the globalization of indigenous pyschologies

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Asian Journal of Social Psychology (2005) 8: 6574

Blackwell Publishing Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychologyand the Japanese Group Dynamics Association 2005

Blackwell Science, LtdOxford, UKAJSPAsian Journal of Social Psychology1367-22232005 Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd with the Asian Association of Social Psychology and the Japanese Group Dynamics Association

April 2005816574CommentaryGlobalization of indigenous psychologiesYpe H. Poortinga

Correspondence: Ype H. Poortinga, Psychology, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,

The Netherlands. Email: [email protected]

This comment was prepared during a stay as Fellow-in-Residence at the NIAS (Netherlands Institute

for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences).

COMMENTARY

The globalization of indigenouspsychologies

Ype H. Poortinga

Tilburg University, The Netherlands & Catholic University of

Leuven, Belgium

Letzendlich, so scheint es zumindest, hat die Welt das bessere Argument: die Macht des

Faktischen.

[In final resort, at least so it seems, the world has the better argument: the power of the factual].

Volker Zeese at the occasion of the death of Jacques Derrida. In: Die Welt, 11-10-2004.

In 1975, the Atlas of Affective Meaning was published (Osgood et al., 1975). It reported on

an investigation into subjective culture (i.e. how members of a culture view themselves and

how they evaluate their way of life). The 30-sample study was based on the Semantic

Differential Technique Osgood et al., 1957), which enquires into the connotative or affective

meaning of words, in contrast to the denotative or referential meaning. Everyday, culture-

common words were used as a starting point to elicit in each society separately a large number

of adjectives associated with each of these words. These local adjectives were the basis for

the construction of local Semantic Differential scales, which were then used to collect a

systematic set of ratings. The resulting data were analyzed per cultural sample, but also for

the 30 cultures together in what was called a pancultural factor analysis. Three factors were

found and labeled: evaluation (goodbad), potency (strongweak), and activity (active

passive). Together, they defined a three-dimensional space of affective meaning. This

structure, especially the first dimension, had been found before and has been replicated many

times (Russell, 1991; Fontaine et al., 2001).

Osgood et al. (1975) used data from the Atlas to identify universals (non-chance trends

across all societies), subuniversals (clusters of societies sharing certain patterns of deviations),and uniquenesses (deviations of individual societies from universal trends). Examples of

universals include a more positive evaluation in each sample for brightness than for

darkness, and a higher rating for darkness on the potency dimension. Also, red was less

positively evaluated than blue, but rated higher on activity. Examples of unique cultural

features include an unusually positive average rating of aggressive in the USA, and low

potency and high activity ratings for the color word black in India. For these uniquenesses

Osgood et al. (1975) could give only tentative interpretations; they could reflect culture-

specific views, but also statistical flukes or other method artifacts.


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From an indigenous psychologies perspective, the relevance and/or validity of findings

such as by Osgood et al

. (1975) can be questioned for various reasons. First of all, these

findings can be seen as emerging from an imposed Western/mainstream ontology, which can

be said to rest on two presumptions about the subject matter of psychology: (i) functions and

processes that can be derived from self-report and observational data that take the form of

dimensions or factors; and (ii) the same processes and functions make sense universally

(Berry et al.

, 2002). The question as to what constitutes the subject matter of cross-cultural

psychology, usually phrased in terms of a dichotomy between unity and culturedness of the

human psyche, remains a central issue, and it also permeates the discussion in this SpecialIssue.

Second, Osgoods findings can be put into question because they are the outcome of an

imposed methodology. Respondents drawn from the various cultural contexts were instructed

to rate prescribed words on characteristics (Likert scales) stipulated by the researchers,

requiring a way of thinking about the meaning of words that would be indigenous in few of

the societies included in the project. This immediately leads to questions concerning an

appropriate methodology and its epistemological underpinnings for indigenous psychologies.

These questions are the main focus of the present Special Issue.

A third reason for critically examining research as conducted by Osgood et al

. (1975), is

that local psychologists outside the mainstream were hardly in a position to assess Osgoods

findings, as they were not part of its conceptualization and overall operationalization. Local

psychologists are important stakeholders and the main representatives of local populations.

Indigenous psychologies require academic institutions and research potential with the implied

political power in international science to realize this stakeholder role. The importance of

indigenization of psychology in this sense has been argued by Adair (Adair & Kagitcibasi,

1995; Adair, 1999).

Finally, one can question the relevance of Osgoods research in the face of overriding

concerns such as poverty and illiteracy, the role of religion, and the everyday realities with

which people have to cope. Western psychology can be said to be characterized as much bythe topics it does not address, as by the topics that reach high numbers of hits when one

conducts a search in a data archive like PsychLit (Poortinga, 1996).

Let me state very clearly that I see all four points as legitimate concerns. At the same

time, none of the four criticisms rules out that the search for empirical evidence of universality

is a worthwhile pursuit. In my view, discussions on the epistemology of culture-informed

research require clear methodological prescriptions on how the culturally unique and the

culture-common are to be related in human psychological functioning. The main theme of

this comment is on how the various articles in this Special Issue implicitly or explicitly

account for that relationship.

The authors positions

Kashima

Kashimas (this issue of the Journal, pp. 1938) final argument is that the contrast between

psychology as a natural science and as a historical or cultural science is a dichotomy of little

relevance for what he refers to as Asian social psychology, because of the monistic ontology

prevalent in this part of the world. His most central concept is symbolic self-reflexivity;


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indigenous psychologies imply that human beings construct their own meanings and through

these meanings their own minds. Asian ontology can take both the inert physical material

and the active intentional being as complementary aspects of the ever-changing whole (this

Issue, p. 36). Human nature, including aspects such as intentionality, is not distinct from

material nature.

Kashima asserts that an assumption of dualism in an ontological sense leads to different

methodologies that are captured in the contrast between causality and intentionality. However,

as dualism is not an issue, there is scope for a social psychology that transcends traditional

dichotomies. An agents beliefs and desires can be introduced in a causal explanation ofaction. By virtue of the prevalent monistic orientation, some essential developments in social

psychology may originate from Asia, but this Asian social psychology is certainly not limited

to Asia.

To arrive at his views, Kashima gives a description of epistemological arguments from

positivism and from two authors who have challenged positivistic perspectives. He introduces

the hermeneutic analysis of Charles Taylor (1974) for whom explanation of meaningful action

is contingent upon shared experiences and common meanings. Kashima sees this as a form

of extreme relativism. The second author is Paul Ricoeur (1974) who argues that meanings

can be linked to external referents; not all interpretations are equally true. Kashima draws a

sharp contrast with positivism that seeks to determine the truth of an explanation in an

absolute sense through data that are taken to be uncontestable.

The most striking point in the article by Kashima is clearly his contention that a culturally

based (Asian) monistic worldview will lead to a psychology, first Asian and later beyond

Asia, in which certain ontological and epistemological contrasts prevalent in the mainstream

are overcome. Perhaps this position might have been illustrated with more arguments from

Asian literature and research, but that is a secondary issue. More important, a rather basic

idea is suggested that may enrich psychological science. Kashima describes a potential

contribution to a more global psychology.

There are two points on which I do not share Kashimas views. The first is his description

of Poppers falsificationism as a variation of verificationism. On whatever question that is

being raised about the reality, scientific inquiry cannot provide a certain answer according to

Popper (1959). Research should lead to the elimination of incorrect knowledge, but falls

invariably short of reaching the truth. The falsification principle can be said to essentially

qualify Popper as a postpositivist (Lincoln & Guba, 2000) whose epistemology comes

close to that of the approach in contemporary social psychology espoused by Kashima.

Nevertheless, falsification is part of an experimental cycle; it is another form of postpositivism

than hermeneutic analysis.

The second point is the definition of the subject matter of social psychology or

psychology (the article is not entirely clear on this point) in terms of symbolic self-reflexivity.I find that a too-narrow definition, as it would seem to exclude many aspects of social

behavior, for example, social interactions of small children and in non-human species. Other

cultural psychologists, especially Eckensberger (1979; 2002) have also emphasized self-

reflexivity. However, for him, a definition of psychology in these terms represents one

perspective (although his preferred perspective) that does not exclude other perspectives

either in an ontological or in an epistemological sense. Significant in this respect is

Eckensbergers (2002) suggestion that paradigms should be seen as complementary rather

than incommensurable.


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Ype H. Poortinga


Hwang

Although Hwang (this Issue, pp. 517) acknowledges reactions of nationalism and

anticolonialism against Western impositions as origins of indigenous psychologies, his

focus is on epistemological and methodological issues. Hwangs most central argument is

that indigenous psychologies are relativistic (local psychologies) and that it requires

inductive inferences as found in positivism, if they are to be developed into a global or

universal psychology. To escape from the need for an inductive argument, postpositivistic

approaches are needed. On the basis of empirical findings, universal theories can be putforward that subsequently are tested in specific cultures. For the epistemological rules of

this deductive process Hwang refers to Popper (1959; see above) and Hempel (1965,

1966). In his analysis, he emphasizes that Popper advocated a deductive approach, but saw

a theory as always remaining tentative. Hempel argued that a theory next to postulating

general laws also refers to antecedent conditions under which the lawful relations should

hold, implying methodological prescriptions on research procedures etc. Tests of a theory

do not lead to a straightforward acceptance or rejection, but to modifications of experiment

and theory.

Hwang applies this reasoning to the positions of various authors in indigenous

psychologies. Thus, Berrys (1989) derived etic approach, if taken as a substantive theory,

implies that separate studies can only minimally advance knowledge; a global psychology

inferred from such studies requires inductive inferences. A similar argument pertains to

Enriquez (1993) and to Yang (2000). They seek theories built on local languages and cultures,

but, from these, a global theory has to be derived by the cross-indigenization method

(Enriquez) or cross-cultural indigenous studies (Yang), requiring inductive argumentation.

Also, the metatheory that can be constructed according to Ho (1998) by eliminating

incongruities between locally based theories is questioned by Hwang, as this metatheory, like

the previous approaches, still requires inductive inferences.

In his own approach, Hwang starts from a theory or formal model developed within amajor cultural area (in his case Confucianism) and tested according to the epistemological

approaches outlined by Hempel (1965). Hwang argues that his analysis of the deep structure

of Confucianism by means of structuralism or constructive realism enables understanding

of the Confucian cultural heritage from the perspective of social psychology (this Issue,

p. 15).

There are three issues raised by Hwang that I wish to comment on. The first is his explicit

endorsement of an international science of psychology that historically happens to have its

roots in the West. According to Hwang, questions regarding indigenous psychology should

be answered from the perspective of the Western philosophy of science, because knowledge

of scientific psychology is a product of Western civilization (this Issue, p. 5). This allowsfor a global or universal psychology, the development of which should be guided by an

empirical cycle with deductive testing of theories that are locally constructed but testable

cross-culturally.

Hwangs empirical studies (so far) have been conducted in China rather than in a Western

society, but there are no psychological principles that limit cross-cultural extension. The

rationale for indigenous psychologies appears to be historical: the mainstream (including the

cross-cultural mainstream) paid insufficient attention to unequal political power and pressing

social and psychological problems of non-Western societies. In my view, this places the work

at the heart of cross-cultural psychology, where the aim of extending the range of variation

in the subject matter of psychology has long been recognized (Child, 1954).


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My third point concerns the discrepancies that Hwang notes between other indigenous

psychologies and his own approach. In Hempels approach, the inductive aspects of theory

construction and the deductive aspects of empirical testing can be seen as part of an iterative

process that (hopefully) converges to stable outcomes. Even though the balance between

inductive and deductive analysis may be different in Hwangs work as in that of other authors

like Berry, Enriquez or Ho, I see these as a matter of degree rather than as a major contrast.

Jackson

Historically, the indigenization of psychology is going through certain stages in various

national communities of psychologists (Sinha, 1997; Adair, 1999). Jackson (this Issue,

pp. 5164) suggests that the resulting multiple indigenous psychologies can be linked through

a cross-indigenous approach as advocated by Enriquez (1993). To elucidate this, Jackson

draws on complexity theory, one of a family of theories allowing for non-linear or dynamic

relations between variables. Higher-order characteristics of a system emerge spontaneously

from the interactions of separate elements. This applies to cultures that emerge from the

interactions of their members, but also to communities of knowledge consisting of scientists

following a common paradigm. These communities operate in knowledge landscapes that

are reminiscent of niches as occupied by biological species in the physical environment.

Jackson develops the concept of knowledge landscapes in some detail and describes how

such landscapes can differ from each other and how research communities operate in them.

He refers to historical examples (i.e. the indigenization of psychology in Canada, Russian

and Turkey. There is ample scope for diversity: A key strategy for promoting indigenous

theorizing is through encouraging multiple starting points for research efforts, with many

individuals or groups exploring different regions of the knowledge landscape (this

Issue, p. 60). An example of an empirical study is an analysis among unemployed Asian

men in the UK of the contribution that religiosity made to their mental health (Shams &

Jackson, 1993). The theorizing was based on general psychological characteristics, but taking

into consideration their relative importance within specific communities.

Jacksons article addresses the development of knowledge and how knowledge

communities operate. For me, the concept of knowledge landscapes has attractive features;

it creates a vivid picture of how scientific research is moving around, rather than moving

along. I also find the notion of communities of researchers seeking to adapt to environments

rather appealing. The examples about countries speak to this. The indigenization of Canadian

psychology was promoted by government measures, Russian psychologists were isolated

from a broader community, and Western academia had a high status in Turkey. However,

when written down this way, these examples seem to reflect plausible antecedent-consequent

relationships and the question may be raised as to the added value of more complexperspectives.

I am not quite sure in how far Jackson sees his analysis as mainly metaphorical, or as a

representation (model) of reality. In so far as the latter applies I have two concerns. The first

is that developmental models taken from biology and described in terms of non-linear

equations so far can hardly be tested for complex behaviors (Poortinga, 1997). The second

point is that such models invariably imply important constraints on the range of variation;

development of biological organisms may be non-linear, but it is highly organized and with

limited variation in outcomes (Waddington, 1975). Jackson does not examine possible

constraints and that is unfortunate. As it stands, the description of the study by Shams and

Jackson (1993) on effects of religiosity appears to fit well within the conceptualization of


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universalism by Berry et al

. (2002), in which species-wide psychological functions and

processes are postulated that show local variations. In other words, why is this study an

example of an indigenous psychologies approach?

Shams

Indigenous in Shams article refers to ethnic or migrant communities in multicultural

societies, more specifically Western societies. Indigenous psychologies are geared towards

community development and integration in the society. There are three key concepts worthnoting, local knowledge, ecopsychology, and sustainability. Local knowledge refers to

knowledge about a community and its culture that is constructed within that community in

the process of social change. Ecopsychology is a New-Age-oriented idealistic movement to

reconnect people to their world. Sustainability refers to development of local knowledge over

time and change in the functioning of a community, especially in opposition to the dominant

order of the majority in a society.

A scheme is introduced that illustrates how local knowledge is the outcome of interactions

of local community groups with a majority group in the society. These interactions generate

psychological processes and outcomes, such as empowerment and emancipation, or

marginalization. Empowerment and emancipation is described as a multistage process from

initial involvement in a community activity, via the development of a community identity, to

sustained change. The author argues that attention to issues of local knowledge construction

and sustainable development should contribute to a discipline of globalized indigenous

psychology.

The article by Shams is oriented towards social action in concrete settings. It differs from

most traditional notions about cultural groups, by taking a local community as a cultural

population. In this way, the issue of how many indigenous psychologies will be needed to

encompass the world (Poortinga, 1999) is simply resolved; it has become irrelevant. However,

the context specificity of local knowledge development makes another issue more prominentin my opinion, namely how the (sustained) local knowledge of one community in one setting

can be related to that of another group in another setting. The author perceives an emerging

globalized psychology on the horizon, but how this will come about is not much elaborated.

I see two possibilities. First, in the article the author freely introduces concepts from the

mainstream literature on social interventions and intergroup relations, suggesting that a global

psychology based on common concepts and methods is already largely in place. The term

indigenous then may refer to issues to be addressed in the specific context of a specific

group (see the fourth reason in my comments on Osgoods research). Alternatively, the

development of local knowledge leads in each case to a local psychology rooted in its own

theoretical concepts and methodologies. In that case, there would seem to be a seriousmethodological problem of how to combine these local psychologies into a global

psychology. Shams mentions epistemology two times in her article, but not in a way that

provides much clarification.

Perspectives and prospects

Taking the four articles together, there were three points that struck me, namely that

indigenous psychologies are seen as well established, that they are (mainly) about differences

between cultural groups and that they contribute to a global psychology.


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Indigenous psychologies are seen as well established

As recently as 1997 the legitimacy of indigenous psychologies was a major issue in a review

of the field by Sinha (Sinha, 1997). That appears to be no longer the case. None of the four

authors discusses this topic anymore. Also, the somewhat subtle relationships between

culture-comparative research, cultural psychology and indigenous psychology that were

examined in a special issue of the Asian Journal of Social Psychology

in 2000 are not

addressed. I fully agree that there is a place for indigenous psychologies. Recently I wrote:

Historically, indigenous psychology movements can be seen as a just reaction against the

tendency among western researchers to see psychology as an accomplished science and field of

application to which others can only add details. Such a perspective in my view amounts to a

serious overestimation of the state of development of psychology, even if one assumes that

systematic accumulation of knowledge on human behavior is possible (Poortinga, 2004).

As mentioned before, the legitimacy of indigenous psychologies is not an argument in

the present comment.

Indigenous psychologies are about differences betweencultural groups

In the introduction above, I mentioned the Atlas of Affective Meaning (Osgood et al

., 1975).

Although it reported on a major project in size and scope, it has never gained the fame of

other large-scale studies in cross-cultural psychology. A likely reason is the strong emphasis

in the findings on overall cultural similarities in affective meaning. The cultural uniquenesses

emerge almost as second-class citizens; Osgood (1977; Osgood et al

., 1975) referred to them

as exceptions that stick out as sore thumbs. Probably, such findings could hardly become

popular in a field that is geared towards the finding and explaining of differences between

cultures rather than similarities (Berry et al

., 2002; Brouwers et al.

, 2004).

For all the four authors, the primacy of culture, leading to culturedness or cultural

specificity in human social behavior, is the point of departure. Perhaps this is understandable

from an historical perspective. But, if the indigenous psychology movement has come of age,

I find it curious that cross-cultural invariance, or similarities, are given only limited attention.

First, this is curious in the light of the everyday observation that humans understand and often

even appreciate across a wide range of cultures products that originate from one culture, such

as literature, movies and TV serials. Second, apart from the results of Osgood, there is a

host of empirical findings from culture-comparative research in fields such as emotions,

personality, and social behavior that point to limited cross-cultural variation (see, for example,

Berry et al

., 2002). One typical example is the cross-cultural equivalence of personalitydimensions, not only found with self-rating questionnaires (Barrett et al.

, 1998; McCrae &

Allik, 2002), but also in comparative studies of locally collected person-descriptive adjectives

(De Raad et al.

, 1998). In Chinese questionnaires there is evidence of an additional factor,

labeled Interpersonal Relatedness. Such a finding underscores the importance of indigenous

research. At the same time, this factor was also replicated in a multi-ethnic sample in Hawaii,

suggesting that interpersonal relatedness may be an aspect of personality that should be

included in a comprehensive personality inventory everywhere (Cheung & Leung, 1998;

Cheung et al

., 2001). A fourth reason is that a one-sided emphasis on cross-cultural

differences ignores culture as a human faculty (Poortinga & Soudijn, 2002) and threatens to

place indigenous psychologies in a marginal position vis vis relevant related disciplines that


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operate from a comparative perspective, such as human ethology (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989),

human ecology (Dent-Read & Zukow-Goldring, 1997) and evolutionary psychology (Barrett

et al.

, 2002).

Of the four authors, Hwang (BBB) most explicitly acknowledges cross-cultural invariance

in human behavior. In his view, a good theory is worth testing elsewhere with a methodology

that historically may happen to have been developed in one context, but applies everywhere.

Of course, the question is whether empirical studies of the Face and Favor model in other

societies will lead to more than occasional sore thumbs, but I am prepared to wait

respectfully for the answer.

Indigenous psychologies contribute to a global psychology

All four authors are of the opinion that indigenous psychologies make a contribution not only

to local bodies of knowledge, but also to a global psychology. As far as I can see, this expected

outcome does not differ essentially from the ideal of a more universal psychology as proposed

by culture-comparative researchers (Berry et al

., 2002). However, these latter authors are

quite explicitly assuming cross-culturally common frames of reference in the form of

presumably universally shared psychological processes and functions. What differs between

cultures are specific manifestations that can be interpreted within such common frames. The

affective dimensions reported in the Atlas of Affective Meaning (Osgood et al

., 1975) are an

example.

As already mentioned in several places in this comment, it is not quite clear to me how

the various authors of this Special Issue bridge the gap between local psychologies and a

global psychology. For example, according to Jackson (this Issue, p. 52): indigenous

theorizing is the study of phenomena within a culture through the application of theoretical

frameworks (ways of thinking and seeing) and methodologies that are appropriate to and

derived from within that culture. I can imagine that these come together in a process of

coevolution, but why and when would centripetal forces be stronger than centrifugal ones?In the article by Shams (this Issue, pp. 3950) the reason for an indigenous approach is

quite clear: there is a local problem context. In contrast, this context is analyzed with concepts

that are taken from social psychology, and these seem to have a general meaning that is not

local. However, this does not appear to meet Jacksons definition.

Hwang (this Issue, pp. 517) will find my formulation of a contrast probably too strong.

He refers to a universalist suggestion that differences in behavior repertoires across cultures

should be understood against the background of commonness in psychological functioning

(Poortinga, 1999). He also refers to the relativist dictum of one mind and many mentalities

(Shweder et al

., 1998). Hwang suggests that these two viewpoints are very similar, but that

can be questioned. For cultural psychologists, mind is often an abstractum that is notexamined in empirical research. In culture-comparative research, cross-cultural invariance is

an explicit focus of empirical research. Kashimas (this Issue, pp. 1938) analysis is a case

in point. His starting point for analysis are concepts such as symbolic reflexivity and the role

of culture in the constitution of the mind. He sees these as the ingredients for Asian social

psychologists to construct a social psychology unencumbered by the weight of the Western

cultural tradition (this Issue, p. 36). For this psychology to be global it also has to fit the

Western mind, but for that to happen, it seems to me, this global psychology somehow must

have transcended the Asian constitution of mind.


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Conclusion

For the authors of this Special Issue it is beyond question that a culture-informed psychology

can only be derived from local analysis. At the same time, there is a common belief that

indigenous psychologies are the basis for a culture-informed global psychology; indigenous

psychologies are ready to become an export product. How the global, or universal, can be

derived from the indigenous remains a tricky question that is not fully answered and perhaps

should be addressed in more detail in a future set of papers.

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