the inter-american democratic regime: the role of the ... · at a minimum, an inter-american...
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THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC REGIME: THE ROLE OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IN PROMOTING AND DEFENDING DEMOCRACY
Rubén M. Perina∗
Introduction: New Context, New Role
The role of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the defense and promotion of
democracy in the inter-American system should be understood in the context of the new
international order that emerged at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and is currently
characterized by the preeminence of democracy and free market economies.
This new international context is also characterized by a process of growing global
interdependence that extends to virtually every aspect of life: society, culture, economics,
politics, and so on. The falling prices in communications, information, and transportation
have facilitated and fueled this process. Thus most of the problems/challenges faced by our
democracies in the hemisphere can no longer be handled or resolved unilaterally or only
within the borders of a country. Challenges related to the environment, drug trafficking,
corruption, terrorism, security, democracy, trade, human rights, and health, among others,
are not only interdependent, but link governments and societies of the region in an
increasingly complex and extensive interdependent network. These challenges are
“intermestic”: part international and part domestic1; and, to address them, solidarity,
collaboration, and regional cooperation are necessary. It is in this context of interdependence
and globalization that international organizations such as the OAS are regaining their
relevance and importance. They were, after all, established to facilitate and promote
cooperation among their members, in the search for joint solutions to deal with common
problems and challenges.
The role of the OAS in the promotion and defense of democracy at the start of the
21st century should be analyzed and understood in that context. However, the development
∗ Is Coordinator, Strategic Programs, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), General Secretariat of the OAS. The views expressed in this paper are the exclusive responsibility of the author. They do not represent the position of the OAS General Secretariat or that of the Organization 1 The concept appeared a few years ago in academic works on interdependence.
2
of this new role has not been a linear, automatic, or easy one. It has required a lengthy,
tortuous, and in-depth debate around the tension existing between the principle of defense
and promotion of democracy, on one hand, and other principles enshrined long ago in the
inter-American system such as the legal equality of states, their absolute sovereignty, and
nonintervention, on the other. The fear that the exercise of the former may have a negative
effect on the latter, or that the former may be used to undermine and violate the latter, has
always been a formidable obstacle to the formal adoption of the former, at least up until the
mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the ideal of and the concern for democracy are long-standing in
hemispheric relations, dating back to the first inter-American conferences.2
2 Heraldo Muñoz, “The OAS and Democratic Governance,” Journal of Democracy (July 1992). Muñoz traces
the historical evolution in the inter-American system to what he calls “the doctrine of democratic governance.”
See also his “A New OAS for the New Times,” in Viron Vaky and Heraldo Muñoz, The Future of the
Organization of American States (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1993). Jerome Slater, the chapter
on “The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance,” in his The OAS and United States Foreign Policy, Ohio State
University, 1967. As early as 1907, the Ecuadorian foreign minister, Carlos Tobar, was advocating the
nonrecognition of de facto governments, a provision that was included in Central American treaties of 1907
and 1923. In 1936, at the Inter-American Conference held in Buenos Aires, the American states declared that
democracy is common cause in the Americas, and in 1945, at the Inter-American Conference in Mexico, the
Guatemalan delegation proposed a resolution on the defense and promotion of democracy in the face of the
possible establishment of anti-democratic governments in the hemisphere,” which was rejected as
“interventionist.” See Eduardo Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System”
(CJI/SO/II/Doc. 37/94 rev. 1 corr., October 18, 1994), Annex VI, in La Democracia en el Sistema Inter-
Americano (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Legal Affairs of the OAS, 1998). Larman
Wilson, “The OAS and Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes: Reactivation in the 1990s?” in Revista
Interamericana de Bibliografía no. 4 (1989); and F. V. García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano
(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary for Legal Affairs, OAS, 1981). It should also be pointed out
that the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
recommended to member states the holding of elections as a prerequisite for the formation of a democratic
government. See also the discussion of whether electoral observation violated the principle of nonintervention
in Joao Clemente Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, 1984-1994 (Washington, DC: General Secretariat of
the OAS, 1994), pp. 142–145. Mention should also be made of the declaration of Mexico on the occasion of
the adoption of the “Washington Protocol,” in which Mexico expressed its disagreement with the amendments
to this protocol, stressing that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside and that “it is unacceptable for a
3
The development of this new role of the OAS is also closely associated to another
interdependent and noteworthy hemispheric phenomenon: the restoration of democracy (in
the early 1980s) as a system of government in almost all the states of the Americas. This new
political congruence among the political systems of the region has brought about a general
consensus and collective commitment on their part to defend and promote democracy in the
hemisphere.
This new hemispheric reality stands in stark contrast to the situation during the first
30-some years of the OAS. During those years (1948–early 1980s), dictatorial, military,
authoritarian, semidemocratic, and democratic governments coexisted in the hemisphere,
despite the fact that as early as 1948, Article 5 of the OAS Charter stipulated that the
solidarity of the countries of the Americas and the high aims sought through it (peace,
security, and development) required that these states be organized “on the basis of the
effective exercise of representative democracy.” This lack of congruence in political
systems, however, did not prevent member states, through the OAS or unilaterally, largely
for reasons related to the Cold War, from taking action to defend democracy against such
dictators as François Duvalier, Rafael Trujillo, Anastasio Somoza, or against the communist
regime of Fidel Castro, which was excluded from the OAS in 1962. But those efforts did not
lead to specific, practical, and permanent instruments for the defense and promotion of
democracy, precisely because of the difference between the systems that existed at that
time.3
Today, at the start of the 21st century, and in view of the congruence in democratic
systems and the joint commitment to democracy being shown by the governments of the
hemisphere, it seems that an inter-American democratic regime (Régimen Democrático
Inter-Americano, REDI, in Spanish) is emerging, as a concrete expression of a new
democratic paradigm, involving a community of nation-states that share a commitment to
democratic values and practices, a commitment that today guides and influences the conduct
regional organization to be given supranational authority and tools to intervene in the internal affairs of our
States,” La Democracia en el Sistema Interamericano, cited above. p. 87. 3 See Slater, Wilson, “The OAS and Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes”; and Robert D. Tomasek,
“The OAS and Dispute Settlement,” Revista Interamericana de Bibliografía, no. 4 (1989). In fact, during the
1960s, not much attention was given within the OAS to the violation of human rights and of the principle of
democracy if they occurred in “big” and strongly anticommunist countries.
4
of their members in the defense and promotion of democracy.4
The thesis of this work is that the hemispheric community of nation-states is
building, in a more deliberate and effective form, an inter-American democratic regime
through the development of principles, norms, and juridical/diplomatic instruments and
through cooperative and collective actions for the defense and promotion of democracy. To
this end, member states would utilize the OAS as the central but not exclusive institution of
the inter-American system, in addition to subregional arrangements such as Mercosur or the
Río Group, or indeed would take unilateral action. Following Stephen D. Krasner's
definition, the word “regime” is understood to mean “an explicit or implicit set of principles,
norms, regulations, and procedures for decision-making, around which the expectations [and
actions] of the actors revolve in a given area [e.g., democracy] of international relations.”5
In this new context, all the nation-states of the hemisphere see regional peace and
their own security as depending on the security, stability, and continuity of each democracy
of the region. From this perspective, democracy is indivisible. A threat to one democracy
4 This notion of a paradigm is based on the sociological significance assigned to the term by Thomas S. Kuhn,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1972), pp. 175–177. 5 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 2. This
definition is one of the most accepted in the specialized literature. Also, according to Krasner, Hedley Bull, in
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colombia University, 1977), argues that
“institutions contribute to the observance of rules, by formulating them, disseminating them, managing them,
applying them, interpreting them, and giving them legitimacy.” Krasner also states, as do Joseph Nye and
Robert Jervis, that international regimes are different from international agreements. The latter are ad hoc and
specific, while regimes facilitate agreements and not only incorporate norms and expectations that facilitate
cooperation but are a form of cooperation that goes beyond the pursuit of short-terms self interest. The
reference is to the works of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1977); and Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, p. 173. Despite the
stinging criticism from Susan Strange of the concept in "A Critique of Regime Analysis," in ibid., the concept
is fairly valid and useful to visualize and give meaning to a series of occurrences or pattern that are observed
with increasing frequency in the conduct of the countries of the hemisphere in their inter-American relations,
particularly with respect to the defense and promotion of democracy. Viron Vaky, in Vaky and Muñoz, Future
of the Organization of American States, in 1994, wonders whether member states would convert the OAS into
an effective tool for regional governance and construction of the inter-American regime. This work argues that
at a minimum, an inter-American democratic regime is being created.
5
poses a threat to all the democracies of the hemisphere. The new norms and instruments are
designed to permit and facilitate the collective defense and strengthening of democracy in
each of the member states. This is essentially a commitment to regional security and peace
based on the concept of “democratic peace.” Democratic freedoms and institutional checks
and balances tend to favor peaceful solutions to international disputes and conflicts.
Democracy fosters mutual trust.
In contrast, dictatorships tend to be aggressive governments not restrained by
democratic institutions. They tend to generate instability and internal conflict, which, in
general, transcend national borders, creating mistrust and insecurity in international
relations. Both threaten peace and security, and hence the importance of defending,
promoting, and strengthening democracy in each member state. Regional peace and security
depend on the full exercise of democracy. Internal aggression or threats aimed at interrupting
or destroying democracy in a member state would be a potential threat to the democratic
community of the region.6
This notion of “democratic security/peace,” which assumes that the exercise of
democracy does not lead to war, seems to have been implicit already in the 1948 founding
charter when member states stipulated in Article 3 that “solidarity…and the high aims which
are sought through [e.g., cooperation and peace] require” that the member states be
organized “on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.” For the
writers of the charter, no doubt the continued existence of democracy was a prerequisite for
solidarity, security, and peace among states. This idea is more clearly expressed in the 1985
6 Recently the relationship between democracy, on one hand, and security and peace, on the other, has been
studied extensively in the field of political science and international relations, and is known in specialized
literature as "the democratic peace." In theory, the principle that democratic states do not declare war on one
another is sensible and persuasive. Empirically speaking, however, a small number of studies have found
exceptions and have maintained that the correlation is not always linear. See, for example, Paul Senese,
“Democracy and Maturity; Deciphering Conditional Effects on Levels of Dispute Intensity,” International
Studies Quarterly, no. 3 (September 1999); John R. Oneal and Bruce Russet, “The Classical Liberals Were
Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985,” International Studies Quarterly, no. 2 (June
1997); James Lee Ray, “The Democratic Path to Peace,” Journal of Democracy, no. 2 (April 1997); Kurt
Taylor Gaubatz, “Kant, Democracy and History,” Journal of Democracy, no. 4 (October 1996); and Edward
Mandsfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995).
6
charter amendments, when the states indicate that they are “convinced that representative
democracy is an indispensable requirement for the stability, peace, and development of the
region.”7
The interest in defending democracy, given its implications for security and peace in
the hemisphere, is not new or something to which the OAS merely paid lip service. It was
specifically manifested in the actions and sanctions (diplomatic, economic, military) of
member states, collectively through the OAS, or unilaterally against the dictatorships of
Trujillo, Castro, Somoza, Manuel Noriega, and, recently, Raoul Cédras.8 And in the 1980s,
7 See also the Declaration of Santiago, Chile, 1959, of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Relations, which states that the existence of antidemocratic regimes violates the principles on which
the organization is based and is a threat to peaceful coexistence in the Hemisphere. See Garcia-Amador, El
Systema Inter-Americano, p. 532. Other significant references to the defense of democracy is the Santiago
Commitment of 1991, Resolution 1080 of Santiago, Chile, and the Washington Protocol on Amendments to the
Charter, the application of which will be discussed later. Some authors are already combining the topics of
security and democracy and are analyzing their relationship in the new inter-American context. See, for
example, Enrique Obando Arbulú, “Democracia y Seguridad Hemisférica,” Análisis Internacional (Lima, Peru:
Peruvian International Studies Center), nos. 6–7 (April–September 1994); Andrés Fontana, “La Seguridad
Hemisférica en los 1990s: Hacia una Comunidad Hemisférica Democrática,” Mimeo., Buenos Aires, 1999;
and “Seguridad Cooperativa: Tendencias Globales y Oportunidades para el Continente Americano,” Working
Document, no. 16, Instituto de Servicio Exterior de la Nacion, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1996. It is interesting
to note also that the Central American states recently signed a democratic security treaty. 8 As early as 1945, the Uruguayan foreign minister, Rodriguez Larreta, had proposed a system of collective
defense for restoring democracy when it had been overthrown, which was enthusiastically supported by the
United States. However, it did not receive the approval of the majority of Latin American countries. See Slater,
“The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance,” pp. 240–241; Wilson, “The OAS and Promoting Democracy and
Resolving Disputes; Tomasek, “The OAS and Dispute Settlement”; and Muñoz, “The OAS and Democratic
Governance.” In Latin America, or rather in the wider Caribbean region, the opposite of the democracy-peace
relationship seems to confirm this theory: The dictatorships of the region were at the root of instability,
insecurity, and conflict in the region, at least since the creation of the OAS. Although the majority of the
conflicts and the antidictatorship actions occurred during the Cold War, when many argued that every conflict
was connected to it and to manipulation by the United States (a theory that ignored the democratic interests and
ideals of many Latin American leaders), and that efforts to secure democracy were only a smokescreen, today
one wonders, in light of the failure of the communist paradigm, with its violations of human rights and of the
most basic political and civil freedoms, whether these efforts to secure democracy, called interventionist by
7
democracy in Central America was sought as a central outcome of the peace negotiations,
because it was perceived as a condition and guarantee of firm and lasting peace within
countries and between the countries of the region.9
Despite the significance of these developments in the Americas and the growing and
unique role of the OAS in them—particularly in terms of important issues for the field of
international relations such as sovereignty, nonintervention, and peace and security— they
have been practically ignored as the focus of analysis or study in the most prominent
international relations academic circles, both in the United States and in Latin America.
Also, and despite the new interest in the role of international institutions awakened by end of
the Cold War, interdependence and globalization, virtually no serious studies have been
published on the OAS (at least in the past ten years). Some of the most respected journals in
this field, such as International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, and World
Politics, have failed to study the OAS. This paper seeks to place the analysis of the OAS in
the context of the academic discussions on international regimes and organizations that
appeared in these journals. An effort also is made to provide some empirical elements on its
structure and functioning, which could contribute to a more detailed and in-depth knowledge
of the organization and serve to enrich theoretical and practical discussion on the role of
international organizations.10
their left-wing detractors, were not valid and timely in the grand scheme of things, despite the abuses that may
have been committed in their name. 9 See the text of the Esquipulas II Agreement in OEA/Ser. G CP/doc. 1827/87, August 14, 1987. 10 Although these academic publications originate in the United States, they represent essentially the
“establishment” and the intellectual mind-set in the field of international relations and their content serves as
important indicators of trends and new paradigms in the study of international relations in the United States,
Latin America, and Europe. See Ole Waever, “The Sociology of Not So International Discipline: American and
European Developments in International Relations,” and Peter Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen
Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, vol. 52
(Autumn 1998). In the United States these publications are influential not only in academic circles but also
have an impact on the training of specialists who frequently work in government circles formulating and
implementing international policy. The journal International Studies Quarterly is a publication of the
International Studies Association, which organizes an annual international convention of specialists
(academicians and officials) on international relations in several countries of the world. These conventions
offer more than 300 sessions on subjects that are topical and of academic and political relevance in the area of
8
The Defense of Democracy: New Legal/Diplomatic Instruments and Their Application
The collective effort of protecting and strengthening democracy has been taking place within
the OAS since the mid-1980s and can be seen largely in the development and application of
a number of legal and diplomatic instruments. 11
Charter Changes
The first instrument pertains to changes made to the OAS Charter in 1985. Here
representative democracy explicitly becomes one of the main purposes of the organization,
although it has to be carried out with due respect for the principle of nonintervention, a
fundamental and long-standing principle of the OAS. The changes to the charter also confer
new “powers” on the secretary-general, which authorize him, for the first time (Article 110),
to bring to the attention of the Permanent Council or the General Assembly of the OAS any
matter that in his view affects or threatens the peace, security, and/or development of a
member state.
This instrument, plus the General Assembly Resolution of 1989, “Human Rights,
Democracy and Electoral Observations,” which instructs the secretary-general to organize
electoral observations at the request of a member state, opened the way for the OAS and the
secretary-general to get involved and to have a significant role in the peace and
democratization process in Central America in the late 1980s. The OAS, the United Nations
international relations. A rapid analysis of the programs of the most recent conventions of the decade also
shows the dearth of studies or sessions on the OAS. By way of exception, mention should be made of the work
of Javier Corrales and Richard Feinberg, “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power,
Interest, and Intellectual Traditions,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43 (March 1999), which mentions
the role of the OAS in the promotion of democracy, but only as a positive example of the waning of an
antihemispheric intellectual tradition that was opposed to a regime of stronger inter-American cooperation. Of
course, some studies on the OAS have been done from time to time during the 1990s, most of which have been
cited in this work. This paper hopes to stimulate academic interest in teaching and research on the institution. 11 On the role played by international juridical norms in the building of international systems and political
change, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”
International Organization, vol. 52, no.4 (1998).
9
(UN), the Contadora Group (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama), and the Support
Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay), monitored, encouraged, and facilitated
compliance with the negotiation process and the signing of the peace and democracy accords
of Esquipulas, Guatemala; Sapoa, Nicaragua; and Tela, Honduras.12
Concerned over the worsening conflict in Central America, the secretaries-general of
the OAS, Joao Clemente Baena Soares, and of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuellar,
in an unprecedented effort at coordination between the two organizations, offered their
support to Central American countries and to the Contadora Group and the Support Group in
November 1986. The proposal was swiftly accepted by the foreign ministers of both groups,
and the two secretaries-general were invited to participate in a fact-finding mission and a
meeting to be held in Central America in early 1987 to revive the peace effort.13 In August
1987, through a proposal by the president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias (San José, February
12 A few years before, the OAS had already played a significant role in withdrawing legitimacy from the
Somoza government, when the 17th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, acting as the
Organ of Consultation, recommended that the regime be replaced immediately and a democratic government
installed. That meeting sent a mission of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to investigate
accusations of human rights violations, and it found that the Somoza government had committed repeated and
widespread violations of the human rights of Nicaraguan citizens. This report served as the basis for the
Meeting of Ministers to condemn the Somoza dictatorship for the situation in the country and to recommend its
removal. See 17th Meeting of Consultation OAS/Ser. F/II. 17 Doc. 40/79, rev. 2, June 23, 1979. See also
Wilson, "The OAS and Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes,” p. 480. This involvement of the OAS
in Nicaragua against the Somoza dictatorship represented perhaps the beginning of a new era of activism by the
organization on behalf of democracy, marked by a new consensus among member states on the need to defend
and promote democracy. This crystallizes later in the political and diplomatic instruments discussed here. On
that occasion, as on others before and after the conflicts in Central America and the Caribbean, a correlation
was established between threats to the peace and security of the region, on one hand, and the struggle against
dictatorship and in favor of democracy, on the other. See also Slater, “The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance, ” in
his The OAS and United States Foreign Policy. 13 See Hugo Caminos and Roberto Lavalle, “New Departures in the Exercise of Inherent Powers by UN and
OAS Secretaries General: The Central American Situation,” American Journal of International Law (April
1989); and Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 183–203. The foreign ministers of the Contadora and
Support Groups, together with the secretaries-general of the OAS and the UN, made a tour of Central America
and held a final meeting on January 21, 1987, in Mexico City, at which both officials were requested to
continue their support of the peace process.
10
1987) entitled "Procedures to Establish a Solid and Lasting Peace in Central America," the
presidents of Central America signed the Esquipulas II agreement, creating the International
Verification and Monitoring Commission (CIVS), made up of the foreign ministers of
Central America, the Contadora Group, the Support Group, and the two secretaries-
general.14
Subsequently, the secretary-general of the OAS participated as an observer and on
some occasions as an informal facilitator for the negotiation process between the Nicaraguan
government and the rebel army, the “Resistencia Nicaragüense,” known as the Contras,
which culminated in the Sapoa Accord of March 1988. That accord, based on Esquipulas II,
called for the cessation of military operations, the beginning of negotiations, a general
amnesty, guarantees of a free press and free elections, and the establishment of the
Verification Commission, composed of Cardinal Miguel Obando and the secretary-general
of the OAS—which was asked to help in implementing the commission. This agreement also
gave rise to a request by the Nicaraguan government for the OAS to send an observer
mission for the elections held in February 1990.
In August 1989 the presidents of Central America, at a summit meeting in Tela,
Honduras, made further progress toward peace and democracy in the region by ratifying the
Esquipulas II commitment. They created the International Support and Verification
Commission (CIAV) and requested the secretaries-general of the OAS and the UN to
establish it immediately with a humanitarian program for the demobilization, repatriation,
and voluntary relocation of former irregular combatants (Contras) and their families. The
OAS became the guarantor and facilitator for compliance with these agreements in
Nicaragua, especially with respect to the cease-fire and the disarming, demobilization, and
repatriation of the Nicaraguan Resistance, including their resettlement, and the provision of
social services, socioeconomic assistance, and guarantees of no reprisals. The UN was made
responsible for demobilizing the Contras in Honduras. All of this was ratified by the new
14 This agreement essentially called for setting up national reconciliation commissions to oversee amnesties,
cease-fire, democratization, elections, dialogue with the opposition in El Salvador and Nicaragua, repatriation
of refugees; to ensure that countries of the region were not used as bases by rebel forces with external support;
and to ensure that external support to irregular forces should cease (e.g., United States support to the Contras in
Honduras). See text of the accord, in OAS/Ser.G CP/doc. 1827/87, August 4, 1987.
11
Nicaraguan government of Violeta Chamorro (elected in February 1990) and in the Tocontin
Agreement with leaders of the resistance in March of 1990.15
Resolution 1080
The second instrument available to the OAS for the defense and promotion of democracy
was established at the 1991 General Assembly in Santiago, Chile, by means of Resolution
1080, entitled “Representative Democracy.” This resolution reiterates the commitment of
member states to take joint and immediate action to protect democracy in any member state
when it is threatened. It also vests the secretary-general with new powers, specifically the
authority to convene a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS, when there is “a
sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the
legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government” in a member state.
This organ can, in turn, convene a special meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which
shall decide on the specific measures to be adopted by the OAS. This resolution has been
applied in four specific cases: Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay. In Ecuador and
15 By July 1990, the CIAV/OAS had already demobilized some 22,500 combatants and had relocated another
18,000 Nicaraguans returning from Costa Rica and Honduras. CIAV/OAS conducted a program to help
reintegrate former combatants and displaced persons, including the provision of food, medical assistance,
vocational training and support for projects in agriculture, livestock, and fishing. Some 120,000 individuals
were given clothing, tools, construction materials, and in cooperation with the Pan American Health
Organization, some 1,500 ex-combatants received medical and psychological attention. See Baena Soares,
Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 199–200. In addition to these demobilization and reintegration tasks, the
CIAV/OAS provided support for socioeconomic and institutional development in former conflict zones and
collaborated with the National Institute for Municipal Development in conducting training workshops for
mayors within the conflict zones dealing with aspects of legislation and municipal administration. It also
undertook surveillance and verification for the observance of human rights and served as a facilitator for
resolving conflicts. Together with the government and the Catholic church, it participated in the Tripartite
Commission responsible for examining the causes of violence and provided technical assistance for creating,
organizing, training, and setting up local networks of human rights activists and the peace commissions
composed of community leaders in places most prone to violence. The mandate of the CIAV came to an end
formally in December 1996. See International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV/OAS), The Peace
Process in Nicargua: Verification of Human Rights, Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts and Building the Peace
(OAS, August 1996).
12
Venezuela, the resolution was not invoked.
Haiti
In Haiti, after the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrande Aristide on September 29, 1991,
OAS secretary-general Baena Soares immediately invoked Resolution 1080 and convened a
meeting of the Permanent Council. This organ condemned the coup d’état and immediately
called an ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This supreme organ of the OAS
met quickly and also condemned the coup; the ministers also decided, inter alia, not to
recognize the illegal government; to recommend the suspension of financial, commercial,
and diplomatic relations with the military government; to suspend cooperation and financial
and military assistance; and to send a mission chaired by the OAS secretary-general to
express to the new authorities the OAS’s condemnation of the action taken against the
constitutional government.16
From then on, and for three years, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs met five times
within the framework of the OAS to analyze the situation in Haiti, to ratify condemnation of
the coup d’état, and to increase gradually the pressure on the de facto government. At these
meetings, member states agreed, inter alia, to send a mission to observe respect for human
rights and to facilitate the restoration of democracy; to recommend new sanctions that
included the freezing of assets in international banks, the suspension of credit, international
assistance, and commercial flights; and to impose a trade embargo, with exceptions being
made on humanitarian grounds. They also agreed to seek the cooperation of the international
community, including the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank in
applying these sanctions.17
Following the Washington agreements of February 1992 and after much foot-
dragging by the de facto government, the OAS was able to send a reduced contingent (18
16 MRE/RES. 1/91, “Support for the Democratic Government of Haiti,” October 3, 1991. 17 During the three years of the crisis, periodic meetings were held and resolutions passed by the OAS
Permanent Council, monitoring closely and carefully, together with the Secretary General, the events that were
taking place. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 68–123; Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the
Inter-American System,” pp. 137–149; and Anthony Manigot, “Haiti’s Sovereign Consent vs. State-Centric
Sovereignty,” in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 189–212.
13
members) of the civilian mission known as OAS-DEMOC (democracy).18 The mission took
up position in Haiti in September 1992 and began its task of observing and promoting
respect for human rights, helping to reduce the level of violence, and verifying and
promoting compliance with the Washington agreements, in order to achieve a lasting
solution to the crisis. Moreover, the OAS requested UN assistance, and a contingent of
observers from the world organization was added to the OAS observers. Together, as of
February 1993, they formed the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (ICIVMIH), which at
one time had as many as 200 members. As a result, a close and fruitful cooperative
relationship began to develop with the United Nations through the secretaries-general of
both institutions. Also, the governing bodies of both organizations (Ad-hoc Meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Council of the OAS and the General
Assembly and Security Council of the UN) explicitly provided mutual and complementary
support for the decisions taken to manage and end the crisis.19
The political crisis came to a dramatic and unsatisfactory end about one year of the
18 These agreements were facilitated and intermediated at OAS headquarters by the secretary- general and his
team. The protocol was signed by the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, by the prime
minister designate, Rene Theodore, and by President Aristide. A second instrument was signed by President
Aristide, the prime minister designate, and the secretary-general. In essence, these agreements recognized the
urgent need to find a negotiated solution to the crisis, to restore democratic institutions fully, and to reestablish
constitutional guarantees and freedoms. They included the return of President Aristide, a general amnesty,
separation between the armed forces and the police, and the presence of the Civilian Mission of the OAS to
guarantee compliance with the accords. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 95–97. 19 The ICIVMIH had offices in all regions of the country. Its major work of observing and promoting respect
for human rights was complemented in the first years through programs to strengthen and modernize the
offices of the president, the prime minister, and the minister of foreign relations; the legislative branch;
political parties: and the office of the public defender. Subsequently it undertook programs to strengthen the
Ministry of Justice, including advice on judicial reform, training for police forces and judges in the area of
human rights and dispute settlement, and also education in civics and in the promotion of human rights for
government authorities and civic and community leaders. The important contributions of ICIVMIH to the
defense and promotion human rights and democratic institutions have been widely recognized both by the
national authorities and by the international community. After seven years of operations, and at the request of
the government of Haiti, the mandate of ICIVMIH was ended in March 2000. See David Forsythe, “The
United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas,” in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, pp. 107–131; and Vaky and
Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, pp. 35–39.
14
signing of the Governors Island Agreement (July 1993), which had stipulated a number of
steps for the return of President Aristide prior to October 30 of that year.20 The de facto
government had failed to comply with the aforementioned agreement by blocking progress
in the dialogue between the presidential commission and representatives of the Haitian
Parliament. No progress had been made in normalizing the functioning of Parliament or in
the parliamentary approval of a prime minister appointed by Aristide. There also had been
no movement on reforming the judiciary system or the police force, in the appointment of
new military authorities, or in mandating the early retirement of the commander of the armed
forces. In October 1993, the de facto government prevented the landing of American and
Canadian troops sent to the country within the framework of Security Council Resolution
867 to facilitate the implementation of Article 5 of the Governors Island Agreement. And to
make things worse, the ICIVMIH was expelled and its members had to leave the country
temporarily, as the human rights situation deteriorated dramatically and the flow of refugees
to the United States increased greatly.
Against that backdrop, the United Nations Security Council, by means of Resolution
940 of July 31, 1994, within the framework of Chapter VII of its charter, authorized
“member States to join a multilateral force, … to use all means necessary to facilitate the
departure from Haiti of the military leaders in accordance with the Governors Island
Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, and the reestablishment
of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti.” This decision of the highest
multilateral entity permitted the government of the United States to begin exerting
diplomatic and military pressure that culminated with the removal of the de facto
government and the return of Aristide as president of Haiti in October 1994.21
20 The agreement was the result of the initiatives and negotiations spearheaded by the joint envoy, Dante
Caputo, former foreign minister of Argentina. 21 The authorization by the Security Council of a comprehensive and mandatory commercial embargo, in
accordance with the OAS recommendation, was based on the argument that the humanitarian crisis in Haiti
posed a threat to security and peace in the region. SC/RES./841 (1993), June 16, 1993. The same argument was
used for Resolution 940. The U.S. government sent a mission composed of former President Jimmy Carter,
Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell mainly to warn the government of General Cédras of the
imminent arrival of U.S. troops to restore the government of President Aristide.
15
Peru
In Peru, after the government of President Alberto Fujimori, on April 5, 1992, dissolved the
Legislature and intervened the judiciary, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the National
Council of the Judiciary, and Court of Constitutional Guarantees, Secretary-General Baena
Soares, invoking Resolution 1080, convened the Permanent Council of the OAS. The council
had an emergency meeting and, in view of the “serious events that had occurred in Peru
[which] had led to an interruption of the democratic political institutional process in that
country,” decided to condemn the events, to urge the Peruvian authorities to facilitate,
immediately, the full functioning of democratic institutions, and to convene, in view of the
gravity of the events, an Ad-hoc Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers, pursuant to
Resolution 1080.22
The ad hoc meeting took place on April 13. During the meeting, the member states
reiterated their condemnation of the event and urged the Peruvian authorities to release the
legislators, political leaders, and trade union leaders who had been detained. They also call
on member states to reassess their relations with Peru and to ask the president of the ad hoc
meeting to put together a mission, along with the secretary-general and other foreign
ministers, to go to Peru to promote dialogue between the Peruvian authorities and the
political forces represented in the Legislature.23 The OAS mission, headed by the foreign
minister of Uruguay, Hector Gross Espiel, and the OAS secretary-general, Baena Soares,
visited Peru three times and met with government representatives and various opposition
groups. During these meetings, it was decided that elections for a constituent assembly
would be called.24
This agreement was ratified at the second ad hoc meeting of May 18, 1992, held in
the Bahamas, during which President Fujimori formally committed himself to hold those
elections, with OAS monitoring. The elections were held in November 1992.25
22 CP/RES. 579 (897/92), “The Situation in Peru,” April 6, 1992. 23 MRE/RES. 1/92, “Support for the Reestablishment of Democracy in Peru,” April 13, 1992. 24 Fujimori originally wanted to hold a plebiscite on the actions taken, while the opposition was seeking the
resignation and prosecution of Fujimori and the immediate calling of general elections. Baena Soares, Síntesis
de una Gestión, pp. 41–44. 25 MRE/RES. 2/92, May 18, 1992. Hugo de Zela, “The OAS and Electoral Observation,” International
Analysis (Lima: Peruvian Center for International Studies, December 1993).
16
The restoration of democracy was due not only to the automatic and immediate
application of the multilateral mechanisms of the OAS but also to the concerns expressed,
the suspension of assistance, and the bilateral pressure exerted by the international
community, including the United States, Japan, Spain, the European Union, the Río Group,
and the Inter-American Development Bank, among others. Within Peru, despite the
popularity of the actions taken by President Fujimori, the press, the traditional political
forces, and the intellectual community strenuously insisted on and pressed for the return to
the constitutional order.26
More recently, during the elections held in 2000, the OAS continued to play a
significant role in supporting the democratic process in Peru by not covalidating Fujimori’s
reelection, because of serious irregularities observed in the electoral process that undermined
the validity of the results, and by exercising diplomatic and political pressure through the
presence in Lima of a political observation mission, which acted as a facilitator of
negotiations between the government and opposition leaders.27
26 See Fabián Novak, “Defense of Democracy and Application of Resolution 1080 to the Case of Peru,” in
Arlene Tickner, ed., Sistema Interamericano y Democracia (Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Estudios
Internacionales, Universidad de los Andes, UPD/OEA, 2000). 27 This mission was established and accepted by Fujimori at the General Assembly in June of 2000. The OAS
monitoring of those elections had extensive international visibility because of the irregularities that it found in
the electoral process. This compelled the member states, at the Windsor General Assembly, to send a high-level
mission, presided over by Secretary General Gaviria and Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian foreign minister, to
explore with all those concerned the options and recommendations that might contribute to the strengthening of
democracy in Peru. At the end of its visit in June of 2000, the mission proposed an agenda for negotiations that
was accepted by most of the political actors and included reforms for the strengthening of the administration of
justice, the rule of law, the separation and balance of powers, freedom of expression, transparency in the
electoral system; and civilian control of the intelligence apparatus and of the armed forces. The permanent
mission, headed by the former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic, Eduardo Latorre, monitored closely
in situ the negotiation and reform process as well as its implementation. Although, for some, this OAS response
was insufficient, one must understand it in context: The organization is not a monolithic and supranational
entity, autonomous of its member states. Its decisions are the result of long and arduous negotiations and
compromises, its traditional method of decision making. The OAS response at Windsor was consistent with
that tradition. It was a compromise between some foreign Mministers who wanted a more activist position in
favor of democracy and fair elections and those who preferred a less “interventionist” posture. See the
mission's report: Observación Electoral en Perú. Elecciones Generales del 9 de abril de 2000, OEA/Ser.D/XX,
17
Eventually the Fujimori regime collapsed, as revelations of widespread corruption
and bribery schemes within his inner circle became publicly known. In September 2000, he
fired his principal adviser, Vladimir Montesinos, announced that he would resign, and
proposed constitutional reforms that would allow for early elections. Fujimori resigned
abruptly in November 2000 and exiled himself in Japan. Fair elections were held in April
and June 2001.
Guatemala
In Guatemala, on May 25, 1993, President José Luis Serrano suspended the Constitution;
dissolved Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court; removed the attorney
general; ordered the detention of the human rights ombudsman; and suspended the electoral
law and the political parties. In light of these events, the OAS secretary-general, in the
exercise of the powers conferred on him under Resolution 1080, immediately convened a
meeting of the Permanent Council. In its May 25, 1993, resolution, the council condemned
the events that had occurred and urged the Guatemalan authorities to reestablish
“immediately the complete functioning of democratic institutions”; convened an ad hoc
meeting; and called on the secretary-general to head a “fact-finding” mission to examine the
events and provide information on the situation in Guatemala at that meeting. The secretary-
general's mission met with officials of the institutions affected by the presidential decision;
with the leaders of political parties and the armed forces; and with representatives of
pertinent sectors of Guatemalan society.28
The ad hoc meeting took place on June 3, 1993, in Washington, D.C. It took note of
the secretary-general’s fact-finding mission, once again condemned the events that had
occurred, and urged the government to reestablish democratic institutions. In addition, it
resolved to call on member states to evaluate their relations and cooperation with Guatemala,
to ask the secretary-general to return to the country to continue providing support for “the
efforts of the Guatemalan people to reestablish constitutional order through dialogue and
SG/UPD/II.26, December 13, 2000. 28 CP/RES. 605, “The Situation in Guatemala,” May 25, 1993. Accompanying the secretary- general on his
mission were the foreign ministers of Barbados, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una
Gestión, pp. 53–68.
18
cooperation,” and to report on the results to the next session of the meeting. Also, member
states “approved” the Guatemalans' rejection of the events and their strong support for all
peaceful efforts “to find a democratic solution.”29
In the meantime, the international community and a number of member states
expressed their concern and rejection of the “presidential coup” and started to assess their
relationship with the government. Argentina withdrew its ambassador and canceled a
scheduled visit of President Jose Antonio Serrano to that country. Chile withdrew its military
cooperation. The U.S. ambassador to the OAS announced the suspension of trade
preferences for Guatemala. The presidents of Central America and Mexico also issued an
appeal to their Guatemalan counterpart.30
At the same time, the presidential coup was widely and forcefully resisted by the vast
majority of the Guatemalan media and people, which significantly contributed to the end of
the crisis. The Constitutional Court itself did not recognize the presidential coup and
declared unconstitutional the decree issued by Serrano. Also, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
refused to accept Serrano’s call for a referendum.31
During the second visit of the secretary-general’s mission, the crisis came to an end.
Serrano resigned on June 1 and left the country, basically because of the resistance to his
actions by the people and institutions that had been targeted for dissolution and because of
the lack of support of the armed forces.32 Since Vice President Gustavo Espina Salguero was
considered to bear joint responsibility for the crisis, the Constitutional Court immediately
called on the Congress of the Republic to elect a new president for the remainder of the
29 MRE/RES. 1/93, “Reestablishment of Democracy in Guatemala,” June 3, 1993; and Francisco Villagrán, La
Crisis Constitucional en Guatemala, La Respuesta de la OEA y de la Sociedad Civil en la Defensa de la
Democracia (Washington, DC: Institute of Peace, October 1993); and Minutes of the Second Ad-hoc Meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/Serv. F/V.3, MRE/Acta 2/93, June 7, 1993, p. 17. 30 CP/ACTA 945/93, Situation in Guatemala, May 25, 1993; and Minutes of the Second Meeting. 31 See the report of Secretary-General Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 53–68; and the statement of
the Representative of Guatemala, Minutes of the Second Meeting, pp. 8–9. 32 The support of the Guatemalan armed forces for the court’s decision and demanding that the presidency
make public the court’s ruling played a decisive role in toppling Serrano. The minister of defense announced
that he had asked Serrano to comply with the ruling of the Constitutional Court but that the president had
refused to do so and had stepped down. See Minutes of the Second Meeting, p. 9.
19
constitutional term. On June 6 the Congress appointed the human rights ombudsman, Ramiro
de Léon Carpio, to this position.
Paraguay
In Paraguay, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy (constitutionally also the commander in chief
of the armed forces) sought the resignation of General Lino Oviedo, head of the army, on
April 22, 1996. The general's refusal to comply with the presidential order propelled the
country into an institutional crisis. His insubordination and failure to recognize the
presidential authority was an ill-disguised attempt to carry out a coup d’état, which also
included a call for the resignation of Wasmosy as well as military and political threats and
pressure against him.33 Strictly and formally speaking, these events cannot be classified as
institutional rupture, but they did create an ambiguous and murky situation that led to
uncertainty about institutional continuity. At least in the view of Paraguan citizens and the
international community, the situation posed an imminent threat to the interruption of the
“legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government,” as stipulated in
Resolution 1080. In that context and at the request of OAS secretary-general César Gaviria,
the chairman of the Permanent Council and Permanent Representative of Panama,
Ambassador Lawrence Chewning Fábrega, called a special meeting of the Permanent
Council on April 23 to assess the situation.34
That organ met and condemned the attempted coup and expressed its decisive
support for the constitutional government of Juan Carlos Wasmosy, calling for the
Constitution and the legally established government to be respected. It also convened an Ad-
hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs without setting a date; this meeting did not take
33 In view of upcoming internal elections within the Colorado party, as well as presidential elections, Oviedo
had been distancing himself from the government and reducing his participation and political influence within
the government-backed party. Wasmosy not only considered this to be inappropriate and illegal conduct on the
part of a military officer but also a challenge to his authority and the presidency. 34 On that day Secretary-General Gaviria was on an official mission to Bolivia. In a 2 A.M. telephone call, he
asked the chairman of the council to convene the meeting. See the statement of Ambassador Lawrence
Chewing Fábrega, who was chairman of the Permanent Council during the crisis, in La Crisis Institucional de
1996 en el Paraguay, UPD/OAS Democratic Forum, 1996, p. 14.
20
place because the crisis ended quickly.35
On that same day, César Gaviria, together with the deputy foreign minister of
Bolivia, Jaime Aparicio (Bolivia was serving a secretary pro tempore of the Río Group),
went to Asunción to express the support of both organizations for President Wasmosy and
Paraguayan democracy. The Argentine foreign minister, the Uruguayan foreign minister, and
the Brazilian deputy foreign minister also went to Asunción for the same purpose. In the
meantime, the ambassadors of the United States, Argentina, and Brazil were engaged
intensely, publicly and privately, to support the president and to explicitly reject the actions
taken by General Oviedo.36 The crisis ended with the formal resignation of General Oviedo
from his position as army chief on April 24 in a public ceremony that was attended by
Secretary-General Gaviria and President Wasmosy. 37
35 CP/RES. 680 (1071/96), “Support for the Democratic Government of Paraguay,” April 23, 1996. See
Chewning Fábrega, in La Crisis Institucional de 1996 en el Paraguay, p. 14. 36 The Argentine, Uruguayan, and Brazilian ambassadors also expressed their support for Wasmosy on behalf
of Mercosur, whose “democratic clause” conditions membership in the group. In addition, the U.S. under
secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, announced at the meeting of the Permanent Council that “the days of
dictatorship are over” and that his government was suspending military aid to Paraguay. He added that the U.S.
government would probably participate in actions to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions if the
attempted coup proved successful. The representatives of those governments also warned Oviedo that, in such
an event, they would seek the international isolation of the new government. Oviedo had also received a call
from the head of the Brazilian army to stop his efforts to overthrow Wasmosy. On the night of April 22 and
during the early hours of the morning of April 23, the ambassadors of the United States, Robert Service, and
Brazil, Oliveira Días, and the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Jeffrey Davidow, and Secretary-
General Gaviria managed to discourage President Wasmosy from resigning. Wasmosy was convinced that
Oviedo would carry out his military threats and that his resignation would avoid a bloodbath. On the morning
of April 23, Wasmosy received calls of encouragement from the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, the United
States, Spain, and others. Statements of support for democracy in Paraguay were also received from Chile,
Peru, Mexico, Russia, Portugal, Venezuela, and the European Community, among others. For further details,
see Arturo Valenzuela, “The Coup that Didn’t Happen,” Journal of Democracy, no. 1 (1997); José María Costa
and Oscar Ayala Bogarín, Operación Godeón: Los Secretos de un Golpe Frustrado (Asunción: Editorial Don
Bosco, 1996). 37 This resignation was apparently the result of an agreement between Wasmosy and Oviedo according to
which the latter would give up his position and insubordination in exchange for his appointment as minister of
defense. However, the president then decided not to do so, in the face of the outright and widespread popular
21
The immediate and widespread support of the international community for President
Wasmosy and Paraguayan democracy contributed significantly to the successful
management of the crisis. However, in the final analysis, and with international support, it
was the Paraguayan political, social, and military forces that found the most appropriate way
to preserve democracy in Paraguay. What sustained the democratic process and determined
the course of events were the political parties in Congress, the press, and the youth, through
popular demonstrations; and the Paraguayan air force and navy, through their public
expressions of support for the constitutional government and their resistance to Oviedo's
demands.38
Four years earlier, an attempted coup d’état in Venezuela on February 4, 1992—
although it was more traditional, open, and violent than the one in Paraguay—did not result
in the invoking of Resolution 1080. But a meeting of the Permanent Council took place
immediately, adopting a resolution entitled “Support for the Democratic Government of the
Republic of Venezuela.” At the meeting, the representatives of member states reiterated their
recent commitment to democracy and the principle of democratic solidarity, “forcefully
condemned the armed uprising against the democratic government of President Carlos
Andrés Pérez as well as the criminal attempt on his life,” and expressed their “condemnation
of all sectors that have attempted to use force to usurp popular sovereignty and the
democratic will of the Venezuelan people.” They also expressed their “resolve and
unconditional support for that Head of State” and reaffirmed “that there is no room in the
hemisphere for regimes established by force.” As an expression of inter-American
democratic solidarity and this rejection, the chairman of the Permanent Council and the
secretary-general traveled to Caracas and publicly delivered the resolution to the president of
rejection of this agreement, evidenced by thousands of demonstrators in front of the official government
headquarters. Most people view the agreement as a betrayal of democratic principles and of the support that
they had given to Wasmosy. The president announced the decision not to appoint Oviedo, acting “on a mandate
of the people,” in the speech made on April 25. See Valenzuela, “The Coup that Didn’t Happen”; and Costa
and Ayala Bogarín, Operación Godeón. Los Secretos de un Golpe Frustrado. 38 See La Crisis Institucional de 1996 en el Paraguay, UPD/OAS, Democratic Forum, 1996; as well as
Valenzuela, “The Coup that Didn’t Happen”; and Costa and Ayala Bogarín, Operación Godeón. Los Secretos
de un Golpe Frustrado.
22
Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez.39
Ecuador
When considering whether to invoke and apply Resolution 1080, mention should be made of
the irregular (or at least ambiguous and questionable from a constitutional standpoint),
although extremely popular, step to remove the president of Ecuador, Abdalá Bucarám, on
February 6, 1997. The resolution was not invoked on that occasion either, nor was there any
formal meeting of the Permanent Council on the matter.40 However, and in the spirit of the
new paradigm of defense and promotion of democracy, several member states expressed
their concern over the crisis and their interest in its prompt resolution through constitutional
and democratic channels. For that express purpose, OAS secretary-general César Gaviria, at
the request of the Ecuadorian head of state, visited Quito briefly on February 5.41
39 See CP/RES. 576 (887/92) and AG/RES. 1189 (XXII-0/92). 40 The president was removed by the National Congress, which, by a simple majority of members, declared him
mentally incapacitated and incompetent, without a political trial or proper analysis of the charges leveled
against him. The eccentric, emotional, and erratic conduct of the president (popularly known as “the
madman”), coupled with the implementation of a difficult economic adjustment program, led to a rejection of
his government by the population and even by the political forces that had originally elected and supported
him. His removal was preceded by a political/institutional crisis that placed the Congress on a collision course
with him. The crisis was accompanied by a national strike, violent street demonstrations calling for his
removal, and by the withdrawal of the armed forces’ support for his administration. See Andres Openheimer,
“Democracies Stay Out of Ecuador Controversy,” Miami Herald, February 8, 1997; Dianan J. Schemo,
“Ecuadorian Crisis Over Presidency Ends Peacefully,” New York Times, February 10, 1997; and Juan Jesús
Aznárez, “La Vicepresidenta Ecuatoriana Sustituye a Bucarám con el Apoyo del Ejército,” El Pais
Internacional, February 10, 1997. 41 Although some opposition leaders did not approve of the visit of the secretary-general and criticized his
alleged “interference” in the internal affairs of Ecuador, he made it clear in a press release that “the purpose of
his visit was simply to express the concern of the OAS over the complex situation existing in Ecuador” and that
he had “profound respect for the capacity of Ecuadorians to resolve their internal disputes on their own.” This
presence and concern on the part of the OAS was described as “understandable” by one of the most influential
newspapers of Quito in its editorial entitled: “Gaviria, Your Visit Is within Bounds,” El Comercio, February 6,
1997. Gaviria also stated that the OAS “has an unwavering commitment to defend democracy and will use the
tools available to it if the circumstances so warrant.” His visit to Quito was also openly supported by the U.S.
Department of State through its spokesman, Nicholas Burns. Despite the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to the
23
Another irregular change of government in Ecuador occurred with the overthrow of
President Jamil Mahuad on January 22, 2000, by the armed forces and indigenous groups.
The interruption of the constitutional process and the irregular manner in which the change
of government occurred was rapidly covered up, if not concealed, by the armed forces when
they appointed Vice President Gustavo Noboa as the successor. This appointment took place
after the dissolution of the civilian-military council that had been formed and in the face of
international pressure, in particular from the inter-American community through the OAS,
the United States, Mercosur countries, and Chile and Bolivia, among others.42
OAS, Harriet Babbit, informally sought consensus for a Permanent Council resolution supporting Ecuadorian
democracy, the topic was not discussed at that council meeting at which the Ecuadorian ambassador to the
OAS “provided assurances that all action would take place within constitutional channels and that there was no
possibility whatsoever of a coup d’etat in his country.” However, because the removal of Bucarán was
considered to be a violation of democratic and constitutional principles, it was condemned by the governments
of Argentina, Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. See news dispatches of the Spanish news
agency EFE, and AFP of February 5, 6, and 7 in OAS News Bulletin of February 6, 7, and 10. On February 6,
the Congress removed President Bucarán and appointed its president, Fabián Alarcón, as interim president of
the republic. However, in a brief and confusing period, Vice President Rosalía Arteaga also assumed the office
of president. (The Ecuadorian Constitution does not set forth any clear procedure for presidential succession.)
The crisis was finally resolved by another congressional decision confirming Fabián Alarcón as interim
president. 42 See “Civilian Rule Is Restored in Ecuador,” Washington Post, January 23, 2000. The OAS Permanent
Council approved a Resolution rejecting and condemning the “attack against the legitimately constituted
democratic order” at a special meeting on Friday, January 21, and supporting President Mahuad; CP/RES. 763
(1220/00), January 21, 2000. The U.S. government apparently played an important role in getting the military
leaders to recognize the danger of isolation that the country was facing with a civilian-military council or with
a clearly unconstitutional government. See the statements of Arturo Valenzuela, director of Hemispheric
Affairs of the National Security Council of the Office of the President of the United States, who points out that
during the crisis, several countries, including the United States, warned the leaders of the armed forces about
the danger of isolation Ecuador faced if the civilian-military council that had been formed took control. See the
interview in the Argentine newspaper El Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, January 22, 2000; CNN in Spanish,
“Governments of America and Europe Clamor for the Preservation of Democracy” in http://cnnenespañol.com,
January 22, 2000; and HOY (digital), “Cae el Triunvirato,” Quito, January 22, 2000. The Congress, which held
a special meeting in Guayaquil, approved the appointment of Noboa that same day.
24
The 1992 Washington Protocol
The third instrument now available to the OAS and its member states for the defense of
democracy is called the 1992 Washington Protocol, approved as an amendment to the OAS
Charter by the 16th regular session of the General Assembly in December 1992. With its
ratification by the majority of member states, the amendment took effect in September 1997
and is now part of the charter of the organization (Article 9). With this legal/diplomatic
instrument, member states have made further progress with their efforts to protect and
promote collectively the existence of democratic systems in the hemisphere. The spirit of
Article 9 of the charter, in essence, provides for the possibility of suspending or excluding
from the activities of the OAS any government of a member state that has not resulted from a
democratic process or that has been formed by military means.43 Since the entry into force of
Article 9, no situation has arisen in a member state that has warranted its invocation or
application.
The Inter-American Democratic Charter
A fourth instrument, known as the Inter-American Democratic Charter, was signed in Lima,
Peru, on September 11, 2001. This latest instrument is intended to strengthen Resolution
1080's “restoration function.” It stipulates that in the case of “an unconstitutional
alteration….that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member State,” it is possible
now for any member state—not just the secretary-general—to request a meeting of the
Permanent Council to assess the situation collectively and eventually, if necessary, to send a
diplomatic mission “to foster the restoration of democracy. If this fails, a special General
Assembly is to be convened to adopt decisions which “may include new diplomatic
initiatives and, if the alteration persists, the suspension of the member State from the
Organization” (Articles 20 and 21). The Democratic Charter also strengthens the preventive
function of the OAS. Article 17 now allows the government of a member state “to request
assistance from the Secretary General or the Permanent Council” for the “strengthening and
43 The article is somewhat elliptical and reads as follows: a “member of the Organization whose democratically
constituted government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to
participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, Meetings of Consultation, and the Councils of the
Organization.
25
preservation of its democratic system,” when it “considers that its democratic institutional
process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk.” Additionally, when the democratic
system and the legitimate exercise of power is threatened in a member state, “the Secretary
General or the Permanent Council, may, with the consent of the government concerned,
arrange visits or other actions in order to analyze the situation” and “adopt decisions for the
preservation and strengthening of the democratic system.” (Article 18).
On April 12, 2002, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was temporarily taken
prisoner and deposed (for approximately 48 hours) by a military faction of the armed forces
that installed Pedro Carmona, a business leader, as provisional president. The new president
tossed out the 1999 Constitution and dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court. As these
events unfolded, Latin American presidents and foreign ministers were meeting in San José,
Costa Rica, at the annual gathering of the Río Group. They condemned the coup and asked
for a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS, invoking Article 20 of the new charter,
to collectively assess the situation in Venezuela and adopt the appropriate decisions. On
April 13 the OAS council unanimously condemned the “alteration of the constitutional order
in Venezuela” and sent the secretary-general to Caracas “to investigate the facts and begin
the necessary diplomatic efforts, including good offices, to promote the immediate
normalization of the democratic institutions.” The council also convoked a special General
Assembly for April 18 to hear the secretary-general's report and decide on the most
appropriate actions to be taken.
The drastic measures of the interim president, plus his decision not to include in his
cabinet those labor, party, and civic leaders who had been active in opposing Chavez or the
moderate “institutionalist” military leaders, led to his immediate isolation and loss of critical
support. Under these internal circumstances, and in view of the condemnation of the coup by
the Río Group and the OAS, loyal and “institutionalist” military groups rescued Chavez from
his military prison and returned him by helicopter to the government palace at 3 A.M. on
April 14.
For three days the secretary-general examined the situation in Venezuela, and on
April 18 he presented his report to the special General Assembly. The General Assembly
unanimously approved the resolution, manifesting, inter alia, the member states'
determination to apply whenever necessary the Democratic Charter for the preservation and
26
defense of representative democracy.44 It also expressed the assembly’s satisfaction with the
reestablishment of the constitutional order in Venezuela and the return to power of the
democratically elected government of President Chavez. In addition, the member states
supported the Venezuelan government's initiative to convoke a national dialogue within the
constitutional and democratic framework, and encouraged the government to observe and
apply all the essential components of representative democracy, as stipulated in Articles 3
and 4 of the Democratic Charter (e.g., rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, separation and independence of powers, fair elections, pluralism). They also
offered any OAS assistance the Venezuelan government might require to consolidate its
democratic process.45
Lessons and Implications
The first lesson that can be drawn from the application fo the legal-diplomatic instruments is
clear and forceful: If there is an attempted coup d’état or irregular interruption of the
democratic process in any OAS member state, its members will take immediate and decisive
collective action through this organization, through other collective bodies, or will even act
unilaterally to stop or reverse such an attempt. Whatever action it takes, it will trigger a
process aimed at defending and restoring the democratic institutions of the country affected.
Resolution 1080 and the Democratic Charter now function as expected.46 And in the most
44 AG/RES. 1 (XXIX-E/02). 45 Because of the uneasy relations existing between Venezuela and the United States, some have speculated that
the U.S. government supported the coup at least that it recognized the coup-makers too quickly, and only
belatedly condemned the coup, when it was reversed. But the fact is that both the Permanent Council and the
Special General Assembly resolutions, with theexplicit vote of the United States, strongly condemned the
unconstitutional rupture of the democratic process. See Arturo Valenzuela, “Bush's Betrayal of Democracy,”
and Karen De Young, “U.S. Seen as Weak Patron of Latin Democracy,” Washington Post, April 16, 2002. See
also Michael Shifter, “Democracy in Venezuela: Unsettling as Ever,” Washington Post, April 21, 2002, and
Peter Hakim, “Democracy and U.S. Credibility,” New York Times, April 21, 2002. 46 See Vaky in Vaky and Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, p. 28. During the second
Ad-hoc Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that was studying the crisis in Guatemala, the
Mexican secretary of foreign relations gave special recognition to the constructive work of the OAS and
described it as having acted in “a timely and effective manner,” thereby showing the “potential of our
27
extreme case, that of Haiti, it was possible for member states, pursuant to Resolution 1080,
not only to condemn the illegal regime but also to recommend sanctions, such as the freezing
of bank accounts/assets, the suspension of loans and assistance, the breaking of diplomatic
relations, and/or the imposition of embargoes. In Peru, the application of Resolution 1080
had consequences beyond the scope of the OAS and the hemisphere. The suspension of its
participation in the Río Group and the threats by pertinent actors of the international
community to suspend international cooperation, international investments, and
economic/trade relations probably played a significant role in the decision of the Peruvian
government to return to the more traditional democratic fold. Although these decisions took
the form of recommendations and their application is always voluntary and nonbinding
(unlike the decisions of the UN Security Council), these new OAS instruments signal a
collective stand in and a commitment to the defense of democracy, as well as a standard of
legitimacy that transcends the organization’s formal contours. If applied, these
recommendations would isolate internationally, on various fronts, a government that results
from an irregular or unconstitutional process. That isolation can now begin formally with the
application of the Democratic Charter and Article 9 of the constitutive charter. In other
words, multilateral political and economic pressure to defend and/or restore democracy may
have a widespread and significant impact on the country. If government leaders and military
officers perceive these instruments as having such an impact, as it appears they do, then the
instruments would have effectively served their preventive purpose.
The democratic paradigm (the collective defense and promotion of democracy) is
taking root in the inter-American political culture. It can even be argued today that it takes
precedence over other values and practices of the inter-American system, such as the
principle of nonintervention. Illegal or unconstitutional governments can no longer hide
behind the principle of nonintervention or absolute sovereignty of the state; nor can the
promotion of democracy be perceived any longer as a pretext of the United States in
Organization to provide assistance by means of the promotion of political dialogue to settle disputes.” The
assistant secretary for foreign affairs of Chile stated that the “rapid and firm action of the OAS should be
recognized,” adding that “the days of an OAS that is silent in the face of a coup d’etat are over,” as is an “OAS
that is indifferent to the violation of the will of the people. He also saw the emergence of an organization that is
“flexible and actively committed to the best values of representative democracy.” See Minutes of the Second
Meeting, pp. 11–14.
28
combating communism, as happened during the Cold War. Democracy, despite its
shortcomings, is what the peoples and governments of the Americas want and seek.
Democracy derives its validity, sustenance, and legitimacy from the sovereignty of a people
and the exercise by citizens of their political and human rights, not necessarily from state
sovereignty. It does not need pretexts. Thus, it is likely and to be expected that in the event
of the interruption of democratic processes, repression, violation of human and political
rights, and humanitarian crises, countries will proceed, either through the OAS or outside of
it, to take collective action through regional groups such as the Río Group or Mercosur
(under its democratic clause), or unilaterally, to reject and condemn such actions and to
apply political and economic pressure and sanctions to the governments responsible for
them.47
Furthermore, if the establishment of a nondemocratic government is perceived as an
immediate threat to national or regional security, countries with the political will and
military means will take action, unilaterally and militarily, if deemed necessary, to restore
democracy. For some experts, “the defense of democracy has no practical meaning if it is not
supported by a capacity for coercion, which, in the final analysis, is the threat or reality of
military intervention.” Similarly, Domingo Acevedo and Claudio Grossman hold the view
that “there are cases where democracy can be restored only through the threat or actual use
of force.” The inability of a regional organization such as the OAS “to use all means
necessary to restore democracy” would undermine the commitment to democracy and its
role as a key institution in the defense and promotion of democracy, leaving the door open to
unilateral intervention or recourse to the United Nations Security Council.48 The case of
Haiti should be borne in mind. It is also useful to recall the unilateral military intervention of
47 Heraldo Muñoz, “El Derecho a la Democracia en las Américas,” Estudios Internacionales (Santiago, Chile)
(January–March 1995); and Domingo Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, “The Organization of American States
and the Protection of Democracy,” in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, p. 133. The topic has been convincingly
discussed by Thomas Franck in his influential article “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,”
American Journal of International Law (January 1992), and in “The Democratic Entitlement,” University of
Richmond Law Review, no. 29 (1994). 48 See Enrique Obando Arbulú, “Democracy and Hemispheric Security,” International Analysis (Lima: CEPEI,
April-September 1994), p. 46; and Acevedo and Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the
Protection of Democracy,” p. 145.
29
the United States in Panama in 1989, to overthrow a repressive military regime that had ties
to drug trafficking. Despite the fact that the intervention violated the principle of
nonintervention, involved the use of violence, and produced victims, it managed to restore
the democratic process that remains in effect to date.49
Perhaps it was this last vestige of unilateral interventionism in 1989 that provoked
and hastened the discussion of the possible mechanisms for the collective defense and
promotion of democracy that would prevent abusive or repressive conduct on the part of
some governments of the region but would also restrain or mitigate the inclination to
unilateral intervention on the part of others.50 The progress made in this regard began to be
49 This action took place after the military regime of General Noriega declared the general elections of May
1989 null and void and engaged in public and brutal repression of the opposition forces that had won the
elections. In addition, there was evidence of the continued violation of human rights. It happened four years
after the 1985 amendment to the Charter but two years before Resolution 1080. On the initiative of Venezuela,
an emergency Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held (OES/Ser.F/II, Doc. 8/89 rev.
2, May 17, 1989), at which Noriega was held responsible for the abuse perpetrated against the opposition
candidates and human rights violations, and it was decided that a transfer of power should take place (similar to
the recommendation made ten years earlier with respect to the government of Somoza). Also, a Mediation
Commission was established, comprised of the foreign ministers of Ecuador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and
Tobago, and chaired by Secretary-General Baena Soares, which went to Panama. However, the commission did
not manage to accomplish the transfer of power or the resignation of General Noriega. Eventually this led to
President Bush's decision to carry out a military intervention in December 1989 to remove Noriega. The
frustration and inability of the mission to achieve change was noted by Baena Soares (Síntesis de una Gestión,
p. 38). After the armed intervention, the Permanent Council condemned the intervention and called for the
withdrawal of the intervention forces. The U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, expressed his regret over the
OAS statement and the fact that this organization had failed to support political and economic sanctions against
Panama prior to the intervention, which could have avoided military action. See Wilson, “The OAS and
Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes.” In that context, it should also be remembered that, in a Cold
War setting, to restore peace and democracy in the Dominican Republic, the United States engaged in military
intervention in that country in 1965. See note 73. 50 Although as far as many critics of the organization are concerned, the resolutions of the General Assembly
are meaningless, superficial, or irrelevant, the process of final approval is complex. These resolutions are
usually the result or conclusion of a long process of debate, analysis, and negotiation, which begins with
informal and committee-level talks among foreign ministers and representatives of the countries at meetings of
the Permanent Council and General Assembly. Only after considerable drafting and efforts to achieve
30
reflected in the resolutions of the General Assemblies in Washington, D.C., in 1989, which
approved the resolution entitled “Human Rights, Democracy, and Electoral Observation”51;
in Asunción, in1990, establishing a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy52; and culminating
in the General Assembly in Santiago, Chile, with the Santiago Commitment and Resolution
1080.
The instruments, actions, and political/diplomatic measures just discussed are short-
term collective tools available to the OAS to respond automatically and immediately to
crises that threaten democracy in a member state. In that regard, they are protective
instruments or deterrents (a red light for possible transgressors). However, when they do not
manage or are insufficient to prevent or discourage interruptions of the democratic process,
they then serve as reactive/corrective instruments that permit collective action to restore the
democratic process of a member state. In both cases, they are “high politics” collective
mechanisms and are operative only because of the present congruence in political regimes
and because of the consensus and commitment of OAS member states to defend and
strengthen, collectively, democracy in the hemisphere. This collection of legal/political
instruments plus the actual actions of member states through the OAS to defend and promote
democracy are configuring and consolidating what has been called here the inter-American
democratic regime (REDI).53
This new role of the OAS represents a significant expansion of its competence and
responsibility since, initially and in conjunction with the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), the OAS was created to “strengthen peace and security in the
hemisphere” and to promote joint action in the event of external aggression.54 But today its
consensus are they finally forwarded to the plenary session of the General Assembly. At any rate, the point is
that the resulting regulations (Resolution 1080, e.g.) do end up influencing the external and internal conduct of
member states. 51 AG/RES. 991 (XIX-0/89. 52 AG/RES. 1063 (XX-0/90. 53 Heraldo Muñoz maintains that this new activism of the OAS to support democracy is consistent with what he
calls the long-standing doctrine of democratic governments within the inter-American system. See Muñoz, The
Future of the Organization of American States, p. 70, and “The OAS and Democratic Governance.” 54 The TIAR was not intended only to defend the hemisphere from an armed attack emanating from outside the
hemisphere, as some critics claim, but rather as a system of collective defense against the attack by any state on
31
commitment is also to defend the democratic system against internal aggression or threats.
These fundamental and unprecedented changes represent an area that has hardly been studied
and one that has profound implications for the traditional concepts of sovereignty and
nonintervention. These concepts and practices are clearly undergoing change. Careful and
in-depth analysis of their implications for the system of inter-American relations and the role
of the OAS is required.55
Perhaps the main lesson learned by these new developments and efforts to defend
democracy, which revolve around the OAS but are not exclusively limited to it, is that, as
stated in the Permanent Council Resolution of 1992 to support Venezuelan democracy,
“there is no room in the hemisphere for regimes established by force” or military
governments.56 The armed forces, which in times gone by did not hesitate to overthrow a
government at the first signs of political instability or threats related to its group interests,
seem to understand today that it is futile to use force to take over a government. In the crises
in Guatemala (1993), Paraguay (1996), and Ecuador (1997), the high command of the armed
forces kept their distance by supporting the constitutional process and did not yield to the
temptation to stage coups d’état. In Venezuela in 1992, the senior officers rejected the
attempted coup and then respected the trial of President Pérez. In 2002, the "institutionalist"
army high command at first appeared to accept Chavez’s “resignation” but then rejected the
unconstitutional measures taken by the provisional government and returned Chavez to
power. In Brazil, they also respected the trial and constitutional removal of President
Fernando Collor de Melo. In Chile, they accepted the detention of their leader, General
Augusto Pinochet, in England as well as accusations leveled against their members for
human rights violations during the military government. The same applies to Argentina,
where former military presidents have been prosecuted for and convicted of human rights
a member state. In fact, the TIAR has been invoked and applied only in the case of intrahemispheric conflicts
and particularly among states that comprise the wider Caribbean region. See “Aplicaciones del TIAR” in
García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, p. 852. 55 The beginnings of this analysis can be found in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty. 56 The reference is to the resolution “Support for Democratic Government in Venezuela,” CP/RES. 576
(887/92), February 4, 1992, and is in keeping with the statement of Strobe Talbott, the U.S. under secretary of
state, at the meeting of the Permanent Council on the crisis in Paraguay, in which he made it clear that “the
days of dictatorship are over.” See note 36.
32
violations.
However, the fact that the military is not seizing power and running the country does
not mean that it is no longer influential in the political process. It is still a significant actor,
although with diminishing power, in Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and
Venezuela. The overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador on January 21, 2000, and
the failed Venezuelan coup of 2002 represent the last expression of that influence.57 This
behavior, this lingering antidemocratic action, underscores even more the importance of
strengthening the REDI.
The Promotion of Democracy
Complementing the "high politics" instruments for the defense of democracy, the member
states also have at their disposal the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). This unit
was created in 1990 at the General Assembly held in Asunción, Paraguay as an executive
instrument for the promotion and strengthening of democratic institutions on a medium- and
long-term basis.58 Its principal objective, as established by the Permanent Council, is “to
respond promptly and effectively to member States that request assistance, providing advice
or assistance related to the preservation and strengthening of their political institutions and
democratic procedures.”59
Like the other political/legal instruments of the OAS in the area of democracy, the
UPD is the product of a consensus reached among the member states of the organization. It
57 The decisive role played by the Ecuadorian armed forces in supporting or toppling of the government in
Ecuador was clear when President Mahuad stated on television that these forces had withdrawn their support
and had formed a civilian-military council, and when the vice president, Gustavo Noboa, announced on
television that he was assuming the position of president with the support of the armed forces. See note 42.
Perhaps one additional way of strengthening the mechanisms or sanctions for the protection of democracy is
for member states to consider, through the OAS, the exclusion or suspension of armed forces that have been
involved in an attempted coup d’état or have seized power by force from inter-American military cooperation
arrangements, such as the inter-American military conferences, the Inter-American Defense Board, and joint
military exercises. Ignoring major violations of the principles that defend democracy or applying them
selectively could weaken the REDI. 58 AG/RES. 1063 (XX-0/90). 59 CP/RES. 572 (882/91).
33
is an important complement to and support for the efforts of the governing bodies in their
activities to defend democracy. While legal/political instruments such as Resolution 1080 are
aimed at confronting the crises threatening democracy in the immediate term and have a
dissuasive and reactive function, the activities of the UPD contribute to strengthening
democratic institutions from a medium- and long-term perspective, which, in the final
analysis, constitutes preventive work. Its activities and actions are less dramatic and visible
than those resulting from the application of Resolution 1080.
The promotion of democracy is, by definition, a complex, multidimensional, slow,
and long-term task. It involves, in essence, the promotion and development of a democratic
culture. In other words, it essentially means the promotion, fostering, and teaching of values,
beliefs, attitudes, and practices that are usually recognized as essential for the existence of a
democratic culture. These are, inter alia, freedom, justice, equality, tolerance, pluralism,
separation and independence of powers, fair elections, ethics, participation, solidarity, fair
competition, cooperation, mutual trust, respect for the rights of others and for formal and
informal rules, the rule of law, negotiation and consensus-building, and the peaceful and
civil settlement of political disputes and conflict in a society. Democracy, then, is not just
elections (as important as these may be) but a way of life and a political culture. Its
promotion involves a process of socialization and internalization of democratic values and
practices carried out by the school system, the universities, the mass media, the organizations
of civil society, the church, the family, interest group organizations, and, of course, political
institutions.
The consolidation and viability of democracy depends in large measure on the extent
to which the political culture of democracy is firmly rooted, solid, and pervasive in a society.
The learning and practice of those democratic values and habits need to be supported and
strengthened on an ongoing and conscious basis, in individuals, in society, and in democratic
institutions themselves. A democratic political culture is the most significant and decisive
long-term variable in a democratic political system.60 Furthermore, a democratic political
60 With regard to the role of political culture in the strengthening of democracy, see Guillermo O'Donnel,
“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy (July 1998), and his article “Do
Economists Know Best?”; Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture”; and Robert Putnam “Bowling
Alone,” all in Journal of Democracy (January 1996). Marta Lagos, “Latin America's Smiling Mask,” Journal
34
culture conditions the international conduct of states and tends to encourage the development
of relations marked by cooperation, security, and peace. The predominance of a democratic
political culture in member states is a prerequisite for the development and consolidation of
the REDI.61
The main challenge in the promotion of democracy is in the world of politics itself, in
the political culture. This is where the most difficult and persistent challenges and threats to
institutions and to the consolidation of democratic practices and values are encountered. The
lack of credibility and legitimacy of political institutions are the major challenges and threats
to democracy in Latin America. And they are related to the lack of representativeness,
weakness, poor organization, technical lags, and inefficiency of political institutions. They
are also related to a weak democratic political culture that is characterized by lack of
transparency, ethics, and integrity in political practices; insecurity in the rules of the game; a
pervasiveness of paternalism, clientelism, mistrust, intransigence, and political intolerance;
and the inability of the political class to resolve conflicts peacefully and build consensus,
among others.
This view of democracy and its promotion provides a useful framework for
understanding the methodology and thematic areas of the UPD. But the UPD’s role is
conditioned by the limits imposed by member states on its autonomy (it may take action only
at the behest and/or instructions of member states) and by the dearth of human and financial
resources at its disposal to carry out its tasks. Thus the UPD's function should be construed
as one of regional cooperation that complements, assists, and supports the internal efforts of
member states. It is a catalyst, and its work is qualitative and regional in nature. The UPD is
not a funding or national technical assistance agency, although it can provide assistance with
“seed” funds and advise governments and academic institutions on start-up activities related
to the strengthening of democracy.
of Democracy (July 1997). Juan Liz and Alfred Stephan, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12. See also Seymour Martin Lisped, “The Centrality of Culture,” Journal
of Democrac (Fall 1990); and the classic book on the topic: Richard E. Damson and Kenneth Precut, Political
Socialization (Chicago: Little, Brown and Co., 1969). 61 On the relationship between political culture and the conduct of states, see Katzenstein et al., “International
Organization and the Study of World Politics,” p. 674; and John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State
Behavior,” International Organization, no. 4 (Autumn 1999).
35
The role of the UPD is to support at least four interdependent processes that are
considered basic and crucial in contributing to the institutional strengthening and
consolidation of a democratic political culture at both the national and regional levels. They
are:
1. The generation and dissemination of new knowledge and information on the
functioning of democratic institutions as well as on democratic values and
practices, particularly through empirical, rigorous, and comparative studies
and research62
2. The training of experts, advisers, young leaders, and officials who implement
policies related to institution building and the promotion of democratic values
and practices through regional courses and seminars
3. The promotion of interaction and dialogue among civil society, the academic
world, and the world of politics to foster a sharing of knowledge and
experience on problems and challenges that face the democratic governments
of member states through regional forums
4. The organization of special missions to provide assistance and support for the
strengthening of democratic institutions and processes in conflictive
situations, at the request of the member state
From that perspective, the UPD has focused its activities on a limited number of
thematic areas. These areas are considered to be priority areas because of their relevance to
the strengthening of democracy and are an integral part, inter alia, of the challenges faced
from within by the political systems of the region, including
• The modernization of legislatures and interparliamentary cooperation
• The process of decentralization and local government
• The strengthening of political parties
• The promotion of democratic values and practices
62 The Latin American experience demonstrates the absence of an adequate body of knowledge in the area,
generated endogenously in the region. An effort should therefore be made to build a Latin American empirical
theory of democracy, focusing on what it is and can realistically occur in the region, given its history and
peculiarities.
36
• Electoral modernization and election monitoring63
Electoral observation missions merit special mention because they constitute one of
the primary and most visible activities of the UPD and one with the greatest immediate
impact on the promotion of democracy. Although the OAS has performed election
monitoring since 1962, substantive systematic work in this area began with the 1989
mandate of the General Assembly and with the observation of the Nicarguan electoral
process in February 1990.64 All electoral observation activities are carried out at the request
of the member state in question. The main function of electoral observation activities is to
observe impartially the electoral process and to inform the secretary-general and the member
states on its developments. Another is to collaborate with all participants (electoral
authorities, parties, and government authorities) in their efforts to have an electoral process
characterized by transparency, fairness, and trust. Electoral observers are not electoral judges
or police; rather they serve as impartial facilitators in solving problems or difficulties that
may arise in the electoral process.
Although the mere holding of elections periodically does not guarantee the full
exercise of democracy, there is no question about the essential role of elections in the entire
democratic process. Representative democracy cannot exist without elections. All
democratic processes begin with and are renewed through elections. Periodic, transparent,
and competitive elections are critical and essential instruments to elect, assess, and make the
63 For a detailed description of the activities and products of the UPD, see its quarterly Reports of the General
Secretariat on the Activities of the UPD or its annual Work Plan. 64 Prior to 1989–1990, electoral observation activities of the organization were conducted in an ad hoc manner,
at the request of member states and through Permanent Council resolutions. In general, these missions, whose
members were appointed by the secretary- general, were small and were present basically on election day.
Notably, at the beginning there was a certain amount of opposition to sending these missions since they were
considered to violate the principle of nonintervention. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 137–180.
The legitimacy and nature of electoral observation missions changed after the 1989 General Assembly
resolution “Human Rights, Democracy, and Electoral Observations,” which recommends that the secretary-
general organize and send missions to observe all phases of the electoral process, provided that this is done at
the request of the state in question. It is important to point out again that the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1962 recommended to member states the
holding of elections as a prerequisite for the formation of a democratic government.
37
leaders of a society accountable, to settle differences, and to make collective decisions on
issues facing a society. They also provide an invaluable opportunity for the periodic exercise
of democratic values and practices. They permit and facilitate political participation, the free
expression of ideas, consensus building and respect for the rules of the game, fair
competition, and tolerance of differing positions and ideas, among others. The periodic
holding of elections strengthens a democratic culture. This fact explains the central role of
elections in democracy and the importance of electoral observation.
To date, the OAS has observed more than 70 electoral processes in Colombia,
Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Venezuela, the nature and scope of which
have varied depending on the situation in the country. The most important electoral
observation missions are those that are known as comprehensive and deploy a large number
of specialized observers. They remain in the country throughout the different phases of the
electoral process, including the registration, campaigning, electoral preparation, voting
phases, and the postelectoral phase, which includes the proclamation of the winners.65
In addition to the UPD, other areas of the OAS contribute significantly to the
promotion of democratic values and practices. One example is the work carried out in the
promotion of human rights.66 The member states of the OAS frequently mention the close
and inseparable link between the respect for human rights and the rule of law. In other
words, democracy cannot exist without the exercise of human rights and vice versa. They
cannot be separated either in theory or principle. This link and the interest of member states
65 See Manual for the Organization of Electoral Observation Missions (Washington, DC: UPD, Organization
of American States, 1998). Examples of comprehensive electoral missions are the ones coordinated by the
author in Paraguay and Venezuela; see Electoral Observation in Paraguay, 1991–1993 (Washington, DC:
General Secretariat of the OAS, 1996); Election Observation in Venezuela. General Elections, 2000,
OEA/Ser.G.; CP/Doc. 3387/00, December 14, 2000. 66 Corruption is another area on which the OAS is increasingly focusing, particularly in terms of internalization
and application of the Inter-american Convention against Corruption. There are, of course, still other areas
thatthreaten democracy from “outside” the political system, such as drug trafficking and consumption,
antipersonnel mines, and terrorism, among others. The member states have increasingly used the OAS as an
instrument of regional cooperation to deal collectively with these threats. See the Annual Reports of the
Secretary-General.
38
in human rights is a long-standing one. One of the first initiatives in this direction is
Resolution XXXVI of the 1938 Eighth International Conference of American States held in
Lima, which states that “the democratic concept of a State guarantees all individuals the
essential conditions for carrying out their legitimate activities with dignity.” Similarly, in the
Caracas Declaration, the Tenth International Conference of American States in 1954
reiterated “the conviction of the American States that one of the most effective means of
strengthening their democratic institutions is to increase respect for the individual and social
rights of man”; and that the “full exercise of fundamental human rights and duties can only
be achieved through a system of representative democracy.”
In a formal sense, however, the inter-American system for the promotion and defense
of human rights begins with the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogotá in 1948.
The system was developed and strengthened with the establishment of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs held in Santiago in 1959 and with the adoption in 1969 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, also known as the Pact of San José (in effect since 1978), which also
establishes the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights are the main institutions that oversee and sustain the inter-American
system of human rights. Both are autonomous, and their members are elected independently
and do not represent the states of which they are nationals. The main function of the IACHR
is the investigation and analysis of the petitions of individuals who claim that their human
rights have been violated by a state and the recommendation of measures to be adopted by
the government in question so that it can resolve the conflict. It also conducts on- site visits
to prepare reports on the human rights situation in member states and often analyzes cases
related to freedom of the press and the rights of women and children, indigenous
populations, and migrant workers.67 The court performs consultative and review functions.
At the request of a state party or the IACHR, it interprets the applicability of the convention
67 The work of the IACHR in these “new” areas of human rights is the result of the mandates of the First
Presidential Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in 1994.
39
to the cases submitted, and its decisions are binding with respect to states parties.68
In summary, the efforts and activities of the OAS, and of the UPD in particular, to
promote democracy must be seen as complementary to the actions of member states to
protect, defend, and restore representative democracy as the preferred system of government.
Generally speaking, its activities are less dramatic and less visible than those of "high
politics" in defense of democracy and in application of Resolution 1080 or the Democratic
Charter. But given its constraints, its efforts are, for the most part, of a regional and catalytic
nature. They are designed to stimulate and coordinate inter-American cooperation in support
of national efforts to strengthen the democratic political culture and its institutions. This
effort is based on the assumption that preventing the breakdown of democratic institutions
and consolidating democracy essentially requires a long-term process of instilling and
fostering a democratic political culture. At the inter-American level, these efforts are part of
the inter-American democratic regime and help to strengthen the democratic paradigm in the
hemisphere.
These activities also supplement the substantial financial efforts for reform of the
state in which multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank are engaged as well as the work of international assistance agencies of
developed countries including the United States, Canada, Spain, Sweden, Norway, and
others, which are making an important contribution to consolidating democracy.
Tensions and Limitations of the OAS
68 The extensive, substantive, and prestigious record of the OAS in this field cannot be analyzed adequately in
this paper. On the evolution and activities in this area, see the Annual Reports of the IACHR (Washington, DC:
OAS General Secretariat); Rafael Nieto Navia, ed., La Corte y el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos (San José, Costa Rica: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, November 1994). Argentina,
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela recognize the mandatory
jurisdiction of the court. See also The Inter-American Agenda and the Multilateral System of Government: the
Organization of American States (Washington, DC: April 1999. On ways of strengthening the system, see
ibid., and Canada and the Inter-American Human Rights System, statement by Ambassador Peter M. Boehm,
Permanent Representative of Canada to the OAS Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Permanent
Council, December 2, 1999, Inter-American Dialogue.
40
The effectiveness of the REDI is conditioned by the inherent limitations and tensions of an
international organization such as the OAS. The limitations that the organization faces in
regulating effectively the behavior of its member states, and in executing or enforcing the
obligations arising from its charter or from the decisions of its governing bodies (resolutions,
Democratic Charter), reflect the limitations that have been generally identified in
international organizations and in international law. This issue has been the subject of much
controversy and debate in academic and diplomatic circles.69
Noncompliance with Obligations
There is no doubt, nor any presumption to the contrary, that the obligation of member states
is to comply with the resolutions of its senior bodies and to respect the charter of the
organization, which is, after all, an inter-American treaty, a binding instrument, with
principles, purposes, obligations, and rights.
Nevertheless, the question frequently arises as to what happens if member states fail
to respect the principles and obligations of the OAS (e.g., the principle of nonintervention or
the effective exercise of democracy) and/or its decisions as a collective body (e.g., sanctions
against a member state that has violated principles or obligations contained in the charter). In
other words, what are the consequences for a member state that does not respect the
principles of the OAS or comply with the decisions of its governing bodies?70 The
consequences depend on to what extent those neighbors in the democratic community that
69 This debate includes issues such as the distinction between domestic and international law, the lack of a
formal government or central formal authority in the international system, the autonomy of international
organizations, the prohibition on the arbitrary use of force, and the legitimacy of its use in self-defense. See
Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison, Politics and the International System (New York: Harper & Row,
1971); Bull, The Anarchical Society; Stanley Hoffman, "International Systems and International Law," in The
International System, edited by Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1961); and Wolfgang Friedmann, Oliver J. Lissitzyn, and Richard C. Pugh, International Law. Cases and
Materials (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Corporation, 1969). 70 Here we understand “respect” to mean not violating principles, while “comply” means not only nonviolation
of principles but also fulfilling the decisions of the governing bodies.
41
feel threatened by the violation are willing (and have the persuasive and coercive capacity)
to enforce, collectively or unilaterally, the provisions of the charter and the decisions of the
OAS governing bodies (the “realist” argument). This contingency points to an OAS
limitation: Its inability, in certain cases, to enforce respect for its principles; or, in particular,
to prevent, with the mere invocation of principles, member states from violating their
commitment to exercise democracy, for example, or from using force in unilateral
interventions, as was done by its most powerful member, the United States, in the Dominican
Republic in 1965, in Grenada in 1982, and in Panama in 1989.71
It should be noted that, despite the serious limitations on the enforcement of
collective sanctions against a member state that has violated the obligation to exercise
effective democracy, history has shown that when a majority of member states considers it
necessary, the OAS can take decisions and collective actions that will have a significant
impact on the violator. This is particularly the case if it is determined that such violation
represents a threat to the peace and security of the region. In the dictatorship cases of Trujillo
in 1960, Castro in 1962 to 1964, and Somoza in 1979, the member states of the OAS
concluded, in the context of the Río Treaty, that their regimes represented a concrete and
direct threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere, primarily because they were
supporting subversives or antidemocratic guerrillas, were engaging in armed aggression, and
were violating the principle of nonintervention. Decisions included such sanctions as
breaking diplomatic and trade relations, economic embargoes, and nonrecognition and
71 On the issue of whether decisions of the Organ of Consultation in application of the Río Treaty are
compulsory, see the enlightening discussion in García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, pp. 838–841. For
Thomas Franck, the obligation to govern democratically that states acquire upon associating themselves
voluntarily is the price they must pay for belonging to a democratic community (e.g., OAS, Mercosur). This is
an obligation to recognize the rights of its citizens to be governed democratically, or if it fails to do so, to face
sanctions by the international community. See Franck, “The Democratic Entitlement,” p. 3. Similarly, Dr. Vio
Grossi, a distinguished member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, argues forcefully that member
States have the legal obligation to exercise effective democracy. See his “Report on Democracy in the
Interamerican System, op.cit p. 110. Farer also suggests that one way of binding member states would be
through national legislation that authorizes and obliges the executive branch to comply with sanctions imposed
against violators of democracy and human rights. To this end, Farer proposes that UPD design and promote
model legislation on the issue. See T. Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, p. 22.
42
suspensions that ended with the diplomatic and economic isolation of those regimes.72
Moreover, to facilitate the return to democracy and to ensure peace and security in the
region, the OAS in 1965 created and dispatched an Inter-American Peace Force to the
72 The coercive measures decided and applied in these cases by the Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Relations were taken in accordance with Article 23 of the Río Treaty, which stipulates that measures
may be adopted in the form of (a) “decisions of mandatory application” or (b) recommendations to states
parties. Once the intention of Rafael Trujillo to overthrow the government of Venezuela and assassinate its
president was demonstrated, the Sixth Meeting of Consultation, in Costa Rica in 1960, imposed mandatory
sanctions against the dictator. These had no precedent in the inter-American system, and consisted in
suspending diplomatic and economic relations as well as imposition of an arms embargo. See Federico Gil,
Latin American–United States Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 200–221and
García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, pp. 920–921. With respect to the sanctions against the regime of
Fidel Castro, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in 1962 (Punta del Este, Uruguay) and the Ninth Meeting in
1964 (Washington, D.C.), under the Río Treaty, concluded that the communist regime was violating the human
rights of its citizens and promoting subversion in other countries of the region, constituting aggression against
those countries (e.g., Venezuela, Peru), and that it was violating the principle of nonintervention and was
incompatible with the fundamental principles of the OAS. On this basis, the member states, by a two-thirds
majority, condemned the actions of the Castro regime, suspended diplomatic and trade relations with the
government of Cuba as well as its participation in the inter-American system, called on that government to
dismantle and withdraw missiles from the islands, and recommended that member states adopt “such measures
as they deem necessary for their legitimate individual or collective defense in order to counter threats or acts of
aggression” of the Castro government. See García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, pp. 832–834 and
Eighth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations Serving as the Organ of Consultation in Application of the
Río Treaty, Final Act, Doc. 38, January 31, 1962, Punta del Este, Uruguay, OAS/Ser. F/II.8, and Ninth
Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations Serving as the Organ of Consultation in Application of the Río
Treaty, Final Act, Doc. 48, July 26, 1964, OAS/Ser. F/II.9; and Slater, “The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance,”
pp. 135–182. It is possible to argue, however, that the prevailing inter-American democratic regime will not
allow the Castro government to return to the OAS at least until there has been a significant democratic opening
in Cuba. In the case of Somoza in 1979, the decision of the 17th Meeting of Consultation in the framework of
the OAS Charter, to condemn the Somoza regime for its violations of human rights and to call for its
replacement by a democratic regime, was sufficient to destroy its legitimacy within the organization and to
isolate Somoza. See note 12 and Acevedo and Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the
Promotion of Democracy,” p. 138.
43
Dominican Republic, to replace U.S. forces.73
But when collective actions against violations have proven insufficient or ineffective,
successive governments in the United States have taken coercive measures against Castro in
Cuba (naval blockade, support to anti-Castro forces, and a continuing embargo) or against
pro-Castro revolutionaries to prevent them from seizing power in the Dominican Republic in
1965. Although these measures were taken in the hypersensitive context of strategic
confrontation during the Cold War, they nonetheless were related to a concern for
democracy, security, and peace in the hemisphere. Almost 30 years later, with the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of communism, when OAS efforts proved inadequate, the United
States intervened militarily in Panama (1989), on the grounds that human rights were being
violated, democracy was being thwarted, and a threat was posed to the peace and security of
the region by the dictatorship of General Noriega. For similar reasons, but with authorization
from the United Nations, the United States took coercive measures against Haiti to remove
the de facto government of General Cédras.
As can be seen, a threat to peace and security is a necessary condition and could
trigger the application of sanctions and coercive measures, either unilateral or multilateral.
Currently, failure to exercise democracy effectively, including respect for human rights, can
be considered or perceived as a threat to the peace and security of the region, as was asserted
as early as 1959 in the Declaration of Santiago of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Relations.74 In this context, and as proponents of “realism” in
73 This intervention was endorsed by the Tenth Consultative Meeting, which decided to establish and dispatch
an Inter-American Peace Force, headed by a Brazilian general, for the purpose of overseeing the peace process
and the restoration of democracy. Democracy in the Dominican Republic, although imperfect, has been in
place for 30 years without interruption. See Jerome Slater, “The Limits of Legitimization in International
Organizations; The OAS and the Dominican Crisis,” in Yale Ferguson, ed., Contemporary Inter-American
Relations. A Reader in Theory and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). See also Neale
Ronning, ed., Intervention in Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970); and Gil, Latin American–
United States Relations. 74 See Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System,” p. 113. See also note 7 on democratic
security. According to T. Franck, the decision of the UN Security Council established a precedent by
permitting the use of force, on the grounds that violations of human rights and the right to democracy
constituted a threat to the peace of the region. See his “The Democratic Entitlement,” p. 9.
44
international relations would argue, it is not impossible that countries of the inter-American
democratic community will resort to coercive measures, multilateral or unilateral, as they
have done historically—particularly in extreme situations that are deemed to pose a clear and
present threat to democracy and to the peace and security of the democratic community.
Notwithstanding these limitations in the OAS and their “realist” consequences, it is
perhaps a promising and significant sign that, in the context of the new democratic paradigm
within the hemisphere, the resolutions or decisions of its senior bodies, its condemnations,
pressures, and political and diplomatic negotiations, and the recommended sanctions arising
therefrom have, in the final analysis, shown themselves to be useful and effective. They have
contributed significantly to reversing institutional breakdowns, as in Peru, Guatemala and
Venezuela or to avoiding them, as in Paraguay. In Haiti, although these actions did not have
the desired effect immediately, pressure was maintained and served as a basis for decisions
by the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, such resolutions and actions in defense
and promotion of democracy have come to represent substantive components of what has
been called here the new inter-American democratic regime, in which the OAS is a central
institution. Its norms and efforts for the defense and promotion of democracy are today a
reference point and a framework that gives legitimacy to measures taken to those ends,
collectively or unilaterally, by members of the inter-American and international community.
The regime would be further strengthened, however, if the new Democratic Charter is also
invoked in cases in which there is a clear and constant violation and erosion of the
principles, values, and practices of a democratic process, as identified in its Articles 3 and 4.
This invocation would prevent the actual rupture of the constitutional framework. Up to
now, Resolution 1080 and recently the Democratic Charter have been invoked only after an
institutional breakdown, which in effect reduces their preventive value.
On the other hand, pursuant to the charter as reformed by the Washington Protocol in
1992, and the new Democratic Charter, the forceful and unconstitutional overthrow of the
democratic government of a member state is grounds for suspension from the OAS. Once
decided by a two-thirds majority of its members, the suspension or collective sanction will
invariably be mandatory and effective, and there will be no grounds for debate over its
compliance.
45
Between Institutional Dependency and Autonomy
To adequately understand this new role of the OAS, one must clearly understand and
recognize that the organization is not a supranational body, independent of its members; nor
is it monolithic. It is a political and diplomatic organization of 34 members, with various
collective decision-making bodies, such as the General Assembly, the Meeting of
Consultation or the Ad-hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations, the Permanent
Council, and the Inter-American Council for Integral Development, which are the senior
OAS organs. But in the final analysis, the behavior, decisions, and actions of these senior
collective bodies depend on the respective foreign policy decisions of each of the member
states. That is, the governing bodies do not act independently of the respective foreign
ministries of the member states.75
The General Secretariat, on the other hand, is a central and permanent organ of the
OAS, but with powers limited by the charter and by the mandates of the member states.
Among its principal functions are those of carrying out the duties entrusted to it by the
governing bodies, providing technical support to those bodies and to the administration of
the organization, and promoting cooperation between member states and the organization.76
The scope and effectiveness of its powers depends on the informal leadership ability of the
secretary-general, who is elected by the member states every five years, and on his ability to
build a consensus.77 The member states have always sought to limit the powers of the
General Secretariat and are very cautious about ceding their sovereignty to a supranational
body. Because of this, it is extremely important to recognize the reality and limitations of the
OAS. A superficial analysis of its activities often leads to the presumption that it is a
75 An excessive dependence on the ministries of foreign affairs of member states can have a paralyzing effect,
if those offices do not have adequate structures, procedures, and resources to follow closely the evolution of
issues in the OAS and to formulate policies on them—particularly during their treatment in the regular
proceedings of the Permanent Council. In times of crisis, however, those ministries obviously pay due attention
to OAS issues. 76 See Chapter XVI of the charter, as amended in 1993. See also Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the
Inter-American System,” pp. 28–29. 77 The current secretary-general, César Gaviria, former president of Colombia, has succeeded in imbuing the
organization with a new vision and new dynamism that have contributed significantly to developing greater
confidence among member states in its renewed role in the defense and promotion of democracy.
46
monolithic and independent body, controlled or directed by the secretary-general, who may
then be unrealistically expected or required to take decisions or actions that are not within
his competence.
Since the 1985 reform of the charter and the adoption of Resolution 1080, the
secretary-general has significantly new and broader political and diplomatic responsibilities.
These responsibilities allow him to act with greater autonomy and to serve as a catalyst in
efforts to respond to a threat to the peace and security of the region and also in the defense
and promotion of democracy. Although prudence requires that he consult member states
closely before proceeding and that he keep them constantly informed, the secretary-general
is empowered, by Article 110 of the OAS Charter, to act on his own initiative and
independently “to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council
any matter which in his opinion might threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere.” As
we have seen, the secretary-general also has the obligation to proceed almost automatically,
pursuant to Resolution 1080 and the new Democratic Charter, to convene the Permanent
Council in case of an interruption in the democratic process in any OAS member state.
Actions of secretaries- general in the cases analyzed above have contributed significantly to
activate immediate and effective collective responses in defense of democracy.78
Moreover, the standards and programs for the defense and promotion of democracy
adopted by the OAS have taken on a certain life of their own. They have a certain degree of
autonomy and have come to constitute an independent contribution to building the inter-
American democratic regime. This regime, although originally constructed by the countries
78 The role of the secretaries-general, ambassadors, and foreign ministries in constructing the regime deserves a
separate and much more profound analysis than can be offered in this paper. In this respect, it would be
worthwhile, for example, to analyze the role played by the ambassadors of Argentina (Hernán Patiño Mayer),
Brazil (Bernaddo Pericas Neto), Canada (Jean-Paul Hubert), Chile (Heraldo Muñoz), Colombia (Julio
Londoño), Saint Lucia (Joseph Edmunds), the United States (Luigi Einaudi), Venezuela (Guido Grooscors),
Uruguay (Didier Opertti), and others in designing and approving Resolution 1080 and the Washington
Protocol. With respect to the importance of individual leadership in the dynamics of international cooperation,
see Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurship and International Cooperation,”
in International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999); Oran R. Young, “Comment on Andrew Moravcsik…” and
his “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society,”
International Organization, vol. 45, no. 93 (1991).
47
themselves, has over time developed its own dynamic. Its norms and rules have come to
condition and affect the behavior of the nation-states of the hemisphere, in particular with
respect to the exercise, defense, and promotion of democracy.79
The Principle of Nonintervention, Its Limits and Erosion
The principle of nonintervention is intimately linked with other traditional principles of
inter-American relations and international law, such as the absolute sovereignty and juridical
equality of states. Recognition and respect for these principles in the inter-American system
and in the charter of the OAS have been major concerns of Latin American countries. This
interest was originally expressed in the Calvo (1868) and Drago (1902) doctrines. Their
essential purpose was to restrain or contain, at least juridically, military interventions such as
those of some European powers (to recover former colonies, protect their citizens, or collect
private and public debts) and those of a series of U.S. governments during the first three
decades of the 20th century (in the context of the Monroe Doctrine and the Theodore
Roosevelt corollary).80
79 S. Krasner argues that there are regimes that acquire autonomy and that are converted into autonomous or
independent variables conditioning and influencing the internal and external behavior of states. See his
“Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables,” in International Regimes, (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 80 These two Argentine international jurists argued, among other things, that states were juridically equal and
sovereign and that they could not be the object of prosecution in the courts of other countries; nor could they be
the object of military intervention to recover debts. European interventionism arose from the wars of
independence: by France in Argentina and Uruguay (1835–1850) and in Mexico, together with England and
Spain (1862–67); by Spain in Peru (1864–65) and in the Dominican Republic (1861–65); and by Germany,
England, and Italy in Venezuela (1902). U.S. interventionism concentrated in states of the Caribbean basin and
sought to instill stability in regimes of the region to forestall European intervention and control over regional
governments and to avoid the threat that this implied for its own security. At the beginning of the 20th century,
the region took on a certain economic, political, and military importance, and the security of the Panama Canal,
particularly after World War I, came to be a central focus of this concern in U.S. policy. In the first 30 years of
the 20th century, the United States intervened and occupied Cuba (1901–09), the Dominican Republic (1907
and 1916–24), Nicaragua (1909, 1912–25, 1927–32), Mexico (1914 and 1917), and Haiti (1914–34). See Gil,
Latin American–United States Relations, pp. 68–69 and 87–115; Samuel F. Bemis, chapter “The Doctrine of
Nonintervention and the Codification of International Law,” in his The Latin American Policy of the United
48
After decades of “negotiations” between Latin American countries and the United
States, the principle of nonintervention was definitively enshrined at the Ninth Conference of
American Republics held in Bogotá in 1948, with signature of the treaty (charter) founding
the OAS.81 During the first four decades of the organization, which coincided with the Cold
War, the principle of nonintervention was invoked on a number of occasions, and this led to
the convening of Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations. Both within
the framework of the Río Treaty and that of the OAS, as noted previously, member states
have taken concrete and coercive measures and sanctions against dictatorships in the
Caribbean that were threatening the security of other member states.82 The sanctions applied
by the Organ of Consultation (the Permanent Council provisionally, or the Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations), were imposed in the context of “decisions
of mandatory application” as contemplated by the Río Treaty (Article 23) in the case of
armed aggression.
States (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), pp. 226–241; and C. Neale Ronning, ed., Intervention in Latin
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970). 81 In 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the “Good Neighbor Policy,” which rejected military
intervention, except in the case of collective and cooperative action in specific cases. To the satisfaction of
Latin American countries, this translated into the acceptance and signature, at the Seventh Conference of
American Republics held in 1933 in Montevideo, of the Inter-American Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States, which included moreover a stipulation that no state had the right to intervene in the internal or
external affairs of another In 1936, at the Eighth Conference of Republics of the Americans, held in Buenos
Aires, the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace was adopted. It
included a Consultation Pact for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a Declaration of Solidarity, which
stipulated the nonrecognition of the acquisition of territory by force, the principle of nonintervention, the
illegality of collecting debts by force, and the peaceful solution of disputes. This convention was the precursor
to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Río Treaty. Bemis, “The Doctrine of
Nonintervention and the Codification of International Law,” pp. 264–265; Gil, Latin American–United States
Relations, pp. 156–158. 82 It is interesting to note that when dictators like Trujillo or Somoza attempted to invoke the principle of
nonintervention, and its corollary, that of collective security through the Río Treaty, and to convene a Meeting
of Consultation, as a consequence of aggression by "democratic" forces of exiles supported by the governments
of Costa Rica and Venezuela, they could not achieve a quorum. In these cases, such principles did not apply
explicitly because the requesting states were nondemocratic. See Slater, The OAS and United Stares Foreign
Policy, pp. 86–91.
49
Nevertheless, in the most obvious cases of violation of the nonintervention principle
by unilateral and military action of the United States (e.g., Dominican Republic 1965;
Grenada, 1983; Panama, 1989; military support to the Contras during the 1980s), member
states of the Río Treaty and of the OAS could do no more than criticize or condemn,
collectively and individually, the behavior of the superpower. Essentially, this reveals the
practical limitations that “realism” imposes on the principle of nonintervention, for obvious
reasons: No country or alliance of member states has the military power to confront the
United States; and any economic sanctions against it would have no major effect but would
in fact be counterproductive for those imposing the sanctions. The crude reality is that
countries that have the necessary power, especially the superpowers, will do whatever they
deem necessary, including the imposition of sanctions and coercion, to eliminate what their
governments perceive as a threat to their vital national interests. From a “realist” perspective,
this is inevitable—even though analysts, international officials, or governments of other
countries consider it illegal, illegitimate, unfair, and contrary to the most elemental
principles of a peaceful and “democratic” international coexistence.
The inability of OAS member states to enforce respect for the principle of
nonintervention in such cases also reflects the reality of asymmetry in inter-American
relations. This fact inevitably conditions the development of a system of democratic peaceful
relations among the member states as well as the inter-American democratic regime. But this
asymmetry does not always, or inevitably, translate into diplomatic victories for U.S.
governments in achieving their objectives through the OAS.83 Yet it is not necessarily
negative or counterproductive to have the world's greatest power as a member of the inter-
American democratic regime, especially when a key element of that country's foreign policy
today, in the post–Cold War era, is to promote a community of democratic nations.84 In fact,
83 U.S. diplomats are not always able to achieve Latin American consensus for their objectives. For example, a
proposal to strengthen mechanisms for preventing constitutional breakdowns was widely and publicly rejected
during the General Assembly in Guatemala, 1999. See also Slater, The OAS and United Stares Foreign Policy,
pp. 242–241, and 274–275. 84 See, for example, speech by the secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, at the School of Advanced
International Studies, January 17, 2000. In fact, the United States has played a significant and decisive role,
both multilaterally and unilaterally, in protecting and restoring democracy during the crises examined here. See
Corrales and Feinberg, “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere”; Vaky, in Vaky and Muñoz, The
50
U.S. participation could contribute to strengthening the REDI and ensuring its
development.85
On the other hand, in recent years the principle of nonintervention (an illusion for
professor Stanley Kaufmann) has lost some of its absolute force and has gradually receded in
the face of the inexorable reality of globalization, independence, and the process of
integration itself. In fact, some observers are already claiming that the international system
has by now accepted a degree of “interventionism” as legitimate and even “legal” or
permitted by international norms. In its extreme expression, this belief manifests itself in
humanitarian military intervention, on a collective basis authorized by regional organizations
such as the OAS, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the UN. According to
this view, this new interventionism is motivated and justified, in principle, by serious
violations of human rights and by the collapse of the rule of law and constitutional
democracy—conditions that, in turn, are considered a threat to the peace and security of
neighboring countries or of the region in which the country is located. Yet paradoxically, the
success of such humanitarian intervention requires basic elements of realism—in other
words, one or more states with the military capability and willingness to carry it out
effectively. 86
Future of the Organization of American States; A. Valenzuela ”The Coup that din’t Happen,” on Paraguay and
his interview in Clarin on Ecuador; and F. Villagran, “La Crisis Constitucional en Guatemala.” 85 In this context, one might even return to the notion of Panamericanism or the “Western Hemisphere Idea”
espoused by some leaders during the second half of the nineteenth century in various American or continental
congresses (Panama, 1826; Lima, 1847, 1856, 1864), and then go on to imagine, in the setting of the 21st
century, an inter-American democratic regime centered on a superpower as its integrating and centripetal
nucleus and as the embryo for institutionalizing an inter-American democratic community with certain
democratic and politically integrating norms and democratic institutions that could actually include some
features of an inter-American confederation of democratic countries. See Corrales and Feinberg, “Regimes of
Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere,” pp. 4–6; Gil, Latin American–United States Relations, pp. 144–183;
and on the conditions and processes for forming or integrating pluralistic political communities, see the classic
work of Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in
the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968).
86 See the excellent analysis of this issue by Fernando R. Tesón, who proposes that collective and humanitarian
military intervention, authorized by the United Nations for the purpose of remedying serious violations of
51
At the same time, standards and actions for the collective defense and promotion of
democracy, which for some imply a kind of interventionism in the internal affairs of member
states, also represent a significant challenge to the traditional principle of nonintervention.
Concepts such as the right to democracy, the principle of democratic legitimacy, and the
rights and sovereignty of peoples (rather than states) have been gaining legitimacy and
international force and have achieved preeminence in the scale of values of the inter-
American system. The effective exercise of representative democracy is no longer a question
of exclusive domestic jurisdiction of any member state, nor can violation of that principle or
obligation be excused under the traditional principle of the absolute sovereignty of states—
particularly when member states have formally accepted the commitment and obligation to
defend, promote, and exercise representative democracy effectively. 87
Conclusion and Comments
The thesis of this paper has been that an inter-American democratic regime is now emerging
for the defense and promotion of democracy in the hemisphere, one that has as its central,
but not exclusive, institution the Organization of American States. The OAS is the key inter-
human rights, is legitimate in current circumstances. He argues moreover that the acceptance of interventionism
of this type, together with the erosion of traditional principles of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, is
essential to maintaining peace in the new international order. See his "Changing Perceptions of Domestic
Jurisdiction and Intervention," in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, pp. 29–51. For Slater, collective action in
defense of democracy should not be regarded as interventionism: see his “The OAS as Antidictorial Alliance.”
On the other hand, it is important to remember the warning of Joseph Nye on the perils of this kind of
interventionism, in “The New National Interest,” Foreign Affairs (July–August 1999). 87 See Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governments”; and his “The Democratic Entitlement,” pp.
1–5, in which he argues that the self-determination of peoples or popular sovereignty is a right that
governments must accord the people who live under their authority and that to the extent that this right to
democracy advances, the traditional sovereignty of states will diminish, since states will gradually cede
sovereignty in exchange for legitimacy and membership in the community of democratic nations. See also Vio
Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System”; Acevedo and Grossman, “The Organization of
American States and the Protection of Democracy”; Heraldo Múñoz, “El Derecho a la Democracia en las
Américas [The right to democracy in the Americas],” Estudios Internacionales (Instituto de Estudios
Internacionales, Universidad de Chile), (January–March 1995).
52
American institution of mandatory and automatic reference for the defense and promotion of
democracy in the hemisphere. It is the regional organization that legitimizes and
immediately triggers inter-American and international cooperation in reaction to a threatened
or actual institutional breakdown. It is the focal point for collective and systematic efforts to
restore democratic institutions and to dissuade attempts to disrupt the institutional integrity
of member states. It is the single institution around which the new inter-American
democratic regime is gradually evolving.88 This regime is emerging at a historic moment of
democratic political congruence and commitment in the hemisphere. It combines a moral
imperative and a degree of idealism for democracy and human rights as the basis for peace
and security with a new political realism that accepts the use, collective or unilateral, of
diplomatic, economic, and coercive sanctions if it is determined that regional or domestic
peace and security are threatened by violations of democracy and human rights.
The inter-American community of democracies that makes up this regime contains,
naturally, some democratic political systems that are weak, fragile, imperfect, or not
sufficiently liberal to be considered full and consolidated democracies. Some of them still
betray an authoritarian political culture with antidemocratic values in which democratic
practices of liberty, justice, equality, and transparency are not fully observed. There is also a
shortage of leaders with the democratic vision and capacity to negotiate and build consensus
and to mobilize the citizenry around it. And it would appear that in some cases the armed
forces still have a decisive role in determining whether a government will survive (as in
Ecuador and Venezuela), while the independence and balance between the branches of
government is still precarious. Given this reality, some pessimistic observers have concluded
that democracy in Latin America is merely an illusion.89
88 It is worth repeating here the words of H. Bull, in Anarchical Society, that it is “institutions that help ensure
adherence to rules, formulating them, communicating them, administering them, enforcing them, interpreting
them, and legitimizing them.” On the other hand, this statement about the importance and significance of the
OAS in the REDI is based on the conventional wisdom, shared by the “neo-realists,” that international
institutions constitute a valuable instrument for promoting the interests of states through cooperation. See
Katzenstein et al., “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” p. 684; and Robert Keohane,
“International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign Policy (Spring 1998). 89 See Larry Diamond, “Degrees, Illusions and Directions for Consolidation,” in Farer, ed., Beyond
Sovereignty; and Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs (November–
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It is maintained here, however, that these shortcomings of democracies do not
necessarily mean that they are failures, but rather that greater effort is still required,
domestically and regionally, to consolidate them. They also point to the need to strengthen,
with constancy, patience and prudence, the inter-American democratic regime as a system of
cooperation for supporting members of the community that need help in their efforts to
cultivate and strengthen democracy, and for defending it when it is threatened, using all the
means necessary and possible. The fact that there are weak democracies that lack some of
the required liberal traits also indicates that the values, rules, and norms of the regime will
inevitably be violated from time to time, just as happens with juridical standards in the
domestic context. What is important here is that there must be, within the inter-American
democratic regime, and particularly among those established democracies that coexist with
the weaker democracies within it, the willingness and the leadership to maintain momentum
toward democracy and to defend it when it is threatened.
As we have seen, the inter-American system for defending and promoting democracy
is centered formally on the OAS, but it is supplemented and supported by the bilateral and
multilateral activities of the inter-American and the international community. In this respect,
the construction of this regime owes much to the summits of Miami (1994) and Santiago
(1998), which have been important sources of mandates and of decisive support for the role
of the OAS in defending and promoting democracy. OAS member states such as Argentina,
Brazil and Uruguay, acting unilaterally and collectively through Mercosur, have together
with the United States played a key role in preventing the breakdown of the democratic
process in Paraguay. Mexico and the countries of Central America did not remain aloof from
the crisis in Guatemala but brought pressure, individually and collectively, to prevent the
attempted coup d'état from succeeding. The Río Group has consistently repudiated and
condemned attempts to disrupt the democratic process in Panama, Venezuela, Haiti, Peru,
Guatemala, Paraguay, and Ecuador. The European Community and countries like Japan have
taken a similar stance. The United States, thanks to its multilateral and unilateral political,
economic, and military clout, has wielded considerable influence in resolving most of the
December1997). See also the collection of articles under the title “High Anxiety in the Andes,” Journal of
Democracy (April 2001).
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crises identified here.90 Canada has also played an important role in building the new regime
within the OAS and in efforts to defend and promote democracy.91
Of course, the involvement of the United Nations and its collaboration with the OAS
in Nicaragua and Haiti represented a significant and decisive contribution to restoring
democracy in those countries. The same is true of its efforts for the pacification of El
Salvador and for the protection of human rights in Guatemala.92 Nor must we overlook the
importance for promoting democracy of the financial aid packages for state reform provided
(at last) by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. These packages
include projects for modernizing the judicial and legislative branches and for decentralizing
local government to promote transparency, juridical security, and good governance in
general, as indispensable conditions for encouraging investment, privatization, trade, and
external financing.93
Construction of the regime has also been facilitated by the new interest and
increasing involvement of civil society in promoting and defending democracy, both at the
national and at the inter-American level.94 It should be noted also that the 1999 General
Assembly approved the holding of a meeting of representatives from the legislatures of the
member states, which eventually became the Interparlamentary Forum of the Americas
(FIPA), as created in March 2001 in Canada. The creation of this forum in the inter-
American system adds a parliamentary dimension that has been lacking to date. Greater
participation by the legislative branch in pursuit of the hemispheric agenda, and in particular
on issues relating to the defense and promotion of democracy, would not only strengthen the
90 A. Valenzuela, interview in Clarín. 91 See Múñoz, “A New OAS for the New Times,” p. 91. 92 See Vaky in Vaky and Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, pp. 35–39 and 81; Baena
Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión; Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System,” pp. 140–149;
and Forsythe, “The United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas,” pp. 107–131. 93 See reports of the IDB and World Bank. The banks, at the insistence of their major democratic members,
have in fact warned of possible suspension of projects and financing in cases where democratic processes were
interrupted. 94 Kathrynn A. Sikkink, “Nongovernmental Organizations, Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America,”
in Farer, Beyond Sovereignty. The General Assembly, at its June 1999 meeting, decided to establish a
Committee of the Permanent Council on the Participation of Civil Society in OAS activities.
55
role of those institutions within their own political systems but would help to strengthen the
REDI.95
Still other measures could strengthen the role of the OAS in supporting the efforts of
member states to prevent institutional ruptures and to protect the democratic process. The
creation of an “early warning” capacity has been suggested as a way of analyzing situations
of potential democratic breakdown and of designing strategies for responding to threats or
for restoring democracy.96 While the suggestion is valid and could be useful both to the
General Secretariat and to the governing bodies, such a capacity by itself is not sufficient to
prevent institutional collapse. Today information and analysis about threats and political
crises are available almost instantaneously through newspapers, radio, and the Internet. The
signals and patterns of crisis are clear, and there is no need to be taken by surprise. In
Ecuador and Venezuela, the last crises were public and easy enough to see as they gradually
became more serious. This “early warning” capacity of the OAS, however, if it is to be really
relevant and useful, must be supplemented by the competence and capacity of the secretary-
general, duly authorized by the governing bodies and at the request of the government
affected, to send a mission of political observation and facilitation to countries in crisis and
facing political instability. Article 18 of the new Democratic Charter makes an important
step forward in this direction.97
95 Resolution AG/RES. 1673 (XXIX-O/99), “Parliamentary Network of the Americas.” This Canadian
initiative received strong support from the great majority of members. The consequences of inserting the
parliamentary dimension in the inter-American system and connecting it to the OAS somewhat are
unpredictable but could be significant since to date the OAS has been an organization in which its members are
represented by delegates from the executive branch of the states. In a context of growing democratization and
the increasing importance of legislative branches in formulating national policies (including foreign policy), it
is not difficult to imagine that their systematic participation in dealing with the hemispheric agenda will have a
significant impact on the formulation and execution of that agenda at the inter-American level and in turn on
the treatment of that agenda at the domestic level. 96 Vaky, Vaky and Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, p. 47. 97 In consonance with the spirit of the new charter, and in view of the continuous political instability in Haiti
(e.g., the attack on the Presidential Palace in December 2001), the Permanent Council has recently instructed
the secretary-general to establish in Haiti an OAS Mission to strengthen democracy, with the purpose, inter
alia, of “monitoring events, including respect for the essential elements of representative democracy” and to
“help the government in the development and strengthening of its democratic processes and institutions.” See
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In a certain respect, the functions of such a political observation mission would be
similar to those of the electoral observation missions that ostensibly observe the electoral
process but, in situations of political tension, frequently act as facilitators in bringing
together opposing factions and helping them arrive at negotiated solutions. In situations of
crisis, polarization, and political instability, the function of such a mission would be to
maintain a public presence in the country, which would immediately put the opposing
factions on notice that the international community is watching their behavior (if it were
antidemocratic or subversive of the constitutional order). The mission would make contact
with contending political forces, receive complaints from and accusations about each other,
and transmit them to the appropriate authorities. If necessary, the mission could organize
venues where competing political forces could meet in private and in an atmosphere of trust,
in the presence of the observer mission. It could even serve as a facilitator in negotiations
and as a guarantor for any agreements the parties might arrive at. The mission would be
composed of experts in political conflict analysis, management, and negotiation, and would
be led by a special envoy of the secretary-general.98
The actions of the OAS to promote democracy could also be reinforced by endowing
it with a greater capacity for analysis, debate, and exchange of ideas on common endogenous
and exogenous threats to democracy the hemisphere. Such a capacity would help to generate
and disseminate new theoretical and practical knowledge about these threats and could serve
as basis for formulating policies in response to such circumstances as well as for training
CP/RES. 806(1303/02), January 16, 2002, entitled “The Situation in Haiti, ” and Primer Informe Provisional
sobre el Cumplimiento de la Resolucion CP/RES. 1003/02) del Consejo Permanente sobre la Situacion en
Haiti, OAS/Ser.G, CP/doc. 3567/02, April 3, 2002. 98 The parallel between a mission of this nature and election observation missions (which have already been
accepted by member states as a valid and legitimate instrument for promoting democracy) is clear when we
consider that, informally and by the very fact of their presence in the country, they perform various additional
functions, beyond simply observing events: They open a window in the country for the international
community; they awaken expectations that conflicts will be resolved; they inspire politicians to act in ways that
will demonstrate their democratic credentials; they reduce the aggressiveness of those who might be
contemplating a coup; they stimulate debate and open discussion of disputed issues; they guarantee freedom of
expression for the public and the press; they open channels of communication, direct and indirect, among
contending parties; and they help to clear up mistrust and misunderstanding between opposing forces. See
Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, p. 59.
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new generations of politicians, officials, legislators, experts, media people, and diplomats.
Finally, it is possible to argue that because democracies tend to be more open and
cooperative societies, the REDI has contributed to the emergence and development of a
greater interest in the creation of a free trade zone in the Americas, which would tend to
favor and facilitate the process of inter-American commercial and economic integration. The
creation of such a zone probably would help strengthen and consolidate the REDI.