The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear Energy

Heather McCormic8/5/2011

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Nuclear technology, some of today’s most advanced science, has been manipulated for

a multitude of purposes, from arms to medicine to electricity generation. Since World War II,

nuclear information and developments have demanded international attention among policy

makers, leaders, and peoples. Proliferation, a looming threat to the entire world, has become a

priority in policies and agreements (the most noteworthy being the 1968 Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty) as more states have acquired the know-how to produce weapons of mass

destruction and other war-making tools. Though the spread of information has the potential to

give states the opportunity to manufacture such weapons, this knowledge is important for the

development of nuclear energy.

This paper seeks to explore the question, “To what extent does the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT or Treaty) prevent the peaceful acquisition of nuclear capabilities as

an alternate energy source?” The general background of the Treaty, nuclear technology, and

nuclear history must be taken into consideration to begin to address such a topic. To delve into

the above query, case studies of three Parties to the Treaty will be analyzed to determine why

and under what circumstances they submitted to the Treaty. The cases chosen for investigation

here are Japan, France, and Russia. Japan is an extraordinary case because of its pledge to

remain peaceful after World War II and its nuclear developments under the NPT. France on the

other hand is vital to this study because of its late accession to the Treaty, and its sixty year long

dependence on nuclear power plants (NPPs) for energy. Lastly, Russia has been a Party to the

Treaty since it was drafted, abiding by its standards while sharing knowledge with states

developing nuclear technologies. With this information compiled, we can begin to understand

what the implications of the NPT are for the development of nuclear energy.

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The Appeal of Nuclear Energy

Nuclear energy is not simply a new development for the sake of science. If the NPT

impedes the development of peaceful nuclear technologies used in nuclear power reactors, the

world will continue to face the ongoing energy crisis along with climate change. For the last half

century, there has been an impetus to replace or complement fossil fuels and other non-

renewable energy sources due to their finite supply. Oil, natural gas, and coal resources do not

suffice to meet the world’s energy demands. Fuels like oil and gas release carbon dioxide into

the atmosphere upon burning; coal emits a great amount of both sulfur dioxide and carbon

dioxide, damaging the environment and speeding global climate change along (Bodansky 2004:

7). Fossil fuels also strain states economically. For example, China is developing nuclear power

technology to alleviate its exhausted coal market (CFR 2009). The key in phasing out the use of

fossil fuels lies with the energy source that reduces harmful carbon emissions while satisfying

an ever-increasing energy demand. Renewable sources such as hydroelectric and wind power

currently provide substantial amounts of energy across the world. Alternatively, nuclear fission

and fusion are viable energy supply options for the future (Bodansky 2004: 15). Though nuclear

energy is not the silver bullet that will solve the world’s resource and climate dilemmas, it is an

important aspect of the more expansive portfolio that will vanquish the threats of resource

limitations and climate change.

The development of nuclear energy began in the 1940s primarily by the United States;

the successful creation of the atomic bomb by the United States during World War II assured

scientists and policy makers alike of the new technology’s practicality (Bodansky 2004: 16).

Since the 1950s, international debate on the use of nuclear energy and technology has

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demanded the attention of national policy makers and leaders. When President Eisenhower

gave his “Atoms for Peace” speech in 1953, he prompted the United Nations (UN) to create the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that would:

…[d]evise methods whereby…fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

The IAEA is vital in determining the role of nuclear energy in society today as discoveries are

made that allow for the increased application of technologies. Nuclear power plants have been

developed to gradually replace coal-fired plants; nuclear energy can in the future also act in the

place of natural gas, allowing gas resources to replace oil and coal especially for heating.

Eventually nuclear energy can contribute to the production of power for electric vehicles and

mass transit (Bodansky 2004: 17). Nuclear technologies have influenced society since their

inception in the 1940s, from changing how the average household operates to what

international agreements are forged.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Before delving fully into the question of whether the NPT impedes the development of

peaceful nuclear technologies, it is imperative to have an understanding of the components of

the Treaty itself. The primary purpose of this review is to show how it approaches the topic of

nuclear energy, and its policy toward the spread of technologies used in NPPs.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is based on a balanced three-pillar system; these

three pillars are non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to “develop research, production

and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (Department of State). Pillar one, non-

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proliferation, is addressed in Articles I, II, and III. Article I denies all Parties the right to transfer

weapons and explosives, while Article II states that no non-nuclear-weapons states can accept

or seek the technology used to develop nuclear weapons. In Article III, the NPT states that the

IAEA, the watchdog of international nuclear developments, will verify that all signatories follow

the standards set by the Treaty for their classification (nuclear-weapons state, or non-nuclear-

weapons state). The same article also prohibits all non-nuclear-weapons states from acquiring

fissile materials (Department of State).

Next, Article VI concentrates on the second pillar, disarmament. This article, though

short, singlehandedly sets a precedent for all future disarmament treaties, stating that each

Party should “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of

the nuclear arms race…and to nuclear disarmament” (Department of State). Last, and most

relevant to the subject matter of this paper, is the third pillar allowing states to develop and use

nuclear technologies for peaceful energy purposes. Articles IV and V address how technologies

used for nuclear reactors should spread. The Treaty all but asks states to promote the

development of nuclear energy and other peaceful nuclear technologies by guaranteeing

signatories the right to exchange equipment, nuclear materials, and information. Nuclear-

weapons states are encouraged to share developments in all types of peaceful nuclear

applications with non-nuclear-weapons states; Article V ventures to say that the findings from

nuclear explosions should “be made available to non-nuclear-weapons [s]tates…on a

nondiscriminatory basis” (Department of State).

Pillar three is profound to this day not because the idea of sharing technology is novel,

but instead because of the many other (mostly belligerent) uses of nuclear technologies. These

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“dual-use” technologies will be discussed at greater length in the following section. Dual-use

technologies are of concern in the continued use of the NPT because permitting states to

distribute nuclear information of any kind could lead to the weapons proliferation of other

states. The NPT is not meant to impede the growth of the nuclear energy sector despite the

limitations it places on the spread of some technologies (Articles I through III). Much criticism of

the NPT focuses on the management of information sharing. “Sharing nuclear technology and

the benefits at least thereof, is a tremendous idea. But if you can't keep technology from being

misused you can forget about expanding or continuing sharing regimes” (CFR 2009).

Dual-Use Technologies

The term “dual-use technology” indicates that similar input, processes, and tools are

used in the making of both nuclear warheads and power. For the last half century, critics of the

NPT have accused the civilian development and use of nuclear power, stating that the

processes and fuel used in making electricity in NPPs can and are frequently used to begin

making nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann 2009: 8). To an extent this is true. States may receive

civilian nuclear assistance from nuclear-weapons states for peaceful purposes and instead use

that information to lay the foundations for developing weapons. Time and again civilian

technologies are used to produce fissile material (the most difficult hurdle in weapons

manufacturing) and build the technical knowledge base critical for nuclear weapons

development (Bluth et al. 2010: 185, 190). In essence, the “dual-use dilemma creates

uncertainty about the end-use of assistance” (Fuhrmann 2009: 184).

Though civilian cooperation contributes to the development of nuclear weapons in

some cases (Pakistan, India, and Iran for instance), states such as Japan have used civilian

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knowledge without producing nuclear weapons. At best there is a plausible connection

between civilian nuclear cooperation and the acquisition of nuclear weapons; nuclear warhead

development is not deterministically dependent on peaceful aid (Fuhrmann 2009: 187).

However, civilian cooperation does potentially reduce the costs of initiating a nuclear weapons

program, making developing such programs less difficult and consequently more appealing

(Fuhrmann 2009: 183).

In order to explain how civilian nuclear technologies are used in both NPPs and

weapons, the next portion of this section will briefly describe the fuel cycle and how similar, if

not the same technologies are used in the production of energy and arms. To begin, all nuclear

products are fueled by uranium enriched in isotope U-235 (World Nuclear Association: Fuel

Cycle). Uranium is mined or taken from secondary sources1 for use in nuclear reactors

worldwide. The United States, Russia, the UK, France, China, Germany, Japan, and other states

currently or have operated enrichment facilities that convert raw uranium into Low Enriched

Uranium (LEU) for commercial use (Nassauer 2005: 5).2 LEU, containing approximately four to

five percent U-235 isotope, is used in commercial power reactors, while HEU (eighty-five to

ninety percent U-235) is considered weapons-grade or fissile material (Deutch 2009: 15; World

Nuclear Association: Uranium Enrichment).

The danger of uranium enrichment lies with the enrichment curve (see Figure 1). As

enrichment progresses, the original raw uranium requires less U-235 enrichment to

substantially increase its isotope content; thus the progression curve of the enrichment process

flattens once four to five percent of the raw uranium’s mass is enriched. “The relatively small

1 These include re-enriched uranium, reprocessed spent fuel, and downgraded HEU (Nassauer 2005: 5).2 The United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China have openly claimed that though they used to “enrich uranium for military purposes,” they have closed those facilities (Nassauer 2005: 5).

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increment of effort needed to achieve the increase from normal [LEU] levels is the reason why

enrichment plants are considered a sensitive technology in relation to preventing weapons

proliferation” (World Nuclear Association: Uranium Enrichment).

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In addition to HEU produced in enrichment facilities, plutonium (pure isotope Pu-239),

often a primary component of nuclear weapons, is a by-product of used LEU (World Nuclear

Association: Plutonium; ElBaradei 2003: 3).3 Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan operate

reprocessing facilities to separate plutonium from spent fuel for military purposes, whereas

most states operating civilian NPPs use foreign commercial plants to reprocess their spent fuel

(Nassauer 2005: 6). Because of the multiple uses of uranium and the by-

3 “Plutonium is both the by-product of nuclear reactors used for peaceful purposes such as generation of electric power or desalination, and the ingredient of nuclear weapons” (Firmage 1969: 712).

Figure 1

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product of its use, dual-use technologies are constantly considered crucial to the

implementation of the NPT and other international non-proliferation standards set by the IAEA.

Historical Overview of Non-Proliferation Efforts

The following is an abbreviated history of non-proliferation efforts related to the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This section outlines the global sentiment toward nuclear

development, and how nuclear power has progressed as a result of the myriad treaties and

agreements concerning nuclear arms and other technological advancements. As time

progressed, more states acquired both peaceful and belligerent nuclear capabilities. Thus the

world was prompted to create one standard set of guidelines for all states, whether they

intended to become nuclear-weapons states or remained neutral and did not proliferate.

After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in 1945 and the end of World War II, the

United States was the only country that had acquired nuclear weapons. Once the dust settled,

President Harry Truman proposed to destroy the entire U.S. arsenal on the terms that no other

World Nuclear Association

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state would develop nuclear weapons; the UN would verify that no states proliferated via

inspections. The Truman administration’s proposal (the “Baruch Plan”) failed, however, because

the USSR did not comply with the required inspections of nuclear power and processing plants

(Bunn 2003: 2; Firmage 1969: 713). This unsuccessful non-proliferation effort led President

Eisenhower to deliver the aforementioned “Atoms for Peace” address, encouraging states to

seek peaceful uses for nuclear technologies and assist others in developing those capabilities.

Nuclear states such as the United States, USSR, and France began supplying research reactors

and the weapons-grade HEU used to operate them to states developing nuclear programs. Thus

began the strides that built today’s nuclear world (Bunn 2003: 2).

For the next eight years, scientists continued making discoveries that increased the

efficiency and applicability of nuclear resources. In 1961, the UN opened its floor to discussion

about the future of nuclear proliferation. The next year a Disarmament Conference began in

Geneva, Switzerland to draft a resolution pertaining to the continued peaceful acquisition of

nuclear technology and the reduction of nuclear armament worldwide. The NPT was written

after a series of compromises between the United Kingdom, Soviet Russia, and the United

States. States began signing the Treaty in 1968, and it entered into force in 1970; India,

Pakistan, and Israel refused to sign the Treaty for political reasons (Bunn 2003: 3). The NPT

allowed signatories to use nuclear technology for medicinal, agricultural, energy, and other

peaceful purposes, while severely limiting the spread of technologies for use in nuclear

weapons (ElBaradei 2003: 2). Although the NPT was slated to have a twenty-five year term, it

was extended indefinitely in 1995 (Bunn 2003: 3).

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Shortly thereafter, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finalized in

1996. The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions in all locations.4 To date (August 2011), three

nuclear states have signed and ratified the treaty (France, Russia, and the United Kingdom);

nine states with nuclear technologies including China, India, Pakistan, and the United States

have yet to ratify. The halt in the CTBT ratification process has kept it from going into force

(CTBTO 2008).

In 2004, President George W. Bush proposed that nuclear exporters should only provide

access to fuel for use in civilian reactors in those states that renounce both enrichment and

reprocessing. However, the Nuclear Suppliers Group refused to impose such a standard due to

the right guaranteed to state governments by the NPT to develop non-belligerent nuclear

technologies (Asada 2009: 68). This shows the authority of the NPT over the creation of other

treaties and regulations on nuclear developments.

Case Studies

The next three sections of this paper will focus on case studies of Japan, France, and

Russia. Each will give an overview of the state’s nuclear history, and will then address the

circumstances under which it ratified or acceded to the NPT. Understanding the context of

these countries’ participation in the Treaty will better explain how the NPT influenced the

development of nuclear technologies.

Case Study I: Japan

Japan was the first East Asian state to develop nuclear technology for electrical power.

On August 6 and 9, 1945, the United States dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

respectively, killing over 200,000 nationals total (Dogra 2011). Regardless, Japan developed 4 Includes “the Earth’s surface, in the atmosphere, underwater and underground” (CTBTO 2008).

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nuclear technologies. Early attempts in making NPPs resulted in the creation of a gas-cooled

reactor (as opposed to today’s water-cooled reactors) in 1966 (von Hippel 2010: 12). To ease

the financial burden of importing massive amounts of oil during the 1970s energy crises, the

Japanese began developing and designing larger NPPs. Japan’s commitment to diversifying its

energy imports led to its current dependence on nuclear power; approximately one-third of its

electrical energy is produced by NPPs. Today, Japan is the only non-nuclear weapons state that

has a highly developed and functioning uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing

procedure. Though the 2011 Fukushima disaster caused four major reactors to be

decommissioned, Japan had built fifty-four NPPs to supply electricity to the country as of March

2009 (IAEA PRIS 2011; von Hippel 2010: 12). This development is a testament to the world;

being a non-nuclear Party to the Treaty does not imply that progress cannot be made in the

nuclear field.

Japan was not deterred by the possibility of losing its ability to develop nuclear

technologies for weapons, or for energy purposes. Submission to the Treaty relates that the

Japanese trusted in the NPT and believed that it would not tear down new technological

developments. Both social and political factors contributed to Japan’s signing and ratifying the

NPT. To understand why Japan became a Party to the Treaty, it is imperative to grasp the

Japanese perspective of nuclear development as a whole.

The Japanese constitution, commonly referred to as the Peace Constitution, was

enacted in May 1947, establishing the fundamental laws that are in place today. The reason

Japan is named the Peace Nation is because of Article 9 of their constitution. It states:

…Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of

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force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article 9 has become part of Japanese culture as the Pledge of Allegiance has become a central

creed in U.S. society. The article does not directly prohibit the development of nuclear

capabilities for deterrence purposes; however, Japanese society deems deterrence intolerable

because of the belligerent implications of nuclear weapons (Rublee 2009: 55). Signing the NPT

was ground-shaking for policy makers, but was second nature to the Japanese as a whole. The

postwar political atmosphere was tense; domestic political opponents to the pro-nuclear elite

urged national leaders to conform to the international non-proliferation norm (Rublee 2009:

54). Policy makers struggled to reach a consensus on ratifying the Treaty (which delayed Japan

from signing the Treaty for six years, causing other Parties to doubt its commitment to the

international non-proliferation norm), but nonetheless Japan ratified the NPT in 1976 (Rublee

2009: 66; Quester 1970: 765). Before Japan signed the Treaty in 1970, President Nixon declared

that the United States would defend Japan with its nuclear weapons in the case of a future

attack. The strong U.S. support for the Treaty, and the reassurance of the extension of U.S.

deterrence motivated Japanese policy makers to finalize ratification.

Japan did not sign on to the Treaty expecting to limit its growth in nuclear technologies;

it intended to continue to develop nuclear energy capabilities while submitting to the

regulations of the Treaty, including inspections by the IAEA. The state has not met strong

opposition to its nuclear developments because of the NPT to date.

Case Study II: France

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Beginning in the 1940s, France shifted its energy economy from coal-burning plants to

NPPs for electricity production. This transition, along with France’s increased use of natural gas

through the last half of the twentieth century, reduced the country’s carbon dioxide output and

oil demand. The use of nuclear energy reduced the share of electricity supplied by fossil fuels

from sixty-two percent to eight percent. Over the same time period, the nuclear share of

electricity production increased to seventy-seven percent from six percent (Bodansky 2004: 18).

Many factors contributed to why France developed such an extensive nuclear power

system. First of all, France imported coal and oil for energy use as it has few fossil fuel

resources. This practice also produced much waste and harmful greenhouse emissions.

Replacing non-renewable resources with cleaner technologies created a positive image among

the populace and in the international arena. More important in the conversion of France from

its fossil fuel-powered electrical system was its political atmosphere. When France began

developing nuclear power reactors (and nuclear weapons shortly thereafter), the general public

did not have the means by which to impede the growth of the new technological sector. This

was because the French Communist Party, a supporter of nuclear power, still had a strong

presence in the French government. Though the public was initially opposed to nuclear energy

development, the program’s success led the French to embrace the nuclear culture and take

pride in their country’s achievements (Bodansky 2004: 48). Today, nuclear energy, the

“radiance of France,” is seen as an integral part of French culture (Hecht 2009: 4).

A vital question to pose is why France delayed joining the NPT regime for such an

extended period of time. France did not ratify the Treaty; instead it joined by accession in 1992.

Though no single reason for France’s delay has been identified, one possible explanation is that

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it “refused to sign…because of its [own] discriminatory character…[T]he French Government

stated officially in 1968…that it would behave exactly as if it had signed it, and since then it has

always respected the spirit of the [T]reaty in its external nuclear actions” (Goldschmidt 1977:

77). Before and after 1992, France shared its nuclear information and technology with nuclear-

weapons states and developing countries alike; through the 1970s and 1980s, the French

cooperated with multiple states to develop one of the first multinational enrichment plants

(Goldschmidt 1977: 81). France abided by the Treaty, even signing others such as the CTBT.

However, it constantly “favor[ed] the principle of maximum restraint on the transfer of the

most sensitive technologies” (Goldschmidt 1977: 83). France, believing that the NPT would

allow non-nuclear-weapons states to acquire the technologies to develop warheads, did not

become a Party to the Treaty but nonetheless accepted its standards. The French were not

hindered by the NPT’s principles as they developed nuclear technologies for energy purposes.

Case Study III: Russia (Former Soviet Union)

“The successful development and testing of the [USSR’s] nuclear weapons opened the

door to the civilian nuclear power” (Rosatom). Five years after the test of its first nuclear charge

in 1949, the USSR began operating a nuclear power reactor near Moscow; this plant was the

foremost of its kind (IAEA PRIS 2011). The majority of Russia’s nuclear power reactors still

operational today were constructed in the 1970s and 1980s; however, the devastating events

of April 1986 in Chernobyl caused nuclear power advancement to slow, never to regain its

former momentum (NTI 2011).

Though the Soviets developed NPPs, the USSR is not primarily known for its peaceful

nuclear developments. Because the Soviet Union possessed the largest stockpile of nuclear

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weapons in the world during the Cold War, it was urged from the beginning to be a leader in

disarmament and the prevention of weapons proliferation. International political pressures to

sign and ratify the NPT demanded that leaders succumb to the new non-proliferation norm.

Today the obligations and rights of the Soviet Union under the Treaty have been transferred to

the Russian Federation. Additionally, the USSR and United States signed a series of

disarmament agreements including the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I and II) in the

1970s, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) in the 1990s, the 2001 Strategic

Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and the 2010 New START treaty (which replaced SORT). All

of these treaties aimed to reduce the number of Soviet (later Russian) and U.S. nuclear arsenals

(NTI 2011).

On the other hand, Russia used its nuclear technologies acquired from weapons

development to promote the use of nuclear energy in its own boundaries and among other

states. Russia expanded its own program by creating the world’s first floating nuclear power

stations while assisting Pakistan and India in developing their nuclear power programs through

the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. To truly establish Russia’s presence in the

nuclear energy arena once more, President Vladimir Putin created Rosatom, the official state

nuclear energy corporation, in December 2007 (Rosatom).5

Findings

The above case studies present data that cannot be accurately displayed by any of the

quantitative information portrayed in Table 1 such as the number of operational reactors or the

5 “ROSATOM implements Government policy, provides integrated control over the use of atomic energy, ensures stable operation of civil and defense nuclear facilities, takes care of nuclear and radiation safety. It is also responsible for fulfilling the international commitments of Russia on the peaceful use of atomic energy and non-proliferation” (Rosatom).

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nuclear share in energy generation in each state. Qualitative data is the most precise

information to base analysis on because it takes into consideration the circumstances under

which the chosen states participated in the Treaty. These conditions are vital to understanding

the development of nuclear energy because it puts the quantitative data in context.

The data in Table 1 suggests that because France was the last to ratify, its civilian

nuclear energy sector was able to expand without the hindrance of the rules and regulations of

Table 1

Country Ratified/Accession of NPT

No. Operational

Reactors, 2011

No. Reactors Under

Construction, 2011

Nuclear Share in Energy

Generation (Percentage),

2010

Nuclear-Weapons Capable,

2011

Japan Ratification, 1976 50 2 29.21% NoFrance Accession, 1992 58 1 74.12% YesRussia (Former Soviet Union)

Ratification, 1970 32 11 17.09% Yes

Compiled from the IAEA Power Reactor Information System and European Nuclear Society

the NPT. However, now that it has been established that France abided by the Treaty before it

became a Party, the fact that France has the most reactors of the three cases does not carry the

weight it did when history and culture was not taken into account. France’s nuclear industry

began internally and was accepted as part of the French national identity early on; hence the

vast majority of its energy is supplied by NPPs. As France pursued the technological

advancements that it needed to grow its civilian nuclear energy sector, the NPT did not

negatively affect its efforts to exchange information with other states developing nuclear power

plants.

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Of the three cases studied, Japan has the second highest nuclear share in energy

generation. Like France, Japan has a culture receptive to the use of nuclear energy. Also similar

to France, Japan abided by NPT standards until it ratified the Treaty; the table neglects to show

that Japan signed the Treaty within two years of both the United States and the Former Soviet

Union. Even without technologies to build nuclear warheads, Japan was able to develop one of

the most effective civilian nuclear power industries in the world. This came to be because of the

sharing of scientific advancements through the NPT and because the Treaty does not hinder the

growth of nuclear energy (Articles IV and V).

Lastly, the Former Soviet Union may have the smallest number of operational reactors

of the discussed cases, but it developed its nuclear capabilities primarily for weapons use, not

energy. Russia today is rich in oil and natural gas resources, and consequently does not feel as

pressured to find alternative fuel sources to produce electrical energy as France and Japan do

(CIA World Factbook: Russia 2011).

These findings prove that the quantitative data collected in the table does not

accurately represent the cases studied. The numbers and facts portrayed are misleading,

causing interpreters to believe that the NPT does impede on the development of nuclear

technologies used in the generation of electrical energy. In fact, the case studies show that the

NPT has not hindered the growth of the civilian nuclear industry of three of the most important

Parties to the Treaty. However, another question to ask in the future is whether the NPT

promotes the peaceful acquisition and sharing of nuclear technologies to the extent that Article

IV intended. Matthew Fuhrmann points out that “NPT members are no more likely than

nonmembers to receive civilian nuclear assistance…This finding suggests that the nuclear

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suppliers are not living up to their commitment under Article IV of the NPT…” (Bluth et al. 2010:

198). In the end, considering these questions will strengthen the NPT regime by inspiring policy

makers to reflect on the effects of the NPT, and how its implementation may be improved.

Conclusion

In short, the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this paper (“To what

extent does the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prevent the peaceful acquisition of nuclear

capabilities as an alternate energy source?”) is that the NPT does not directly hinder the

development of nuclear technologies for energy purposes. This finding was not expected upon

conducting the preliminary research on this subject matter; the assumed answer to the

question is that the NPT does indeed hamper the growth of nuclear energy technology.

Nonetheless, the quantitative data on which this conjecture is based does not suffice in

explaining the effects of the NPT. Because the results of this study disprove the presumptions

many have of the Treaty, this paper is a testimony that there is still much to be explored on this

topic of international relations.

The future of energy lies in nuclear power, the cleaner, more cost-effective alternative

to the use of limited resources such as coal, oil, and natural gas. Because of the importance of

nuclear energy, it is critical that the international legislation establishing the standards by which

nuclear technologies are developed are precise and do not impede this growth. Article IV of the

Treaty states that signatories have the right to share peaceful nuclear technologies with each

other for the betterment of the entire world, especially developing regions. Many states

exercise caution when sharing these technologies, however, due to the dual-use of the

materials, equipment, and information being shared under the Treaty. Though some states

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were hesitant to contribute to the spread of nuclear information, the NPT regime expanded

through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries with countless treaties and agreements. The

world has not seen the end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as more studies,

discussions, and forums provide policy makers with new challenges to overcome, and

improvements to be made.

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