the making of fail state - the case of cosovo

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ART ICLE

The making of a failed state: the case

of Kosovo

Spyros Economides

Published online: 11 November 2011 Centre for European Studies 2011

Abstract The status of Kosovo remains an issue more than three years after its

unilateral declaration of independence. Since then, Kosovo has been maintained,

as a state, by an international presence and commitment. This article suggests

that the history of this commitment has been the cause of state failure and that

we are at a critical juncture in the future of this state.

Keywords Kosovo Serbia State failure Western Balkans

UNSC Resolution 1244 Ahtisaari Plan

Introduction

The recent European Commission progress report on Kosovo [3] and the

relevant section on Kosovo in the Commissions Enlargement Strategy and MainChallenges 20112012 make for depressing reading [2]. The reports make it

perfectly clear that Kosovo is lagging behind in all its reform efforts: politically,

economically and in the field of justice. The reports highlight weaknesses in

public administration, the rule of law, the protection of minorities and in the

fight against criminality and corruption. In economic terms, it is indicated that

Kosovo has made no progress towards establishing a functioning market

economy [2]. The perhaps unmanageable budget deficit has resulted in the

interruption of an International Monetary Fund Stand-By Arrangement and

Commission funding for macro-financial assistance. There is also the outstanding

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allegation stemming from the Council of Europes report on the Inhuman

treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, which

implicated high-ranking government officials [1].

The European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), deployed in Kosovo since

2008 under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has had itsauthority challenged and undermined by domestic actors, while the relationship

with Serbia remains very hostile. The recent dialogue opened up between

Belgrade and Pristina, brokered by the EU, has broken down after outbreaks of

violence at border crossings in northern Kosovo which had to be quelled by

Kosovo Force (KFOR). Kosovo is now recognised by 85 UN member states, which

may be a significant figure but falls far short of the two-thirds majority of the 193

UN members who would have to vote in favour for Kosovo to be admitted to the

UN. Equally importantly, five EU Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Romania,

Slovakia and Spain) have yet to recognise Kosovo.Essentially, what we have is a state which does not control all of its territory,

relies on external actors such as KFOR for the provision of internal security,

depends on financial assistance from Europe and further afield to prop up its

domestic economy, falls short in almost every area of reform and institution-

building (as identified by its primary sponsor, the EU), and is less-than-universally

recognised as a state. Some could say that this is a maintained state, but to all

intents and purposes it could also be classified as a failed state.

In all fairness, it is only just over three years since Kosovo declared its

independence and 12 years since the conflict there. However, it is clear thatsince 1999 Kosovo has been maintained by external actors and since

independence would have failed as a state were it not for substantial

international support. The key questions to be asked in this context are: How

did we get here? Has Kosovo ever truly functioned as a normal, sovereign state?

and How can its most serious issue, its status and hence its relationship with

Serbia, be managed, if not resolved?

Creating state failure

Kosovos current predicament stems directly from the two most important

documents and plans for its future, which have emanated from the UNs

attempts to reach a solution to Kosovos status. The first of these documents is

UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244, passed in June 1999. The second is

the Ahtisaari Plan, a set of proposals laid out by the UN Secretary Generals

Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari in March 2007. Each of these documents, in

content and tone, set the foundations for the difficulties we are encountering

within Kosovo today with respect to its status and in its international relations.

The implications of Resolution 1244

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that body over the implications of this type of challenge to a states sovereignty

and territorial integrity. Russia, for a variety of reasons, would never allow such a

resolution to be accepted by the Security Council, and division quickly emerged

in the EU, with five states evidently not willing to accept an independent Kosovo

without Serbias consent. The result was a stalemate which created conditionsnot of supervised independence of the state of Kosovo, but of an internationally

maintained entity short of statehood; in short, an entity in limbo.

The result of this impasse, both within the Security Council and in the EU, was

a dash to unilateral independence, which was declared by Kosovo on 17

February 2008. This unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), which met

with some Western support, with the UK, Germany, France and Italy quickly

recognising the new state, brought about the third stage in the failure of Kosovo

(of course, after a UDI one can talk of a failing or failed state). Essentially, Kosovo

entered the limbo mentioned above because its independence was notuniversally recognised. While it received recognition from significant actors like

the US and the aforementioned European states, the implication of a UDI which

seemingly infringed the general principles of international law, as well as the

right of Serbia to have a say over its sovereign territory, proved too much for the

majority of UN member states. This, in conjunction with an increasingly active

Serbian diplomatic effort to encourage states not to recognise it and the backing

of a potential Russian veto in the UN Security Council, meant that Kosovos

independence was incomplete. Its status, in practice, remained unresolved, it

was precluded from UN membership and effectively Serbia would have to beincluded in any dialogue facilitating a resolution of mutual differences. In

addition, the EU deployed EULEX, and (a much reduced) KFOR remained in place

to guarantee security between the two rival ethnic communities and perhaps

create the requisite space for reconciliation.

The EU had taken over from UNMIK as Kosovos material and technical

provider: Kosovo remained and remains dependent on the EU for its economic

survival. Its political and administrative institutions, and general internal

governance, are reliant on external support and legitimisation. However,

Europeans remain somewhat divided on Kosovos status. In a recent visit to

Belgrade, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made it clear, in no uncertain terms,

that Serbia would be wise to relinquish its claims over Kosovar territory and

make speedy concessions to Pristina if it wished for a smooth path to EU

membership. Others in the EU, especially those five states which still do not

recognise Kosovos independence, are less strident, seeking a negotiated

settlement and the agreement of Serbia in any solution. But behind this array of

actors lies perhaps the most significant external actor of all, the US. It was the

willingness and ability of the US to intervene, through NATO, in 1999 that

resulted in the beginning of the process of independence for Kosovo. Pristina

sees Washington as the greatest champion of its unilateral independence and, as

such, is often not concerned with what Europeans have to say. In Kosovos

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not be repeated. The Kosovar leadership knows this and exploits this support

accordingly.

Therefore what we have in Kosovo is a state in name, but not necessarily in

practice. Internationally, it has its supporters, some of them highly powerful and

influential, but Kosovo is recognised by less than half of the UNs membershipand is thus blocked from membership itself. Even its main provider, the EUthe

institution which maintains Kosovo economicallyharbours dissenters in its

midst. Russia and China oppose the recognition of Kosovo for their own national

interests far beyond the seeming defence of Serbias rights. In practice, Kosovo is

a state, but not to the whole international community: it is not, therefore, a

complete state. Domestically, as mentioned above, Kosovo can only survive and

function through external support. The Ahtisaari Plan spoke of supervised

independence. In effect what we have is a maintained state with a frozen

conflict which, without external support and provision, would surely fail. If thatcategorises Kosovo as a failed state, then so be it.

Where do we go from here?

The BelgradePristina dialogue, which began in March 2011 and is facilitated by

the EU, was meant to be the first step in an attempt to normalise relations

between Serbia and Kosovo. By tackling and agreeing to the free movement of

people and goods, and to regional cooperation, for example, it was hoped thatcommon ground could be found to start building towards a permanent

settlement of the status issue in a European context.

Serbias predicament is that domestic public opinion will not allow it to make

grand concessions in pursuit of European membership. Until recently, it was

believed that recognition of Kosovo would be the key to Serbias European

prospects, which would have been politically unsustainable for President Tadic

and his Democratic Party. In Pristina, European pressure can be side-stepped. If

Kosovo is not maintained internationallyand especially by the EUthen it will

create an unacceptable security vacuum in the Western Balkans, as well as

counting as a failure of the EUs foreign policy. With this in mind, and with the

unwavering backing of the US, Kosovo can afford to maintain a hard-line stance

in its relations with Serbia.

The end result is a stalemate which results in the types of violent outbreaks

seen in August and September between the ethnic communities, which draw in

the international presence as well.

The October Opinion of the Commission on Serbias membership prospects,

and the recommendation that candidacy be conferred, offers Belgrade a

tremendous opportunity. By the time the December meeting of the European

Council makes a final decision on Serbias EU prospects, Belgrade could make an

offer of substance. Serbian public opinion will not tolerate a relinquishing of all

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want to physically enforce the full independence plan proposed by Ahtisaari.

The solution lies in a formula which would afford an enhanced form of

autonomy for the Serbs in northern Kosovo, offer guarantees for those in the

enclaves below the Ibar River and perhaps grant special status to the religious

sites. In turn, Serbia would no longer object to other states recognition ofKosovo or block it from membership of international organisations such as the

UN. This would then allow for a gradual normalisation of SerbiaKosovo relations

and perhaps eventual recognition. It would also open the door for Serbias EU

candidacy and a date for accession negotiations to begin, which would go part-

way to placating the more nationalist elements in Serbia. If Serbia were to

propose this type of formulaand this is but a sketchin a clearly iterated and

viable plan, it would win many plaudits in European circles, perhaps swing the

decision of the upcoming European Council meeting and put an internationally

sponsored solution firmly on track. This would be a bold move which wouldhave to overcome hurdles both domestically and in Washington and Moscow. It

would take a true act of statesmanship for Belgrade to propose this and for it to

be carried. But it would also mean that Kosovos future would be firmly

ensconced within a regional and European perspective that would remove state

failure from the agenda.

References

1. Council of Europe (2010) AS/Jur 4612

2. European Commission (2011a) Enlargement strategy and main challenges 20112012. Commu-

nication, COM (2011) 666 final. Brussels, 12 October

3. European Commission (2011b) Kosovo 2011 Progress report. Commission staff working paper, SEC

(2011) 1207. Brussels, 12 October

4. United Nations (1999) UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Preamble. New York, 10 June

Spyros Economidesis a Senior Lecturer in International Relations and European

Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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