the kula-ring of bronislaw malinowski co-evolution of … · the kula-ring of bronislaw malinowski...
TRANSCRIPT
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw MalinowskiCo-Evolution of an Economic and
Ceremonial Exchange System
Rolf ZieglerInstitute of SociologyUniversity of Munich
Bronislaw Malinowski1922
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Theoretical interpretations have so far concentrated on the functions of the Kula
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Theoretical interpretations have so far concentrated on the functions of the Kula
Unsolved problem: What kind of starting mechanism can explain the emergence of the Kula exchange?
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Twofold basic aim: to theoretically derive the behavioral
assumptions of a starting mechanism for the emergence and co-evolution of a peaceful system of economic and ceremonial exchange from game-theoretic reasoning
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Twofold basic aim: to theoretically derive the behavioral
assumptions of a starting mechanism for the emergence and co-evolution of a peaceful system of economic and ceremonial exchange from game-theoretic reasoning
to use simulation as a methodological device in order to demonstrate the macro-social consequences of a multi-level, multi-agent, dynamic system and compare them with the observed structure
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
A short description of the social
system of Kula exchange
Kitava
Kiriwina
Kayleula
Sinaketa
Vakuta
Amphletts
NW Dobu
Dobu
SE Dobu
East Cape
East EndIslands
Wari
Tubetube
Misima
Laughlan
Alcesters
Woodlark
Marshall Bennets
Kula-expedition
Sailing boat
Karumosa, a Kula canoe from the Trobriand-island
A friendly welcome
Ceremonial Dance
Amphlett Island pot
Trobriand gourd lime container
Yam storage shelter on Kiriwina, Trobriand Islands
Dancers at Kaibola, Kiriwina, Trobriand Islands
Dancers at Kaibola, Kiriwina, Trobriand Islands
A corpse covered with valuables
The Explanandum:the „Empirically Observed“ Kula Ring
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Soulava – Necklaces
Kiriwina
KitavaKaileula
Sinaketa
Vakuta
Amphletts
NW Dobu
SE Dobu
Dobu
East Cape
TubetubeEast EndIslands
Wari
Misima
Laughlan
MarshallBennets
Alcesters
Woodlark
The Kula-RingDirection and entry of necklaces
Mwali – Armshells
Kiriwina
KitavaKaileula
Sinaketa
Vakuta
Amphletts
NW Dobu
SE Dobu
Dobu
East Cape
TubetubeEast EndIslands
Wari
Misima
Laughlan
MarshallBennets
Alcesters
Woodlark
The Kula-RingDirection and entry of armshells
Kiriwina
KitavaKaileula
Sinaketa
Vakuta
Amphletts
NW Dobu
SE Dobu
Dobu
East Cape
TubetubeEast EndIslands
Wari
Misima
Laughlan
MarshallBennets
Alcesters
Woodlark
The Kula-Ring
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange
Three processes will be distinguished:
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange
Three processes will be distinguished: the development of an economic trading
network
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange
Three processes will be distinguished: the development of an economic trading
network the spread of peaceful relationships
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange
Three processes will be distinguished: the development of an economic trading
network the spread of peaceful relationships the evolution of a ceremonial exchange
network of Kula valuables
Problem 1:Establishing Economic Trade
Problem 1:Establishing Economic Trade
„Double coincidence of wants“
Problem 1:Establishing Economic Trade
„Double coincidence of wants“ Empirical boundary conditions:
geographic distances as indicators of costs supply and demand of 25 goods
Process 1:Results of the Economic Trading Module
This simple model is completely unable to reproduce the structure of the exchange network
Process 1:Results of the Economic Trading Module
This simple model is completely unable to reproduce the structure of the exchange network
Trading by middlemen has to be added as another incentive to obtain a good fit
Process 1:Results of the Economic Trading Module
This simple model is completely unable to reproduce the structure of the exchange network
Trading by middlemen has to be added as another incentive to obtain a good fitDemand is determined not only by consumptive needs but also by demand of other exchange partners
Problem 2: Establishing Social Order
The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game
Problem 2: Establishing Social Order
The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game
Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights
Problem 2: Establishing Social Order
The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game
Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights
Shadow of the future
Problem 2: Establishing Social Order
The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game
Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights
Shadow of the future Exit option
Problem 2: Establishing Social Order
The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game
Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights
Shadow of the future Exit option Importance of expectations, trust,
reputation and fear of ostracism
Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module
In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”
Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module
In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”
An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust
Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module
In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”
An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust
If a contact is made the chances of peaceful trading depend on the strategies used by both actors and the trust and perception of a conditionally cooperative host j about his “guest’s” reputation
Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module
In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”
An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust
If a contact is made the chances of peaceful trading depend on the strategies used by both actors and the trust and perception of a conditionally cooperative host j about his “guest’s” reputation
After an interaction has taken place both actors recognize and remember each other’s present true strategies
Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module
In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”
An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust
If a contact is made the chances of peaceful trading depend on the strategies used by both actors and the trust and perception of a conditionally cooperative host j about his “guest’s” reputation
After an interaction has taken place both actors recognize and remember each other’s present true strategies
Afterwards defective players adopt the conditionally cooperative TFT-exit strategy if they have made a certain number of contacts because of fear of exclusion due to a bad reputation
Process 2: Results of the Peace-spreading Module
Without trust, reputation and fear of ostracism a coherent network almost never develops
Process 2: Results of the Peace-spreading Module
Without trust, reputation and fear of ostracism a coherent network almost never develops
With trust, reputation mechanism working and fear of ostracism peace always prevails and all actors can satisfy their consumptive needs
Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions
Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions
If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system
Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions
If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system
Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving issuch a signaling system of peaceful intentions
Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions
If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system
Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving is such a signaling system of peaceful intentions
There is a common interest in creating the following convention: „Don‘t forget to present a gift, if you have a lasting interest!“
Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions
If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system
Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving is such a signaling system of peaceful intentions
There is a common interest in creating the following convention: „Don‘t forget to present a gift, if you have a lasting interest!“
The problem of cheating and trust
Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions
If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system
Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving is such a signaling system of peaceful intentions
There is a common interest in creating the following convention: „Don‘t forget to present a gift, if you have a lasting interest!“
The problem of cheating and trust The mechanism of reputation and the fear of
being ostracized foster both cooperative and honest behavior
The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes
EconomicBarter
Peaceful Cooperation
CeremonialExchange
The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes
EconomicBarter
Peaceful Cooperation
CeremonialExchange
Barter only possible if both actors cooperate
The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes
EconomicBarter
Peaceful Cooperation
CeremonialExchange
Barter only possible if both actors cooperate
Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation
The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes
Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is workingEconomic
Barter
Peaceful Cooperation
CeremonialExchange
Barter only possible if both actors cooperate
Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation
The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes
EconomicBarter
Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is working
Peaceful Cooperation
CeremonialExchange
Barter only possible if both actors cooperate
Exchange of Kula valuables only if trading is possible
Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation
The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes
Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is workingEconomic
Barter
Peaceful Cooperation
CeremonialExchange
Barter only possible if both actors cooperate
Exchange of Kula valuables only if trading is possible
Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation
Contact of Kula partners independent of distance
The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes
Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is workingEconomic
Barter
Peaceful Cooperation
CeremonialExchange
Barter only possible if both actors cooperate
Exchange of Kula valuables only if trading is possible
Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation
Contact of Kula partners independent of distance
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?
Goodness-of-fitness measures: Similarity of trading network Degree of clockwise circulation Reachability of gift exchange
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?
Goodness-of-fitness measures: Similarity of trading network Degree of clockwise circulation Reachability of gift exchange
Mean values of fixed points
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?
Goodness-of-fitness measures: Similarity of trading network Degree of clockwise circulation Reachability of gift exchange
Mean values of fixed points Aggregate simulated Kula Ring
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
The empirical fit of this baseline model is unsatisfactory
Mean(945 fixed points)
Aggregate
Similarity .539 .628
Circulation .064 .647
Reachability .483 .039
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
A substantial improvement is gained by differentiating between different historical phases in the emergence of the Kula-ring
Differentiation of Historical Phases
Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“
Differentiation of Historical Phases
Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“ Phase 1: the process develops among the 9
members of the Urkula in the Western part
Phase 1 ofthe Ur-Kula
Kiriwina
KitavaKaileula
Sinaketa
Vakuta
Amphletts
NW Dobu
SE Dobu
Dobu
East Cape
TubetubeEast EndIslands
Wari
Misima
Laughlan
MarshallBennets
Alcesters
Woodlark
Differentiation of Historical Phases
Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“ Phase 1: the process develops among the 9
members of the Urkula in the Western part Phase 2: the potential link between Tubetube
and Woodlark is “opened”
Phase 2 ofthe Ur-Kula
Kiriwina
KitavaKaileula
Sinaketa
Vakuta
Amphletts
NW Dobu
SE Dobu
Dobu
East Cape
TubetubeEast EndIslands
Wari
Misima
Laughlan
MarshallBennets
Alcesters
Woodlark
Differentiation of Historical Phases
Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“ Phase 1: the process develops among the 9
members of the Urkula in the Western part Phase 2: the potential link between Tubetube
and Woodlark is “opened” Phase 3: the simulated Urkula is embedded in
the total Kula; members of the Urkula stick to their “traditional way of ceremonial exchange” among themselves
Simulation Results with Historical Phases
Bifurcation of development depending on the outcome in the Ur-Kula
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
circulation measure
num
ber o
f fixe
d po
ints
Baseline Model
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
circulation measure
num
ber o
f fixe
d po
ints
Model with Historical Phases after positive Ur-Kula
Baseline Model
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
circulation measure
num
ber o
f fixe
d po
ints
Model with Historical Phases after positive Ur-KulaModel with Historical Phases after negative Ur-KulaBaseline Model
Simulation Results with Historical Phases
Bifurcation of development depending on the outcome in the Ur-Kula
Better goodness-of-fit
Simulation Results with Historical Phases(mean values of fixed points)
Baseline Model
(945 fixed points)
Model with Historical Phases
After positive Urkula (597 fixed points)
After negative Urkula (385 fixed points)
Similarity .539 .556 .556
Circulation .064 .395 –.340
Reachability .483 .657 .758
Simulation Results with Historical Phases(values of aggregate Kula)
Baseline Model
Model with Historical Phases
After positive Urkula
After negative Urkula
Similarity .628 .659 .659
Circulation .647 .622 –.676
Reachability .039 1.000 .595
The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
Limits and future directions