the neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitionsjournalpsyche.org/articles/0xc02d.pdf ·...

Evolution and Cognition

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Concepts without factualcontent are empty; sense-data without concepts areblind. The senses cannotthink, The understandingcannot see. By their uniononly can knowledge be pro-duced.—

Immanuel K

ANT

,

The Critique of Pure Reason

USANNE

L

ANGER

(1951)in contemplating the

status of emotional pro-cesses in her own time,worried that everythingthat falls outside of thedomain of analytic, prop-ositional, and formalthought is merely classed“

as emotive, irrational, andanimalian… All otherthings our minds do are dis-missed as irrelevant to intel-lectual progress: they are re-siduals, emotional distur-bances, or throwbacks to theanimal estate

” (p246, myitalics in this and all otherquotes). Several genera-tion later, Joe L

E

D

OUX

(1996), “the leading ex-pert on the emotionalbrain” (G

AZZANIGA

et al.1998, p516), promoted amodern variant of thatintellectual tradition bysuggesting that:

“The brain states and bodily responsesare the fundamental facts of an emotion, and the con-scious feelings are the frills that have added icing to the

emotional cake”

(p302). Inessence, L

E

D

OUX

, as wellas many other neurosci-entists believe that affec-tive experiences—thoseintangible and presum-ably unmeasurable sub-jective events —are of lit-tle importance for a scien-tific understanding ofemotions.

My personal view onthese issues is quite dif-ferent: I accept the im-portance of all of theabove levels of analysis,but would also suggestthat an understanding ofaffective processes inboth humans and othermammals should bedeemed an essential in-gredient for the field toconsider. In accepting thelikelihood that the basicemotional feelings arefundamental representa-tions of complex, caus-ally efficacious, organicprocesses within mam-malian brains—emergentproperties that are real-ized in the dynamic orga-nizations of neuronalnetworks—I have calledfor my colleagues to “

con-sider one simple bit of logic: If affective feelings do existin the minds of other organisms and have causal conse-quences on their behaviors, we will never adequately un-

S

Jaak Panksepp

The Neuro-Evolutionary Cusp Between Emotions and Cognitions

Implications for Understanding Consciousness and the Emergence of a Unified Mind Science

1

The neurobiological systems that mediate the basicemotions are beginning to be understood. They appearto be constituted of genetically coded, but experiential-ly refined executive circuits situated in subcortical ar-eas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral,physiological and psychological processes that need tobe recruited to cope with a variety of survival need (i.e.,they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birth-rights allow newborn organisms to begin navigatingthe complexities of the world and to learn about thevalues and contingencies of the environment. some ofthese systems have been identified and characterizedusing modern neuroscientific and psychobiologicaltools. The most fundamental emotional systems cannow be defined by the functional psychobiologicalcharacteristics of the underlying circuitries—charac-teristics which help the organism coordinate behavior-al, physiological and psychological aspects of emo-tionality, including the valenced affective feelingstates that provide fundamental values for the guid-ance of behavior. The various emotional circuits arecoordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arous-al of each system may generate distinct affective/neu-rodynamic states and imbalances may lead to variouspsychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to dis-cuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be ad-dressed for additional progress in understanding thenature of primary process affective consciousness.

Brain, emotions, consciousness, affect, cognition,emotional disorders, neuropeptides, psychiatric impli-cations.

Abstract

Key words


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Jaak Panksepp

derstand their brains, or our own for that matter, unlesswe incorporate various new functional concepts into ourthinking.”

(P

ANKSEPP

1999, p164). In short, I believe that a neural understanding of

emotional feelings—those apparent underlying reg-ulators of many behavioral choices—remains one ofthe most important topics for our science and oursociety to pursue. In part, this position is based onthe recognition that for any lasting understanding,complex brain phenomena need to be viewed fromseveral mutually complementary perspectives. Neu-rophysiological terminology is not sufficient to con-ceptualize many global brain processes. The neuro-biological nature of feelings can be scientificallyapproached through the conjoint cross-species im-plementation of

behavioral, psychological

and

neural

perspectives—namely, through a triangulation thatis essential for the pursuit of a substantive

affectiveneuroscience

(P

ANKSEPP

1998a). At the same time, I, along with most investigators

in the field, accept as given that substantial amountsof emotional processing within the brain (e.g., un-conditional responses) are achieved by neural net-works that in themselves probably elaborate no con-scious emotional feelings. Indeed, in line withF

REUD

’s original suggestion, most investigators nowagree that much of what goes on in the brain is dy-namically on automatic pilot and unconscious. Atthe same time it seems likely that a great deal of timeand effort in brain evolution was devoted to the es-tablishment of intrinsic values—the various feelingsof goodness and badness that are internally experi-enced indicators of survival utility, elaboratedwithin ancient regions of the brain shared by allmammals in remarkably homologous ways. This isnot to say that these emergent feelings are not thor-oughly biological in their essential underlying form,but to accept that psychology has a major role to playin unraveling the nature of such processes within thebrain. The simple fact that other animals avidly con-sume and get “hooked” on the same drugs as hu-mans—becoming dependent on molecules that pro-mote essentially similar neuropsychologicalprocesses in all mammals—provides one robust lineof support for such a thesis. The essential substratesfor such desires are subcortical (I

KEMOTO

/P

ANKSEPP

1999; M

C

B

RIDE

/M

URPHY

/I

KEMOTO

1999; W

ISE

1996). There are many other equally compelling lines of

evidence that investigators who do not wish to con-front the central issue of human and animal feelings,and other aspects of their psychological lives, com-monly choose to ignore. At the same time, the pur-suit of substantive knowledge in this area is remark-

ably difficult, and perhaps the prevailing agnosticview is a preferred tactic for various socio–politicalreasons (i.e., sustaining consensus and grant sup-port). But it is ultimately not a wise path: All toocommonly it fails to consider the whole corpus ofevidence on such topics. It can undermine our abil-ity and willingness to confront the reality of theemergent neurodynamics that may constitute prim-itive forms of consciousness. It also promotes a neo-dualism that is harmful for scientific understand-ing—sustaining a division of mind and matter intro-duced by D

ESCARTES

for outdated religious and polit-ical reasons. The unified nature of basic emotionalprocesses across all mammalian species—with essen-tial subjective and objective aspects that must bestudied conjointly—is a monistic perspective that Iwould encourage all to accept. My aim here will beto share an overview of how affective neuroscientificstrategies for understanding mind could help us cor-rect our neglect of those affective processes that Su-san L

ANGER

and other thoughtful observers of thehuman/animal condition encouraged us to considerduring the past century.

Toward a confrontation with affective consciousness: background issues

Let me first affirm once more that it has long beenobvious to critically minded observers that many ofthe emotional acts that humans and animals ex-hibit reflect no conscious intent. Many impulsiveemotional acts are projectile, reflexive responses toenvironmental stimuli, and the rules for those re-sponses are ingrained within seemingly straightfor-ward types of neuronal circuits. For instance, ani-mals do not learn to exhibit a startle response to asudden sound or a withdrawal response to suddenpain or rapidly approaching threats. These re-sponses are much closer to reflexes than intentionalactions, even though a process is set in motion inthe brain that can govern future actions. However,there is an intermediate class of emotional actiontendencies that do contain a germ of intentional-ity—for instance, the tendency of animals sponta-neously to seek resources. Although no higher levelconscious intent is required for animals to becomeappetitively energized when confronted by anabundance of various environmental rewards, theirbehavioral engagements have more complex neuralunderpinnings than those that govern stimulus-bound reflexes. The underlying SEEKING systemprovokes animals to exhibit a flexible appetitivepresence in the world. Many emotional responses


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reflect “intentions in action” to use S

EARLE

’s (1983)discriminating terminology, even though they maynot constitute “intentions to act” (which may re-quire higher cognitive processes). Emotional feel-ings, I believe, are realized more in the neural sub-strates of the former than the later.

The exploratory and investigatory behaviors ofanimals seeking resources have an outward charactersuggesting that they emerge spontaneously fromcertain ingrained types of neural organization—seeI

KEMOTO

/P

ANKSEPP

(1999) for a most recent review.Such “instinctual” behaviors flow as naturally as ariver cascading down a waterfall. Such spontaneousemotive behaviors have a flexibly characteristic

pres-ence

suggesting they do represent the fundamentalurges of an organism. There are many emotive be-havior patterns such as this in the intrinsic behav-ioral repertoires of all species. The fact that such ba-sic emotional action tendencies arise spontaneouslyfrom an intrinsic form of neural organization doesnot automatically mean that they do not have im-mediate repercussions on a primary-process form ofconsciousness. There are good reasons to believesuch behaviors arise from neural systems whose sub-strates constitute the very foundation of all subse-quent forms of consciousness: If these systems aredamaged, the adaptive competence of animals is se-verely compromised. To the best of our knowledge,these neural systems create the experiential immedi-acy of an internally felt presence in the world, aproposition that can be tested in humans, the ques-tion being—when the underlying systems are artifi-cially activated does internal experience have a qual-ity of belongingness or one of artificial imposition?

Because such “intentions in action” are not cre-ated by “intentions to act,” many behavioral neuro-scientists, including those prominently interested inemotions, have chosen to remain skeptical of thepossibility that other animals have consciously ex-perienced emotional feelings. Indeed, many assertthat if such mental faculties do exist, they may havelittle to do with the way brains control behavior. Asalready noted, L

E

D

OUX

(1996) has been a prominentadvocate of such an epiphenomenalist perspectivein cognitive neuroscience. In my estimation,

unsub-stantiated disbelief

—skepticism about reasonablepossibilities that have substantial empirical sup-port—can be as much of a barrier to scientificprogress as

unsubstantiated belief

. I would submit thatthe concept of emotional feelings is not in the latercategory, but that agnosticism on the issue

is

rapidlybecoming an exemplar of the first. In areas such asemotion research, we should not remain eternally

silent on such matters, as some behavioral neurosci-entists would prefer. That is rapidly becoming a po-tentially immoral stance, as we recognize that theprobable existence of emotional states in other ani-mals is very high. In any event, to understand thebrain, we must be willing to entertain the reality ofvarious psychological processes, as created throughpoorly understood neurodynamics.

Certain investigators, as committed to a rigorousscientific understanding of the fundamental natureof emotions as the skeptics and agnostics, feel thatthere is no rational alternative but to seriously con-sider the existence of a primordial form of affectiveconsciousness in other organisms and to analyze therole of such processes in behavioral choices (B

UCK

1999; D

AMASIO

1999; P

ANKSEPP

1998a, 1998b,2000a). The weight of evidence is simply too largefor us to ignore the possibility that affective feelingsare fundamentally created by brain systems that gen-erate “intentions in action” rather than simply beingcreated by the higher associative and language abil-ities of the human brain, as claimed by some prom-inent investigators (R

OLLS

1999). Here I will advancethe view that primary-process “affective conscious-ness” is constructed fundamentally from the intrin-sic capacities of certain neural circuits—the basicemotional systems of the brain—which operate ingoal-directed and valenced ways, working in har-mony with basic, thoroughly biological, self-repre-sentational systems of the brain.

These distinct points of view—one asserting thatthe topic of emotional subjectivity, especially inother animals, is simply not workable from any cred-ible scientific perspective, and the other assertingthat it is—are presently in deep conflict. In my esti-mation, the argument against animal feelings comesultimately from an unforgiving, anthropocentricform of solipsism combined with a pernicious formof neo-dualism. It is remarkable that it is supportedby so many neuroscientists, for there is no well-ar-gued data base supporting that view… only thephilosophical residue of C

ARTESIAN

dualism. The evi-dence for animal subjectivity comes from i) an enor-mous number of approach and avoidance tests,ii) various consummatory choice and stimulus pref-erence studies that have been conducted on manyother mammals, and iii) the remarkable homologiesin the neuroanatomies and neurochemistries forsuch affective tendencies in all mammals. The weightof existing evidence (although there is no “knock-out”

final proof—

an impossible task in science) is thatother animals do have internally experienced feel-ings that have consequences for their behaviors.


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The ultimate resolution of this issue should be ofconsiderable interest to investigators of the humanmind, especially since an understanding of the“higher” forms of awareness may be critically depen-dent on our ability to understand some of the“lower” substrates of felt existence. Indeed, there isnow an increasing enthusiasm to deal with thosesubtle brain processes we know as moods and feel-ings, which appear to be part of the genetic birth-right we share with many other creatures, for theyhave powerful influences on the way our cognitiveactivities operate and hence in all aspects of the waywe live our lives (D

AMASIO

1994, 1999). These are thesystems that create a foundation of meaning forhigher life decisions. Some of us believe that a trueunderstanding of the organization of mind andground of being must be premised on a neuroscien-tific probing of those ancestral value-processes thatevolution provided to help complex creatures likemammals navigate successfully through the world.

From an evolutionary perspective, honed by theremarkable recent advances in molecular biology, itis now certain that many of our fundamental abili-ties are remarkably similar to those of our brethrenanimals. The underlying “mechanisms/processes”can only be understood if we are willing to simulta-neously take several perspectives to the organizednature of complexity—with one critical but oftenneglected one being a data based cross-species, expe-riential point of view. We can probably understandthe nature of human hunger by studying the subcor-tical energy regulatory systems of rats. We can do thesame for thirst, anger, fear, and the many other vex-ations and pleasures of the shared, primitive regionsof mammalian brains.

A psychobiological confrontation with these an-cient emotional systems, and the intrinsic valuesthey create (as monitored indirectly via the variousapproach and avoidance behaviors animals exhibit),shall be of foremost important in decoding how con-sciousness first emerged on the face of the earth(P

ANKSEPP

1982, 1998b). Through the ability of emo-tional systems to conditionally encode every-day ac-tivities with values, many of our cognitive activitiesremain tethered to affective principles. As manyhave suspected, we tend to approach things

because

they have made us feel good (in the various ways thatis possible), and we avoid things because they makeus feel bad. Other animals presumably operate essen-tially in the same manner, even though the cognitivestrategies we use to fulfill our desires and to avoid ourtravails are surely more sophisticated and long-sighted than in most other animals. Of course, the

different species often employ very different sen-sory, motor and cognitive tools to achieve emotionaland motivational homeostasis.

This naturalistic view of human and animal ex-istence lost credibility abruptly with the success ofthe behaviorist revolution early in the 20th centuryand it was sustained by the subsequent advent ofdigital computational models of mind and the emo-tion-free cognitivism of the second half of the cen-tury. As a result of those schools of thought, whichmarginalized the importance of emotional and mo-tivational feelings in the governance of human andanimal lives, several generations of thinking alonglines advocated here were lost. Only recently aresome returning to reconsider such evolutionaryroots of mental existence.

The issues I shall focus on here were aired by pre-vious generations of thinkers (e.g., C

OGAN

1802;D

ARWIN

1998; F

REUD

1981b; S

HAND

1920 just toname a few), and they are re-emerging once again tothe forefront of evolutionary and neuro-epistemo-logical thought (D

AMASIO

1999; M

AC

L

EAN

1990;P

ANKSEPP

1998a, 1998b). My basic premise here willbe that the evolution of higher brain mechanismswas critically guided by the preexisting neurobiolog-ical exigencies of organisms (i.e., subcortical emo-tional and motivational abilities), which are gener-ally more similar among living mammalian speciesthan their higher cortico-cognitive functions whichhave diverged more considerably (see B

UDIANSKY

1998 and H

AUSER

2000, for a recent overviews of cog-nitive differences). However, even there we will finda great deal of convergent evolution because of thebasic needs all animals share. In sum, my guidingpremise is that a knowledge of the “lower” affectivefunctions will constitute essential substrates for un-derstanding the operation of higher brain–mindfunctions: Unless we come to terms with the deeplyorganic nature of our basic drives—the various emo-tions and motivations—we may never understandthe multi-faceted nature of consciousness(es).

Evidence concerning many of the basic emotionalsystems we share with the other mammals has re-cently been summarized (P

ANKSEPP

1998a). Here Iwill largely focus on the types of higher brain dy-namics (or cognitive “modules” in the debatable par-lance of modern evolutionary psychology) that mayexist in human cortico-cognitive areas that establishmany of our more sophisticated behavioral priori-ties. In general, it will be important to have formalproposals, as well as empirical tests, of specific typesof “affect-logic” that emerge from higher regions ofthe mind that have evolved to deal with basic emo-


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tional and motivational issues (C

IOMPI

1997; W

IM-

MER

1995; W

IMMER

/C

IOMPI

1996). There are presently three major strands of experi-

mentally-based neurobiological thought in thisarea: i) One strand is emerging from modern evolu-tionary psychology which is postulating mind–brain “modules” that arise all too often from an“arm-chair” Pleistocene-oriented logical analysis ofhuman mind and behavior (T

OOBY

/C

OSMIDES

2000).ii) Another is emerging from modern cognitive neu-roscience, which generally takes a massive cortico-centric focus, that often seems to be deny, or at leastignore, the existence of powerful emotional forces inthe deep recesses of the brain–mind (e.g., G

AZZANIGA

et al. 1998; G

AZZANIGA

2000). iii) Finally, the thirdand most solidly evolutionary approach is highly fo-cussed on subcortical issues and has arisen from therecognition that the basic emotions may reflect or-ganizational principles at the very foundations ofthe mammalian mind (D

AMASIO

1999; M

AC

L

EAN

1990; P

ANKSEPP

1998a). The three could work welltogether toward a comprehensive mind science, butthat will require better understanding, appreciationand integration of each others’ premises and databases than presently exists. The philosophical com-munity is also becoming remarkably interested insuch issues (e.g., G

RIFFITHS

1997), and investigatorsshould become immersed in

all

the available scien-tific evidence rather than constraining themselves tothe most prominent human psychological traditionthat was heavily based on a facial-analysis of emo-tions that emerged in the 70s (e.g., E

KMAN

1998). Theanimal neurological traditions should not be ig-nored by philosophers, for that is the only way wecan resolve the foundational processes.

My aim here will be to provide a historical over-view of some of the above issues and to push forwardthe idea that one way we can come to understandthe natural order of the human mind is to clarify avariety of interrelated themes that arise from the an-cestral nature of the brain–mind: i) to decode thebasic nature of the biological value-generating sys-tems that are built into mammalian brains as ances-tral birthrights, ii) to discuss how these and relatedsystems actually generate “valence-tagging” of pre-viously neutral perceptual events; iii) to understandhow the aforementioned interactions govern morecomplex layers of thinking and perceiving; iv) tosuggest how experimental work on the basic affec-tive processes of the brain may interweave withthose subtle brain process(es) generically known asconsciousness; v) to discuss how the above lines ofinquiry may have important implications for under-

standing the essential nature of volitional activitiesand free will, as well as vi) the understanding psychi-atric disorders. This will be followed by vii) someexamples of how the intrinsic plasticity in the un-derlying system may establish temperamental statesand habitual ways of being within organisms. Afterproviding overviews of each of these topics, I willconclude with my personal views on the possibilitythat affective processes will ever be simulated com-putationally.

I. Biological Value Encoding Processes of the Brain

I have recently summarized the nature of brainemotional systems both in synoptic (P

ANKSEPP

1982,1991, 2000a, 2000b) and comprehensive archivalways (P

ANKSEPP

1998a), including recent chapterson separation distress (P

ANKSEPP

et al. 1988), play(P

ANKSEPP

1993b), fear (P

ANKSEPP

1990) and seekingsystems (I

KEMOTO

/P

ANKSEPP

1999), which are thespecific emotional processes that have been the fo-cus of my research during the past three decades. Iwill not aspire to any detailed coverage of facts here,but will simply highlight the main conceptualthemes that the current evidence supports, includ-ing a revitalized form of psychoanalytic thinking.

A synopsis of affective neuroscience

In general, the executive emotional systems are con-ceived to generate a variety of internally experi-enced affective states and related “evolutionary op-erants” or instinctual behavioral tendencies thatemerge from widespread brain systems that have atleast 6 attributes: As I suggested in 1982, they areable to 1) directly evaluate the meaning of certainsensory inputs (e.g., the smell of predators in preyspecies); 2) they modulate attentional and sensory-motor sensitivities relevant for the evoked behav-ioral tendencies (e.g., hunger sensitizes olfactoryacuity); 3) they control diverse physiological andhormonal conditions of the body which bringmany organ systems in line with the concurrent be-havioral demands (e.g., adrenaline secretion isadaptive for all behaviors that require motorarousal); 4) they sustain animals in specific feeling(mood) states for relatively prolonged periods oftime (e.g., separation protest vocalizations and feel-ings of distress are typically be sustained until socialreunion occurs or despair sets in ). All of the aboveare also 5) modulated by various cognitive activities(i.e., appraisals can provoke emotions) and which 6)

Evolution and Cognition ❘ 146 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 2

Jaak Panksepp

also modulate cognitive activities (i.e., emotionschannel thoughts and code memories). The mannerin which the seventh major attribute, affective ex-perience, is generated remains most mysterious ofall, but there is a great deal of relevant data that canguide our thinking. My best estimate is that centro-medial mesencephalic systems, such as those of theperiaqueductal gray (PAG) are absolutely essential(BANDLER/KEAY 1996; PANKSEPP 1998b), even thoughthese system are in strong interaction with higherbrain areas such as the cingulate, frontal and insularcortices, which surely elaborate felt emotional expe-riences. For a summary of details concerning thissystem, see WATT (1999b). In any event, the notionthat affect is an irrelevant issue for understandinghow the brain controls behavior will hopefully soonbecome a minority view, even among those rigorousanimal behaviorists who have been trained to avoidany tinge of anthropomorphism. Now that weknow how much we share genetically, behaviorallyand probably psychologically, such issues need tobe evaluated on a case by case basis rather than dis-missed by fiat. Obviously, this strategy is bound tosucceed more in the analysis of primitive brain sys-tems that all mammals share homologously ratherthan higher systems where there has been muchmore evolutionary divergence.

I doubt if many investigators of the relevant sys-tem would claim that there are no intrinsic emo-tional systems in the brain as many did just a fewyears ago. It is now certain that the brain contains avariety of genetically ingrained emotional systemsfor generating specific classes of emotional behav-iors (PANKSEPP 1998a). To all appearances, affectiveexperience is a rather direct manifestation of thearousal of these systems. When these systems areelectrically stimulated, humans report urges to actand describe emotional experiences that have a feel-ing of belongingness, as opposed to being alien tothe self. Presumably, the arousal of the various emo-tional command systems could be distinguishedsubjectively from each other by humans as beingfundamentally distinct feelings, but such issues werenever addressed during the era when such brainstimulation studies were most actively pursued (seePANKSEPP 1985 for review). Of course, the essentialrole of these primitive systems should not be takento mean that the higher cortical projection areashave no role in experienced feelings. The clinical ev-idence indicates that they most certainly do, butlargely in a modulatory/regulatory capacity. Thecore mechanisms for affect appear to be subcorticallysituated.

The brain emotional “command” systems thathave been provisionally identified in experimentalanimals, along with their major anatomies and neu-rochemistries are summarized in Table 1. I will notattempt to provide any more detail in the limitedspace available here, especially since they have beenthoroughly summarized recently (PANKSEPP 1998a).However, I would emphasize that we are only on thenear shore of substantive human work in this areaand even critical animal work on such issues remainsquite meager because there is currently little institu-tional support for work which is attempting tofathom how affect is elaborated within the mamma-lian brain. Most still believe that such issue reside inthe realm of intuitive hunches rather than the pre-dictive landscape of mainstream science. Consider-ing the existence of cross-species affective neuro-science type research strategies, that bias is blatantlyincorrect. In any event, there would have to be amajor shift in both our research priorities and strat-egies for this type of work to proceed at a reasonablepace. For now, I would simply emphasize that thetype of detailed knowledge of the underlying neuralsubstrates that needs to be obtained simply can notbe achieved without behavioral brain research inother animals, along with careful evaluation of per-missible manipulations in humans (e.g., KNUTSON etal. 1998). I personally believe this kind of knowledgewould be invaluable for a new and hopefully highlyhumanistic phase of biological psychiatry wherepsychoanalytic approaches become, perhaps for thefirst time, widely used tools for new types of inquiriesinto the psychodynamics of the human mind.

In any event, now that we know a great deal aboutthese intrinsic emotional systems in the brains ofother mammals, we could (at least in theory) arousea variety of distinct emotional tendencies in humansby artificial means (i.e., various types of direct brainstimulation), and ask how those systems contributeboth to behavioral choices and mental states. Ofcourse most such work is ethically problematic, un-less retired neuroscientists interested in such issueswere more willing to be guinea pigs for future inquir-ies. However, to the extent that we can selectivelyarouse such systems using peripheral pharmacologi-cal maneuvers, we could validate that the behavioralindices we utilize in animals are not leading us astray.The development of molecules that can activate spe-cific neuropeptidergically orchestrated emotionalsystems may eventually allow us to evaluate very dis-crete possibilities rather directly. They may also leadto a to a new revolution in biological psychiatrywhere very specific feelings can be modulated by



pharmacological influences on specific affect systemsof the brain. These lines of thought raise the possibil-ity of some very interesting psychoethological workthat could be pursued in humans, perhaps imple-mented with psychoanalytic free-associative, activelistening procedures as outcome measures.

I single out the psychoanalytic tradition becauseit was a line of 20th century thought that continuedto accept the importance of affective processes in ourattempts to understand the mind. Even though psy-choanalytic approaches were not robust enough toreveal the internal nature of emotions, FREUD diddevelop a provisional conceptual scheme—of id, egoand superego functions—where the drive-like neural“forces” within the id were the primal powersaround which the rest of the mental apparatus re-volved. While FREUD realized that his system ofthought depended critically on our ability to under-stand the id, he and his colleagues had no reasonableway to probe the internal neural structures of thevarious “drives” that constituted that conceptualbrain–mind. However, FREUD presciently suggested

that the id, cut off from the external world, has a worldof perceptions of its own. I translate this to mean thataffective processes, being very ancient in brain evo-lution, do not need cognitive structures in order togenerate the psychological impact of raw feelings.However, without a substantive neuroscientific un-derstanding of the id, the rest of FREUD’s theory ofpsychology could not be adequately evaluated. Ourrecent understanding of basic emotional systemspermits a potentially fruitful rapprochement be-tween psychoanalytic and neuroscientific ap-proaches to mind (KANDEL 1998; PANKSEPP 1999).

FREUD, no doubt, would be very favorably dis-posed to such views. As FREUD highlighted in his“Project” (1981a) when he discussed the pleasureand unpleasure of sexual release: “…a suspicionforces itself on us that… the endogenous stimuliconsist of chemical products, of which there may be aconsiderable number.” (p321). Although he ne-glected such issues for most of his career, toward theend of his life FREUD still asserted that “The futuremay teach us to exercise a direct influence, by means

Basic Emotional Systems Key Brain Areas Key Neuromodulators

General + MotivationSEEKING/Expectancy

Nucleus Accumbens—VTAMesolimbic and mesocortical outputsLateral hypothalamus—PAG

DA (+), glutamate (+), manyneuropeptides, opioids (+) neurotensin (+)

RAGE/Anger Medial amygdala to Bed Nucleus of Stria Terminalis (BNST). medial and perifornical hypothalamic to dorsal PAG

Substance P (+), ACh (+) , glutamate (+)

FEAR/Anxiety Central & lateral amygdala to medialhypothalamus and dorsal PAG

Glutamate (+), many, neuropeptides, DBI, CRF, CCK, alpha–MSH, NPY

LUST/Sexuality Cortico-medial amygdala,Bed nucleus of stria terminalis (BNST)Preoptic and ventromedial hypothalamusLateral and ventral PAG

Steroids (+), vasopressin, & oxytocin, LH–RH., CCK.

CARE/Nurturance Anterior cingulate, BNSTPreoptic Area, VTA, PAG

oxytocin (+), prolactin (+)dopamine (+), opioids (+/–)

PANIC/Separation Anterior Cingulate,BNST & Preoptic AreaDorsomedial ThalamusDorsal PAG

opiods(–), oxytocin (–) prolactin (–) CRF (+)glutamate (+)

PLAY/Joy Dorso-medial diencephalonParafascicular AreaDorsal PAG, Tectum

opioids (+/–), glutamate (+)ACh (+), Any agent that promotes negative emotions reduces play

Table 1. General summary of the key neuroanatomical and neurochemical factors that contribute to the construction of basicemotions within the mammalian brain. The monoamines serotonin and norepinephrine are not indicated since the participatein non-specific ways in all emotions. The higher cortical zones devoted to emotionality, mostly in frontal, cingulate, insular, andtemporal areas, are not indicated. Key: CCK = choleocystokinin, CRF = corticotrophin releasing factor, DBI = diazepam bindinginhibitor, ACh = acetylcholine, MSH = Melanocyte Stimulating Hormone, NPY = Neuropeptide Y. – inhibits prototype, + activates prototype. (Adapted from PANKSEPP 1998a and WATT 1999a)


Jaak Panksepp

of particular chemical substances, on the amountsof energy and their distribution in the mental appa-ratus.” (FREUD 1981c, p182). It would be an under-statement to say that many such agents have nowemerged, and there are many other possibilities inthe wings. Indeed, at the heart of many of the brain’saffect programs of the mammalian brain, “there area variety of chemical codes (largely neuropeptider-gic) that may eventually permit precise new modesof psychiatric intervention, and new ways to evalu-ate how feelings are constructed in the humanbrain” (PANKSEPP 1999, p44).

From this vantage, it would be important for us tobe able to directly study the human mental processeson line—not just with direct brain measures such asEEG and fMRI but also psychoanalytically (i.e., freeassociative narratives in “normal” individuals in-duced to experience distinct moods). Althoughbrain imaging techniques have given us remarkablesnapshots of emotions—from psychostimulantcraving (CHILDRESS et al. 1999) to sadness (GEORGE etal. 1996)—they have not yet added much to our un-derstanding of how the dynamics of mind changeduring these states. Could the technique of free-as-sociation be utilized experimentally to reveal the af-fective dynamics of the human mind (DAHL 1998)?I suspect that a new field of inquiry, such as psychoe-thology, which would seek to characterize the normalaffective-cognitive topography of the human mindunder the sway of different emotions could help usscientifically characterize many basic psychologicalprocesses. But more on that later.

II. The Generation of Associative “Valence-Tagging”I doubt if many investigators today would claimthat human emotions are totally socially con-structed. At the same time few would claim that so-cial-construction of emotionality is either modestor negligible. Obviously, the genetically providedemotional systems of the brain, many of which be-come fully operative soon after birth in all mamma-lian species (Table 1), are continuously molded byorganismic responses to new environmental objectsand events. Brains can imbue initially neutral envi-ronmental events with values. This is commonlycalled valence-tagging or secondary/conditioned re-inforcement—the ability of previously neutralevents to assume the intrinsic values evoked byemotionally salient events (i.e., unconditional stim-uli) through associative learning. Even though thismay transpire by a variety of distinct mechanisms

operating at several hierarchical levels within thebrain/mind, leading to a complex developmentallandscape, the simplest and most widely studiedform is that arising from classical conditioning. Thisreflects one of the simplest forms of cognitive-emo-tional interaction that exists within the brain. Toput it in everyday words—even though individualsat an instinctive level may know what they like andwhat they do not like (through unconditional plea-sure-unpleasure responses), at a cognitive level theydo not. However, through classical conditioning,cognitive systems learn quickly.

Let me also put this in more traditional psycholog-ical terms: The systematic pairing of neutral cues orconditional stimuli (CSs) with biologically importantevents or unconditional stimuli (UCSs) which spon-taneously evoke instinctual behavioral and physio-logical changes, also known as unconditional re-sponses (UCRs) can rapidly produce learning, or con-ditioned responses (CRs). The ability of the temporalpairing of CSs with UCSs to produce CRs, has been astaple of behavioral psychology since Pavlov system-atized such knowledge. Now, there is widespread rec-ognition that most emotional responses can be con-ditioned in this way. That has led to a cottage industryof behavioral researchers working to reveal the detailsof how fear responses condition in the amygdala (e.g.,how tones and light paired with shock evoke condi-tioned withdrawal or or autonomic arousal re-sponses). Generally, such investigators believe thatthe understanding of emotions is best achievedthrough the implementation of simple learning ap-proaches that focus on associative learning issues asopposed to the intrinsic evolutionarily dictated na-ture of brain emotional systems. The techniques arevery effective in both animals (LEDOUX 1996) and hu-mans (ÖHMAN 1993), and they are well within thetradition of 20th century behavioral science.

Unfortunately, such work only tells us a great dealabout how emotional responses can be molded bylearning, but comparatively little about the intrinsicnature of the evolved emotional processes of thebrain. The widespread use of such classical condi-tioning techniques has led to the recognition thatmuch of emotional learning occurs at unconsciouslevels. That conclusion is generally accepted sincemany classically conditioned fear responses occur sorapidly that no subjectively experienced cognitive oraffective processes is likely to have intervened be-tween the presentation of a CS and the emission ofthe CR that is measured. However, it is rarely ac-knowledged that the long-term affective responsesgenerated by such conditioning may also be influen-



tial in regulating the behavioral tendencies of ani-mals. Indeed, the comparative neglect of long-termemotional responses within such research programsmay now be promoting a misleading picture of theorganization of emotions in the brain/mind, and thestudy of projectile classically conditioned responsesneeds to be supplemented by the recognition thataffective feeling states are concurrently conditionedto the CSs, and that those states may have causalefficacy in the sustained regulation of subsequent be-haviors.

For instance CSs that have been paired with pain-ful stimuli, can subsequently intensify other fear re-sponses commonly evaluated in the potentiatedstartle paradigm, and also promote longer term be-havioral changes such as freezing. A study of thisbackground fear is getting somewhat closer to theunderlying affective process. It is now certain, as hasbeen suspected for 30 years, that a hot-bed for suchassociative learning is in the local circuits of the lat-eral and central amygdala (LEDOUX 1996), but it isgradually being realized that anxiety conditioningcan occur in many other brain areas (DAVIS/SHI 1999;MAREN 1999). The key synaptic chemistry whichseems to promote both the conditioning and de-conditioning of such associative responses arechanges in glutamatergic transmission (FALLS/MISER-

ENDINO/DAVIS 1992). Indeed, it is likely that condi-tioning, or at least long-term sensitization (ADAMEC

1997), can occur along the whole length of emo-tional command systems (see previous section), soan enormous amount of work remains to be donebefore we truly understand how pervasive is the plas-ticity of this system along the neuroaxis.

Only modest headway has been made in imple-menting such strategies for the study of most other,especially positive, emotional processes. An excep-tion is the recent work on the role of brain “reward”and dopamine systems in the conditioning of appet-itive eagerness (for a recent reviews, see IKEMOTO/PANKSEPP 1999; SCHULTZ 1998). To highlight how ef-fectively such processes can be used to study othersubtle positive responses such as social “joy” or ani-mal “laughter,” Figure 1 summarizes a classical con-ditioning experiment with tickle-induced 50-KHzchirping in young laboratory rats (PANKSEPP/BURG-

DORF 1999). Of the four groups depicted (see legend),only the group with contiguous CS-UCS pairings ex-hibited a systematically incrementing pattern oflearned behavior. In other words, the young ratschirped in anticipation of being tickled. We pres-ently have no empirical knowledge of where suchconditioning occurs, but the cingulate and orbito-

frontal cortices, as well as nucleus accumbens, septalnuclei and bed nuclei of the stria terminalis (BNST)are likely places to look.

Although the classical conditioning procedurestell us a great deal about how emotional values canbe linked to neutral stimuli, we must also recognizethat such approaches tell us practically nothingabout the intrinsic nature of the emotional valuesthat are mediated by the emotional command sys-tems or UCR pathways (Table 1). To my way of think-

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Figure 1. Mean (±SEM) levels of 50 KHz “laughter” type chirp-ing during the first five trials of conditioning: “Tickle: PairedCS” animals were exposed to the conditioned stimulus—pas-sive exposure to the the tickle hand—right before a 15 secondperiod of tickling (data not shown, but rates of chirping wereabout 38 per 15 sec). The group of animals that received theCS followed immediately by tickling, exhibited significantlyhigher chirping rates than the other two control groups (dataaccording to PANKSEPP/BURGDORF 1999).


Jaak Panksepp

ing, that can only be achieved by the types of ap-proaches highlighted in the previous section, as wellas through various place-preference and place-avoidance conditioning procedures (for summary,see SCHECHTER/CALCAGNETTI 1993), as well as rele-vant operant learning tasks, with stringent sched-ules of reinforcement, to evaluate motivationalstrength. Animals seek out places where they havehad positive affective experiences, and they avoidplaces where they have had negative ones.

Although many would like to believe that affec-tive experiences occur within fairly high areas of thebrain, such as neocortical zones that mediate work-ing memory (LEDOUX 1996), the evidence so farseems to be that the affective content of experiencecan be elaborated quite low in the neuroaxis (e.g.,OLMSTEAD/FRANKLIN 1997; PANKSEPP 1998a). Somemay be tempted to suggest that such “affects” reflectunconscious processes, perhaps the “dynamic un-conscious” postulated by FREUD, but I would ratherview them as the essential foundations of conscious-ness. Consciousness must not only be conceptual-ized phylogenetically (CABANAC 1999; PANKSEPP

1990a), but also as ontogenetic processes of neu-ronal/psychological development. From this van-tage, it is noteworthy that PET studies of infantbrains have found much higher levels of metabolicactivity in those primitive emotional areas of mid-brain and diencephalon than in most cortical areas.However, with development, intense patterns of cor-tical activation gradually emerge (CHUGANI 1996).Are infants then unconscious, or are they simply op-erating primarily with primitive forms of affectiveconsciousness? Pain studies of human infants tendto bear out the second alternative (ANAND 1997). Thegradual development of working memory, with theability to treat subcortical processes as tokens of in-formation, presumably provides high-order regula-tion over emotional processes rather than construct-ing affect out of those inputs.

III. Emotions and Higher Order Psychological ProcessesIt is a straightforward tenet of folk-psychology thatour emotions have robust effects on the way wethink and what we think about. Because of such in-teractions, there is a regrettable tendency to con-flate emotional and cognitive processes by peoplewho do not work on the deep structures of thebrain. Since so much of current work in experimen-tal psychology is concentrating on higher cogni-tion-emotion interactions in humans, and since an-

imal work has comparatively little to say aboutthose issues (i.e., thought processes are even harderthan emotional ones to observe in animals—seeHAUSER 2000), I will briefly cover one historical an-tecedent—the ideas of Alexander SHAND—that mayhelp highlight reasonable ways to proceed at thehuman level. Then I will focus on one major con-ceptual issue—the nature of emotional projections,which may help us better understand how affectivefeelings interact with cognitive processes in veryglobal ways. These lines of thought may help us es-tablish some lawful relationship between emotionsand cognitions.

First, let me indicate that three general laws ofemotions that could be linked to a biological analysiswere put forward by Charles DARWIN (1998). He sug-gested that each basic emotional system of the brain(i.e., his principle of action, due to the constitution ofthe nervous system), interacts with other systems (hisprinciple of antithesis) and is also accompanied bythe vast baggage of accumulated learning (his prin-ciple of serviceable associated habits). Contrary tomodern investigators of emotions in animals, DAR-

WIN was not hesitant to acknowledge that mostprobably a key feature of their emotional responsesis a feeling tone.

Since then, there have been several attempts tocodify the laws of emotions, as they operate at thepsychological level (FRIDJA 1986) as well as how theyoperate at a deeper affective-logic level that has beenrelated to psychiatric disorders (CIOMPI 1997). Un-fortunately the empirical work has lagged far behindthe general conceptualizations. To generate somesimple straightforward experiments, it may be in-structive for us to once more consider the systemati-zation attempts of our predecessors, and I have beenimpressed by some of the ideas advanced by SHAND.

The “laws” of Shand

In 1920, Alexander SHAND published his monumen-tal “The foundations of character: Being a study of thetendencies of the emotions and sentiments” which, inthe midst of an impressive narrative, put forward150+ laws that he believed accurately characterizedhuman emotional feelings, their attending cogni-tions, and their various interactions. These “laws”were derived from everyday observations and per-sonal insights rather than any systematic empiricalanalysis, but we should not dismiss them because ofthat. They still provide a source of many intriguing,empirically testable, hypotheses. I will only providea sampling of his thought. His first few fundamental



laws were those that he believed were the founda-tion for all other laws of character:

1) “Mental activity tends, at first unconsciously, after-wards consciously, to produce and to sustain system andorganization.” (p21)

2) “Every primary impulse, whether it is independentor belongs to a primary emotion, is innately connectedwith the systems of fear, anger, joy, and sorrow, in sucha way that, when opposed, it tends to arouse anger; whensatisfied, joy; when frustrated, sorrow; and when it an-ticipates frustration, fear; these systems being similarlyconnected together.” (p38)

6) “All intellectual and voluntary processes are elic-ited by the system of some impulse, emotion, or senti-ment, and subordinated to its end.” (p67).

Although many of SHAND’s laws seem straightfor-ward, even self-evident, and hence perhaps notworthy of empirical analysis, there are good reasonsthey should be deployed for experimental studies.An empirically verified fact is worth a thousand rea-sonable assumption. Indeed, I am tempted to sug-gest that a new discipline, such as experimentalphilosophy, might be quite useful in this arenasince experimental psychologists often seem not betemperamentally ready to tackle such issues. In anyevent, it they could be empirically substantiated,each of the following assertions could broaden anddeepen our scientific understanding of basic emo-tional matters.

15) “The joyful temper, in proportion as it is strongerthan the ordinary disposition to joy, weakens sensibilityto the opposite emotions of repugnance and sorrow, andby strengthening hope and confidence in the future, weak-ens the opposite emotions of despondency and despair.”(p153).

17) “The joyful temper lowers the threshold of sensi-bility for joy, hope, and confidence, but raises it for sor-row, despondency, and despair.” (p.154).

20) “The sorrowful temper lowers the threshold of sen-sibility for sorrow, despondency, and despair, but raisesit for joy, hope and confidence.” (p154).

33) “The universal end of Fear is merely to prevent theoccurrence of some threatening event whether the dangerbe ‘real’ or ‘imaginary.’ “ (p215)

37) “All varieties of anger tend to accomplish theirends by some kind of aggressive behavior.” (p250).

38) “Fear and anger tend always to exclude one an-other, where both are referred to the same objects.”(p254).

69) “Sorrow tends to be diminished by the knowledgethat another sorrows with us.” (p341).

70) “Sorrow tends to be increased by the knowledgethat another rejoices at our suffering.” (p341).

Perhaps one reason such reasonable assertionsnever received much attention was because they uti-lized a host of affective concepts which were axiom-atically accepted as emotional givens, with no repli-cable empirical evidence provided for theirexistence. Now that we are beginning recognize theneural circuits from which such feelings arise (PANK-

SEPP 1998a), we may finally be able to implementnew research programs that try to highlight thetypes of intrinsic affective-cognitive regularities thatare evident from an everyday folk-psychological per-spective. One of the most workable general conceptsis that of projection—the tendency of people to casttheir feelings onto the world as if the world were thecause of their feelings.

Emotional projections into cognitive activities

It is now generally accepted that emotional and cog-nitive processes massively interact (GRAY 1990;PANKSEPP 1988, 1990b; PARROT/SCHULKIN 1993), andincisive empirical work on those topics is increasing(CHRISTIANSON 1992). Rather than detail thosetrends here, let me simply highlight one issue thatmay be empirically very workable—the ability ofemotions to be projected onto objects and subjectsin the world. Although the concept of “projection”was a mainstay of FREUDIAN theory that has beenempirically neglected, its pervasiveness in humanaffairs should be receiving more prominent atten-tion in the empirical analysis of how emotions andcognitions interact within the brain. It still hasenormous psychiatric implications.

Although one could envision that “projection”would be largely a matter of how “valence tagging”between perceptions and cognitive impressionstranspires (vide supra), it may be a more pervasiveand dynamic a brain response than that. It may re-flect direct actions of emotions on brain areas thatmediate cognitive and perceptual processes. Sincecognitive processes are designed to deal with mo-ment by moment events in the external world, whileaffective feelings reflect evolutionarily providedvalue codes, it may be that the projection of feelingsonto environmental events and objects was one ofthe simplest ways for evolution to persistently guidethe perceptual priorities of the cognitive apparatus.

It is easy to imagine that this type of interactionoperates through some type of global neurody-namic/neurochemical process in the brain,whereby basins and peaks of attractors mold thepsychological landscape. It may reflect how emo-tions are “embodied” or broadcast widely in neural


Jaak Panksepp

tissues rather than being informationally encapsu-lated linear programs such as those that operate indigital computers. Various widely acting neuro-chemical “spritzers” (e.g., norepinephrine and se-rotonin) as well as widely dispersed peptide systemcould be the substrates for these widespread effectsin the brain.

If we correctly comprehend how the correspond-ing psychological processes are aroused neurobio-logically, we should be able to develop major newways to modify how people view the events of theirlives and hence open up new avenues of psychother-apeutics. For instance, from the animal data, wecould envision that sexual jealousy is aroused sub-stantially by activation of brain vasopressin systems(WINSLOW et al. 1993). Many comparable psychobi-ological hypotheses concerning human mental dy-namics could be generated from recent neuropep-tide research in animals, (PANKSEPP 1993a, 1998a),which should eventually provide opportunities tomodify specific emotions in fairly discrete ways, andto determine, mechanistically, how affects, andhence value priorities, are “projected” into theworld. Some of the most dramatic forms of such pro-jection will be found in disorders such phobias andpost-traumatic stress disorders (VAN DER KOLK et al.1996), and there are new ideas (e.g., “limbic perme-ability”) how such processes emerge psychobiologi-cally (ADAMEC 1997).

It is possible that many cognitive problems couldbe ameliorated simply by adjusting the underlyingemotional feelings. Recent evidence for this comesfrom the widespread use of SSRIs (Serotonin SpecificReuptake Inhibitors) which dramatically reduces thetendency of people to experience negative emotionstoward other people (KNUTSON et al. 1998). Indeed,marriages that have been on the verge of falling apartbecause of the negative feelings that spouses com-monly project on each other have been saved by theability of these agents spontaneously alleviate nega-tive feelings, with no need for any further cognitiveadjustments (KRAEMER 1993). In other words, affec-tive states of consciousness may have such insistenteffects on cognitive flow that direct interventions onthe affective processes may, quite simply, be amongthe most robust and effective ways to rechannel cog-nitive resources. However, since cognitive attribu-tions can re-evoke emotions once pharmaceuticalshave worn off, the role of other therapeutic interven-tions in establishing long-term ways to solidify newlevels of emotional homeostasis need to be imple-mented. Even strange new technologies such as va-gal pacemakers and modulation of cortical activity

through rTMS (GEORGE/BELMAKER 2000), not to men-tion traditional interventions such as exercise, danceand music, may help achieve such ends.

IV. Emotions and Affective States of ConsciousnessOur scientific understanding of how emotions andcognitions interact will depend substantially on ourability to decode how consciousness is elaboratedby neural tissues. We are finally in an intellectual erawhere the discussion of such issues is again encour-aged, but we remain remote from any consensus onhow such processes are instantiated within brains. Ifavor the view that several types of consciousnessexist—with an essential distinction to be made be-tween affective-feeling and cognitive-propositionalforms of consciousness as well as the simple percep-tual awareness of events in the world (PANKSEPP

1990, 2000a). The former may be integrally linkedto global organic processes constructed partly fromslowly firing neuropeptide networks of subcorticalorigin, while the latter may be more “digital” andbased on rapid-fire, informationally restricted exci-tatory amino acid transmission.

Although the foundations of consciousness are,no doubt, constructed from unconscious neural pro-cesses, I believe that cognitive forms of conscious-ness (thoughts about the world) were evolutionarilypremised on the prior evolution of affective forms ofconsciousness, which inform organisms what itmight be worth thinking about. That form of mentalactivity, as described by Marian DAWKINS (1998,p97), may be essentially “a matter of attending tointernal images or representations of objects andevents… that an animal has some sort of inner rep-resentation of the external situation confronting itor that it has memories or anticipations of futuresituations. Thinking may lead to comparisons be-tween two or more representations and to choicesand decision about what to do next based on somesort of assessment of likely outcomes.” The samemay be said for affective consciousness, except theso-called “representations” may be evolutionarilyprovided action states that arise intrinsically fromemotional systems of the brain. In their role of reg-ulating behavioral output, these states may be muchmore similar across mammalian species than the thespecific thoughts and behaviors animals exhibit.

The emergence of higher forms of consciousnessin brain evolution may have been premised uponthe preexisting action-readiness and affective dy-namics of emotional systems. As I suggested a few



decades ago: “I assume that the most primitive func-tion of consciousness is to facilitate adaptive re-sponse selection from alternative courses of action:It allows organisms to cope with complex environ-mental situations in which several behavioral alter-natives are competing, with comparable urgency, fora common output channel in the brain. Such a crisisof choice (if one can imagine a crisis on an evolution-ary time scale) may have become most urgent to spe-cies that possessed executive brain mechanisms thatcould concurrently promote several adaptive behav-ior patterns to a single type of environmental chal-lenge. As I have discussed more fully elsewhere…emotive command circuits may have such a charac-teristic. This flexibility could promote adaptive re-sponse-molding, perhaps by a ‘reinforcement’mechanisms linked to fluctuating activities in theunderlying executive circuits.” (PANKSEPP 1982,p451).

The number of proposals on what it means inneural terms to have had emotional feelings arerather scarce. Some believe that feelings are noth-ing more than some type of information in compar-atively recently evolved neocortical working mem-ory systems (e.g., LEDOUX 1996), while others havepreferred a JAMES-LANGE type of bodily feedback ap-proach (DAMASIO 1994). The only reasonably well-developed alternative to that view is the possibilitythat emotional command systems can establishvarious distinct types of resonances in the neuro-symbolic representation of a primordial body (the“SELF”), situated largely, at least in early neonataldevelopment, within deep and ancient mesenceph-alic areas such as the PAG and surrounding tectaland tegmental systems (PANKSEPP 1998b). Paren-thetically, DAMASIO (1999) has more recentlymoved toward this point of view, with his idea ofcore-consciousness which is very similar to the con-cept of the SELF (Simple Ego-type Life Form). TheSELF is capitalized to highlight that this is a postu-late concerning some type of primordial organiza-tion of the brain—a coherent neurosymbolic-ho-muncular schema of the organism, a virtual bodyheavily weighted toward the representation of ba-sic motor-orientational and visceral processes.Within consciousness studies, this most centralzone of the midbrain has often been neglected inpreference to the adjacent Extended Reticular Tha-lamic Activating System (ERTAS) which is especiallyimportant in gating somatic-sensory informationto the thalamus (NEWMAN 1997; STERIADE 1996; STE-

RIADE/JONES/MCCORMICK 1997). However, for the“consciousness community,” WATT (1998, 1999a,

1999b) has been aspiring to make the necessary ad-justments.

This view, contrary to cortico-centric views ofconsciousness, situates the emergence of globalemotional integrative abilities rather more mediallyin the neuroaxis than the ERTAS, but still situated ina way that can modulate the arousability of the ER-TAS structures (i.e., an amalgam of cholinergic, cat-echolaminergic, GABAergic and glutamatergic sys-tems). With a massive concentration of the affectiveSELF in mesencephalic levels as well as slightlyhigher reticular tissues such as hypothalamic andother basal forebrain zones as well as among in-tralaminar and other reticular tissues of the thala-mus, we have an image of affective consciousnesswhich is experimentally testable. Further, the possi-bility of such brain functions are reiterated in yethigher interconnected tissues, especially frontal cin-gulate and insular cortical areas, the type of global,organically “embodied” influence that emotionscan have on the brain is finally being more widelyconsidered in the literature (see DAMASIO 1999; PANK-

SEPP 1998b; as well as the recent e-mail seminar or-ganized by WATT, with a target paper by SCHIFF/PLUM

1999 providing a focus for discussion). Obviously, affective consciousness, just like all

other forms of consciousness, do not rely on singlenuclear groups but rather the patterned interactionsof may brain areas that are all refined by experience.Thus, the seat of the “SELF” is presumably reiteratedduring brain/psychic maturation, so that affectiveprocesses (and hence primal values) continue to in-undate the rest of the emerging neural apparatus,especially of frontal cortical zones that elaboratelong-term intentions and plans. This would help ex-plain why modern brain imaging procedures tend tolargely highlight correlates of telencephalic arousalduring emotional states, while the more causal ani-mals studies that tend to manipulate systems di-rectly, are highlighting the importance of subcorti-cal circuits that are rarely visualized with the PET andfMRI imaging procedures. Clearly, those techniquesare generating many false negatives, for neurologicalstudies indicate that the subcortical areas are of de-cisive importance in both the generation of affectand primary-process consciousness (SCHIFF/PLUM

1999). Recent work with new brain-imaging ap-proaches is affirming such conclusions (DAMASIO etal. 2000).

In sum, according to the present view, affectivefeelings arise from various neurodynamics, whichare concentrated but not restricted to specific centro-medial areas of the brainstem. This general view


Jaak Panksepp

could easily have been empirically refined duringthe middle and later parts of the last century. How-ever, the emergence of digital computers, the cogni-tive revolution with its informationally encapsu-lated-modular views of information processing, aswell as the rapid decline of psychodynamic perspec-tives, led several generations of scholars to neglectsuch integrative concepts for understanding the na-ture of consciousness. From the long-term vantage,this neglect may have some hidden benefits: Now itallows investigators, steeped in modern neuro-science methodologies, to construct more preciseneural image of such foundational issues than couldever have been done before. Such a revolution in ourthinking is already fostering new disciplines such asNeuro-Psychoanalysis (see SOLMS/NERSESSIAN 1999).

In any event, the above view of emotional feelingscould help explain why so many emotions are soreadily projected into the world of sensory-percep-tual affairs, and how minimal stimuli in the environ-ment (e.g., the way someone glances at you, or theintonation in one’s voice) can captivate the brain/mind in emotional turmoil. Within the deepest mes-encephalic areas (e.g., in PAG-ERTAS interactions),we can easily envision how basic emotional and mo-tivational processes control the attentional and in-formation-processing capacities of the somatic-ex-teroceptive (i.e., sensory thalamic-neocortical)nervous systems. The neurodynamics of emotionscan easily inundate the neurodynamics of percep-tual systems. Unfortunately, the empirical evalua-tion of such issues remains rudimentary.

V. Affective Consciousness and the Evolution of Free WillOne of the ultimate issues of consciousness studiesis how “free will” could ever emerge from mechanis-tic activities of the brain. To have true voluntarychoice seems incomprehensible within practicallyall materialistic physiological or computational no-tions of how cognitive processes of the brain–mindmight operate. Unless one is willing to entertainthat psychological processes operate at the quan-tum level (e.g., BECK/ECCLES 1992) there is simply noplace for an immaterial mind to intervene in thematerial processes of the brain. Perhaps the presentview of emotions can provide a conceptual handleto how that remarkable a feat may be achievedwithin a complex materialistic framework whichdoes not aspire to deny that basic biological valuesdo exist within the nervous system. It requires usfirst to appreciate that consciousness is not only

caused by but also realized in specific types brain sys-tems that mediate “intentions in action” (to againdeploy SEARLE’s discriminating perspective on thistroublesome issue). There is no immaterial mind. Areasonably satisfactory understanding of the issuescan be had if we appreciate how the higher forms ofcognitive consciousness (e.g., “intention to act”),reflecting some capacity for freedom of choice, arebased fundamentally upon the more ancient formsof affective consciousness where such choice wasminimally possible. Still, affect programs in the ab-sence of any sophisticated cognitive abilities, canpresumably permit simple choices by being able tocoherently reflect values that may be only partiallyrepresented in the environment. In any event, thebasic emotional circuits, without the addition ofcognitive potentials, are mechanistically ratherclosed systems—they are relatively blind to oppor-tunities for adaptive behaviors that may exist incomplex environments. Only additional layers ofbrain evolution opened up opportunities for thetype of flexible response selection that we tradition-ally conceptualize as free will or volitional action(also see, LIBET/FREEMAN/SUTHERLAND 1999).

This view could also help bring some resolutionto other major philosophical problems in conscious-ness studies: The dilemma of how the unified expe-rience of consciousness get “bound” within thebrain could be solved if we conceptualize that thevery foundation of an affective mind, namely thevirtual body or SELF, was first established in evolu-tion upon stable motor coordinates, capable of beingmodulated by basic emotional systems that generatevarious forms of action readiness, upon which addi-tional complex perceptual and cognitive processescould be built (PANKSEPP 1998b).

To reiterate, the type of “solution” to the free willproblem that I and others (e.g., DAMASIO 1999) favoris based firmly on an evolutionary view of conscious-ness which makes a distinction between having ba-sic emotional feelings (a brain function that allmammals share) and having the ability to havethoughts about those feelings (which is much morehighly resolved in humans than most other mam-mals). The probability that consciousness emergedrapidly in brain evolution is, of course, remote. Itprobably went through many stages of emergence(PANKSEPP 1990a), and to understand it, we must firstunderstand the foundational stages.

If affective consciousness emerged fairly early inbrain evolution, and it is fundamentally reflectiveof instinctual emotional action systems interactingwith a primitive neural representation of the SELF



and ancient bodily (i.e., evolutionary) memories,then, with higher brain evolution, those pieces ofinformation could serve as symbolic token withinthe deliberative capacities of more recently evolvedneural substrates of more cognitive (i.e., exterocep-tively tethered) forms of consciousness. Animalsthat only have affective consciousness presumablydo not have the neural complexity to exhibit free(i.e., self-directed) choice. On the other hand, whena receptive neurosymbolic field evolved where af-fective forms of consciousness could be used as to-kens of information in higher levels of deliberation,the doors to “free will” were opened in brain evolu-tion. If the brain substrates for “the SELF” bifur-cated, to be well represented in cognitive networks,as they already had within affective networks, thenit is possible to envision that decisions could bemade several steps removed from the immediacy ofone’s basic urges. Hence, rather than simply having“intentions in action,” to again use SEARLE termi-nology (1983), the capacity to have “intention toact” gradually emerged.

The capacity of the higher self-structures to en-tertain several conflicting emotional and motiva-tional alternatives concurrently is, to my way ofthinking, the essential foundation for those brainprocesses that we presently subsume under the con-cept of “free will.” As others, I would seek suchhigher abilities within neural systems closely affili-ated with frontal cortical working memory systemsas well as more posterior parietal systems that elab-orate multi-modal representations of the world(SPENCE/FRITH 1999).

Although this provides only a glimmer of thecomplexity that needs to be empirically unraveled,I do not find it problematic to believe that “freewill” is fundamentally, the ability of higher brainssystems to deliberate more fully on the affectiveissues confronting an organism than they would becapable of if they did not have the higher symboliccapacities of the cortico-cognitive apparatus. Al-though all of our choices may seem quite limited,especially when the affective urges are intense, thecognitive symbolization of such affective processesunder calmer states of mind, would provide the op-portunity for flexible characterological develop-ment in well-reared children and hence the widen-ing of meaningful life choices they can eventuallymake.

Those who are especially committed to becomingmasters of that cognitive terrain, can even makechoices incompatible with survival. Although mostwould have little desire to entertain such options,

they are potentially there to be entertained by all.Within such a view of complexity, I see no problemfor a highly evolved brain like ours, to “freely” pur-sue options completely of their own making. Ofcourse, we should anticipate that the level of uncon-scious materialistic control within such control sys-tems will always remain more substantial than anycivilized human would wish to admit, and it mightbe deemed wiser, as a matter of personal philosophy,to not voluntarily enslave oneself to those organictethers (e.g., as advocated by UUS 1999 in his exis-tential “Libertarian Imperative” option).

In sum, we have to be willing to see our naturefrom several, often contradictory, perspectives, andit may be worth considering once more what Will-iam JAMES (1961, p305) had to say about the diver-sities of consciousness that can co-exist within ourminds: “[O]ur normal waking consciousness, ratio-nal consciousness as we call it, is but one specialtype of consciousness, whilst about, parted from itby the flimsiest of screens, there lie potential formsof consciousness entirely different. We may gothrough life without suspecting their existence: butapply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they arethere in all their completeness, definite types ofmentality which probably somewhere have theirfield of application and adaptation. No account ofthe universe in its totality can be final which leavesthese other forms of consciousness quite disre-garded.”

VI. Implications for Psychotherapeutics

The implications of such a vision of the emotionalbrain should have profound consequences for howwe eventually envision certain psychiatric disor-ders. The existing diagnostic systems, such as DSMIV and ICD-10, are excessively weighted to lists ofsymptoms, with a rather striking neglect of the un-derlying neural and psychodynamic issues (JENSEN/HOAGWOOD 1997). The present views may encour-age investigators to bring brain emotional aspectsinto prominence once more (for one potentialscheme, see Table 2). If we do this well, we should beable to create more effective and more humane ther-apeutic approaches, where well-informed patientsare full collaborators in the therapeutic enterprise,including the selection of medications based onwhat they would desire for their lives.

Psychological and somatic therapies would alsohave increasingly prominent interactive roles intreatment strategies. In addition to harnessing themedium of language and cognitive insights, clients


Jaak Panksepp

would also be increasingly guided to supplementthe more standard treatments with musical inter-ventions, dance, exercise, meditation and the vari-ous untapped powers of various placebo effects. Psy-chopharmaceuticals and direct brain stimulation(as with rapid Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation—see PASQUAL-LEONE et al. 1998; GEORGE/BELMAKER

2000) might be used more rationally, with continu-ous structured client feedback about the quality oftheir lives. In such multi-modal approaches, psy-chopharmaceuticals might be more commonlyused in lower doses, perhaps less frequently (moreon demand when clients desire certain kinds ofemotional support), and the re-structuring and bal-ancing of emotional energies would be pursued in amuch richer therapeutic structures of understand-ing than they have been for too much of this pastcentury.

Although such re-structuring of mental-healthprograms may sound utopian, we can anticipate thatthere will soon be a new age of psychopharmaceuti-cals, especially as we develop specific modulators ofpeptide based emotional systems (PANKSEPP 1993a),where psychological effects of drugs may be highlydependent on the quality of the social–emotionalenvironments in which people live. We have alreadyencountered some of this in our attempts to perfectnaltrexone in the treatment of autism: The efficacyof that medication may be dependent on the socialsensitivity of care-providers (PANKSEPP et al. 1991).The notion that medications may be uniquely effi-cacious in certain emotional environments is an ideawhose time will come.

I do hope a day will eventually emerge when theanalysis of the human psyche, perhaps again on theproverbial FREUDIAN couch can be implemented in

Basic Emotional System (see Panksepp 1998a)

Emergent Emotions Emotional Disorders

SEEKING (+ & –) InterestFrustrationCraving

Obsessive CompulsiveParanoid SchizophreniaAddictive Personalities

RAGE (– & +) AngerIrritabilityContemptHatred

AggressionPsychopathic tendenciesPersonality Disorders

FEAR (–) Simple anxietyWorryPsychic trauma

Generalized Anxiety DisordersPhobiasPTSD variants

PANIC (–) Separation distressSadnessGuilt/ShameShynessEmbarrassment

Panic AttacksPathological GriefDepressionAgoraphobiaSocial Phobias

PLAY (+) Joy and gleeHappy playfulness

ManiaADHD

LUST (+ & –) Erotic feelingsJealousy

FetishesSexual Addictions

CARE (+) NurturanceLoveAttraction

Dependency DisordersAutistic aloofnessAttachment Disorders

The SELF—a substrate for Core Consciousness (see Panksepp 1998b).

A mechanism for all Emotional Feelings

Multiple Personality Disorders?

Table 2. Postulated relationships between basic emotional systems, common emotional processes, and major psychiatric disorders.The last two columns only provide best estimates of the major relationships. Obviously, multiple emotional influences contributeto each of the emergent emotions (e.g., jealousy is also tinged by separation distress and anger), and all the emotional disordershave multiple determinants. Plus and minus signs after each indicate major types of affective valence that each system canpresumably generate. Capitalization is used to designate the various emotional systems to highlight the fact that these are instan-tiated as distinct neural entities rather than simply psychological concepts. The essential neural components constitute commandinfluences that coordinate the basic behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of each emotional response.



scientifically meaningful ways—perhaps throughsome type of approach such as “psychoethology.”.In part, new variants of psychoanalysis should beguided by our understanding of the basic emotionalprocesses that we share with the other animals. In-deed, for maximal progress, it would be advanta-geous if institutes are developed where convergenthuman and animal studies can be conducted underthe same physical (and intellectual) roof. At presentthat remains a rare scientific model. The blending ofapproaches will require a level of consilience thatwas never achieved during the past century. Itshould be one of our foremost goals for the next.Such a synthesis would require us to respect not onlythe enormous fixed gifts of heredity that we carrywithin us but the remarkable plasticity of the brain–mind as it interacts with different environments.

VII. The Plasticity of Emotional Systems and TemperamentThe plasticity of the nervous system—its ability tobe molded in diverse ways by environmental in-puts—is increasingly being recognized and ac-knowledged. Unfortunately, in certain segments ofthe intellectual community, this is still all too oftendone with a neglect of the equally important propo-sition that the plasticity operates within certain ge-netically dictated limits. The developmental impli-cations of such processes are especially noteworthy(PANKSEPP 2001). Since the available literature in thefield is so vast, let me simply summarize three of myfavorite recent discoveries from animal brain re-search that have implications for understandinghow stress may affect long-term psychological ad-justments.

It is now known that the long-term stress respon-siveness of an organism is strongly related to mater-nal bonding/separation issues (SCHMIDT/SCHULKIN

1999), but the details are rather surprising. For in-stance, although rodents exhibit a very modest pitu-itary-adrenal (P-A) stress response during the earlyneonatal period (3–4 days of life), animals that hadbeen stressed at those early ages exhibit an exagger-ated stress response when they grow older. On theother hand, older neonates (11–12 days of age), whoalready show a vigorous P-A stress response, exhibitcomparatively less stress at an older age (VAN OERS/DE KLOET/LEVINE 1998). Thus, the long-term develop-mental consequences of neonatal stress can be dia-metrically different depending on exactly when thestress occurred (HEIM et al. 1997). It is to be expectedthat such long-term changes in stress-reponsivity

may have effects on how emotions and cognitionsinteract later in life (i.e., early trauma that is not re-membered may have long-lasting effects on adultpersonality), but little evidence is presently availableon such issues.

A second impressive recent study related to thelong term consequences of stress, as induced by amajor social event—a single instance of social de-feat—found remarkably long lasting effect in rats(RUIS et al. 1999). Socially housed male rats weregiven one robust experience with defeat by beingforced to intrude into the territory of another male.The behavioral and physiological consequenceswere followed for three weeks. An informative aspectof this study was that following that horrendous de-feat, half the animal were returned to live with theirnormal social groups while half were forced to liveindividually. The animals that had friendly socialcompanionship following the stressor fared muchbetter. They lost less body weight, were behaviorallyless fearful, and exhibited smaller P-A stress re-sponses to new stressful situations. At the end of thethree week experiment, the socially-housed animalshad larger sex glands and smaller adrenal glands (in-dicating they had experienced less chronic stress).This effect is rather similar to what we might expectfrom SHAND’s 69th law, and it would suggest that sim-ple social comfort is enough to ameliorate the effectsof devastating emotional episodes. Active cognitivesupport may not be needed. In sum, friendly socialcompanionship protected even “lowly” rats from thedeleterious effects of social stress. One can onlyimagine how long such stressors might last in hu-mans that had little social support—years no doubt.

Finally, in the same vein, BRUIJNZEEL et al. (1999)recently evaluated the cerebral consequences of oneprior stress as evaluated by the number of neurons thatrespond to a different stress. The experimental ani-mals in this study were exposed to one experiencewith mild foot shock, while the controls received noshock. Two weeks later, a shock-probe (very differentfrom the previous shock device) was placed into eachanimal’s cage. In investigating this novel object, an-imals usually received one or two shocks, and afterhalf an hour their brains were removed and pro-cessed for cFos immunoreactivity, highlighting howmany cells had been aroused by this stressful experi-ence. The animals that had had the single prior ex-perience with shock, exhibited twice the overallbrain reactivity as animals that had not been previ-ously stressed. Thus, the neural consequences of onestress experience could be clearly detected two weeklater within a remarkably large number of brain ar-


Jaak Panksepp

eas. Using such techniques, we are coming to betterappreciate the widespread consequences of emo-tional arousal within the brain, even throughoutmost of the cortex (BECK/FIBIGER 1995; KOLLACK-WALKER/WATSON/AKIL 1997).

In short, we are finally in a position to empiricallydetermine how emotional experiences can modifythe temperamental tendencies of animals. More ba-sic studies along these lines are bound to appear, andthey will allow us to think clearly about the way sim-ilar emotional processes operate within humanbrains. How emotional habits may emerge in one ofour most important, but least recognized emotionalsystems—the appetitive motivational SEEKING sys-tem—is extensively discussed in IKEMOTO/PANKSEPP

(1999). Similar scenarios can be constructed for allthe other basic emotional systems of the mamma-lian brain.

Conclusions and evolutionary/computational perspectives

Andy CLARK (1997) has provided a compelling argu-ment for viewing cognitive processes as much morethan digital information flow, and has insisted onincluding the analog processes of the body and en-vironment as essential components of mind. Suchperspectives are equally germane for emotions. Weneed thoroughly organic concepts of emotions inorder to come to terms with what the brain reallydoes. The cognitive revolution, modeled upon thetype of information that flows most easily in digitalcomputers is insufficient to really get at the roots ofthose organic dynamics that create affective con-sciousness. Although “affective computing” is be-ginning to flourish (PICARD 1997), there are manyreasons to suspect that the neural foundation ofconsciousness is so fundamentally analog and or-ganic that present computational–functional ap-proaches will fail in giving us a realistic image of thefoundations of mind. However, computational ap-proaches do provide excellent ways to envision howthe “scaffolding” for many higher informational-knowledge processes are created in higher regions ofthe brain.

At this point in the development (and failure) ofcognitive science, it is becoming ever more evidentthat we need alternatives to traditional digital algo-rithms of consciousness. As Walter FREEMAN (1995,1999) has advised us, we may need to fathom the“shape” of mind through images of multiple chaoticattractors derived from real-life analyses of spatiallyresolved neurodynamics. But still, such computa-

tions may only provide surface images of brain func-tions that constitute psychological processes in ac-tion. Then again, maybe that is precisely what mindis—a global, spatio-temporally resolved neurody-namic envelope arising from cascades of local per-turbations within multitudes of neuronal assem-blies. Perhaps the external form is a finerepresentation of the inner content. In any event,such dynamic metaphors provide images we desper-ately need to envision the true complexity of brain–mind. However, to fathom the ancient emotionaland motivational systems upon which our highermental abilities are build, we may need to under-stand the synaptic tides that course through the fab-ric of our lower brain through the auspices of manyinteracting neurochemical systems. Understandingthe computational chatterings of digital on–offswitches in computer simulations will never providethe powerful knowledge afforded by a study of theunderlying organic processes.

In any event, to make substantive progress onsuch issues we need to have more pluralistic pointsof view. In addition to progressing further and fur-ther upward in computational–representationalspace, we also need to develop downward viewswhereby mind is rooted in, and perhaps fundamen-tally situated within embodied brain processes. Eventhough we may be able to eventually monitor thefluctuating shapes of primordial aspects of mind innon-linear dynamics (LEWIS/GRANIC 2000), to reallyunderstand what is going on, I suspect we shall alsohave to conceptualize psychological processes in or-ganic terms: Not only does the brain resonate withthe abilities of the physical body and the dynamicsof the world, as outlined by CLARK (1997), the mindis instantiated in neural nets which do not simplytransmit information, but which create dynamicfields of action that proved useful in the evolution-ary history of each species. I suspect that such fieldsof action are the key dimensions of mind which arecurrently missing in modern mind science, andwhich can be most readily implanted into our waysof thinking through a variety of primary-processemotional concepts which recognize that affectivelytinged action readiness is a fundamental substrate ofmind. Basic psychological processes reflect the waysin which the evolutionarily provided brain tools ofan organism to reach out into the environment. Iespecially like William POWERS’s (1973, 1998) Percep-tual Control Theory of Action, which is quite compat-ible with such views.

The fundamental cleavage lines of the primordialmind will have to be fathomed through some type



of evolutionary psychology that we presently do nothave. The “massive modularity” of the TOOBY/COSMIDES (2000) tradition has yet to handle thefoundational issues well. It has not yet provided anintellectual structure that offers clear predictionsabout the brain. All too commonly, modern evolu-tionary psychology is expending its intellectual re-sources on potential fantasies (see SAMUELS 1998)—evolutionary stories which may interface nicely withthe digital-cognitive revolution, but which do notjibe well with what we already know about the an-cient regions of the brain where emotional urges aretruly elaborated.

Too much of current evolutionary psychology isconvincing too many young scholars who have notbeen steeped in substantive neuroscience and be-havior genetics traditions a bill of goods that maylead to another “century of misunderstanding” com-parable to that foisted upon us by the behavioristand cognitive revolutions—branches of which rap-idly transformed into “dustbowl” varieties wherefacts were collected with inadequate guiding con-cepts (which Kant warned us against—see epigraph).No comprehensive brain–mind science has yetemerged that has given us the type of realistic gen-eral image of mind that psychoanalytic thoughtsought to advance during the 20th century. Ofcourse, the psychoanalytic tradition, followingFREUD’s (1981a) abandonment of his neuro-theoret-ical Project for a Scientific Psychology also did not havethe heart to immerse itself in substantive brain mat-ters, a bias that is only gradually being coaxed tochange (see the new journal Neuro-Psycholanalysis—SOLMS/NERSESSIAN 1999). In any event, recent effortslike DAMASIO’s (1999) are welcome harbingers of anew age of reason.

My personal advocacy of the subcortical view ispremised on the conviction that at that level of neu-ral evolution, we will find the genetically ingrained“powers” that have guided all subsequent layers ofbrain–mind emergence. Accordingly, I remain suspi-cious of an evolutionary psychology that would as-pire to find special-purpose “modules” in higher re-gions of the human brain (e.g., TOOBY/COSMIDES

2000) when the absolutely essential lower moduleswe share with the other animals are being ignored.There are many reasons to believe that higher heter-omodal regions of the human cortex are more akin,at least at birth, to general-purpose computationaldevices rather than special-purpose cognitive tools.Perhaps we could here extend Andy CLARK’s (1997)remarkable image of language evolution as some-thing that was adapted to existing brain function,

rather than the brain being adapted to language. Letus take that line of reasoning a step further back:Perhaps the neocortex, a general purpose informa-tion processor resembling a massive ensemble of dig-ital computers is adapted to the exigencies of coresubcortical functions—the basic genetically-in-grained survival issues—which took so much longerto construct during brain evolution than did the cor-tex. We should remember that the human neocortexexpanded remarkably rapidly during the past 3 mil-lion years, resembling the swift pace at which thespeed and memory size of our man-made digitalcomputers has increased during the past half cen-tury. A general purpose knowledge machine, withevolutionarily refined perceptual and motor abili-ties, is much more useful for guiding adaptive behav-iors than special purpose cognitive modules. In thiscontext, we should remember that most of the basicemotional and motivational survivial modules hadbeen “perfected” by evolution long before proto-hu-mans strode the face of this earth.

The human neocortex may be better conceptual-ized not as the fundamental source of consciousnessbut as a remarkable general-purpose skill-box that isadapted to the types of subcortical functions thathad existed for a much longer time. Obviously, it isalso designed to perceive the world in specific ways,but I doubt if it could perceive anything if separatedfrom the subcortical functions to which it is largelysubservient. In the final accounting, it may only bea tool of a more primary form of consciousness, andquite incapable of sustaining any type of conscious-ness on its own. And even though it is a most mag-nificent tool (with vast perceptual and cognitiveabilities), it remains, I suspect, a handmaiden formore primary forms of consciousness (DAMASIO

1999; PANKSEPP 1998a, b). Core-consciousness—aglobal brain dynamic built upon biological survivalvalues—was constructed out of organic materials inbrain evolution, and it may still be tethered to thoseanalog processes in some very fundamental ways.

I know of no evidence that is inconsistent withsuch a view, and if it were more generally considered,we might be encouraged to start looking for the biganswers to our big questions subcortically where thecognitive light is dim but the affective light is bright.Obviously the subcortex is incredibly SELF-centricand “myopic” and the remarkable brightening andfocussing of perceptual images achieved by the re-cently emerged cortical abilities is just short of mi-raculous. However, the real miracle of mind—theseat of the SELF—resides within medially situatedsubcortical areas as neurological evidence has long


Jaak Panksepp

affirmed (SCHIFF/PLUM 1999). “Only” the glitteringraiments of the mind—the autobiographical self andits many attendants—are stitched together by cor-tico-cognitive computations (DAMASIO 1999).

In sum, there are presently compelling reason tobelieve that the foundation of mind is realized inorganic processes that can only be superficially mod-eled (i.e., like a toy-airplane) using computationalapproaches. Such pursuits may run into a massivewall—the true complexity of life—which may neverbe simulated except in the most pedestrian of ways.And our most effective simulations may requiresome type of attempt to mimic the evolutionary andepigenetic processes that help create the real devel-opmental landscapes within living organisms. Mo-lecular biology is now confronting such a walls in itsdesire to genetically engineer away disease. The in-teractive complexity of genetic controls remainsmind-boggling and will continue to baffle us longafter the human genome has been sequenced.

However, our technological endeavors arebound to yield many remarkable products, andcomputationalists are bound to eventually claimsuccess on the consciousness issue. Accordingly, wenow need another Turing Test to provide a compel-ling screen to evaluate the presence of “real” emo-tional and motivational processes—mental life inits various affective forms. May I suggest a few?Might not a combination of the following suffice:i) responses on a visually based RORSCHACH-type testdesigned to simulate our own free-associative ten-dencies, ii) an auditory-aesthetic prosody/musicalappreciation test, and iii) asomatosensory and sexualtest to evaluate the pleasureof touch and the friction ofskin between consenting be-ings. We might add gustatorytests to distinguish wonder-ful culinary delights frommore mundane edibles andpotables, and tests to evaluatethe presence of true hungers,

passions, desires as well as cognitive responses tosuch basic conditions of the flesh.

In any event, it is a pity that many of these issuesin humans remain to be empirically characterized.To achieve that, we will need a generation of mindscientists willing to pursue such mysteries of the hu-man mind—evaluating the parametric psychologi-cal and brain responses of humans to a large rangeof affective stimuli, through some type of integrativepsychobiology that does not yet exist. Because of thecurrent stranglehold of fine-grained neuroscienceand computational cognitivism on available re-sources, such integrative approaches to the brain–mind have barely begun. In short, it will be as impor-tant to understand why colo-rectal distentionarouses so much affective turmoil in our brain–minds (TRAUB et al. 1996) as why we aspire to havelofty thoughts.

We will never have a satisfactory understandingof the human mind until we have a reasonable graspof the “emotional brain” that all mammals share. Inother words, there may be something to the embod-ied nature of living existence at the subcortical levelthat will require young scholars, devoted to the pur-suit of artificial mentality, to get immersed in brainresearch. Perhaps we should encourage all studentsinterested in mind to return once more, with re-freshed evolutionary perspectives, to the animalbrain research laboratory as part of their obligatoryapprenticeship. Brain emotion theory can guide in-sightful new observations concerning animal be-havior and predictions concerning the feelings that

exist in human minds. With-out such perspectives, thepresent tsunami of affect-free,cognitive research, that re-veals little about our deeplyhuman/animalian condition,can only increase, and we willcontinue to have an inade-quate appreciation of ourdeeply embedded place ofmind in the living order.

Note

1 Previously published in 2000 as “The neuro-evolutionarycusp between emotions and cognitions: implications forunderstanding consciousness and the emergence of a uni-fied mind science”, Consiousness and Emotion 1:15–54.Copyright John Benjamins Publishing Company. Reprint-ed with their permission. Since we did not have the oppor-

tunity to work from the final copy-edited manuscriptpublished in Emotions & Consciousness, the present ver-sion is based on the penultimate version of the author'smanuscript. Except for precise wording and a few para-graphs that were not included in the previously publishedpaper, this is essentially the same paper.

Jaak Panksepp, Memorial Foundation forLost Children , J.P. Scott Center for Neuro-science, Mind & Behavior, Department ofPsychology, Bowling Green State University,Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA.Email: [email protected]

Author’s address



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