the operational challenges of task force hawkhawk was the most visible case. in-tended to supplement...

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O peration Allied Force was amajor NATO success. TheAlliance withstood compet-ing national agendas and

divisive political pressures while con-ducting a 78-day campaign that endedviolence against Albanian Kosovars.Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo andrefugees returned home. Yet the con-flict also raised questions. While manyof the controversies were debated onthe levels of policy and strategy, differ-ences on the operational role of U.S.joint forces also arose. Task ForceHawk was the most visible case. In-tended to supplement airpower byusing the AH–64 helicopter and multi-ple launch rocket system (MLRS), its

52 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02

Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV, USA (Ret.), Bruce Nardulli, and LieutenantColonel Walter L. Perry, USA (Ret.), are defense analysts with RAND.

The Operational Challengesof Task Force HawkBy J O H N G O R D O N I V, B R U C E N A R D U L L I, and

W A L T E R L. P E R R Y

ANTP–Q–37 radar,Task Force Hawk.

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Report Date 00 00 2002

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Title and Subtitle The Operational Challenges of Task Force Hawk

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Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) National Defense University Institute for NationalStrategic Studies Washington D C 20319-5066

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G o r d o n e t a l .

Grafenwohr, Germany, on March 20,1999, just four days prior to the start ofNATO air attacks. Initial guidance tothe Germany-based Army V Corps wasto plan to deploy a force of 1,700 toMacedonia, where it would prepare fordeep attack helicopter operations. Theforce would eventually grow to 48AH–64s, although the initial deploy-ment envisioned 24 aircraft plus sup-port ships. A small number of MLRSwere included to provide air defensesuppression fires. Since the force wasoriginally envisioned to deploy toMacedonia and be positioned near ele-ments of the NATO Allied Rapid Reac-tion Corps, planners minimized unitsize because force protection and logis-tic support would be available.

Clark’s request for Task ForceHawk proved controversial. He wassearching for ways to hit Serb fieldedforces in Kosovo, believing that theirdestruction would convince the enemyto end the conflict. He considered theground forces a center of gravity forSerb leader Slobodan Milosevic. More-over, he felt the political pressure forresults. Initial air attacks had done lit-tle to either damage Serb forces or haltethnic cleansing.

Where Clark saw benefits, JCSfound risks. They immediately raisedobjections. Critics cited such issues aspossible Serb attacks against theAH–64s’ operating base, low altitudeair defenses in Kosovo, and the dis-persed nature of ground targets. Thewhole issue appeared moot whenMacedonia refused permission tomount offensive NATO operationsfrom its territory. Army planners inGermany learned the mission wouldprobably be cancelled on the Fridaybefore Easter.

The situation changed over theweekend. Albania agreed to acceptground forces. The President was per-suaded at the same time to authorizethe mission despite strong JCS objec-tions. On April 3, he decided to deployTask Force Hawk.

On the FlyThe new base profoundly im-

pacted planning and operations. Giventhe absence of U.S. or NATO units inAlbania to provide force protection orother support, the size of the force

mission proved to be controversialamong senior U.S. military officers. Inaddition, operations revealed majorfailures in the integration of groundand air forces.

This article reviews the backgroundleading to the decision to launch Task

Force Hawk, its deployment, miscon-ceptions regarding its speed of arrival,and the operational difficulties thatconfronted the joint force.

A Rumor of WarPreparations for a campaign

against Yugoslavia started in summer1998. With conditions in the provinceof Kosovo steadily deteriorating, mili-tary planning was conducted withinboth NATO and U.S.-only channels.Planning was significantly constrainedbecause few Alliance members per-ceived that they had vital interests atstake in Kosovo. In particular, neitherAmerican nor NATO leadership fa-vored using ground forces as part of anintegrated joint operation. While fairlyelaborate air attack options were devel-oped through the early winter of 1999,

there was no planning for a land com-ponent. This shortfall strongly influ-enced subsequent operations.

Although the initial mission was totake out the Serbian air defense system,air operations included provisions forattacks on ground forces as well as fixed

infrastructure targets. Plannersrealized at the outset that itwould be hard to locate andhit Yugoslav ground troops op-erating inside Kosovo whereregular army and police forces

were conducting operations against theKosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Serbianconventional units were employed incompany- and battalion-sized battlegroups so forces could spread through-out the province and rapidly move tosupport the police. These tactics andthe forested, hilly terrain produced adispersed and nearly invisible enemywith long experience in small unit,combined arms operations.

While NATO had months to pre-pare for air operations, the timeline forTask Force Hawk was constrained.Army planners in Europe first learnedthat General Wesley Clark, USA, Com-mander in Chief, European Command,was considering using attack helicop-ters in Kosovo at a planning exercise at

Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 53

while NATO had months to preparefor air operations, the timeline forTask Force Hawk was constrained

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grew dramatically. Small parties dis-patched by V Corps to determinewhere to locate the unit recommendedRinas airport near Tirana. Other air-ports were ruled out because they werewithin surface-to-surface fires range ofMontenegro. Still, Tirana was closeenough to Serbia that the threat of airand ground attacks could not be ig-nored. This led to further task force ex-pansion. A battalion-sized mechanizedtask force with M–1 tanks and M–2 in-fantry fighting vehicles, additionallight infantry, an air defense battery,more MLRS, cannon artillery batteries,and support units was added. Forceprotection, support units, and com-mand and control elements increased

the total number personnel to 5,100. Amajor portion of the V Corps staff wasdeployed to Albania to control opera-tions. Lieutenant General John Hen-drix, USA, was named to head TaskForce Hawk.

Expanding the size of the forcewas not the only factor affecting de-ployment. The small airstrip at Rinas,inbound humanitarian flights, andlimited means of offloading restrictedarrivals to twenty C–17s per day.

Transports carrying personnel andequipment departed from Ramstein airbase on April 8. Helicopters began de-parting six days later. All arrived in Pisa,Italy, by April 18. They were held thereseveral days. The situation at Rinas waschaotic. There was limited ramp roomfor cargo aircraft and torrential rainshad turned the surrounding area into alake of mud. Humanitarian relief heli-copters landing in open fields had sunkup to their bellies. The attack shipswould have to wait while concrete land-ing pads were constructed.

The first 11 AH–64s and 20 sup-port helicopters arrived April 21. Theremaining 24 ships came five dayslater. Hendrix declared an initial oper-ational capability on April 26. OnMay 7, Task Force Hawk was declaredto be fully ready for deep operations

and placed under the operational con-trol of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil,commanded by Admiral James Ellis.

These dates did not compare unfa-vorably with the expectations of U.S.and NATO commanders. Task ForceHawk met its goals despite the publicperception that it was slow to deploy.The National Security Council set mis-sion capability for April 23–24. OnApril 23, 11 mission-ready AH–64swere at Rinas and several missionreadiness exercises had been con-ducted. In fact, the deployment hadgone well from the viewpoint of theArmy and Air Force despite one train-ing accident and another mishap at-tributed to equipment failure.

An April 4 DOD press statementcontributed to the feeling that the de-ployment was slow. Kenneth Bacon,Assistant Secretary of Defense for Pub-lic Affairs, told a reporter, “You’re prob-ably talking, when you consider thetransportation challenges, about a weekor so, maybe seven to ten days. . . .” Aformal press release the same day statedthat it would “take up to ten days todeploy the units,”1 implying closure onApril 14, well before the Clark or Na-tional Security Council targets. This es-tablished a false expectation in themedia and amoung the public.

Preparing for WarOnce in theater, the plan was for

attack helicopters to strike conven-tional and police units operating incentral and western Kosovo. The tar-gets were to be developed by variousmeans, including joint reconnaissancesystems, Army counterfire radars thatwere observing artillery and mortar fir-ing against KLA in western Kosovo,and Army unmanned aerial vehiclesfrom Macedonia.

All the missions were planned asnight attacks by groups of four to sixAH–64s, supported by fixed-wing air-craft strikes and helicopters on standbyfor rescue in case a ship was shotdown. Extensive deception missionsand suppressive fires against air de-fense sites were prepared. Lethal sup-pressive fires were to come from MLRSand artillery units flown to Albania.


AH–64s near Tirana.

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Air defense position on Albanian border.

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Allied fighters were achieving at leastsome effect on enemy forces fromsafer medium altitude attacks, al-though post-conflict analysis showsthat ground forces suffered less dam-age than was thought at the time.

Exacerbating the challenge of lowaltitude operations by the helicopterswas the fact that the aircraft wouldhave been limited to several mountainpasses leading from Albania intoKosovo; they could not fly over themountains carrying weapons loads.Therefore, the enemy could concen-trate its defenses on those ingress andegress routes.

The rules of engagement were sorestrictive that extensive lethal suppres-sive fires were not viable. There wasgreat concern for the huge number ofrefugees. NATO pilots were required toactually see their targets before releas-ing ordnance to confirm that therewere no civilians in the target area. Therules of engagement tightened everytime civilian casualties occurred. In the

For planning and control, V CorpsDeep Operations Coordination Centerdeployed to Albania, developed targetsfor attack helicopter strikes, and passedthose to the Combined Air OperationsCenter (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy. Task

Force Hawk maintained close contactin Vicenza with the Battlefield Coordi-nation Element (BCE), a small Armydetachment whose role was to negoti-ate the details of proposed helicoptermissions. As plans developed, the de-tachment communicated them toCAOC to deconflict airspace, negotiatefixed-wing support, and work out tim-ing. Task Force Hawk submitted mis-sion proposals daily. While the forceprepared for strike operations, it alsodeveloped targets that were passed toCAOC for possible fixed-wing strikes.

The Chains that BindAs with the deployment, Task

Force Hawk faced a variety of obstaclesonce in Kosovo. Overshadowing opera-tional challenges was enduring seniorlevel disagreement over the risks versus

benefits of employing the force. Com-bined with Belgrade’s capitulation inearly June, these factors resulted inTask Force Hawk never being employedin direct combat.

Authorization to employ theforce directly never came for severalreasons. The target set in westernKosovo consisted of platoon-sizeforces, dispersed and usually hiddenunder trees and in villages. Attack hel-icopters penetrating at low altitudewould have been exposed to smallarms fire, antiaircraft guns, and shoul-der-fired missiles. Given the extremeU.S. and NATO unwillingness to suffercasualties, the risks were determinedto be too great relative to the payoff.


Helicopter Locations

April 1999

Giebslstad, Germany

Ilesheim, Germany

Le Cannet, France

Pisa, Italy

Brindisi, Italy

Anacona, Italy

Naples, Italy

Rinas, AIbania

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V Corps orderedto deploy Task Force Hawk

to Tirana

Awaiting"Call Forward"

Initial operatingcapability declared

Self-deployment of AH–64 helicopters

beginsFirst elements

depart Ramstein

DOD Press Release:"it will take up to ten

days to deploy the units."

Held up by BG Cody because

of parking at Rinas

Awaiting "call forward"DOD press release states:

"It will take up to tendays to deploy the units."

Held up because of parking

at Rinas

overshadowing operational challenges was disagreementover the risks versus benefits of employing the force

Task Force Hawk: Helicopter Self-Deployment

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case of night attack by helicopters, ex-tensive lethal suppressive fires wouldhave been required since low altitudeair defense weapons did not need emit-ting radars to conduct engagementsand were therefore hard to locate.

Washington’s support for opera-tions also seems to have eroded as aresult of two crashes involvingAH–64s in Albania during training.Both crew members were killed in thesecond accident.

Meanwhile, Task Force Hawk con-tinued to target enemy positions. Sinceit did not have permission to engagethe enemy, these locations were nomi-nated for attack by other air assets.However, due to the lack of preexistingjoint procedures to share data onemerging targets and quickly respond,most targets were struck hours later ornot at all. Restrictive rules of engage-ment also limited the effectiveness ofsensor-to-shooter linkages. The re-quirement for eyes on target to mini-mize collateral damage frequentlynegated the utility of rapid targetingdata such as that provided by the taskforce’s counterfire radars.

Despite the fact that the AH–64swere not employed in Kosovo, TaskForce Hawk contributed to the successof Allied Force. The leadership in Bel-grade probably viewed it and theNATO ground forces in Macedonia asthe nucleus of an eventual ground at-tack into Kosovo.2 The presence of theforce also likely reassured Albania thatthe Alliance was committed to its de-fense during a time of extreme crisiswhen tens of thousands of refugeeswere flooding in from Kosovo. In addi-tion, the task force’s target locationand reconnaissance systems, thoughnot used to best effect, also assisted inlocating enemy forces.

For the FutureOperation Allied Force provides

many lessons for joint operations. Itwas an operation with strictly limitedobjectives and significant politicalconstraints. Tomorrow’s joint opera-tions will present similar challenges.It is thus possible that, due to politi-cal realities, future operations will beair-only—despite the fact that air-land

synergies are preferable tosingle dimension opera-tions. A better joint ap-proach is needed to respondto similar contingencies.

While NATO won theconflict using airpower aloneand with no combat fatalities,joint planning and executionwere lacking and better jointprocedures would have helped. No landcomponent commander was ever desig-nated. That precluded ground forceplanning in the event that a land offen-sive was ever required. It also added tothe difficulties of establishing cleanlines of command for the joint taskforce commander. Additionally, landcomponent intelligence with its expert-ise in enemy land force tactics couldhave facilitated strike operations.

Similarly, joint procedures for tar-get coordination were slow to evolve.There was a general lack of familiarityamong the components as to how tointegrate and deconflict target requests.The BCE located at CAOC did not nor-mally work with corps-level headquar-ters, and Air Force and Navy personnelthere were unfamiliar with Army proce-dures. The joint targeting coordination

process needs to be worked out in ad-vance and well understood.

Better methods to integrate Armyattack helicopters with an air opera-tion are also needed. Allied Forcerevealed a general lack of understand-ing about how to employ attack heli-copters in conjunction with what wasprimarily an air offensive, resulting ina lost opportunity to expand themeans of attack. Planners should con-sider how Army attack helicopters andmissiles can be employed in the initialphase of a joint campaign beforeground forces arrive.

Campaign plans should also be asmultidimensional as possible. Execu-tion will be compromised when thereare no air-land synergies on the opera-tional level. Neither the United States


UH–60s supportingcivil engineeringproject.

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consequences of adopting a lesserstrategy. Key combat synergies derivedfrom joint air-ground operations andthe compelling force they can exerton enemies were not realized. AlliedForce was a combined air campaignthat never had the benefit of a trulyjoint command. Establishing such acommand would have helped theoverall effort. Ground intelligence an-alysts would have brought their spe-cial expertise to the identification oftargets in Kosovo, possibly improvingthe effectiveness of the air campaignagainst Serb forces. Above all, a fullyjoint headquarters would have beenbetter able to integrate Task ForceHawk, not to mention more ambi-tious ground operations. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Defense Link, DOD news briefing,April 4, 1999, and “U.S. Attack Helicoptersand Multiple Launch Rocket Systems to De-ploy in Support of Operation Allied Force,”DOD press release no. 145–99, April 4,1999; DOD news briefing, April 4, 1999,Kenneth H. Bacon, Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Public Affairs.

2 Clark states that Task Force Hawk “con-veyed a powerful image of a ground threatand would have been its lead component.”See Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War(New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 425.Some argue that the threat of a ground in-vasion was one of several contributors toMilosovic’s willingness to settle with NATO,citing Yugoslav precautionary measuressuch as strengthening defensive positionsalong possible invasion routes and position-ing 80,000 mines along the Kosovo borderwith Albania. See Steve Hosmer, WhyMilosovic Decided to Settle When He Did,MR1351-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001),pp. 109–14.

nor NATO was willing to consider aground attack into Kosovo. The practi-cal effect was that the enemy could tai-lor countermeasures and tactics to min-imize the effects of air attack alone. KLA

was such an inadequate ground forcethat police and conventional forcescould operate in a very dispersed man-ner and still defeat it despite Alliedcommand of the air. With no crediblethreat of a ground offensive, there wasno need to be concerned with creatingdefenses and massing units. Post-con-flict analysis indicates that the minimaldamage inflicted on the forces insideKosovo was largely due to their abilityto disperse in the face of a single-di-mensional threat.

The Army should expand groundforce options to help improve jointsynergies. Essentially two types ofground units were available for opera-tions in Kosovo, light forces and heavymechanized units. However, given the

limited firepower, ground mobility, andprotection of light units, casualty-averse decisionmakers would probablyhave been loath to employ them evenhad there been a willingness to con-

duct a ground operation.On the other hand, theheavy Army forces withtheir M–1 tanks and M–2infantry fighting vehicles

would have been severely constrainedby the terrain. Indeed, Army engineersin Albania who surveyed routes heavyunits could have taken from Albanianports to the Kosovo border concludedthat weeks of extensive engineeringwould have been needed to shore upbridges, repair roads, and make otherinfrastructure improvements. TheArmy’s current plans to introducemedium units into its force structure,as represented by the interim brigadecombat teams and the later ObjectiveForce, are appropriate given the AlliedForce experience.

Allied Force demonstrated thestrategic deficiencies of not taking ajoint air-land approach to military op-erations. The political impedimentswere real enough, but so were the


the Army should expand ground forceoptions to improve joint synergies

Redeploying M–1 tank.

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