the iaea and control of radioactive sources · pdf file06.01.2002 · the iaea and...

The IAEA and Control of Radioactive Sources

The IAEA and Control of The IAEA and Control of Radioactive SourcesRadioactive Sources

Brian Dodd

International Atomic Energy AgencyInternational Atomic Energy Agency

137 Member States

2229 Staff from more than 90 countries

6 Departments

“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

Authorized functions:Authorized functions:

To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses...To make provision,...for materials, services, equipment, facilities...To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses...To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts...

Authorized functions:Authorized functions:

To establish and administer safeguardsdesigned to ensure that special fissionable materials...are not used to further any military purpose...To establish...standards of safety for protection of health...and to provide for the application of these standards...To acquire or establish any facilities...useful in carrying out its authorized functions...

Six Departments of the IAEASix Departments of the IAEA

ManagementPolicy, Legal Advice, and Admininistrative Support

Nuclear Sciences and ApplicationsPeaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology

SafeguardsVerification of Peaceful Uses

Technical Co-OperationTechnology Transfer

Nuclear EnergyNuclear Power, Fuel Cycle, and Waste Management

Six Departments of the IAEASix Departments of the IAEA

Department of Nuclear Safety and SecurityOffice of Nuclear SecurityDivision of Nuclear Installation SafetyDivision of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety

Policy and Programme Support SectionWaste Safety SectionEmergency Preparedness & Response SectionRadiation and Transport Safety Section

• Radiation Protection Group• Radiological Protection of Patients Unit• Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials• Safety and Security of Radiation Sources Unit

HIERARCHY HIERARCHY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDSOF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

Guides

Fundamentals

Requirements

underlying principles -aimed at politicians and regulators

specify obligations and responsibilities

recommendations to support

requirements

Other LowerOther Lower--Level DocumentsLevel DocumentsSafety Reports

Technical Documents (TECDOCs)

Conferences and Symposium Papers Series

Accident Reports

Others

SafetyPurpose

Human Health

Impacts

Socio-psych.

Impacts

Economic Impacts

Env. Impacts

Political Impacts

•Terrorism•Political power•Individual intent to harm

•Illegal sale for profit•Extortion•Avoidance of ownership costs

•Dispersion•Irradiation•Sabotage

Actual / Threat

Safety

Security

Control Loss of Control

•Misplaced•Lost•Forgotten•Accidental loss•Accidental damage•Collateral theft

•Theft•Illegal purchase•Legal purchase•Find an orphan

Inadvertent

Intentional

Acquire

In possession

Malevolent Motive

Financial Motive

SecurityPurposes

Impacts of Loss of Source ControlImpacts of Loss of Source Control

DOM07/PP, lp10

‘ORPHAN’‘ORPHAN’ SOURCES are radioactive SOURCES are radioactive sources which:sources which:

Were never subject to regulatory control; or

Were initially regulated, but then:

Abandoned,

Lost or misplaced,

Stolen, or

Removed without authorization.

DOM07/PP, lp11

‘VULNERABLE’‘VULNERABLE’ SOURCES are SOURCES are radioactive sources which:radioactive sources which:

Are currently under regulatory control; but

For which the control is insufficient to provide

assurance of long term safety and security.

Vulnerable sources could relatively easily

become orphaned.

Concern was raised in Dijon in 1998 Concern was raised in Dijon in 1998 because of accidents with orphan because of accidents with orphan sourcessources

GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil

1985: Private radiotherapy clinic closed down Unit dismantled,

Cs-137 source capsule ruptured causing major contamination

1987: teletherapy head stolen

50.9 TBq (1375 Ci) caesium-137 teletherapy machine left in abandoned clinic

GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, BrazilExposure of large number of public:

112 000 people monitored249 people contaminated49 people 0.1 - 6.2 Gy4 people died

6 y old girl18 y old man22 y old man38 y old mother

GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, BrazilMajor contamination of property:85 houses significantly contaminated200 people evacuated7 houses demolished

GoiGoiâânia, Brazilnia, Brazil

Total volume of waste = 3500 cubic m3800 metal drums1400 metal boxes10 shipping containers

GilanGilan, Iran, Iran1996: Ir-192 source used for industrial radiography falls out of shielded container

Manual worker picks up source and puts it in chest pocket

GilanGilan, Iran, Iran

Severe radiation burns

to the chest

Istanbul, TurkeyIstanbul, TurkeyDecember 1998: Two containers sold as scrap and broken open 3.3 TBq (88 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshieldedContainers dumped10 persons with acute radiation syndrome404 persons medically examined23.5 TBq (636 Ci) cobalt-60 source unaccounted

Istanbul, TurkeyIstanbul, Turkey1993: 3 disused teletherapy

sources packaged and stored by a private company awaiting return to supplier in USA

Inappropriate storage facilities

February 1998: 2 packages transferred to

inappropriate storage facilities

Samut Prakarn,Thailand,ThailandOctober 1999: 3 disused teletherapy sources stored by a private company at unsecured parking lot Jan/Feb 2000 unauthorized removal of one unit - dismantled for scrap

15.7 TBq (425 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshielded

10 people highly exposed3 of whom diedno contamination

LiloLilo, Georgia, GeorgiaLilo military training center

1997: 11 Georgian soldiers developed radiation induced skin lesions and acute radiation syndrome

Abandoned sources (Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226) found at various locations:

in coat pocketon building sitein buildingsburied in groundsin refuse moundon soccer pitch…

1997, LILO

POTIMATKOJI

ZUGDIDISANTREDIA

KAHISHIDec.2001, LJA

Radiological accidents in Georgia.Radiological accidents in Georgia.

December 2001, Lja, Georgia

A group of woodcutters find 2

hot ‘objects’ in the forest.

(unshielded strontium-90 sources, each approx.

30,000 Ci !)

The back of patient 2 on 6 January 2002

… sources later discovered beside a path, under a rock, on the edge of a 50m-

deep 30°-slope.Source

Source

Source Recovery in Georgia

Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)

RTG’s were used in various civilian and military applications (e.g. to power navigational beacons and communications equipment in remote areas…)

Several 100’s Sr-90 powered navigational beacons operated

in the Artic from Novaya Semlaya to the Bering Strait.

These generators also appeared in Belarus …

… and elsewhere in Asia…

… completely unsecured!…

… and easily removable by the public! ...

Radiological Accidents Statistics Radiological Accidents Statistics (1944(1944--2000)2000)

~ 400 reported accidents~ 3000 exposed persons> 100 deaths, more than half involving patientsIn addition, orphan sources can be mixed up with scrap causing contamination problemsIllicit trafficking involves orphan sources but very few orphan source incidents are due to illicit trafficking events

Consequences of accidents Consequences of accidents

Human healthSevere deterministic effects:Death, loss of limbs, erythema, ARS

Environmental contamination

Social consequencesPoliticalEconomic consequences

Social consequences Social consequences

Exposed persons become socially outcastPsychological problems

Anger, fear, insomnia, nightmares, depressionrescue teams also effected

Public question competency of government and regulatory authorityIntense media interest

Economic consequences Economic consequences

Consider costs ofDecontamination/clean-upDisposal/storage of wasteMedical treatmentLitigationLong-term issues

Example: Acerinox, Spain (Source melted, 1998)Interruption of factory activities > US$ 20 millionClean up operations > US$ 3 millionWaste storage > US$ 3 millionLitigation: Italian government suing Spanish government

Summary so far...Summary so far...

Inadequate control (safety and security) has caused many serious accidentsOrphan sources were, and are, a major concernIAEA developed and implemented an action plan and developed guidance to begin to address the issues

Development of IAEA GuidanceDevelopment of IAEA Guidance

IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material

Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General ConferenceSeptember 1999GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10



Major Findings of the Conference:Investigate formulation of an international undertaking on the safety & security of sources

Dijon September

1998






• Approved by BoG &endorsed by GC Sept 1999

• Some issues not resolved

SCOPE


REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources


REVISEDIAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources


Draft REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2002/35/Add.1-GC(46)/11/Add.1

Draft REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2002/35/Add.1-GC(46)/11/Add.1

Draft REVISEDCategorization of Radioactive Sources

Draft REVISEDCategorization of Radioactive Sources

September 11

International Conference on International Conference on Security of Radioactive SourcesSecurity of Radioactive Sources

High-level conferenceHeld 10-13 March 2003Over 720 participantsFrom over 120 countriesTwo major findings with other topical findings


Endorsed by GC

GC(47)/RES/7

REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9

REVISEDCode of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9

Scope

IAEA/CODEOC/2004

G8 Evian SummitJune 2003

Categorization of Radioactive Categorization of Radioactive SourcesSourcesCategory Practice Activity Ratio

A/D

1 RTG’s; Irradiators; Teletherapy; Gamma Knife A/D ≥ 1000

2 Industrial gamma radiographyBrachytherapy (HDR/MDR)

1000>A/D≥10

3Fixed industrial gauges(e.g.: level, dredger, conveyor gauges)

Well logging gauges10>A/D≥ 1

4

Brachytherapy (LDR except eye plaques & permanent implants)

Portable gauges (e.g. moisture/density); Bone densitometers; Static eliminators

1>A/D≥ 0.01

5 Brachytherapy (eye pl. & perm implants); XRF; ECD; PET chckg

0.01>A/D≥Exempt/D

Incr

easi

ng R

isk

Some D values of interestSome D values of interest

Radionuclide D (TBq) D(Ci)

Am-241 0.06 2Co-60 0.03 0.8Cs-137 0.1 3Ir-192 0.08 2Sr-90/Y-90 1 30

Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Nuclear Security Plan of ActivitiesNuclear Security Plan of Activities

I – Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear FacilitiesII – Detection of Malicious Activities Involving Nuclear and Other Radioactive MaterialsIII – State Systems for Nuclear Material Accountancy and ControlIV – Security of Radioactive Material Other Than Nuclear Material

IAEA Nuclear Security Plan of IAEA Nuclear Security Plan of Activities (cont.)Activities (cont.)

V – Assessment of Safety/Security Related Vulnerability of Nuclear FacilitiesVI – Response to Malicious Acts, or Threats ThereofVII – Adherence to and Implementation of International Agreements, Guidelines and RecommendationsVIII – Nuclear Security Co-ordination and Information Management

Two main thrusts for sources:Two main thrusts for sources:

1. Remediation of Past Problems2. Prevention of Future Problems

Two main thrusts for sourcesTwo main thrusts for sources1. Remediation of Past Problems

Collect, dispose of known disused sourcesSecure vulnerable sources, especially high-risk sources (Tripartite initiative)Search for, recover and dispose of orphan or vulnerable sources

Collecting known disused sourcesCollecting known disused sources

IAEA has for many years had campaigns to collect, properly dispose of, and secure the large number of disused sources around the worldCollection and conditioning of radium sources in Africa is a good exampleRecent return of a 700 TBq (19,000 Ci) 137Cs source from Cote d’Ivoire to France is another

Securing vulnerable sourcesSecuring vulnerable sources

Tripartite Initiative aimed at securing HIGH activity sourcesin the former Soviet Union countries

Tripartite PartnershipTripartite Partnership

USA brought $ and security teamRussia brought information on sources and technology and possible recycling of some sourcesIAEA brought contacts, local knowledge, project management and co-ordination

Many high activity radioactive sources are vulnerable...

Active Searches for

orphan sources

Surveyor Rappellinginto Ravine

Passive searches for sourcesPassive searches for sourcesIAEA published guidance on prevention, detection and response to illicit trafficking and inadvertent movement of radioactive materials (TECDOCs 1311, 1312, 1313)ISO, IEC are each developing standards based on this earlier workIAEA has a research project aimed at capability improvements: 28 labs and 18 countries are involvedIAEA, USA and EU have all provided equipment and training for border monitoring, with concentration in Eastern Europe and NIS countries

IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking DatabaseIAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database

As of Dec. 2002:284 incidents involving non-nuclear, radioactive materials have been confirmedHowever, more than 75% of these involve Category 4 & 5 sourcesAt least 50% of 284 appear to entail deliberate criminal activities, including 15 incidents with Category 1-3 sourcesMost of these seem to be amateurish groups motivated by financial gain

Two main thrusts for sourcesTwo main thrusts for sources2. Prevention of Future Problems

Legal and regulatory infrastructureCode of ConductStrengthening or regaining control with a National strategyIncreasing security of sources

Legal and regulatory controlsLegal and regulatory controlsIAEA has published a large numberof standards, regulations and guidance including:

Basic Safety Standards, Governmental Infrastructure Requirement

Model Project for Strengthening Radiation Protection Infrastructure helps developing countries put these into practiceEU, AFRA, PAHO, MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL, ASEAN all have efforts to enable better control of sources

Proposed EU HighProposed EU High--Activity Activity Sealed Source DirectiveSealed Source Directive

HASS Directive has additional requirements regarding:

AuthorizationsFinancial provision for disused HASSsTransfersRecordsAccountingPrevention of unauthorized accessNotification of loss, theft or unlawful useReturn or transfer of disused sourcesIdentification and markingTrainingInternational co-operationInspections

Code of ConductCode of ConductHigh level document to governments and regulatory authorities to serve as “guidance for the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations on the safety and security of radioactive sources”Over 60 countries, G8 and EU have endorsed the Code

Objectives of CodeObjectives of Code

…through the development,harmonization and enforcement of national policies, laws and regulations, and through the fostering of international co-operation to:

achieve and maintain a high level of safety and security of radioactive sourcesprevent the malicious use of radioactive sources to cause harm to individuals, society or the environment

Scope of CodeScope of Code

Focus on sealed, high-risk radioactive sources– defined in the IAEA Categorization of Radioactive Sources (TECDOC-1344)Excludes nuclear materials, as defined in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear MaterialsExcludes radioactive sources within the military or defense programs

Target Audience of Code: Target Audience of Code: Primarily GovernmentsPrimarily Governments

Need to:ensure that radioactive sources within its territory, or under its jurisdiction or control are safely managed and securely protected during their useful lives and at the end of their useful livesestablish an effective national legislative and regulatory system of control, recognizing:

prime responsibility for the safe management and the security of radioactive sources is on the persons being granted the relevant authorizations

Security Measures StrengthenedSecurity Measures Strengthened

Promotion of a security cultureAssessment of the security of the source and/or the facilityProvision of security measures to deter, detect and delay, the unauthorized access to, or the theft, loss or unauthorized use or removal of sourcesVerification of safety and securityProvision for the safe management and secure protection of sources once they become disused

Import/Export ControlsImport/Export Controls

Import and export of high risk radioactive sources should take place only with the prior notification and consent of the importing and exporting States

Export of a high-risk radioactive sources should take place, … only if the recipient is authorized under its national legislation to receive the source

TECDOCTECDOC--13881388Strengthening control

over radioactive sources in authorized

use and regaining control over orphan

sources

National strategies

ObjectiveObjective

“… to provide practical guidance to States on the development of a national strategy for improving control over radioactive sources, particularly dangerous sources.”

“The ultimate objective is that States will use this report to develop and then implement a plan of action that will result in all significant sources being managed in a safe and secure manner.”

Development and implementation Development and implementation of a national action planof a national action plan

Development

Assessment

Implementation

Assessing the potential problemAssessing the potential problemImport and export

of sourcesTypes of use in

countryMilitary uses

And sites of conflictLegacy

knowledge

Gather national informationIntelligence onIllicit trafficking

TradingPartners;

Commodities,ContaminatedItems, NORM

MetalsRecycling

Disusedsources

Quality ofsource

inventory

Current and past degree ofregulatory

controlDetermine the nature andmagnitude of the potential

radioactive source problem•Identify gaps in controls or data•Examine the potential consequences of no action

Known lostand found sources

Developing the national strategyDeveloping the national strategyWith data from assessment, compare

the actual situation with the ideal•Identify gaps in controls or data

•Examine the potential consequences of no action

Identify corrective actions

Prioritize Actions:•Degree of immediate hazard•Degree of potential hazard•Cost•Short or long term•Solutions needing further work

Develop national plan

Selection of Search MethodsOverall Strategy, based on:

• National Situation •Priorities

•Resources

Non-physical search methods

Info Sources:•Gov’t Authorities•International Org.•Users/Owners•Manufacturers•Suppliers•Individual Workers•Pioneers•Relatives, neighbors, friends•The Public

Tools:•Broadcast media•Records searches•Interviews

Passive detection at nodal points

Waste facilities, metal fabricationrecycling, scrap

Nationalborders

Othernodalpoints

Identification of unknown sources

Disposition of sources

Physical search Methods

Pro-active searches for specific sources and

during inspections

ImplementationImplementation

ImplementPlan

Decide to Implement Plan

Update of plan based on feedback

Evaluate effectivenessof plan

Control established

Increasing securityIncreasing security

Increasing security, especially of high-risk sources, minimizestheftIAEA has developed interim guidance on source security (TECDOC-1355)Provides methodologies andincludes measures to deter, detect and delay theftApart from this, there is remarkable little international guidance

Security during transportSecurity during transportUN Sub-committee on DG agreed on changes to the ‘Orange Book’ including Class 7 – regardless of quantity - problematicRecommend enhanced security for >3000 A1 or A2These measures will eventually get into the modal regulationsICAO and IMO have also been working in this areaIMO published International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and SOLAS amendments

ConclusionConclusion

This survey shows that the IAEA’s work in the safety and security of radioactive sources has been quite extensive…but it can only go so far…Ultimately, effective control is dependent on the person with the authorization for the source…The question before us is: