The Menu for Choice

How do States Make Decisions?

I. The state as unitary actor?

A. Unitary Actors?1. Realism and the “National

Interest”a. What is the “national interest”?

b. Why does regime type matter?

B. “As If” Assumption

1. Support: Power politics models, situations of constrained choice

2. Problem: Internal differences matter in unexpected ways – “as if” assumption generates incorrect predictions

C. The Puzzle: How does a State Select From the Menu?

II. Arrow’s Theorem and the National Interest

A. Focus: How to aggregate individual interests into social or national interest

B. Setting and question1. Three or more citizens2. Three or more outcomes or objectives they must

rank: Example: economic growth, human rights, and military security.

3. Is there a reasonable way for society as a whole to rank the outcomes? Could be anything – voting, polling, mind-reading, etc. Is there any system at all that would be reasonable?

C. Notation

1. Choices or outcomes are indicated by capital letters: A, B, C, etc.

2. Preferences indicated by use of letters p, i, or r:

Strong preference: If someone prefers one option to another we write: A p B

Indifference: If someone thinks A and B are about equal, we write A i B

Weak preference: If A p B or A i B then A r B. So A r B means “A is at least as good as B”

2. A minimal definition of rationality

a. Preferences are connected: Given any pair of options, someone can relate them with p, i, or r.

b. Preferences are transitive: If A r B and B r C then A r C.

D. Characteristics of a desirable aggregation technique

1. Universality: Our technique should apply to any group of rational people, regardless of their specific preferences about A, B, or C.

2. Non-Dictatorship

If Bob says: A p BBut everyone else says B p A then…

We should not conclude that for society, A p B

3. Unanimity

If everyone agrees that A p B then…

We should conclude that for society, A p B

4. Collective Rationality

If individuals are rational, our technique should create social preferences that are rational

Remember what this means: connected and transitive preferences

5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

Suppose I have the options A, B, and C. I can rank these however I want. One example: A p B p C

Now suppose a new option is available: D. I must not change the order of A, B, and C relative to each other. Starting with above example:

D p A p B p C OK A p D p B p C OK A p B p D p C OK A p B p C p D OK D p B p A p C Not OK (B and A swapped places)

Restaurant analogy: Waiter offers chicken or fish. I like chicken better. Waiter comes back and explains there is also beef. I now decide I want the fish. (Not OK)

D. Characteristics of a desirable aggregation technique (revisited)

1. Universality: Applies to people with different values or beliefs

2. Non-Dictatorship: No one person’s preference outweighs everyone else together

3. Unanimity: If everyone prefers one option to another, then so should society as a whole

4. Collective Rationality: Should produce a transitive ranking of options

5. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: New options don’t change the relative ranks of earlier options

E. Conclusion and Implications

1. Arrow proved these conditions cannot all be true!2. Implications

a. There are times when there is no single “national interest,” “general will” or “will of the people”

b. Rational individuals may not make a rational collectivityc. Preference cycles and the power of agenda-setting

Voter 1: A p B p C Voter 2: B p C p A Voter 3: C p A p B SOCIETY:

A p B B p C C p A!

III. Beyond “National Interest” – Opportunity and Willingness Revisited

A. Reminder: First lecture of class outlined the menu for choice approach

B. What affects states’ opportunities?1. System: Position in hierarchies2. Region: Neighborhood effects of regime, trade, and

conflict 3. Dyad: Trade dependence, relative power4. State: Power projection capability, stage of

development

C. What about willingness? Need to move BELOW state level of analysis!

IV. Selectorate Theory: A Framework for Understanding Willingness

A. Division of society:1. Leader: Decides public policy

2. Selectorate: set of people with legal right to participate in selection of the government

a. Democracies: Adult citizens

b. Monarchies: Royalty or nobles

c. Some autocracies have large selectorates (single-party states, rigged elections, etc.) Why…?

3. Winning Coalition: Number of selectorate actually needed to gain/retain power

a. Democracies: About half of S

b. Autocracies: Military leaders, key nobles, etc.

4. Disenfranchised: Powerless

Selectorate Theory’s Division

Society’s Disenfranchised

Selectorate

Winning Coalition

Leader

B. Regime Types: Three combinations

W = Size of winning coalition

S = Size of selectorate

W/S = Regime Type

Typical Regimes:Winning Coalition Size

Small Large

Selectorate Size

SmallMonarchy/

JuntaN/A

Large Autocracy Democracy

C. Policy Tools1. Allocation of resources

a. Public Goods: National security, prosperity, etc.

i. Benefit the entire selectorate (S) – both supporters and opponents/defectors

ii. Collective in nature: joint and nonexcludable (economic growth, safety, clean air, etc.)

b. Private Goods: Benefit supporters only (W)

2. Leaders prefer to use private goods to remain in power (punish defection)

D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W

1. W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high defect if private goods at less than maximum

Large W/S: Democracy and Monarchy/ Junta (Chance of being needed is high)

Selectorate Winning Coalition

D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W

1. W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high defect if private goods at less than maximum

2. W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low defection offers little prospect of increased private goods

Small W/S: Autocracy (Chance of being needed is low)

Selectorate Winning Coalition

D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W

1. W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high defect if private goods at less than maximum

2. W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low defection offers little prospect of increased private goods

3. Small W: Easy to reward/punish defectors

4. Large W: Hard to reward/punish defectors

5. Institutions and Incentivesa. Leader wants: Small W (easy to bribe if desired)

and large S (very small W/S means defection is unattractive). Result: Corruption possible but not required

b. Winning coalition wants: Small W (more private goods) and small S (large W/S means leader must devote most resources to bribes). Result: Corruption required.

c. Selectorate wants: Large W (focus on public goods) implies Large S. Result: Corruption difficult.

E. Evidence for Selectorate Theory

1. Development: Explains many previous failures (modernization, dependency)

a. Agrarian elite coalitions reduced productivity (large estates, agricultural protectionism) but…

b. Urban elite coalitions also reduced productivity (food subsidies, “the Iron Triangle”)

c. State control patronage and kickbacks (mere cosmetic differences between “socialist” or “capitalist” autocracies)

d. Autocracy forces corruption on the leader! Leaders who emphasize public goods are rejected explains post-colonial development

3. Foreign Policy

a. Democracies less likely to fight: leaders punished for public policy mistakes

b. Democracies more free-trade: general benefits of free trade > damage to specific groups

Evidence for Selectorate Theory: Democracy and Public Goods

Economic Growth Trade Policy

4. Other findings of selectorate theory

a. Economic/Political freedom associated with greater prosperity (weakly) and life expectancy (moderately)

b. Leaders in autocracies (Large S/Small W) last longer than those in democracies

c. Historical move away from monarchies, infrequency of juntas

5. Limits of selectorate theorya. Few useful policy recommendations :

“Pursue public goods so people re-elect you” is vague

b. Growth is only one public good – government may opt for social insurance, education, social welfare programs, etc in lieu of economic growth

c. National security vs. growth? Model has difficulty predicting both at once

American Foreign Policy

Below the State Level of Analysis

I. Interest Groups in International Politics The people matter (selectorate theory

says leaders emphasize public goods in democracies)

But politics is messy (“national interest” may not exist, which means public goods only go so far)

So how do interest groups affect leaders’ choices?

A. Interest Group Models1. Pluralism – Competing groups represented

according to numbers and issue salience2. Collective Action – Group goal as “public

good”a. Free-Rider Dilemma: Must use selective

incentives to overcomeb. Implication: Organization necessary for success

3. Winning Coalition: Many theories argue that leaders are most concerned preserving their coalition (listen to allies before enemies). Example: Bush and Republican support.

B. A Framework for Comparison: Who has influence?

1. Individuals

1. Individuals

1. Individuals -- Powerless alone

2. Unorganized Groups

2. Unorganized Groups -- Must be considered, but cannot set agenda

3. Organized groups

3. Organized groups -- Set agenda and affect public opinion

4. Benefits of Organizationa. Credible Commitment -- Conditional support

b. Outreach -- Publicity, Money, Media Access

c. Persuasion -- Information to representatives

C. How do interest groups affect international relations?

1. Collective action model is strongest: Discrete, organized, funded groups have the most influence

2. Which groups qualify in the US?

a. Funding: Which groups give the most money?i. Foreign and Defense Policy Groups:

Surprisingly little (< .1% of total funds raised)

ii. Industries Defense = More

$ but still behind most industries

Agriculture and Energy = Much more $

Labor = Even more

Conclusion: Banks > Manufacturing > Labor > Energy and Farm Interests > Defense > Foreign Policy Groups

b. Other forms of influence?

Ethnic interest groups: Additional influence in proportion to demographic size (Latinos, Jews, Armenians, etc.)

INGOs: Publicity, but usually limited direct political participation (legal restrictions)

c. Don’t forget Salience!

Explains why foreign policy groups have influence beyond funding and numbers: small, intensely interested groups get more than large but distracted groups.

Most influential: Well-funded groups with foreign policy focus (salience) and domestic ethnic base (e.g. AIPAC)

II. Public opinionA. Follow the Leader

1. “Rally ‘Round the Flag”

II. Public opinionA. Follow the Leader

1. “Rally ‘Round the Flag”

2. Trust in President

B. Long-term consistency on major issues

C. Military Operations1. Visible costs:

Casualties, Money2. Perceived National

Interest

Battle-Deaths and Support for Wars

Iraq (sketch)

D. Ideologies in Foreign Policy1. Liberal vs. Conservative – Limited Use:

US foreign policy shows remarkable continuity, many important issues don’t fall on liberal-conservative spectrum.

2. Isolationism vs. Internationalism – Incomplete

a. Isolationism: Avoid foreign commitments, stay at home

b.Internationalism: Active role in world affairs

c. Problem: What kind of internationalism?

D. Public vs. Power Elites: Forms of Internationalism

Cooperative Internationalism

Low High

Militant

Internationalism

Low

High

D. Public vs. Power Elites: Forms of Internationalism

Cooperative Internationalism

Low High

Militant

Internationalism

Low

Isolationist Accomodationist

High

Hardliner Internationalist

D. Public vs. Power Elites: Forms of Internationalism

1996 Data

Cooperative Internationalism

Low High

Militant

Internationalism

LowIsolationist

Public: 25%

AccomodationistPublic: 25%

High

HardlinerPublic: 25%

InternationalistPublic: 25%

D. Public vs. Power Elites: Forms of Internationalism

1996 Data

Cooperative Internationalism

Low High

Militant

Internationalism

LowIsolationist

Public: 25%

Political Elites: 10%

AccomodationistPublic: 25%

Political Elites: 50%

High

HardlinerPublic: 25%

Political Elites: 10%

InternationalistPublic: 25%

Political Elites: 30%