The Intergovernmental Dimension of EU Foreign and Security Policy:

Enacting Normative Meaning-in-Use in Policy Deliberation

Uwe Puetter / Antje Wiener

Uwe Puetter is Professor at the Department of Public Policy and Director of the Center for European Union Research at Central European University, Budapest. puetteru@ceu.hu

Antje Wiener is Professor of Political Science & Global Governance at the Faculty of Social & Economic Sciences, University of Hamburg. antje.wiener@wiso.uni-hamburg.de More information on the Center for European Union Research at Central European University can be found here: http://ceur.ceu.hu

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Introduction and analytical framework1 European Union (EU) foreign and security policy-making is undoubtedly one of the most dynamic areas of European integration. The level of coordination activity has dramatically increased over the last 15 years or so. With the recent changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty this trend is going to continue. New institutional capacities will evolve; existing structures will undergo adjustment. However, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) will be confined within an essentially intergovernmental setting for the foreseeable future. In addition, major foreign policy crisis situations regularly put CFSP governance under strain. This somewhat paradoxical picture poses a challenge to researchers. How can we consider the CFSP process as a dynamic and evolutionary one? How can we make sense of the constant alternation between consensus and conflict against the background of an ever more complex institutional architecture which implies a web of constant exchanges over policy options at the intergovernmental level? Finally, can we determine alternative institutional options within such intergovernmental setting which can be considered to improve the effectiveness of CFSP governance in terms of coherent and collective policy actions by the EU member states and the Union’s institutions?

This article seeks to respond to these questions by applying two distinct, yet interrelated, analytical perspectives to the analysis of contemporary intergovernmental policy coordination within CFSP: the contested norms approach (Wiener 2008) and the concept of deliberative intergovernmentalism (Puetter 2012). This perspective draws on interdisciplinary research on pluralist cosmopolitanism (Kleingeld 1999; Tully 2008; Zürn 2010).

Given the pre-dominantly intergovernmental character of CFSP we expect dynamism and evolution to occur mainly in two areas: first with regard to how foreign policy practice refers to underlying norms that constitute this policy field and, second, how the working methods and practices of core CFSP decision-making forums evolve. Thus, we distinguish between the content and the setting of the coordination process while assuming that both are closely interrelated.

Following the contested norms approach we expect shared policy norms in international settings to be contested by default. That is, in inter-national contexts which are defined by a low degree of shared social recognition and a high degree of diversity with regard to individual experience policy-makers’ expectations diverge. Subsequently they derive diverging policy options from norms despite a documented general agreement to adhere to them. However, we expect norm contestation to vary depending on what type of norm is subject to policy discourse. More specifically we distinguish between three types of norms according to their degree of generalisation, expected contestation and, accordingly, likelihood of convergence across national boundaries. (1) Fundamental norms such as human rights, sovereignty, democracy and the rule of law exist on the meta-level of international relations. They are defined in most general terms and hence the least likely to be contested and the most likely to converge in multi-national policy or politics. (2) Organising principles such as a the commitment to a combined civilian-military approach, the responsibility to protect or gender-mainstreaming evolve from multi-national negotiations on a

1 This working paper is the outcome of research carried out within the context of the RECON Integrated Project which is supported by the European Commission's Sixth Framework (Work Package 6, Partner 23). The authors gratefully acknowledge this support. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the RECON workshop 'What kind of democracy for what kind of European foreign and security policy?', Oslo, 16-17 September 2011. The authors thank the participants for their comments.

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meso-level; they qualify international interaction and are hence more specific than fundamental norms, less likely to be contested and more likely to converge. (3) Standardised procedures include most specific guidelines such as CFSP decision-making procedures and operational frameworks for CFSP missions. They are most specific with reference to domestic and EU-level contexts alike and therefore the least likely to be contested about their specific meaning, however, most likely to generate critique even resistance; and they are also highly likely to diverge according to their socio-cultural context of origin (compare Wiener 2008, 2009). The degree of contestation should be highest with regard to fundamental norms, so-called organising principles obtain a medium position and the lowest degree of contestation is expected at the level of standardised procedures (Wiener 2008: 37-58).

We expect CFSP policy coordination to move forward or evolve whenever the institutional architecture and practice of policy-making provides for so-called venues for contestation. This means an institutional setting which enables policy-makers to engage in collective processes of norm contestation and to obtain an understanding of diverse interpretations of key norms (Puetter 2007). It is only on the basis of this that an underlying working consensus may emerge over time. This consensus may comprise a greater convergence of views on some aspects and/or a better understanding of how to accommodate diverse policy preferences with reference to specific foreign policy scenarios. In some cases this may be manifest in a greater use of written policy documents which interpret and operationalize key CFSP norms and/or through informal resources such as a common understanding or an underlying working consensus among particular constituencies or groups of policy-makers.

This leads to the focus on the coordination setting. We understand CFSP policy coordination as deliberative intergovernmentalism. That is a decentralised policy setting in which successful policy formulation and implementation depends on the constant generation of consensus among independent actors (Puetter 2012). Contrary to decision-making under the classical Community method CFSP cannot rely on the instrument of EU law to engineer policy consistency. Consequently, the evolution of working methods and practices, which structure intergovernmental decision-making, gains in importance. Deliberative intergovernmentalism holds that a coordination setting can be assessed according to its potential to foster the closer integration of a independent actors into continuous processes of policy dialogue. Thus, the question is which institutional adjustments in the CFSP setting indicate that the most senior decision-makers have an increased opportunity to engage in collective processes of norm contestation and are therefore able to develop a common understanding of key policy norms in an international setting? Here, the degree of interaction, the extent to which it is possible to engage in substantial policy debates as well as the level of integration of political seniority and technical expertise are key indicators. As regards the introduction of new working methods to the coordination process, indicators for an increased potential of the coordination setting to provide venues for contestation are the focused use of informal working methods to improve dialogue among the most senior decision-makers. Also specific presidency arrangements are considered which are conducive for structuring policy debate and pro-actively identify diverging interpretations of policy norms. CE

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Reviewing CFSP arenas Following our two-fold conceptual approach we have analysed recent intergovernmental policy coordination practice within CFSP more closely. To this end we have looked at different CFSP arenas which are either related more closely to the content of policy coordination – i.e. positions of actors regarding specific policy issues – or to the setting, i.e. the practice and procedural arrangements of the coordination process or a particular working method. Thus, we use the term ‘arena’ for characterising a particular setting or venue for policy dialogue as well as a particular theme or aspect of it. In the following sections of this article we present our findings in a way that allows for (re-) connecting the two dimensions. In other words, we hold that it matters who says what and which context. The link between content and setting has also been emphasised in our questionnaire and interview guide used for more than 30 in-depth semi-structured expert interviews with CFSP policy-makers in Brussels, Berlin, London, Stockholm and Warsaw.2

Our choice of the individual CFSP arenas is informed by the idea that they provoke particular reactions on part of policy-makers. We derive this assumption from the analytical perspective of deliberative intergovernmentalism as far as CFSP negotiation settings are concerned. Here, we cover the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)3, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as discussions among the group of Political Directors. All settings are looked at with a particular focus on whether they encourage or discourage specific forms of policy dialogue and function as venues for norm contestation.

The selection of the particular content of policy dialogue and the policy issues at stake in CFSP follows the contested norms approach as we expect contestation to vary according to different norm types. Here, we have selected a mix of more general and more applied issues and debates. We focus on the more fundamental question as to how far CFSP is driven by a principled or a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. This CFSP arena is crucial for enhancing our standing of what role fundamental norms play in CFSP and in which way they are institutionalised. In a similar way – although already with a focus to more specific questions of foreign policy-making – we discuss the role of a potentially shared and particular European preference for a combined civilian-military approach in case of military intervention – a question which links the focus on fundamental norms and organising principles.4 We briefly review more generally two key arenas of EU foreign policy on which the EU has been constantly tested – the transatlantic partnership and the relations with Russia. Each of them reveals particularly well that a significant potential for norm contestation exists. Finally, we offer a brief insight into two policy episodes.

2 In order to allow for contextualising the responses by our interviewees while at the same

time preserving their anonymity we have grouped them into different categories such as ‘participant in PSC meetings’ or ‘foreign ministry official’. There are multiple interviewees in each category. We make reference to these categories throughout the text. Interview quotations are in italics. 3 This article covers CFSP practice before and after the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the FAC was referred to as the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).

4 This arena which we consider to be constituted by processes of contestation around an organising principle has been widely identified by the literature as being pivotal for characterising EU foreign policy. Our own research thus did not aim at repeating what we consider to be established through previous scholarly work (Manners 2006) but to look for variations in interpreting this organising principle of CSFP.

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First, the Georgia crisis in 2008 involved a military conflict between Russia and Georgia and provoked a relatively swiftly coordinated response including high profile intervention on part of the rotating EU presidency and the implementation of an EU monitoring mission. Second, we look at the EU’s reactions to three particular crisis situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the years 2003, 2006 and 2008.

Principled vs. pragmatic orientation of CFSP

The development of CFSP includes the definition of guiding principles and key objectives of EU foreign policy. Like other EU policy areas CFSP is founded on a quasi-constitutional basis through the relevant Treaty provisions (Article 21, TEU). In addition, the EU has sought to translate its overall policy principles into strategic guidelines. The most prominent document in this regard is the European Security Strategy (ESS). The European Council regularly specifies strategic policy guidelines. In order to understand the intergovernmental policy coordination environment of the CFSP field as a dynamic and evolutionary one, a key question is whether and how these substantial policy guidelines matter for CFSP practice. Shared interpretations of key policy guidelines and principles are crucial in order to generate consensus among independent actors in a decentralised decision-making structure. However, shared interpretations cannot be taken for granted but rather emerge over time through policy practice (Puetter and Wiener 2007). As the comparison with other intergovernmental policy areas such as economic policy coordination shows, such processes are likely to take a longer period of time and require collective experiences in norm application (Puetter 2006).

As regards current CFSP practice our interviewees disagree most when referring to the overall importance of the fundamental norms of EU foreign policy-making as specified in Article 21.1 (TEU). Individual responses are concentrated around two extreme positions. At the one end of the spectrum are those policy-makers who explicitly reject the idea that CFSP is or should be based on core principles which inform concrete policy decisions. As one participant in Nicolaidis Group meetings put it:

“Basically there are no guiding principles in foreign policy. We support what is in our interest.”

At the other end of the spectrum were a great number of respondents who are fairly convinced that CFSP is and should be founded on principles. As one foreign ministry official said:

“There are some underlying principles in the work of both [our national; country name deleted] foreign policy and that of the CFSP. They are clearly mentioned in the CFSP treaties and are democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. These principles are at the core when working with common foreign policy issues and should be so.”

While most of our respondents appear to have fairly well pronounced views on the matter of whether CFSP should follow a principled or pragmatic approach, we also noted that many of them believe that there are country specific attitudes. Scandinavian countries were seen (by their own officials and by others) as being those most supportive of a principled approach to foreign policy.5 Also Germany and the Netherlands were being mentioned as having a foreign policy based on identifiable principles such as human rights. While some

5 This has been highlighted by other research as well. See e.g. Jakobsen (2009) on the

credibility with which Scandinavian countries have adopted a principled human rights discourse in CFSP.

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officials did believe that foreign policy in general is based on pragmatism rather than on principles, we did not find many who clearly singled out individual member states pursuing such an approach. When asked about the practice of making reference to either the Treaty provisions or the ESS in policy debates most of our respondents doubted that these documents provide much orientation in specific debates.

Following our conceptualisation of the CFSP coordination setting as deliberative intergovernmentalism we should not only expect formal documents to be a resource for linking core principles and policy guidelines with decisions over policy but should also recognise the role of informal resources. A good example for such a resource would be an underlying working consensus which has developed over time among a key group of senior policy-makers. When asked about an underlying working consensus among CFSP policy-makers several respondents mentioned the group of PSC ambassadors. As one EU official with long-time experience in the preparation of PSC and FAC meetings pointed out:

“The PSC ambassadors are those who are the closest to an underlying working consensus or a common understanding.”

However, some PSC participants expressed frustration that the PSC has yet not advanced further in establishing “policy criteria and standards” and that ambassadors “often reinvent the wheel.”6

Civilian-military approach

The previous section reveals how fragile a principled approach to CFSP currently is. Although fundamental norms in EU foreign policy do seem to inform the way many policy-makers approach the interpretation of specific foreign policy issues, our empirical findings suggest that CFSP has yet to develop a more routinised form of norm application with regard to specific foreign policy contexts. CFSP practice does, however, reveal a certain degree of informal institutionalisation of fundamental norms in the form of organising principles of CFSP action.

The case for which this is most obvious is the preference for a combined civilian-military approach regarding EU-led interventions in third countries. We consider this policy approach as an organising principle of EU foreign policy. As in the case of the set of fundamental norms to which EU foreign policy subscribes, we consider this organising principle as being shared among EU member states in principle. At the same time we expect norm contestation and the emergence of divergent views on the exact definition and implementation of such a strategy in crisis situations. Therefore, we looked in our interviews more closely at how policy-makers refer to this policy principle. Contrary to our above findings on the overall foreign policy approach represented in CFSP a large number of our respondents converge in their assessment of the relevance of this particular principle for CFSP and are almost enthusiastic about its relevance for coordination arrangements at the EU level.

Many of our interviewees firmly believe that the combined civilian-military approach also makes CFSP different from other foreign and security policy approaches represented in international affairs. As one participant in PSC meetings pointed out:

“The ‘hard/soft’ capacity notion is crucial for everybody in the process – also for the member states – it is the distinctive feature of EU foreign policy. Others can’t do it. NATO is much more about ‘hard’ security.”

6 Participant in PSC meetings.

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Another PSC participant highlighted the difference with US foreign and security policy:

“The Americans see everything as being part of a military mission with a security objective. They speak about cleaning up villages and all that. We don’t do this. We want to establish a legal order and state structures following the principles of justice and law and we mean this.”

However, policy-makers also see limitations of this particular focus of CFSP. The organising principle of a combined civilian-military approach remains contested. One PSC participant explained under which conditions divergences are most likely to occur:

“Our divisions increase with the conflict spectrum. We are fairly good at the lower and middle level of the conflict spectrum but [the question of] war fighting will divide member states.”7

Transatlantic partnership

The question of transatlantic partnership is one of the most contested organising principles in CFSP. While all EU member states seem to subscribe to the particular importance of linking EU foreign and security policy with US policy, individual country positions can diverge fundamentally as the example of the US-led invasion in Iraq demonstrated most drastically. At present CFSP policy-makers seem to attach a lot of attention to prevent a repetition of such severe divisions in other areas. Our respondents were reluctant to spell out more clearly what for them transatlantic relations imply at the moment. Even those who identified individual countries which they considered emphasising the transatlantic link more than others stressed that it is important to avoid divisions within the EU. Such a view was reflected in the following comments of one PSC participant: “The transatlantic relationship should be also one [guiding principle on which all member states converge] but it is not always.” However, the same diplomat also pointed out that: “[p]eople are very eager to prevent a reoccurrence of the Iraq coordination failure.”8 And an official from a new member state underlined that EU-US relations are among the top priorities of his/her countries approach towards CFSP coordination: “We stick to our principles and priorities. They are the Eastern partnership, Afghanistan and EU-US relations.”9The replies to our questions related to EU crisis reactions after the experience of the divisions over the US-led invasion in Iraq. Our findings suggest that member states were eager to find a common position by all means also because they wanted to prevent the reoccurrence of such a situation of inner-EU conflict.

EU-Russia relations

As much as the EU finds it difficult to deal with the question of transatlantic partnership, it struggles with finding a unified position towards Russia. We consider the EU’s preference for close relations with Russia on a wide range of policy issues as an organising principle of EU foreign policy. Although this question is in many ways different from the idea of transatlantic partnership, which also has become manifest through the joined membership in NATO, EU relations with Russia are fairly institutionalised. This is reflected in a number of so-called first pillar policies towards Russia in the area of economic relations.

7 Participant in PSC meetings. 8 Participant in PSC meetings. 9 Member of European correspondent network.

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The EU’s emphasis on good relations with Russia also correspondents to the idea of a stable European neighbourhood. Member states, however, tend to diverge on how strict the EU should be with Russia in cases of disagreement and how much priority this organising principle should obtain compared to other priorities. Here, the focus is in particular on fundamental norms of EU foreign policy such as human rights and democracy.10

The issue of EU-Russia relations suggests a similar pattern as observed in the previous section on the transatlantic partnership. Although respondents acknowledged the importance of the issue for the coherent functioning of CFSP they admitted that the most senior policy-makers spend little time with explicitly discussing a strategic approach towards Russia and potential divisions between member states. At the same time, Russia – as much as the transatlantic link – is on their agenda all the time when it comes to deciding about specific EU activities and policy responses. As one PSC participant explained:

“It might be surprising but in fact Russia as such is relatively rarely a topic on the PSC. This is because relations are already highly institutionalised in terms of Community policies which apply to Russia – be it trade, energy, ENP issues – we don’t talk about it. Russia only becomes a topic in times of crisis when we have to react. There is nothing such as a strategic dialogue on EU-Russia relations. This is a pity – a neglect.”

Georgia crisis

In the summer 2008 an armed conflict erupted between Georgia and Russia. Russian troops occupied larger parts of Georgian territory and came close to the capital Tbilisi. French president Nikolas Sarkozy and his foreign minister Bernard Kouchner quickly moved to coordinate an EU response and personally embarked on diplomatic missions to Moscow and Tbilisi. The EU demanded the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory and set up the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM)11 to monitor the ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops as well as the refugee situation. Internal agreement within the EU was relatively swift and member states pledged the necessary resources for the mission. Our interviewees were unanimous in praising the EU’s response to the crisis as swift and appropriate. Many paid tribute to the leadership exercised by France on the matter. PSC participants explain the fact that the EU was able to reach consensus so quickly with the overall agreement that Russia had gone too far with invading Georgian territory – something no EU member state could accept. Several respondents mentioned that in their view Russia had crossed “too many red lines”12. A PSC participant emphasised how far the consensus in the committee went:

“The discussions we had in the PSC were ideologically motivated [as opposed to a purely pragmatic approach] in the sense that everybody quickly agreed that we need to have a common EU-27 approach to which all member states also should contribute during the implementation phase – not just a coalition of the willing and able. We wanted to make sure that the Russians and the Georgians saw that we are united in our effort.”

10 For a general analysis of lacking convergence among EU member state positions towards

Russia see also e.g. Haukkala (2008) and Schmidt-Felzmann (2008). A detailed examination of individual member state relations with Russia is provided by Leonard and Popescu (2007).

11 See for further details http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1512&lang=fr (accessed 25 August 2010).

12 This phrase is used by different respondents.

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Congo crises

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been the spot for two EU military missions so far. In addition, the EU intervened in the country through non-military missions. The 2003 ARTEMIS and 2006 EUFOR military missions are considered crucial in the development of the military component of CFSP (Duke 2009; Gegout 2005). In particular the EUFOR mission, which was mandated by a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution to improve the security situation in the capital during the final phase of the national elections, was seen as politically difficult to achieve.13 However, most of our interviewees who commented on the EUFOR mission emphasised the determination within the PSC and among ministers to use this opportunity to demonstrate the EU’s ability to act militarily. There is no mentioning of substantive issues on which policy-makers found it difficult to agree on. As one PSC participant put it:

“The Congo election mission was a huge effort and investment for the EU but a success.”

In particular the commitment by Germany to shoulder a large part of the military responsibilities was considered as being an important step in the evolution of the country’s position towards the military aspect of CFSP. As one member of the European correspondent network recalled:

“The Germans indeed didn’t want to touch this [the Congo military mission]. Also the defence ministry was cautious. However, the European Security Strategy did not exclude common actions in Africa, so Germany did not want to stay completely outside. [...] But now, for Germany Africa is a regular and normal aspect of EU foreign policy...”

In 2008 UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon submitted a request to the EU to provide an intervention force in the DRC as UN troops were struggling to provide adequate protection to civilians and UN humanitarian staff in Eastern Congo. This request was eventually turned down by the EU. French president Sarkozy – holder of the rotating EU presidency – pointed out: “You can’t be everywhere all the time.”14 The refusal to commit troops was echoed by the German government. However, the Belgium and Swedish foreign ministers Karel de Gucht and Carl Bildt were quoted saying that they regretted that the EU could not agree on using its collective military instruments.15

This time agreement was impossible and the EU did not return to the DRC with a military mission. PSC participants were overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the decision-making process. They highlighted inconsistencies and difficulties in the process of finding a common basis for discussion at the EU level. One PSC participant explained:

“Belgium and France absolutely wanted the intervention. However, there was not much of a discussion in the PSC.”

Another one emphasised: “This was a non-starter. Nobody wanted to provide troops. The Germans

killed this immediately as they were the ones providing the standby battle group for ESDP during this period.”

13 Gegout (2007) emphasises that Germany was initially hesitant to agree to the EUFOR

mission but eventually agreed to take on the role as the framework nation after a compromise on the deployment of troops in Kinshasa had been struck with France.

14 As quoted in European Voice, 12 December 2008, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/12/eu-rejects-un-request-for-congo-force-/63419.aspx (accessed on 3 August 2010).

15 Ibid.

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Our interview responses related to the 2008 Georgia EUMM mission, the 2003 ARTEMIS and the 2006 EUFOR missions in Congo, however, show the stability of standardised procedures in the current CFSP context. The processes of adopting a joint action in the Council and launching an EU mission are not contested among policy-makers. The selection of a so-called “Framework nation” for a specific operation and the leading role of that particular member state in the operational implementation of the activities as well as the supervisory role of the PSC in terms of its responsibility for the political control and strategic oversight of operations seem to be well accepted among the different actors.16 The comments we received in this field only related to technical problems and suggested a learning process which included the acknowledgement of some implementation difficulties in the case of the Congo missions and an almost textbook style process in the case of the 2008 Georgia EUMM mission.17

FAC

We now turn to the institutional settings which provide the context for political decision-making on CFSP. This change in perspective follows the assumption by deliberative intergovernmentalism that the composition of a particular decision-making forum as well as the working methods applied by it influence the overall potential to generate consensus among CFSP decision-makers and to provide venues for contestation in which diverging interpretations of key norms and policy guidelines can come to the fore and are reviewed in context. We therefore asked our interviewees about their views on the current decision-making practice in key CFSP forums as well as about alternative institutional options which are applied beyond the standard meeting format or which could be envisaged for the future.

The FAC formation of the Council is the top-level CFSP forum for political discussion among ministers and final decision-making. It follows a schedule of monthly meetings. Extra meetings are scheduled in crisis situations. CFSP issues occupy considerable time of EU foreign ministers. A fact which is reflected in the formal separation of foreign affairs from general EU coordination issues by the Lisbon Treaty.18 Council meetings imply a highly formalised setting with a large number of participants as member states are represented through delegations. This set-up may limit the ability of the FAC to have forward-looking debates and to identify possibilities for forging strategic consensus on contested issues which have previously blocked progress. In crisis situations – when FAC meetings see the surfacing of substantial differences – the opportunity to engage in policy dialogue is limited given the restricted time for interventions.

These deficiencies are not unknown to CFSP policy-makers and there are two main strategies through which they have been addressed so far. First, the inflexibility and size of FAC has encouraged the formation of dialogue coalitions, i.e. particular groups of ministers discuss policy issues in greater detail either ahead of FAC meetings in smaller groups or convene at the fringes of Council meetings. The practice of intensive coordination among the so-called EU-3 is the

16 See for example press release 9957/03 (Presse 156) from 5 June 2003 on the “Adoption

by the Council of the Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/76047.pdf (accessed 3 August 2010).

17 For an assessment of the EUMM mission see e.g. Kreczmańska and Terlikowski (2009) and Whitman and Wolff (2010).

18 See note 3.

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most pronounced way of doing so. – Second, foreign ministers have applied an informal working format – the so-called Gymnich meetings. These gatherings are reserved for strategic debate, reflection exercises and the discussion of confidential matters. Ministers meet in this restricted format without their full Council delegation. Some of our interviewees see the planned increase in the number of such meetings as a way for developing CFSP policy dialogue further. However, not all respondents see a good chance of structuring the actual debates in a way that a strategic focus is maintained. A member of the European correspondent network thought that ministers tend be overloaded with things they need to deal with immediately, thus leaving limited room for forward-looking debates. The same respondent believed that “Political Directors are in a better position to have this focus.”

Another potential instrument for developing consensus formation is the routinisation of policy review. This means the engineering of repeated and context specific norm contestation which eventually leads to an underlying working consensus about appropriate reactions to key foreign policy challenges. The chair can be instrument in such a process. He/she can seek to formulate conclusions and circulate them to members. The chair can also remind ministers of conclusions reached at earlier gatherings. Finally, the chair can act as the main spokesperson for the relevant Council formation avoiding conflicting interpretations of Council positions.

The rotating presidency arrangement applied before the Lisbon Treaty set limits to this practice as the chair was changing every six months. The High Representative was mandated to act as a spokesperson for the Council in particular circumstances but could not act as a chair and, thus, had to pursue a pragmatic strategy. In the words of one participant in PSC meetings: “Solana is essentially a representative to third countries but not someone reminding member states on compliance with common positions.”

The idea that the Council is an inclusive forum for policy dialogue among the ministers of all EU-27 is crucial for CFSP decisions gaining legitimacy with all member states. The Council setting, therefore, should guarantee access to dialogue. As shown above, already the sheer size of the FAC and the standard meeting format are conducive to the formation of informal sub-forums. This trend is reinforced by more institutionalised informal groupings within the EU. 19 The most prominent example is the special role the EU-3 play in the EU’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear program. Several of our interviewees – even some of those from the EU-3 countries – acknowledged the limitations of this format as they see problems in mobilising support among all 27 member states. In the case of the implementation of sanctions this problem is seen as being most pronounced.

PSC

FAC discussions require complex technical and political preparation. As the senior expert committee on CFSP matters the PSC plays a pivotal role in the process of intergovernmental policy coordination (Duke 2005). It is a Brussels-based ambassadorial committee. Seen from the perspective of deliberative intergovernmentalism the PSC setting provides for close policy dialogue among the most senior decision-makers. The committee also links the work of national administrations, the Commission services and the Council Secretariat as all

19 Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomorska (2006) have highlighted the dynamics of the

formation of informal coalitions at the level of CFSP Council working groups.

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major discussions and preparatory work pass through it.20 With two to three meetings per week and the possibility to convene on short notice during crisis situations the PSC witnesses a very high frequency of interactions. Individual meetings last for several hours. Thus, the potential of the PSC to develop and establish routinized forms of policy dialogue is very high. Its working method is based on the model pursued by other senior EU committees such the Economic and Financial Committee and COREPER. The PSC meets in closed sessions and its proceedings are confidential.

The question as to how far the PSC can shape CFSP decision-making and generate self-commitment on part of individual member states to pursue common policies much depends on the committee’s ability to function simultaneously as a political body and a group of technical experts. A key question therefore is in how far the PSC is able to play both roles and thus can exercise influence over CFSP?

The majority of our interviewees believed that the PSC is essentially a political committee and not just a group of experts who provide only technocratic advice. In the words of one PSC participants this means:

“The PSC is very much a political committee – one at the level of civil servants of course – but what we do is political and we try to solve as many issues as we can before they got to the Council and the European Council. I would not at all describe our discussions as technical.”

Several of our interviewees thought that technical preparation is the job of the various other auxiliary CFSP committees such as CIVCOM and the Political Military Committee. However, some of them stressed that the PSC agenda is still overloaded with technical responsibilities. This limits the room for political questions of strategic relevance. It also implies that the agenda is largely predefined and often leaves not enough scope for more open debates.

We also focused more closely on the question of the composition of the PSC and the ability of committee members to engage in substantial debates over policy. For example, we wanted to know whether instructions from the capitals are too tight in order to enable PSC ambassador to perform the role of a clearing house. Our findings suggest that many member states have indeed adjusted their practices of instructing PSC delegations. Some administrations consider themselves as being more flexible in their approach; others insist on providing detailed instructions. What seems to be true in all countries covered by our research is that PSC reporting and the preparation of PSC members through the capitals is taken very seriously. What is also clear is that foreign ministries and PSC members have developed a range of additional mechanisms to complement – and in some cases partially replace – the conventional system of written diplomatic instructions. The use of frequent phone and video-conferences, e-mail and text messaging are all mentioned. Almost all our respondents who commented on PSC practices claimed that the PSC ambassadors generally do never or only very rarely call the capital during PSC sessions in order to get approval for adopting a particular position. As a member of the European correspondent network explained:

“The PSC meetings are arranged in a session before lunch and one after and it happens that the rep phones during the lunch break to clarify a position. But this is seen as losing face and is not favoured by the reps.”

Another crucial factor in this regard is the seniority of PSC ambassadors as this factor will determine the potential influence diplomats have in relation to key domestic actors. Most of the CFSP policy-makers interviewed by us believed

20 As regards the finalisation of CFSP decisions and the preparation of FAC meetings

COREPER II has oversight responsibility.

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that PSC ambassadors “are high in rank and able to talk to ministers and heads of government.”21 However, there are also sceptical voices who doubt that this is true for the full committee and rather characterise the PSC as being a “mix of junior and senior ambassadors with mixed capacities to relate to Political Directors and ministers.”22 Others observe that PSC ambassadors increasingly become key figures for decision-making in the capitals as the foreign policy agendas of member states are more and more driven by EU coordination dynamics.

Finally, we wanted to know in how far PSC members pay attention to domestic politics. Following the contested norms approach we also assume that divergences between member states become more difficult to bridge once domestic debates have provoked ministers to explicitly position themselves in favour or against a particular policy option. An additional question therefore is whether a Brussels-based forum such as the PSC is in a position to anticipate and counter such problems. Several interviewees pointed out that it is relevant that PSC ambassadors are familiar with the domestic political dynamics. As one PSC participant put it:

“PSC ambassadors have to be very well aware of domestic developments and political developments.”

Political Directors

In almost all foreign ministries of EU member states the position of Political Director is a crucial one. The holder of the post would normally have oversight responsibility for CFSP coordination as well as for strategic planning. Given the seniority of the post the relevant person normally also enjoys direct access to ministers and will take responsibility for the political fine-tuning of decisions prepared by the administration. In the words of a member of the European correspondent network:

“The cabinet of the minister and the Political Director deal with political decisions.”

In the beginning of CFSP coordination the group of Political Directors constituted the membership of the PSC. The idea behind this arrangement was that only a very senior group of civil servants would be able to develop EU level coordination and to feed coordination results into domestic decision-making. The massive expansion of the CFSP agenda and the transformation of the PSC into a Brussels-based committee made the original arrangement unsustainable.

The potential downside of the changed composition of the PSC is that the coordination process might be less well integrated with domestic decision-making. At present the Political Directors continue to gather as a group at the fringes of FAC meetings for informal working lunches. Political Directors are part of member state delegations at Council meetings and advise their respective foreign minister. Given the seniority of this group the question is whether the gatherings of Political Directors, which are complemented by telephone-conferences and intensive bilateral contacts, can be considered a venue for norm contestation. This is all the more important as Political Directors have responsibility for strategic policy development and enjoy access to ministers. As one member of the European correspondent network explained, Political Directors play a crucial role in attempts to resolve political disagreement and therefore can pave the way for negotiation among ministers:

“The member states’ Political Directors try it out first.”

21 Participant in PSC meetings. 22 Participant in PSC meetings.

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Asked about what the best venue for strategic policy development and reflection is in the CFSP environment the same official emphasised:

“The PSC is too bureaucratic – it has no time for reflection. Political Directors are more distant to the day-to-day process. This is why lunches of Political Directors at FAC meetings are crucial – it is a less bureaucratic setting.”

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Evaluation of findings and conclusion Throughout this article we have highlighted two distinct, yet inter-related, theoretical approaches for conceptualising CFSP coordination practice as a dynamic and evolutionary process. As CFSP is for the foreseeable future confined within an intergovernmental setting new analytical perspectives are needed for understanding institutional and policy dynamics. We have addressed this challenge by following the contested norms approach and the analytical perspective of deliberative intergovernmentalism. Most importantly, we have sought to demonstrate that it matters what is discussed, by whom and in what kind of negotiation setting. Negotiation settings are not equally suited for dealing with specific policy content. Introducing criteria for distinguishing between different types of policy content – our reference to norms – and between different settings for policy dialogue is, therefore, a crucial outcome of our research.

According to the contested norms approach we have distinguished three types of CFSP norms – fundamental norms, organising principles and standardised procedures – and have explored empirically how these norm types are subject to different degrees of contestation. This distinction allows understanding CFSP practice as a process of establishing normative meaning-in-use in a transnational environment and to differentiate between different aspects of the policy discourse. In other words, we are trying to resolve the puzzle of CFSP being characterised by both a fairly stable evolutionary process of ever increasing intergovernmental coordination activity and the regular occurrence of severe conflict over key policy decisions. As our research shows, at this stage the coordination process has been developed to an extent that standardised procedures are overwhelmingly shared among policy-makers. In cases where respondents mentioned difficulties with regard to these standardised procedures, they were largely of a technical and temporary nature. There also seems to be a fairly well developed common understanding among PSC members on how to apply these CFSP decision-making procedures and process regulations in specific policy-making contexts. Here, our interviewees’ comments on the different EU missions have been most instructive.

With regard to the set of fundamental norms defining the overall context and orientation of CFSP normative meaning remains highly contested at the EU-level. This is not surprising given the intergovernmental setting where the rules of norm convergence and divergence apply according to the three types of norms. Accordingly, different views exist regarding the question of whether these norms are relevant to policy-makers in a more general sense or not. The group of interviewees who consider fundamental foreign policy norms as relevant for EU-level decisions more or less converge on the question of what constitutes the specific set of fundamental norms people refer to. They are in agreement with what is formally set out as the normative framework for the EU’s foreign and security policy in Article 21.1, TEU. However, policy-makers are aware of the existence of diverging interpretations of these norms.

The case of the ESS shows that written documents do currently not play a significant role when it comes to deriving particular policy options from fundamental norms or organising principles in CFSP. This practice reveals a low degree of formal and informal institutionalisation of normative meaning in the CFSP context. However, the extended use of such documents in decentralised policy settings is possible. Similarly, this would require (re-) structuring the work of the relevant policy forums around the production and application of

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such documents. The example of the organising principle of a combined civilian-military approach has shown an important variation in the degree of contestation. Still, this principle cannot be considered as a static one but remains contested in terms of its concrete application. However, previous periods of norm contestation seem to have contributed to it becoming firmly incorporate into the set of CFSP policy norms and policy-makers have a relative concrete understanding of the range of alternative policy options being informed by this norm.

Here, deliberative intergovernmentalism comes into the picture. Our review of CFSP negotiation settings has shown what the limits to pro-actively addressing diverging normative meanings currently are. At the same time our conceptual framework also enables us to draw conclusions on how working methods could be further developed. To what extent do CFSP decision-making forums serve as venues for norm contestation and encourage the routinization of policy review? What options for further institutional engineering exist?

The FAC setting is crucial to CFSP decision-making. Our findings suggest that one of its key deficiencies is that it is ill suited to pro-actively engage with addressing known normative divergences such as the transatlantic partnership or EU-Russia relations. A key obstacle is the standard FAC working method. The increased use of the informal Gymnich format as well as the potential evolution of the office of the High Representative into a pro-active FAC chair – for which the Lisbon Treaty provides the legal basis – may be indeed highly relevant in this regard.

However, our findings also illustrate what the limitations of institutional engineering at the level of discussions among ministers might be. Notably the PSC and the group of Political Directors are relevant in this regard. – Given the degree of interaction prevalent in the PSC setting and the centrality of the committee we should expect further dynamism in this particular area of the coordination process. Also the PSC setting leaves room for further evolution. The seniority of PSC ambassadors and the question of how well members of PSC delegations in the Permanent Representations in Brussels are embedded with their ministries back home are considered to be crucial by many CFSP policy-makers. Our findings also suggest that PSC debates play a pivotal role in CFSP in terms of the way policy-makers make reference to and apply organised principles in CFSP. In general the degree of contestation in this field is far greater than at the level of standardised procedures, yet it remains below the degree of contestation observable at the level of fundamental norms. However, the PSC is quoted by several responds to be the setting in which a common understanding on organising principles of the EU’s CFSP and their application is most likely to be present. The group of Political Directors might be best suited to play a stronger role in terms of an institutionalised venue for norm contestation in a forward-looking manner. Most importantly, Political Directors are closer to the foreign ministers and their cabinets. Yet, this presumes that the Political Director position is the same within the different administrative settings of the member states which is not always the case.

Our research also speaks to more recent contributions to the field of CFSP studies. Simon Duke and Jeffrey Lewis have recently applied the concept of normative institutionalism (Thomas 2009) to the CFSP context in two separate policy case studies. Both authors highlight the importance of consensus-building processes among member states for CFSP decision-making and reject a straightforward rationalist focus on CFSP negotiations. The main assumption is that over time “actors begin to associate more closely with the institutions and values they embody” (Duke 2009: 395). Moreover, with reference to EU’s involvement in reconstruction assistance following the US-led invasion of Iraq

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Lewis (2009: 442) demonstrates the normative relevance of rule of law, democracy and the UN framework for consensus-building in EU foreign policy. Our conceptual approach is compatible with such an institutionalist interpretation. However, while we share the focus on routinization, we stress the fragility of the normative meaning-in-use and the relevance of the process of its enactment. We see the identification of practices of norm contestation within CFSP as pivotal for understanding this policy-making environment as a dynamic and evolutionary one. We see routinization as an important but not a sufficient condition for generating self-commitment in a decentralised policy setting and emphasise the need to engineer venues for norm contestation through adjusting the design of core CFSP decision-making contexts.

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