the inmates are running the asylum: why some multi-factor authentication technology is irresponsible
TRANSCRIPT
Slide 0
The Inmates Are Running the Asylum:
Why Some Multi-Factor Authentication Technology
is Irresponsible
Clare Nelson, CISSP
@Safe_SaaSBsides Austin, March 13, 2015
Slide 1
Speaker Bio
• Clare Nelson, CISSP– [email protected], @Safe_SaaS
• B.S. Mathematics• 30+ years in industry
– Encrypted TCP/IP variants for NSA– Product Management at DEC (HP), EMC2
– Director Global Alliances at Dell, Novell– VP Business Development, MetaIntelli (Mobile Security)
• 2001 Founder ClearMark Consulting • 2012, 2013 Elected to Austin ISSA Board• 2014 Co-founder C1ph3r_Qu33ns • 2014 USA Yoga National Champion• Favorite tortilla chip: Sesame Blues
Slide 2
• Based on information in public domain
• Sources are cited, footnotes on most slides
Slide 3
Scope• Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) use case:
– Focus on consumers and external customers
• No protocols (OAuth, OpenID Connect, SAML, etc.), that is a separate talk
• United States focus– EU regulations
o France: legal constraints for biometric, must be justified and authorized by the National Commission for Informatics and Liberty (CNIL)1
– India: e-commerce Snapdeal, Reserve Bank of Indiao Move from two-factor to single-factor authentication for transactions
less than Rs. 3,0002
1Source: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:512852/FULLTEXT01.pdfl2Source: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/snapdeal-for-single-factor-authentication-for-low-value-deals/articleshow/46251251.cms
Slide 4
“The System of Doctor Tarrand Professor Fether”
– Edgar Allan Poe
Slide 5
NIST Definition
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
• National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
• SP 800-63-2 (August 2013), Electronic Authentication Guideline
1. Something you know (password)
2. Something you have (ID badge, cryptographic key)
3. Something you are (fingerprint, other biometric data)1
• What is the origin of this definition?
• NIST authors: might be Gene Spafford, or just “ancient lore”2
– @TheRealSpaf: “Nope — that's even older than me!”3
– 1970s? NSA? Academia?
1Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf2Source: February 26, 2015 email response from a NIST SP 800-63-2 author3Source: February 27, 2015 response from @TheRealSpaf (Gene Spafford)
Slide 6
How can you write a guide based on a definition of unknown, ancient origin?
How can you implement MFA without a current, coherent definition?
Slide 7
Updated Definitions (More Risk)
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Factors:• Knowledge • Possession
– Mobile device identification
• Inherence – Biometrics: Physical or Behavioral
• Location – Geolocation– Geofencing– Geovelocity
• Time1
1Source: http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/multifactor-authentication-MFA2Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf
NIST:Device identification, time, and geo-location could be used to challenge an identity; but “they are not considered authentication factors”2
Slide 8
FFIEC MFA Definition
• Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)• 2011 update to 2005 document, Authentication in an
Internet Banking Environment:– “…virtually every authentication technique can be
compromised”– Financial institutions should no longer consider simple device
identification (such as cookies, IP addresses, or geo-location information)
– Complex device identification, “digital fingerprinting,” incorporates a number of characteristics such as PC configuration, IP address, geo-location, and other factors
– Implement time of day restrictions for funds transfers– Consider keystroke dynamics, biometric-based responses1
1Source: https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11111a.pdf
Slide 9
Authentication silos predominate• 200+ MFA vendors offering fragmented,
custom, often proprietary solutions
“…time to alter how authentication is done …it doesn't meet today’s demands
….the range of technologies, such as soft tokens, hard tokens, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), biometrics, simple passwords and more have led to a ‘Tower of Babel’ for authentication.”1
– Phil Dunkelberger,CEO Nok Nok Labs
1Source: http://www.networkworld.com/article/2161675/security/pgp-corp--co-founder-s-startup-targets-cloud-authentication.html
State of the Market
Slide 10
Why 200+ MFA Vendors?
Authentication has been the Holy Grail since the early days of the Web.1
The iPhone of Authentication has yet to be invented.2
1Source: http://sciencewriters.ca/2014/03/26/will-your-brain-waves-become-your-new-password/2Source: Clare Nelson, February 2015.
Slide 11
Suboptimal Choices
Authentication Factors/Technology1. Biometrics, 2D fingerprint2. Short Message Service (SMS)
– One-Time Password (OTP)
3. Quick Response (QR) codes4. JavaScript5. Weak, arcane, account recovery6. Assumption mobile devices are secure7. Encryption (without disclaimers)
– Quantum computing may break RSA or ECC by 20301
• Update on NSA’s $80M Penetrating Hard Targets project2
– Encryption backdoors, is it NSA-free and NIST-free cryptography?– No mysterious constants or “magic numbers” of unknown provenance”3
1Source: January 18, 2015: Ralph Spencer Poore, cryptologist, Austin ISSA guest lecturer2Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html3Source: https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm
Slide 12
Juniper Research:• By 2019, 770 million apps that use biometric authentication will be
downloaded annually- Up from 6 million in 2015
• Fingerprint authentication will account for an overwhelming majority- Driven by increase of fingerprint scanners in smartphones1
Irrational Exuberance of Biometric Authentication Adoption
1Source: http://www.nfcworld.com/2015/01/22/333665/juniper-forecasts-biometric-authentication-market/
Samsung Pay
Slide 131Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3ymzRYXezI
Apple TouchID: Cat Demo
Slide 14
• Cannot be revoked or re-issued- Easy to reset your password, not easy to reset your fingerprints
• 2D Fingerprints- Proven especially vulnerable to targeted attacks
• Your biometrics are in public domain, and elsewhere, easily accessed• Biometric identification systems may undermine privacy by making
identity theft more likely1
• Biometrics will likely persist in government and private databases, accreting information whether we like it or not2
• False positives, false negatives• High cost • Need to account for disabilities, injuries, other issues• User acceptance, preference for biometric factors varies by demographic
Issues with Biometrics
1Source: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:512852/FULLTEXT01.pdfl2Source: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/biometrics-and-the-future-of-identification/
“Fingerprints scare me” - Anonymous (2015)
Slide 151Source: http://www.dw.de/image/0,,18154223_303,00.jpg
Slide 16
2D Fingerprint Hacks
• Starbug, aka Jan Krissler
• 2014: Cloned fingerprint of German Defense Minister, Ursula Von der Leyen– From photographs1,2
• 2013: Hacked Apple’s Touch ID on iPhone 5S ~24 hours after release in Germany– Won IsTouchIDHackedYet.com competition3
• 2006: Published research on hacking fingerprint recognition systems4
1Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVivA0eoNGM2Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulmonckton/2014/12/30/hacker-clones-fingerprint-from-photograph/3Source: http://istouchidhackedyet.com4Source: http://berlin.ccc.de/~starbug/talks/0611-pacsec-hacking_fingerprint_recognition_systems.pdf
Slide 17
2013: Starbug Faking TouchID
1Source: http://istouchidhackedyet.com
Slide 18Source: http://www.wellhappypeaceful.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/baby.jpg
Slide 19
Riccio versus Krissler
“Fingerprints are one of the best passwords in the world.”1
– Dan RiccioSenior vice president, Apple
“Don't use fingerprint recognition systems for security relevant applications!”2
– Jan Krissler (Starbug)
1Source: http://www.imore.com/how-touch-id-works2Source: http://berlin.ccc.de/~starbug/talks/0611-pacsec-hacking_fingerprint_recognition_systems.pdf
Slide 20
Biometrics Systems: Types of Attacks1
1Source: http://berlin.ccc.de/~starbug/talks/0611-pacsec-hacking_fingerprint_recognition_systems.pdf
Starbug’s Threat Model
Slide 21
3D Fingerprint1
1Source: http://sonavation.com/technology/
No matter how advanced the biometric is, the basic threat model persists.
Slide 22
Behavioral Biometrics: BehavioSec
1Source: http://www.behaviosec.com
Laptop: requires JavaScript, won’t work with Aviator browser, or if you disable JavaScript
Slide 23
Behavioral Biometrics: BioCatch
• Detect threats based on user interaction with online, and mobile applications
• Analyzes 400+ bio-behavioral, cognitive and physiological parameters
– How you find missing cursor1
1Source: http://www.biocatch.com
Slide 24
Fingerprinting Web Users Through Font Metrics1
• Browser variations
– Version
– What fonts are installed
– Other settings
• Font metric–based fingerprinting
– Measure onscreen size of font glyphs
• Effective against Tor Browser
2Source: http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/paper_83.pdf
Slide 25
Biometrics: In Use, Proposed• Fingerprints 2D, 3D via ultrasonic waves
• Palms, its prints and/or the whole hand (feet?)
• Signature
• Keystroke, art of typing, mouse, touch pad
• Voice
• Iris, retina, features of eye movements
• Face, head – its shape, specific movements
• Other elements of head, such as ears, lip prints
• Gait
• Odor
• DNA
• ECG (Beta: Bionym’s Nymi wristband, smartphone, laptop, car, home security)
• EEG1
• Smartphone/behavioral: AirSig authenticates based on g-sensor and gyroscope, how you write your signature in the air2
1Source: http://www.optel.pl/article/future%20of%20biometrics.pdf2Source: http://www.airsig.com
Slide 26
“Thought Auth”1
EEG Biosensor
• MindWave™headset2
• Measures brainwave signals
• EEG monitor
• International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
1Source: Clare Nelson, March 20152Source: http://neurosky.com/biosensors/eeg-sensor/biosensors/
Slide 27
SXSW Preview
“… biometrics cannot, and absolutely must not, be used to authenticate an identity”1
– Dustin Kirkland, Ubuntu Cloud Solutions Product
Manager and Strategist at Canonical
1Source: http://blog.dustinkirkland.com/2013/10/fingerprints-are-user-names-not.html
SXSW: March 15: “Fingerprints are Usernames, Not Passwords”
Slide 28
• Many MFA vendors use SMS OTP- Send text with One-Time-Password
• 2014 Paper from Northeastern University and Technische Universität Berlin - “SMS OTP systems cannot be considered secure
anymore”• SMS OTP threat model
- Physical access to phone- SIM swap attack- Wireless interception- Mobile phone trojans1
1Source: https://www.eecs.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/f4/TechReports/2014/tr_2014-02.pdf
SMS OTP Attacks
Slide 29
• Operation Emmental• Defeated two-factor authentication (2FA)
- 2014, discovered by Trend Micro1
- Targeted Swiss, Austrian, German, Swedish other European; plus Japanese banks
- Typical scenario: customer goes to online bank1. Customer enters username and password2. Session token sent to mobile device (SMS OTP)3. Customer enters session token (OTP)
- Attackers scraped SMS one-time passwords off customers’ Android phones2
1Source: http://blog.trendmicro.com/finding-holes-operation-emmental/2Source: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf
SMS OTP Attack: Banking Example
Slide 30
QR Code Risks1
• VASCO two-factor authentication
– User captures QR code with mobile device
– User enters PIN code to log on, or validate transaction2
• QR codes used by many MFA vendors
• QR code redirects user to URL, even if URL is displayed, not everyone reads
– Could link to a malicious website
1Source: http://www.csoonline.com/article/2133890/mobile-security/the-dangers-of-qr-codes-for-security.html2Source: https://www.vasco.com/products/client_products/software_digipass/digipass_for_mobile.aspx
Slide 311Source: http://www.zdnet.com/article/google-unveils-5-year-roadmap-for-strong-authentication/
Account recovery is the Achilles heel of 2FA
– Eric SachsProduct Management Director, Identityat Google
Slide 32
Account Recovery
• Recovering your account if you lost your 2FA credentials– If you've lost access to your account after enabling two-factor
authentication, <Vendor Name> can't help you
• Google Authenticator provides recovery codes– 10 codes, print hard copy, put in your wallet (purse)
• Apple Two-Step Authentication– What if I lose my Recovery Key?
– Go to My Apple ID, create a new Recovery Key using your Apple ID password and one of your trusted devices1
1Source: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204152
Slide 331Source: http://guardtime.com/blog/biggest-enterprise-risk-mobile-devices
“Mobile is the New Adversarial Ingress Point.”1
– Lee Cocking, VP Product Strategy at GuardTime
Slide 34
What’s Wrong with the Mobile Device Becoming the Authentication Device?
Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project#tab=Top_10_Mobile_RisksSource: http://metaintelli.com/blog/2015/01/06/industry-first-metaintelli-research-discovers-large-number-of-mobile-apps-affected-by-owasp-mobile-top-10-risks/
MetaIntelli research: sample of 38,000 mobile apps, 67% had M32
Slide 35
MFA Double Standard
Big Company (2015)
• Consumers may use facial and voice recognition for mobile login2
• Employees use Symantec Validation and ID Protection (VIP)3
1Source: http://cdn.themetapicture.com/media/funny-puppy-poop-double-standards.jpg2Source: http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/biometric-tipping-point-usaa-deploys-face-voice-recognition-1072509-1.html3Source: http://www.slideshare.net/ExperianBIS/70-006identityauthenticationandcredentialinginpractice
1
Slide 36
Perfect Storm
• Fractured, crowded market, 200+ MFA vendors chasing ~$1.8B market1
• Apple, VISA, Samsung, others: fingerprint-based authentication is cool, secure
• FIDO Alliance
• 2014, year of the breach
• Increased legislation
1Source: http://www.slideshare.net/FrostandSullivan/analysis-of-the-strong-authentication-and-one-time-password-otp-market
Slide 37
FIDO Alliance
• Fast ID Online (FIDO) Alliance• Proponent of interoperability
– Universal 2nd Factor (U2F)– Universal Authentication
Framework (UAF)
• Triumph of marketing over technology
• Network-resident versus device-resident biometrics– FIDO advocates device-resident
• Problems, especially with voice– Phone-resident malware– Back-door vulnerability– Prohibits cross-channel usage, black
list processing1
1Source: January 2015, “Networks vs Device Resident Biometrics,” ValidSoft
Perhaps interoperability is a good thing. Bad guys have many different systems to hack.
Slide 38
“Legacy thinking subverts the security of a well-constructed system”1
– David Birch, Digital Money and Identity Consultant, Author of Identity is the New Money2
1Source: https://www.ted.com/talks/david_birch_identity_without_a_name?language=en#t-1123822Source: http://www.amazon.com/Identity-Is-New-Money-Perspectives/dp/1907994122
Slide 39
Consider Context-Based Authentication(aka Risk-Based Authentication, Adaptive Authentication)
• Device registration and fingerprinting
• Source IP reputation data
• Identity store lookup
• Geo-location
• Geo-fencing
• Geo-velocity
• Behavioral analysis
1Source: http://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/authentication/moving-beyond-2-factor-authentication-with-context/a/d-id/1317911
Layer multiple contextual factors. Build a risk profile.
Slide 40
What You Can Do
1. Request threat models from MFA vendors 2. Beware 2D fingerprints, already-hacked
biometrics, QR codes, SMS OTP, JavaScript requirements, weak account recovery, lack of mobile device risk analysis, and encryption with backdoors
3. Do not be swayed by latest InfoSec fashion trends– Apple TouchID, integration with VISA; Samsung Pay– FIDO Alliance
4. Rethink the definition of MFA, beware of new interpretations
Slide 42
Backup Slides
Slide 43
Additional References
1. 2014 December, Starbug (Jan Krissler) video, Iche sehe, also bin ich … Du, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVivA0eoNGM&feature=youtu.be
2. OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks, Insufficient Transport Layer Protection, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2014-M3
3. OWASP Guide to Authentication, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Guide_to_Authentication#What_is_two_factor_authentication.2C_really.3F
4. SANS, Two-Factor Authentication: Can You Choose the Right One? http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/authentication/two-factor-authentication-choose-one-33093
5. Gluu blog, (January 15, 2014), Achilles Heel of Two-Factor Authentication, http://www.gluu.org/blog/2fa_achilles_heel/
6. Gartner, December 1, 2014, Magic Quadrant for User Authentication.7. Forrester, December 30, 2013; Market Overview: Employee and Customer
Authentication Solutions in 2013: Part 1 of 28. M2SYS Technology (July 24, 2014), The Impact of Biometrics in Banking,
http://blog.m2sys.com/financial-services/impact-biometrics-banking/9. Google Unveils 5-Year Roadmap for Strong Authentication,
http://www.zdnet.com/article/google-unveils-5-year-roadmap-for-strong-authentication/
Slide 44
• Biometrics, when employed as a single factor of authentication, do not constitute acceptable secrets for e-authentication
• Biometrics may be used in the registration process for higher levels of assurance to• Later help prevent a subscriber who is registered from
repudiating the registration• Help identify those who commit registration fraud• Unlock tokens1
1Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf
NIST on Biometrics
Slide 45
NIST: Threat Resistance by Threat Level1
1Source: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf
29 Long term authentication secrets shall be protected at this level. Short term secrets may or may not be protected.30 Although there are techniques used to resist flood attacks, no protocol has comprehensive resistance to stop flooding.
Slide 46
SecSign: Apple Watch 2FA
1Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ub-hKlacN9I
Slide 471Source: http://www.creditconsumersassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/sim-swap-fraud.png
Slide 48
Hacker Mentality
1Source: http://www.darkreading.com/identity-and-access-management/the-problem-with-two-factor-authentication/d/d-id/1113697
“The hackers are breaching the architecture, not the authentication mechanism.”1
– Garret Grajek, CSO at dinCloud
Slide 49
Biometrics: Imaginable
• Body shape recognition
• Internal structure of body parts
• Analysis of other electrical and magnetic fields created by body
• Analysis of face and head vibrations during speaking1
1Source: http://www.optel.pl/article/future%20of%20biometrics.pdf