INDEX

No. Particulars

1. The Maharashtra Floods of 2005.

2. Financial Effect.

3. Effect on Mumbai.

4. Threat to Public Health.

5. Uncontrolled Development.

6. Antiquated Drainage System.

7. Conclusion.

Group Introduction

Roll No. Names.

22. Parmar Rishi.

23. Patel Ankit.

24. Patel Falgun.

25. Patel Mehul.

26. Patel Pragenesh.

27.

28.

The Maharashtra floods of 2005

The Maharashtra floods of 2005 refers to the flooding of many parts of the Indian state of Maharashtra including large areas of the metropolis Mumbai, a city located on the coast of the Arabian Sea, on the western coast of India, in which at least 1,000 people died. It occurred just one month after similar flooding in Gujarat.

The floods were caused by the eighth heaviest ever recorded 24-hour rainfall figure of 994 mm (39.1 inches) which lashed the metropolis on 26 July 2005, and intermittently continued for the next day. 644 mm (25.4 inches) was received within the 12-hr period between 8am and 8pm. Torrential rainfall continued for the next week. The highest 24-hour period in India was 1,168 mm (46.0 inches) in Aminidivi in the Union Territory of Lakshadweep on 6 May 2004 although some reports suggest that it was a new Indian record. The previous record high rainfall in a 24-hour period for Mumbai was 575 mm (22.6 inches) in 1974.

Other places to be severely affected were Raigad, Chiplun, Ratnagiri and Kalyan in Maharashtra and the southern state of Goa.

The rains slackened between the 28 July and 30 July but picked up in intensity on July 31. The Maharashtra state government declared 27 and 28 as a state holiday for the affected regions. The government also ordered all schools in the affected areas to close on August 1 and August 2. Mumbai Police commissioner Anami Narayan Roy requested all residents to stay indoors as far as possible on July 31 after heavy rains disrupted the city once again, grounding all flights for the day.

Financial effect

The financial cost of floods was unprecedented and these floods caused a stoppage of entire commercial, trading, and industrial activity for days. Preliminary indications indicate that the floods caused a direct loss of about Rs. 450 crores (€80 million or US$100 million). The financial impact of the floods were manifested in a variety of ways:

The banking transactions across the counters were adversely affected and many branches and commercial establishments were unable to function from late evening of 26 July 2005. The state government declared the 27th (and later, 28th) of July as a public holiday. ATM networks of several banks, which included the State Bank of India, the nation's largest national bank; ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank, and several foreign banks like Citibank and HSBC, stopped functioning from the afternoon of 26 July 2005 at all the centers of Mumbai. ATM transactions could not be carried out in

several parts of India on 26 July 2005 or 27 July 2005 due to failure of the connectivity with their central systems located in Mumbai.

Effect on Mumbai's links to the rest of the world

For the first time ever, Mumbai's domestic and international airports (including Chatrapati Shivaji International Airport, Sahar and Juhu aerodrome) were shut for more than 30 hours due to heavy flooding of the runways and extremely poor visibility. Over 700 flights were cancelled or delayed. The airports reopened on the morning of 28 July 2005. Rediff. Within 24 hours of the airports becoming operational, there were 185 departures and 184 arrivals, including international flights. Again from early morning of 31 July, with increase in water logging of the runways and different parts of Mumbai, most of the flights were indefinitely cancelled.

Rail links were disrupted, and reports on late evening of 30 July indicated cancellation of several long distance trains up to 6 August, 2005.

Transport stats 52 local trains damaged 37,000 auto rickshaws spoilt 4,000 taxis 900 BEST buses damaged 10,000 trucks and tempos grounded

Threat to public health

The rain water caused the sewage system to overflow and all water lines were contaminated. The Government ordered all housing societies to add chlorine to their water tanks while they decontaminate the water supply.

Thousands of animal carcasses floated in the flood waters, raising concerns about the possibility of disease.

Reports in the media warned of the threat of waterborne diseases, and hospitals and health centers geared up to distribute free medicines to check any outbreak.

Map showing wards declared critical areas for being hygienically sensitive

On August 11, the state government declared an epidemic of leptospirosis in Mumbai and its outskirts, later clarifying that there was no such threat anywhere else in Maharashtra. 66 people died of fever suspected to be leptospirosis. 749 people were admitted with such fever, with 41 cases "unstable" and in an advanced stage of the disease. The BMC declared three zones - P South (Goregaon) ward, L ward (Kurla) and H East (Bandra-Kalina) - as critical areas for being "hygienically sensitive".

Uncontrolled, unplanned development in Northern Suburbs

Unlike South Mumbai, development in northern suburbs of Mumbai is haphazard and buildings are constructed without proper planning. The drainage plans in northern suburbs is chalked out as and when required in a particular area and not from an overall point of view.

No environment clearance is mandatory for large urban construction projects in northern Mumbai. Officials in the environment ministry claimed that it was not practical to impose new guidelines with retrospective effect "as there are millions of buildings"

Antiquated drainage system

The present storm-water drainage system in Mumbai was put in place in the early 20th century and is capable of carrying only 25 millimetres of water per hour which was

extremely inadequate on a day when 994 mm of rain fell in the city. The drainage system is also clogged at several places.

Only 3 'outfalls' (ways out to the sea) are equipped with floodgates whereas the remaining 102 open directly into the sea. As a result, there is no way to stop the seawater from rushing into the drainage system during high tide.

In 1990, an ambitious plan was drawn to overhaul the city's storm water drainage system which had not been reviewed in over 50 years. A project costing approximately 600 crore rupees was proposed by UK based consultants hired by the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation to study the matter. Implementation of the project would have ensured that rainwater did not flood the streets of Mumbai. The project was planned to have completed by 2002 and aimed to enhance the drainage system through larger diameter storm water drains and pipes, using pumps wherever necessary and removing encroachments. The project, if implemented would have doubled the storm water carrying capacity to 50 mm per hour.

The BMC committee had rejected the proposed project on the grounds that it was "too costly".

CONCLUSION

Thousands of schoolchildren were stranded due to flooding and could not reach home for up to 18 hours. The subsequent two days were declared as school and college holidays by the state government. The city region and the suburbs that make up the

metropolis of Mumbai received 994 mm (39.1 inches).

Areas in Mumbai badly affected by the flooding

The rains hit the state of Goa and parts of western Maharashtra on July 25. Adding to the chaos was the lack of public information. Radio stations and many television stations did not receive any weather warnings or alerts by the civic agencies. The Met department blamed it on the lack of sophisticated weather radars which would have given a 3 hour prior warning.

References

News Paper Web sites

Yahoo.com & Google.com

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

We are extremely grateful to Mrs. SACHIN JOSHI for giving me this opportunity of working upon this project. We are thankful to her in valuable guidance & advice.

We are thank over librarian Mrs. ALKA WADHWANA. Who help in us in research of book? I am grateful to thanks class mates for cooperating me on this subject for making the project.

Presented To:-

(Sachin Joshi)