THE EFFECTS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE CONTROL, PARTY CHANGE, AND

LEADERSHIP CHANGE ON STANDING COMMITTEES WITH A SPECIAL

EMPHASIS ON THE CASE OF NORTH CAROLINA

David Prince

Department of Political Science/Criminal Justice

Appalachian State University

Prepared for Presentation at the North Carolina Political Science Association meeting at

UNC-Pembroke, Lumberton, North Carolina

March 21-22, 1997

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The 1994 elections served to change, in many respects, the way we think about politics.

For the first time in forty years the Republicans were able to gain control of the House of

Representatives. Many interesting questions have arisen as the result of the change in the

balance of power. There are several goals of this section. The first goal is to give a brief history

of the committee system. It is extremely important that we understand how the committee

system has evolved in order to enable us to better understand how current reforms affect the

committee systems and what are some possible explanations behind the reforms. The second goal

is to briefly review the reforms that the Republicans implemented at the national level which

affected the committee structure in Congress. Finally, this first section will review what previous

researchers have found concerning committees at both the national and state levels. Through,

this review of the literature a foundation will be laid to examine the effects of party control, party

change and leadership change on standing committees.

History of the Committee System

Congress is an extremely complex organization with many different integral parts.

Committees have long been a key component in the functioning of Congress. The founding

fathers gave Congress tremendous latitude in organizing itself (Shepsle 1988). From early in the

history of the country lawmakers have been torn between establishing a system which would lend

itself to effective lawmaking and one in which too much power was concentrated in the hands of

only a few members. Many members, especially in early Congresses, were not willing to

delegate power to the leadership or to small groups of members (Shepsle 1988).

The importance of the committee system has changed over the years. In the early years of

Congress members were still aware of the way in which the British House of Commons operated

and they were careful to implement a system in which help to maintain equality of legislators and

would not lead to a system in which an elite few made the decisions (Smith and Deering 1990).

The early Congresses did not need an elaborate committee system that would become necessary

later on when the workload of members increased. In early Congresses there was a reliance on

the House and Senate chambers and ad hoc or select committees to consider legislative

proposals. In many instances the broad outline of a bill was determined in the committee of the

whole, which is the full body of the legislature, and then the bill was referred to an ad hoc or

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select committee to help establish the details. The committee of the whole acts as a committee,

in effect, but consists of all the members of the House or the Senate (Shepsle 1988). The

appointment of so many ad hoc committees took up valuable time that could have been spent

doing other tasks.

As the United States progressed from the early days of a new Republic more and more

issues began to face the country. With an increase in the number of issues facing the United

States the work load for members of Congress increased dramatically. With so many new issues

facing members of Congress it was nearly impossible for every member to be knowledgeable

about every subject. As a result of this increased workload the House acted first in the creation

of permanent committees. The first Congress created a standing Committee on Enrolled Bills in

1789, but it was 1794 before additional committees were created. In 1794 the Committee on

Elections and the Committee on Claims were created. This was followed by the creation of the

Committee on the Revision of the Laws and the Committee on Commerce and Manufactures in

1794. By 1810, the House of Representatives had created 10 standing committees. During the

administration of President James Monroe the committee system expanded considerably. There

was an increase in the reliance on Standing committees between the War of 1812 and the Civil

War (Smith and Deering 1990).

These standing committees differed from the select committees in several ways. First,

they were permanent structures. Second, they had a defined jurisdiction. Third, their

membership was not restricted to just a single bill and they lasted beyond the consideration of

any single bill. Third, standing committees were able to originate legislation. Forth, they were

not required to report legislation out of the committee. “In effect, they possessed both agenda and

veto power” (Shepsle 1988, 465).

The rising numbers of standing committees brought with them a change in the way bills

were handled. In the past, bills were referred to a committee after being looked at by the full

body of the House of Senate. With the increasing numbers of standing committees, bills were

referred to committees first and then referred to the full House after being considered by the

committee. Bundling legislation about similar topics together is a major advantage of a system

in which standing committees are utilized (Hamm and Hedlund, 1994). The advantage of being

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able to group legislation together is an advantage that is lost in a system in which ad hoc

committees are formed to deal with each legislative matter.

The existence of a system of permanent standing committees also provides for the

establishment of expertise on a particular area. Many members stay on the same committee

across many sessions and this allows them to build up an expertise in a particular area. With so

many more complex issues to be considered, it is impossible for one member to be an expert in

every matter that comes before the legislature. When members are allowed to build up an

expertise in a certain area they become a resource for information of other members about how to

vote on a certain issue. If you are a member voting on a piece of legislation you are able to make

a more informed vote through gaining information from someone who has become an expert

about a subject and is knowledgeable through his experience serving on a committee for multiple

legislative sessions.

During the later part of the 19th century committees acquired much of their present day

authority and power (Smith and Deering 1990). Committees became major policy-making

bodies and helped to set the agenda for the Congress. Committees were no longer just used to

figure out the technical aspects of legislation. Committees, in many cases, were given authority

to legislate exclusively in certain areas. Committees also begin to gain the power of killing

legislation before it ever reached the floor of the House of Representatives. By the turn of the

century committees had gained a great deal of autonomy from the chamber itself. The

committees also had a great deal of independence from the political parties. Much of the real

power rested with the chairmen of the committee who exercised tremendous control over the

committee’s business (Smith and Deering 1990).

At the turn of the century the committee system had increased at such a rate that it

became extremely difficult to facilitate coordinated policy-making. In many cases several

committees had jurisdiction over the same piece of legislation. In 1913 the number of Standing

committees peaked at 61 in the House and 74 in the Senate. Many of these committees had not

held meetings for many years or reported a bill. The 20th century has brought about a

retrenchment of the committee system. Many committees have been eliminated in the 20th

century.

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Committees have also been part of the structure of American state legislatures for many

years. Committees have been a feature of American legislative bodies since their use in colonial

assemblies (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). A core of committees has existed in most state

legislative chambers over numerous two-year sessions. “Basic state-policy responsibilities have

been represented by some type of committee for decades” (Hamm and Hedlund 1994, 673).

Committees that have been seen in some form or the other over the decades include committees

that deal with financial issues. Examples of committees that have been established to deal with

financial issues include, appropriations, revenue, ways and means. Additionally, committees

have been established to deal with education, business or commerce, and local government.

Over the years the names of committees dealing with the specific areas above have changed, but

their presence in most state legislatures has not changed for many decades (Hamm and Hedlund

1994). The number and types of committees are continuously changing due to new concerns of

the state. In some cases committees are created to deal with legislation in a particular session of

the legislature and in other cases the jurisdiction of existing committees are expanded to deal

with the new concerns and issues. Hamm and Hedlund (1994, 669) summarize how the

development of the committee system has helped the country adapt to changing times:

Utilization of these devices has permitted the collective decision-

making nature of a legislative body to be maintained amid the

transformation from a slow-paced, relatively unified eighteenth

agrarian political society to a fast-paced, diverse urban society of the

twentieth century.

1994 Republican Reform of the Committee System

House Republicans implemented many changes to the committee system. Changes in the

committee system were part of the Republicans “Contract with America” (Davidson and Oleszek

1995). Further, changes by the Republicans have decreased the power of the committees and put

more power into the hands of the leadership. Many of these changes are unlikely to be undone in

the future even if the Democrats regain control of Congress.

One of the first reforms of House Republicans was the elimination of proxy voting in

committee (Davidson and Oleszek 1995). Proxy voting is the process that allows a committee

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chairman or a designee of the chairman to cast votes for members that are not present in

committee. Proxy voting puts a great deal of power in the hands of the committee chairman. A

chairman that has proxies in hand can easily defeat amendments by the minority party. When the

chairman controls the proxies of committee members, minority members are unable to work out

deals with members of the majority and perhaps defeat the position of the committee chairman.

The Republicans had attempted to eliminate proxy voting for committees in the past and

they followed through on the elimination of proxy voting, even though it tends to hurt the

majority party (Davidson and Oleszek 1995). The Republicans have to make sure that all of their

members are present at committee votes or risk losing to a Democrat minority that is present and

votes together. The elimination of proxy voting is an effort at attempting to decrease the power

of committee chairmen, and thus return power to the leadership which selects the members of

the committees. Additionally, the elimination of proxy voting increases the accountability of

members. Members can no longer just avoid going on record about a particular issue by just not

showing up to vote. With the elimination of proxy voting the member has to show up and be

accounted for or risk the loss of the vote to the Democrats.

In addition to the elimination of proxy voting in committees, the Republican’s also

reduced the size of committee staff and the number of standing committees and subcommittees.

The elimination of staff, however, will primarily affect the Democrats, because the Republicans

will have more staff since they are in the majority.

Republicans, in their reform of the committee system, eliminated three standing

committees. The District of Columbia, Post Office, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries

committees were eliminated and their functions were transferred to other standing committees

(Davidson and Oleszek 1995). The Senate eliminated some subcommittees, but did not eliminate

any of its standing committees. This is not the drastic cuts that many members would have liked

to have seen The elimination of these committees, by the House, basically brings the House of

Representatives in line with the Senate. The Senate eliminated its District of Columbia and Post

Office committees in 1977 and has never had a Merchant marine and Fisheries committee. The

jurisdictions of the District of Columbia and the Post Office committees were placed under the

Government Reform and Oversight Committee, while the duties of the Merchant Marine and

Fisheries Committee were placed under the jurisdiction of three other committees.

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The elimination of the standing committees in the House of Representatives has little

political ramifications for the Republicans. The Post Office, District of Columbia and Merchant

Marine and Fisheries committees basically serve Democratic constituencies. The postal and

maritime unions are overwhelming Democratic. The District of Columbia is also

overwhelmingly Democratic, which is evident by their votes in presidential elections.

In addition to the elimination of three committees, the House Republicans also renamed

some of the committees to reflect Republican interest. For example, the Committee on

Education and Labor was renamed the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities

(Davidson and Oleszek 1995). Education and Labor generally tend to reflect Democratic ideas

and constituencies whereas the name of Economic and Educational Opportunities is more in line

with Republican constituencies.

On March 15, 1995 the Republicans approved a 30 percent cut in the funding for

committees in the House of Representatives. The House Republicans also consolidated several

committees’ accounts. The various sources in which committees received funds from were

consolidated into one account. Previously committees had received funds from three sources.

Under House Resolution 107 committees were to draw funds only from one source

(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995).

In addition to the elimination of standing committees and the slashing of committee

budgets the Republicans have also eliminated subcommittees and they have attempted to limit

the number of subcommittees that each standing committee can have. The Republicans limited

each committee to no more than five subcommittees with the exception of the Appropriations,

Government Reform and Oversight and Transportation which were allowed to have more than

five subcommittees (Davidson and Oleszek 1995).

Republicans also cut the size of committees, but they did not go as far as some would

have liked for them to have gone. It is extremely difficult to cut the number of seats on

committees when there are a large number of members wanting seats. This is especially true on

the most prestigious committees. Matters were complicated by the large number of freshman

members who were entering the House in 1994. The leadership can use committee assignments

to reward those members that are loyal to the party position. At a reduced number of seats, it

becomes more difficult to use committee assignment as a reward mechanism.

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The Republicans still, however, as the majority party are able to set the ratio of majority

to minority members on each committee and as the majority party the Republicans have a greater

number of seats than they had in the minority. The Republicans have generally given themselves

55 percent of the seats on each committee, but on the most important committees such as

Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means they have given themselves even a higher

proportion of the seats in order to make sure that they are able to enact their program (Davidson

and Oleszek 1995).

In a further effort to centralize power in the leadership the Republicans have also limited

members to six years as chairman of a committee (Davidson and Oleszek 1995). Limiting the

terms that a member can serve as chair prevents the member from building up his own power

base and influence. The limiting of terms of chairmen should help in breaking down the

decentralized system of power that has been present for many years.

There is also a break down in the seniority system in the 104th Congress. While seniority

is still an important criterion in the selection of committee chairmen and committee assignments

it is not the sole factor in the selection of a chairman. Party loyalty has become an extremely

important factor in the selection of committee chairs. For example, Robert L. Livingston was

chosen as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee despite the fact that Joseph M.

McDade of Pennsylvania, John T. Myers of Indiana, C.W. Bill Young of Florida, and Ralph

Regula of Ohio had more seniority than Livingston (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995).

Thomas Biley Jr. of Virginia was selected as chairman of the Commerce Committee, but Carlos

Moorhead of California and Billy Tauzin of Louisiana had more seniority than Biley.

With the election of a large freshman class to the 104th Congress many of these

individuals do not want to wait for years before they become chairman of a committee. With

term limits placed on committee chairs, freshman will be able to move up the ranks much faster

than would have previously been the case. The second part of this thesis will examine the break

down in seniority that is present at the national level and attempt to determine if the same trend is

present at the state level.

National Level Findings

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Woodrow Wilson was one of the first individuals to address the role of committees in the

American political system. In Congressional Government written by Wilson in 1885, Wilson

wrote about the importance of the committee system. Wilson believed that the real work of

Congress took place in committees. Wilson (1885, 69) wrote: “ ....it is not far from the truth to

say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in committee

rooms is Congress at work.”

Wilson, in Congressional Government, argued that the Speaker of the House does not

have a whole lot of power beyond the appointment of the committees. He believed that the

committees are where power is really located in the Congress. The work of the house is done by

the committees and not by the speaker and the leadership.

Wilson (1885, 58) writes “ The leaders of the House are the chairmen of the principle

Standing Committees.” He continues by writing that there are many different leaders in the

House of Representatives:

The House has as many leaders as there are subjects of

legislation; for there are leading classes of legislation, and

in the consideration of every topic of business the House

is guided by a special leader in the person of the chairman

of the Standing Committee, charged with the superentendence

of measures of the particular class to which that topic belongs

(Wilson 1885, 58-59).

Wilson sees the organization of the House as being extremely complex and therefore it is

extremely difficult for uninformed observers to understand how the system works. Many

outsiders would probably see the House of Representatives as being an institution in which little

order exists and things tend to be done in a haphazard manner.

Wilson also addresses the difficulty that a new member has with adapting to the way that

things work in Congress. A new member does not have the experience which is crucial for

success in the House of Representatives and the committee system within the House of

Representatives. Wilson (1885) writes about committee government and the necessity in

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learning the powers and the procedures of the Standing Committees. If a member does not learn

the powers of the committee it will be extremely difficult to get anything accomplished.

Wilson (1885, 63) also examines the problem of jurisdiction of the committees. There

are many bills that affect several different areas and therefore which committee to refer the bill to

becomes as important question. He sees the Committee of Ways and Means and the Committee

on Appropriations as being the most important. The subjects that these committees cover always

receive prompt attention in the House while other matters may not receive prompt attention.

Wilson also states that reports from the Committees on Printing and Elections always receive

immediate attention. It is very difficult for the other committees to get their measures to the floor

for consideration (Wilson 1885, 65).

Wilson was writing at a time when committee hearings were not open to the public as

they are today. In modern American citizens can see the work of committees on television or can

attend their meetings in person. In many ways members at work in committees in modern

American are on public display. Many members are very aware that everything that they say or

do is being televised. In many cases what takes place in committees is for a television audience

and not really aimed at trying to move legislation out of committee to the floor.

Other scholars have built upon the early work of Wilson by examining the committee

system from a different perspective than the one taken by Wilson. Studies have tended to offer a

more in-depth analysis of the functioning of the committee system in the American political

system. Richard Fenno (1973) did a comparison of six committees, in which he looked at the

Appropriations, Ways and Means, Interior, Post Office, Education and Labor, and Foreign

Affairs. He argued that the decision making process of committees differs because “ member

goals, environmental constraints, and, hence, strategic premises, differ” (Fenno 1973, 280).

Fenno (1973) identified three basic members goals. First, members desire to be reelected.

Second, they desire to gain influence within the House. Third, they desire to establish good

public policy. Fenno also looked at a members goal of having a career beyond the House, but

this was not an issue in which he put his biggest influence on. Additionally, he identified the

goal of members to make private gains, but this was an issue which was not addressed in the

book.

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Fenno (1973) identified four basic environmental constraints on members on congress.

Members of the parent House, members of the executive branch, members of clientele groups,

and members of the two major political parties where seen as environmental constraints placed

upon members of Congress. All of these factors play a role in affecting how members of

Congress behave in carrying out their legislative duties. Environmental constraints, however,

affect different committees in different ways.

Additionally, Fenno (1973, 46) addresses questions that must be addressed by each

committee member in the decision making process:

Are there, in each committee, any agreed prescriptions for

decision making - particular any substantive decision rules -

which might help us as we move to view the committee less

as an aggregate of individuals and more as a working group?

Each member of each committee faces this strategic problem:

how shall I proceed in the committee to achieve my personal

goals, given the environmental context in which my committee

operates?

In contrast with Fenno’s work, which looked at committee members goals from a more

general perspective, Reeves (1993) offered a more focused study in which he examined the

leadership style of three committee chairs. He looked at three committee chairman of the

committee on Education and Labor -- Graham Barden, Adam Clayton Powell Jr. and Carl

Perkins. Graham Barden, a conservative Democrat from North Carolina, became chair of the

committee in the early 1950s. During the 1950s when Barden served as chairman the rules

allowed for him to act in an autocratic manner in ruling his committee (Reeves 1993, 74). He

focused primarily on stopping legislation instead of using his power as chairman to support a

positive agenda. In the 1950’s institutional resources were more important to a chairman being

successful than the personal qualities of the chairman . The late 1950s saw the removal of some

of the institutional power of the chairman and led to an increasing importance of personal factors

in order for the chair to be successful (Reeves 1993).

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Adam Clayton Powell Jr., was the second chairman that was examined by Reeves.

Powell, a Democrat from New York, held the chairmanship of the Committee on Education and

Labor during a period in which there was a high number of social reforms occurring. He became

chairman in the early 1960’ s and he ruled his committee in a manner different from what was

seen during Barden’ s tenure as chair. Powell became chair in 1961 at the beginning of the

Kennedy administration (Reeves 1993). Kennedy and Powell had many of the same political

beliefs; therefore, he was able to exercise great influence in his assistance in helping to pass

Kennedy’ s proposals. Powell, in contrast to Barden, was more interested in passing legislation

than he was in stopping legislation. He was seen as being a “ good chairman” by most of the

members of his committees (Reeves 1993). In his reign over the Education and Labor

committee he used both institutional prerogatives as well as personal factors to exercise control

over his committee. Powell, as chairman was, much more willing to let subcommittees carry out

their work without being dictated from the chair. Additionally, he was willing to let others do

the work while he received the “ perquisites of the office (symbolic and material), and generally

let others run the legislative show” (Reeves 1993, 138).

Carl Dewey Perkins, a Democrat from Kentucky, became chairman of the Committee on

Education and Labor in 1967 (Reeves 1993). He did not face many of the issues that previous

chairmen had faced because many crucial questions had been decided during the chairmanship of

Adam Clayton Powell. Perkins, however, did face new challenges that previous chairmen had

not faced. Many of the institutional resources that chairmen had previously possessed had been

curtailed and this led to new challenges for him as committee chair. He had to mostly rely on his

personal resources in order to be successful as committee chair. “ Perkins found rewards a better

strategy than sanctions in eliciting support from his members. He chose to make resources

available to members of the committee and to keep his members apprised of what was going on

in the areas under their jurisdiction” (Reeves 1993, 210).

Reeves (1993) stated that the prevailing view of institutional leadership is that the

leadership has little influence on the organizations that they head and that organizations tend to

be shaped by their environments instead of their leaders. After examining the leadership of

Barden, Powell, and Perkins Reeves concluded that the traditionally held view that committees

were shaped by their environment and not their leaders proved to be inaccurate. The chairmen

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looked at by Reeves each conducted the business of the committee in a markedly different

manner, and as the result of their different leadership styles, contributed to a different manner in

which the committees operated.

Whereas, Reeves (1993) examined the leadership styles of committee chairs Melissa P.

Collie and Brian E. Roberts (1992) asked why members of Congress choose to chair the

committees that they do in the first place. Their analysis examines senators that have been in the

position to chair two or more committees during the period from 1950 to 1986. Collie and

Roberts (1992) found that the decision as to which committee to chair has been associated with

more than one-third of the committee chair vacancies that arose during the last quarter of a

century. One factor that goes into the decision making process is the relative prestige of the

committees. Another decision making factor is the effect that the next person in line for the

committee chairmanship would have on the policy objectives of the member who is deciding

which committee that he should chair. “ In general, senators opted for the chair of the more

prestigious committee and opted to chair the committee where the policy interest of the heir

apparent were the more threatening” (Collie and Roberts 1992, 242).

Collie and Roberts (1992) identified prestige as one of the factors in selecting which

committee to chair. Michael C. Munger (1988) looked at the allocation of desirable committee

assignments to all members. Just as some committees were seen as being more desirable to chair

some committee assignments are seen as being more valuable than other committee assignments

by all committee members. Munger (1988) addresses two institutions that have evolved to serve

in the function of determining how committee assignments are rationed out. Queuing and

committee expansion are two ways in which to ration committee assignments. Each committee

assignment may be thought of as a queue where the number of years of continuous service on a

committee determines the place in the queue. This queue not only takes into account those

members that are already on the committee, but those who wish to serve on the committee in the

future as well. Under this type of system the leadership promises one member the next opening

on a committee and another member the opening that occurs after that. This type of system

assumes that the number of seats on a committee does not change. The leadership can, however,

expand the number of committee seats if the demand for seats on a particular committee

increases. The alternative to queuing is the expansion of committee size, however, the expansion

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of committee size may make committees less attractive to members, but this is a factor that has

been largely ignored.

James W. Endersby and Karen McCurdy (1996) had results which were similar to

Munger (1988) in which he found that some committee assignments are more desirable than

others. Endersby and McCurdy (1996) looked at committee assignments in the U.S. Senate.

They attempted to measure the relative value of committee seats. They assume that members

who change committees from one legislative session to the next are doing so in the effort to

improve their own political and electoral position. In their analysis Endersby and McCurdy use

two different models in the effort to measure Senate committee prestige. They conclude that

models that were established in the effort to measure committee prestige in the House of

Representatives can be used to effectively measure committee prestige in other legislative bodies

as well. Senators, like members in other bodies, have common preferences when it comes to

committee assignments.

Reeves (1993), Fenno (1973), Collie and Roberts (1992), Munger (1988), and Endersby

and McCurdy (1996) approached their studies of committee systems from a more internal

perspective of what goals committee members and chairman wished to obtain and how they go

about obtaining these goals. Randal Strahan (1990), in contrast, focused on the context in which

a committee operates, thus taking a more external approach in examining the committee system .

He examined the Ways and Means Committee in the period since the congressional reforms that

occurred in the 1970s. The Ways and Means Committee has differed in significant ways since

the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s the Ways and Means committee was a integral part of a

House which was largely decentralized. In the 1970s and 1980s, one has to give more attention

to the parent institution and to the social and political environment in which the committee

operates (Strahan 1990). This was in contrast to the findings of Reeves who concluded that

environmental concerns were not as important as many had perceived them to be. One of the

most important reforms that occurred in the 1970s was the election of committee chairs through

the party caucus rather than the chair being based totally on seniority (Strahan 1990).

Additionally, the 1970s brought about increases in the size of the Ways and Means committee.

Bruce Ray and Steven Smith (1984) also looked at the size of committees in the U.S.

Congress. Strahan (1990) findings of increases in the size of the Ways and Means committee

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were consistent with the findings of Ray and Smith (1984) . They found that there was an

increase in the number of committees seats across all committees. From 1947 to 1982, the

number of standing committees in the U.S. Congress increased by three in the House and by one

in the Senate. However, even though there was not great change in the number of committees,

there was a great increase in the number of committee seats in congress. Ray and Smith argued

that change in the number of committee seats are the result of changing political conditions rather

than the effort to gain support from rank and file members.

State Level Findings

In contrast with the national level, little research has been conducted on the committee

system at the state level. Rosenthal (1974, 7) wrote: “ When it comes to standing committees,

congressional research is considerably ahead while state legislative research lags far behind.”

He wrote that any study concerning standing committees must basically begin from scratch.

“ Little presently exists from which to generalize or on which to base conclusions” (Rosenthal

1974, 7-8).

C. I. Winslow (1931) produced one of the few early works on standing committees in

state legislatures that covered the subject with any depth. Winslow, in his study provides

statistical data on the structure of standing committees for every state. Included as part of his

study he provides information about the number of committees, the size of committees and the

number of committee assignments. In addition to his statistical information he conducted a study

of Maryland and Pennsylvania in which he found that the committees action on a piece in final

in 80 percent of the cases.

Rosenthal’ s (1974) work was one the few in-depth works conducted on committees in

state legislatures since Winslow’ s 1931 work which provided some of the basic statistical

information on committees. Rosenthal (1974) examined various aspects of committee

performance in several states, but not a whole lot of other in-depth analysis of state committee

systems has been undertaken. In the intervening years since Rosenthal’ s book some progress has

been made concerning committee systems at the state level, but there is still much to be learned.

Political scientist have long been concerned about where the important decisions

concerning legislation are made. A study of the U.S. legislative process reveals that there are

15

many different points of decision making for legislation. Each of the different decision making

points for legislation can have a profound impact on the outcome of legislation (Hamm and

Hedlund 1994). Subcommittees, legislative leaders, the governor, administrative agencies, floor

debate, interest groups, constituents, and committees are factors that play an important role in the

legislative decision making process (Hamm and Hedlund 1994).

Various scholars have conducted research which looks the various aspects of the

committee system decision making process. Hamm (1980, 49) wrote: “ The legislative

committee decision making process tends to screen out a substantial number of bills that have

extralegislative opposition; in turn this may reduce opposition once bills reach the floor.” Hamm

(1980) concluded that if there is strong extralegislative opposition to a bill the chances of the bill

passing the committee stage is greatly reduced. If there is no opposition to a bill at the

committee hearing the chances of the bill passing are greatly enhanced.

Standing committees were formed for the purpose of dealing with matters that are related

to the name of the committee (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). They were instituted to help make the

decision making process more efficient. A problem that has risen with standing committees is

the question of jurisdiction. In many cases there is overlapping jurisdiction for a piece of

legislation and the decision on which committee it should be sent to is of key importance to the

success of the legislation in many cases.

The system of standing committees, that has been put into place, has allowed for

legislatures to specialize in a particular area. Most researchers tend to make the assumption that

committees make a difference in the policy making process. Much of the impact of committees

on the decision making process is seen as being the result of specialization of committees and

subcommittees (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). Committees have been put in place in a large extent

to deal with the increasing range of policy concerns. A question that is put forth by Hamm and

Hedlund (1994) is if changes in the number of committees leads to an increase or decrease in

specialization. Some scholars have argued that reductions in the numbers of standing

committees has actually led to an increase in specialization instead of the decrease in

specialization in which one would expect (Hamm and Hedlund 1994).

Basehart (1980) also dealt with the issue of specialization and members establishing

expertise on a particular area. He examined the relationship between membership stability and

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the extent to which committees have chairmen and members who have experience dealing with a

particular issue because of continuous service on the committee. He also found that many

committees at the state level lack stability. In many cases the membership and chairman of

committees are continuously changing and thus making committees less effective. Basehart

(1980, 66) concluded that “ With the exception of one indicator- the percent of chairman who

were serving at least their second legislative term- membership stability is closely associated

with the other indicators experience and continuity.”

In 1917, the average number of standing committees in state senates was slightly greater

than 31 and the range was from five in Wisconsin to sixty-two in Michigan. In the lower house

of state legislatures the average number of committees was around forty, with a range from

fourteen in Rhode Island to sixty-five in Kentucky (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). In the next

several decades there was not a lot of change in the number of standing committees. During the

period from 1949 to 1969, significant decreases in the number of committees in both the lower

and upper houses occurred. In 1969, the average number of committees dropped to slightly

below 20 in upper houses while the number dropped to below 23 in lower houses of state

legislatures (Hamm and Hedlund 1994).

The decreasing number of committees has generally weakened committees in state

legislatures. There are various factors which help account for the weakening the committee

system at the state level. Committee assignments at the state level tend to be controlled by the

party leadership. Therefore, the committees are tools of the leadership and they don’ t have a lot

of autonomy. Additionally, in some states legislatures rules exist which allow bills to come to

the floor without being considered by committee.

Wayne Francis (1989) conducted a study that examined the importance of committees in

state legislatures and he found that committees tend to be weaker in some states than they are in

other states. In his study he looked at whether power resided with the committees or if power

was retained by party leaders. In a survey conducted by Francis (1989 , 41) the following

question was asked of legislators: “ In your legislature where would you say the most significant

decisions are made?” Legislators were given the following possible responses:

1. Office of Presiding Officers or Majority Leaders

2. Regular Committee Meetings

17

3. Party Caucus

4. In Governor’ s Office

5. On the Floor

6. In Policy Committee

7. In Subcommittees

8. Pre-legislative Session

9. Other

Francis (1989) found that committees were important in eighty-one of the ninety-nine chambers.

In fifteen chambers committees were the only decision making bodies within the legislature. In

twenty-nine chambers committees shared power with party leaders. Additionally, in sixteen

chambers committees shared power with the party caucus and in twenty- one chambers power

was shared among committees, party leaders, and the party caucus.

Francis (1989) found results which were consistent with what he and Riddlesperger

(1982) had found earlier. Francis and Riddlesperger (1982) attempted to look at the importance

of committees in the states. They saw the committee system as increasing in importance at the

time they were writing. Committees are the primary way in which legislatures respond to the

increasing number of needs of the states (Francis and Riddlesperger 1982). “ State legislatures

have become the principle centers of decision making” (Francis and Riddlesperger 1982, 469).

The committee system, however may be declining in importance. In many cases the leadership is

becoming more and more important in the decision making process. This is especially true at the

national level. As Smith and Deering (1990) have noted there tends to be a decreasing

importance of the committee system at the national level. This is a trend which is also seems to

be appearing at the state level as well.

Wayne Francis (1985, 243) wrote: “ The role of elected party leadership, the caucuses, and

the committees in the management of legislative business varies considerably among state

legislative chambers in the United States, depending in part upon the majority party’ s percentage

of seats and in part upon the size of the chamber.” Francis (1985) concludes by stating that

legislative leaders have many important decisions to make which affect management of

legislative business. Among the most important decisions made by the leadership is the way in

which committee positions are filled. In most cases the leadership attempts to accommodate the

18

requests of the members when assigning positions (Francis, 1985). This approach to assigning

committee positions enables the leadership to gain some influence over members who owe their

position to the leadership. In most cases the leadership has great flexibility in determining the

size of the committee, thus the leadership is able to increase or decrease the number of seats on a

committee based on demand. The style of the leadership management is partly a function of the

features of the chamber and of the party structure (Francis 1989). In many cases a lack of party

competition in a chamber leads to a lack of party control. Wayne Francis (1989) addresses the

question of determining an optimal size for a committee. Francis (1989, 114-115) found that size

is based on two criteria:

the optimality estimate in large chambers is about eleven,

whereas it is closer to seven in smaller chambers.... In

large chambers that experience high subcommittee use

the optimal committee size estimate moves upward to

between twelve and thirteen-as opposed to approximately

nine where there is low subcommittee use. In small chambers

(80 or less), however, the use of subcommittees seems to

make very little difference in response patterns.

Francis (1989) concluded that the leadership in state legislatures tend to have a great deal

of leeway in determining the number of seats that a committee has. Additionally, Francis (1985)

determined that the leadership tends to be responsive to members wishes in the assignment

process. Hedlund and Patterson (1992) also looked at the committee assignment process at the

state level. They tested the reelection hypothesis which is that legislators receive committee

assignments which help them to win their next election and found that the effects of electoral

margins on committee assignments was not significant. Hedlund and Patterson (1992) also

found that legislatures make strategic decision in the requesting of committee assignments.

Legislatures tend to take in to account the number of committees requested and the demand level

for these committees (Hedlund and Patterson, 1992). Hamm and Hedlund (1990) attempt to

account for the change in the number of state legislative committee positions. In their research

they attempted to account for these changes through the development of five models. They

19

found that the number of committees, the jurisdiction, and the number of positions on the

committee tend to be altered by legislative leaders from session to session.

Hamm and Moncrief (1982), prior to Hamm and Hedlund (1990) which looked at the

alteration in the number of committees from session to session, examined the effects that

changes in committees have on subsequent committee performance. They found that changes in

committee structure had the most noticeable affect on those activities that the committees could

most easily control such as the screening and shaping of legislation. Additionally, the

magnitude of the performance change is a direct product of the combined effects of the structural

changes.

Previous research had looked at the role that the leadership and committees play in the

decision making process of state legislature, but little attention had been paid to the role of

parties in that process. Hedlund and Hamm (1996) looked at the roles that political parties play in

the organization of state legislative committees. They found that in most of the state legislative

chambers that no written rule existed which required the strict use of seniority in the selection of

committee members, thereby decreasing the powers of the political parties. Many party leaders

suggested that while seniority may play a role in the selection process of committee members is

not a constraining factor in the selection process of committee members. Additionally, the

minority party tends to exercise control over the appointment of its members in about one-half of

the cases. Five percent of the committees were found to be chaired by members of the minority

party. The proportion of the seats that each party held on each of the committees was generally

found to be in close approximation to the percent of seats that the party held in the chamber.

The professionalism of a legislature affects the number of committees that are present in a

state legislature. The effects of professionalism will be controlled for in this study. In most

cases the more professional a legislative body is the greater the number of committees that that

body will have. Squire (1992) looked at professionalism in state legislatures. He establishes a

measure of professionalism in which he uses the United States Congress as a baseline to relate

the attributes that are present in other legislative bodies. Squire (1992) collected data from 1986

to 1988 on member pay, staff members per legislator, and total days in session for Congress and

each of the fifty state legislatures. These indicators are consistent with those found by other

scholars including Mooney (1995).

20

In Squire’ s study the measure indicates how close the body approximates characteristics

of Congress. If a state legislative body has a level of professionalism of 1 then the body has all

of the same characteristics that are present in Congress. If the body has a professionalism level

of 0 then the legislative body is nothing like Congress. Squire (1992, 74) found that New York

had a professionalism level of .659 while New Hampshire had a professionalism level of .042.

Therefore, the New York legislature most closely resembles Congress while the New Hampshire

state legislature possesses characteristics that are least like Congress. The professionalism of a

state legislature is likely to have a profound effect on the number of committees in a state

legislature. The more professional a legislature the more days in session they are and the greater

the work load and therefore, professional legislature are more likely to have greater numbers of

committees.

As shown in the previous section most of the literature has tended to focus on the

decision making process in state legislatures. Research has tended to focus on who makes the

decisions in state legislatures. Does the leadership tend to make most of the important decisions

or do the committees have a larger role in the process. Little research has been conducted which

looks at the affects of party control and change in control on the committee. Additionally, little

research has been conducted which examines the affects of a leadership change on the number of

committees. Hopefully, this paper will bridge these gaps and offer insight to what future

research needs to be undertaken.

Change In The Number of Standing Committees: Four Hypotheses

The section will identify the hypotheses which will be tested in this study. As shown in

the literature section research has been conducted which has looked at the committee assignment

process, the effects of committee decisions, the centrality of committees to various state

legislatures, committee size and so on. However, little research has been conducted that looks at

why the number of committees has tended to decrease in recent years and the effects of changes

in leadership on standing committees. This research will hopefully add to our knowledge of state

legislative committees by addressing two phenomena which have previously not been looked at.

Additionally, this study will hopefully suggest possible areas for future studies on state

committees.

21

When there is a change of control from one party to the other it is logical that the new

party will want to change the committee system to reflect the interest and goals of the new party.

Hypothesis #1: When control of a legislative body changes from one party to another

party, the number of standing committees will change.

This hypothesis is consistent with what we saw in the House of Representatives in 1994 when

there was a change in party control. Through this hypothesis hopefully it will be determined if

the change in the committees at the national level is also present at the state level when party

control changes.

Hypothesis # 2: When control changes from the Democratic party to the Republican

party the number of standing committees will decrease.

This hypotheses is also consistent with what was seen in the House of Representatives in 1994

when the Republicans gained control of the House. House Republicans eliminated three standing

committees. This second hypothesis will also allow us to determine if this is just a national trend

of if this is a phenomena which is also present at the state level.

Hypothesis #3: The longer a party has been out of power the greater the change in the

number of standing committees.

This hypothesis arises from the fact that when a party has been out of power for a long period of

time they have had little if any input on the current organization of the institution, therefore they

are more likely to change the number of committees than in the situation where there are more

competitive parties and power changes hands every few years.

Hypothesis # 4: When there is a change in leadership the number of standing committees

will change.

This hypothesis is derived from the fact that when there is a leadership change in a legislative

body the new leadership wishes to change the system to reflect his or her own interest. This

hypothesis will be used to test if the changes that are occurring are the result of the actions of a

particular political party or if changes in committees are more likely to be a product of the

leadership that control the legislative body.

Independent Variables

Change In Party Control

22

Two different change variables will be used in this study. The first change variable that

will be used is a dummy variables which indicates if there is a change in control from one party

to an other. If there is a change of control from one party to another then the variable will be

coded as a one. If there is no change in party control then the variable will be coded as a zero. A

second change variable, which will be used in separate regression analysis, is a variable which is

coded as a one if there is a change of control from Democratic to Republican and as a minus one

if there is a change in control from Republican to Democrat. If there is no change in party

control then the variable will be coded as a zero. These variables are included in the study to

determine if the changes in the number of committees are a product of a change in control of the

legislative body. In many cases when a new party comes into power they desire to make changes

in the structure of the legislature. A party that has control the legislature in the previous session

is unlikely to make major in the number of committees since they have governed with the system

that is already in place.

Years Out Of Power

The number of years that a party has been out of power could have an effect on the

changes made when that party comes to power. When a party has been out of power for an

extended period of time they may be more likely to implement greater changes than if they had

been out of power for only one term of the legislature. For the purpose of this study, 1950 was

used as the cut off date for determining the variable for the number of years that a party had been

out of power. In many cases, especially in the south, some states had not witnessed a change in

party control since Reconstruction. The use of 1950 provides a long enough time period to see if

the number of years out of power are affecting the number of committees in the system. The

number of years out of power is used instead of the number of legislative terms out of power to

take into account varying length of legislative session that exist among the states.

Control of the State Legislature

A third independent variable which is a part of this study is control of the state legislature.

The variable will be coded as a dummy variable with one representing Republican control and

zero representing Democratic control. Republicans at the national level decreased the number of

23

standing committees upon coming to power. The purpose of this variable is to determine if

Republican control at the state level leads to a decrease in the number of standing committees.

Republicans have traditionally been viewed as the party of less government. Republicans may be

more likely to decrease the number of committees since they tend to see the government as doing

too much.

Leadership Change

A forth independent variable to be included in this study is a change in the leadership of

the legislative body. For lower houses of state legislatures the variable will indicate if there has

been a change in the Speaker of the House from one term to the next term. If there was a change

in the speaker then the variable will be coded as a one. If there is no change in the office of the

speaker then the variable will be coded as a zero.

For upper houses of state legislatures two leadership variables will be included. The first

variable will indicate if there is a change in the President Pro Temp. The second variable will

indicate if there is a change of the majority leader. Two variables are taken into consideration

due to the fact that the real position of power varies from one legislative body to another body.

Additionally, some state have only one of the two positions in their legislative body.

Professionalism

The effects of professionalism will be controlled for in this study. In most cases the more

professional a legislative body is the greater the number of committees that the body will have.

A measurement of professionalism was created for this study. Three factors are used to

determine how professional a legislature is. The length of session, compensation, and staff are

used in establishing the measurement of professionalism for this study. These are factors which

are consistent with Squire (1992) and Mooney (1995).

The measurement of professionalism incorporated into this study is a dynamic

measurement of professionalism which takes into account changing levels of professionalism

from one session to the next. Compensation is the first part of the professionalism

measurement. Compensation is the salary that each member receives plus their per diems for the

24

year. If a legislature meets biannually then the salary is divided into half to reflect what the

member would make for one year.

The final factor included in the professionalism measurement is staff. There are three

categories of staff. First there are personal staff, second there are district staff and finally there

are shared staff. For each type of staff the variable was coded zero if there was none present,

one if there was limited staff and 2 if there were full-time staff present. Shared staff was

weighted half of what personal and district staff were weighted. A professionalized legislature is

more likely to have personal and district staff than they are shared staff therefore they are

counted more heavily than the shared staff. For the final measurement of professionalism

compensation, section length and staff were given equal weight. The rankings were consistent

with what Squire (1992) found in his study.

Two Models of Committee Change

Actual Committee Change Model

For this study two dependent variables are going to be used. The first dependent variable

is a variable that indicates the absolute value of the actual number of committees changed from

one session of the legislature to the next session of the legislature.

Proportional Committee Change Model

The second model to be considered uses a different dependent variable. The second

dependent variable established for this study is a proportional change in the number of

committees. A legislature that did not see any change in the number of committees would be

coded as one hundred percent, while changes in the number of committees would be a number

greater than one hundred percent.

The second model to be considered uses a different dependent variable in the effort to

control for the fact that a one committee change in a system in which there are thirty committees

may not be as significant as a one committee change in a system in which there are only a few

committees to begin with.

Methods

25

The data used in this study was obtained from the Books of the States from 1983 until

1995 and the State Elective Officials and the Legislature from 1993 to 1995. Nebraska was

omitted from this study because they have an unicameral nonpartisan legislature. Additionally,

Connecticut was also omitted from this study because they only have joint committees and Maine

was excluded from the analysis for 1985 and 1987 because they had only joint committees during

those legislative sessions. This study will examine both models of committee change that were

previously mentioned. The first regression analysis to be run will use as the dependent variable

the actual number of committees that changed. The independent variables will be change in

party control, years out of power, control of the state legislature, leadership change and

professionalism. The second regression analysis to be ran will also use the actual change in the

number of committees but will involve the removal of the change in party control variable and

control of the state legislature and replace them with a variable that indicates the direction of

change in of change in party control.

The third regression analysis to be ran for this study will look at the second model of

committee change that uses a proportional increase and reduction in the number of standing

committees as the dependent variable. The second model will include the same independent

variables of change in party control, years out of power, control of the state legislature, leadership

change and professionalism that were included in the first regression analysis. The final

regression analysis to be ran again includes the removal of the change in party control variable

and control of the legislature variables and replaced with a variable that indicates the direction of

change in party control. Each of the four analysis will be ran for all cases over the six session

period and will also be ran for each individual year. Additionally, all regression analysis will be

ran for the upper and lower houses of state legislatures.

From the regression analysis it will be determined what variables had an effect on the

number of committees over the six session period and in each on the legislative session.

Additionally, R square will be reported as an indication of how much of the variation in the

number of committees is being explained by the independent variables in this study.

Results

Actual Committee Change Model

26

The first regression analysis ran for the entire period from 1985 to 1995 using control and

change as two separate variables found that a change in the speaker was significant in lower

houses (see table 1). When there was a change in the leadership of state houses we would expect

on average a .723 committee increase. A change in leadership was also found to be significant

when a directional change variable was incorporated into the study (see table 1). For the same

time period of 1985 to 1995 leadership changes were not found to be significant for upper houses

of state legislatures (see table 1). The regression analysis presented in table 1 offers evidence to

support the forth hypothesis that when the leadership changes the number of committees will

also change. However, this appears to only be the case for lower houses and does not pertain to

upper houses in most cases although for the 1987 term a change in the president pro temp was

significant at the .1 level using separate control and party change variables leading to the

conclusion that when there was a change in the president pro temp we would expect on average a

1.2 committee decrease (see table 3). Additionally, a change in the majority leader was

significant at the .1 level for the 1991 term using separate control and change variables as well as

a directional change variable leading to the conclusion that we could expect on average about a

committee increase when there was a change of the majority leader (see table 5).

For the 1985 to 1995 time period the years that a party was out of power was significant

for upper houses of state legislatures only when a directional change variable was used (see table

1). We would expect on average approximately a .2 committee increase for each year that a

party is out of power. This result is consistent with what was predicted in hypothesis number 3.

The years out of power also proved to be significant for the 1985, and 1991 terms in upper

houses when a directional change variable was used in the study and for 1985 when separate

variables for control and change of control were used in the study (see table 2 and table 5). The

years out of power never proved to be significant for lower houses.

Control of the legislature and change in control of the legislative was not significant for

the period of 1985 to 1995 for either upper or lower houses of state legislature (see table 1).

However, control and change of control did prove to be significant for specific legislative terms

in lower houses. Using a .1 level of significance the directional change variable proved to be

significant for 1985 leading to the conclusion that we would expect on average a 1.6 committee

increase when Republicans gain control of the house (see table 2). For 1995 we would expect

27

on average a 2.2 committee increase when Republicans gain control of the house using a separate

control variable and a 2.1 committee increase using a directional control variable (see table 7).

Professionalism was found to be significant for the period of 1985 to 1995 for lower

houses of state legislatures (see table 1). Professionalism was never found to be significant in

upper houses of state legislatures. The more professional a legislature is the more committees

that legislature is likely to have. Professionalism was also found to be significant for specific

legislative sessions. For 1987 professionalism was found to be significant using both a

directional change variable and separate control and change variables (see table 3). For 1991

professionalism proved to be significant when a directional change variable was used whereas for

1993 professionalism was significant using both a directional change variable and separate

variables to indicate control and change (see table 5 and table 6). No factors were found to be

significant for 1989 for either lower or upper houses (see table 4).

Proportional Change Model

A change is the speaker was also significant using a proportional change of the number of

committees. For the period of 1985 to 1995 we would expect on average a .03 increase in the

number of committees when there is a change in the speaker (see table 8). A change in

leadership never proved to be significant in upper houses.

The years that a party is out of power proved to be significant for the period of 1985 to

1995 when a directional change variable was used. We would expect on average a .0014

increase in committees for every year that a party is out. The years out of power also was

significant for the 1985 term as well as the 1991 term when a directional change variable was

used (see table 9 and table 12).

A change in control proved to be significant for the 1993 and 1995 terms in lower houses.

For 1993 we would expect on average a .373 committee decrease when the Republicans gain

control of the legislature using a directional change variable (see table 13). Additionally, we

would expect on average a .474 decrease in the number of committees when there was a change

in control using separate control and change variables. For 1995 we would expect on average a

.09 increase in the number of committees when Republicans gain control of the state legislature

(see table 14).

28

Professionalism also proved to be significant for lower houses using the proportional

committee change model for the period of 1985 to 1995 (see table 8). As the legislative body

becomes more professional we would expect an increase in the number of committees.

Professionalism also proved to be significant for the 1987 term of the state legislature (see table

10). No factors proved to be significant for 1989 (see table 11).

The Case of North Carolina

The purpose of this section is to examine what happen in North Carolina during the time

period looked at in this paper. North Carolina provides a vary interesting case when looking at

the change in standing committees. The North Carolina state legislature has probably seen more

changes in its committee system than any other state in the country.

When the North Carolina House of Representatives is examined we see results which are

consistent with what was found when all of the states were examined. Liston B. Ramsey held the

speaker’ s position of the House of Representatives from 1981 until 1988. The 1985 and the 1987

terms, which were examined in this study, saw no change in the number of committees in the

House. In 1989 Josephus L. Mavretic became the speaker of the House and we saw a major

change in the number of standing committees.

Many full committees were made subcommittees in 1989. For example, the Aging

committee was made a subcommittee of the Human Resources Committee called Aging,

Medicaid, and Family Service. The Agriculture committee became a subcommittee of a new

committee entitled Basic Resources. The Water and Air Resources, Marine Fisheries, Wildlife

Resources, Natural and Economic Resources, Cultural Resource committees all became

subcommittees of the Basic Resources Committee.

Additionally, prior to the 1989 term, there were twelve different Appropriations

Committees which dealt with Appropriations in different areas. With the reorganization of the

House the various Appropriations Committees were consolidated into one Appropriations

committee with various subcommittees. 1989 saw 58 standing committees consolidated into 13

permanent standing committees.

1991 also saw a change in the speaker of the House when Dan Blue became speaker. The

committee system also saw major change in 1991 with an increase of 10 committees in the

29

House upon the change of leadership. 1991 saw the Agricultural committee become a full

standing committee instead of being a subcommittee of the Basic Resources Committee.

Additionally, 1991 saw the Judiciary committee divided up into Judiciary I, Judiciary II, and

Judiciary III and the Standing Committee on Government divided up into various subcommittees

just to name part of the changes that occurred.

1995 saw the Republican come to power in the House of Representatives. With the

change in party control we naturally saw a change in the Speaker. Harold J. Breaker became the

speaker of the house and like some of his predecessors he implemented changes in the committee

system. Three standing committees were eliminated in the House of Representatives in the 1995

term. The Agriculture and Environment Committees were combined into one committee called

Agriculture, Environment, and Natural Resources. Additionally, the various subcommittees of

the Appropriations Committee were made full standing committees in the 1995 session. The

committees on Children, Youth and Families, and Health and Human Services were combined to

create one committee called Children and Human Resources. The Ethics committee was also

eliminated in 1995 among various other changes that occurred. The findings in North Carolina

for 1995 are consistent with hypothesis 4 that when leadership changes the number of

committees will change and hypothesis 2 that when control changes from the Democratic party to

the Republican party the number of committees will decrease.

Conclusions and Implications

This study has attempted to explain why we see changes in the number of committees

from one session of state legislatures to the subsequent session. The first hypothesis of this study

was that when control of a legislative body changes from one party to another party the number

of standing committees will change. There is little evidence found in this study to support this

hypothesis. There were only two instances to support the first hypothesis. 1985 and 1995 saw

change in control being significant in explaining the change in the number of committees. Other

than these two cases there is very little support the first hypothesis. It is extremely hard to

generalize the findings by just looking at two individual years. There may be other factors which

need to be explored further to explain the change in the number of committees that was present

in 1985 and 1995 .

30

The second hypothesis that this study looked at was when control changes from the

Democratic party to the Republican party the number of standing committees will decrease. This

hypothesis attempted to look at the fact that when the Republicans gained control of the U.S.

House of Representatives in 1994 they eliminated three standing committees. There is no

support in this study to support the second hypothesis. The years in which change proved to be

significant led to the conclusion that the numbers of committees actually increased when

Republicans gained control. In addition, it is extremely difficult to generalize this finding by

only looking at two individual sessions since there is no trend present across the six terms that

were looked at. North Carolina, however, offered support for the second hypothesis. 1995 saw

a decrease in the number of committees when the Republicans gained control, but North

Carolina also saw a change in leadership control which may be more important in explaining the

change in the number of committees that occurred.

The third hypothesis that was looked at in this study was that the longer a party has been

out of power the greater the change in the number of standing committees. There was definite

support for this hypothesis found in the study. However, the years that a party has been out of

power seems to only apply to upper houses of state legislatures. The years that a party has been

out of power proved to be significant using both the actual committee change model and the

proportional committee change model. The years that a party has been out of power was found

to be the main factor in explaining change in committees in upper houses of state legislature. It

was not possible to look at the effects that an extended period of time out of power had on the

North Carolina Senate because there was no change of control during the time period which was

looked at.

The final hypothesis that was looked at in this study was that when there was a change in

leadership the number of standing committees will change. This hypothesis was supported for

lower chambers in this study. When there was a change in the speaker we could expect about a

.7 increase in the number of committees. Generally speakers are in charge of committee

assignments and the organization of the legislature for each term, therefore this may be the most

important factor in explaining change in the number of committees. The case of North Carolina

also supported this hypothesis as was seen in the previous section. Additionally,

professionalism is extremely important in explaining change in the number of committees in

31

lower houses. The more professional a legislature becomes the more likely they are to increase

the number of standing committees.

Many of the years presented in this study saw little turnover in the state legislature,

therefore this may help to explain why many of the results proved to be statistically insignificant.

Additional research needs to be undertaken which looks at a larger range of legislative sessions.

Special attention needs to be paid to periods of American history in which there has been a large

turnover in party control. An examination of the Watergate era in which Democrats won in mass

numbers may help to more clearly determine if committee decrease is a product of a change in

the control of the legislature or if it is a product of Republican control. Additionally, other

factors need to be considered in future research. Only a small percentage of the change in the

number of committees was being explained by the independent variables in this study. Through

a better understanding of change in the committee system we will be in a better position to

understand the legislative process and the legislation that is a product of that process.

32

TABLE 1 Actual Committee Change Model of Numbers of Standing Committees, 1985-95

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept -.254 Party Control .0036 .001 .010 .992 Years Out of Power .0040 .023 .319 .750 Professionalism .044 .249 3.769 .000 Change In Control .370 .041 .617 .538 Speaker Change .723 .142 2.276 .024 N= 282 R Square = .073 Adjusted R Square = .056 Upper Chambers Intercept .813 Party Control -.203 -.056 -.643 .521 Years Out Of Power .017 .145 1.465 .145 Professionalism .0011 .010 .124 .902 Change In Control -.074 -.013 -.133 .894 Majority Leader Change -.038 -.011 -.117 .907 President Pro Temp Change -.030 -.001 -.009 .992 N= 277 R Square = .035 Adjusted R Square = .000 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept -.153 Years Out of Power .0024 .014 .222 .825 Professionalism .043 .241 3.955 .000 Change In Control .545 .063 1.036 .301 Speaker Change .682 .135 2.188 .029 N = 286 R Square = .074 Adjusted R Square = .061 Upper Chambers Intercept .587 Years Out of Power .021 .184 2.383 .018 Professionalism .0015 .012 .165 .870 Change In Control .229 .041 .536 .593 Majority Leader Change -.075 -.021 -.253 .800 President Pro Temp Change .0034 .001 .011 .991 N = 286 R Square = .034 Adjusted R Square = .006

33

TABLE 2 Actual Committee Change Model of Numbers of Standing Committees, 1985

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept 1.392 Party Control -.677 -.171 -.940 .353 Years Out of Power -.012 -.087 -.440 .662 Professionalism .012 .091 .512 .611 Change In Control .903 .151 .795 .431 Speaker Change .198 .054 .317 .753 N= 47 R Square = .066 Adjusted R Square = -.048 Upper Chambers Intercept .084 Party Control .864 .193 .962 .346 Years Out Of Power .082 .498 1.968 .062 Professionalism -.032 -.217 -1.069 .297 Change In Control .864 .193 .962 .346 Majority Leader Change .114 .027 .107 .916 President Pro Temp Change .896 .204 .992 .332 N= 47 R Square = .318 Adjusted R Square = .132 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept .480 Years Out of Power .0014 .010 .060 .952 Professionalism .026 .205 1.266 .212 Change In Control 1.557 .271 1.694 .098 Speaker Change .256 .069 .443 .660 N = 47 R Square = .097 Adjusted R Square = .011 Upper Chambers Intercept .625 Years Out of Power .070 .430 2.254 .034 Professionalism -.028 -.194 -.916 .369 Change In Control .648 .113 .588 .562 Majority Leader Change -.014 -.003 -.016 .987 President Pro Temp Change .582 .134 .662 .515 N = 47 R Square = .253 Adjusted R Square = .098

34

TABLE 3 Actual Committee Change Model of Numbers of Standing Committees, 1987

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept -.683 Party Control .716 .174 .961 .342 Years Out of Power -.0037 -.026 -.138 .891 Professionalism .060 .455 2.308 .026 Change In Control .716 .174 .961 .342 Speaker Change .792 .210 1.330 .191 N= 47 R Square = .205 Adjusted R Square = .108 Upper Chambers Intercept 2.473 Party Control -1.090 -.323 -1.375 .183 Years Out Of Power -.017 -.147 -.690 .498 Professionalism -.012 -.110 -.545 .591 Change In Control -1.129 -.132 -.582 .567 Majority Leader Change 1.076 .319 1.533 .140 President Pro Temp Change -1.201 -.382 -1.752 .094 N= 46 R Square = .210 Adjusted R Square = -.006 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept -.220 Years Out of Power -.0097 -.069 -.451 .654 Professionalism .0054 .405 2.548 .015 Change In Control .090 .010 .070 .944 Speaker Change .825 .219 1.379 .175 N = 47 R Square = .173 Adjusted R Square = .094 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.896 Years Out of Power -.0060 -.053 -.266 .792 Professionalism -.016 -.150 -.756 .457 Change In Control -1.911 -.221 -1.031 .313 Majority Leader Change 1.057 .312 1.528 .140 President Pro Temp Change -.900 -.289 -1.444 .162 N = 47 R Square = .153 Adjusted R Square = -.023

35

TABLE 4 Actual Committee Change Model of Numbers of Standing Committees, 1989

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept .096 Party Control .036 .013 .076 .940 Years Out of Power .011 .133 .743 .462 Professionalism .012 .147 .829 .412 Change In Control .036 .013 .076 .940 Speaker Change -.158 -.066 -.434 .666 N= 47 R Square = .093 Adjusted R Square = -.017 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.073 Party Control -.717 -.249 -1.041 .309 Years Out Of Power -.0013 -.014 -.054 .957 Professionalism .0054 .059 .283 .779 Change In Control -.717 -.249 -1.041 .309 Majority Leader Change -.401 -.144 -.586 .563 President Pro Temp Change .365 .129 .517 .610 N= 48 R Square = .088 Adjusted R Square = -.150 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept .442 Years Out of Power .0022 .026 .162 .872 Professionalism .0074 .091 .586 .561 Change In Control -1.385 -.237 -1.508 .139 Speaker Change -.027 -.011 -.071 .943 N = 48 R Square = .060 Adjusted R Square = -.028 Upper Chambers Intercept .481 Years Out of Power .0093 .094 .411 .684 Professionalism .0075 .082 .396 .695 Change In Control -.147 -.026 -.112 .912 Majority Leader Change -.503 -.181 -.743 .465 President Pro Temp Change .497 .175 .714 .482 N = 48 R Square = .045 Adjusted R Square =-.154

36

TABLE 5 Actual Committee Change Model of Numbers of Standing Committees, 1991

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept -1.809 Party Control -.727 -.068 -.381 .705 Years Out of Power .027 .085 .515 .609 Professionalism .089 .274 1.601 .117 Change In Control -.790 -.034 -.198 .844 Speaker Change 2.288 .245 1.575 .123 N= 47 R Square = .117 Adjusted R Square = .009 Upper Chambers Intercept -.242 Party Control .231 .107 .449 .658 Years Out Of Power .031 .436 1.291 .211 Professionalism .0034 .050 .265 .793 Change In Control .175 .043 .183 .857 Majority Leader Change 1.005 .453 1.742 .096 President Pro Temp Change -.197 -.093 -.313 .757 N= 44 R Square = .314 Adjusted R Square = .118 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept -2.369 Years Out of Power .034 .109 .700 .487 Professionalism .099 .304 2.009 .051 Change In Control -1.257 -.055 -.347 .730 Speaker Change 2.199 .238 1.569 .124 N = 47 R Square = .114 Adjusted R Square = .031 Upper Chambers Intercept -.459 Years Out of Power .034 .506 2.428 .023 Professionalism .0075 .109 .576 .570 Change In Control -.154 -.039 -.212 .834 Majority Leader Change .720 .346 1.786 .086 President Pro Temp Change .110 .053 .233 .818 N = 47 R Square = .278 Adjusted R Square = .134

37

TABLE 6 Actual Committee Change Model of Numbers of Standing Committees, 1993

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept -.283 Party Control .715 .150 .890 .379 Years Out of Power -.012 -.084 -.477 .636 Professionalism .057 .372 2.359 .023 Change In Control -1.497 -.168 -1.077 .288 Speaker Change .683 .157 1.066 .293 N= 47 R Square = .195 Adjusted R Square = .097 Upper Chambers Intercept .265 Party Control -.287 -.098 -.386 .703 Years Out Of Power .0043 .050 .176 .862 Professionalism .024 .250 1.112 .279 Change In Control -.592 -.148 -.570 .575 Majority Leader Change -.340 -.113 -.384 .705 President Pro Temp Change N= 46 R Square = .125 Adjusted R Square = -.125 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept -.025 Years Out of Power -.013 -.090 -.618 .540 Professionalism .050 .329 2.276 .028 Change In Control -.553 -.064 -.437 .664 Speaker Change .781 .181 1.231 .225 N = 48 R Square = .150 Adjusted R Square = .071 Upper Chambers Intercept -.750 Years Out of Power .044 .316 1.359 .186 Professionalism .033 .204 .963 .344 Change In Control 2.570 .386 1.409 .171 Majority Leader Change -.704 -.145 -.606 .550 President Pro Temp Change -.263 -.054 -.239 .813 N = 48 R Square = .099 Adjusted R Square = -.075

38

TABLE 7 Actual Committee Change Model of Numbers of Standing Committees, 1995

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept 1.572 Party Control -.677 -.195 -.916 .365 Years Out of Power -.0093 -.091 -.350 .728 Professionalism .0045 .034 .195 .847 Change In Control 2.238 .510 2.563 .014 Speaker Change -.504 -.135 -.796 .431 N= 47 R Square = .231 Adjusted R Square = .137 Upper Chambers Intercept -.756 Party Control -.085 -.017 -.062 .951 Years Out Of Power .049 .346 1.117 .275 Professionalism .036 .224 1.021 .318 Change In Control 2.814 .423 1.466 .156 Majority Leader Change -.767 -.156 -.588 .562 President Pro Temp Change -.406 -.082 -.355 .726 N= 47 R Square = .122 Adjusted R Square = -.098 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept -.025 Years Out of Power -.013 -.090 -.618 .540 Professionalism .050 .329 2.276 .028 Change In Control -.553 -.064 -.437 .664 Speaker Change .781 .181 1.231 .225 N = 48 R Square = .150 Adjusted R Square = .071 Upper Chambers Intercept -.750 Years Out of Power .044 .316 1.359 .186 Professionalism .033 .204 .963 .344 Change In Control 2.570 .386 1.409 .171 Majority Leader Change -.704 -.145 -.606 .550 President Pro Temp Change -.263 -.054 -.239 .813 N = 48 R Square = .099 Adjusted R Square = -.075

39

TABLE 8 Proportional Committee Change Model of Number of Standing Committees, 1985-1995

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept 1.025 Party Control .0030 .010 .138 .890 Years Out of Power -.00020 -.021 -.279 .780 Professionalism .0013 .133 1.966 .050 Change In Control .0030 .010 .138 .890 Speaker Change .034 .118 1.854 .065 N= 282 R Square = .027 Adjusted R Square = .009 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.070 Party Control -.0050 -.018 -.204 .838 Years Out Of Power .0013 .146 1.475 .142 Professionalism -.00043 -.047 -.600 .549 Change In Control .00039 .001 .009 .993 Majority Leader Change -.025 -.093 -1.003 .317 President Pro Temp Change .0089 .032 .360 .719 N= 277 R Square = .033 Adjusted R Square = -.001 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept 1.024 Years Out of Power -.000088 -.009 -.144 .886 Professionalism .0013 .127 2.037 .043 Change In Control -0026 -.005 -.087 .931 Speaker Change .031 .108 1.709 .089 N = 286 R Square = .024 Adjusted R Square = .010 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.063 Years Out of Power .0014 .162 2.088 .038 Professionalism -.00042 -.046 -.612 .541 Change In Control .022 .050 .658 .512 Majority Leader Change -.026 -.095 -1.128 .261 President Pro Temp Change .0076 .028 .327 .744 N = 286 R Square = .036 Adjusted R Square = .008

40

TABLE 9 Proportional Committee Change Model of Number of Standing Committees, 1985

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept 1.062 Party Control -.018 -.062 -.345 .731 Years Out of Power .000082 .008 .041 .967 Professionalism .000059 .006 .037 .971 Change In Control .110 .257 1.369 .178 Speaker Change .033 .124 .742 .463 N= 47 R Square = .092 Adjusted R Square = -.019 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.027 Party Control .102 .278 1.412 .172 Years Out Of Power .0062 .454 1.831 .081 Professionalism -.0037 -.308 -.1.553 .135 Change In Control -.050 -.098 -.384 .705 Majority Leader Change .0025 .007 .030 .977 President Pro Temp Change .076 .210 1.038 .310 N= 47 R Square = .345 Adjusted R Square = .167 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept 1.032 Years Out of Power .00023 .023 .144 .886 Professionalism .00080 .087 .553 .583 Change In Control .141 .341 2.198 .034 Speaker Change .043 .161 1.057 .297 N = 47 R Square = .148 Adjusted R Square = .067 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.090 Years Out of Power .0049 .367 1.940 .064 Professionalism -.0034 -.283 -1.353 .189 Change In Control .063 .133 .701 .490 Majority Leader Change -.020 -.057 -.283 .780 President Pro Temp Change .053 .148 .740 .466 N = 47 R Square = .267 Adjusted R Square = .114

41

TABLE 10 Proportional Committee Change Model of Number of Standing Committees, 1987

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept .954 Party Control .047 .184 .985 .330 Years Out of Power .00027 .031 .160 .873 Professionalism .0032 .395 1.948 .058 Change In Control -.055 -.095 -.561 .578 Speaker Change .056 .239 1.468 .150 N= 47 R Square = .157 Adjusted R Square = .055 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.147 Party Control -.068 -.248 -.986 .335 Years Out Of Power -.00027 -.029 -.127 .900 Professionalism -00038 -.044 -.201 .842 Change In Control -.051 -.073 -.301 .766 Majority Leader Change .037 .133 .598 .556 President Pro Temp Change -.061 -.237 -1.013 .322 N= 46 R Square = .090 Adjusted R Square = -.158 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept .984 Years Out of Power -00012 -.014 -.087 .931 Professionalism .0028 .343 2.090 .043 Change In Control .0043 .008 .053 .958 Speaker Change .058 .248 1.516 .137 N = 47 R Square = .122 Adjusted R Square = .039 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.110 Years Out of Power .00032 .035 .168 .868 Professionalism -.00059 -.068 -.323 .750 Change In Control -.099 -.142 -.625 .538 Majority Leader Change .038 .138 .640 .528 President Pro Temp Change -.045 -.177 -.837 .411 N = 47 R Square = .054 Adjusted R Square = -.143

42

TABLE 11 Proportional Committee Change Model of Number of Standing Committees, 1989

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept 1.011 Party Control .022 .113 .639 .527 Years Out of Power .00061 .103 .572 .571 Professionalism .00083 .147 .825 .414 Change In Control .081 .201 1.205 .235 Speaker Change N= 47 R Square = .084 Adjusted R Square = -.028 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.095 Party Control -.062 -.242 -1.023 .317 Years Out Of Power .00032 .037 .150 .882 Professionalism .00028 .034 .165 .871 Change In Control .036 .073 .309 .760 Majority Leader Change -.059 -.241 -.989 .333 President Pro Temp Change .024 .094 .382 .706 N= 48 R Square = .108 Adjusted R Square = -.124 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept 1.043 Years Out of Power .000010 .002 .011 .992 Professionalism .00038 .067 .431 .669 Change In Control -.058 -.143 -.905 .371 Speaker Change -.029 -.172 -1.127 .266 N = 48 R Square = .055 Adjusted R Square = -.033 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.044 Years Out of Power .0012 .141 .627 .537 Professionalism .00046 .056 .275 .786 Change In Control .017 .035 .148 .883 Majority Leader Change -.068 -.276 -1.147 .263 President Pro Temp Change .035 .139 .575 .571 N = 48 R Square = .068 Adjusted R Square = -.126

43

TABLE 12 Proportional Committee Change Model of Number of Standing Committees, 1991

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept .975 Party Control -.035 -.077 -.423 .674 Years Out of Power .00055 .039 .234 .816 Professionalism .0026 .186 1.069 .291 Change In Control -.033 -.034 -.191 .849 Speaker Change .105 .262 1.659 .105 N= 47 R Square = .089 Adjusted R Square = -.022 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.018 Party Control .020 .120 .475 .640 Years Out Of Power .0018 .326 .912 .372 Professionalism -.00064 -.122 -.610 .549 Change In Control .0085 .027 .109 .914 Majority Leader Change .061 .358 1.300 .208 President Pro Temp Change -.024 -.147 -.468 .645 N= 44 R Square = .232 Adjusted R Square = .012 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept .946 Years Out of Power .00094 .069 .438 .663 Professionalism .0031 .221 1.436 .158 Change In Control -.054 -.054 -.340 .736 Speaker Change .100 .252 1.633 .110 N = 47 R Square = .085 Adjusted R Square = -.001 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.009 Years Out of Power .0020 .380 1.739 .094 Professionalism -.00045 -.085 -.428 .673 Change In Control .0080 .026 .136 .893 Majority Leader Change .044 .273 1.341 .192 President Pro Temp Change -.0059 -.037 -.155 .878 N = 47 R Square = .205 Adjusted R Square = .046

44

TABLE 13 Proportional Committee Change Model of Number of Standing Committees, 1993

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept 1.174 Party Control -.017 -.041 -.260 .796 Years Out of Power -.0027 -.222 -1.361 .181 Professionalism -.0011 -.081 -.552 .584 Change In Control -.474 -.605 -4.168 .000 Speaker Change .0098 .026 .187 .852 N= 47 R Square = .301 Adjusted R Square = .216 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.018 Party Control .010 .069 .269 .790 Years Out Of Power .000051 .012 .041 .968 Professionalism .0010 .210 .930 .363 Change In Control -.042 -.205 -.788 .439 Majority Leader Change -.0079 -.052 -.175 .863 President Pro Temp Change .0083 .058 .199 .844 N= 46 R Square = .120 Adjusted R Square = -.131 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept 1.019 Years Out of Power .000094 .008 .055 .956 Professionalism .00025 .018 .134 .894 Change In Control -.373 -.491 -3.521 .001 Speaker Change .046 .123 .874 .387 N = 48 R Square = .226 Adjusted R Square = .154 Upper Chambers Intercept 1.005 Years Out of Power .00047 .111 .521 .608 Professionalism .0012 .235 1.108 .279 Change In Control -.0020 -.010 -.052 .959 Majority Leader Change -.014 -.089 -.325 .748 President Pro Temp Change .0058 .041 .152 .881 N = 48 R Square = .087 Adjusted R Square = -.112

45

TABLE 14 Proportional Committee Change Model of Number of Standing Committees, 1995

Understan- dardized Standardized Coefficient Coefficient T-Value Significance

Lower Chambers Intercept 1.065 Party Control -.016 -.098 -.453 .653 Years Out of Power -.00037 -.078 -.294 .770 Professionalism .00037 .061 .337 .738 Change In Control .090 .442 2.178 .035 Speaker Change -.024 -.139 -.800 .428 N= 47 R Square = .199 Adjusted R Square = .101 Upper Chambers Intercept .979 Party Control -.0081 -.022 -.079 .938 Years Out Of Power .0031 .299 .954 .349 Professionalism .0019 .164 .737 .468 Change In Control .199 .406 1.392 .177 Majority Leader Change -.063 -.174 -.649 .523 President Pro Temp Change N= 47 R Square = .104 Adjusted R Square = -.120 Regression Results Using Directional Change In Control Variable Lower Chambers Intercept 1.039 Years Out of Power .000047 .010 .053 .958 Professionalism .00058 .097 .602 .550 Change In Control .089 .434 2.238 .030 Speaker Change -.022 -.127 -.773 .443 N = 48 R Square = .202 Adjusted R Square = .128 Upper Chambers Intercept .978 Years Out of Power .0028 .274 1.167 .254 Professionalism .0017 .145 .678 .504 Change In Control .183 .372 1.344 .190 Majority Leader Change -.059 -.165 -.687 .498 President Pro Temp Change -.021 -.057 -.252 .803 N = 48 R Square = .083 Adjusted R Square = -.093

46

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