immortality and the nature of the soul in the phaedrus.pdf

8/13/2019 immortality and the nature of the soul in the phaedrus.pdf

1/27

Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the "Phaedrus"

Author(s): Richard BettSource: Phronesis, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1986), pp. 1-26Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182241.

Accessed: 01/04/2011 07:59

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at.http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap..

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

BRILLis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4182241?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4182241?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=bap


2/27

Immortalityand the Nature of the Soul in thePhaedrus

RICHARD BErr

"Firstwe must nquirewhat kindof soulthediscussion sabout".So beginsHermeias'commentaryon the argument or immortalityn the Phaedrus(245c5-246a2).' t is a pieceof advicethathasnot, I think,beensufficientlyheeded by modern scholars.There has been some discussionof varioustextualproblemsand pointsof translation, nd this has,of course,involvedsome scrutinyof the argument's tructureand presuppositions; ut I amnot aware of any really detailed, step by step analysisof the argumentotherthan Hermeias'own.2As a result,the preciserelationbetweenPlato'sviews on immortalityand the nature of soul in the Phaedrusand in otherdialogueshas not received as close attentionas it could. In particular, hequestionof whatconceptionof soul Plato soperatingwith n thisargumenthas tended to be dealt with too superficially by examinationof single,

I HermeiaeAlexandrini n PlatonisPhaedrumScholia, ed. P. Couvreur Paris, 1901) ad.loc.2 The most detailed discussionsI am aware of are in R. Hackforth,Plato's Phaedrus,(Cambridge, 1952), pp. 64-8, and T.M. Robinson, "The Argumentfor Immortality nPlato'sPhaedrus",EssaysinAncient GreekPhilosophy,ed. J.P. Anton andG.L. Kustas(Albany, 1971). But both of these, while they do cover the main steps of the wholeargument, deal with most of them extremely briefly; in addition, Robinson'sanalysisseems to me mistakenin severalplaces. Among other writersandcommentatorson thePhaedrus, W.J. Verdenius ("Notes on Plato's Phaedrus", Mnemosyne, Series 4, 8(1955), 265-89) and G.J. de Vries (A Commentaryon Plato's Phaedrus, Amsterdam,1969) offer only isolated remarks,mostlyon passageswhere the text is in doubt. I.M.Crombie (An Examinationof Plato'sDoctrines,London, 1962) in a long and exhaustivechapter on Plato'sviews on the soul (Vol. I, ch. 7, "ThePhilosophy of Mind"),devotesonly a pageanda half(325-7) to the argument,mostly at a veryabstractevel; andMarthaNussbaum, in a discussionof the Phaedruswhichcoversalmost every major topic in thedialogue ("'This Story Isn't True'; Poetry, Goodness and Understanding in Plato'sPhaedrus", Moravcsik and Temko (eds.), Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts,Totowa, N.J., 1982), dismissesit in literally a sentence (pp. 106-7).Phronesis1986. Vol. XXXIII (AcceptedJuly 1985) 1


3/27

troublesomephrases, rather than by assessment of the argumentas awhole.My purpose, then, is to analyse he Phaedrus' rgument or immortalityasminutelyas I can. Thisargumentsof considerable ntrinsic nterest,andIshallbeginbytreating t largelyas an isolatedpiece of logic, examining henatureand cogency of the variouspremisesandinferences.However, theargumentmust also, of course, be seen in its context. By examining t indetail, I hope also to clarify, to some degree, the place of the Phaedrusamong Plato's works - or at least, among those works that deal withquestionsabout the souland immortality. naddition,I hopeto arriveat abetter understanding f the argument'splace in the Phaedrus tself. Foranother neglected issue, I believe, is that of the relation between theargument or immortality nd the mythof thecharioteers hat immediatelyfollows it. Typically,the two sections have been discussedtoo much inisolation from one another;yet clearly the natureof the soul is a centraltopic for both of them.That Plato intends the argumentas a rigorousproof, and hence asadmittingof the detailedexamination intend to give it, is not, I think,indoubt. In this respectit contrasts harplywiththe myththatfollows, andPlato purposely signals the contrast in two ways.3 First, there is the warningat 246a6(immediatelypreceding he myth) that whatfollows is a descrip-tion of the soul only T EOLXEV,ot o[ov {GTL;the proof has no suchqualificationsattachedto it. Secondly,the stylesof the two passagesarevery different. The proof is presented n extremelyspare, choppy prose;Platohere seems to be aiming or maximum larityand ogicalperspicuity.43 This contrastshouldnot be taken to implythat the proof is more importantthan themyth, or thatthe mythis not "realphilosophy". In thisconnection, it is interestingthatPlato uses the word &x6bettg (245c1,4; cf. &no6eLXtwoV,b7) to refernot simplyto theproofof immortality,but to the entireensuingdiscussion; he "demonstration"s of thefact that the madness of the lover is divinelyinspired,and so encompasses the myth aswell as the proof. InPlato'sview, then, mythandproofareequallyvalidwaysof showingthings- though of course, each may be appropriate n differentcircumstances.4 Some (e.g. de Vries, op.cit., followingDenniston) have likenedthe style of the proof(in addition to its thought butthat isanothermatter)to that of certainPresocratics.Thesimilaritymay be there, andmaybe intentional;butthisdoes not, I take it, detractfromthe plausibilityof my suggestion here - there may be more than one reason for hisadoptingthe style that he does. RaphaelDemos (in "Plato'sDoctrine of the Soul as aSelf-MovingMotion", JHP 6 (1968), 133-45)goes so far as to suggest, largelyon thegroundsof thisstylisticdifference,thattheargument s a later nsertion.Thisseemsto mequite unnecessary; t is not at all unusualfor Platoto changehis style radicallybetweenadjacentpassages.2


4/27

When he embarkson the myth, his language loosens up, and seemspositively florid compared with the rigor and economy of the previouspassage. In fact, of all the arguments or immortalityn Plato, this one ismuch he closestto what wewouldconsidera formalproof.So indissectingit, we are notapproachingt in aspiritanydifferent romthat n whichPlatocomposed it.

IThe basicshapeof the argument s as follows:

1) Soul s thatwhich is its own source of motion.2)Thatwhich s its ownsourceof motion s immortal.Therefore ) Soul s immortal.Platopresents t, though, nthe reverseorder.Theconclusion3) isstatedatthebeginning 245cS); heargument or 2)occupieshimfrom hereuntile2,and2) is stated at e2-3; 1) is thenargued or between245e3and246al; andfinally,at 246al-2, the conclusionof the whole arguments restated.Theargument or 1) is relatively traightforward,ndwe shalldealwith t later;2), however, is established n a muchmore complexfashion, by meansoftwo independentsub-arguments.The premisesof the firstsub-argument(which I shall label A) are as follows:

Ai) Thatwhich s itsownsourceof motion salwaysinmotion.Aii) That which is always in motion is immortal.The premisesof the secondsub-argumentB are:

Bi) thatwhichis its own source of motion is a source of motionfor everythingelsethat moves.Bii) that which is a source of motion for everything else is ungenerated andimperishable.A is alsopresented nthereverseorder,but B occurs n theorder nwhichIhavejustexhibited t.5I shallnowanalyse he stepsone by one, inthe orderin whichPlato gives them, beginningwithsub-argumentA.I Thisanalysisof the argument'sbroadoutlineagreesmostcloselywiththat of Hackforth(op. cit.). The only point at which I would take issue with him is that he regardsthesecond of the two arguments or2) as subordinate o the first; t seems to me thatthe twoare paralleland equally important.Hermeias'sreconstruction s also roughlyin agree-mentwith my own (see p. 104.4-12for his introductorystatementof the premises). Hethinksthat the argumentas a whole dividesinto two; in hisview, the firstsub-argumentruns(usingmy symbolism)1), Ai), Aii), therefore 3), and the second (roughly)1), Bi),Bii), therefore 3). (This is not quite right, since he furthersubdividesmy Bii), and his

3


5/27

We begin with a statement of Aii) - TO yaQ a'ELXLVTOV aOtvacVov(245cS). No argument s offered for this premise; it seems to be simplytaken for granted.6Presumably he underlying hought s that somethingwhich is alwaysin motion must always exist, and so must be immortal.Provided "always n motion"means "in motion for eternity"(on whichmorebelow), thisseems hardto quarrelwith. It is onlywhen we move toAi) that the real argumentation egins.

The effect of Ai) is to identify that which is always in motion with thatwhichmovesitself;given Aii), this establishes he main premise2). Platonow states Ai) at 245c7-8 - "only that which moves itself . . . never ceasesmoving" prefacing t withwhatamounts o astatementof its converse"that which . . . is moved by something else, since it admits of a cessationof movement,admitsof a cessationof life" (c5-7).7 At the sametime, heoffers a reasonfor the assertion; his is contained n the terseandcrypticphrased-E o"ux unoXkiLnovTr6O c7-8).viewof the logicat thatpointis slightlydifferentfrommine;on this,see furthernote 14.)The main difference, then, is that he does not include Plato's statement of my mainpremise 2); but this difference is not important,except froma strictlyformalpoint ofview. The analysisof Robinson(op. cit.) is rathermoredistantfrommine. Partly orthisreason, itwouldbe asomewhatarduous askto criticise tdirectly;Iprefersimply o offermy own rivalinterpretation,and hope that it prevailson its own merits.6 Therehas been muchdivisionof opinionover the alternativereadings&ELXt(v-TovndaU1roxLvrlrovn 245cS. It seems to me that the mattercannotbe decided on the basisoftheirrelativeappropriateness o the argumentas a whole; either readingwould yield aclosely-knitlogical progression.It is truethat the readinga1'Tox'vToV makesfor somerepetition;but this would be quite tolerable - it by no means suffices (as J.B. Skempthinks- see TheTheoryof Motionin Plato'sLaterDialogues,Cambridge,1942,p. 3, n.2) to rulethat readingout. Hackforthdefends &ELXCViTov on the grounds hat it givesusa statementof an ?vbo?ov - that is, a premisewhichcould be expected to find generalacceptance;butagainst his, Ackrill(Mind62 (1953),p. 278)seemsright o pointout thatan argument does not need to begin with a statement of some premise that isuncontroversial.Logical considerationsaside, however, the evidence for &ElXiVoTOVseems to me entirely superior. The mss. agree on &etx(v-9TOV; aUToxLvTjTov is foundonly in one Oxyrrhynchus papyrus (1017). In addition, Hermeias clearly had&tLXLvItOV in frontof him, and so did Cicero when he translatedthe passage for theSomniumScipionis(a section whichhe also quotes in TusculanDisputations,1,54); theLatinis "quodsempermovetur, aeternumest". For a fulldiscussionof the issue, whichsupportsthis generalposition, see F. Decleva Caizzi, 'AEIKINHTONo AYTOKINH-TON?', Acme 23 (1970), 91-97.7Thus c5-7 (T0 b'&Xo xtvoi3v, etc.) seems to me to look forward to the followingsentence, rather than back to T6 y'Q &ElLX1VqTOV &06vaTov, despite the evidentparallelism between the pairs &eLx(v1qTov/&0aTov and 7tafOav XLV'EJOW QVa4X95. Burnet'spunctuationsuggeststhe opposite. (Translations,here and elsewhere,are my own.)

4


6/27

What is meant byalE oUx &3toXkE'Lov'vTo? Literally, he phrasemustmean somethinglike "in as much as it does not abandon tself";and thenaturalway to understand his is as sayingthat for a self-moverto ceasemovingwould be for it to abandon ts own nature.It is, then, an essentialpropertyof a self-moving hing (to speak in a later, but surelyan appro-priate,terminology) hatit be moving tselfatany given time;self-movingthings are necessarily n constantself-motion. Two questionsnow arise.First,whydoes Plato thinkthat thisis so?Andsecond,ifwe acceptthat t isso, does thissufficeto show thatself-moving hingsareeternallynmotion?On the firstpoint,Platooffers usnofurther nlightenment; utperhaps heunderlying dea is something ike the following.Supposethata self-moverwere to cease to move itself. Then it could not start movingitself againunlessgalvanised nto motioneitherbyitselforbysomethingelse. But if itwere galvanised into motion by itself, this would have to occur by theagencyof some partof itself thatwas already n motionin whichcase,contrary o hypothesis, he thingwouldnot reallyhaveceasedto move itselfafterall. But if bysomethingelse, it couldno longercount as aself-mover.Thussomethingwhich trulymoves itself must move itself continually.8Supposethatwe acceptthisconclusion whetherornotPlatoarrivedatitinthewayIjustproposed).The otherquestion s whether his isequivalenttosaying hatsomethingwhichmoves tselfdoes soeternally;andto this theansweris clearly "no". As we saw, a straightforward nderstandingofpremiseAii) requires hat we take &ELXiLVTOV in c5 as meaning"eternallyin motion";so if the argument s to work,oThnoTE XT'1yELLVOV?CVOV in c8mustpresumablyhavethesamesense. However, it is not in thissense thatPlato has shown us that self-movers"nevercease moving". If being inconstant self-motionis an essentialpropertyof a self-mover, then a self-movercannotcease to be in motionandstillbea self-mover;butthisis not8 If this were the line of thought thatwas motivatingPlato- and it is my best conjectureon the subject- then it would in one respect anticipateAristotle's ideas on self-motion.Foron this conjecture, Plato is led very naturally nto thinkingof self-movers as consis-ting of (at least) two parts, the activeand the passive part,so to speak. Aristotle'sanalysisof the concept of self-motion (Physics Bk. VIII, ch. 5) makes central use of just such adivision; a thingwhich moves itselfmust, he thinks, consistof a partwhich ismoved and apartwhichcauses this motion. Aristotle arguesconvincingly hat this latter partcannotitself be in motion, which leads him to the concept of the unmoved mover; it turns out,then, that, contrary o Plato, the ultimatecause of motion isnot a self-mover.However,apicture n whichAristotle developedbeyond Plato, havingbegun by holding deassimilarto his, is presumablyone we are boundto adopt in anycase; and the developmentwouldperhaps be a little smoother if Plato'sviews were of the type I suggest. But of course, allthis is pure speculation.

5


7/27

to say that t willnecessarilykeep movingforever andso existing or ever).There is, then, a gap in the argument.At the same time, however, it isquite understandable hat Plato should not have been aware of it. Thetrouble s that "X never ceases to be F" (of which"thatwhichmoves itselfnever ceasesmoving" s an instance)can mean either"It is impossible hatthere shouldbe an X which s not F" (i.e., F is an essentialpropertyof Xs)or "Xs areeternallyF"; the second entails thatXs are immortal,but thefirst does not. It is only the first that Plato is really entitled to in thisinstance; or as I understand t, &TEotUx&doXntXEovaiavi6makes a pointabout an essential property, not about the eternal possession of any

property.But it is not surprising hat the ambiguity hould haveescapedhim.It is interesting hat precisely he sameillegitimatemove is made in thefinalargument or immortalityn thePhaedo anargumentwithwhich hisone is often compared; ndeed, I take thisparallelas confirming videncefor my readingof whatis goingon here in the Phaedrus.9 n the PhaedoPlato moves from "The soul always comes bringing ife to whateveritoccupies" 105d3-4),and itscorollary dlO-11)"Thesoulmayneveradmittheoppositeof thatwhich t alwaysbringswith t"(i.e. death,as hegoesonto say)to "Thesoulisimmortal" e6). Again,it isin one senseuncontrover-sial, given thecommonsenseGreekview of the soul, that "the soulalwaysbrings ife".That s, anythingwhichhasasoul istherebynecessarily live; tis anessentialpropertyof souls thattheyare notpresent norganismswhichhave died. But thisisnotto saythatsoulsexisteternally.Nothingcanceaseto bring ife andstill be a soul; this followsfrom the essentialpropertyofsoulswehavejustnoticed,and n this sensewemayagree hat the souldoesnot "admitdeath".It doesnot follow thatthe soulmustcontinue opossessthis life-givingcapacitythroughout ime, and so be immortal.As in the9 Thatthere is an errorcommon to the two passages is noted in passingby Demos (op.cit., p. 135). The standardview of the relationbetween them seems to be that they areargumentsof essentiallythe same kind, but that the argument n the Phaedrusis of amore empiricalnature;see Hackforth,op. cit., p. 68 and Robinson,op. cit., p. 347. 1agree about the similarity,but I cannot see that the Phaedrusargument s moreempiri-cal. It is truethatthe Phaedoargumentmakesuse of the terminologyof Forms;butas faras I can see, this is not really essential to it. The crucialpoint is simply that the soulnecessarilybrings ife. In the Phaedrus,the crucialpoint is thatthe soul is necessarily nconstantself-motion.Eachargumentrests,then,on averybasicfeatureof thesoul, andIdo not see thatone of these features s anymoreempirical,orobservable,thanthe other.It is alsotruethatthe Phaedrusargumentowesmoreto Presocratichought(on whichseealso Skemp, op. cit., pp. 3-10);but to equate "Presocratic"with"empirical" as Robin-son, at least, appearsto do) seems to me highlyinadvisable.6


8/27

Phaedrus, he difficulty temsfromPlato'suseof thewords&drandoVU'OTE- words whose primary enseshave to do withtemporalduration to talkaboutwhatwe wouldcallessentialproperties. 0 t is hard o knowhowelsehe could have expressedhimself,given the vocabulary vailable o him;butthe resultingambiguitywas a treacherousone."ISo much, then, forthe argumentgivenin the phrase&TEOVX 0koXELetoVEaTO6.While the argument s notone we canaccept,it is significant orthepictureof the soul thatit obligesPlatoto hold. He mustembracea viewofthe soul as not simply a self-moving hing, but as necessarily n unceasingself-motion. We will returnto this point later; for the moment, let uscontinue withthe analysisof the argument.Sub-argumentA for the mainpremise 2) is now complete, and Plato moves on to sub-argumentB; thediscussionhere is somewhatmore lengthy.Premise Bi) is stated in the same sentence we have been looking at forsome time; "only that which moves itself . . . is a source and first principleof motion for the other things that move" (c7-9).'2Bi) is not arguedfor10 Fora similaruse of 6e( and o'vnoxe,considerone of the waysinwhich PlatocommonlycontrastsFormsandparticulars.Formsare frequentlysaid to be "always" hesame;eachForm "always" possesses the property which makes it the specific Form that it is.Particulars are sometimes one way, sometimes the opposite way; but the Form ofBeauty, for example, is "never" other than beautiful. Examples of this usage are Rep.479a2-3, A,. 74b7-c3, and Symp. 21 1a3,bl-2.11Curiously enough, Plato appears to recognise the error in the Phaedo immediatelyafter he has committed it. (Curiously, because the interlocutorsare made to regardtheargument we have been discussing as entirely conclusive - 105e9.) He continues bypointing out that it needs to be shown that the soul is imperishable.He appearsto besayingthat to establishthat the soul "does not admitdeath"- i.e., that nothing is bothdead anda soul - is not to establish that it never ceases to exist;andthis is essentiallythepoint thatIhavejustbeen making. (See inparticularhe paragraph106b1-c7.)However,his way of closing this gap is rather lame; he simply says that of course that which is

6d6varogs also imperishable 106d2ff.). If "the soul is e0dvatos" means only that thesouldoes not admit death, ina sense which is compatiblewith the soul'sceasingto exist-as he appears to have just conceded- then this is plainly begging the question.12 Indeed, this sentence is dense to the point of being very confusing; it contains apremiseforsub-argumentA - aswell as a reason for it- anda premiseforsub-argumentB; moreover, the same wordsg6vov bh lb abTr6 Lvo Bverve as subject in the statementof both. I was originally tempted to think that what I am now calling Bi) was a secondsupporting consideration, parallel with &rEoOx&okoEinov taUT6,in favorof Ai). Butwhile this would reduce the numberof differentthings going on in the sentence, it cannotbe the rightway to read it; for no mention is made, here or anywhere,of the firstprincipleof motion being always in motion- as would be needed if the assertion n question (thatthat which moves itself is a first principleof motion) were to constitute support for Ai).Instead, this assertion leads directly into claims about an d4e s freedom fromyiveoLtandWoQ&-claims eading to what I now call Bii); the idea of constantmotion, which s atthe center of sub-argumentA, is left behind.

7


9/27

directly. Instead, Plato immediatelystates one half of Bii) -a'X be&ykvrltovdl) - and the argumentorBii) takeshim fromthere to 245e2.(Bii) is stated in full at d7-8; "it is not possiblethat this [i.e., thatwhichmovesitself]shouldeitherperishor cometo be".) However,thefirstpointhe presentsin favorof Bii) - namely,that everythingwhichcomes to bemust do so from a first principlewhichdoes not itself come to be fromanything lse (dl-2, repeatedat d6)- is alsoapoint n favorof Bi) (providedwe understandyeveovL s a species of xLvroLg - I shall return to thislater). Indeed, as if to signalthathe has been confirmingBi) at the sametime as he has been arguingfor Bii), Plato restatesBi) at d6-7; "thusthatwhichmoves itself by itself is a first principleof motion".Theargument or Bii) is asfollows.(I havejustmentioned hefirststageof it, butI shallrepeatthisfor clarity's ake.) A firstprinciple s ungenera-ted (ay'v-qTov),ince everything hatcomesto be comesto be outof a firstprinciple, and it (i.e., the first principle)does not come to be out ofanything lse (dl-2); if a firstprincipledidcometo beoutof something lse,then"it wouldno longerbe outof a firstprinciple hatall thatcomesto becomesto be" (d2-3) 1 This lastpoint ssomewhatobscure,andthetextmaybe faulty. But the general idea, that a first principleis necessarilynotgeneratedfrom somethingelse, seems clear enough;and it does followplausibly noughthata firstprinciplesungenerated, ssuminghatnothingcan generateitself. Hence, Plato continues,it mustalso be imperishable(d3-4);for (inviewof whathasjustbeensaid)if it wereto perish,nothingelsecouldbring t back ntobeing,norcouldanything lsecometo beoutofit (d4-6). One mightstill askwhythis showsthatit couldnot perish.Platogiveshis answerat d8-e2, in conjunctionwith his explicitstatementof thepremiseBii)withwhichwe arenow concerned.Essentially, he point sthatif it were to perish(so bringing o an end all possibilityof yEvFotg),theuniversewould collapseinto immobility.4 However, it is not statedwhy13 Reading*t &?XQlgn d3, and taking JC&V8 yLyv6Rtevovs the subject of yLyvoLo; inthis I follow Verdeniusandde Vries (opp. cit. ad loc.). Buttmann'sconjecture tTL?x1iwould make for much better sense (and for a closer fit with Cicero'stranslation),if wecould understand ytyVOLTos equivalent to dl; but this is surely impossible."4The balance of opinion now seems in favor of the mss. yEvrotv n el (also found inHermeias - see p. 117.24), and against Bumet's reading yfv d; Ev (followingPhiloponus). It is generally agreed that yfvEotv can be taken as equivalent to tcaytyv6pEva,and this gives good sense.Hermeias'view of the logicat thispointis puzzling.He saysthat once it hasbeen shownthat a first principleis ungenerated, that by itself suffices to show its imperishability(p. 117.17). In his view, therefore, the considerationsoffered in d4-e2 form a supple-mentary, and strictlyspeaking superfluous,argumentdg &biGvactovp. 117.17-25;cf.8


10/27

this, in turn,couldnot happen.'5This concludessub-argumentB for the mainpremise2); immediatelyafter, ate2-3, 2) is explicitly tated. Whatare we to make of sub-argumentB? There are two points about it which I find of interest. First, theargumentrequires that we think of yEVEOLgas a species of XIVaCLg. ForPlato introduces the notion of an aQxi XLV9(aWo;, and then immediatelygoeson to say(bywayof arguing orBii)) that"everythinghatcomes to becomesto be"out of an a'QxTI.or the argument o work,it mustobviouslybe the same kind of aQxqunderdiscussion hroughout; nd it follows thatXLVYiOLannotsimplymean"(loco)motion",but must referto anykind ofchangewhatever.However,there is nothingverystartling n this. We findjust such a broad notion of xivqcL;explicit in the Laws (again in thecontext of a discussionof soul as self-mover);at 893b6-894c8en kinds of"motion" (xLvivtL, also interchangeablyRETcaokX)re distinguished,two of which are yEVEFLg and pOoQasee, e.g., 894bll).16 Similarly, nPhysics I11.1 Aristotle gives his definition of motion (xivrJoL;) as thefulfilment of a potentialityqua potentiality,and immediatelygoes on todistinguishvariousspecies of motion, amongwhichare yEVEOL;and aoQd(201alO-16). And indeed, a strong connection between yEvrOL; and

xivroL; occurs as early as Parmenides:"Thatwhich is" in Parmenides sexplicitlysaid to be bothaye'- ov and&xLvTTov, nd thesetwopropertiesappear to be seen as closely connected - see especially DK B8.26-8.Parmenides does not appear to treat y~VEGL; as actually a species ofxLvrloGL;ut in his use of these notions, he certainly eems to foreshadow

103,11.3-6, wherehe saysthat the argumentas awhole consists of twosyllogismsplusonefurtherargument ?i5 dEbivvaTov).fail to understandthis; it seems to me that d4-e2 isintegral to the main argument, and builds very directlyupon the demonstration justabove that an &pxQis &yv og. Robinson (op. cit.) claimsagreementwithHermeiasonthis issue, but seems to me also to misconstrue Hermeias'view as to the extent of theargument ErigM6vvaTov,ocating it from d8-e2 only.15 The best comment on this point may be Hackforth's(op. cit., pp. 66-7) who simplysays"ThatwasapossibilitynevercontemplatedbyanyGreekthinker".As hepointsout,the possiblity in question is that there should be no yvEaLg whatever, not that someparticularcosmos should perish. The Greeks had no trouble conceiving this latterpossibility;Plato himselfsuggestsin the Timaeus 41a) that it is possible (though in fact,since the creator is good, it will not happen to this cosmos), and many PresocraticandHellenistic schools held that it actuallyoccurred.16 The Theaetetuss also relevanthere; in the context of the "secretdoctrine"associatedwith Protagoras, Heraclitus and others, the words nactvtayLyvETaL and nacvTaXLVELttaLppear to be intended as equivalent (compare 152d8with 183a5).9


11/27

those who do. There are, then, respectableparallelsfor the idea that"comingto be" is a kindof x(vrt'Cg.'7On the otherhand, thisdoes notmean we shouldsimplygrantPlatotheidea and moveon. It may be understandablehat he shouldhave regardedy?vws1; as a species of xUvroLV; ut I think that questionscan still beraisedabout the role this assimilationplays in the argument.Recall thatPlato has just claimedthat a self-mover s a firstprincipleof motionforeverythingelse that moves. We have now discoveredthat "motion"in-cludes"coming o be";but presumablythoughthis is notexplicitly tatedhere) it includesother thingsas well - at least some of the otherkinds of"motion"mentioned nthe Lawsand inAristotle'sPhysics.Butif thisis so- if thereareseveraldifferentkindsof x(V1OL; - one mightwonderwhy thesame thingshouldhave to be a first principle or allof them. If we acceptthat there are suchthingsas self-movers,we can also acceptthat these areresponsible orthe "motion"of everything lse. But it is notclearwhyanyone self-mover houldhave to be responsible or everyone of the differentspecies of xCvrioM.For example, why should not one thing (or kind ofthing) be a first principleof yCvFsog,and some other thing (or kind ofthing) a first principle of locomotion? Plato's argumentrequires thatanythingwhichis a self-mover s a first principlespecificallyof y'vECtL;but it is not obviousto me whythis shouldbetakenfor granted.Needlesstosay, Plato does not respond o thisquery;andin view of theparallels justadduced romParmenides,Aristotleand elsewhere n Plato, this shouldnodoubt not surpriseus. Amongotherthings,these parallelsdemonstrateapervasivetendencyin Greek thoughtto see all the processessubsumedunderthe headingof xivrjo5L, n the broad sense we have examined,asbeing very intimatelyrelated. (In Parmenidesand Plato, at least, thistendencyresultsfrom the central contrast n both their philosophiesbe-tween the worldof changeand the worldof thechangeless, he worldof Toov;someonefor whomthis distinctionwasprimarywouldnaturallyendtogrouptogetherall speciesof change,as beingon a par.)Here, then, is one assumption,or set of assumptions,n thispartof theargument. move now to the secondof mytwo observations.Notonlydoesthe argumentrequirethat "motion" ncludes"comingto be", and thatanythingwhich is a first principleof "motion"is a first principleof all

17 Hermeiasseemsquite unruffledbythis idea;in discussing his partof the argument,hesimply remarks in passing iy y4p ytvEaL x(vT)o;t tOrtLV (p. 116.13), as if this isentirely commonplace.10


12/27

speciesof "motion";'8t alsoappears,at least at first sight, to require hatthereis just oneprinciple f motion n the entireuniverse.Fortheargumentfor the indestructibility f the principleof motion rests,as we saw, on theassertion hat allyFVetLgwouldcease with its destruction.But if there wasmore thanone principleof motion,it is notclearwhythedestruction f anyindividualprinciplewouldresult nthe collapseof theuniverse; o longas atleast one principlewas in operation at any given time, it seems (givenPlato'sother assumptions)as if yFVEOLtcould continue. Apparently, hen,Platois simplytakingforgranted hat thereis not more thanone principleof motion.

But there is somethingvery peculiaraboutthis. Recallthat Platois justabout to identify hat whichmoves tselfwith soul(this s step1) of the mainargument,according o my analysis).Sincesub-argumentB has identifiedthat which moves itself as the principleof motion, we are led to infer, bysimpletransitivity, hat soulis the principleof motion.But now,if the logicof sub-argumentB requires hat there be just one principleof motion, itappears o followthat there must be justone soul. And this, besides beingplainly contrary to any commonsenseview of the soul, seems flatly tocontradict the myth which immediately follows the proof, in which apluralityof individual ouls is discussed.Somethinghas gone wronghere;and since,on thisview of the matter, heinconsistency eemsso blatant,weshould probablyconclude that the fault lies not in Plato, but in our in-terpretationof him.Oneway to eliminate his apparent ontradictionmightbe to suggest hatPlato is implicitlyoperatingwhith some notionof a World Soul. That is,perhapshe is thinkingof individual oulsas beingall ultimatelyaspectsofsomelarger,unitary oul of cosmicproportions. nthis waythe plurality findividual ouls wouldbe only superficial,and wouldbe consistentwiththeprinciple of motion in the universe being in a deeper sense one, as theargumentfor imperishability equires. Besides making Plato's train ofthought coherent, this proposal seems to have at least some historicalplausibility.First, a doctrine of World Soul certainlywas adopted byvarious later philosophicalschools - by the Stoics and, perhaps moresignificantly,by the Neo-Platonists and it is hardnot to see the presentpassageas in some way prefiguring hese later ideas. Second, the Timaeusmakeslarge use of the concept of a WorldSoul (though t lookshere as ifindividual ouls exist in their own right, n addition o the WorldSoul, not18 This is perhaps too strong. Strictly, all that the argumentrequiresis that anythingwhich is a first principle of any species of "motion" is also a firstprincipleof yE'VEGLg.

11


13/27

as aspectsof it'9).Despite these parallels,however,I do not think his is theright way to understand his part of the Phaedrus. t wouldnot be surpri-sing, in viewof theparallels, f Platowere operatinghere with a conceptionof WorldSoul;butthe parallelsdo not provideany positiveevidence thathe is doing so. And the fact is that there is absolutelyno hint of any suchconception n thePhaedrus tself. We findno suggestion,either n the proofof immortality r in the succeedingmyth, that all our souls are ultimatelyaspectsof the same thing, or that our ultimategoal, in striving o escapefrom the cycle of rebirth, is reabsorption n some largerunity. On thecontrary,I wouldsay, it is the individuality f our souls, the differencesbetween them, thatis emphasised n the myth.20Iconclude hatwe are not entitledto readthe hypothesisof a WorldSoulinto the Phaedrus; nd the problemremainsasto howwe areto makesenseof Plato's apparentassumption that there is just one self-mover. Butperhaps hereis anotherwayto understand hematter.Possiblyhe isusing"VPuX"s a mass term, analogousto "water"or "electricity".2'n thiscase, it wouldnotbe that therewas one soul- the WorldSoul;rather, herewould be a single kind of stuff (just as water is a single kindof stuff), of

t9 The creationof individualsouls (or rather, of those souls and partsof souls that areimmortal)is described at 41d4ff. The creator is said to fashion these souls out of theremainderof theelementspreviouslyusedto fashionthe WorldSoul, mixingtheminthesame bowl, and in the same manner (except with some dilution), as was used for theWorldSoul. Obviously,it is hardto know how, if at all, this is to be cashedout literally.Butit isat leastimplied, I take it, thatindividual oulsarenotsimplyaspectsof the WorldSoul; they enjoy a separateexistence.It is sometimes saidthat a WorldSoul is also to be found in the Laws, but this is muchlessclear;as far as I know, a WorldSoul is neverexplicitlyreferred o in thatdialogue. Ishallbrieflytouch upon this point again nearthe end.20Think,for example,of the distinctionbetweengods' soulsand human souls (246a-b);between the twelve companiesof souls, each led by a differentgod (246d6-247a4);andbetween the ten types of human lives, correspondingto variousconditions of humansouls at birth(248c2-e3). While none of these distinctions s formally nconsistentwiththe notion of a World Soul, they do indicate that Plato is choosing to focus on thedifferencesbetween souls, not on their fundamentalunity;and this, I think, makes itimplausibleto suppose that he has a WorldSoul in mind- given that there is nothingwhatever in the text to suggest it.21 In what follows, I am expandingon a suggestionby Tony Long. This is perhapsanappropriate place also to thank him more generally for much helpful criticism andencouragementas thispaperwasdeveloping- especially on the mattersI amnow aboutto introduce.12


14/27

which individual souls (like individualpools of water) consist.22Now,anythingwhich is true of water as such (for example, that its chemicalcomposition s H20), orof electricityassuch, is alsotrueof any individualpool of water,or of anyindividual lectrical urrent;andsimilarly, f soulisbeing conceived of along the samelines, anythingwhich is trueof soul assuchwill alsobe trueof individual ouls. But thepropertywhich,bythe endof the argument,we discover o be true of soul as such is precisely mmor-tality.Thus it will follow, on thisunderstanding, hat anygivenindividualsoul is immortal a conclusionwhichPlato obviouslywants to uphold.Moreover,if thisis right, we canrespectboththe logicof sub-argumentBand the pluralityof individualsouls. Sub-argumentB requires,in somesense, thesingularity f soul. Butthis does notmeanthatwe need to ascribeto Plato theview that, out of allthe particularsin theuniverse,onlyone is asoul. If "soul" is a single kindof stuff, the argumentwill work perfectlywell. For if this stuff is responsible for all y'4veOLg in the universe, thedestructionof this stuffwould indeedresult n the universe'scollapse;and22 Myuse of the term"stuff" s perhapsa littleunusual,and Ishoulddefine it aspreciselyas I can. To begin with what is uncontroversial,all stuffsare designatedby massterms,but not all masstermsare the namesof stuffs. For abstractnouns, such as "hunger"or"wisdom", qualify as mass nouns (they do not occur in the plural, nor can they bequalifiedby numericaladjectives); yet it would be bizarre to call hungeror wisdom astuff. Now, this might suggest that stuffs are by definitionmaterial;and in this case Iwould not, of course, wantto suggest thatPlatothinksof soul as a stuff. But however itmaybe in ordinaryusage, I intendto use the word"stuff" n sucha waythat there canbesaidto be non-materialstuffs.Inmyusage, the referentof anymassnounwhich s not anabstractnounwillcountas astuff. (Here I amassuming ome intuitivesense of whatis anabstractnoun; I admit that it is very hard to give a foolproof definition. On this andseveral other complications in the notion of a stuff, see V.C. Chappell, "Stuff andThings", PAS 71 (1970-1)61-76- an articlefromwhich I have profitedin writingthis.)Thuselectricity,thoughnot inanyobvioussense material, s a stuff;andso, too, is soul-if it is truethatPlatoisusing"pu " as amassterm.Forthisreason, electricity sperhapsthe most useful analogy to keep in mindin whatfollows.Another parallel whichmaybe helpfulis the concept of "spiritual ubstance" n earlymodernphilosophy;a famouspassagewhichmakesuse of thisconcept is the chapter onidentityin Locke'sEssay(Bk. II, ch. XXVII, "OfIdentityandDiversity").Here Lockeraises the possibilitythat some contemporaryperson'ssoul mightbe composed of thesame spiritual substance as that which made up the soul of Socrates (though thispossibility is, accordingto him, irrelevantto questions about identity) - just as twomaterialobjects existing in non-overlappingperiodsof time mightbe composed of thesame materialsubstance.In myusage,we mightsaythatspiritualsubstance,like Plato'ssoul, is a kindof immaterial tuffof whichsouls arecomposed(though I do not wanttotake the parallelany furtherthan that); while we may find such a picturehighlyalien,Locke's account (even if it is not offered in an entirely serious spirit) does, I think,illustratethat the concept of an immaterialstuff is a perfectlycoherentone.

13


15/27

from this it does indeedfollow, on Plato's assumptions, hat the stuff willnecessarilynot perish.But all this is quite compatiblewithsaying hat thereare manyindividual ouls- just as water (or electricity) s a single kind ofstuff, yet there are manypools of water (and many electricalcurrents).Equally,the singularity f the stuff "soul" s quitecompatiblewiththe ideathatsoulshave differentiable arts,and withthe ideathat there are qualita-tive differencesbetween souls (bothof whichwe subsequentlyearn n themythof the charioteersandtheirhorses). Forwater,electricityandthe likeare similarlydifferentiable;water is composedof hydrogenand oxygen,and differentelectricalcurrentscome in differentvoltages.

This understanding f soul seems, then, to fit the context somewhatbetter thanthe previous deaof a WorldSoul. In addition,Plato'susageofthe term"9vx" itself seems more consonantwiththe notionof soul as astuff (in the sense I have explained).Throughout he argument,"pVX"occurs n the singularwithoutarticle.If he hadin minda WorldSoul, onemighthave expectedhimto refer o itusing hedefinitearticle;but heneverspeaksof"A vx", onlyof "Vu "323Grammatically,hat s, he doesseemto be using the word as a massterm;24ndthis is exactlywhat we wouldexpect if he is thinkingof soul as a stuff. While the evidence is all too23The one possibleexception is 246b6, at the beginning of the myth, where some mss.have ni&oaA Vuxi,also i Vuxhn&aoa.As faras I can gather fromLSJ and fromGreekgrammars,both these phraseswould have to mean "The whole soul".And sinceit isclearfrom the context that the reference is not to individual souls (for no individualsoul,whether in its entirety or not, "takes care of all that is soulless"), it would have to be to aWorldSoul. If so, however, itwould be the sole explicit mention of theWorldSoul in thewhole dialogue; and its intrusion here, after a complicatedproof of the immortalityofsoul whichmakes no explicituse of such a notion, would, I think,be verysurprising.Myclaimregarding he usageof Vu should not, therefore,be upsetbythese ms. variants;we shouldfollow Hermeiasand Simplicius,and readVurX2&aa. (All moderneditors ofwhom I am aware do indeed adopt this reading.) Given the prevalence of doctrinesof aWorld Soul in later antiquity(including, as I said, Neoplatonicdoctrines), one might inany case argue thatVuyX3tdoa, which does not entail anynotion of a WorldSoul, is thelectio difficilior.24 This is not necessarily rueof Vuxh3rtoa in245c5;taken in isolation, the phrasecouldequally be translated "all soul" or "every soul", and commentators have sometimesexercisedthemselves over which sense Plato intends. Plainlythis cannot be decided byinspection of the phrase itself. The question must be whetherone or the other sense isrequired by the logic of the argument; and this question we are now in a position totackle. Given the presuppositionsof sub-argumentB that I have unearthed, the collec-tive sense "all soul" seems clearly more relevant. As we saw, the principleof motionthere underdiscussion s thought of as in some sense single andwhole (whetheror not Iam rightabout the exactconception); and the distributive ense "every soul"would runcounter to this. On the other hand, the argument s presumably ntended to show that14


16/27

nebulous o admitof certainty,I thinkwe are entitled at least to a tentativeconclusion namely, that the underlyingpictureof soul with whichPlato isoperating s indeedthislatterone, and not the one which nvolvesa WorldSoul.25I have dwelt at some lengthon the presuppositions f sub-argumentB,both because of their interestfor our broaderunderstanding f Plato (amatter o whichI shallreturn hortly),and becauseof the greatdifficultyofelucidating hem. The remainderof the argument an be dealtwith muchmorebriefly.Ouranalysishad reached245e2. Thefollowingsentence(e2-4) containsa statementof both the mainpremises2) and 1) (in that order).To recall, premise 1) states that soul is that which is its own source ofmotion; and Platonow offersus a considerationn favor of this assertion.The argument s simplythat any bodywithan externalsourceof motionis"soulless" (&ivXov), whereasone with an internalsource of motion is"ensouled" EtVuXov)e4-6). On its own, this seems somewhat limsy; t isnot at all clear thatit justifiesthe conclusion hat"soul" s a self-mover nthe very strong sense used above. We may certainlymake a distinctionbetween bodies that needto be pushedor pulledby somethingelse in orderto move, and bodiesthatdo not; andthese two classes do seem to corres-pond with the classes of soulless and ensouledbodiesrespectively.Butit issurelyquite possible, forall that Platohas said, thatbodiesof the latterclassshould have received some initial propulsion nto motion from outside,even if they need no further propulsionafter that. And this, of course,woulddisqualify hem as self-movers; or as we saw, Plato is thinkingof aeach individualsoul is immortal;so that the sense "every soul", while less suited to thetenor of the argumentitself (and to the usage of "Vux" elsewhere in the argument),cannot be decisivelyruledout. Hackforthmay be rightto conclude (op. cit., p. 64) that"the distinctionbetween collective and distributivesenses is not here before his mind";see his discussionfor several other useful insights.25 I should perhaps briefly allude at this point to Hermeias' views on how Plato isconceiving of soul- sinceit waswith his adviceon thissubjectthatI began. While he citesPosidonius as having thought that Plato had in mind the World Soul (apparently asdistinct rom individualsouls), he himself rejects the idea. Relying heavily on 0ecag mExai &vOQ(w;ivTSn 245c3, he says that Plato must be thinkingof the rationalsoul -since this is the kind of soul possessed by gods and humans,but not by other ensouledbeings (p. 102.15ff.). This seems to me acceptableas far as it goes; but as the last fewpages should have made clear, I do not think it goes far enough. Plato's logic raisesdeeper problems,whichI have triedto address;neitherHermeiasnoranyone else seemsto have faced these problems. Robinson (op. cit.) follows Hermeias, but then makesmatters worse by suggesting that Plato is perhaps thinkingnot of the rational soul intoto, but of the rationalpart of the soul. This seemsto me obviously wrongin view of themyth, where the immortalsoul is clearly protrayed as tripartite;more on this in sec-tion II.

15


17/27


18/27

phrase &TEoIUx &oXeikitov EaT6O,Plato's support for premise Ai) -namely, that soul, the self-mover, is in unceasing self-motion, andnecessarily o. Further,wediscovered, nconnectionwithpremiseBi), thatsoulhas a cosmicsignificance;or asself-mover,soulmoves notonlyitselfbut everything lse - where"moves" snot restrictedo whatwewouldcall".motion",but includes(probablyamongother things) generation.Andfinally,therewas the puzzlingpoint raisedby premiseBii), that "soul" sbeingconceivedof as insome sense unitary.While heissue sveryobscure,we concluded that it was best to understand"soul" as a unitary (non-material)stuff, of whichoursoulsconsist. How does a conceptionof soulcontaining hese featuresrelateto otherconceptions hatwe findinPlato?I shallbegin by summarising few familiarpointsfrom the Phaedo andthe Republic.In thesetwo dialogues,a strictdivision s madebetweentworealms,the realm of the changeableandthe realmof the changeless.Theformer s the realmof sensibleobjects,the latterof intelligibleobjects;andin the Republic,at least, it is the latterclassof objectswhich, just becausethey are changeless, alone fully warrantthe title of "things that are"(v&Ta).Now, inthe Phaedo hesoulisargued o be akinto theForms thatis, to the objects granted to belong to the non-composite,changeless,intelligible class; and from this it is deduced that the soul, too, is non-compositeandchangeless,andtherefore mmortal 78b4ff.).Orat least, itis claimed, the soul in its essentialnature s non-compositeandchangeless.However,becauseof itsassociationwiththebody,it isbound, nthis ife, topartakeof the changeable o some extent- though this taintis somethingwe should striveto minimise.In the Republic, he pictureof the soul is morecomplicated; or in BookIV we are told that the soul consistsof three parts, and that our task is toachievethe appropriate armonybetweenthem. Now, the two lower partsof the soul, at least, appear o be very much subjectto change;27nd so it27 This is not, as far as I know, explicitlystated. But there is much emphasis, in thedescription of the inferior states and inferior souls in Bks. VIII and IX, on theprogressivelygreaterinstabilityand variabilityof the various kindsof life. The less theinfluenceexerted by the rationalpartof the soul, and the greater the power of the twolower parts (particularly R1LORLa, which is throughout seen as standing in starkeroppositionwith the rational),the morethe person, orthe state, issubjectto change. Alsorelevant s the discussion,againin Bk. IX (580d-588a),of the differenttypesof pleasuresassociatedwitheachpartof the soul. Here the pleasuresof EhI&RLeVareidentified as thepleasuresof the body, andas suchintrinsically hangeable;by contrast,the pleasuresofthe rational part come from its communion with that which truly is - that which ischangeless- and so are themselvesnot subjectto change. Platohassome troublefittingthe OVUtOeLEbUnto this discussion, but he does place it in the same category as thebALOlURilltLXoV586c7-d2).

17


19/27

might seem that the Republic'sview of the soulwas a fundamentaldepar-ture from that of the Phaedo. However, a strongcase can be made forsayingthat the two dialoguesare reallyconsistentwithone another.Forone thing,the idealstatefor the soul in the Republic thoughmostpeopleare incapableof attaining t) is still rationalcontemplation;and this is astate where the lower two partsof the soul, andchangeitself, appeartohave no place. But more importantly, he argument or immortality nBook X seemsto implythat, as in the Phaedo,the soul in its truenature snon-compositeand changeless.As we see it, it is "composedout of manyelementsandnot enjoying he finestcomposition"611b5-6),and s "fullofvariability ndunlikenessanddifference" b2-3).However, his sdueto itsassociationwiththebody; f we were to see the soulas it really s, freefromsuch association,we wouldprobably ind thatit wasjust theopposite.It ishardnot to readthis as suggesting hat in its true nature,the soul is nottripartite thatthe divisionargued or inBookIV pertainsonly to the soulas embodied.18To be sure, the tone is tentative; but the view beingexpressedseems clearenough.Let usreturn o thePhaedrus.How doesthePhaedo/Republiciewof thesoul compare with the underlyingconception we discovered in thePhaedrus'argument or immortality?The first featurein that underlyingconceptionwasthat soul was that whichmoves itself;andsince"motion"hereincludesallkindsof change,thisappears o stand nsimplecontradic-tion withthe view Ihavejustbeen describing.Now, if we restrictourselvesto the bare assertion"soul is that which moves itself' (which was mypremise1)), it is not, infact,clearthat thetwo viewsare formallynconsis-tent. For the Phaedoand the Republicallow that the soul does undergochangewhenin thebody;and ndeed,the evidence or premise1)concernsthe distinctionbetweenensouledandsoullessbodies.The issue snot, then,assimpleas it mightseem. However,as we saw,theunderlying onceptioninthe Phaedruss notjustthatsouls do at timesmove themselves,butthatsoulis necessarily lways nmotion.In otherwords,soul mustbe inmotionboth in andout of the body;in the Republic'serminology, he soul "initstrue nature" s inunceasingmotion.Andthisconceptiondoes undoubtedlystandin oppositionto that of the Phaedoand the Republic.Instead,it isalignedwith views whichwe can confidentlyplace at the end of Plato'scareer. I am thinkingin particularof the Laws, where the definition28The disclaimerat the beginningof the Bk. IV argument, o the effect thatthe presentmethods are inadequate for a precise understanding 435c9-dS),may be intended toaccommodate this point.18


20/27

(Xoyog)of soul is saidto be "thatmotionwhich scapableof moving tself'(896al-2); exceptthatsoul is here seen not as the thingwhichmovesitself,but as itself a species of motion,29 his is identicalwith whatthe Phaedrusrefers o as theoia'Cv TExaa X6yovof soul (246e3). But another mportantpassage s Sophist248a4-249d4.Here Plato argues, against he view of theRepublicand elsewhere,that "thatwhich s" isnotrestrictedo thechange-less, but encompasses the changeable as well; in fact, it is plausible tosuppose that the putative targetof the argument, ome people called the"Friendsof Forms", is really his own earlier self. Most interestingly, hekey point in the argument s that if the Friendsof Formswere right, then"life, soul and thought" (248e6-7) could not belong to the realmof thatwhich is. Obviously t is assumednot only that soulis a "thingwhich s"-which, I take it, Plato assumedat every stage 0- but also that soul belongsto the classof changing hings. This argument, hen, is highlycongenial othe underlyingconceptionof soul in the Phaedrus.For there, as we saw,soul is in constant self-motion;and by the PhaedolRepublic riterion orBeing, this would entail that soul was not a "thingwhich is". So far,therefore, the matter appears relatively straightforward;he Phaedrusseems to squarewith Plato's ater thought,not with what is usuallyseen ashis middle period.Let usnow turn rom he Phaedrus' rgumentorimmortalityo the mythwhichfollows. At first sight, this seems to run against he conclusionI justreached.For themyth ncludes everalelementswhichare clearlyreminis-cent of the Phaedoand the Republic.First,the image of the charioteerandtwo horses, one of which is obedient to the charioteerand the other not,evidentlyrecallsthe tripartite oul in the Republic;at 247c7-8, ndeed, thecharioteer s explicitly dentifiedas vouv. Again, the supremevision thesoulcanexperience sthe "vision"of theForms;andas in theRepublic, heFormsconstitute he realmof "thatwhich s" (247d3),and are the entitiesof which rue knowledge s possible as contrastedwith the sensiblerealm,the realm of yCvVEGL,f which one can have only opnion. Moreover, t isthrough ecollection f the Formsbeheldbefore birth hat understandingnthis life is said to be possible(249b-c); his doctrinegoes backto the Phaedoand to the Meno. Finally,of course, as in the Phaedo, the goal of life is toescapefromthe cycleof rebirthas soon as possible, and themeans s to liveas a philosopher.29This differenceis noted by Demos, op. cit., p. 136.30 Except in the Timaeus.For the Timaeus'very peculiarviewof thecomposition of soul,see furthernote 36.

19


21/27

We cannotdeny, then, that thereare many continuitiesbetweentheseother dialogues andthe Phaedrus.31 t the same time, though,thereareseveralcrucialdifferences,which makethe continuitiesmuch ess signifi-cantthanthey mayseem. Onepointwhichhasoftenbeen noticed sthat inthe Phaedrus,unlikethe Republic if my own andothers' readingof it iscorrect), all three partsof the soul are immortal; ven the gods'souls havethree parts, thoughin their case the differentpartsare not in conflict.32Again, the end-pointof the soul's progress s not changelessand eternalcontemplationof the Forms, but an eternal traversingof the heavens,punctuatedby contemplationof the Forms at intervals.Moreover,if wetakethe detailsof the mythseriously as I thinkwe should thelowertwopartsof the soul (representedbythe horses) playan indispensable ole inthis eternaltraversing,and in transportinghe charioteer,reason,to the31 My wording here and elsewhere assumes the standardview that the Phaedrus s laterthan the Phaedo and the Republic; this seems to me justified by precisely the kinds ofcomparisonswith other dialogues to whichthis entire half of the paper is devoted.32 Pace Guthrie, who thinks that the soul is tripartiteonly during the cycle of rebirth.(See "Plato's Views on the Nature of the Soul", reprinted n Vol. 11of Plato, ed. G.Vlastos, New York, 1971; and Vol. IV, pp. 421-5 of Guthrie's A History of GreekPhilosophy, Cambridge,1975.) Because the gods' souls arefree from nternalconflict, hethinks that they must be unitary; and the same goes, he believes, for those originallyhumansouls who have escapedthe cycle. In this way he is able to hold thatthe Phaedrusis fundamentally onsistentwiththe Republic.That the gods' soulsconsist of acharioteerand two horses he puts downas just part of the machineryof the myth.Thisseemsto mequite untenable. It is true that Plato switches to the mythicalmode here because, as hesays, it is beyond humanpowersto give a fully accurate iteraldescriptionof the soul; thepicture conveyed, therefore, is only tentative and only partial.But this does not meanthat we are free to discardany element of the myth thatwe choose. He composed themythashe didbecause he felt that this was theclosestapproximationo the truthofwhichhe was capable. If he had meant to suggestthat the gods' souls did not consist of threeparts, he could very easily have composed that part of the myth differently. Nor,incidentally, does he ever suggest that the blackhorse of the humansoul becomes whiteon thesoul'sescape fromthe cycle; rather, t becomes progressivelymore obedientto thecharioteer.Guthrie'sinterpretation hus involves a furtherdeparturefrom what Platoactuallytells us.Another author who seeks to show that Plato's views on the compositionof the soulremain essentially the same is Robert W. Hall, "4u ' as Differentiated Unity in thePhilosophyof Plato", Phronesis8 (1963) 63-82. As the title suggests, Hall arguesthat inthe Republic, the Phaedrusandevery other dialogue thatdealswiththe subject, the soulis viewed as a differentiatedunity. This seems to me almosttrivially rue, but obviouslyinadequate to show that Plato's views did not change. For the question now simplybecomes "into what aspectsis this unity differentiated?"And to this question, as Hallseems quite ready to admit, different dialogues return different (and incompatible)answers.20


22/27

pointwhereit cancontemplate he Forms;reasonon its ownappears o berelatively nert. The ideal state is no longerone where the lower, change-able parts of the soul are transcended.On the contrary, hey are just asimportantas reason tself to the soul'sfulfillingof itsfinaldestiny;andthisfinal destiny tselfconsistsnot of freedom rom allchange,but of constant,albeit regular,motion.Finally,whilethe PhaedolRepublic onceptionof aschism between Being and Becomingis maintained, he criterion or thedivisioncan no longerbe quite the same. For as I saidearlier,I presumethatateverystagePlato wouldhaveheld that the soul is a "thingwhich s";but if so, changelessness an no longerbe anecessary ondition orBeingfor as we haveseen, the soul, even in its truenature, s no longerchange-less. Plato does not explicitly ell us thatthe soul is anov; indeed,he seemsto restrict he title to the Forms.However,he doessaythat the soul "feastson" and "is nourishedby"Toov; and themetaphorof nourishmentmust,Itake it, implythat the nature of the soul is not basicallyalien from thatwhich nourishes t - in other words, that the soul, too, is an ov.On this lastpoint,it maybe that Plato did notmanage o take accountofall the implications f what he was saying.But even so, there is at least ashift away from the Phaedo and the Republicand towardsthe Sophist,where it is argued hat we must not restrict he title of Toov to changelessentities. As forthe other issuesI just mentioned, he Phaedrusmythseemsto be definitelyalignedwith the view of soul propoundedn the Laws, andagainstthose earlierdialogues.As we saw, the Laws defines soul as self-motion;and the souls in the Phaedrusmyth, insteadof being ideallystatic,are in constant, self-propelledmotion. Moreover, the myth assignsanessential role in this motion to those partsof the soul other than reason.Again, inthe Laws, the following ist of motionsof the soul is given:"wish,reflection, foresight, counsel, judgement, true or false, pleasure, pain,hope, fear, hate, love" (897al-3, A.E. Taylor's translation).The Lawsdoes not makeexplicituseof the notionof a tripartite oul. However, f oneapproaches his list with the tripartite oul in mind,andaskswhich tems onthe list can be assigned o the rationalpart, the answerseems clearly o be"not all of them": some, at least, would have to belongto the other twoparts.So it turnsout, Ithink,thatthe Phaedrusmyth s in centralrespects loserto Plato's later views than to the Phaedo and the Republic; he similaritieswith the latter dialoguesseem to me less significant han the differences.We can now see, too, that the myth is, after all, in agreementwith theargument for immortality which immediately precedes it. Given thesimilaritiesbetween the myth and the earlierdialogues, it looked as if the

21


23/27

myth and the proof wereat odds with one another.In fact, however,bothviewthe soulas being n eternalmotion;and this setsthem both apart romthe earlierdialogues,where the soul is in its true naturechangeless,andalongsidecertain ater dialogues.33 here is, then, a deep connectionbe-tween the proofand the myth aconnectionwhichhas rarelybeen noticed.I have so far said nothingaboutthe placeof the Timaeus.Thereis, ofcourse, muchin the Timaeusabout the soul; and since it is usuallycon-sidered a late dialogue, one mightexpect that it, too, would be naturallygroupedwith the Phaedrus,Sophist and Laws. Now, the datingof theTimaeushas beenthe subjectof muchheateddebate, andI cannotattemptto deal with this thornyquestion here. However, it is striking hat, withregard o the matterswe have looked at so far, the Timaeus s in severalrespects closer to the Phaedo and the Republic han to the later group.First, the Timaeus, ike those two dialogues,makes a strictdivision be-tween the realmsof Being andBecoming,with changelessness includingmotionlessness)repeatedlycited as a feature of the formerrealm andchangeas a featureof the latter.34 hisclearlyseparates he Timaeusromthe Sophist and the Laws, and separates it to some extent from thePhaedrus though, aswe saw,the Phaedruss not entirelystraightforwardabout the relation between change and Being. Second, the Timaeusemploys he notion of a tripartite oul; however,here Plato squiteexplicitthatonly therationalpart s immortal,whichplaces t withtheRepublic ndagainst he Phaedrus.Again, at 69c8ff. thereoccursa listof "terribleandnecessaryaffections"associatedwith themortalpartsof thesoul;thesearepleasure,pain, rashness, ear,anger,hope,sensationand ove. Theimmor-tal parthas none of these, except in so far as it is polluted by the mortalparts; nfact,it is to minimise hispollution hatthe mortalpartsarehousedinseparatepartsof the body.35 ut this isthas much n commonwith he listof "motions"of the soulin theLaws,whichI quoteda littlewhileago;andthose "motions"are certainlynot regardedas merely temporary,or as apollutionof anykind. Once more, the Timaeus ppears o fit lesswith the33 For a fullerdiscussionof ways in whichthe Phaedrusmyth departsfromthe Phaedoand the Republicwithregard o the natureof the soul, see Nussbaum,op. cit., section II("MoralPsychology"),pp. 92-107.34See, for example, 27d5ff., 29b5ff., 35al-3, 48e5ff., 51e6ff.3S It is curious, however, that at 42a-b most of the items on this list are apparentlyassignedto the immortalpartof thesoulalso. ButPlatodoes say thatthisis whathappensto it whenit is "implantedof necessity in bodies" (a3-4), and that the goal shouldbe toovercome these states as much as possible. Perhaps, then, this is a reference to thepollution by the mortalpartsthat we find in the other passage;if so, however, it is aconfusingone, since the mortalpartshave not yet been introduced.22


24/27

later dialoguesthan with the earlier ones. Finally,the Timaeusdoes notdefinesoul as thatwhichmoves tself,orsuggest hat t isresponsibleorthemotion of everythingelse. It is true that the World Soul does undergocertainharmonious osmic revolutions 35alff.); but these are initiatedbyits creator,notby itself,andtheyare not whatcausesmotion n otherthings- though they do appear o playsome kind of regulating unction.36Whatwe seem to have foundso far is that there areroughly wo sets ofideas about the soul in Plato- one of whichappears o be earlierandonelater - and that the Phaedrus,both the proof and the myth, displaysessentially the later set. Now, it may look as if the introductionof theTimaeusdoes not importantly hangethis picture.Formy remarks n thelastparagraphmightsuggest hat we could retain he twofolddivision,andsimplygroupthe Timaeuswith the earlierset. There are someoddities,tobe sure; but the Timaeus' iew of the soul, it mightbe said, is basically hesame as that of the Republicand the Phaedo. However,the situation s notso simple. Recall that the underlying onceptionof soul that I detected inthe Phaedrus' rgumentorimmortality ad several eatures.Two of thesefeatureswe have not yetdiscussed; ne was that soul playsa vitalroleintheoperation nthe cosmos, andthe other was that soul is in some sense one -probablya singlekindof stuff. These featurescomplicate he picture n twoways. First, they alert us to the fact that what I have been callingthe laterconception s actuallya lot less unified than I have implied. And second,they inclineus to group he Timaeuswiththe laterset of dialogues,andnot,as we were doing just now, with the earlierset. I shall brieflyexpanduponthese points.In the Phaedrus'proof, Plato regardssoul as having a cosmic signifi-cance;for it turnsout thatsoul is responsible or the motion, including heyEVEOL;, f everything that is not soul. This agrees with the myth; at 246b6we are told that "all soultakes care of all that is soulless".Now, this idea isnot present in the Phaedo or the Republic.In both dialoguesthere is thesuggestionthat the universe s orderedfor the best, and this may suggestsome beneficentordering orce. But Platodoes not tell us aboutanysuchordering orce, and he certainlydoes not suggestthat it is soul. Again, thePhaedrus marks a departurefrom those dialogues; and in this respect,again, it is in agreementwith the Laws. As the "motionwhichmoves itselfby itself', soul is said in the Lawsto "'directverything n heaven, earthand36Given the Timaeus'criteria orBeing, the factthat the WorldSoul is in motionshouldmean that it is not in the full sense a "thingwhich is". This is indeed the case; for themixtureoutof whichthe WorldSoul is formed(as well asothersouls) is a mixtureof T6 ovand T6 yLyv6otcvov35al-3). As far as I know, this idea is perfectlyunique in Plato.

23


25/27

sea" (896e8-9). But the other dialoguewhichmakessoul a cosmicforce isthe Timaeus.As we saw recently,the view is not the sameas that of thePhaedrusand the Laws. It is not suggestedthat the WorldSoul initiatesmotionin otherthings,northat it is self-moving.In the framework f theTimaeus, he originof motioncan be accounted or in otherways;there isthe Craftsman,who creates andsets in motion the WorldSoul itself, andthere is also the disorderlyprecosmicmotion in the Receptacleof Beco-ming.Instead,the WorldSoulis saidto be the "mistress nd ruler" 34c5)of its body, the cosmos; and its functionis apparently n some way topreserveorder. A further difference(if I was right earlier) is that thePhaedrusdoes not employthe notionof a WorldSoul. (The positionof theLaws in this respectis not clear to me, for reasons whichI shall go intoshortly.)But despitethese differences, he Timaeus eems in at least oneway closer to the laterdialoguesthan the earlierones.The final feature of the conception of soul we extractedfrom thePhaedrus' proof - albeit tentatively - was that soul is a single kind of stuff(in the sense explained see note 22); how does this comparewithotherdialogues?The Phaedoand the Republic ontainno hint of sucha concep-tion, though they do not obviouslyexclude it. The one other dialoguewheresoul definitely s regardedas a stuff inmysense, and a singleone, isthe Timaeus.As we havenoted, the Craftsmanmixesa certaincompoundsubstance,and out of this substanceall souls are formed.Now, the sub-stance put together n the mixingbowlclearlyqualifiesas a stuff;thisstuffcouldverywell be designatedbythe mass term "soul"(thoughPlatodoesnot appearto do so). Individual ouls (both the WorldSoul and humansouls) consist,then,of portionsof the stuff"soul";and this isprecisely hepicture foundto besuggestedbythePhaedrus.Onemight aythatthis s afar too literalreadingof the Timaeus'mythical pparatus.But I believethatone shouldalwaystake seriously he detailsof Platonicmyths. Obviouslysome features,suchas themixingbowl,will be factoredout whenwe trytopenetrate o the coreof doctrinePlatois trying o present.But if Platohadnot meantto conveythe impression hatthere is a kind of stuff of whichsouls are composed,he could havewrittena differentmyththat did nothave these implications;he was not forcedto write it as he did. (On thispoint, see also notes 3 and32.)Here, then, is anotherapparentpointof contact betweenthe Phaedrusandthe Timaeus.37Let us see, finally,whetherwe canrelate the Lawsto3' I have throughoutbeen cautious about attributing he notion of soul as a stuff to thePhaedrus;and it will be rememberedthatthe alternative,whichI consideredbutfound24


26/27

thesetwo. Plainly, heevidenceforanynotion of soul asa stuff nthe Lawswill be indirect;but thereis one pointthat seemsto me suggestive.Thisisthat Plato is strikinglyevasive about the number of souls that run thecosmos. He is clear that this is done by one or moregood souls; but herefuses to commithimself as to how many. (This is why it is hard to tellwhetheror not he has in mind a WorldSoul.) Mostlyhe uses the singular4uxiwithoutarticle,as inthe Phaedrus'proof;buthe speaksalsoof "soulorsouls"(899b5,cf. 898c7-8),andhe neverdecideswhether hesingular rthe pluralis more appropriate.He seems, then, to be either uncertainabout,oruninterestedn, the individuation f souls; yet thisappearsnottodetract nany wayfromhisconfidence nthedoctrineof soulasactivatorofthe cosmos. Now, this does not, of course, show conclusively hat he isthinkingof soul as a stuff. On the otherhand,if he wasconceivingof soul(or simplyof good soul) as a uniform tuffdistributed bout the universe,this insoucianceaboutthe numberof goodsoulswouldbe entirelyunder-standable.If there is a certainkindof stuffwhosenature t is to activate hecosmos,then it is indeedof minor mportance supposing hat the motionsof the cosmos arewhatwe areseekingto understand howportionsof thisstuff are to be individuated.However,this is as far as we canpursuethequestion. It is possiblethat the Laws as well as the Timaeuss in line withthe Phaedrus n thismatter;butthe evidence stoo slender or usto decidewith anyconfidence.Moreover,even ifall this s correct and I amfarfrominsistingon it- itstill leavesoutof account he Laws' diosyncratic otionofevil soul. The one thing Plato isclear about n the Laws, withregard o thenumberof souls, is thatthere areatleast two.Thesoul or souls thatactivatethe cosmos aregood; however, theremustalso be one or moreevil souls(896e4-6), to accountfor the presenceof evil in the world. Of course, itmightstill be thatthere was a singlestuff "soul"(whoseessencewasself-motion)encompassingbothgood andevil soul. But it is obviously mpos-sible to tell whetheror not this is Plato'sconception; he remarkson evilsoul - indeed, on soul in general - in the Laws are just too sketchy.Whatgeneralconclusions, f any,canwe draw romthisinvestigation? tissometimes uggested hatthe Phaedruss a "transitional" ialogue.Now,we haveexaminedonly a tiny fractionof the dialogue;and it may well bethat, concerning opics whichwe did not touchupon, this verdict s a fairless likely,wasthatthe Phaedruspresupposesa notion of WorldSoul. It isworthpointingout thateven if I waswrong in my choice between these alternatives even if we shouldread the Phaedrus as implyinga World Soul - the closest parallelwould still be theTimaeus.

25


27/27

one. But with regard o the natureof the soul, I believe, it needsat least tobe substantiallyqualified.Forto saythatthe dialogue s transitionals toimply hat there s an earlier et of doctrinesand a laterset of doctrines,andthat the Phaedrus s between the two. Thisis not entirelydevoid of truth,but it is misleading n two ways. First, as we have seen, in as muchas onecanspeakof two groupsof dialogues,anearlierand a later, the Phaedrusseems in most respects again, of those thathave been the subjecthere) tobelongsolidlywith the latergroup; he transition, or the mostpart, occursbefore the Phaedrus,notduring t. But second,thereare not just two viewsof the soul in Plato. The Phaedoand the Republicmaywithsome justicebeconsidered as expressinga single view - though even this is perhapsanexaggeration;but amongthe laterdialogues, hereis farless homogeneity.In particular, he position of the Timaeus,on this as on so manyotherissues, is baffling. It is dangerous,then, to speakof "transitions"n thiscontext. We can certainly indvarious rends nPlato'swritings nthesoul;andwe cantryto describe he positionof the Phaedrus mong hese trends.But we shouldnot think n termsofstablebodiesof doctrinebetweenwhichthe Phaedrusmight be consideredas intermediate.Thisconclusion s nodoubtnothing urprising; eoplehave oftentoldusnot to forcePlato ntoastraitjacket. Much more interesting - or so I hope - are the detailedconsiderationswhich have led us there.University f California

26

immortality and the nature of the soul in the phaedrus.pdf

Documents