the new life of the party: party-building and social

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The New Life of the Party: Party-Building and Social Engineering in Greater Shanghai

Patricia M. Thornton

ABSTRACT

While the 2004 introduction of a Party-organized trade union in Wal-Mart’s mainland China-based stores was widely reported, far less is known about official Party branches and committees in the non-state-owned sector. Well over 3.5 million Party members now work in “non-publicly owned enterprises”, a sector of the economy in which the Party has con-tinued to expand. The Party is experimenting with new organizational arrangements and remaking its social agenda in order to increase its popularity, relevance and appeal, particu-larly among young urban professionals. This article outlines recent Party-building initiatives in the private sector over the last decade. Drawing upon membership and other data from over 1,000 local Party committees in non-publicly owned enterprises in greater Shanghai, I analyze contemporary “Party life” in “two new” branches—new social and new economic organizations since the adoption of market reform—as a reflection of the Party’s possible future as it absorbs the “advanced forces” of an increasingly market-oriented China.

In October 2008, the Intel Shanghai Communist Party branch helped to or-ganize what was probably the largest speed-dating event in history. Working

“under the care of ” the local Party office in Wujing, which provided a minibus to ferry “educated white-collar employees of foreign enterprises” to and from the event, the Intel Party branch mobilized a coterie of hopeful singles to participate in the “It’s a Fine Time for Love” social mixer. On the day in question, 3,000 eligible bachelors and single women—including 16 Intel Party branch members and “ordinary masses” from Wujing—convened in Luwan Stadium for an after-noon of activities “painstakingly prepared” by a subdivision of the Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau. For the afternoon’s first event, the “Great Turntable of Happiness” (xingfu dazhuanpan 幸福大转盘), the assembled singles paraded past one another in gender-segregated columns; at the behest of the organizers, favored partners were either discretely passed “easy on the eyes cards” (shunyan kapian 顺眼卡片) containing personal contact information or invited to “Heart-Unlocking Speed Match” (xinsuo supei 心锁速配) interviews during which participants briefly grilled one another on a range of topics before passing to the next in line. While some disgruntled participants complained that the din in the stadium was hardly conducive to serious courtship, at least one attendee disagreed: “As busy with

The China Journal, vol. 68. 1324-9347/2012/6801-0003. Copyright 2012 by The Australian National University. All rights reserved.

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work as we usually are, slaving away in our cubicles, our circle of friends is pretty small. With an opportunity like today’s to actively take the initiative, I hope I can find someone among these ladies with whom I have that special connection.” Communist Party organizers of the event concurred, expressing their hope on the Intel Party branch website that such sentiments were widely shared.1 In a sim-ilar vein, the Zhuanqiao Town Communist Party Committee organized a public pillow fight in March 2010 for young singles working for foreign- and domestic-owned private enterprises, in order to facilitate opportunities for “networking” (jiaoyou 交友) and to “enrich corporate culture” (fengfu qiye wenhua 丰富企业

文化) in the district,2 while one of several Party branches at the Shanghai offices of DuPont Chemical hosted a board game night and “Da Vinci Code” trivia quiz at the Zhongshan Park Funbox, in the name of “comprehensively advancing the work of Party-building” (quanmian tuijin dangjian gongzuo 全面推进党建工作). Reporting on the success of the event, the DuPont organizers claimed that their Party branch activities had “culminated in a high tide of harmonious interaction and enthusiastic engagement” at the Funbox, and expressed their hope that the future would bring more of the same.3

While the 2004 introduction of a Party-organized trade union in Wal-Mart’s mainland China-based stores is well documented in the scholarly literature,4 less is known about the existence and activities of official Party branches and committees in the non-state-owned sector of the Chinese economy. In his re-cent book on the state of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Shambaugh cites a nationwide survey in 2000 that found that only 1.9 per cent of Party

1. Shanghai Yingte’er yatai yanfa gongsi (Shanghai Intel Asia Research and Development Company), “Jiji zuzhi gongsi bailing qingnian canyu ‘langman aiqing jia nianhua’ jiaoyou hui” (Actively Organized Company’s White Collar Youth to Participate in “It’s a Fine Time for Love” Match-making Event), 20 October 2008, http://tinyurl.com/2vcjjyz1 (accessed 22 March 2012); Zhan Fen, “Meigui xiangyue” (Rose Date), Xinmin wanbao (New People’s Evening News), 26 December 2008, p. B2; “Shanghai 3000 nannü xiangyue aiqing jianianhua” (3000 Men and Women in Shanghai Date During “It’s a Fine Time for Love”), Jiefangwang (Liberation web), 20 October 2008, http://old.jfdaily.com/life/bphd/200810/t20081020_415866.htm (accessed 22 March 2012); “Zhengfu datai hushang 3000 danshen bailing shangyan ‘qingcheng zhilian’” (Government Sets the Stage [for] 3,000 White Collar Singles to Perform “City of Love”), Dong fangwang (Eastday.com), 20 October 2008, p. 3, http://shwomen.eastday.com/renda/node9672/node9674/u1a1554419.html (accessed 22 March 2012).

2. See http://tinyurl.com/5v7zwu8 (accessed 22 March 2012).3. “Xin shiqi, xin xingshi, xin huodong—Keyuan Lu Er Zhibu zuzhi shenghuo xiaoji” (New Era, New

Form, New Activities—A Brief Record of the Organization Life of The Number Two Keyuan Road Party Branch [DuPont])”, 22 December 2008, http://tinyurl.com/2e49xre (accessed 22 March 2012).

4. Marc Blecher, “When Wal-Mart Wimped Out”, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2008), pp. 263–76; Anita Chan, “Organizing Wal-Mart: The Chinese Trade Union at a Crossroads”, Japan Focus (September 2008), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Anita-Chan/2217 (accessed 22 March 2012). As of 2006, Wal-Mart stores in China now also host internal CCP branches. See Jiang Min, Wu Zheng and Zhang Jianhua, “Zhonggong shouci zai Woerma fendian jianli dang zuzhi” (CCP Establishes Party Organizations in Wal-Mart Stores for the First Time), Xinhua News Agency, 26 August 2006, http://www.ln.xinhuanet.com/ztjn/2007-08/26 /content_11295101.htm (accessed 22 March 2012).

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The New Life of the Party • 3

members worked in the private sector, prompting the Party to redouble its out-reach efforts there.5 More recently, Dickson has observed that the Party was “virtually absent” from private workplaces in 2003,6 but the “particularly strong” resistance to the presence of the Party in foreign-invested enterprises during the 1990s had waned by 2005: although fewer than 30 per cent of the firms in his 2005 sample had established Party organizations, the proportion of private sec-tor firms with Party organizations grew a staggering 50 per cent between 1999 and 2005.7

This trend has continued. Defying early predictions that the power and rel-evance of the Communist Party would erode beneath the unrelenting pressures of market reform,8 Party membership expanded from 3.8 per cent of the popula-tion in 1978 to 5.2 per cent in 2002, making the CCP the largest political orga-nization in the world.9 By the end of 2008, membership increased 1.77 million over the previous year, and by 2009 was purported to be 77.99 million.10 As Pieke observes, contrary to early expectations, the Chinese Communist Party enjoys a “symbiotic relationship with the market economy”, using it to “to build a broad range of informal ties that are both the lubricant and glue of the administration” of the post-Mao Party-state.11 Schevchenko concurs, noting that the Party’s “en-trepreneurial adaptation” has conjoined “the logic of the market with the logic of the party’s struggle for organizational survival” in a manner both “productive

5. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 136.

6. Bruce J. Dickson, “Threats to Party Supremacy”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2003), p. 30.7. Bruce J. Dickson, Wealth Into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 125–31; see also Bruce J. Dickson, “Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party’s Embrace of the Private Sector”, The China Quarterly, No. 192 (December 2007), pp. 827–54.

8. Victor Nee, “A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 5 (1989), pp. 663–81; Douglas Guthrie, Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Feng Chen and Gong Ting, “Party Versus Market in Post-Mao China: The Erosion of the Leninist Organization From Below”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1997), pp. 148–66; Minxin Pei, “China’s Governance Crisis”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 96–109.

9. Simon Appleton, John Knight, Lina Song and Qingjie Xia, “The Economics of Communist Party Membership: The Curious Case of Rising Numbers and Wage Premium during China’s Transition”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 (February 2009), p. 257.

10. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, “2008 nian Zhongguo Gongchangdang dangnei tongji gongbao” (2008 CCP Internal Party Statistics Report), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) (2 July 2009), p. 4; “Zhongzhibu fabu 2009 nian dangnei tongji shuju” (Central Organization Department Releases 2009 Internal Party Statistics), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/95111/11994237.html (accessed 22 March 2012).

11. Frank N. Pieke (with Duan Eryu), “The Production of Rulers: Communist Party Schools and the Transition to Neo-socialism in Contemporary China”, Social Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2009), p. 25, and Frank N. Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 150.



and socially efficient”.12 Likewise, Edin finds that the Party “is using market forces to reinvent itself, and has proved to be much more innovative than it is usu-ally given credit for”.13 Moreover, this new commercialism, as Barmé pointed out more than a decade ago, “includes promotional positioning, or at least posturing, by the Communist Party” through “tactics that encapsulate the unique environ-ment of commodified socialism”.14

In 2008, well over 3.5 million Party members were employed by “non-publicly owned enterprises” ( feigongyou qiye 非公有企业), which have been targeted by the Party in recent years in its effort to “comprehensively cover” (quan fugai 全覆盖) the new economic and social organizations, also known as “two new” or-ganizations (liangxin zuzhi 两新组织), which emerged in the wake of market reform. In order to do so, local officials have experimented with new organi-zational arrangements that straddle traditional boundaries, including “high-rise Party branches” (louyu zhibu 楼宇支部) combining residents and office workers in multi-story buildings, “business park branches” (yuanqu zhibu 园区支部), and even “culture street Party branches” (wenhuajie zhibu 文化街支部) serving cul-tural enterprises in designated themed spaces.15

The Party’s remaking of its social agenda is central to its ongoing expansion into the private sector. “Party life” (dangde shenghuo 党的生活, zhibu shenghuo 支部生活), described by Lieberthal as “very important in the years before 1966, but [which] declined in vigor during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution”,16 has been reinvented, and is undergoing a vigorous revival. Once dominated by political study, self- and collective criticism, “Party branch life” in the “two news” increasingly revolves around building a “corporate culture” (qiye wenhua 企业文

化)17 and “social harmony” by organizing “lively and colorful activities”, including yoga and salsa-dancing classes in the workplace, poker tournaments, “iron man” swimming and tug-of-war competitions, and seminars for young entrepreneurs. Downplaying their role as the “vanguard” of the revolutionary masses, the new joint Party branches present themselves as the “adhesive glue” (nianhe ji 粘合

剂), “incubators” ( fuhua qi 孵化器) and “engines” ( fadong ji 发动机) of social

12. Alexei Shevchenko, “Bringing the Party Back in: The CCP and the Trajectory of Market Transition in China”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 37 (2004), pp. 179–80.

13. Maria Edin, “Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China”, China: An International Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003), p. 4.

14. Geremie Barmé, “CCPTM & ADCULT PRC”, The China Journal, No. 41 (January 1999), p. 20.15. Lu Yuemian, “‘Liangxin’ lingyu dangzuzhi shezhi moshi chuangxin tanxi” (Investigatory Analysis

of Foundational Patterns in Party Organization-building in the “Two News” Domain), Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian (Shanghai Party History and Party-Building) (August 2004), pp. 49–51.

16. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd edition (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 240.

17. Colin Hawes, “Representing Corporate Culture in China: Official, Academic and Corporate Perspectives”, The China Journal, No. 59 (January 2008), pp. 33–61.



harmony. Working with Party branches in new social organizations (shetuan 社团) and social intermediary organizations established by the Party,18 they sponsor a broad range of recreational activities designed to boost the Party’s popularity, relevance and appeal, particularly among the young urban professionals whom they target for recruitment.19

This article outlines recent Party-building initiatives in the private sector over the course of the previous decade. Drawing upon self-reported membership data from over 1,000 local Party committees in non-publicly owned enterprises in greater Shanghai, I offer an analysis of contemporary Party life in “two new” branches as grass-roots manifestations of “commodified socialism”20 or “market Leninism”21—a system in which the Party pursues its shifting political impera-tives through market institutions and market-based strategies of accumulation, without renouncing its Leninist principles. Mediating between the commandist hierarchy of the central Party structure and the flexibility and opportunities cre-ated by the global marketplace, “two new” Party branches shun potentially con-tentious discourses of class and power in favor of social-network-building among their increasingly white-collar membership.22 Given the task of implementing a new social “cohesion project” (ningjuli gongcheng 凝聚力工程), these new Party organizations aim to deepen and naturalize the presence of the Party in urban life.

However, the longer-term consequences of such activity for the Party are as yet unclear. Chinese scholars generally agree that the “important thought” of the “Three Represents” has wrought a fundamental transformation for the Party, al-tering not only its social composition but also its practices on the ground. New joint-venture and foreign-funded enterprises present a particular challenge, in-sofar as they “already manifest the characteristics of heterogeneous ideas, for-eign religious influences, and all sorts of ideological trends that are already in the process of seeping into the Party at various levels”.23 Some critics charge that, in

18. See, for example, the discussion of the Élite Union below, and Patricia M. Thornton, “The Advance of the Party Transformation or Takeover at the Urban Grassroots?”, The China Quarterly (forthcoming, 2013), which refers to social intermediary organizations such as Youth Business China (YBC) and the Shanghai Pudong Non-profit Incubator (Shanghai Pudong feiyingli zuzhi fazhan zhongxin), both of which are registered private non-enterprise units (minban feiqiye).

19. Li Guodi, “ ‘Louyu zhibu’ shi zhouniande sikao” (Reflection on Ten Years of “High-rise Party Branches”), Shequ (Community) (September 2009), pp. 18–20.

20. Geremie Barmé, “CCPTM & ADCULT PRC”, p. 20.21. Frank N. Pieke, The Good Communist, p. 122; see also Jonathan London, “Viet Nam and the Making of

Market-Leninism”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 2009), pp. 375–99.22. Walter W. Powell, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization”, Research in

Organizational Behavior, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 295–336.23. Qi Xingfa, “ ‘Liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian gongzuo zhong de ziyuan touru yinsu fenxi” (Factor Analysis of

Resource Investment in “Two New” Organization Party-building Work), Gansu lilun xuebao (Gansu Theory Journal), No. 5 (September 2006), p. 33.



opening up and accommodating to new social forces, the Party has succumbed to “depoliticized politics”, having changed “from a party-state to a state-party”.24 Others argue that social change made the transformation of the Party necessary, in order to avoid the processes of decline or decay, fragmentation and decompo-sition that Lipset and Rokkan documented among Western political parties in 1967.25 “Two new” Party organizations in Shanghai thus afford a window onto the possible future of the Party as whole, as it adapts to the newfound success of market reform and absorbs into its ranks the “advanced forces” of an increasingly market-oriented Chinese society.

CoMPrehensive Coverage

In 1997, when the Fifteenth Party Congress recognized the “non-public” sector as an “important part of the nation’s socialist market economy in which the public sector was the main part”, the transfer of formerly state-owned enterprises to pri-vate ownership, internal migration and rising levels of unemployment weakened the Party’s grass-roots organizations. Laid-off workers ceased to be managed by local enterprise Party branches, while others were migrating in large numbers to work in new enterprises that lacked Party committees altogether. When the September 1999 “Central Committee Views on Strengthening and Improving Political and Ideological Work” asserted that the health of the Party as a whole depended upon its grass-roots membership, a mere 1.5 per cent of privately owned enterprises could claim established Party branches; the majority of Party members working in the private sector were considered either “hidden” (yinxing 隐性) or “pocket” (koudai 口袋) members, not officially registered as such within their places of employment.26

A year later, the Central Committee issued a provisional draft document calling upon private enterprises with three or more Party members to establish a branch (dang zhibu 党支部) immediately, and enterprises with fewer than three mem-bers to establish joint branches (lianhe dang zhibu 联合党支部) drawing together members from different workplaces. Those with more than 50 Party members were enjoined to establish either general Party branch committees (zong zhibu

24. Wang Hui, The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity (London: Verso, 2009), p. 9.25. Zhou Jianyong, “Zhongguo Gongchandang zhuanxing yanjiu: zhengdang–shehui guanxi shijiao”

(Researching the Transformation of the Chinese Communist Party: Perspectives on the Ruling Party–Society Relationship), Shanghai xingzhengyuan xuebao (The Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute), Vol. 12, No. 4 (July 2011), p. 13.

26. Shao Jianguang, “Gaige kaifang yilai feigong qiye dangjiande fazhan licheng he chuangxin shijian” (The Trajectory and Innovative Practice of Party-building in Private Enterprises Since Reform and Opening), Tansuo (Probe), No. 6 (2008), pp. 37–38.



weiyuanhui 总支部委员会) or basic Party committees ( jiceng weiyuanhui 基层委

员会). Enterprises with too few Party members and no opportunities to join or establish joint branches were to link up with the local Communist Youth League or local trade unions, and await further guidance on Party-building. All Party organizations in the private sector were urged to carry out “activities beneficial to the principles of promoting corporate development, and specifically those of the enterprise with which the Party is affiliated”, and cautioned against agitating in the workplace because “it is necessary to educate and guide the work of private entrepreneurs, and unite them around the Party, so that they support the work of the Party organizations established in their enterprises”.27

By 2003, one year after the Party codified its presence in private enterprises in its Constitution, the number of non-public economic organizations in the PRC surpassed 26.76 million (including 22.6 million foreign-invested enterprises), em-ployed than 100 million people and accounted for one-third of the gross domestic product. In many counties and municipalities, the non-public economy had be-come the Party’s primary source of revenue, notwithstanding the fact that Party organizations had been established in a mere 2 per cent of them.28 In Shanghai, “two new” organizations numbered as many as 560,000, and employed some 4.21 million people (an estimated 50 per cent or more of the city’s resident full-time labor force29), the vast majority in workplaces outside the Party’s purview.

Shanghai Party authorities began promoting “comprehensive coverage” as early as 2001.30 In 2004, the Municipal Party Committee released a four-year program specifically aimed at reducing “blank areas” (kongbai dian 空白点) and “blind spots” (mangqu 盲区) in the non-public sector of the economy. Two cen-tral directives informed the subsequent shape and direction of this effort. The 2004 “Decision on the Enhancement of the Party’s Governing Capability”31 cas-tigated the Party for its failures to adapt to changing situations and to conform

27. Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhi bu, “Guanyu zai geti he siying deng feigongyouzhi jingji zuzhi zhong jiaqiang dangde jianshe gongzuo de yijian (shixing) de tongzhi” ([Trial] Opinion on Strengthening the Party Construction Work in Individually, Privately and Other Non-publicly Owned Economic Organizations), 13 September 2000, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71383/4844924.html (accessed 22 March 2012).

28. Li Jingtian, “Jin yibu jiaqiang feigong youzhi qiye dangjian gongzuo” (Going a Step Further in Strengthening Party-building Work in Non-publicly Owned Enterprises), Jingji ribao (Economics Daily) (10 September 2003).

29. Hong Meifen, “Zhashi tuijin ‘liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian” (Solidly Advance “Two New” Organization Party-building), Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily) (3 November 2004).

30. Hong Meifen, “Shanghai jiceng dangjian shuoguo leilei” (The Innumerable Great Achievements in Grass-roots Party-building in Shanghai), Jiefang ribao (23 June 2001).

31. Dong Qiang, “Shanghai ‘liangxin’ zuzhi dangzhibu shuji duiwu jianshe diaocha” (An Investigation into Building the Team of “Two New” Organization Party Branch Secretaries in Shanghai), Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian (May 2005), p. 25.



to the “important thought” of the Three Represents”, and urged grass-roots activ-ists to target both “new economic and new social organizations” and “advanced elements” in their Party-building efforts.32 In 2005, the Party also kicked off a campaign to “maintain the advanced nature of Party members”.33 At the grass roots, “outstanding elements” (youxiu fenzi 优秀分子) among middle manag-ers and technicians employed by foreign and foreign-invested enterprises were targeted for recruitment, with a view to consolidating the Party’s ruling position in society.34

In extending the élite recruitment drive into foreign-owned and foreign-in-vested firms, the Party faced resistance both from within its own ranks and from the managers and owners. On the Party’s side, “three fears” persisted among many cadres: that the Party would not be accepted in private enterprises, that such Party branches would have difficult relations with bosses and owners, and that there would be problems initiating and carrying out Party activities. Some owners of private firms also feared that Party organizations could be antagonistic to pri-vate business ownership, or that the establishment of an enterprise Party branch would result in “loss, splintering, and/or a struggle for power” (shiquan, fenquan, zhengquan 失权, 分权, 争劝), or that the presence of the Party would raise operat-ing costs.35 To allay such anxieties, those involved in grass-roots Party-building agreed to pay close attention (tiejin 贴近) to four areas of concern: facilitating the management of a company’s productivity, tackling scientific and technical prob-lems, employee training and employee self-improvement. In addition, some ad-opted the “three not-wavers” in the workplace: unwavering support for creativity and innovation, unwavering support for the deepening of market reform and un-wavering support for harmonious relations within their enterprises. As a further signal of their enthusiasm for private industry, municipal Party officials developed elaborate incentive schemes to reward innovation and facilitate employee assess-ment. Party members whose evaluation scores lagged were ordered to write re-ports and undergo rectification (zhenggai 整改) within three months.36 The Party branch at Shanghai Matsushita, which produces microwave ovens for Panasonic,

32. Zeng Qinghong, “Jiaqiang dangde jiuzheng nengli jianshede ganglingxing wenxian” (A Programmatic Document on Strengthening the Party’s Governing Capacity), Renmin ribao (8 October 2004).

33. Joseph Fewsmith, “CCP Launches Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of Party Members”, China Leadership Monitor, Vol. 13 (Winter 2005), pp. 1–10.

34. Chen Hong, “Jiaqiang feigongyouzhi qiye dangjian gongzuo de ruogan sikao” (Some Considerations on Strengthening Party-building Work in Non-publicly Owned Enterprises), Bianjie jingji yu wenhua (Borderlands Economy and Culture), Vol. 50 (February 2008), p. 58.

35. Ibid., p. 58.36. Zhang Jian, “Mubiao guanli: tuijin feigong qiye dangjian gongzuo xin fazhande youxiao tujing”

(Management by Objectives: Advancing an Efficacious Course of New Development for Party-building Work in Non-public Enterprises), Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian (December 2009), p. 50.



provides special mentoring services for new employees: workers receiving poor service ratings are taken under the wing of a designated Party member, “as if the employee were his or her own child”, until performance improves.37 One Wal-Mart toy department manager was informed by her Party branch secretary that “one criterion for evaluating Party members’ advanced nature (xianjinxing 先进性) is whether we have helped to boost sales at the Wal-Mart store where we work”.38

The Party’s deeper involvement with private enterprises has created a new blend of Communist Party aims and commercial business interests, with the common goal of fostering “corporate culture”.39 Party branch secretaries in the private sector now form “joint management teams” with managers, “link Party-building to production” and recommend themselves to private enterprises as human resource centers, talent agencies and recruitment specialists with the ability to supply temporary skilled workers or freelance employees to local busi-nesses in need.40 Likewise, catering specifically to young educated white-collar professionals, “two new” Party branches offer a range of networking opportuni-ties designed to facilitate the “flow” (liudong 流动) of talent between individual firms, as well as job-training to help Party members upgrade their skills and keep abreast of new technological developments.41 Local Party activists now consider efforts to “establish the Party-building brand (dangjian pinpai 党建品牌) as mandatory”, and focus on developing a service brand ( fuwu pinpai 服务品牌), a democracy brand (minzhu pinpai 民主品牌) and a culture brand (wenhua pin-pai 文化品牌) for their Party-building activities.42 Some seek to “open up the product brand market while at the same time opening up the Party-building

37. Hu Fengguan, “Chuangxin, rang hezi qiye dang zuzhi geng xian huodong—Shanghai songxia deng lizi xianshi qi youxian gongsi deng san jia qiye dangjian gongzuo diaoyan” (Blaze New Trails, Allow the Activities of Joint Venture Enterprise Party Branches to Become More Salient: An Investigation Into Party-building Work in Three Enterprises, Including Panasonic Plasma Display Shanghai Co., Ltd.), Qiye yu wenhua (Enterprises and Culture) (April 2007), p. 18.

38. Jiang Min, Wu Zheng and Zhang Jianhua, “Zhonggong shouci zai Woerma fendian jianli dang zuzhi”.39. Colin Hawes, “Representing Corporate Culture in China”, pp. 33–61; see also David J. Davies, “Wal-

Mao: The Discipline of Corporate Culture and Studying Success at Wal-Mart China”, The China Journal, No. 58 (July 2007), pp. 1–27.

40. Wu Jinliang, “Feigong jingji zuzhi dangjian gongzuo de wuge nandian wenti” (Five Difficult Problems in Party-building Work in Non-publicly Owned Economic Organizations), Dangzheng luntan (Party and Government Forum) (August 2001), p. 22.

41. Li Guodi, “‘Louyu zhibu’ shi zhouniande sikao”, p. 19; Wang Guoliang and Wang Jiaohui, “Guanyu jiaqiang dangyuan fuwu zhongxin gongneng jianshe duice yu jianyi” (Methods and Suggestions for Strengthening the Construction of Party Member Service Centers), Shanghai dangshi yu diangjian (January 2006), pp. 36–38.

42. Ni Zhaoshun, “Dui dazao juyou Jingkou tese: dangjian gongzuo pinpai de yanjiu yu sikao” (Forging a Jingkou with Special Characteristics: Research and Reflections on Branding Party-building Work), Jinshan (Gold Mountain) (April 2008), pp. 98–99.



brand market by promoting the societization (shehuihua 社会化)” of the Party, by publicizing its presence in local communities through public “fora, training sessions, brain quizzes and speech contests . . . that will generate an atmosphere thick with brand creation”.43 The formula of “Party-building + brand” is mar-keted to private enterprises as a way of supporting “the sustainable development

43. Li Dongxiao, “Yong pinpai xiaoying tisheng jiceng dangde jianshe shuiping—Qingdao shi chuangjian dangjian pinpai de zuofa yu qishi” (Use the Brand Effect to Elevate the Level of Grass-roots Party Construction—The Means of and Inspiration for Qingdao City’s Creation of its Party-building Brand), Lilun xuekan (Theory Journal), Vol. 193, No. 3 (March 2010), pp. 26–27.

Table 1. Composition of sample of 1017 listed grass-roots party branches

Enterprise type by United Nations Statistical Division International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities [ISIC v. 4]

Number (% of total)

A - Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4 (0%)B - Mining and quarrying 2 (0%)C - Manufacturing 622 (61%)D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 8 (1%)E - Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 4 (0%)F - Construction 74 (7%)G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 33 (3%)H - Transportation and storage 17 (2%)I - Accommodation and food service activities 15 (1%)J - Information and communication 35 (3%)K - Financial and insurance activities 12 (1%)L - Real estate activities 51 (5%)M - Professional, scientific and technical activities 27 (3%)N - Administrative and support service activities 25 (2%)O - Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 4 (0%)P - Education 9 (1%)Q - Human health and social work activities 3 (0%)R - Arts, entertainment and recreation 4 (0%)S - Other service activities 9 (1%)X - Joint Branches of Mixed Type 22 (2%)Z - Diversified Conglomerates 37 (4%)



of an enterprise’s core competitiveness”44 as well as to struggling state-owned enterprises, to promote market-friendly reform.45

44. Zhi Degang, “Dangjian ye neng chuang pinpai” (Party-building Can Also Create Brands), Jiang Huai (Jiangsu-Anhui) (October 2010), p. 51.

45. Zhou Ke, “Jiaqiang dangjian chuanxin dazao qiye pinpai—yi gaige chuangxin jingshen jiaqiang dangde jianshe tuidong xianlu gongse xuelu fazhan” (Strengthening the Creativity and Innovation of Party-building in Forging Enterprise Brands—Using the Creativity and Innovation of the Spirit of Reform to Strengthen the Building and Promotion of the Party’s Line on the Scientific Development of Companies), Qiye daobao (Business Guide) (October 2010), pp. 125–26.

Table 2. Composition of sample of 622 enterprises engaged primarily in manufacturing by ISIC v. 4 subtype

Enterprise type by United Nations Statistical Division International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities [ISIC v. 4]

Number (% of total)

Manufacture of food products (C.10) 31Manufacture of textiles (C.13) 51Manufacture of wearing apparel (C. 14) 13Manufacture of leather and related products (C. 15) 3Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials (C. 16)

1

Manufacture of paper and paper products (C. 17) 15Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (C. 19) 3Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (C. 20) 46Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (C. 21)

33

Manufacture of rubber and plastics products (C. 22) 31Manufacture of basic metal (C. 24) 28Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (C. 25)

46

Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (C. 26) 125Manufacture of electrical equipment (C. 27) 31Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c (C. 28) 96Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (C. 29) 33Manufacture of other transport equipment (C. 30) 14Manufacture of furniture (C. 31) 10Other manufacturing (C. 32) 12



“Two new” ParTy BranChes in greaTer shanghai

In 2007, the one-stop Shanghai Municipal “Two New” Interactive Web (http://www.shlxhd.gov.cn) designed by Shanghai Municipal Party’s Social Work Committee went online. This comprehensive web-based information platform and interactive communication hub for “two new” Party organizations provides self-reported data on the membership and recruitment activities of thousands of “two new” Party organizations, as well as virtual classrooms, teaching and con-ference space, and a digital archive of documents relating to grass-roots Party building. In 2009, when the website served over 8,000 members of “two new” Party organizations in Xuhui District (65 per cent of whom were under the age of 35, and at least 63 per cent of whom were college graduates), the web portal was extended to include “two new” Party organizations throughout Shanghai mu-nicipality.46 The current sample of 1017 “two new” branches registered in greater Shanghai draws upon self-reported data published on the linked websites of Party branches established in medium- to large-scale47 non-publicly owned en-terprises.48 Thirty-three per cent of the firms (331) are located in or subordinate to one of the nine districts in central Shanghai (Changning, Hongkou, Huangpu, Jing’an, Luwan, Putuo, Yangpu, Xuhui and Zhabei); 64 per cent (646) are in Pudong (including Pudong New District, Baoshan, Fengxian, Jiading, Jinshan, Minhang, Qingpu, Songjiang) and 40 are located in Chongming County.

Sixty-one per cent (622) of the “two new” Party branches in the sample were established in enterprises primarily engaged in manufacturing, followed by those specializing in construction (74, or 7 per cent), real estate activities (51, or 5 per cent), information and communications (35), wholesale and retail trade (33), and professional, scientific and technical activities (27) or administrative and support service activities (25). Of the 622 manufacturing firms, 20 per cent (125) produce computer, electronic, and optical products; 15 per cent (96) produce machinery and equipment; 8 per cent (51) are engaged in textile manufacturing; 7 per cent (46) produce chemicals or chemical products; and 7 per cent (46) manufacture fabricated metal products (see Figures 1 and 2).49

46. Zhonggong Xuhui quwei zuzhibu (Communist Party Xuhui District Party Organization Department), “Dazao ‘liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian gongzuo de xin pingtai” (Building a New Platform for Party-building Work in “Two New” Organizations), Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian (February 2009), p. 32.

47. “Medium- to large-scale” enterprises are defined by the Party as firms employing three or more registered Party members that have established an official Party branch in the workplace.

48. The sample includes every “medium- to large-scale” enterprise Party branch or committee listed online, as of 28 March 2010.

49. The coding of industry type follows the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of All Economic Activities, Revision 4, maintained by the United Nations Statistical Division, available online at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27&Lg=1, with two necessary additions: “joint branches” merging employees of one or more enterprises with residents are coded as X, and enterprises that listed themselves as diversified conglomerates spanning more than one ISIC classification were coded as Z.

q1



Of the 790 “two new” branches in the sample providing information on the dates of their founding, only one was established before the reform era. “Two new” branches grew at a modest rate beginning in the mid-1990s, with sharp an-nual increases beginning in 2004, and peaked in 2007, gradually declining there-after. The largest of the 882 branches that reported membership figures was the Shanghai division of Price Waterhouse, which boasts 723 members; the mean branch size is 20.93, and the mode branch size is six. Of the 195 Party branches reporting both the total size of the enterprise workforce and the Party organiza-tion, the percentage of Party members ranged from a high of 56.25 per cent of the workforce at Liang Cereals and Oil in Chongming to a low of 0.12 per cent of the workforce and residents in Xuhui’s Maple Street Joint Party Committee. On the average, members of “two new” Party branches involve nearly eight per cent of the workforce or residents in the enterprises or districts that they repre-sent; approximately 10 per cent of the “two new” Party branches in the sample emphasized on their websites that their most recent recruitment activities spe-cifically targeted prospective Party members from within the ranks of middle- management, scientific and technical personnel, employees with post-graduate degrees and those with professional training.

“ParTy Life” in shanghai’s “Two news”

According to Whyte, “political rituals and mutual criticism” formed the core of Bolshevik “Party life”, and the CCP expanded such practices to include the base area population in Yan’an, allowing them to maintain “leadership over the masses with less reliance on hierarchical command and external manipulation than had been the case in Stalinist Russia”.50 Barnett found that Mao-era “Party life” meetings involved the dissemination of instructions and information from higher levels to the rank-and-file membership, discussion of current programs and policies, criticism and self-criticism, and political study,51 while Schurmann described “Party life” as “mostly talk, discussion, group interaction, criticism and self-criticism”, collective activities in which “[e]very individual Party member must participate actively”.52

A new generation of Party strategists decided that traditional Party-building methods—“monotonous in form and boring in content—reading newspapers or studying dossiers”—resulted in “simplistic, rigid, and hollow” responses from élite prospective members in the private sector. “Two new” Party branches

50. Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 34–35.

51. A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 25–26.

52. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 48–49.



instead organize more engaging activities that promote “team-building” and “ad-vanced” and “corporate culture”, and raise the “political quality” (zhengzhi su-zhi 政治素质) of their members.53 For example, the Communist Party branch in Century 21 Realtors recently pioneered a training seminar to foster “scientific development” and the “sense of service” that involved Department of Justice rep-resentatives fielding questions regarding new real estate regulations. The branch further implemented a customer satisfaction survey system to increase staff pro-fessionalism, prevent corruption and improve service.54 The Party Committee at Shanghai Alliance Investment Advisory Services, Ltd., organized a “Who Moved my Cheese?”55 seminar at the Shen Garden Hotel that brought some of Shanghai’s most successful entrepreneurs together with local business school students. The forum began with the students introducing themselves in turn, articulating their future aspirations, and recounting their past successes and failures in the busi-ness world; according to the branch report, some were “visibly moved” by the concern expressed for them by the senior entrepreneurs in the room, with a few “unable to stop themselves from breaking down in tears” of gratitude and joy for the opportunity to participate in the seminar.56

A premium is placed on activities that are “interactive”, “small-scale”, “diverse”, “outside the workplace” and “informative”, and on “methods of socializing [that] would vigorously advance Party-building work toward ‘comprehensive cover-age’ ”, and transform “two new” organizations into “incubators bringing fresh blood into the Party”.57 When members of the Hongkou District Organization Department complained that “traditional, close-ended, monotonous forms of member education and Party life” including “being force-fed and parroting Party

53. Zhongyang tongzhangbu (Central Statistical Department), “Guanyu gonggu he zhuangda xinshiji xinjieduan tongyi zhanxian de yijian” (On Solidifying and Expanding a New Phase in the United Front in the New Century), as cited by Zhongyang dangxiao xiaokanshe ketizu (Discussion Group of the Central Party School Party Journal), “Xinshiqi jiaqiang ‘liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian gongzuo de diaocha yu sikao” (Investigation and Consideration of Strengthening Party-building Work in ‘Two New’ Organizations in the New Period), Qianyan diaocha (Front Survey), Vol. 18 (2007), p. 46; on the CCP’s recent efforts to raise the “political and ideological quality” of its members through educational reform, see Andrew Kipnis, “Subjectification and Education for Quality in China”, Economy and Society, Vol. 40, No. 2 (May 2011), pp. 289–06.

54. 21 Shiji Budongchanye Shanghai Ruifeng fangdichan touzi guwen youxian gongsi dangzhibu (Century 21 Real Estate Shanghai Ruifang Realty Investment Advisors Co., Ltd, Party branch), “Zhan xuexi shijian kexue fazhanguan huodong de qingkuang huibao” (Report on the Situation Regarding Activities Developing the Practice of Scientific Development), 10 January 2010, http://tinyurl.com/6xojk3m1 (accessed 22 March 2012).

55. Spencer Johnson’s 1998 Who Moved My Cheese? is a motivational best-seller written in the form of an allegory, designed to help people in the business world to cope with change.

56. Shanghai jielian touzi zixun fuwu youxian gongsi dangzhibu (Shanghai Allied Investment Advisory Services, Ltd.), “ ‘Nailao zai na li’ YBC (Shanghai) chuanyezhe julebu tebie huodong” (“Who Moved My Cheese?” Special Activity of the YBC [Shanghai] Entrepreneurs Club), 16 October 2009, http://tinyurl .com/5uulq861 (accessed 22 March 2012).

57. Wang Guoliang and Wang Jiaohui, “Guanyu jiaqiang dangyuan fuwu zhongxin gongneng jianshe duice yu jianyi”, p. 37.



texts” were ill-suited to their needs, the district responded by adopting “open-themed Party organizational life” to “diversify monotonous methods, use fresh and lively themes, new and novel forms, and enhance the focus and pleasure of educational activities”. Participating branches were given a menu of possible issues to address, and encouraged to come up with “themed” events and new formats. Party members were given swipe cards that allowed the district to moni-tor participation, and were asked to fill out surveys rating various activities.58 In Pudong New District, the Jiaxing Building joint Party organization—a newly established “high-rise Party branch”—purportedly unites (ningju 凝聚) and ac-tivates ( jifa 激发) young white-collar Party members, and facilitates their inte-gration into the local community by organizing charitable relief and “new style civilization-enhancing activities”, including a variety of sports and recreational events.59 In Changning District, the Party Member Service Center (Dangyuan Fuwu Zhongxin 党员服务中心) aims to “establish a standard, project distinguish-ing characteristics, and build the brand” (lizu guifan, tuchu tese, gouzhu pinpai 立足规范, 突出特色, 构筑品牌) through activities that apply marketing techniques to public service.60 According to one Party journal, the variety of activities on of-fer in Songjiang District was apparently so desirable that “fake Party members” infiltrated branch events, illicitly availing themselves of the joys of Party life; the problem became so acute that the District was forced to issue an official “Party activities card” for its bona fide members to show at certain Party-organized events.61

The increased mobility of the professional urban labor force presents a par-ticular challenge for Party life in “two new” organizations, which include high numbers of “floating Party members” (liudong dangyuan 流动党员) who have left their original work units to seek more lucrative positions elsewhere, with-out transferring their Party branch membership. One 2010 survey conducted in Shanghai’s Songjiang District found that 88 per cent of its “floating Party mem-bers” were employed by “two new” enterprises. The district responded by issuing special “floating Party member activities cards” that permitted them to partic-ipate in Party-organized activities in multiple locations.62 Of the 42 enterprise

58. Shanghaishi Hongkou qu xiaojiao disi dangzongzhi (Shanghai Hongkou District Primary Education No. 4 General Party Branch), “Tansuo danyuan jiaoyu de youxiao tujing—kaifangxing zhuti dang zuzhi shenghuo de shijian” (Exploration of Effective Methods of Party Member Education—The Open Topic Practice of Party Organizational Life), Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian (July 2006), pp. 38–40.

59. Li Guodi, “‘Louyu zhibu’ shi zhouniande sikao”, pp. 19–20.60. Wang Guoliang and Wang Jiaohui, “Guanyu jiaqiang dangyuan fuwu zhongxin gongneng jianshe duice

yu jianyi”, pp. 37–38.61. Zhonggong Songjiang quwei zuzhibu, Songjiang qu shehui gongzuo dangwei keti zu (Songjiang

District Chinese Communist Party Organization Department, Songjiang District Party Committee Social Work Working Group), “Shanghai shi Songjiang qu liudong dangyuan duiwu de diaocha yu fenxi” (Investigation and Analysis of Floating Party Members in Shanghai’s Songjiang District), Shanghai dangshi yu dangjian (November 2010), p. 29.

62. Ibid., pp. 27–28.



Party branches in the current Shanghai-based sample reporting both total and mobile membership numbers, “floating members” averaged 52.59 per cent of total branch membership. Construction or manufacturing enterprises prone to seasonal fluctuations accounted for the highest percentages; however, a few high-tech firms, like Kingdee International ( Jin Die 金碟软件), which manufactures enterprise management software, and Hinge Software Company (He Qin 和勤

软件), likewise reported that 50 per cent or more of their membership “floated”. One solution to this problem has been to provide job-seeking and professional training services to temporarily unemployed workers.63

More broadly, however, much of the recent effort to build the Party’s “brand” is designed to increase the visibility of the Party and its members in daily life. Joint residential and commercial “two new” branches organize regular rounds of events and performances in plazas and other public places to convey broad expressions of popular support for local and central Party committees.64 For ex-ample, on 20 May 2011, “two new” Party branches in Minhang District organized a “sing red songs” competition in Xinzhuang Zhongsheng Square to mark the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. The Wujing Town Group Party Committee selected three teams to participate in the semi-finals, with each of three “two new” Party organizations putting forth its best vocalist. The Party branch website reported that, “beneath the flickering light of the red star and basking in its splendid warmth”, the three competitors regaled the public with one well-loved red classic after another, “rekindling everyone’s passionate memo-ries of their years under the red flag . . . with all recalling with great emotion the tortuous and moving road trodden by the Chinese Communist Party since its founding 90 years ago”.65 In 2009, the Hongqiao District (Street-level) Party Committee organized a daily “Red SMS” text message aimed at younger Party re-cruits, sending single-line messages “introducing the Party’s concept and theory of ‘scientific development’, promoting the exemplary methods and deeds associ-ated with practice and study, and circulating news of the practice and study ac-tivities of ‘two new’ Party branches” in order to “penetrate deeply into the hearts of every single ‘two new’ Party member” in Hongqiao.66 The 142 members of the

63. Li Dongxiao, “Yong pinpai xiaoying tisheng jiceng dangde jianshe shuiping”.64. Patricia M. Thornton, “From Liberating Production To Unleashing Consumption: Mapping

Landscapes Of Power In Beijing”, Political Geography, Vol. 29, No. 6 (2010), pp. 305–08.65. Tu Zhili, “Minhangqu juban ‘liangxin’ zuzhi hongge sai” (Minhang District Holds “Two New”

Organization Red Songs Contest), Renminwang (People’s web), 20 June 2011, http://sh.people.com.cn /GB/134836/14952171.html (accessed 22 March 2012).

66. Shanghai Chuangqiao jinchukou youxian gongsi dangzhibu (Shanghai Chuangqiao Import-Export Co., Ltd. Party Branch), “Hongqiao shequ ( jiedao) zonghe dangwei zhuahao ‘sanlü’ cujin liangxin xueshi huodong youxiao kaizhan” (Hongqiao Community [Street-level] Party Committee Grasps Well the ‘Three Rates’ in Promoting ‘Two News’ Through the Development of Effective Practical Study Activities), 2 February 2010, http://tinyurl.com/3bl3pe61 (accessed 22 March 2012).



Kongjiang Road and Enterprise Joint Party branch participated in a branch work conference in July 2011 that included break-out sessions on developing their “Party-building brand” with online tools like electronic bulletin boards aimed at “normalizing, standardizing and enriching” their virtual “Party branch life”. Members who had participated in an earlier “‘seeking red footsteps, knowing the history of the Party and the state of the nation, standing fast in conviction, look-ing forward to a glorious future’ red tour activity” at a former anti-Japanese resis-tance base area in Zhejiang were encouraged to post their memories, thoughts, reflections and photographs of the activity on the Party branch website—“an in-teractive platform that will gather the strength of Party members”—to build the distinctive brand of the Kongjiang Road and Enterprise Joint Party branch.67

Given the recent focus on brand promotion and brand creation, it is hardly surprising that the new life of the Party has become a highly commercialized af-fair. Journals published by provincial Party Committees, like Party Life (Dangde shenghuo) and Party Branch Life (Zhibu Shenghuo), have recently been rede-signed, to sport glossy covers and rich online content; a monthly “Party Life” television program regularly broadcasts on Shanghai Education TV (SETV). In downtown Shanghai’s bustling Jing’an District, the district Party committee, with the support of the local district government, established a community and activ-ity center to cater to the specific needs of downtown white-collar workers.68 The Bailing Yijia (白领驿家), which goes by the English name “Élite Union”, pro-vides “bundled” entertainment and leisure services for professionals, including a dinner reservation booking service, cybercafé with coffee bar, drop-in coun-seling center, fitness center and an in-house tourist agency. White-collar pro-fessionals employed by over 400 enterprises in Jing’an are eligible to receive an Élite Union VIP card that allows them to use the center and a “hotline prior-ity booking” for concessions throughout the city. Special events organized in its first year include “white-collar lunches”, a “Take Back the Night” concert and an “International Shopping Festival”. The District Organization Department head boasted at the center’s opening day celebration that “the ‘Élite Union’ provides services to white-collar professionals, is a window for white-collar cohesion, and will become a white-collar spiritual home ( jingshen zhijia 精神之家)”. The sec-retary of the Municipal Party Committee’s Social Work small group concurred, observing that “the establishment of the ‘Élite Union’ has altered the traditional model of Party-building work in the ‘two new’ realm, and opened up a new road

67. Shiye dangzong zhibu (Enterprise General Party Branch), “Queli xinde mubiao, yingjie xinde tiaozhan: shiye dangzongzhi kaizhan bannian gongzuo zongjie huibao” (Firmly Establish New Targets, Welcome New Challenges: Summary Report on the Enterprise General Party Branch’s Opening of the Semi-annual Work [Conference]), 11 July 2011, http://tinyurl.com/44rf7j77 (accessed 22 March 2012).

68. Luan Yinzhi, “Bailing yijia: shiwan bailing xin jiayuan” (Élite Union: New Homebase for a Hundred Thousand White-collars), Jiefang ribao (13 December 2009), p. 3.



through which to explore strengthening Party-building work among ‘two new’ organizations”.69 In a similar vein, Xuhui District’s Xietu Community Joint Party Branch established a “white-collar friendship club” that oversees six “salons” (the “OK salon”, an automobile salon, a salon for singles, and one each for badmin-ton, basketball and bridge players) that serve as “a platform for exchange and service between the Party and white-collar youth, enriches the after-hours lives of white-collar workers, and expands the influence and cohesive power of the Party”. In 2009, the club sponsored a masquerade ball and amateur talent show for young white-collar singles which culminated in the release of colorful paper sky lanterns designed to “represent how white-collar aspirations are drawn aloft” through the work of the Party.70

a new Beginning for, or The end of, ParTy Life?

As the foregoing demonstrates, the CCP has defied predictions that the deepen-ing of market reform would hasten its demise, and is breathing new life into its grass-roots organizations in precisely those areas in which the forces of com-mercialization and marketization have developed most rapidly. While the Party journals and branch activity reports cited here may well overstate the degree of enthusiasm for new Party life, statistics demonstrate that the Party is penetrat-ing private- and foreign-funded enterprises at an impressive rate. As of 2010, the number of Party members in Shanghai topped 1.7 million, 7.61 per cent of the city’s population and 1.75 per cent higher than the national average. Slightly more than half of the city’s Party members in 2010 boasted a college or university degree, compared to 13.13 per cent of Party members nationwide. In addition, according to one 2011 Party report, by the end of 2010 99.69 per cent of the city’s medium to large-scale enterprises in the non-publicly owned sector of the economy deemed eligible to host internal Party organizations had established them,71 demonstrating that the antipathies that once roiled between the Shanghai Communist Party and its resident capitalist class have been relegated to the dust-bin of history.

The Party’s more inclusive positioning nonetheless involves potential dangers that threaten the existing order. As Zhou Jianyong noted, one major hurdle is

69. Zhou Qijun, “Louyu jingji cuisheng shoujia ‘Bailing Yijia’” (Skyscraper Economy Spawns First “Élite Union”), Wenhui bao (Wenhui Daily) (12 December 2009), p. 3.

70. Xietu shequ ( jiedao) zonghe dangwei (Xietu District [Street-level] Joint Party Committee), “Xietu shequ bailing lianyi julebu” (Xietu Community Establishes White-collar Club), 27 July 2007, http://tinyurl .com/3lgewvp1 (accessed 22 March 2012); Xietu shequ ( jiedao) zonghe dangwei, “2009 xiangyue Xietu bailing qingnian jiaoyou huodong ceji” (“2009 Engagement Xietu” News of White-collar Youth Activity), 27 April 2009, http://tinyurl.com/42rjd581 (accessed 22 March 2012).

71. Hong Meifen, “Shanghai Zhonggong Dangyuan 175.32 wan ming, wei jiefang chuqi dangyuan zongshu de 85 bei” (Shanghai CCP Members 1.7532 million, 85 Times the Number of Those in the Early Liberation Period), Jiefang ribao (4 July 2011), p. 1.



the sheer size of the Party: as the largest political organization in the world, the Chinese Communist Party moves into the future without historic precedents or models to provide guidance on managing, mobilizing and coordinating a Party organization of its scale and scope.72 A second concern is the erosion of its tra-ditional mass base among the so-called “revolutionary classes”: Party members broadly defined as “working on the frontlines to develop production”—a cate-gory that includes farmers, herders, fishermen, migrant and seasonal laborers, managers and other types of wage-earners—were said to constitute 45.4 per cent of the national membership of the Party in 2010;73 however, the number of blue-collar working class members is not known, and evidence suggests that it is in serious decline.74 Third, by expanding recruitment, the Party could conceivably either import the contradictions now plaguing Chinese society into its core, en-dangering Party unity and the functioning of inner-Party democracy, or trivialize the Party’s mission in its drive to woo the professional white-collar class, thereby undermining its “fighting strength” (zhandouli 战斗力) and vanguard role with respect to Chinese society as a whole.75

The shifting composition of the Party’s membership has furthermore raised fears among some that the CCP is in danger of becoming a diluted “catch-all party” ( jianrongxing zhengdang 兼容性正党) such as, for example, the German Christian Democratic Union, which, according to one flagship Party journal, blithely aims “to represent everyone”.76 Writing in 1966, Kirchheimer described the rise of “catch-all” parties as a result of both internal and externally-derived pressures in post-war Europe: as electoral competition in liberal democracies pushed parties to broaden their electoral “catchments”, specific class-based con-stituencies and core ideological appeals eroded, and dominant parties became more closely amalgamated with the state apparatus. In the denuded political en-vironment that resulted, “catch-all parties” aimed less to integrate citizens into the body politic than to appease them in their role as largely uncritical and apathetic

72. Zhou Jianyong, “Zhongguo Gongchandang zhuanxing yanjiu”, pp. 19–22.73. Song Yingshuai, “Shishibande huihuang jubian—90 nianlai Zhongguo Gongchandang dangyua

shuliang yu jiegou de bianhua yu fazhan” (Glorious and Epochal Changes—The Development and Transformation in the Number and Composition of Chinese Communist Party Members over Ninety Years), Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily) (5 July 2011), p. 15.

74. See “2009 nian Shanghai shi Zhongguo Gongchandang dangnei tongji gongbao” (2009 Shanghai City CCP Internal Party Statistics Report), http://shzw.eastday.com/shzw/szyw/userobject1ai2140.html and “2010 nian Zhongguo Gongchandang Shanghai shi dangnei tongji gongbao” (2010 CCP Shanghai City Internal Party Statistics Report), http://shzw.eastday.com/shzw/G/20110704/userobject1ai52370.html (both accessed 22 March 2012).

75. See, for example, Liu Yong, “Zunzhong dangyuan zhuti diweide yiyi tansuo” (An Exploration into the Meaning of Esteeming the Distinctive Role of Party Members), Weishi (From Reality), No. 4 (2010), p. 18.

76. Zhan Hongfeng and Li Zhiming, “Lun shehuizhuyi fazhi linian zai Zhongguo minzhu jianshezhong de zuoyong—cong fazhanzhong guojia minzhu jianshe lishi jingyan” (Theorizing the Utility of the Socialist Concept of Rule of Law in Constructing Chinese Democracy—Speaking of the Historical Lessons and Experience of Building Democracy in a Developing Country)”, Qiushi (Seeking Truth), No. 5 (2010), p. 52.



consumers of “political products”.77 As public administration scholar Gao Qiqi noted, when the CCP began absorbing “advanced productive forces” across the social spectrum, both the Party’s connection to its original mass base and the “distinctive features” of its formerly left-wing ideological orientation weakened significantly, and the CCP began more closely to resemble Western “catch-all parties”.78 However, Liu Yong contends that the lack of electoral competition in the Chinese case actually produced a different outcome: instead of becoming a “catch-all party”, the CCP more closely approximates a “socialist cartel-type po-litical party” (shehui zhuyide kate’erxing zhengdang 社会主义的卡特尔型政党). Extending Kirchheimer’s insights, Katz and Mair recently argued that Western “catch-all parties” set the stage for the emergence of “cartel parties”, which not only collectively reorient their focus away from grass-roots civil society and to-wards the state apparatus and transform career party activists into professional state bureaucrats, but also collude to prevent potential challengers from compet-ing.79 In the Chinese case, Liu finds that the lack of inter-party competition and control over state-owned assets exacerbates these tendencies. The CCP’s exclu-sive control enhances its risk of ossification and could erode the Party’s governing capacity as it involutes, becoming bogged down in the management and control of state-owned resources. According to Liu, only further development of inner-Party democracy—“whether through perfecting the existing system, expanding the channels, and/or promoting the quality of inner Party democracy by valuing the role of Party members as both the origination and terminus” of the political process—can rejuvenate the vitality of the Party as a whole and interrupt the process of further cartelization.80

The crux of the current challenge facing the Party, in the view of the partici-pants in this unfolding debate, is how to accommodate the disparate needs and interests pressing in from the grass-roots via “two new” organizations, without losing control of the Party’s explicitly political mission at the center. In order for the CCP to avoid going the way either of Western “catch-all parties” or involuting cartelized ones, it must intensify the political nature of Party life, particularly in

77. Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of Western European Party Systems”, in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 177–200; see also André Krouwel, “Otto Kirchheimer and the Catch-all Party”, West European Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April 2003), pp. 23–40.

78. Gao Qiqi, “Xin Zhongguo zhendang yu gongmin shehui guanxi bianqian yanjiu—zhengdang leixingxue he gongnengzhuyi lujing de fenxi” (Research on the Vicissitudes of the Relationship Between China’s New Ruling Party and Civil Society—A Typology of Ruling Parties and an Analysis of Functionalist Methods), Shanghai xingzhengyuan xuebao, Vol. 11, No. 6 (November 2010), p. 9.

79. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 5–28; Mark Blyth and Richard Katz, “From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party”, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2005), pp. 33–60.

80. Liu Yong, “Zunzhong dangyuan zhuti diweide yiyi tansuo”, p. 19.



“two new” organizations,81 where both substantive politics and anchoring ideolo-gies have been displaced by more market-friendly practices and rhetorics.

However, the active repoliticization of its grass-roots membership is not on the agenda of either CCP central or local leaders: the new life of the Party instead fuses commercial and social forces as an instrument of competitive commercial advantage, and actively markets the Party’s capacity to manage its workforce to a receptive—and increasingly transnational—corporate audience. In so doing, the Party has arguably become more flexible without abandoning its hallmark rheto-ric of social assistance and social equality. As Tomba observes, one indication of the success of “tailor-made governance” is that members on the lower rungs of the socio–economic hierarchy continue to view the Chinese Party-state “as the last defense against the deregulation of the market”, whereas the upwardly-mobile middle classes see central leaders “as the champions of newly acquired ‘rights’ ”.82

The current coexistence of multiple framing arguments within the Party to contain, manage and regulate different constituencies appears to be at odds with the Mao-era tactic of overtly entitling some groups while excluding and attacking others. However, as Perry observes, the Party’s unifying rhetorics have long been “tempered by a politics of division”: the “divide-and-conquer” strategies of previ-ous decades have in fact been refashioned as “divide-and-rule” tactics, used to stimulate political participation that bolsters the political hegemony of the Party and undercuts the potential for fundamental challenges to the regime.83 This dy-namic can be seen as well in the recent reinvention of Party life: while catering to the interests and proclivities of new socio–economic élites, the Party also em-phasizes discourses and practices of charity, volunteerism and social assistance to vulnerable groups.84 Yet, in spurning the bitter pill of revolutionary transfor-mation for the palliative of what some have dubbed “philanthrocapitalism”,85 the Party has arguably already sanctioned the country’s movement toward becoming an increasingly unequal and potentially unstable society in which the force of the market, and not the Party, is the real driver of historical change.

81. Qi Xingfa, “ ‘Liangxin’ zuzhi dangjian gongzuo zhong de ziyuan touru yinsu fenxi”, p. 33.82. Luigi Tomba, “Making Neighborhoods: The Government of Social Change in China’s Cities”, China

Perspectives, Vol. 4 (2008), p. 61.83. Elizabeth J. Perry, “Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?”, The China Journal, No. 57

(January 2007), pp. 11–12.84. Luigi Tomba, “Of Quality, Harmony, and Community: Civilization and the Middle Class in Urban

China”, positions: east asia cultures critique, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 2009), pp. 592–616; Vivienne Shue, “The Political Economy of Compassion: China’s ‘Charity Supermarket’ Saga”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No. 72 (November 2011), pp. 751–72; and Outi Luova, “Community Volunteers’ Associations in Contemporary Tianjin: Multipurpose Partners of the Party-state”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No. 72 (November 2011), pp. 773–94.

85. Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World, and Why We Should Let Them (London: A&C Black, 2008); see also the September 2011 symposium on the politics of philanthrocapitalism in Society.


QUERY TO THE AUTHOR

q1: Citations of Figures 1 and 2 were given but Tables were provided, instead of Figures? Should we change these citations to Tables 1 and 2? Based on our under-standing, these citations should have been for Tables. Please advi e.

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