are naturally 'embodied.' The reply in both cases tacitly supposes the Plotinian doctrine that true health, which correlates with our exercise of the higher and therefore most proper activity, is invariably accompanied by a 'diminution,' at least of such corporeal consciousness.

Ennead V 8.

11. 24-31 : e e a e e e -

a , e a

a a e ? ? e e , e a e e -

a ? ? a - e , e a e

e a a a ? e a * e ... ? a e o I e a -

a ' ' e a - a I o i e ,

a a a a e e -

a e ?v . T? e a e a a ? . . .

33-38 : a e 9 e a a e a a , a e e ...

a a e , e a e * , e a

a e , '

?v a e e e e a .

De musica 6.

9-10: Gorporalia ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiciun

tur ... in ipso corpore aliquid faeiunt,

quod operi ejus [seil, animae] aut ad versetur aut congruat. Ideoque cum

renititur adversanti et mat?ri?m... dif

ficulter impingit, fit attentior ex diffi cultate ... et hoc vocatur dolor aut la

bor. Morbidam quoque perturbationem

corporis attente agit ... (10:) Sed iste

sensus ... instrumentum est... similia

s?milibus ut adjungat, repellatque quod noxium est... Agit haec anima cum

quiete, si ea quae insunt in untiate va

letudinis, quasi familiari quadam cot?

sensione cesserunt_Gum autem ...

nonnulla, ut ita dicam, alteri tate, cor

pus afficiunt, exserit atientiores ac

tiones_ Quibus actionibus congrua l?benter associ?t, et moleste obsistit in

congruis.

Here an identity of doctrine is expressed in the same basic analogy, and vested in a constellation of corresponding terms: Ficinus' translation repro duces Augustine's sanitas, morbus, quietior, familiare, tranquilla, changing

pacity on its part5 he advises his disciple, would be real cause for wonder. He then goes on (ibid. 9-10) to elaborate (with help from Plotinus, we may think: see Enn. IV 4.22ff.

which Augustine seems to have interpreted in the light of additional suggestions in Enn.

I 4.10 where the present problematic is remarkably paralleled) his celebrated theory of

sensation as an active 'attention of the soul to the passio corporis.' That attention becomes

sharpest when the soul encounters some difficultas in its normal animating activity, one

which produces the distraction from the higher activity of contemplation which is traced

to its cause in De musica 6.37ff. The cause is, as one might guess, the fall of the soul.


20 TRADITIO

his consensione to the cognate consensu. Vivid sense impressions leave ' shocks

'

rather than clear knowledge; they go with a state of sickness ? alien, unnatur

al, incongruous ? rather than with the more natural,

' familiar,

' congruous

state of health; their evidence, accordingly, is more deceptive on our real

ontological condition than informative. Their clamorous claim on our atten tion both authors associate with disturbance, tension,

' otherness

' ? and

Augustine feels obliged to add an apologetic ut ita dicam to the alteritas which he may well have found translating Plotinus' a

? a disrupted state

contrasting with the companionate, tranquil 'unification' proper to health: a tranquillity whose upper extreme is, in both authors, the soul's ability to abstract entirely from bodily concerns.85 Thus Augustine's reminder in De

quantitate animae 79 that only those activities obtrude upon our attention which we exercise with greater difficulty. The truth of the matter may be ?

potest esse ? that the soul is constantly engaged in all seven levels, even

in the highest contemplative activity ? its noblest portion never, in Plotinus

'

term, having ' come down.

' For this reason, too, he has previously observed

that the souls' re-ascent resembles nothing more than a cessatio, less a kind of knowing than a lack of it

? a e e ? a 'diminution of con sciousness. '86 From this standpoint it becomes plain why Augustine has felt

obliged repeatedly to return to the subject of the soul's 'immobility' in, his

early works87 ? a corollary of the Plotinian teaching whereby the pinnacle

of the soul remains entirely at peace, tranquil and changeless in the empyrean. Potest esse: Augustine abstains from affirmation, and the uncertainty does him credit. For Plotinus' doctrine ultimately implies the rejection of any need of 'being saved.' Salvation is already an accomplished fact, and the

only thing the soul need do is grasp that fact by an effort of intellectual ascent whose function is to bring consciousness into line with what her true onto

logical status unalterably is. But such was Augustine's enthusiasm for the Neo-Platonic illumination of Milan, ? after which (Conf. 7.17) he could more easily doubt his own existence (

' a avr?v e e e e a ) than

the reality of that Supernal Truth these books had told him of ? that it

took him some time to grasp the dangers of this implication of the master's

85 Compare De musica 6.49 and E . I 4.10, where (see note 84) absorption in intellectual

activity is shown to take our minds completely off any routine lower activity we may be

engaged in at the same time. 86 De quant, animae 55. On whether, in Plotinus' system, all elevation corresponds to

'diminution de conscience' (Br?hier, Enn?ades V 149, note 1?? propos of the exact

passage from Ennead V 8.11 cited above, p. 19), see H.R. Schwyzer's careful "'Bewusst' und 'unbewusst' bei Plotin" in Sources, 341-378. Augustine maybe excused for holding, as regards corporeal consciousness, essentially the same view as Br?hier.

87 See De imm. animae 3-4 (comparing with Enn. IV 7.9); De ord. 2. 3-7, 18-21.


the plot in i an fall of the soul 21

personal, characteristic, and therefore eminently recognizeable teaching on

the soul.

The Mechanism of the 'Fall'

(a): Fault and cosmic order are identical

To return now to the mechanism of the fall itself: is it so evident that the

problematic in both authors is parallel on the fundamental identity of 'fault' and

' being sent ?

' Again we are faced with an example of Augustinian spiritual

exegesis which at first sight appears utterly inexplicable. Why does he take such pains to draw our attention to the expression in Genesis whereby God 'dismisses' the sinful soul, rather than 'excluding' it from paradise? Close

examination of Augustine's writings from Cassiciacum onwards shows him

preoccupied with understanding the articulation which exists between the sinner's action and the action of the sinless God:88 an articulation rendered all the more delicate in a participation scheme wherein the action of the

' sec

ondaries ' always reduces to the action of the

' First.

' To this nettling issue

he comes back in the De libero arbitrio,89 answering it in terms which strongly recall the definition of iniquitas which lies at the core of the Confessions' account of his Neo-Platonic readings.90 In all these instances, the background

88 This is one of the background implications in De ord. 2.11-13 and 18-21; the overt

question is whether the actions of the stultus (translate: 'sinner') are performed in ordine; the real question is whether Deus omnia agit as the universality of Providence seems to

imply; cf. ibid. 1, 1, aut certe mala omnia Dei vol?ntate committi. Plotinus' formulation of

the problem is the same, cf. 'On Providence,' Enn. Ill 2.7, and 10, and 12; III 3.3, and

4, where he is unable to hide his acute embarassment before this question. In the De ord.

sections referred to (as well as in De ord. 2. 22-3), the only solution offered is that the actions

of the stultus do not elude God's logically subsequent ordering activity. What drives Augus tine in both instances to point out the need of an ordo studiorum before being fit to gain

insight into such question is his own awareness that this is an escape from rather than a

solution of the questions which he has posed entirely too squarely to get out of it that easily. He is looking for a scheme such that the sinner can commit sin, and God not commit

it, while at the same time the dualistic solution of the Manichees is foiled, and the exigencies of participation theory are conscientiously observed.

89 See De lib. arb. 1.4: the statement of the question is beguiling if one takes voluntas

hi a chosiste manner. Augustine really wants to know how God can give us a free will whose

very free act is reducibly His, without making Him the auctor of the sins we commit. 90 De lib. arb. 2. 53; cf. Conf. 7.22 and De quant, animae 78. The structure of both thought

and image in all these texts is the same: our fall plunges us from the Summa, God, our 'com

mon' object of (contemplative) beatitude, into the ima of corporeal creation; and its root

is a 'turning away' from God through the proud desire to have something proprium. Why this structure appeals to Augustine as his way out of the difficulty mentioned in notes 88

and 89, above, we shall see presently in connection with the pondus motif.


22 TRADITIO

is heavily tinted by the treatise on omnipresence, Ennead VI 4-591, but the innermost solution seems to have been suggested by Ennead IV 392 and par ticularly by the two lengthy sections which Plotinus devotes93 to showing that identity of fault and universal cosmic necessity to which he has felt

obliged to return time and time again.94 The De musica presents the remark able parallel on the carmen universitatis which shows Augustine's mind adop ting Plotinus' thought to a point that is downright disturbing:

Ennead IV 3.

12, 12-26 : es0 a e , a ' a a e a a e a e a , a a ae e a

e ? e a e * a a a ae e

a a a e a e -

? e a a e a a -

a e e , a a '

e

e a e e a '

e a ? a e a -

e e a a a a e a a a a a.

a e a -

a e a

a a , a a a e a a -

a a a a -

a e a , a a -

a a a ? a a a a a e a

a - a al a a

e e a - a . a

a e a a e a .

De musica 6.

29: Non ergo invideamus inferiori

bus ... nosque ipsos inter illa quae infra

nos sunt, et illa quae supra nos sunt, ita ... ordinemus, ut ... solis ... super ioribus delectemur. Delectatio quippe

quasi pondus est animae. Delectatio

ergo ordinat animam .... Quae vero

superiora sunt, nisi illa in quibus sum

ma, inconcussa, incommutabilis, ae

terna manet aequalitas? Ubi nullum

est tempus, quia nulla mutabilitas est; et unde tempora fabricantur et ordi

nantur ... dum coeli conversio ad idem

redit, et c?eles da corpora ad idem revo

cai, diebusque et mensibus et annis

et lustris, caeterisque siderum orbibus,

legibus aequalitatis et unitatis et or

dina tionis obtemp?r?t. Ita coelestibus

terrena subjecta, orbes temporum suo

rum numerosa successione quasi carmini

universitatis associant.

30: In quibus multa nobis videntur

inordinata et perturbata, quia eorum

ordini pro nostris meritis assuti sumus, nescientes quid de nobis divina Provi dentia pulchrum gerat.

Starting with a recall of the soul's intermediate position in the 'order' of reality (just as Plotinus does in the section preceding) Augustine goes on

91 See our article, pp. 15-20. 92 See Henry, Plotin, 123; the solution is drawn from the very section he finds Augustine

citing in De. civ. Dei. 93 E . IV 3. 12-13. 94 E . IV 8.5, Iff. and III 2.12.7ff. He is evidently bothered by the problem, as well

he might be.



to sketch the fall as one which 'binds' us to the order of temporal realities. The accent is characteristic of the De musica which stresses the fall into time as much if not more than the fall into the body; but it reflects Plotinus' re minder that the souls

' by their descent ... have put themselves into contact,

and they stand henceforth in harmonious association with the cosmic circuit, '

tied to it (cf. context) with ' bonds

' which Zeus the father periodically dissolves.

Fall and return are both, therefore, the work of the cosmic order, of that

providence which rules the periods of history (a cyclic conception which Augus tine was later firmly to reject, and in explicit connection with this same text)95 ' leading the things of this realm to be of one voice and plan with the Supreme

'

so that Out of this concordance rises as it were one musical utterance.' But in the section following (IV 3.13) Plotinus goes to some pains to show

that the inalterable law does not draw its power 'from without' but that it is interior to the beings which execute it: its action is also theirs. How does it operate ?

' Each several entity is overruled to go, duly and in order, towards

that place and kind to which it characteristically tends, that is towards the

image of its primal choice ... to which its individual constitution inclines it; there is therefore no need of a sender ... of its own motion it descends ... as

by a magician's power or by some mighty traction ... neither under compul sion nor of free will

' but more by a kind of

' leap of the nature as moves men

to the instinctive desire of sexual union or, in the case of some, to fine conduct. '

And Plotinus ends with another image, one which illumines both Augustine's Delectatio ... quasi pondus est animae, and his curious exegesis of Genesis' dimisit ilium:

Ennead IV 3.

13. 27-33 : ... a ?vorfj a , a e e a , e a

e a e a , e a a e e , a e e -

a a a a e e a a a , ? a e a a a e a a a e e e e , e a

e e e a .

De Genesi contra Manichaeos 2.

34: Et bene dictum est, dimisit, non, exclusit; ut ipso peccatorum suo

rum pondere tanquam in locum sibi

congruum videretur urger i. Quod pa titur plerumque malus homo cum inter

bonos vivere coeperit, si se in melius

commutare noluerit: ex illa bonorum

congregatione, pondere malae suae

consuetudinis pellitur; et illi eum non

excludunt reluctantem, sed dimittunt l cupientem.

Amor meus pondus meum: the celebrated phrase of the Confessions9* is not so different from the De musicals: Delectatio quippe pondus est animae; at

95 In De civ. Dei 10.30.30 precisely in connection with E . IV 3.12; see Henry, loc. cit.

note 92 above. 96

Conf. 13.10. See the context.


24 TRADITIO

each of his life's turnings he finds God has governed him by those stimuli interni which are none other than his own profoundest inclinations, those

pondera in the deep heart of that mystery, man.97 For an understanding of the Augustinian doctrine of freedom and grace, it would seem imperative to ask how far he went in adopting the Plotinian problematic of freedom and cosmic law which is suggested here.

(b): Pride, concupiscence, and 'curiosity*.

Law and fault are, therefore, one: another extremely characteristic tension in Plotinus' teaching can be found in Augustine as well, and related persuasively to a precise text which we have every evidence Augustine read. But what of the fault itself? Here another set of tensions greets us, for Plotinus' doc trine is not entirely easy here. The root fault Plotinus designates by the term a; the likelihood that a Latin, especially one interested in erecting a Plotinian intellectus of the Biblical fides, would translate this with the term

superbia, has already been suggested by students of the question.98 But the identity of that primal fault is more complex: we have seen already

that Augustine relates it to a superbia whereby the soul, sibi arrogando quod non est, chooses at the same time sua potentia tamquam sine Deo fru?." And

yet, in that very paragraph, he speaks of an 'implication' in terrenae cupidi tates, in corporeae voluptates: are we to understand that the fault of superbia is identical with a species of cupiditas^

This tension too is found in Plotinus, whose a frequently contains a note of

' excessive zeal

' for the ordering of the sensible universe, not entirely

unconnected with the kind of desire for sense-delights which the Orphic strain in the Platonic tradition, complicated by Plotinus' own semi-Gnostic leanings, finds uniformly reprehensible.100 Thus, in the early treatise on beauty which so struck Augustine, he describes the soul's ugliness

? ' dissolute, unrighteous,

teeming with all the lusts ... thinking only of the perishable and the base ...

97 Con f. 7.12: stimiilis internis; 4. 22, pondera; 7.23, pondus. The idea without the term occurs frequently, e.g. 5. 14 and 23.

98 See W.M. Green, ' Initium omnis peccati superbia. Augustine on pride as the first

sin,' U. of California Publications in Classical Philology 13 (1949) 407-31. W. Theiler, Porphyrios, 28, tries to show that the concept which he finds so important in both Augustine and Plotinus, must therefore have been in the Porphyry who (he would have it) transmitted Neo-Platonic thought to Augustine.

99 De Genesi 2.12, cited above, p. 12. 100 See the description of the fall in Enn. IV 8.4.11-28 in addition to the texts cited below,

notes 101, 103. Note that a certain 'interference' was likely in Augustine's reading of all these texts, so that he found the coloration of one in the occasionally more neutral language of the others.



the friend of unclean pleasures'101 ? in terms which only too faithfully echoed

both Augustine's experience and the Manichaean revulsion toward the sexual

reproduction which they held to be the chief of all sins; and it is interresting that they traced that sin to the principle of concupiscence, ,102 just as

Plotinus traces it, both here and in his last word on the question, to the alien

principle, matter.103 It is not, therefore, surprising that Augustine's first

serious efforts to seek out a definition of sin start with the terms libido and

cupiditas,10* and that his later efforts to make this emphasis rime with the more Christian superbia, found the ambiguity of Plotinus' a ready and

waiting to help him. Even more relevant to the text which concerns us here, is Plotinus' insistence at a number of points that matter is the primal evil,105 that consequently the initiative for the fall of the soul comes from below, from that sensible universe which like an undisciplined 'rabble of pleasure, desires and fears,' sets up a howling for the soul's attentions.106 This may

explain Augustine's curious insistence, not once but twice in the De Genesi contra Manichaeos,107 that the only path temptation can take to the virile

ratio is the lower, animal 'feminine' principle in each of us.

There is, however, actually a triad of sins which dominate Augustine's moral thinking from the De Genesi onwards. Theiler has underlined the im

portant r?le played in the De vera religione by what at first sight appears to be the 'triple concupiscence' of St. John's first Epistle, and he has labored to show that it reproduces a Neo-Platonic moral triad that 'must have been' in Porphyry.108 Concupiscentia, curiositas and superbia are, assuredly, terms

which would seem to derive from the Johannine concupiscentia carnis, con

cupiscentia oculorum, and ambitio saeculi to which Augustine later on explicitly relates them.109

But the only difficulty here is explaining the explanation. Why in the

world should Augustine have chosen, as his constant set of moral categories,

101 Enn. I 6.5.22ff. But see the following section as well, I 6.6. 102 See H.G. Puech, Le Manich?isme, son fondateur, sa doctrine (Paris 1949) 68-71 and

76-8. Note the relation of with concupiscence. Augustine claims to Honoratus that

he has conserved all he found true in Manichaeism: De utilitate credendi 36: quod apud eos verum didiceram, teneo. Any understanding of his hardy effort to erect an intellectus

fidei must bear in mind that such a (legitimate in itself) intention carries risks with it. 103 Enn. I 8 (chronologically

= 51st of the 54 treatises) which, as Br?hier notes (Enn?ades

I, 51) embodies the same theory of evil as the treatise on Beauty I. 6. 104 De lib. arb. 1.8ff. 105 See note 103 above. 106 Enn. VI 4.15. 107 De Genesi 2.20 and 39. 108

Porphyrios, 36ff. Gf. I Jo. 2. 15-16. 109 De musica 6.44.


26 TRADITIO

a triad of sins to which nothing in the ecclesiastical tradition seems to have accorded a similar importance? What we wish to suggest as an explanation is this: Theiler is correct in thinking that Augustine found the Johannine triad in more or less reasonable accord with an appealing Neo-Platonic triad, but the Neo-Platonist in question was, after all, most probably Plotinus. The possible correlates for Augustine's superbia and concupiscentia we have

already suggested: the key facet of the question, consequently, is the origin of the curiositas notion.110

Having supposed that this final category was taken bodily from Porphyry, where it was presumably directed against the imagination and its works, Theiler must suppose a constancy in Augustine's use of it, which precludes the tentative work of adaptation which in point of fact characterizes his initial introduction of the category into his writings. Theiler's mistake, if mistake there be, is partly accounted for by the fact that he starts his investigation of Augustine with the relatively systematized De vera religione, then some what blandly assures his readers that the earlier works present ein ?hnliches Bild.111 Partly, too, his confidence reposes on the use of the triad in the second book of the De libero arbitrio, which he mistakenly assumes is prior to the De Genesi contra Manichaeos,112 when it is, in fact, subsequent to it, and profits accordingly from the initial effort of systematization which we are about to observe.

The first occurrence of the triple concupiscence in Augustine's writings is

found, unless we are seriously mistaken, in De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.40.113 But its very firmness there suggests that it may have been inserted after the second book was completed, to lend the entire work a certain unity of design. For its appearance in the course of the second book is nowhere near so firm.

In the course of his exegetical task Augustine is led to comment on the

punishment imposed on the serpent; the biblical text he is using presents a

110 Its presence in Porphyry Theiler must deduce from its presence in Plotinus; see note 98 above.

111 Ibid. 57. Theiler overlooks the adjustments Augustine must make in Plotinus in order to achieve the provisional synthesis of the De vera religione. Some of the portions of his

work where that labor is most evident are, for that very reason, most illuminating on the real sources he is remolding: hence the importance of the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, which Theiler, like most scholars, accords only passing attention.

U2 See note 16. Bardy's arguments, be it observed, impose a later date for the second book than for the first, but it remains quite possible that it was written shortly after the De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De musica and De magistro, which show many analogies with it.

113 Augustine is explaining the allegory of the seven days of creation, and is in the finale

of the first book. His formal exegetical task is over, and it is possible that this portion con

stitutes a conclusion added later.



triadic structure which has been eliminated from our modern translations, and he reads God's words as Pectore et ventre repes, et terram manducabis.lu

His taste for parallelism leads him to see in the condemnation of the serpent a reference to the same sins as provoked the fall of the soul: the pectus means

pride, superbia; the venter refers to desiderium carnale. Alas, what is to be made of the terram manducabisl Augustine hesitates: this, he suggests at first, could refer once again to earthly

' cupidities.

' But the solution does

not satisfy: it involves duplicating the symbolic force of the venter. Only then does the happy idea seem to occur to him that this third member arms him with a neat sally against the materialism and sensism of his Manichaean adversaries, and he proposes that

... vel certe genus tertium tentationis his verbis figuratur, quod est

curiositas. Terram enim qui manducat, profunda et tenebrosa p?n?tr?t, et tarnen temporalia atque terrena. (2.27).

Examining its next occurrence, one is at first tempted to grant Theiler that this notion might indeed have originally been directed against imagina tion and imaged thinking, and that its Porphyrian pedigree might be showing.115 But in the case before us, as in so many instances, we must take into account the exigencies of controversy: Augustine is hardly bashful in making adapta tions when they serve the cause. Once arrived at the prophetica explanatio of this same punishment, all his hesitation has left him; the triad is directed

squarely against what he conceives to be the major errors of the Manichees, and it is this clearly polemic reference which has molded the triple concupis cence into final shape:

Non enim decipit [diabolus] nisi aut superbos, qui sibi arrogantes quod non sunt, cito credunt quod summi Dei et animae humanae una eademque

sit; aut desideriis carnalibus implicates, qui libenter audiunt quod quid

quid lascive faciunt, non ipsi faciunt sed gens tenebrarum; aut curiosos,

qui terrena sapiunt, et sp?ritalia terreno oculo inquirunt. (2.40)116

The likelihood is, therefore, that Augustine did not find this triad already neatly packaged for him in Porphyry; but the question of the origin of curio

114 Gen. 2.14. The triad, in which the venter and pectus mentions are really a doublet, seems to be one of those peculiarities of the translation Augustine is using; see De Genesi

2. 27. 115

If, that is, one admit with Theiler that Augustine's curiositas reflects a Porphyrian

polemic against the imagination, for which his major piece of evidence is the fact that it is

found in that connection in Augustine. We would suggest, on the contrary, that its terminal

function in Augustine is a result of sifting it through the anti-image analysis of Ennead VI

4-5, a process which had definitely anti-Manichaean point. See note 116, infra. 116 The main defect that Augustine finds in his former intellectual comportment is this

habit of inquiring into spiritalia terreno oculo; see Conf. 5.19 and our article (cited note 1

above) especially the texts cited in notes 13 and 33.


28 TRADITIO

sitas still calls for resolution. We suggest that Augustine found it in the Plo tinian treatise on Time and Eternity, Ennead III 7. And it is in the De musica that Augustine briefly tips his hand and cues us in this direction.

Guitton has well characterized the preoccupation of the De musica with the title, 'Le Temps Po?tique,'117 for Augustineseems to have done little but

transpose Plotinus' considerations on temporal measures, intervals, and their

relativity, into a series of metrical applications. All the soul's creative ac

tivity, in fact, he there links to an amor generalis actionis which urges her to create a 'mendacious' array of numbers in imitation of the immobile perfec tion of the eternal world. In all this, the context of Ennead III 7 is faithfully reflected;118 but as if to clear up any remaining doubts, Augustine gives an

etymological definition of curiositas wherein its Plotinian origin becomes manifest.

That definition, however, is rooted in a context which speaks of the fall of the soul: what possible connection could there be here? Plotinus has described the process of the fall in Ennead IV 8, without mentioning the term a.119

But, as B

the plotinian fall of the soul in st. augustine

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