the natural immortality of the soul

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218

The f o u l a

f m p l e fubftancey

S E C T .

I I I .

The n a t u r a l immor ta l i ty o f the f o u l

f hewn

f r o m its being a

Jimple

or

uncompoundedfubflance;

what this

immortality imports.

A F T E R

w h a t has been f a i d ,

it

m i g h t

not

perhaps

be

im p r o p e r

to

e x a m in e

the

ar

g u m e n t s t h a t are g e n e r a l l y b r o u g h t to mew

t he ma te r i a l i t y

of the

f o u l ,

or the objections

agaihft its b e in g i m m a t e r i a l , u p o n w h i c h

o u r p re jud ices m a k e

us lay

great ftfefs;

for

t h o u g h w h e n

a

t h i n g

is

once p roved t rue ,

we need not m u c h conce rn ourfe lves w i t h

w h a t

is

f a id

againft i t, fince

t he re canno t

be

c o n t r a r y t r u t h s ; yet (as h a th been la te ly

wel l obferved) f ince objections f o u n d e d u p o n

pre jud ices ga in ea fy admi t tance,

and few

words ferve to m a k e t h e m

u n d e r s t o o d ,

i t

w i l l

not be amifs to

take no t ice

of t h e f e :

bu t th i s may be done w i t h m o re eafe and

clearnefs

a

l i t t l e f a rt he r o n . W h e re fo re t ha t

w e

may the

be t ter

underftand the

na tu re

of

th e h u m a n f o u l , let us n e x t confider the con-

4 fequences



t h e r e f o r e n a t u r a l l y i m m o r t a l .

219

fequences of

its

being a

fimple

or uncompound-

ed fu b j la n c e ; for i f i t we re ma de u p o f par ts ,

as m a t te r is , i t m i g h t be contend ed tha t i t

cou ld na tu ra l l y be re fo l ved in to

thefe

parts

a g a i n ,

b y the

action

o f f o m e th ing o r o the r

u p o n i t : whereas i f i t h a th no par ts, o r is b u t

one

fingle uncompounded

t h i n g , w e

{hall

be

fatisfied i n our o w n w a y , th a t i t is l iab le b u t

to one cha ng e, o r ca fua l ty , v i z . to be

a n n i

h i l a t e d ,

or to be

destroyed

b y a B e in g to

whofe p o w er th a t e ffec t is co m pe tent . I n o r

d er to th is , a n d to he lp us to get the bet ter

o f fome o f ou r p re jud ices , w h er eb y w e are

ftill a p p ly in g the properties o f m at te r to f p i -

r i t , b y w h i c h , i n p r o p r i e ty w e

mould

a lways

m e a n i m m a t e r i a l fubftance

( a ) ;

I fhall p r e -

mife

t he fo l l ow ing ob fe rva t ions .

I I . N o

(a) M r . Locke, in his controverfy with the Bifhop o f

Wortefter mentioned above, endeavours to juftify his

ufing

the word fp ir i t for a thinking fubftance, without

excluding materiality out of i t , by the authority of V ir

gil and Cicero: where he

fays

" Whether they

thought righ t in this [that the foul might be only a

fubtil matter, which might come under the name of

aura, or ignis or at her,] I do not fay : that is not the

e'

queftion;

but whether they

fpoke

properly, when they

{<• called an adive thinking fubflance, out of which they

excluded



2 2 0 T h e f o u l a J tmp le fub f tance>

I I .

N o

fubjlance

or being can have a

n a t u

r a l tendency to a n n i h i l a t i o n , or to become no

t h i n g .

T h a t a b e i n g w h i c h o nc e

exifts

f h o u l d

ceafe to e x i f t , is a re al ef fect , a n d m u f l b e

prod uce d b y a rea l

c a u f e :

b u t th is caufe co uld

not

be p lan ted i n the n a tu re o f an y

fubfiance

o r

B e i n g ,

to become a tende ncy o f i ts n a

t u r e ;

fox i t could not be a f r e e

caufe; other-

w i f e i t muf t be a B e in g i t fe l f , th e fubject o f

the a t t r i b u te f reed om , an d the re fo re n o t t he

pro pe r t y o f ano ther Be ing ' , no r a

necejfary

caufe, fo r fu c h a caufe is on ly th e e f fec t o f

fbmediing

i m p o f i n g t h a t

nece f f i t y ,

and fo no

caufe at a l l . Necefary caufes and pqjjive p o w -

ei excluded only grofs and palpable matter,

fpir i tus ,

fp i -

ritj

fefc." Bu t w ith

fubmifiion,

I think no

man

ever

before defended

the

propriety of an

expreflion, exclufivc

of the truth of it , in a philofophical controverfy. I f the

acceptation o f a word is fuch as determines the

queftion,

without farther argument, as in this cafe, to

juftify

the

propriety of it

then,

is to make the common ufe of

lan

guage decide in points of philofophy. I f Cicero or V ir

gil had wrong ideas as to the immateriality of the foul,

though they

exprefled

thefe wrong ideas right, that doth

not mend the matter. The difpute between the Bifhop

and M r . Locke, was, whether matter could th in k, and

not the

claffical

acceptation of the word

fpiritus.

ers



t h e r e fo r e n a t u r a l l y

i m m o r t a l .

221

e n

deny t he t h i ng t hey

feem

to expre fs . T h i s

efFecl therefore m u f l be the opera t ion and e f

fic iency o f an oth er B e in g ab ex t ra . O ne o f

o u r pre jud ices here is , tha t w e im a gi ne Beings

may have a na tura l tendency to change the i r

n a tu re ; bu t t hen t he i r na tu re w o u ld be i n c o n -

fiftent, and deftructive o f

i t f e l f f ^

an d the fam e

arg um en t m a y be app l ied here to the na tu ra l

ftate o f b e in g , i n ge ne ral , as was a pp l ied at

N ° 1 4 . o f th e firft fe&ion to the ftate of reft

o r m o t i o n o f m a t te r i n particular; f ince that

is b u t one pa rt icu lar caufe o f the n a tu ra l ftate

o f be ing . F o r a tend en cy to perfevere i n the

fam e f ta te o f na ture, an d a tend enc y to chan ge

i t ,

are

cont rad ic to r ies ,

a n d

impoffible

to be

p lan ted in the fame fubjedr. a t o n c e : o r ( no t

to urge the contradiction) i f t he laft p reva i led ,

the remain ing in the fame f ta te , for any g iven

t i m e , w o u ld be im po f f i b l e . W e fo rge t t he

t ru e caufe o f a l l thefe tendenc ies , the w i l l o f

Go d ,

w h i c h i t is ab fu rd t o fuppoie con t ra ry

(b)

The natures of things

are

only the ideas in the d i

vine

intellect, confiftent

to be made

fubfift

together in

the fame fubjedt, extra

intelleftum;

but the idea of a

ten

dency

deftrudive

of that nature (». e. of

thofe

other ideas)

muft have been inconfiftent

with

them;

which points out

(10 us the origin of the contradiftion,



2 2 2 T h e f o u l a J i m p l e f u b f t a n c e ,

t o i tfe l f . T h e tend en cy i n m a t ter to per feverc

i n the fam e ftate o f re f t o r m o t i o n is n o th in g

b u t the w i l l o f t he Cre a to r , w h o p re fe rves a l l

t h i n gs i n t he i r ex i ft ence , an d m anne r o f e x -

iftence ( c j :

no r can w e have recour fe to a n

o ther cau fe fo r t he p re fe rva t ion o f immate r ia l

fubftance i n its ex i f tence and m a n n e r o f e x -

i f t e n c e ;

t a k in g m an ne r o f ex i ft ence i n a la rger

f en fe , (becaufe b ei ng aftive i t can change

the f tate of i ts cogi tat ion

(cf).

T he re f o re , as

I

f a i d ,

thefe tendenc ies are or ig ina l ly to be

a fc r ibed to the w i l l o f G o d , an d i t is ab fu rd to

(c) Definant jam Phikfophi cont'inuati motus exquirere

caujam7

alia

qulppe

agnofcenda eft nulla

prater prlmam

Warn,

qua run modo

motum,

fed res omnes in ejfe fuo con-

fervat

j Deum fc i l .

Opt. Max.

nee

alia

ratione perfeverat

motus,

quam qua continuatur corporis alicujus Jigura, co

lor, aut alia quavis iftiufmodi

affeHionum,

qua

femper

eadem permanerent, nife

vis aliqua externa

eas

turbaverit.

Introducl. ad Ver. Phyfic. Left . 11.

(d ) The firft exiftence of matter, and every change

in the manner of its exiftence, requires an immaterial

Caufe. And though every change of the manner of the

exiftence of fp ir it, doth not immediately proceed from

the power of G od, being

a£tive

itfelf in changing the

ftate of its cogitation; yet the having received this acti

vity fhews it no lefs dependent on the w i l l of the Crea

tor, than if it were preferved in one continued ftate of

inactivity.

%

^-iuppofe




223

f u p p o f e t h e m c o n t r a r y . W h a t w e f u pp o f e a

tendency of nature to a change in mater ia l

t h i n g s , is b u t t h e g r a d u a l effeSi o f an e x ter io r

caufe,

o r

immaterial

p o w e r , w o r k i n g a c h an g e

i n th e m , as w h e n i ro n expo fed to the a i r is

g r a d u a l l y confumed t o r u f t , w h i c h is

m i s

ta k e n fo r a na tura l tend ency , becaufe o f the

flownefs a n d imp erce pt ib lenefs o f the op era

t i o n (e). A n o th e r o f ou r p re jud ices is , th a t

w e argue f r o m a change o f acc idents o f th e

fame fub f tan ce , to a change o f the fub f tance

i t fe l f , ( t h o u g h a change o f f ub ftance is i m

pro pe r ly ca lled a ch a n g e ) : an d becaufe fome

ex ter io r t h i n g is ftill e f fe ct ing thefe changes o f

acc iden t s, i n f u c h m a te r i a l

objects

as we are

m o f t f a m i l i a r w i t h , w e im a g i n e t h a t i m m a

te r ia l fub f tanc e o r be ing m a y have a na tu ra l

t endency t o decay o r become n o th ing . B u t

m e t h i n k s w e

mould

qu i t t h i s p re jud ice , when

w e fee, t h a t even th is change o f acc idents o f

(e)

Philcfophers obferve

this is

efFe&ed

by a fermen

tation,

which,

by the

laft

fe&ion,

is no natural power

of matter. " For air (fays Sir If. Newton, Opt. p. 355-)

abounds with acid vapours fit to promote fermentations,

as

appears by rafting of iron and copper in i t , the

k ind

ling of fire by blowing, and the beating of the heart by

jjieans of

xefpiration,

na tu ra l



2 2 4 <^>e f o u l a f i m p l e f u b f t a n c e .

n a tu ra l bod ies is n o t e ffed ted w i t h o u t the c o n

c urre nc e o f A l m i g h t y P o w e r .

I I I . N o be ing, though i t ha th po w er , can

have

fuch

po w er as to an n ih i l a t e i t f e l f : f o r

th e n i t o u g h t to have p o w e r to e ffed t th a t i t

mould

have n o p o w e r , w h i c h is c o n t r a d i c t o r y ;

fince

w e a re fo rce d to fuppo fe the th in g

f t i l l

r e m a i n i n g ,

w h i c h w e f u p po f e t a k e n a w a y .

I f a cau fe p ro d uce th an

ef fedt ,

i t mu f f have

po w er t o f i n i f h t ha t e f fed t ; o t h e rw i fe i t cou ld

not be the caufe o f

i t :

an d i n th is cafe i f i t

had power to f in i fh the ef fedt , the ef fedt could

n o t be fin ished, th a t p o w e r ftill re m a in in g .

I t is therefore the fame

contradiction

to f u p

po fe tha t a be ing fh o u ld an n ih i la te i t fe l f , as

tha t i t f h ou ld create i t f e l f ; na m e ly , t h a t i t

Jhou ld acl when i t is not. Y e t w e con t rad t a

p re jud i ce , w h i c h makes us fancy t ha t a Be ing

co u ld p u t an en d to i t fe l f , as w h e n a m a r l

gives h im fe l f a dead l y w o u n d . B u t i t is b e g

g i n g t h e q u e f t io n t o f a y t h a t a m a n a n n i h i l

a tes h im fe l f i n fuch a c a f e ; a n d i t is f r o m

fuch in f tances on ly tha t we con t rad t t h i s p re

j u d i c e .

T h e f trength o f t he m an 's a r m d o th

tha t , w h i c h w i t h t he fub fequen t e f fi ciency o f

o ther

caufes, brings

o n t h e e n d o f l i f e ; w h i c h

i t



therefore

n a t u r a l l y i m m o r t a l . 2 2 5

i t is n o t a l low e d is th e en d o f be ing , m o re

th a n the cha ng e o f figure o r polition i n m a t

te r is t he a n n ih i l a t i o n o f m at te r . I n th e

pre fe n t cafe , b y fu p p o f i t i o n , no cau fe co -o pe

rates, befides t he p o w e r o f t he being i t f e l f ;

a n d the re is n o tendency to an n ih i l a t i o n i n

t h e na tu re o f any be ing w i t h o u t t he e f f ic iency

o f fome o th er caufe , b y w h a t wa s fa id juft

n o w , N ° 2 . bu t ch ie f l y , b y w h a t is f a i d

t h e r e , i t is G o d w h o pre ferves a l l th in gs i i i

being a n d ex i f ten ce : the ref ore n o being can.

a n n ih i la te e i ther i tfe l f , o r any o th er be ing ,

w i t h o u t i t Were fuppo fed able t o re f i l l i n f i n i t y

o f po w er , w h i c h con f t an t l y p re fe rves t h e m .

I V . I t w i l l be f a i d , fince finite Beings

have no t endency t o a n n ih i l a t i o n , the re w i l l

be need o f no power to pre ferve them in the i r

n a tu ra l ftate. B u t t o th is i t is an fw ere d firft,

that any being ( th is f tone for in f tance) as

exi f l ing t h is m i n u t e , h a t h n o neceffary

c o n

ne x io n w i t h i t f e l f , as e x i f l i n g t he nex t . T h i s

i s o f t he na tu re o f a l l con t ingen t

be ings;

eve ry m in u te o f t he i r

exiftence

i s i ndepen

d e n t o f a l l the re f t , an d there fore

mufi

depend

upon fomething elje : fo r th e i r ex i ftence b y

th e te r m s, is n o t ab fo lu te ly independ ent o f

V o l .

I . Q _ a l l



2 2 6 'The f o u l a J imp le fub f l ancey

a l l

t h i n g s ;

o t he rw i fe i t w o u ld no t be con t i n

gen t , b u t nece f fa ry . I f t he existence o f a

be ing th i s m in u te in fe r re d i ts ex i f tence the

n e x t , i t w o u l d be a

phyfical contradiction

t h a t any t h i n g t h a t h ad eve r once ex i f t e d ,

fhould

ever ceafe to

e x i f t ;

a n d contingent

exiftence w o u l d be the caufe o f

necejfary

ex

i f t ence ; wh ich i s

a b f u r d .

A n d f e c o n d l y , th is

b r ings us , b y ano ther k i n d o f re a fo n in g , t o

w h a t w a s

afierted

N ° 2 . an d w h i c h is t h e

ch ie f an fwe r t o t h i s ob jec t i on , t ha t t he non -

ten d en cy o f beings to cha ng e th e i r ftate, or

th e i r tend ency to per fevere i n the i r be ing a n d

ex i f t ence , ha th n o o the r cau fe b u t t h e w i l l

o f G o d ; an d tha t t ende ncy is b u t t h i s

c o n

t i n u e d a ct o f h is w i l l e x e r t e d , a n d t a k i n g

e ffect. I t w o u ld be ab fu rd the n to fa y , be -

caufe the tend en cy o f beings to re m a in i n

th e i r fta te o f ex i f tenc e, fuppofes the c o n f t a n t

c o n c u rr e n ce o f t h e w i l l a n d p o w e r o f G o d ;

t he re fo re fu ch a tend ency fuperfedes th e w i l l

a n d p o w e r o f G o d i n t h e i r a c tu a l p r e f e rv a -

t i o n : a n d ye t the ob jec t ion comes j u f t t o

t h i s .

W e f a w i n th e

laft

f e c t i o n , w h e n

f p e a k i n g o f t h e cohefion o f m a t t e r , t h a t i t

i s a c o n t i n u a l p o w e r i m p r e f l e d , w h i c h c o n

stitutes

t h e f o l i d i t y o f i t . A n d g e n e r a l ly ,

fince




227

fince to w i l l a n d to do, is the fam e th in g to

in f i n i t e p o w e r , the p re fe rva t ion o f a l l t h ings ,

Whether m a te r ia l o r im m a te r i a l , is t he f ame ,

or equa l to

a

cont inued creat ion. A c o n t i n u e d

a d :

o f t he w i l l is a co n t i nu ed

a c t :

a f u f -

penfion o f a n a£l o f t he w i l l is i t f e l f a p o f i -

t i ve

a d ,

(as w i l l appear i n the ne x t

f ed l i on ) .

A n d the re fo re the p re fe rva tion o f

being,

a n d

its a n n ih i l a t i o n , requ i re as

pofitive

an a£t ,

as i ts c reat ion.

V . T h e f e t h i n g s b ein g p r e m i f e d , i t a p

pears th a t a l l fub f tan ce eq ua l ly , as w e l l m a

te r ia l as im m a te r i a l , ca nn o t ceafe to e x i f t b u t

b y a n

effect

o f i n f i n i t e P o w e r . A n d t h e

o n ly re m a in in g change i t can be l iab le to

f r o m the agency o f any fecond

caufe,

is in

i ts acc id ents, o r f u c h propert ies as are n o t

necef fa ry t o i t , as fu ch a fu b f t a n c e ; b u t

w h i c h be ing a l te red , i t rema ins ft i l l a f u b

ftance w i t h t he fame fun d am en ta l and fpe c i -

fic prop ert ies i t ha d

b e f o r e ;

t h a t is , f till th e

fame fub f t ance .

V I .

A l l th e

changes

o f t h i s k i n d , w h i c h

h a p p e n to m at te r , are e f fec ted i n i t , becaufe

i t is a fub f tance c om po un d ed o f pa r t s , a n d

Q j j

aga in



228 The

f o u l a fimph f u b j l a n c e ,

aga in

divisible

in to par ts , each o f w h i c h is a

f o l i d ,

e x t e n d e d ,

d i v i f i b l e ,

f i g u r e d f u b f t a n c e ;

o r h a th the

ejjentlal

p roper ties o f the w h o le ,

o f w h i c h i t is a p ar t , as m u c h as the w h o le

h a t h . F o r i n a n y indivifible o f m a t te r , f u p -

pofing

f u ch were

po f f i b l e ,

we can conceive

n o change po f f ib le : becau fe i t w o u ld i m p l y

a

c o n t r a d i c t i o n .

I t co u ld no t be chang ed in

ibl idi ty

o r

extenfion ;

t ha t w o u ld be t o change

i t i n q ua n t i t y , w h i c h cou ld on l y be e ffected

by ad d ing parts to i t , w h i c h is no change i n

itfelf; o r b y t a k i n g p arts f r o m i t , w h i c h b y

fuppofition

i t h a th no t . I t co u ld n o t be

c h a n g e d i n f ig u r e o r d i m e n f i o n s , w i t h o u t a

change o f t he po f i t i on o f pa r ts , w h i c h i t h a th

n o t . I f i t f h ou ld be

f a i d ,

t h a t i t m i g h t b e

c ha ng ed f r o m re f t to m o t i o n , o r f r o m m o

t i o n to re f t , t h i s is no change o f t h is i n d i v i

f i b l e

confidered

a lone, b u t a chang e o f i t

confidered w i t h r e la t i o n t o fomething

e l f e ;

t o w i t , o the r pa r t s , t he d i f tan ce be twe en

w h i c h an d i t i s chang ed . E ve n i n abfo lu te

mot ion noth ing is effected b u t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n

of the inac t iv i t y , o r re f i f tance, to one par t

m o r e t h a n a n o th e r , w h i c h is n o

intr inf ic

m u

ta t i on o f f ub ftance o r f ub f t an t i a l p ro pe r

ties ( f ) .




229

tIes /)•I n

fliort, this

indivil ible

c o u l d u n

dergo no change in

itfelf,

n o n o t f r o m a n y

p o w e r ,

( f)

In abfolute or real motion, the force, moment or

refiftance, is only determined to one

fide,

I think, or

receives

a

particular d irection, but

is

not

changed

in quan

t i ty , unlefs we take it relatively, or w ith

refpect

to a

terminus

a

quo. By N ° 12. of the firft

fe&ion,

if we

fix on fuch a terminus, the refiftance of matter is end-

lefly

increafible. In receding from the terminus of re ft,

i t may always receive another degree of celerity, and

therefore w i l l make another degree of refiftance. Th is

is becaufe of the degree of refiftance it made to receive

that celerity. I t could not make two degrees of refif

tance to be ftopt,

utyfefs

it had made two degrees of re

fiftance to be put up into that motion.

So,

that the in -

creafe of moment fuppofes a previous repetition of equal

refiftances

to equal changes. And therefore this refiftance

taken abfolutely, is always the fame, as much as the in

activity

is, as in N° 13. of that fection. However, in

cafe one

mould

be tenacious of the contrary, not much

depends

on this. But having mentioned moment

as

art

affection

of real motion in matter, let me be permitted

to explain, and

reftrain a

l itt le, what M r.

Locke hath ad

vanced concerning the motion of all finite fpirits. la

Book 2. chap. 23.

feet. 17

and

18.

having enumerated

the primary ideas peculiar to body and

fp i r i t ,

as contra-

diftinguifhed to each other, he makes mobility common

to them

both;

which

he

illuftrates

and

defends,

fed:. 19,

20

and

2 i .

He hath before afcribed

motivity,

or

a

power

of putting body into motion by thought, to fp irit, as one

Qf

the ideas peculiar to

it}

fo that by mobility he

feems

0=3 »



2 3 0

'The

f o u l a fimple f u b f t a n c e ,

po w e r , b u t a change o f f ub f t anc e , o r

a n n i

h i l a t i o n ,

w h i c h is n o t a change p ro pe r l y

f p e a k i n g .

to mean a capacity in

fpirit

of being

moved,

by

fome-

thing ab extra, and not the power of moving, which is

included in

motivity •

efpecially fince he makes mobility

common to both matter and fpirit. W h ic h , w ith

fub-

miflion, I th ink is very wrong, and tends to confound

the natures of the two fubftances he would diftinguifh.

W e fay a thing is moveable, which can be moved by a

orce applied ab extra: thus a table or a chair is move

able. And

confequently

we

call

a thing immoveable

wh ich

310

force applied, or that we can apply, is

able

to

move:

thus a houfe or a mountain is faid to be immoveable.

N ow a fubftance that no way impedes motion, but ef

fects i t , can w ith no propriety, I th in k, have the capa

city of mobility afcribed to i t , as i t is afcribed to body,

a fubftance which refills motion, and no way effects i t ,

and therefore wants an external mover. T o make

fp i

rit material, and fo at once both to caufe and hinder mo

t ion, is a plain

contradiction.

Spirit, i t is true, flops

motion ; but it is by the fame liv ing efficacy, by which

It

begins it

•

not by a deadnefs and

refi/iance

in it

felf

to

le

moved.

Befides, a fpirit when it moves, hath no mo

ment,

as body

hath,

proceeding from its vis inertia. I t

cannot be faid to refifl: being brought from motion to reft

or from reft to motion ; fince i t effects thefe changes. I f

I t moved circularly, i t could have no centrifugal force.

W hen a man walks, his fpirit moves his body; but is

not moved by it . I f both were moved, there would be

no mover. N ay, even in the journey betw ixt Londm

3nd

Oxford, where the man's fp iri t is not the mover,

but the horfes move the coach, his body and all, his fpiri t

doth




231

Speak ing :

I f the m at te r o f o u r bodies w ere

fuch an i nd i v i f i b l e , w e cou ld be affedted w i t h

none o f t he

viciffitudes

we a re now

affe&ed

w i t h

j

bu t ou r m a te r ia l pa r t w o u ld be as i n -

dhTo luble as n o w ou r t h i n k in g p a r t i s, w h i c h

is indeed

affedted

w i t h the changes o f th e

doth not impede the motion, or

make the

draught

heavierj

or is not properly a moved. So that, in effe£r, mobility

doth not belong in common both to body and fpirit. Nor

farther, can motion belong to

both,

but in very different

fenfes. M r . Locke fays, fe£t. 19 ' ' For having no other

ideaof

motion,

but change of diftance with other beings

that are confideredas at re ft ; and find ing that fp irits,

& c ." I t is true, fpirits change

place,

and motion in this

fenfe is competent to all finite fp irits. But in this m o

tion they are not moved but movers ; which is the d iftinc-

tion endeavoured to be

confounded.

Sceptical people con

clude from this, that whatever moves is material. But

i t w i l l not follow that whatever moves, as a mover, is

material, and has the relations of matter. For in the

idea of the motion of body, a

moved.,

and not a mover is im

plied

•

and the

affections

of moment,

reft/iance,

and ten

dency to move in the fame J iraight and uniform

direSiioTit

are necefiarily included. Were there but one body in

the

Univerfe,

thefe

affections

would infeparably attend

its

m ot ion;

and yet then the relation of

diftance

would

never fhew motion. The diftinflion of ubi and in loco,

which M r . Locke obferves, feci.

z i .

to be of little ufe to

our conception,

was

introduced probably, to fignify that

body and fpirit occupy fpace after a different

manner;

though we cannot conceive that difference of manner.

( X j , b o d y ,



2 3 2 T he f o u l a J lmple f u b f i a n c e ^

b o d y , b u t w i t h o u t a n y f u n d a m e n t a l c ha ng e

or a l te ra t ion i n i ts o w n fub f tance .

4

V I I . A l l th e ch an ge s t h e n w h i c h h a p p e n

to m a t te r , are ef fected in i t , becaufe i t is a

fubftance

co m po un d ed o f pa r ts , an d aga in

divifible i n to par ts , each o f w h i c h is a f o l i d ,

d i v i f i b l e , ex tended , f i gu red fub f t ance , o r ha th

th e ejjential p rope rt i es o f t he who le o f w h i c h

i t is a p a r t , as m u c h as t he w h o le h a t h .

B u t fu re ly th is can never be fa id o f

aSlive

percept ive Jiibjiance t h a t i t is c o m p o u n d e d o f

par ts ,

w h i c h a r e

l ikewife a fl ive

percept ive

fob/lances^ w e fh o u ld th e n have as m a n y

di f ferent percept ions and confc ioufnef fes as

the re we re dirlerent par ts o f the

f o u l :

no r

c o u ld f u c h parts fubjecT: a n adtive percept ive

f u b fta n c e t o m o r t a l i t y , o r c o r r u p t i o n , t h o u g h

f e p a r a t e d ; fo r the fe par ts cou ld no t be o ther

th a n ac l ive percept ive fub f tances , as m u c h as

th e w h o le is w h o fe parts the y a re , an y m o re

th a n t he pa rts o f m a t t e r co u ld be u n fo l i d

o r un ex ten d ed . Par ts o f an y fub f tance

muf t

be o f t he fame fub f tance , b y the te rms , a n d

o f th e f a m e n a tu re w i t h th e w h o l e , o f w h i c h

th e y a re

p a r t s ;

d i f f e r in g o n l y f r o m t h e w h o l e

j n m o r e o r

lefs,

bu t n o t i n na tu re an d f u n

d a m e n t a l




233

damental p r op e r t i e s ; o the rw i fe the fubjlance

o f thefe p a r t s w o u ld no t be t he fame w i t h

tha t o f t he w h o l e : o r the y w o u ld be par ts

o f t he fame fub f tance , and n o t o f the fam e

f u b f t a n c e , w h i c h i s

c o n t r a d i c t o r y .

T h i s is

i m p l i e d ,

I f ay , b y the te rm s , w h e n w e fay

f a r t s o f th e f a m e f ub fta n c e ; for that is the

fame fub f t ance confidered as h a v i n g par ts i n

i t ; w h e r e , b y t h e f u p p o f i t i o n , t he fub f tance ,

a n d there fore the fu b f ta n t ia l p roperties i n

th e pa r ts , a re th e fam e as i n the w h o le .

T h a t w h i c h adds w e i g h t t o t h is r e a fo n in g is ,

0iat

as i t appe ared i n the

h f t f t c J i o n ,

t ha t ac

t i v i t y a n d pe rce pt iv i ty can belong only to i m

m a t e r i a l f u b f t a n c e ; f o i t fhall be f h e w n i n

th e n e x t , t h a t they muft alw ay s belong to i f ,

o r a re in feparab le f r o m i t . T h e re fo re , i f t h is

fub f tan ce h a th par t s , every pa r t m u f t be ac

t i ve an d pe rcep tive . A n d t he

actual

fepara-

t i o n o f fu ch parts co u ld never be the c o r r u p

t i o n ,

o r dea th ,

o f ac t i ve ,

pe rcep ti ve , o r l i v in g

fub f tance , bu t ra ther the genera t ion o f many .

V I I I .

A l i v i n g f u b ft a n c e c o u l d n o t

confift

o f o ther l i v in g fub f tance s, as a dead fub f tanc e

m a y be th e aggregate o f othe r dead fubf ta nc es ,

Vipon th is fa r ther accou nt . Deadnefs is a

mere



2 ? 4-

T h e f o u l a

f i m p l e

f u b f t a n c e ,

mere negat ion, a n d do th not w a n t a p r in c i p le

o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y , t o r e f t r a i n a n d a p p r o p ria t e

i t to an y pa r t o f th e aggregate . I t w o u ld be

ab fu rd t o f ay , t he

deadnefs

o f every p a rt is

i ts o w n par t i cu la r , o r i n d i v id u a l deadne fs ,

wh i ch can be a f c r i bed t o no o the r

p a r t ;

a n d

the deadnefs o f the who le i s l i kew i fe i t s i n d i

v i dua l deadne fs , wh i ch muf t be d i f f e ren t f r o m

the deadnefs o f a l l the par ts . I t w o u l d be

a b f u r d ,

I fay , to fpea k thu s . B u t activity

be ing a pojitive

power,

wan t s a p r i n c i p l e o f

i n d i v i d u a l i t y ;

or the

activity

o f a n y p a r t ,

m u f t as ce r ta i n ly be t he p o w e r o f t h a t p a r t ,

an d n o t o f an oth er , as its fubftance is th e

fub f tanc e o f i t o n ly , and n o t t h e fub f tanc e

o f ano the r . O r i f w e confider t he a c t i v i t y

o f a ny par t as a p ro p e r t y , i t m u f t have th a t

pa r t , i n e xc lu f i o n o f a l l o the rs , as th e f u b -

ject of i ts i n h e l i o n . A n d w e m a y r ea f on t h e

fam e w a y w i t h t he pe rcep t i v i ty . I f eve ry

p a r t w e r e p e r ce p tiv e , n o t h i n g c o u l d h i n d e r

th e percep tions f r o m be ing d i f fe ren t , a nd as

m a n y as t he pa rts . T h u s neceffarily there

w o u l d be a

confufion

a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y o f dif

f e ren t activities a n d percept iv it ies i n ac t i ve

percept ive fubf tances that confifted o f o the r

ac t ive percept ive par ts . A n d i f w e can ftop

a t



therefore naturally immortal 235

at the fe par ts , o f wh ich we have been fpeak-

i n g ,

it

is

w e l l :

b u t

i f

w e are forced to a l lo w

o f

a&ive

percept ive

fubftances

t ha t do no t

c o n f i f l of p a r t s ; w h y f h o u l d w e c o n te n d at

a l l f o r f a r t s i n f u c h

fubftances

f r o m t h e b e

g i n n i n g

?

A n d

i f

w e c o n te n d f o r p a r t s a t a l l ,

w h a t rea fon can t he re be g iven fo r f l o p p in g

at the fe par ts , an d n ot co nte nd ing fo r o the r

a n d o t h e r p a rts i n i n f i n i t u m , w h i c h w i l l m a k e

t h e a b f u r d i t y

monftrous?

A n d i n e i the r ca fe ,

th e activity and pe rcep t i v i t y o f the whole c o u ld

never be one f imple a n d u n c o m p o u n d e d a c

t i v i t y a n d

p e r c e p t iv i t y ;

o r be in d iv i d u a l to

i t ,

i n o p p o f i t i o n to th e p a r t s : b u t c o n t r a r i l y , t h e

activity

a n d p e r c e p t iv i ty o f each p a r t w o u l d

h av e its p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n t h a t p a r t ,

i n op p o f i t i o n to the whole ; a nd a l l toge ther ,

t he y w o u ld appea r va r ious , con fu fed ,

and

d i v i d e d ; and one in d iv id u a l l i v in g being co u ld

neve r re fu l t f r o m th e m . I f i t f ho u ld be f a i d ,

t ha t t he ac t i v i t y and percep t i v i t y o f each p a r t

wou ld no t be d i f f e ren t f r om tha t

of

another

;

it is as

i f

w e f h o u l d f a y , t h e

fubjeds of

i n -

h e f i o n of the fe proper t ies wou ld no t be

dif

f e ren t t h e one f r o m the o the r ,

or

t h a t

thefe

par ts are b u t one a n d th e fam e pa r t , or t h a t

t h e f o u l

is

no t m ade u p

of

par ts ,

or

is i n d i -

v i f ib le . IX The



2 3 6 T h e f o u l a f t m p h f u b j l a n c e ^

I X . T h e p arts o f

ac t i ve ,

percept ive fub-

ftance, i f i t co u ld have a n y ,

muf t

be

alfo

ac t ive and percept ive f rom th is

c o n f i d e r a t i o n ,

t h a t t o fuppo fe i t o th e rw i fe i s t o a l l o w tha t

act iv i ty an d pe rcep t i v i ty may re fu l t f r o m the

jo in in g toge ther dead in e r t p a r t s ; w h i c h i s t h e

f a m e

c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,

w he the r w e a l l ow i t i n

ma te r i a l o r immate r i a l f ub f t ance : f o r i t i s t o

m a k e t h e

effect perfecter

th a n the caufe , b y

fuppofing pe rcep t i v i t y and fpon tane i t y bo th

o f m o t i o n and t h o u g h t , an d rea fon i t f e l f , t o

a r i fe f r o m the mere

add i t i on ,

o r

j u n c t i o n ,

o f

th in g s dead an d ine r t , to o th er th in gs eq ua l ly

dead an d i ne r t. W e

mall

f ee , when we come

aga in t o fpeak o f M r . Locke's Juper added p r o

pe r t y o f l i f e , fen fe , and fpon taneous m o t i o n ,

th a t i t co u ld have n o

fubjedt

o f

i n h e f i o n ,

b e -

fides t he m ere ju n c t i o n o f dead par t s to dead

p a r t s :

b u t t h a t

junction

o r a dd i tio n , w h i c h

is i t f e l f a p r op er t y , fhould be the fubject o f

another p roper ty , i s aga in f t fen fe and rea fon.

Th e re fo re aga in , i f an

active

pe rcep ti ve f u b

ftance ca n have par ts , the y m u f t o f neceffity

be a&ive an d perceptive . A n d i f the fe par ts

a re ind iv i f i b le , w e are a t l e n g th come t o i n -

divifible

l i v in g fubf tances -} a n d as. f u c h , no t

l iab le



t h e r e fo r e n a t u r a l l y i m m o r t a l . 237

l iab le to any change excep t a n n ih i l a t i o n . B u t

he w h o con tends , t ha t l i v in g fub f tance muft

be co m po un d ed o f pa rts , canno t co n f i d en t l y

w i t h

h imfe l f

be fuppo fed to f l o p any w he re ,

b u t m u f t r a t h e r

affert

th a t the fe pa rts are ftill

d i v i f i b l e i n t o o the r p a r t s : i n w h ic h cafe he

m u f t l i k e w i f e f a y , t h a t e ach p a r t , i n a n y d i -

v i f i o n , o r fu b d iv i f io n , is ac tive an d percept ive ,

fo r the rea fon

ju f t

n o w a f f igned , v i z . becaufe

o t h e r w i f e th e w h o l e c o u l d n o t be

active

a n d

p e rc ep tiv e. T h i s w o u l d b e t o m u l t i p l y l i v

i ng be ings

end le f l y , inftead

o f

fhewing

t ha t

t hey a re m o r ta l and co r rup t i b l e . N o r co u ld

h e m a k e a n i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g f o u l o u t o f a

c o m p o f i t i o n o f th efe . T h e

confcioufneffes

r e f u l t i n g f r o m t h e activity an d pe rcep t i v it y

o f each par t w o u ld be va rious an d in f i n i t e .

F r o m w h a t is a lre ady f a i d , we cannot be at

a

lofs

f o r an an fwe r , i f an y one fh o u ld be

f o

humourfome

as to fa y, th a t active pe rce p

t ive f ub f tance m a y be com po un d ed o f

d i f f i -

milar

par ts ,

fome

o f w h i c h o n l y are

a d i v e ,

an d o thers in e r t : fo r t he f i r f t f o r t o n ly , fe -

c lu d in g the la f t , w o u ld be ac tive fub f tance .

X . T h u s a l i v i n g fub f tance mad e up o f

dead parts is a

c o n t r a d i c t i o n ;

and a l i v i n g

l

fubf tance



2 3 8

T h e f o u l a

Jtmple

f u b f t a n c e ,

f ub f tanc e m ad e u p o f l i v in g par ts , is n o t one

l i v i ng fub f t ance , bu t as

many dift inct

l i v i ng

fub f lances , as there are

d i f t i n c l :

l i v i ng par t s

i n i t . A n d in de e d t h i s compofit ion a n d d i -

v i f i b i l i t y o f l i v i n g f u b fta n c e m u l l i n fe r t h e

fa m e confequences , as i f w e fu pp of ed m at te r

a t h i n k i n g l i v i n g f u b fta n c e : t h e fa m e m u l

t i p l i c i t y , o r r a the r i n f i n i t e va r i e ty o f c o n fc i -

ou fne fs and pe rcep t i on , muf t be as w e l l i n

th e on e cafe as the oth er . B u t th is is n o t

o n l y

fa l fe ,

as p la in l y appears f r o m th e

f i m -

p l i c i t y o f ou r con fc iou fne fs an d pe rce p t i on ,

b u t c a n n o t

pofl ibly

be o f an y fe rv ice to th o fe

w h o aiTert th e f ou l's m o r t a l i t y ; f o r fince every

p a r t m u f t be a l i v i n g p a r t i n t o w h i c h e i th e r

fub f tanc e , be i t m a t te r o r fp i r i t , is d i v i f i b le ,

becau fe a l i v ing who le cou ld never be made

u p ou t o f an y nu m be r o f dead pa r ts . T h e y

m u f t neceffarily o f cour fe b y th i s fup po fed d i v i -

fibility, m u l t i p l y l i v in g be ings w i t h o u t en d ,

or a t laft ftop at indivifible l i v i ng fub f l ances ,

wh ich a re l i ab le to no

effential

a l t e r a t i o n , a n d

ca n never ceafe to be b y a n y o th er m ea ns

t h a n a n n i h i l a t io n . A n d f r o m h e n ce i t

f o l

l o w s ,

t h a t parts an d d i v i f i b i l i t y a re n o t a f

f ec t i ons con f i f t en t w i t h adive pe rcep t i ve f ub

ftance, w h i c h m u f t be one , an d

f i m p l e ,

I w i t h o u t




239

w i t h o u t c o m p o f i t i o n .

D iv i j ib i l i ty

is

fuch

a n

a f fec t ion o f fub f tance, as mews on the one

h a n d ,

t ha t m a t t e r ,

becaufe d i v i f i b l e ,

cannot

t h i n k , o r b e a l i v i n g f u b f t a n c e ; a n d o n t h e

o the r , t ha t fpir i tual f ub f tance , becaufe t h i n k

i n g , ca n n o t be d iv i f ib le , o r have par ts .

X L T h e h u m a n f o u l t h e n , hav ing no par ts ,

muf t

be

indifToluble

i n i ts na ture,

by

a n y t h i n g

tha t h a th no t po w er to d e f t r oy o r an n ih i l a t e i t .

A n d fince i t ha th no t a na tu ra l t endency to

a n n i h i l a t i o n , n o r a

power

to ann ih i la te i t fe l f ,

n or ca n be a n n ih i la te d b y a n y being fin ite ly

p o w e r f u l o n l y ; w i t h o u t a n i m m e d i a te a ct o f

t h e om n ip o te n t C rea to r t o an n ih i l a t e i t , i t

m uf t endlejly abide a n active p e r c e p t i v e f u b

ftance, w i t h o u t e i the r f e a r or hopes of d y in g

th rough a l l e t e rn i ty . W h i c h i s, i n o the r

w or d s , t o be im m o r ta l as to the agency o f

a l l n a tu ra l , o r f econd

cau fes ;

i . e. n a tu ra l l y

i m m o r t a l .

A n d th is is th e i m m o r t a l i t y w h i c h

the A th e i f t , an d rea l l y i n the gene ra l w h a t

al l m e n i n f i f t mof t u p o n . W e infi ft to have

i t p ro v e d i n o u r o w n w a y ; a n d d e m a n d t h a t

i t may be

fhewn

i m m a t e r i a l ,

f imple

and u n -

co m p o u n d e d i n its na ture , as a p ledge and

fe cu r i t y th a t i t is never to d ie . L u c re t iu s

places



2 4 0 7%e f o u l a

J imple

f u h j l a n c e .

p laces the m o r t a l i t y o f i t in i ts b e in g

m a t e r i a l ;

an d w h e n he imag ines he ha th p roved t h a t ,

he adds , as t he c r i t e r i on o f im m o r t a l i t y , t ha t

f u c h a

fubftance mu f t

be

f imple

w i t h o u t p a rts ,

becaufe a change or

lofs

o f par ts is the death

o f t h a t t h i n g ( g ) . I t is t r u e , t h e i m m a t e r i

a l i t y o f t he fo u l is a fa t i s f y in g p lea fan t c o n

t e m p la t i o n , e fpecia lly w h e n w e pe rceive t ha t

i t is impoffible tha t ever mat te r can become

active o r pe rc ip ien t , b y an y p ow e r , o r i n a n y

th e leaft degree, a n d i n confequence o f th is

d i f cove ry com e to t he kn ow led ge o f f eve ra l

o t h e r

m o i l

w e i g h t y a n d u f e f u l t r u t h s :

b u t we re t he re no t m ore d i rec t a n d p ro pe r

p roo fs , t he end le fs d u ra t i on o f t he h u m a n

f o u l w o u l d r e m a i n p re ca rio us . T h e

Athe i f l

a r t f u l l y feeks th e lea f t d i rec t a n d

remoteft

k i n d o f p roof ; b o th becaufe he

thinks

(g ) A t neque transferri fib'i parteis, nee tribui vul t ,

Immortale quod eft quicquam : nee dijjluere h i lum^

N a m

quodcunque

fuis

mutatum

finibus

exit-,

Continuo hoc mors ̂ f l i l l ius quod f u i t ante.

L i b . 3. ver.

516:

And after at ver. 807. he fays,

Praterea qutscunque manent

a terna,

necejje [ft.,

Au t quia fu n t folido cum corpore, refpuere iclus,—:

A ut idea durare

eetatem pojfe

per omnem,

Plagarum quia fu n t

expert ia;

Jicut inane [ft t

£>uadmanet intaclum> neque ab iclufrangitur hiluml

. i t



t h e re f o r e n a t u r a l l y i m m o r t a l .

241

i t ha rd ef t to be g i ve n , and becaufe, w h e n

g i v e n ,

i t proves n o t

e n o u g h ;

f o r i f t ha t

o n

l y co u ld be g i ve n , he w o u ld n o t w an t o the r

fubter fuges, the

laft

o f w h ic h I {ha l l endea

vour to p revent in the nex t

f e f t i o n .

I ndeed

th e

neceffary perfections

o f th e D e i t y , w h i c h

f land engaged fo r , an d de m and ou r appear

ance i n a fecond pe r iod j an d the nature o f

ou r rat io na l p leafures an d

d ef ires,

w h i c h

{hew

t ha t we were

defigned

by an i n f i n i t e l y ra t i o

n a l be ing fo r endlefs ex i f tenc e, are the th in g s

that g ive the fan<5tion o f de m on f t ra t i on t o

t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e

f o u l .

N o very great

ftrefs could elfe be la id u p o n th e fimplie ity

o r divifibil i ty o f i ts fub ftan ce ; fince fu re ly

w e m a y fay , i t w o u ld be as eafy f o r O m n ip o

tence to def t roy a

ample

fub f tan ce , as fo r fe

c o n d caufes to d i f fo lve a co m po un d ed one.

Let

i t be

con f i de red ,

tha t im m a te r ia l i t y is as

cer ta in ly competent to the fou ls o f brutes ,

as

o f m e n : bu t the argume nts pro v in g the laft

i m m o r t a l , , f r o m the ra t iona l na tu re , an d the

neceffary perfect ions o f the D e i ty * are a l toge

t he r i ncompe ten t t o t h e m . A n d i t h a th been

th e

conftaiit

end eavour o f the Sceptic to { h e w

a p a r i t y , and ru n a pa ra l le l , be tween the fe

V o l . I .

R t w s



242

T h e f o u l a

Jimple fubftance->

t w o

fpecies ( h ) . Be l ides ,

F ro m w h a t h a t h

been fa id in t he la f t

f ed t i on ,

i t is p la in , th a t

even

(h) And many good men (as was faid in the end of

the laft fe£Hon) are needlefly terrified left every thing

fhould not be different in thefe two

fpecies;

hence they

fight againft the immateriality of brute-fouls,

as the mojl

dreadful phenomenon

philofophy could difcover. Thus a

learned and pious Author (fee the Book called The proce

dure, extent, and limits of

human

Underftanding, p. I J J ,

174.)

fays,

<c

They who hold fenfitive perception in

brutes to

be an

argument of the immateriality of their

*' fouls, find themfelves under a neceflity of allowing

ic

thofe fouls to

be

naturally immortal

likew ife:

and they

are fo

embarraffed

in thinking how to difpofe of thofe

4< irrational immortal fouls after the diffolution of their bo-

dies, and what fort of immortality to conceive for them,

that they imagine them all to return to the great foul

or fpirit of the

wor ld;

or by a metempfychofis to pafs

tc into the bodies of fucceeding

animals;

and then when

u

they

have done

their work,

at the end

of

the world,

they

are to

be

difcharged out of

being, and again reduced

to

their primitive nothing." Let me ask, ifthisbeagood

argument, that we are not to allow brutes to be actuated

by an immaterial fubftance (though reafon evinces i t) , be-

caufe we cannot te ll how the Creator difpofes of thefe

fouls, after the difTolution of their bodies? Why Jhould

any man

embarrafs

himfelf about this ? Cannot the thing

be done without his contrivance

?

O r when their little

bodies were formed w ith fuch

inexpreflible

art and pow

er, was this point left to the determination of

Philcfo-

phers ?

Here i t

is

forgot that by natural immortality , no

More

can be meant,

than

that a being

fhould

exift as

long




243

even com po un d ed , o r ma te r i a l

fubftanceSj

are not

d i f l o l v e d ,

a nd m u c h

lefs

cou ld the y

be

long as God doth not extinguifh it -7 or as long as he fup-

ports and preferves i t : and thus there's no being but what

is naturally immortal. Even our bodies might be thus

immortal, God fo w illing it . Nay, otherwife there is

no being at all but what is naturally

mortal.

By natural

immortality cannot be meant that any being of itfelf, and

abftra£ting from the wi l l and concurrence of God, would

remain for ever. No being is thus immortal. How ab-

furd is it, when all immortality is founded on the wil l

and defign of G od, to feek for a demonftration of it irt

the nature of the created being Itfelf

The Author continues, " But i f thefe fouls are once

granted to be immaterial, it is utterly inconceivable

that they mould not naturally have the fame immor-

<c tality w ith thofe which are human ; fince we cannot

w ith any fenfe or confiftency diftinguifh two different

kinds of immortality for created fpirits. I f the foul

tc of brutes is immortal, that cannot, when feparated,

,c be thought to remain altogether in a tate of utter in-

activity and infenfib ility, which communicated fenfe

and activity to matter while in conjunction w ith it.

And if fo, they muft be fenfible of happinefs or mife-

ryj and, in fome

degree,

liable to rewards and

punith-

ments as eternal as their fouls." Here let me

obferve,

that the human foul being rational, and the brute foul not,

the one a moral agent', and the other not, is the foundation

of a very confiftent and folid

diftincSion,

I conceive, be

tween the one and the other, as to immortality; fofar-js

i t from being utterly inconceiveable Here immortality

R 2

feems



244 fflje f o u l a fimple fubjlance,

be

d e f t r o y e d ,

w i t h o u t

the

i m m e d i a t e p o w e r

o f

God: and

n a t u r a l agency,

or the

7iatural

powers

feems

w ho lly founded upon

immaterial i ty,

wh ich is ex

tremely w rong . Betides,

an

agent

not

moral, though

capable

of

pleafure

or

pain,

is not

capable

of

rewards and

punifhments, by the very terms, I fuppofe. Moreover,

brutes have not the nobleft k in d of ac tivity , even here,

Jn

a

flate

of

u n i o n ;

viz. the

comm and over their paft

perceptions; and fo this Author cannot argue for that

fpecies of

activity

in their foul when feparated. T h a t

which communicated activity

to

matter when

in

con

junction w i t h

i t,

cannot indeed be utterly,

nor

any w a y ,

inac tive, when feparated from it. But if this be fo w i t h

refpecl

to the brute

f o u l ;

why is it all along faid with

refpecT:

to the

human foul

by

this A u th or, that thought

and perception is the joint aclion of matter and fp ir i t in

ejfential

union,

as he

chufes

to

exprefs

it

?

He who al

lows thought to be the action, or

effe£t

of matter (though

but as

a

partial caufe,

or

co-efficient) will hardly

be

able

to prove the

neceflary activity

of feparate fpirits. He

concludes, " W h a t heightens the abfu rdity of this way

of

th ink ing

is,

that

in

imagining

the

fouls

of

brutes

to be

imm ater ia l ,

men

mu f t necefTarily diftinguifli

a

great variety of them both in nature and degree; one

11

fort for birds, another for beafts, and another for fifties.

iC

And

thefe m uft

be all

fubdivided again into very

dif-

ferent fpecies of immaterial fouls, according to the

different forts there are under each of thefe general

heads.

Nay,

every

fly and

infeft muft

on

this

fup-

<c pofition have fome fort

of

immaterial foul, even dow n

to the

cheefe-mite ;

and what is yet more abfurd is,

cc

that



therefore naturally immortal. 24.5

powers

of

matter^

is

( l i ke chance) on ly

a

n a m e

for our

i gnorance ,

or at

leaft

for our

i n a t -

that there muft be an infinite variety of immortalities

Ci

imagined to

luit

the rank and condition of every in-

*'

dividual, l iv ing,

fenfible

creature." No certainly

(fay

I ) not one fpecies of immortality needs be im a

gined, but all le ft to the

wifdom

and power of the Crea

tor , who, as ha th been obferved before, doth not dif-

dain to

manifeft

the wonders of his knowledge and pow

er in the na rrow bounds of thefe infect-bodies, nay, to

aftuate

their furprizing

mechanifm

continually. We are

not fo much

as

certain o f their

immor ta l i t y ;

for the im

material ity, f rom wh ich it is here infe rred, is not conclu-

f i ve ; unlefs this Autho r

fhews

how. A nd when he hath

done tha t, he

will

have done no harm to

pbilofophy.

La f t -

l y , why is the abfurd ity fo much heightened by different

fpecies of immaterial fouls, more than by different fpecies

of material bodies

?

T here is really no abfurd ity here but

this, that we chalk out a method for Om nipotence, and

then reckon every deviation from that method abfurd;

and

fo, if

matter

of facT:

did not convince

us,

we might

prove

the

exiftence

of fo

many different fpecies

of ma

terial bodies impoflible. W h a t

is

here faid

to

heighten

the ab furdity,

viz.

that m en mu ft diftinguiih a great va

riety

of

immaterial fouls both

in

nature

and de

gree, for infedts, fillies,

birds

and bea'ls,

ought rather

perhaps

to be

looked upon as

a

very great beauty

of the

creation, and

that w hich lhews

the

vying fcale

of

imm a

ter ia l beings maintained.

It

would be a wide gap,

if

there

were nothing between dead matter and the human

fo u l ;

when

we fee

fuch

a

gradation

of

workmanihip and per

i l

3

f eft ion.



246 The f o u l a J im p l e fubftance>

i n a t t e n t i o n .

I f

t h e n ,

w i t h o u t h is a f t ,

a

ha i r

cou ld n o t f a l l f r o m ou r head , w h i c h is t rue

i n

fe&ion

maintained from

rude,

unformed

earth,

through all

the fpecies of plants and animals, up to the human body,

And

fince

the

fcale

of immaterial Beings is thus carried

up to the human foul, it cannot certainly end there.

Another late Author, I th ink, fpeaks more rationally

(Dr. Thomas Burnet's

Demonjlration,

&c. p. 92.)

Hence, fays he, it w i ll follow, by

neceffary

confe-

quence, that every

rational, fenfible,

and living crea-

ture muft be endued with fbme immaterial principle,

which is the caufe of all their rational, fenfible, or

animal operations, & c." And below,

—

Thus much

we may fay with

fafety,

that it is not inconfiftent

<c w ith reafon, that there may be feveral degrees and

orders of immaterial

beings,

with different powers and

faculties, according to their different

ends;

and that

fuch of thefe

as

are made to

aftuate

bodies, may be

a put into different bodi.es, according to their different

iC

capacities; and when the immaterial beings are fepa-

<c

rated from thefe bodies, fo that the bodies are

dead,

*' it is not inconfiftent to imagine, that they may tranf-

migrate into other

bodies,

and when they have fin ifhed

that courfe they were made for, they may either at

laft

be annihilated, or i f they are capable of any re-

ward, God may have provided proper recompences

for them, according to their feveral natures and capa-

'c

cities. There is nothing in

all

this but what is rea-

*' fonable." Now if even we can conceive more ways

poflible,

and not inconfiftent, how they may be difpofed

of} where is the

abfurdity

confequent upon allowing

them



t h e re f o r e n a t u r a l l y i m m o r t a l . 2 4 7

in a l i tera l and phyfical f e n f e ; our fouls, tho'

c o m p o u n d e d , muf t end ure fo r ever, w i t h o u t

h is

a<5t

to

diffolve

t h e m .

them to

be immaterial ?

Though, as this

laft

Author

well

obferves a little before, it is

none

of our buftnefs to deter

mine what becomes of them after death.

W e

mould

never

diilemble

any truth for fear of its

confequences. I t is

direclly impoflible

that truth

mould

have any

bad

confequences. The things we are afraid

of may

be

but our

own

particular prejudices;

and

I think

it is fo in the

prefent

cafe, w ith refpecT: to the immateri

ality of the brute foul.

Befides,

i f we deny thefe to be

immaterial,

we deny the

moft

convincing argument for

the immateriality of the human foul, taken from the

neceflary inactivity

of matter. And thus this learned

and pious Author, while he is zealous to

eftablifh

the

immortality of the foul, becaufe of its

being immaterial^

goes

in

effeir.

a great way to deny that very immateri

al i ty; and thus feems to defeat his own

defign.

The

Sceptick, though he is never confident with

himfelf,

is

yet very

clear-fighted

to difcover thefe

inconliflencies

in

his Adverfaries; and fails not to improve

them to his own

purpofes.

R

4 S E C T .

the natural immortality of the soul

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