the impact of agents on union solidarity and collective bargaining in major professional sports

7/30/2019 The Impact of Agents on Union Solidarity and Collective Bargaining in Major Professional Sports

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The Impact of Agents on Union Solidarity

and Collective Bargaining in Major

Professional Sports

______________________________

By: Alex Stolls

For: Labor and Employment Relations Independent Study Research

December 2012


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Table of Contents:

Introduction 3

NFLPA and agent regulations 5

1987 lockout and decertification 7

Quarterback Club and licensing wars 10

2011 NBA lockout and the Super Seven 14

Alan Eagleson 20

Larry Fleisher 22

Baseball agents and the 1994-95 labor dispute 26

Conclusion 27

Bibliography 30


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Over the past few decades, sports agents have begun to step into the limelight of

the professional sports industry becoming more important and in some cases, even

becoming household names. You wont find any major motion pictures that detail the

stimulating inner-workings of professional sports unions, yet Tom Cruise was nominated

for an Academy Award for portraying Jerry Maguire, a sports agent with an interesting

love interest and a moral epiphany.

Agents are one of the most popularized and essential pieces of the professional

sports pie, but when did this happen? When did agents become this important, even part

of the union family as labor lawyer and former Interim Executive Director of the

National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)Richard Berthelsen put it during

my discussions with him?1 What has been the general impact of agents on union

solidarity and collective bargaining throughout history? And perhaps even more

important, what is the current landscape of the agent business and where is it heading?

By examining a number of specific examples across the four major professional

sports, this paper will attempt to validate the claim that throughout history, agents have

done more to harm union solidarity than to help it. In 1983, Mr. Berthelsen and the rest of

the NFLPA drafted the first set of agent regulations to govern the business practices and

list of union-approved agents.2 These regulations have since been adopted (in some form)

by the National Hockey League Players Association (NHLPA), Major League Baseball

Players Association (MLBPA), and National Basketball Players Association (NBPA),

and have helped clean up the system and avoid a Wild, Wild, West landscape, as

former Assistant Executive Director of the NFLPA Doug Allen put it.3 However,

following the implementation of these regulations a number of examples have arose in


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which agents priorities differ from the goals of the union, one example being the

Quarterback Club and licensing wars that plagued the NFL-NFLPA relationship in the

late 1980s-early 1990s. In some instances, most notably the 2011 NBA lockout, agents

have even had a direct impact on actual collective bargaining between the league and

union. I will assert that agent impact can also be affected by sport, circumstance, and the

individuals involved. To do this I will examine the similarities and differences between

the Alan Eagleson-run NHLPA and the NBPA under Larry Fleishers leadership,

exploring why one relationship was able to thrive while the other fell victim to the

conflict of interest that existed with an agent in charge of the union.

However, this research paper will ultimately claim that agents play an imperative

role in todays professional sports landscape as a sounding board and go-between for the

league, union, and players. Based on my research and interviews with experienced

leaders in the industry, I will provide my opinion on why plenty of historical examples

exist of agents opposing union goals and ideas. Yet I will explain why the subjects of my

interviews and I have a generally positive outlook on the future role and importance of

agents in professional sports.


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and beginning to get a bigger chunk of the pie, it was imperative to make sure they

were doing things fair and moral.5

Around this time, former Assistant Executive Director Doug Allen explained to

me that the NFLPAs next move was to hire a collection of outside lawyers to gauge the

possibility of agent regulations, who began by examining the precedent set by the Screen

Actors Guild out in Hollywood. Though the SAG did things differently, the basic

leverage of both groups came from their right under labor law as the exclusive

representatives of each respective group. With their outside lawyers insisting that agent

regulations were perfectly legal, the NFLPA traveled across the country to meet with

agents and inform them that for the first time in professional sports, the union would be

implementing agent regulations. This announcement was met with a wide variety of

emotions and opinions from agents who were unsure of the fairness and legality of these

new regulations. Arguments took place and threats were made but eventually the

regulations were accepted with the NBPA, NHLPA, and MLBPA eventually following

suit. By the mid-90s, agent regulations drafted by the unions existed in all of the four

major professional sports, and agents had finally become a governed and legitimate piece

of the sports industry.6


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Ironically, the first substantial example of agents having an adverse effect on

union solidarity came a few years later when these regulations could not legally be

enforced. As the NFL players prepared for the 1987 CBA negotiations their main goal

was free agency, a concept that had become incrementally closer in the past couple

decades without being truly obtained. When the owners made it clear that they had no

intentions to change the current system they had spent years working towards keeping,

players voted on and prepared for another strike. Similar to their previous strike in 1982,

this one began at the start of the regular season where it would hurt the owners the most

financially. However, this time owners were prepared with replacement players and TV

deals that stated that the only way for the owners to receive TV revenue was to make

sure games were played.7

So that is exactly what happened. 24 days and three regular season games later,

NFL veterans left the picket lines and returned to work. Some players such as Mark

Gastinueau of the New York Jets and Howie Long of the Los Angeles Raiders crossed

the picket line weeks before, claiming they didnt believe in free agency or couldnt

afford to sit out.8 When the NFLPA began to realize it was fighting a losing battle,

players were forced to admit defeat and crawl back to work without free agency or a

guaranteed percentage of the leagues revenue.9

But the NFLPA and its players were far from dead. Learning once again from the

previous 1982 labor struggle, the union took to the courts on October 15, 1987 (the same

time players were sent back to work) and filed an anti-trust lawsuit against the league in

the name of Powell v. NFL, arguing that the NFL was enjoying certain exemptions from


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challenges by the players under anti-trust laws that were only applicable if a Collective

Bargaining Agreement was in place regulating their relationship.

Essentially, the players were looking to challenge negotiated issues such as the

draft, the salary cap, restrictions on free agency, standard NFL contract, etc. The union

and its players felt that these were all considered anti-competitive and therefore illegal

under anti-trust law during the time that an agreement is not in place with the union.

Since an agreement was yet to be negotiated, the union felt that the NFL and its owners

had no right to be exempt from the challenges that the players were trying to make.

Judge David Doty agreed and ruled in their favor, proclaiming that the current

bargaining impasse the two sides were caught in ended any exemption that the owners

were enjoying from anti-trust challenge. The owners immediately appealed this decision

feeling confident it would be overturned by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which

indeed it was. As the NFLPAs website perfectly puts it The Eighth Circuit ruled that, so

long as a union represented players, they had no rights under antitrust laws to sue owners.

The court said that players had to choose between being a union and using their right to

strike under labor laws, or relinquishing their union rights and pursing their antitrust

rights as individuals in court.10

So in a move that completely shocked the NFL owners, NFLPA leadership chose

the latter, and two days after the Eighth Circuit reversed Judge Dotys pro-union

decision, the NFLPA Executive Committee voted to give up its status as the collective

bargaining agent of the players.

A common misconception here is that the NFLPA officially decertified and was

no longer a union representing the players. In order to this, the National Labor Relations


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This is significant because while the free agency battle was taking place in the

courtrooms, the league was waging another threatening battle against the union in the

form of player licensing deals. Player licensing deals provided revenue to fund the

NFLPA from the sale of player names and image rights for everything from trading

cards, apparel and memorabilia to player appearances. Licensing money was essentially

a fight over a finite amount of resources and control, and during the CBA negotiations

and in between agreements this revenue was essential to the union. The NFL recognized

an opportunity of their own, and began persuading players to join the leagues own

licensing program known as NFL Properties. Mr. Berthelsen explains that it got to the

point where league management was offering individual players large sums of money to

abandon the NFLPA and make NFL Properties their official licensing agent. When

players decided to go this route they were essentially withdrawing their authorization

from the group-licensing program set up and run by the NFLPA. Naturally this harmed

the union and was counter-productive to what it was currently fighting for, but the NFL

and its new licensing program were not easy to turn down. 12 They promised extra

opportunities off the field and broadcasting opportunities after their playing career,

according to Mr. Allen.13 These false promises, as well as a minimum payment of

$10,000, were enough to sway over 700 players to sign up for NFL Properties, with the

initial group being a collection of high-profile quarterbacks that became known as the

Quarterback Club.14

Eventually the tide started to turn in favor of the union, as the NLRB ruled in

March of 1990 that owners committed an unfair labor practice at the end of the

replacement-player fiasco by punishing players who participated in the strike by waiting


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an extra week before allowing them to return to work. This ruling awarded $19 million in

damages to the 1,400 players affected. A little over a year later Judge Doty of Minnesota

ruled in favor of the players in McNeil v. NFL, setting the stage for a full-blown trial to

challenge the leagues longstanding free agent restrictions which the players eventually

won, sending both sides back to the negotiating table to complete the 1993 CBA.15

So what role did agents play in the Quarterback Club and licensing wars that

plagued this relationship in the early 90s? Mr. Berthelsen put it quite simply Up until the

union renounced its right as bargaining representative of the players, agents had an

adverse effect on union solidarity.

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But why?

As Mr. Allen put it, mainly because agents will always be more motivated by the

needs of their clients than anything else. He noted that plenty of agents recognized the

importance of the union and advised their clients to avoid joining NFL Properties and the

Quarterback Club. Plenty more like Leigh Steinberg tried to have it both ways and

appease both sides while ultimately looking out for their clients.17 However for the most

part, agents felt that with the potential of no season it was more financially beneficial to

side with the NFL and join NFL Properties, taking the quick payday rather then duking

it out alongside the NFLPA.

While the union fought tirelessly to avoid situations like this and keep players and

agents committed to the NFLPAs group licensing system, I feel this time period best

represents the impact agents have had on this relationship throughout the course of

history. In the early 1980s before agent regulations were put in place, it was fair to say

that there was no shortage of agents taking advantage of players. It was not unheard of

for an agent to be taking bribes from management or leveraging players if they


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represented multiple players from the same team or same position. A few agents were

even requiring exorbitant percentages as commission, then taking this commission out of

the signing-bonus or first-year of the players contract, even if that contract was not

guaranteed for injury or performance.18In addition, many agents during this time were

also responsible for providing financial advice, and some set clients up with raw deals or

bad investments that left young men recently out of college (or who never attended

college) scratching their heads.This naturally did not sit well with the union or its

members, which finally instituted the regulations governing the business practices of

individual agents and only allowing franchises to negotiate with union-approved agents.

Things were much different by the time the 1987 CBA negotiations rolled around.

Agents were still very much involved, even more so as they advised or advised against

their clients essentially ditching the NFLPA and jumping to NFL Properties and the

short-term payday it provided. For some particular players, this appeared to make sense

financially while for others, sticking it out with the union was the only option. Therefore

during this situation, there were a number of agents who had advised certain clients to

join NFL Properties and the Quarterback Club, and certain clients to remain loyal to the

unions group licensing system.

I feel that this variety of advice and opinions proves the true ultimate goal of

agents that has remained steadfast during a number of labor disputes, and that is to do

whatever is necessary to represent his/her client. Sometimes that is calling General

Managers urging them to take a look at a free agent, other times its answering phone calls

from clients and family members at 3am, and most times it means siding with whichever

side offers the most substantial and immediate financial support to their client.


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Throughout the long and winding history of the NFL and NFLPAs relationship, agents

have always played an important role in collective bargaining and done plenty to frustrate

both the NFL and the NFLPA. With this responsibility certainly comes a great deal of

power that agents have been known to flaunt, yet I feel agents are only becoming more

important in the professional football landscape, so both the NFL and NFLPA will need

to continue to work on working with agents rather than around or against them.


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However professional football is certainly not the only sport with a history of

agents being extremely involved in the labor struggle between league and union. The

National Basketball Association and its player union, the NBPA, have had somewhat of a

strained and tense relationship recently, which we saw play out right before our eyes in

the 2011 lockout.

After failing to come to an agreement with the existing CBA set to expire, the

NBA officially locked out its players on July 1, 2011. With the main issues of this dispute

being money-related in terms of the revenue split between the owners and the players, as

well as the exponential growth of salaries and lack of a hard salary cap, NBA deputy

Commissioner Adam Silver explained that the recently-expired 2005 CBA created a

broken system that produced huge financial losses for our teams.19 Simply put, a

younger, more corporate group of owners coupled with an economic recession had too

many owners looking at red on their balance sheets. The players were receiving 57% of

Basketball Related Income, a number that owners felt was incredibly high. With both

sides dangerously far apart on key issues, the summer of 2011 came and went without

virtually any hope or progress that a deal was on the horizon. 20

Enter the agents.

After a less than productive summer, the NBA and NBPA prepared for a huge

face-to-face meeting on October 4 that would effectively determine if the season was

going to start on time. The owners felt that the players resolve and commitment to the

union was wavering and would continue to, especially in the near future when they began


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extreme alternative of renunciation of bargaining rights in order to file anti-trust litigation

(more similar to the NFLPAs 1987 strategy). It was mostly a belief and a mindset that

something substantial needed to be done, and that union management may not have what

it takes to do that without a little kick-in-the-butt.

However, this proposed (or strongly advised) strategy from the agents was met

with far greater scrutiny and debate in the circumstances of this particular labor struggle.

Unlike the NFL-NFLPA negotiation in 1987, the union was not suggesting this

decertification strategy nor were they on board with it, with NBPA Executive Director

Billy Hunter continuously insisting that the union would instead stay the course and

pursue the Unfair Labor Practice charge it filed with the National Labor Relations Board

(NLRB) against the league months earlier.24 Choosing to break apart the union and

pursue anti-trust litigation brought the battle to the courts and their time-frame and

schedule, effectively ensuring the entire NBA season would be lost. Some NBA players,

including superstars such as Kobe Bryant, felt short-term losses should be strongly

considered if they would eventually lead to long-term gains and victories for the players

and the union. However there were also plenty of others who had a fair point of their

own, explaining that Kobe certainly has the right idea, but also has less at stake regarding

these short term losses since hes got a little more in the bank than I do.25

When the NBA players and their union met with league officials on October 4 and

followed the advice of their agents by staying strong and refusing to accept a lower

percentage of Basketball Related Income, talks broke down once again. Next thing you

know, reports were surfacing that the relationship of Billy Hunter and Union President

Derek Fisher was crumbling and that Fisher was meeting secretly with Commissioner


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David Stern and attempting to broker a deal on the side. Though Fisher immediately

denied these accusations, soon internal strife was threatening to sink the NBPA as players

began choosing sides in Derek Fisher and Billy Hunter spat and also in the decertification

or not debate.26

It is impossible to argue the impact and involvement that agents had on this

drawn-out, murky labor dispute. A better discussion might be whether this impact was

positive or negative. On one hand, this powerful group of agents clearly played a part in

creating the internal chaos and difference of opinion among players and union leadership.

In an article for CBSSports.com back in November 2011, Ken Berger argued Agents'

attempts to influence the negotiations can be harmful even if their overriding point that

the players have made too many concessions is accurate.27

Clearly this group of agents had seen numerous CBA negotiations come and go

during their collective time representing NBA players. However voicing their opinion

and asserting themselves into these labor talks could be taken as a clear sign of distrust

and lack of connection with the union. Itput players in a difficult position and if were

getting extreme, pitted them against each other in a sense. With the Super Seven agents

(as they came to be known) representing a large percentage of superstars and NBA All-

Stars, the suggestion of sacrificing short-term losses for eventual long-term gains was a

relatively easy one to propose and back up.However referring back to the earlier quote

from an unnamed NBA player, the lesser-known role players who relied on the game

checks they were beginning to miss out on had a difficult time supporting a strategy that

would effectively ruin any chances of an NBA season. This created a divide between the

union and its players at one of the most critical times in the negotiating process. With all


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that being said, it is tough to argue that agents were not at least partially responsible for

the struggles and lack of unity in the NBPA as the 2011 lockout wore on. This lack of

unity is ultimately what doomed the NBPA and its players, as they struggled to gain any

real leverage and ultimately agreed to a deal that included a 50/50 split of Basketball

Related Income (drastically different from the 2005 CBA in which the players received

57% of BRI) as well as a number of other concessions.

However was their impact strictly negative? Some would say the agents were

simply doing what was necessary given the circumstances. Some would argue the

relationship with Billy Hunter and Derek Fisher was doomed regardless of the opinions

and actions of the agents. Finally, some would say that without the threat of

decertification, the league would not have gotten the kick-in-the-butt it needed to get

back to the negotiating table and hash out a deal with its players.

According an article in the Sports Business Journal in late September 2011, a

lower level NBA player agent noted that the fact that agents are not on the same page as

the union could actually spur a deal. He went on the say that though the agents

suggestion of decertification would certainly create a chaotic and uncertain situation, and

perhaps the threat of this madness could bring both sides together in an effort to avoid

this last resort. Giving the NBA and the union a common enemy, that being the agents,

is not necessarily the worst thing for the negotiation.28

Perhaps the Super Seven really did know exactly what they were doing. Could the

2011 CBA have been a lot worse for the players had the agents not stepped in and flexed

their muscles? Would the league have been truly motivated to return to the negotiating

table in good faith if not for the threat of decertification, or would they have been content


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to sit on TV revenues for a year or so to make a statement? Despite the debate

surrounding the true impact agents had, it is clear that the 2011 NBA-NBPA labor

dispute and CBA negotiation was one of the most agent-involved negotiations in any of

the four major sports, proving that agents are only becoming more and more important in

the landscape of professional sports.


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With player agents recently becoming more important and visible than they have

ever been in the sports business, their power and influence will assuredly be something

worth noting and managing. For a speech originally planned for the Jefferson Day Dinner

in 1945 Franklin D. Roosevelt acknowledged simply Great power involves great

responsibility, and one way to further examine the issues of excess power and conflict-

of-interest in professional sports is to compare and contrast the circumstances

surrounding Larry Fleisher and his time at the NBPA with Alan Eagleson and his reign of

power at the NHLPA.29 Both were player agents who also ran their respective unions,

certainly a potential conflict-of-interest scenario on the surface. The difference between

the two is how and why one was able to become one of the most celebrated and important

figures in the history of players rights, while the other spent years ripping off both the

league AND its players before being sentenced to 18 months in prison.

Im referring of course to Alan Eagleson, hockeys first player agent who became

the most celebrated and powerful man in hockey before his fall from grace in the mid-

1990s. After helping form the NHLPA back in the 60s, he was appointed its first

Executive Director in 1967. For the next 25 years, he held this position while also being

one of the most powerful agents in the business. He was inducted into the Hockey Hall of

Fame in 1989 for his work building the NHLPA and advancing the sport of hockey, and

was named an Officer of the Order of Canada that same year for his work promoting the

sport.30

However, people around the sport eventually began voicing their concerns

regarding the scope of Eaglesons power as union chief, player agent, and hockey

promoter. In 1989, a movement was led to review the NHLPAs operations under


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Eagleson.31 While he was initially able to weather the storm, Eagleson eventually stepped

down from his post as Executive Director in 1992, hopeful that stepping out of the

limelight would be sufficient in slowing down the storm of controversy forming around

him. This was not the case, and in September 1991 Russ Conway, sports editor ofThe

Eagle-Tribune, began publishing a series of installments that revealed evidence collected

from Conways investigation into Eagleson and his business practices. The series was

called Cracking the Ice: Intrigue and Conflict in the World of Big-Time Hockey, and it

proclaimed that Eagleson had engaged in an astonishing collection of unethical and

criminal conduct for decades.

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Eagleson essentially had his hand in the pockets of both the players and the

owners, profiting richly from the international hockey tournaments he was able to

organize.33 He embezzled player pension funds, manipulated all parties in order to profit

off of players filing for permanent disability due to injury, and used union money for

questionable and unauthorized loans to friends.34Eaglesons story ends with him being

sentenced 18 months in prison, serving six, resigning from the Hockey Hall of Fame and

disappearing from the spotlight, leaving a shameful but important legacy behind.

So where did he go astray, and why was he able to get away with his crimes for as

long as he did? What can we learn about the amount of power granted to Eagleson, and

this conflict of interest scenario in general?

Eagleson was able to succeed largely due to the tremendous amount of trust

placed in him by the players. As an agent, Eagleson built a client list of more than 150

NHL players, he negotiated Bobby Orrs first contract with the Boston Bruins and made

him the highest-played player in professional history, and was essential in the formation


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of the NHLPA. He made players realize they should be earning more money, and was

instrumental in increasing player rights during the early days of the NHLPA.

However as his power continued to grow, so did his shady, behind-the-scenes

business practices. Eagleson was essentially too smart for his own good, finding ways to

manipulate the groups that trusted him due to his sterling reputation of supporting the

players. Holding the positions of union head, player agent, and worldwide promoter all at

once is a tremendous amount of power for one individual, and Eagleson simply did not

have the morals or will to succeed and leave himself a proper legacy

So the lesson learned from the Alan Eagleson mess is simple: Allowing an

individual to be a player agent while also holding an important and commanding role

with the union gives he/she too much power, and is nothing more than a clear example of

a conflict-of-interest.

Well in my opinion, not exactly.

Perhaps the circumstances and individuals involved are just as important as the

potential conflict-of-interest scenario itself. To support this claim one must simply

examine the similar power yet vastly different legacy of Larry Fleisher and his role in

professional basketball.


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In terms of power and influence, there is perhaps no one who had a greater impact

on their particular sport than Larry Fleisher. A Harvard Law graduate working as a

lawyer and tax accountant, Fleisher was summoned by the young NBPA in 1962 and

immediately began making his presence felt as a true advocate for the players. Working

as President of the union as well as General Counsel, Fleisher organized a strike of the

All-Star game in 1964 that forced owners to finally adopt a pension plan for players

whose careers spanned longer than four years.35

In 1970, he filed a class-action lawsuit seeking to eliminate the leagues reserve

clause, which bound a player to a particular team indefinitely unless the team chose to

trade him. A lengthy six years later, the Oscar Robertson Settlement finally established

free agency for players, and was the first successful challenge to a professional-sports

reserve clause.36

In 1983 with NBA owners preparing to implement new methods to cut costs,

Fleisher and the union threatened the league with a potentially-crippling mid-season

strike. Then miraculously days before the deadline, the two sides reached an agreement

that has been called statesmanlike...one of the most innovative in any area of labor-

management relations."37

However, the most remarkable part of Larry Fleishers resume is that he did all of

this while also working as one of the most accomplished player agents in the business.

His clients have included NBA stars such as Bill Bradley, John Havlicek, Willis Reed,

Bob Lanier, Paul Silas, David Thompson, and Jim Paxton. When he negotiated a four-

year, $750,000 contract for Rhodes Scholar Bill Bradley with the New York Knicks, it


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was by far the largest NBA contract signed to that pointand started the trend toward

astronomical player salaries.38

Yet even Fleisher wasnt able to completely escape the whispers and criticisms of

having conflicting interests. The argument is simple: How can a lawyer represent the

superstars of the league while leading a union that is supposedly bargaining for the

interests in many less-talented players? Others are concerned that player appearances and

endorsement requests received by the union could easily be funneled towards Fleishers

clients. And in 1978, he negotiated a lucrative contract for client Marvin Webster with

the New York Knicks, and then proceeded to criticize the extremely generous

compensation rewarded to the Seattle SuperSonics in return because he feared its size

would discourage teams from bidding on free agents.

Clearly these concerns and sticky situations are legitimate and worth considering.

Giving one individual the power that both Larry Fleisher and Alan Eagleson had will

never be a clean, perfect situation. However, there is a reason that Bill Bradley, a former

U.S. Senator from the state of New Jersey, called Fleisher One of the most effective

labor leaders in the past three decades.39 Fleisher was able to manage his power and

wear a number of different hats mainly due to his ability to always keep players informed

and educated. Unlike Eagleson who normally worked behind the scenes while assuring

the players he had their best interests in mind, Fleisher kept the players involved while

ruthlessly battling management on behalf of them. He even stayed on, without salary, as

General Counsel to the NBPA for 19 years after he stepped down from his post as union

president.


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There are few men who could have thrived in such a difficult and potentially

murky situation the way Larry Fleisher did. One of the strongest negotiators in the history

of professional sports, Fleisher was responsible for numerous monumental victories as

the head of the NBPA, while also moonlighting as one of the most successful and

respected agents in professional basketball. He maintains great relationships with many

of his clients and was proof that if done the right way, it is possible to wear multiple hats

and manage a potential conflict-of-interest scenario to ultimately leave a legacy as a true

advocate for the players. His true motives and practices were rarely (if ever) questioned,

and the legal work he did as head of the union laid the groundwork for the business and

overall landscape of professional basketball that we see today.


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Though Fleisher is certainly a tremendous example of positive agent impact, if

there is any sport that could and should be used as a model for agent involvement in

collective bargaining, I feel it is professional baseball. Even with agent regulations in

place similar to other three major professional sports, baseball player agents have still

been able to have a direct positive impact on union solidarity and the MLB and

MLBPAs most recent laborstruggle. During my interview with basketball agent David

Mondress of BDA Sports, he stated simply Donald Fehr and the MLBPA have

embraced the agents and that sport has been the most successful with collective

bargainingthere is a direct correlation.

40

During the 1994-95 labor dispute, agents played a heroic role in expediting the

process and getting a deal done. They helped explain the circumstances and bargaining

situation to certain owners who were unaware and uninformed of what exactly was

happening. They made sure owners were aware that the union was committed to getting a

deal done, a terrific example of agents working with the union rather then against it.41

Other high-profile agents even advised union and management officials to change

or enhance their leadership style to become more effective negotiators. They encouraged

MLBPA officers to abandon their loud, brash negotiating style and try to brainstorm

alternative, mutually beneficial solutions. Mondresss statement supports all of this and

indicates that the MLBPA took this advice and constructive criticism in stride,

establishing a working relationship between agents and the union which cannot be found

in any other professional sport.42


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So what has history taught us about the impact of agents on collective bargaining

and union solidarity? On one hand, examples such as the Quarterback Club and the 2011

NBA lockout make it difficult to believe that agents can ever fully support union ideals

while ultimately looking out for the well-being of their individual clients. Alan Eagleson

seemed to be proof that giving one individual the power of being an agent and a high-

level union executive is a recipe for disaster.

However, my research has led me to conclude that this is simply a small part of

the story. Examples such as Larry Fleisher and the baseball agents in the mid-1990s are

encouraging examples of agents being able to represent and remain loyal to their clients

while also supporting the union. With plenty of evidence also suggesting that the NBA

agents may have ultimately expedited a deal in 2011 with their pressure, it is difficult to

argue the certain and positive impact that agents have had on the professional sports

landscape throughout history. With obvious conflict-of-interest pitfalls and numerous

delicate situations there are bound to be scattered examples of agents engaging in

immoral practices or standing in the way of the union. However, I feel agents in the past

have for the most part done an admirable job of representing and looking out for clients

while adhering to the union-governed agent regulations, creating a mutually beneficial

business relationship.

Also worth noting is that as player salaries in all sports continue to increase, I feel

agents will continue to become even more important and this delicate relationship will

occupy an even greater role in the landscape of professional sports. Agent regulations

have been effective in cleaning up thebusiness and allowing agents to be an information

source, as well as a communication source, as Mr. Berthelsen put it.43 Howeer these


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said I am confident that as agents continue to become more important they will continue

the trend of being a constructive go-between and sounding board for players,

management, and the union.

After all, I hope to enter this business one day, and with inspiring examples to

look up to as well as a few less-than-stellar examples to learn from, it is easy to be

optimistic about the future of sports agents. The business does not need a mission

statement like Jerry Maguires The Things We Think and Do Not Say, it simply needs

agents to continue to be an ethical, honest piece of the professional sports pie by learning

from history. Whether it is older, established agentsyoung, up-and-coming agentsor

students like myself hoping to break into the business, it is up to everyone to ensure that

the business of sports agents continues on the successful, virtuous path that it should.


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Bibliography:

1 Telephone Interview with Richard Berthelsen, November 6, 2012.

2

Telephone Interview with Richard Berthelsen, November 6, 2012.

3 Face-to-face Interview with Doug Allen, November 27, 2012.

4 Shropshire, Kenneth L. The Business of Sports Agents, 2nd Edition. University of Pennsylvania Press; 2ndedition (May 28, 2008)



7National Football League Players Association,History.https://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History/

8Ethan Trex, Scab Story: The 1987 NFL Strike,Mental Floss, March 12, 2011.http://www.mentalfloss.com/blogs/archives/82262

9Mark Craig, The 1987 NFL Strike: Picking at an old Scab, Star Tribune, June 28, 2011.http://www.startribune.com/sports/vikings/124627618.html?refer=y










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26Kurt Helin, Players union executive board to meet, try to get on same page, ProBasketballTalk,November 3, 2011.http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/11/03/players-union-executive-board-to-meet-try-to-get-on-same-page/

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http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/15945298/on-nba-opening-night-labor-fight-continues-because-of-agents

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29Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Undelivered Address Prepared for Jefferson Day.," April 13, 1945. Online byGerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16602.

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http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/alan-eagleson

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37Alexander Wolff, NBA Players Counsel Larry Fleisher Wears a Second Hat As An Agent, SportsIllustrated, February 11, 1985.http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1119142/index.htm

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39Robert Thomas, Jr, Larry Fleisher, 58, Former Head of Pro Basketball Players Union, New York TimesObituaries, May 5, 1989.http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/05/obituaries/larry-fleisher-58-former-head-of-pro-basketball-players-union.html

40 Telephone Interview with David Mondress, November 29, 2012.

41Jennings, Kenneth M. Swings and Misses: Moribund Labor Relations in Professional Baseball. Praeger(September 16, 1997)

42 Jennings, Kenneth M. Swings and Misses: Moribund Labor Relations in Professional Baseball. Praeger(September 16, 1997)


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the impact of agents on union solidarity and collective bargaining in major professional sports

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