the elements of the concept of ideology

Political Studies (1987), XXXV, 18-38

The Elements of the Concept of Ideology MALCOLM B. HAMILTON

University of Reading

This article, based upon an extensive examination of the literature on the concept of ideology, identifies some 27 definitional components or ‘elements’ which are discussed in turn to ascertain their utility and coherence as definitional criteria. On the basis of this examination a number of these elements are found to be essential to the concept, and are built into a definition which allows consideration of, among other things, the expressive and justificatory dimension of beliefs often ignored in other definitions.

Anyone who reviews the literature dealing with the concept of ideology soon discovers that there are at least as many definitions of it as there are theorists proposing them. At least as many because some theorists are not even content with offering a single one. Such definitions, moreover, utilize a very wide range of definitional criteria, few of which are common to all definitions. An examination of a large number of definitions of the concept revealed no fewer than 27 different elements or definitional criteria which have been combined in various permutations of from two to at least as many as seven.’ Many of these elements appear fairly frequently while others are quite idiosyncratic. Why is it that such conceptual anarchy prevails? It may be that theorists are unable to agree upon the best terminology with which to describe a reality, the fundamental characteristics and categories of which are not in dispute. Or, it may be that the disagreement is about how reality itself is to be categorized. This is a more serious type of disagreement and especially so if there is no common core to the various conceptions. If this is so, it is not simply a matter of arriving at some consensus about the limits of the phenomenon or where the boundary between ideology and other phenomena should be drawn, but a question of deciding between conceptions, some of which share absolutely nothing in common with some others. Of course, the debate about the meaning of ideology rests upon a combination of all the types of disagreement mentioned here. And, of course, such disagreements are in many cases a reflection of theoretical dispute. Definitions are rarely neutral with respect to theoretical

I Eighty five sources were consulted. Both formal definitions and general discussions of the concept of ideology in which a definition is implicit rather than explicitly stated were examined. In such discussions it is not always clear whether the characteristics attributed to the concept are intended as definitional criteria or as empirical generalizations. I t is often necessary, therefore, to interpret the intentions of the author. However, if occasionally attributes which were not intended to be definitional criteria have been so interpreted here it is of no consequence since they may, nevertheless, be considered as possible definitional criteria.

0032-321 7/87/01/0018-21/$03.00 0 1987 Political Studies

MALCOLM B. HAMILTON 19

approaches. How one categorizes reality depends upon one’s purposes, the questions one asks about it, and, often, prior dispositions and commitments to particular explanations of it. However, in the social and political sciences the concepts by which reality is described, individuated and classified too often embody theoretical and explanatory assumptions to the detriment of empirical study. Consequently, debate and disputation too often turn upon the meaning and use of words and little progress is made. This has very much been the case with the study of ideology. The term is too often used in an excessively theory- laden manner such that propositions which ought to be established empirically are implied or prejudged by the definition of the phenomenon under investigation.

This article argues in favour of a definition of ideology which is as close as is possible to being a purely descriptive term implying as little as possible about its causes or its effects. An attempt will be made to reduce the diversity of definitions of ideology and of the elements of such definitions to an acceptable subset of elements which are mutually consistent and which together comprise a coherent and applicable concept.2 In undertaking such a task it is always wise to remain as close to common usage as possible. There are those who would abandon the term ‘ideology’ completely because it is so laden with theoretical baggage and, indeed, pejorative connotations. But this is not true of all conceptions to which the term is applied and it does have wide currency. If it is abandoned a new term must be found to replace it and this may simply add to the confusion rather than cutting through it. The definitional task, in any case, still has to be carried out. The strategy of this article will be, therefore, to retain the term and as much of the content of current definitions of it as can usefully be retained. There seems little point in adding entirely new definitional criteria when such a superfluity of them already exists. The task would seem rather to be to break down existing definitions into their elements and by recombining some set of them, with some fine-tuning of their meaning, reconstruct a coherent definition. At the same time, the discussion of these elements may serve as a review of the literature. In other words, criteria which are universal, if any are, should be incorporated, as should those which are common to most definitions, provided that coherence and consistency are maintained. Idio- syncratic criteria should normally be rejected unless it can be demonstrated that despite their idiosyncrasy there are good reasons for including them. By this procedure, the core features of the majority of definitions will be retained. The selection of other elements on the basis of reasoned argument will then fix the limits or boundaries of the concept. The intention is t o construct a ‘minimal definition’ of the phenomenon.3 The fact that the original definitions which provide the raw materials for this reconstructive exercise were devised with particular purposes or theoretical tasks in mind might at first sight seem to pose

2 This procedure is similar to that adopted by G . A. Huaco, ‘On Ideology’, Acta Sociologica, 14

3 ‘A definition is minimal when all the properties or characteristics of an entity that are not indispensable for its identification are set forth as variable, hypothetical propositions not as definitional propositions. This is the same as saying that whatever falls beyond a minimal charac- terisation is left to verification not declared true by definition.’ G . Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 61.

(1971), 245-55.

20 The Elements of the Concept of Ideology

a problem. However, there is nothing to prevent us from taking these definitional elements as candidates for inclusion in a reconstructed descriptive definition. It follows, though, that the definition developed here by such a procedure cannot be claimed to necessarily replace other conceptions in any automatic way. Its test against other conceptions will lie in the extent of its utility and applicability in comparison with them and the extent to which it is able to enter into true and significant propositions about the subject matter in question. Also, the definition proposed on concluding this discussion must remain provisional in nature, as indeed must all definitions of concepts during the early phases of objective investigation which the study of ideology has surely not yet gone beyond.

Let us, then, review the range of definitional elements of the concept of ideology that appear in the literature. The following list, although not exhaustive, includes all but the most obscure or unreasonable.

1 . 2.

3 . 4.

5 . 6. 7. 8. 9.

10.

1 1 . 12.

13. 14.

15 . 16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25.

It consists of ideas, beliefs, understandings and attitudes, etc. It is the underlying cognitive assumptions of belief, or the total structure of the mind including the conceptual apparatus. It takes the form of a system or pattern which is more or less coherent. It is associated with a particular group, class or collectivity within the wider society. It is associated with the whole society or community. I t places supreme significance upon one particular class or group. It is functional in some specified way. It is socially determined. It contains statements of fact, or statements which are held to be factual. It contains statements of a normative character expressing morals, values, etc. It seeks to explain. It makes use of and seeks to base itself upon philosophical ideas, arguments and theories. I t is concerned with society, man and his place in the world. It is the individual’s or group’s understanding of its relation to, or position within, the world. It facilitates choice or decision. I t is passionately held or there is an emotional commitment to it. It is closed to argument and to evidence. It reveals an isomorphism or duplicaton of reality into an everyday and a symbolic realm or dimension. It consists of, or contains, false, distorted, oversimplified, illusory or mistaken statements. It promotes, serves or reflects interests. It is unconsciously motivated. It consists of, or contains, statements which are unverified or unverifiable and held without good evidence. I t advocates action or impels to action. It seeks to promote social change, often of a radical kind, and often suddenly, that is, in a revolutionary manner. It seeks to prevent change and to preserve a particular social order.


26. It is a weapon in the class struggle. 27. I t is persuasive and seeks to argue a case in order to convince.

1. It Consists of Ideas, Beliefs, Understandings and Attitudes, etc. Clearly this is central to the notion of ideology and appears in some variety in all the definitions examined. The ideas and beliefs need not, however, be explicitly formulated or stated in the form of an ‘ism’, but may be discernible only in the views, attitudes and opinions prevalent among a group or c~llectivity.~ To equate the concept with formal doctrines and ‘isms’ seems unduly restrictive. More importantly, it would cause problems in instances where actors, genuinely or otherwise, do not interpret their behaviour in terms of any commitment to a set of beliefs but as simply pragmatic, but where it is clear to the observer that it is, in fact, in conformity with such a set of beliefs. This is often the case in the political sphere, of course. Many definitions fail to include such possibilities, perhaps unintentionally, by referring to only ideas and beliefs. It seems necessary to add ‘attitudes’ and ‘understandings’ to avoid confusion on this point.

2. It is the Underlying Cognitive Assumptions of Belief, or the Total Structure of the Mind including the Conceptual Apparatus

Some definitions go much further than this, however, in defining ideology in terms of the underlying assumptions, and the basic conceptual structure of all belief and knowledge; that is, they make element (2) a fundamental criterion of ideology. Mannheim’s concept of ‘total ideology’ would belong in this category, as would the definition given by Walsby.5 The trouble with such conceptions is that they rarely aid research, they are rarely useful for ordering observational data or for formulating hypotheses that can be tested. Actual research hardly ever makes use of such definitions. An entity such as the ‘total structure of the mind of an epoch’ is impossible to work with and to opera- tionalize.6 In Mannheim’s case the effect of this was to leave his account of the ‘Sociology of Knowledge’ at the level of an unverified and perhaps unverifiable hypothesis. He failed to specify the mechanisms by which the objective world of society and its structure becomes reflected in cultural forms and to show how this objective social world is in fact reflected.’ Indeed, it would be a difficult task to identify something as vague as the ‘total structure of the mind of an epoch or class’ at all. Once one departs from concrete specific ideas and beliefs

4 In Lane’s terminology, it may be ‘latent’ as opposed to ‘forensic’. R. E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York, Free Press, 1962), p. 16.

5 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960). pp. 49-50; H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950); H. Walsby, The Domain of Ideologies: a Study of the Origin, Structure and Development of Ideologies (Glasgow, William MacLellan, 1947), p. 142.

6 A. Naess, et al., Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. 13.

7 J. N. Shklar (ed.), Political Theory and Ideology (New York, Macmillan, Atherton Press, 1967).


to search for underlying structures, even assuming such structures can be identified, the task becomes all-absorbing, leaving little prospect of taking the further step of relating these structures to the structure of the society. In addition, the whole enterprise threatens to become a matter of interpretative recovery of such structures where one man’s reading is as good as any other’s and there are few criteria for deciding between rival interpretations.

Mannheim does at least make a distinction between the ‘particular’ and ‘total’ conceptions of ideology so that a study of the concrete and specific beliefs and ideas prevalent in a society and their relation to the social structure, the interests and social position of those who compare them, and so on, can be undertaken. One may agree or disagree with Mannheim’s characterization of such a study as concerned to uncover errors which have occurred as a result of the intrusion of interests, and therefore biases, into thought (and Mannheim clearly considered such a study to be somewhat pedestrian compared to the rarified realms of the Sociology of Knowledge), but he does at least allow for the possibility of such a study. Those who, like Walsby, do not distinguish between ‘total’ and ‘particular’ ideology but who define it solely in terms of the ‘total’ sense, ignore this possibility. And again, this type of definition leaves the notion of ‘ideology’ far too broad for practical use. If ideology is ‘the complete system of cognitive assumptions and effective identifications which manifest themselves in, or underlie, the thought, speech, aims, interests, ideals, ethical standards, actions-in short, the behaviour-of an individual human being’,8 then almost no aspect of human belief, thought or behaviour is left out of the notion of ‘ideology’. Such a definition simply fails to discriminate between different kinds of ideas or mental states. It fails, for example, to discriminate between science and ideology.

3. It Takes the Form of a System or Pattern Which is More or Less Coherent Element (3) should be retained. It appears in almost all definition^.^ We certainly seem to imply a system of an interconnected set of ideas when we use the term ideology. This need not imply, however, that there must be complete consistency or a close logical, empirical, or other relationship between every component.10 The ideas may be loosely structured, ambiguous and even contra- dictory as long as they are in some way, and to some minimal degree, inter- related. Any stricter criteria of this sort become too restrictive. The interrelatedness of the elements in a belief system must surely be a matter of degree

a Walsby, The Domain of Ideologies. J. Houghton, ‘Ideology: a Marxian-Paretian critique of the Weberian orientation’, Journal of

Political and Military Sociology, 5 (1977), 155-68, is an exception. He argues that this should be treated as an empirical matter, but presumably he does not wish to count a totally unrelated set of beliefs as an ideology and would accept that some minimal degree of interrelatedness is a requisite, the degree of interrelatedness being a matter to be established empirically.

10 This is a requirement emphasized by P. E. Converse, ‘The nature of belief systems in mass publics’, in D. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York, Free Press, 1964), p. 207, who speaks of the elements being bound together by some form of constraint or functional inter- dependence. E. Shils, ‘The concept and function of ideology’, International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York, Macmillan, 1968), p. 66, and G. Sartori, ‘Politics, ideology and belief systems’, American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), p. 401, also emphasize this aspect.


and it is difficult to draw a line which would demarcate highly consistent sets of beliefs from those which are not so, except arbitrarily. What matters is that there should be some interrelationship. For example, belief A may be consistent with belief B and B with C, but not A with C. Contradictions and ambiguities of this sort are fairly common in those belief systems which most theorists have wished to call ideology.

4. It is Associated with a Particular Group, Class or Collectivity within the Wider Society

5. It is Associated with the Whole Society or Community Elements (4) and ( 5 ) are closely related. The issue here is simply whether ideology is to be defined as a system of ideas associated with a particular group or class or movement, as something essentially sectional, or whether it is to be equated with a dominant system of thought which in some way can be said to be that of the whole society.ll But, of course, we d o not have to define ideology as either one or the other. The concept could cover both; and it seems to make good sense to so define it. If a certain system of ideas and beliefs, which had begun as the beliefs of a group or movement within the society, were to become widely accepted and therefore the dominant system of ideas in the society, the communal ideology, it would be strange to insist that it had ceased to be an ideology on this ground alone. Conversely, if a universally accepted set of beliefs were to lose the support of the majority of the population it would seem an odd thing to say that it was no longer an ideology simply for this reason.

Components (4) and ( 5 ) can, then, be combined. If we accept them as definitional criteria of ‘ideology’, this becomes a belief system which is associated either with a particular class or group, or an entire community. The virtue of making use of this criterion in defining ideology is that it would allow us to differentiate ideology from those systems of widely diffused ideas that transcend particular social groupings, including whole societies; for example, scientific theories, philosophical schools and certain religions. Unfortunately, as most definitions which emphasize this criterion stand they are ambiguous. Is it a prerequisite that an ideology be associated exclusively with a particular social group or collectivity? Or may it be shared by more than one such group? It has been argued by several writers on the subject, and in particular by Martin Seliger, that most systems of ideas generally acknowledged to be ideologies have much of their content in common with other such systems of ideas and that very similar ideologies are often accepted by rather different social groups. This he terms ‘ideological pluralism’.I2 We should not therefore interpret the collective character of ideology as exclusive association with a particular social group or category.

However, the question remains whether it is essential to emphasize the collective character of ideology at all. Most definitions do so and there are good

I I Many definitions state that ideology is collectively held by a class, group, nation, etc. Examples which define it as essentially community based rather than sectional include R. M. Merelman, ‘The development of political ideology: a framework for the analysis of political socialisation’, American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 750-67, and W. A. Mullins, ‘On the concept of ideology in political science’, American Political Science Review, 66 (1972), 498-510.

I * M. Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1976), pp. 161-5.


reasons for such an emphasis connected with the persuasive and hortative character of ideology, assuming for the moment this criterion must be adopted. Justification of this and further discussion of the point must wait until later.

6. It Places Supreme Significance upon One Particular Class or Group This is, in some ways, similar to that of (4), but seems unduly restrictive and idiosyncratic.13 Systems of belief generally acknowledged to be ideologies, while collectively held, do not necessarily make any reference to the particular collectivity that espouses them, but are frequently couched in universalistic terms. This criterion seems specifically aimed at confining ideology to a restricted set of phenomena containing Marxism, fascism and perhaps some nationalistic creeds, while giving no justification for this procedure.

7. It is Functional in Some Specified Way This, too, must be rejected. Definitions in terms of alleged specific functions prejudge the empirical question of what functions, if any, ideologies might h a ~ e . 1 ~ This is likely to be, in any case, a very variable characteristic, different ideologies functioning in different ways and similar ideologies functioning differently at different times. It is unlikely that all ideologies will have the same function or that any given ideology will have only one function, l 5 or will always function in the same way.

8. It is Socially Determined Another definition which can be rejected is in terms of this element.16 Again, an empirical question is prejudged by such definitions since it is first necessary to establish that all the systems of belief to be included in the category are socially determined. Very often this is precisely the objective of research into the nature of certain beliefs termed ideologies. This type of definition confuses extrinsic and intrinsic characteristics of the phenomenon.17 One might, of course, reserve the category ‘ideology’ for any set of beliefs which turns out, after extensive research, to be socially determined in some way. But such is the extent of our knowledge on this question that the category is unlikely to cohtain any instances. And what is meant by the term ‘socially determined’? The social determination of ideas is likely to be a matter of degree and there is likely to be a

l 3 L. S. Feuer, Ideologyand theIdeologisfs(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975). pp. 1, 13-16. For a trenchent criticism of Feuer’s approach see R. A. Sharpe, ‘Man, the ideological animal’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 6 (1976), 363-8.

l 4 Mullins, ‘On the concept of ideology in political science’, p. 502. I s D. Sainsbury, ‘Theoretical perspectives in analysing ideological change and persistence: the

case o f Swedish Social Democratic ideology’, Scandinavian Political Sfudies, 4 (1981), 273-94. I6 This is, o f course, characteristic of many, but not all, Marxist definitions. For example,

L. Goldman, The Human Sciencesand Philosophy (London, Cape, 1969), pp. 102-3, A. Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (edited by Q. Howe and G . Nowell- Smith) (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 376. It is central also to Mannheim’s conception: Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 50.

1’ Huaco, ‘On ideology’, p. 248.


complex interplay between ‘ideational’ and ‘material’ forces. The difficulties involved here have been discussed so often that there seems little point in going into them again.

9. It Contains Statements of Fact, or Statements Which are Held to be Factual 10. It Contains Statements of a Normative Character Expressing Morals,

Values, etc.

The problem with both elements (7) and (8) is that they depart from a definition of ideology in terms of the general substantive characteristics of the ideas and beliefs of which i t is comprised and seek instead to define it in terms of extraneous factors, such as the functions it fulfils, or its causes. Elements (9) and (10) do seek to state what kind of ideas and beliefs are involved. Some definitions specify that ideology is on the face of it a system of statements which are factual in nature but which are really intended to express values or norms; to present the latter as if they were facts. This is really a variety of that type of definition which emphasizes element (19).18 Ideology is a system of ideas which deceives, because those who espouse it pretend, or are themselves deceived, into the belief that what they desire or think is right is a matter of objective fact and not subjective value. This type of definition will therefore be discussed when element (1 9) is examined.

It is necessary to include element (10) in order to distinguish ideology from science or any set of allegedly explanatory and descriptive ideas, whether or not they are true or false. There are those who claim that science is ideological, and that no system of ideas is, or can be, objective. This question leads us into a realm of epistemological problems which cannot be discussed, let alone resolved, here. I t must suffice to say that at least the natural sciences and such things as mathematics and logic, however they may be affected by social influences, biases, and so on, are, nevertheless, different sorts of ideas from those which express aims and desires, which uphold certain forms of action and conduct as desirable, admirable, moral, and so on. ‘Ideology’ belongs to the latter category of belief or idea. Even Mannheim excluded mathematics and logic from those idea systems of which the Sociology of Knowledge treats. And if it is claimed that the natural sciences show biases and distortions as a result of false-consciousness, or the influence of interests, then this has to be demonstrated. I t is an empirical claim. A fuller discussion will be more appropriate with reference to element (19) below.

Having argued for the inclusion of element (10) in order to distinguish ideology from science and similar systems of ideas, it is necessary to ask whether ideology should be equated with belief systems of a normative kind or whether ideology contains both normative and factual propositions. It is hardly ever the case that peopole who espouse and propagate systems of ideas which state aims and desires say nothing about how those aims and desires can be realized. This entails saying things about the world of an empirical and factual kind. And even systems of ideas which set out to establish, on a purely conceptual level, ethical arguments, values and standards, often have to make reference to facts about the world, man, and so on. Not all such belief systems

18 G . Bergman, ‘Ideology’, Erhics, 61 (1951), 205-18.


are ideologies but the fact that they have to rely upon factual propositions shows that ideologies also incorporate factual statements. I t follows, then, that ideologies must contain statements of both a normative and factual or ‘positive’ kind. l 9

11. It Seeks to Explain Some definitions, acknowledging that it contains factual statements and empirical claims, regard ideology as essentially explanatory in character.20 Not all these definitions state precisely, if at all, what is meant by ‘explanatory’. Two sorts of implication seem to be involved. First, that ideologies seek to account for why some state of affairs is as it is; secondly, why certain things are desirable, right, good, moral. According to such definitions it is not sufficient to say that a system of ideas must contain factual or normative statements, or both, to be considered an ideology. It must also contain arguments and reasons which support such factual and normative propositions.

There seems to be no good reason for including this element in a definition of ideology. I t serves no essential purpose and may be unduly restrictive. It does not, for example, help in distinguishing ideology from science, which is also, of course, explanatory. In any case, what is often meant by the ‘explanation’ of values, norms and morals, by the use of argument, is in fact the justification of them, and this can be subsumed within element (27).

12. It Makes Use Of and Seeks To Base Itself Upon Philosophical Ideas, Arguments and Theories

This element21 is almost the same as element (11) and must be rejected for

I9 Definitions which explicitly incorporate both elements include D. Easton, A Systems Analysis ofPoliticalLife(New York, Wiley, 1965), p. 43; J. Could, ‘Ideology’, in J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary ofthe Social Sciences (London, Tavistock, 1974). p. 315; A. Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: the Origins, Grammar and Future of Ideology (London, Macmillan, 1976), pp. 31 and 85; H. Johnson, ‘Ideology and the social system’, International Encylopaedia of the SocialSciences(New York, Macmillan, 1968), p. 77; W. P. Metzger, ‘Ideology and the intellectuals’, Philosophy ofscience, 16 (1949), p. 125; D. L. Miller, ‘Ideology and the problem of false consciousness’, Political Studies, 20 (1972), 432-47; Mullins, ‘On the concept of ideology in Political Science’, p. 508; L. T. Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies: a Comparative Analysis (3rd edition) (Arundel, Irwin Dorsey International, 1975), p. 1; Seliger, Ideology and Politics, pp. 119-20. Those which mention only a ‘factual’ content include Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists, pp. 17-19. Those which mention only a normative content include J. L. Adams, ‘Religion and the ideologies’, Confluence, 4 (1955), 72-84; T. W. Adorno, etal., The Authoritarian Personality (New York, Harper and Row, 1950), p. 2; W. E. Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York, Atherton Press, 1967), p. 2; F. Gross (ed.), European Ideologies (New York, Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 5; Lane, Political Ideology, pp. 14-15; L. La Palom- bara, ‘Decline of ideology: a dissent and an interpretation’, American Political Science Review, 60 (1966). 5-16; Naess, Democracy, Ideologyand Objectivity, p. 181; J . S. Roucek, ‘A history of the concept of ideology’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 5 (1944), p. 249; Walsby, The Domain of Ideologies, p. 142.

2o Could, ‘Ideology’, p. 315; C. Ceertz, ‘Ideology as a cultural system’, in D. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, p. 72; J. Plamenatz, Ideology (London, Macmillan, 1970), p. 75; H. McClosky, ‘Consensus and ideology in American Politics’, American Political Science Review, 58 (1964), p. 362.

2 1 Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists, pp. 1 and 17, uses this criterion in his discussion of the nature of ideology.


similar reasons. In addition, it is not always easy to distinguish philosophical ideas, schools of thought, theories, and so on, from ideology itself. We may, in fact, wish to say that they are ideologies. Furthermore, i t may well be the case that rather than ground themselves in pre-existing philosophical arguments and theories, ideologies are involved in generating such theories.22 These are, of course, empirical questions. The relationship between ideology and philosophy cannot, therefore, be taken as the basis for a definition of ideology.

13. It is Concerned With Society, Man and His Place in the World Many conceptions of ideology define it in terms of what the ideas and beliefs which constitute it refer to. Element (13) is frequently the basis of this type of definition.23 The reference may be very broad, incorporating ideas about the social world in general, man, his nature, and his place in the world, and the implications for social life. Or it may be rather more narrow incorporating only ideas pertaining to political life and institutions. The frequency with which this element appears in definitions suggests that it iscentral to the notion. Ideologies by consensus are constituted by ideas about the social world rather than the non-social or natural world. The question is how broad is their reference? To confine it to the realm of politics and the political seems restrictive. Seliger has argued at length for an inclusive definition of ideology, rather than a highly restrictive one, yet his own definition is restrictive in this respect.24 As Houghton has recently argued,25 Seliger’s definition would confine the concept to formally structured political perspectives, usually tied to political philosophies and to the function of mobilizing as much support as possible for a programme of action. Ideology would be a phenomenon of the modern era of political parties.26 It would be wise to retain a broader reference for the concept but the limits will be more precisely drawn towards the conclusion of this discussion.

14. It is the Individual’s or Group’s Understanding of its Relation To, or Position Within, the World

For the moment, let us note that element (14) goes rather too far in broadening

22 R. A . Sharpe, ‘Ideology and ontology’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 4 (1979). 55-64. 23 H. D. Aiken, TheAgeofldeology(New York, American Library, 1956). p. 17; Adornoetal.,

The Authoritarian Personality, p. 2; Could, ‘Ideology’, p. 3 15; S. P. Huntington, ‘Conservatism as an ideology’, American Political Science Review, 51 (1957). 454-73; Johnson, ‘Ideology and the social system’, p. 77; A. King, ‘Political parties in western democracies’, Polity (1969), I 1 1-41; Lane, Political Ideology, pp. 14- IS; K . Loewenstein, ‘Political systems. ideologies and institutions: the problem of their circulation’, Western PoliticaI Quarterly, 6 (1953), 689-706; C. B. MacPherson, ‘Revolution and ideology’, in C. J . Friedrich (ed.), Revolution (New York, Atherton Press, 1966). p. 301; Sargent. Contemporary Political Ideologies; R . Scruton, ‘Ideology’, A Dictionary of Political Thought (London, Macmillan, 1982). p. 21 3; Seliger, Ideology and Politics, pp. 119-20; L. Silverman, ‘Locating the new right’ (paper presented at the ECPR Workshop on ‘Social and Political Movements in Western Europe’, Berlin, 1977), p. 27.

24 Seliger, Ideology and Politics. pp. 119-20. 25 Houghton, ‘Ideology’, p. 157. See also J . B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology

26 Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, p. 93, and Mullins, ‘On the concept of (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984). p. 83.

ideology in Political Science’, p. 503, argue that it is an essentially modern phenomenon.


the concept.2’ It does not distinguish ideology from social-scientific theories or from those generally accepted observations and understandings, more or less objective, coherent, true, systematic, total, sophisticated, which every member of a group or society shares to some extent. Ideology in this conception is nothing other than the stock of social knowledge or ideas, collective representa- tions, taken-for-granted views of the world. It is thus redundant as a distinct concept. It does not refer to any distinct type of belief system concerned with social reality and social life.

15. It Facilitates Choice or Decision 16. It is Passionately Held or there is an Emotional Commitment to it

17. It is Closed to Argument and to Evidence 18. I t Reveals an Isomorphism or Duplication of Reality into an Everyday and a

Symbolic Realm or Dimension All of these elements must be rejected. Clearly the claim that ideology facilitates choice or decisionZ* is better treated as empirical than as essentially characteristic of ideologies. It is difficult to see why a system of belief which hinders choice or decision should not be counted as an ideology when in every other respect it meets all the criteria of an ideology. Many systems of belief, commonly agreed to be ideologies, can in certain circumstances make choices and decisions more difficult and agonising.

Similarly, element (16)29 is better treated as an empirical question. Nothing is gained by making it a defining characteristic while considerable incoherence results from doing so, as Seliger has cogently argued.30 If the same set of beliefs is held with passion by one person but without passion by another, is it then an ideology in the first instance but not in the second? This element has to do not with ideology itself but with the manner in which it is held and accepted. I t ignores the fact that there are few followers of an ideology who have not at some time doubted its central tenets or principles. Also, pragmatism as an ideology would be ruled out. This, of course, was convenient for those exponents of ‘the end of ideology thesis’ who often used this criterion. This self-protecting device, as Seliger has shown, turns out to be self-defeating. The attempt to impose a pejorative and restrictive connotation was itself ideological. Much the same can be said (as it has been by Seliger) of element (17)? There is no necessity to repeat all the arguments here.

27 Althusser, ‘Ideology and ideological state apparatuses’, pp. 153-5; R. Coward and J. Ellis, Language and Materialism (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977); A. Maclntyre, Against the Selflmagesof theAge(London, Duckworth, 1971), p. 6; G. Therborn, TheldeologyofPowerand The Power of Ideology (London, Verso, 1980), p. 2; R. Wuthnow, ‘Comparative ideology’, Inlernational Journal of Comparative Sociology, 21 (1981), p. 121.

28 Adams, ‘Religion and the ideologies’, p. 72; Could, ‘Ideology’, p. 315. 29 D. Bell, TheEndofldeology(Glencoe, I l l . , Free Press, 1960), pp. 370-1; M. Rejai, ‘Political

ideology: theoretical and comparative perspectives’, in M. Rejai (ed.), The Decline of Ideology (Chicago, Aldine Atherton, 1971); Sartori, ‘Politics, ideology and belief systems’; P. Sigmund, The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York, Praeger, 1963). p. 4.

30 Seliger, Ideologyand Politics, pp. 137-43. See also J . P. Diggins, ‘Ideology and pragmatism: philosophy or passion’, American Political Science Review, 64 ( 1 970). 899-906.

3 1 Seliger, Ideology and Polilics. Those who have used this criterion include Sartori, ‘Politics, ideology and belief systems’, p. 405; Shils, ‘The concept and function of ideology’.

MALCOLM B. H A M I L T O N 29

Element (18) is emphasized by Feuer3* and by H ~ a c o . ~ ’ They argue that the notion of ideology as false-consciousness entails more than that i t is simply distorted thought. Rather, i t involves a duplication of reality and the projection of characteristics of the everyday world onto a fantastic, religious, or other symbolic realm of existence. This process, analysed by Marx and Engels, is a key characteristic of ideology, according to Huaco, because the duplication of reality sets the limits within which thought can take place and defines the assumptions which underlie and constrain it. This seems, however, an unwarranted restriction of the term ideology to a phenomenon which Marx and Engels thought characteristic of religion-a species of ideology. Whether one agrees or disagrees that this is a characteristic of religion, i t can hardly be said to characterize those secular systems of ideas which have been considered ideologies. I t is not clear whether Huaco intends that all three of the characteristics of ideology he mentions, namely that the constitutive ideas perform some function of some kind, that they are distorted, and that they demonstrate an isomorphism, are essential definitional criteria. I t may be that the presence of either distortion or isomorphism makes them ideological. His claim that the three aspects are fundamental seems to indicate the former position, but from his comments to the effect that isomorphic duplication may be a true reflection of social reality i t would seem to follow that not all three elements can simul- taneously be characteristics of ideology. The relationships between these elements are obscure and the centrality of this isomorphic characteristic is uncertain. Isomorphic reflection is, furthermore, a matter of interpretation. Structuralist accounts of belief systems, of course, often emphasize this aspect but are very much open to debate precisely because of this, often idiosyncratic, interpretative character.

19. I t Consists of, or Contains, False, Distorted, Oversimplified, Illusory or Mistaken Statements

This is, of course, central to most but not to all Marxist conceptions of ideology; but i t is not confined to Marxist definitions.34 Despite its prevalence,

32 Feuer. Ideology und rhe Ideologisrs. p. 17. l3 Huaco. ‘On ideology’, p. 254. See also J . McCarney, The Red World ofldeology (Brighton.

Harvester, 1981), p. 30. 34 Examples of definitions which make this characteristic central are those of A. Callinicos,

Alrhusser’s Murxisnr (London, Pluto Press, 1976). p. 99; Goldman, The Hutnun Sciences und Philosophy. p. 103; Gouldner, The Diukcric of Ideology und Technology, p. 38. Other Marxists attempt to distinguish ideology from mere falsehood while retaining some notion of distortion or limitation. e.g.. L. Althusser, For Murx (London, Allen Lane, 1969); J . Larrain, The Concepr of Ideology (London, Hutchinson, 1979); G. Lichtheim, ‘The concept of ideology’, Hisrorv und Theory, 4 (1965), 164-95; Miller, ‘Ideology and the problem of false consciousness’. pp. 442-4. Marxists who reject falseness a s a criterion include Houghton. ‘Ideology’, p. 161; McCarney. The Red World of Ideology, p. 95, and E. Sprinzak, ‘Marx’s historical conception of ideology and science’, Poliricsund Sociery, 5 (1979, 395-416. They generally question and reject the claim that Marx himself saw this as a central defining characteristic of the concept. The fullest discussion 01 this i s McCarney’s recent work.

Non-Marxists who base their definitions on this criterion include Huaco, ‘On ideology’, p. 248; Johnson, ‘Ideology and the social system’, p. 77; Mannheim, Ideologyund Utopia. pp. 49-51; G. Nettler, Explunurions (New York, McGraw Hill, 1970), pp. 177-8; Roucek. ‘A history of the


it must be rejected because it renders the concept incoherent and difficult to apply. So much has been written on this question that it would be tedious to repeat all the arguments in detail.35 The more familiar and frequently expressed points will be briefly mentioned; difficulties which have received less attention will be developed.

Definitions of this type refer to falsehood or distortion or constitutive ideas sometimes without, and sometimes with, further qualification; for example, that only some kinds of distortions, or those with certain kinds of causes, are relevant. In both cases, they make what would be better left as an empirical matter the basis of the definition. Both tend to ignore the fact that if ideologies are in some essential respect normative in character, then the criterion of falsehood or distortion is inapplicable to them. The less sophisticated versions of this type of definition, those which are based on the criterion of falsehood or distortion in general, fail to discriminate between ideology and ‘honest’ error and mistake. The more sophisticated versions, which specify particular kinds of falsehood or distortion produced by specific causes, such as the influence of interests, must demonstrate that the falsehood or distortion is in fact caused in the appropriate way or is of the appropriate type, before they can identify an instance of the phenomenon. This is rarely done and may be extremely difficult; the matter is likely to be open to question. The trouble with this conception of ideology is that identification of an instance of it depends upon having determined both the truth or falsity of rival social ideas and theories and the reasons for their falsehood. This entails allegiance to a specific theory which must deny hypothetical status to its own propositions if it is even to identify instances of one of its fundamental categories. One could only know that there was such a thing as ideology if one first accepts a whole series of propositions as true. This tends to make such an approach ‘closed’ to argument and to dialogue. It does not debate with its opponents but simply labels them as ideological and seeks to explain them and to discover the causes of these ‘false’ and ‘distorted’ ideas, I t is no longer a matter of settling theoretical dispute by appeal to evidence, and so on, but simply of ‘unmasking’ rival ideas as really ideological. For this reason, somewhat ironically, Marxism was itself found to be a paradigm of the ideological by the ‘end of ideology’ theorists on the basis of a highly restrictive and pejorative conception of ideology which emphasized its ‘closed’ character rather than its falsehood.

Another variant of this type of definition is that which states that ideology is not so much false-consciousness or distorted thought as thought based upon limited perspectives or partial theories.36 Miller, for example, characterizes ideological thought as conceptually inadequate in that its concepts fail to dis-

concept of ideology’, p. 482; and W. Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge: an Essay in Aid of Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas (London, Routledge, 1958), p. 48.

Marx’s own conception has recently been characterized as a ‘body of thought systematically biased towards a specific social group’, for which absolute and universal validity is illegitimately claimed. B. Parekh, Marx’s Theory of Ideology (London, John Hopkins, 1982), p. 214.

35 There are numerous discussion and critiques of the Marxist conception of ideology as distorted throught, false consciousness, etc. Among the more recent are W. Carlsnaess, The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis (London, Greenwood Press, 1981) and M. Seliger, The Marxist Conception of Ideology: a Critical Essay (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976). 36 Miller, ‘Ideology and the problem of false consciousness’, pp. 442-4.


criminate distinct phenomena; as looking at phenomena in isolation from their social and cultural contexts within which they must be located before they can be understood; as involving the process of eternalization in which characteristics of individuals or groups are taken to be natural, universal or eternal rather than the products of particular socio-historical circumstances; and as reification, that is, mistaking abstractions for realities. But this is simply to equate ideology with bad and unimaginative social science of which, no doubt, there is a great deal: but it is hardly what one is after with the concept of ideology. Many diciplines go through a phase of conceptual flux and confusion; eternalization and reification are indeed constant dangers in social science; that one’s perspectives are sometimes limited and require broadening by placing phenomena in a wider social context is something one learns as a consequence of testing hypotheses which turn out to be less than adequate to account for the facts. Such deficiencies may be the consequence of biases or predispositions linked to interests, but equally may be ‘genuine’. Miller himself accepts that it is consequently not possible to distinguish between ideology and limited social science in claiming that practically all social ‘knowledge’ is ideological, that false-consciousness is endemic and that true-consciousness is something we can only approach. But if this is so, we need no concept of ideology. If all social thought is said to be ideological, no more is said than that all social thought is limited and inadequate and will be superseded. This much we know anyway and, as in any science, the endeavour is to improve, to further knowledge and understanding. The concept of ideology becomes redundant if it refers to nothing more than the universal limitations of knowledge, even if these limitations are a matter of degree.

20. It Promotes, Serves or Reflects Interests The notion of ideology as limited consciousness or deficient social knowledge, as we have seen, often implies that its deficiencies are caused by the disturbing factor of interests. Other definitions explicitly make this a central criterion.3’ Ideology is said to reflect, serve, or promote, interests. This element is easily dispensed with. Harris has argued that there is no reason to assume that ideologies only reflect interests, rather than, in addition, defining and shaping them.38 Systems of ideas which are obvious candidates for inclusion in the category of ‘ideology’ generally attempt to state what the interests of those whom it seeks to convince or those who already espouse it actually are. Conversion to the perspective of a particular ideology may thus entail an alteration in a person’s perception of his or her own interests, for example, from material well-being to spiritual salvation.

In any case, the same argument applies against this conception as against ideology as false-consciousness. Before an instance can be identified one first

3’ B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London, Routledge, 1974), p. 218; P. Berger and T. Luckman, The Social Construcfion of Reality (Harmondsworth, Allen Lane, 1967), p. 141; P. Corbett, ldeologies(London, Hutchinson, 1965), p. 138; J . Elster, ‘Belief, biasand ideology’, in M. hollis and S. Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982), p. 123; A. Giddens, CentralProblems in Social Theory (London, Macmillan, 1979), p. 188.

38 N. Harris, Beliefs in Society (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971), p. 16.


has to demonstrate that it does, in fact, reflect, serve or promote the interests of some group, and, further, that it is espoused and propagated because it does so. Again, .the question of the relationship between ideologies and interests is better treated as an empirical matter.

The definition of ideology in terms of the promotion of interests is, of course, closely associated with the ‘debunking’ or ‘unmasking’ tradition of analysis of ‘ideology’.39 If the beliefs serve someone’s interests then knowing this we can see them for what they are and so reject them as unsound. The significance of this argument is that it would have little point if the ideas concerned could clearly be shown to be false. If they were shown to be false, the fact that the falsehood was the consequence of the intrusion of interests would be of interest only to historians of ideas. Labelling of ideas as ‘ideological’ on the grounds that they serve interests, then, is likely to occur precisely when it is not easy to dismiss those ideas by reason, logic or appeal to evidence. A different basis must be sought for their rejection. Suspicion must be cast upon them by unmasking the interests underlying them. Apart from ignoring the well-known dictum that the truth or falsity of a proposition can be established only independently of its provenance or the reasons anyone might have for believing it, this type of argument is, of course, ideological by the terms of its own definition of ideology.

21. It is Unconsciously Motivated Frequently, with this type of definition, the influence of interests is said to be unconscious; the espousal of the ideas has unconscious motives.

There seems to be no good reason to limit the notion of ideology to ideas which have unconscious motivations. In the first place, the notion of the unconscious is a difficult, ambiguous and contentious one. Are the exponents of an ideology really unconscious of the motivations for their acceptance of the ideas? Can anyone be unconscious of their own motivations? It is a matter of how much a person reflects upon his reasons and motivations; of how much attention he gives to them, which is a matter of degree. An emphasis on unconscious motivation is often a way of distinguishing ideology from mere lying and propaganda. The latter may be defined as a system of ideas which are propagated by individuals and groups who do not themselves believe in, or accept, them. But, although the concept of ideology should perhaps exclude lying and even straightforward propaganda not accepted by its propagators, there is a great deal that falls between clear propaganda, as defined, and those ideas which are held with complete conviction. Much of this region one would wish to include in the concept of ideology. The criterion of unconscious motivation is not adequate to do this. Moreover, if ideology consists of unconsciously motivated ideas, does it follow that if someone comes to see the previously hidden motives which led him or her to espouse these ideas, while remaining convinced of their validity, these ideas are no longer ideological? If so, it would mean that a set of beliefs is ideological when held by some individuals but not so when held by others. This, obviously, will not do.

39 E.g., Corbett, Ideologies, p. 138.


22. It Consists of, or Contains, Statements which are Unverified or Unverifiable and Held Without Good Evidence

Element (22) states that ideologies are not so much false as accepted without good evidence, unverified, unverifiable, and so 011.40 It is closely related to elements (19), (20) and (21) discussed above. The motives alleged to be behind such acceptance in the absence of evidence vary from material interests to psychological disparities. These definitions often have similarities to Freud’s conception of wish-f~lfilrnent.4~

In so far as the criterion used is that of unverifiability, this type of definition fails to discriminate between ideology and other systems of ideas such as science. It could be argued that science rests upon unverifiable assumptions and, in fact, that all systems of ideas contain assumptions which are unverifiable. The problem then becomes one of distinguishing between different kinds of unverifiability, something which no conception of ideology of this kind does. In so far as unverifiability can be taken to mean metaphysical or perhaps meaningless propositions, there seems no reason to restrict the concept of ideology in this way. Such definitions frequently associate ‘ideology’ with ‘faith’ or ‘fanaticism’. They are related, therefore, to those definitions previously discussed which state the manner in which the beliefs are held; for example, those which say ‘ideology’ is a system of ideas held with passion, or closed to argument or evidence. It has been found necessary to reject these criteria.

Turning now to the notion of ideology as a system of ideas and beliefs held without evidence or good reason, there are two kinds of problem involved. First, there is the question of whether this criterion refers to the ideology as a whole, or only to certain parts of it. Secondly, there is the question of whether ‘good reason’ is defined in terms of the observer’s or the actor’s criteria.

If one accepts that ideologies contain both normative as well as factual claims, then the criterion that it is something held without good evidence or reason may be misapplied if i t is intended to refer to a whole body of ideas. Much depends upon what is meant by ‘evidence’ or ‘good reason’, but normative statements are not the kind of statements for which one can adduce evidence in the usual sense of this term. The term ‘good reason’ is vague; so much so that practically any argument in favour of accepting the normative prescriptions of an ideology would probably count as a ‘good reason’. Any attempt by the theorist to distinguish between good and not-so-good reasons is bound to be arbitrary, idiosyncratic and biased towards his or her particular predispositions. This criterion, then, can only be applied to certain statements or propositions contained within an ideology rather than to the body of ideas as a whole. But most systems of ideas contain some statements that are not fully supported by evidence or about which there is disagreement as to the evidence for them. Another difficulty is that many systems of belief are highly selective, and one-sided in their views of reality. While there may be nothing in the ideology itself which is lacking in evidential support, it may be what is not said,

40 Connolly, Political Science and Ideology, pp. 2 and 49; D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London, Macmillan, 1970), p. 19; Sartori, ‘Politics, ideology and belief systems’, p. 403.

41 S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion (London, Hogarth Press, 1962), p. 54.


what is ignored, that is significant, although, as we have seen, this characteristic could not serve to define the concept.

The second and related problem with this definitional criterion, is that it is not clear who is to be the arbiter of ‘good reason’ or ‘evidence’. Is this to be determined by the observer or by those who espouse the ideology? The latter, of course, would argue that they do have evidence or good reason for the beliefs they espouse. If the theorist rejects this claim and imposes his own interpretation of ‘good evidence’ then he is, in effect, defining ideology in terms of a set of beliefs which rest upon false assumptions. Falsehood becomes the real criterion in such definitions and they are consequently open to all the objections previously made. The evidential basis of the beliefs contained in an ideology should, in any case, be an empirical question.

There is one further possible interpretation of this type of definition, namely that an ideology is a set of beliefs held without good reason or evidence even according to the criteria of good reason and evidence of those who espouse the ideology themselves. This is, however, a very restrictive criterion and one which makes it very difficult to demonstrate that a set of beliefs is, in fact, an ideology. This conception of ideology sees it, in effect, as a kind of wish- fulfilment or self-delusion. To show that a system of beliefs is an ideology, one would have to ascertain exactly what its standards and criteria for ‘evidence’ or ‘good reason’ are. This would, in many cases, be very difficult to do; those standards may not be highly coherent or consistent anyway. One would then have to show that the beliefs were in contradiction with these standards and criteria. Even then there may be subsidiary beliefs which can explain apparent contradictions. Again, the belief system may be defended by inventing ad hoc or supplementary beliefs. If this were to occur, does the system of beliefs then cease to be ideological?

23. It Advocates Action or Impels to Action42 24. It Seeks to Promote Social Change, Often of a Radical Kind, and Often

Suddenly, i.e. in a Revolutionary Manne143 25. It Seeks to Prevent Change and to Preserve a Particular Social Orde144

These three elements are closely related; both (24) and (25) imply (23). There seems no good reason for equating ideology with either the advocacy of change or the advocacy of the prevention of change.

42 Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 400; Connolly, Political Science and Ideology; D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, Wiley, 1965), p. 43; C. J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York, McGraw Hill, 1963), p. 89; Geertz, ‘Ideology as a cultural system’, p. 71; Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology, p. 85; Gross, European Ideologies, p. 5 ; Harris, Beliefs and Society, p. 43; Lane, Political Ideology, pp. 14-15; La Palombara, ‘Decline of ideology’, p. 7; Loewenstein, ‘Political systems, ideologies and institutions’; MacPherson, ‘Revolution and ideology’, p. 301; Mullins, ‘On the concept of ideology in Political Science’, p. 506; Scruton, ‘Ideology’, p. 213; Seliger, Ideology and Politics, pp. 119-20; Silverman, ‘Locating the new right’, p. 27.

43 Feuer, Ideology and the Ideologists, pp. 1-4; C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 74; C. J. Friedrich, ‘Ideology in Politics: a theoretical comment’, Slavic Review, 24 (1%5), 612-16; Roucek, ‘A history of the concept of ideology’, p. 279; Shils, ‘The concept and function of ideology’, pp. 67-8. e, Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 85.


The equation of ideology with the advocacy of change has been largely associated with those who have seen ideology as essentially related to radicalism and to totalitarianism and who have looked forward to the end of ideology. But radicalism and the desire for change can quickly become conservatism and the desire to preserve, once power is won and success achieved, without the basic ideas and beliefs being much altered. Similarly, conservatism itself may seek to change things back to what they once were. Seliger makes all these points and argues most convincingly against definitions which associate ideology with either advocacy of change or opposition to it, rather than with b ~ t h . ~ S Seliger is strongly in favour of a definition which places action orientation in a central position. Action orientation thus subsumes elements (24) and (25) .

Action orientation as a definitional criterion is too limiting and restrictive. In equating ideology with systems of ideas which impel to action in the pursuit of some end or goal some systems of ideas would be excluded which should properly be included. This type of definition suffers from too close an identification with political philosophies, ideologies, programmes, and so on, which are only a subset of a wider category. Excluded by such a definition would be those systems of ideas which do not seek to induce any particular behaviour in potential supporters but rather to influence attitudes, perceptions and opinions. Of eourse, one of the most common reasons for seeking to affect attitudes is that by this means behaviour can be affected. Ideas, however, are often aimed not at inducing particular actions in others but rather at preventing this. In other words, the ideas concerned may be intended to simply neutralize potential opposition and interference from others. No action is expected on the part of those to whom the ideas are addressed, only quiescence, acceptance, toleration, neutrality, or perhaps verbal rather than active support and approval. These, of course, might be regarded as also constituting action but if so then the criterion is clearly a redundant one in any case. There is a strong justificatory, or legitimating, dimension to such systems of ideas. In many respects they share a great deal in common with ideas which do impel to action; these also may be fundamentally concerned with legitimating or justifying action of a certain kind.46 It would be misleading to confine the concept of ideology to those beliefs which impel to action, then, and perhaps too restrictive in excluding related systems of belief which do not impel to action. Definitions which include element (27) sometimes link this element with the criterion of action orientation, or imply it. Some of the points raised by this element will be relevant, therefore, to the criterion of action orientation and they will be discussed below.

26. It is a Weapon in the Class Struggle Element (26)47 defines ideology in terms of its main use or function. It is therefore open to all the objections raised against functional definitions. But in many respects it is also very similar to definitions in terms of action orientation.

45 Seliger, Ideology and Politics, pp. 91-6. 46 This function of ideology has been emphasized by Lane, PoliticalIdeology, pp. 14-15, and

47 Callinicos, Althusser’s Marxism, p. 99; MacCarney, The Real World of Ideology, pp. 9-10. Sainsbury, ‘Theoretical perspectives in analysing change and persistence’, pp. 286-9.


This is because it implies that what an ideology is intended to achieve for the class that uses it as a weapon is a degree of influence over the behaviour and actionsof others. For this reason it is open to the objections raised in discussing the action orientation criterion above. It might be interpreted, however, to imply that ideology is intended to influence attitudes, perception, and so on, as well as, or rather than, action or behaviour. It might not, therefore, be restrictive by excluding systems of belief which are concerned primarily with legitimation and justification. It is, however, very restrictive in another way. Why limit the concept to the use of ideas in the class struggle? What about the use of ideas in ethnic, racial, national, and other kinds of struggle? And why limit it to the use of ideas in the pursuance of struggle? This places a rather arbitrary limitation upon the concept,

27. It is Persuasive and Seeks to Argue a Case in Order to Convince This comes very close to capturing that aspect of ideology referred to above in speaking of legitimating and justificatory beliefs and ideas.48 A definition, it was argued, should not exclude such belief systems. In addition, it will be argued that this is characteristic of ideology and may be used as a central definitional criterion of the concept. However, the form of words usually used, for example, that it is persuasive, narrowly misses the target and remains somewhat too restrictive.

It is this characteristic of ideologies that has often been behind the tendency to define the concept as action orientated, and reflective of interests. As Mann- heim put it, men think with some groups against others. These particular formulations have been rejected, but what underlies them might be retained if it captures their essence without being unduly restrictive. This essence, though, is not so much that ideologies seek to persuade, although they often, and perhaps usually, do, but rather that they make claims, present an argument, state reasons, for or against some plan, programme, behaviour, action, conduct, value, attitude, preference, view, and so on. In making such claims they may not necessarily be particularly concerned about whether they manage to convince others, or persuade them to accept their arguments, although again they usually are. What matters is that the claims are stated. They may be concerned with simply declaring the legitimacy, justice, rationality, admirability, worthiness, validity, meaningfulness, rightness, morality, and so on, of a way of life, pattern of conduct, or programme of action. In other words, they may be intended as much, or even more, for the consumption of those who espouse them as they are intended to persuade others. They may be forms of self-legitimation on the part of those who espouse them; ways in which groups reassure themselves about their own way of life, conduct, predicament and so on. In this they resemble, and probably include, those systems of belief which Max Weber called t h e ~ d i c i e s . ~ ~ Whether they suffer good or bad fortune in life, men need to know that they have a right to their good fortune, or to

48 Lane, Political Ideology, p. 14; Gouldner, The Dialectic ofldeology and Technology, p. 85;

49 M. Weber, ‘The social psychology of the world religions’, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills Plamenatz, Ideology, pp. 73-4.

(eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London, Routledge, 1979). p. 271.


know that their ill-fortune will be recompensed and that they will receive their just rewards in the fullness of time, in this existence, or in the hereafter. It is all too often assumed that allegedly dominant ideologies and value systems are primarily devices for the preservation of the privileged position of those who disseminate them and the manipulation of those who would otherwise seek social change deleterious to the interests of the dominant class, elite, group, or whatever. An awareness of the possibility that an ideology is not simply a device for persuasion, control of perceptions, values and beliefs, but also a form of self-justification allows us to consider the possibility that the ‘dominant’ ideology is primarily for the consumption of the dominant class or group. It may serve to integrate and to secure the coherence of the dominant class.50 One might generalize this point to a wider range of ideological positions or at least certain variants or interpretations of the major ideologies of the contemporary world. Even the ideologies associated with subordinate classes and groups, for example, socialism (in certain of its variants), may be as much an expression of feelings and a theodicy in Weber’s sense, as it is a programme of action or a serious attempt to convince and convert. This might be true, for example, of certain forms of middle class socialism. While we must be very wary of the more extreme reductionist sociological interpretations of social movements, moral crusades, and so on, some do often make an important point; the ideologies of such movements may be as much ‘symbolic’ or ‘expressive’ as practical poiitics. And whatever it is they seek to symbolize and to express, it may well be addressed as much to themselves as to the rest of the society; it is an affirmation of their own worth.5’ In this aspect, ideology is very close to rhetoric, on certain definitions. I t is an inducement to attitude as well as to action.

Element (27), then, should be retained in the form of one of its variants, namely, that ideology argues a case for or against something. In saying that i t argues for or against something, recognition is given to the fact that making claims and proposing arguments implies combatting rival claims and counter- arguments.

A Definition of the Concept of Ideology I have argued, then, that there are good reasons for retaining, at least in certain of their variants, elements ( l ) , (3), a synthesis of (4) and ( 5 ) , (9), (lo), (13) and (27). It remains to build these into a definition. The following is proposed:

50 This point has been made by N. Abercrombie and B. S. Turner, ‘The dominant ideology thesis’, British Journal of Sociology, 29 (1978), 149-70, and N. Abercrombie, S. Hill and B. S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1980).

51 Among themany studies of movements of this kind, and which adopt this type of analysis, the following are perhaps the most interesting examples. J . Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement (Urbana, University of lllinois Press, 1963); L. A. Zurcher and R. G. Kirkpatrick, Citizens for Decency: Anti-Pornography Crusades as Status Protest (Austin and London, University of Texas Press, 1976). Manning’s discussion of the nature of ideology captures something of this. D. J . Manning, The Form of Ideology (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1980). But in claiming that ideology, in being imaginative language, is essentially not about the real world he makes a common weakeness of ideological arguments, namely, their use of linguistic devices and rhetorical tricks, something which might be found in all discourse, the essence of the phenomenon, and thereby fails to distinguish i t as a distinct type of discourse.


An ideology is a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain.

This definition is coherent and sufficiently broad, yet sufficiently circum- scribed, to meet the requirements of empirical application and research. It indicates the kind of ideas and beliefs that comprise ideologies rather than making claims about their causes, functions, or anything else that may or may not be empirically true about such ideas and beliefs.

the elements of the concept of ideology

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