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P ARTY C RASHERS : T HE P OLITICAL L OGIC OF L EGISLATIVE I NSTITUTIONALIZATION U NDER S INGLE P ARTY R ULE Paul Schuler Stanford University Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Prepared for Seminar at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Stanford University April 1, 2015

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Page 1: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE

Paul Schuler Stanford University

Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center

Prepared for Seminar at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Stanford University

April 1, 2015

Page 2: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Party Crasher?

2

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung

National Assembly Delegate Nguyen Minh Thuyet

Was Thuyet’s behavior intended by the party?

Page 3: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Why do we care? • Ubiquity of authoritarian legislatures • Do legislatures enhance regime stability? • Do legislatures impact policy?

3

Page 4: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Logic of Legislative Institutionalization Under Authoritarian Rule • Legitimacy

• Co-optation (Gandhi and Przeworski)

• Power Sharing (Svolik, Gehlbach and Keefer)

Legislatures enhance autocratic rule by incorporating elites or opposition

4

Page 5: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Logic of Legislative Institutionalization Under Authoritarian Rule

• How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV: •  Party Elite? No •  Party Outsider? No

• What reforms made his speech possible? •  VNA increased number days in sessions (1989)

5

Page 6: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Days in Session

6

Figure 3.1: VNA Days in Session

020

4060

80

Day

s

1980 1990 2000 2010Year

Number of Days Smoothed Running Mean

Page 7: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Alternative Logic? • How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV: •  Party Elite? No •  Party Outsider? No

• How was his speech possible? •  VNA increased number days in sessions (1989) •  VNA passes more laws (1989)

7

Page 8: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Laws Passed

8

Figure 3.2: Laws Per Year

010

2030

Law

s

1980 1990 2000 2010Year

Laws Smoothed Running Mean

Page 9: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Alternative Logic? • How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV: •  Party Elite? No •  Party Outsider? No

• How was his speech possible? •  VNA increased number days in sessions (1989) •  VNA passes more laws (1989) •  VNA expanded number of fulltime delegates (1992-present)

9

Page 10: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

VNA Membership

10

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

1976 1981 1987 1992 1997 2001 2007 2011

Non-Party

CCOM

Fulltime

Business

Note: Data collected by author from Vietnamese news media and VNA website

Page 11: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Alternative Logic? • How well does these theories explain Thuyet’s activity?

• Nguyen Minh Thuyet CV: •  Party Elite? No •  Party Outsider? No

• How was his speech possible? •  VNA increased number days in sessions (1989) •  VNA passes more laws (1989) •  VNA expanded number of fulltime delegates (1992-present) •  VNA televises government hearings (1994)

No reforms increased elite or opposition representation

11

Page 12: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Alternative Theory: Enhancing “Rule by Law” •  Alternative explanation – Creating “rule by law”

•  Rule By Law: Coherent, enforceable legal code on subset of issues •  Two components

•  Generating more coherent laws •  Ensuring government compliance

•  More coherent legal code desirable when regime •  Faces economic crisis •  Needs private foreign investment •  Concerned with local implementation of policies

•  Why use the legislature?

•  More stable policy •  Less conflict of interest •  More legitimate policy

12

Page 13: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Testing the Theory… • Observable implications of theory using VNA speeches • Speeches collected from 2007-2013 •  Four types of debates

13

Legislation 3605Government Hearings 1687Query Sessions 1182Constitution 185Total 6663

Page 14: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Professionals, Elites, and Outsiders Three types of delegates 1.  Professionals: Fulltime delegates

•  Locally nominated •  Centrally nominated

2.  Party Elites: Central Committee Members

3.  Outsiders •  Non-Party members •  Business delegates

14

Page 15: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Professionals, Elites, and Outsiders

15

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

1976 1981 1987 1992 1997 2001 2007 2011

Non-Party

CCOM

Fulltime

Business

Note: Data collected by author from Vietnamese news media and VNA website

Page 16: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Hypotheses Rule By Law Hypothesis: •  Fulltime delegates are more likely to use speeches to:

•  Ensure coherence of legal code of proposed legislation How •  Ensure government implement existing legislation How

Power-Sharing Hypothesis •  Central Committee delegates more likely to use speeches to:

•  Ensure government implement existing legislation How

Co-optation Hypothesis: •  Non-Party/Business delegates more likely use speeches to

•  Ensure government implement existing legislation How •  Raise issues the party does not want discussed What

16

Page 17: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Models • Tests of how issues are discussed

•  Discriminant/Cluster analysis •  Standardized log-odds ratio (Monroe, Colaresi, Quinn)

• Tests of which issues are discussed: •  Topic Model •  Latent Dirichlet Allocation (Blei, Ng, Jordan)

•  Were top-20 words associated with list of “sensitive” issues? •  “Sensitive issue” created from dictionary •  Includes words like “South China Sea”, “multi-party

democracy”, and dissident names

17

Page 18: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Data Processing 1.  Break word files into speeches 2.  Attach speeches to biographical data 3.  “Tokenize” speeches: Trung quốc becomes Trung_quốc 4.  Remove “stop” words, numbers, punctuation, capitalization 5.  Convert all provincial names to word “province” 6.  Convert all committee names to word “committee”

7.  For discriminant/cluster models, equal numbers of each category (fulltime vs. part time; business vs. non-business) were selected for each debate through random sampling

18

Page 19: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Who speaks?

16% of CCOM delegates make only 3% of speeches

19

VNA Average

02

46

810

1214

Num

ber o

f Spe

eche

s P

er V

NA

Ses

sion

_ Party _ Non-Party _

VNA Average

02

46

810

1214

Num

ber o

f Spe

eche

s P

er V

NA

Ses

sion

_ Business _ Non-Business _

VNA Average

02

46

810

1214

Num

ber o

f Spe

eche

s P

er V

NA

Ses

sion

_ Fulltime Central _ Fulltime Local _Part-Time Central_ Part-Time Local _

VNA Average0

24

68

1012

14N

umbe

r of S

peec

hes

Per

VN

A S

essi

on

_ Central Committee _ Non-Central Committee _

Page 20: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Cluster analysis

•  Fulltime central concentrate on legal code •  Fulltime local concentrate on accountability • Party and business delegates focus on economy

20

Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes NoDecision Province Minister Business Decision Business Business Decision

Law Realize Law Development Law Country Bank LawOffice Paragraph Decision Country Implement Vietnam Interest (rate) MinisterReport Development Paragraph Economy Minister Bank Credit Province

Legal Code Debate Implement Production Province National Export ImplementMinister Conditions Responsibility Activity Management Use Gold Paragraph

Responsibility Ensure/Guarantee Project Tax Level Export Win ManagementSpeech Solve Province Debate Office Foreign Subject OrganizationManage Grassroots Voters Agriculture Responsibility Contribute Company Country

Resolution Activity Promulgate Hardship Report Country Bidder DebateBudget Citizens Office Vietnam Paragraph Development Inflation Activity

Calculate Business Report Labor Amend/Supplement Technology Income Tax InvestmentEnsure/Guarantee Production Concerning Effective Oversee Economy Equitize High

Price Vietnam Authority Grassroots Legal Code Investment Catfish DevelopmentConstitution Solution Manage Goods and Services Locality Purchase Unemployment Economy

Approval Amend/Supplement Solve National Policy Science Moneyary ResponsibilityStanding Committee Concering Oversee Legal Code State Bank Governor Gold Wood Usage

Sector Market Petition Capital Solution Credit Protest SocietyLight gray highlights words related to legal compatabilityDark gray indicates words related to government responsibility

Fulltime Central Fulltime Local Party Business

Page 21: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Topic analysis What about topic of speeches?

21

Topic Sensitive Topic Sensitive Topic SensitiveLand No Health Care No Labor Union/Protest NoTaxes No Education No Banking/Interest No

Family Issues No Rural Development No Rural Development NoJustice No Admin Procedures No Taxes (1) No

Petitions/Prosecution No Health Care (2) No Macro-Economy NoConstitution No Land No Social Affairs No

Urban Planning No Constitution No Accounting NoCadre Evaluation No Bank/Credit No Public Investment No

Rural Development No Business/Conglomerate No Corruption NoEducation No Family Issues No Taxes (2) No

Public Security No Consumer Protection No Public Investment (2) NoLegal Development No Environment No Exports No

Health Care No Social Insurance No Development NoBusiness No Technology No Inflation No

Government Oversight No Inflation No Health Insurance No

All Non-Party Business

Page 22: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Topic analysis: Validity Check

Determinants of “sensitive speeches”

22

VARIABLES Base Interaction 12th VNA 13th VNA Count1 2 3 4 5

Party -0.0158 -0.0158 -0.00425 -0.0273 -0.0350(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0209) (0.0252)

Central Committee -0.0177*** -0.0198*** -0.0165* -0.0222*** -0.0380***(0.00580) (0.00610) (0.00952) (0.00803) (0.00895)

Politburo -0.0188*** -0.0215*** -0.0291** -0.0173** -0.0307***(0.00582) (0.00647) (0.0122) (0.00805) (0.0109)

Fulltime 0.00340 0.0128** 0.0209** 0.00336 0.0371***(0.00547) (0.00553) (0.00823) (0.00722) (0.0107)

Centrally Nominated 0.00751 0.0181* 0.0240 0.0108 0.0164(0.00689) (0.00968) (0.0177) (0.00904) (0.0129)

Fulltime*Centrally Nominated -0.0244** -0.0411** -0.00608 -0.0352*(0.0107) (0.0178) (0.0124) (0.0192)

Business 0.00306 0.00194 0.00431 -0.00322 -0.00579(0.00757) (0.00750) (0.00992) (0.0109) (0.0124)

Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes YesConstant 0.0111 0.0148 -0.0264 0.0670 0.0619*

(0.0282) (0.0279) (0.0239) (0.0509) (0.0354)Observations 992 992 492 500 992R-squared 0.041 0.047 0.058 0.064 0.089

1. OLS used for each specification 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses 3. The dependent variable for models 1-4 are the percentage of the delegate's speeches that are "sensitive" 4. The dependent variable for model 5 is the a count of all sensitive speeches

Page 23: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Summary of Results What explains institutionalization of VNA? • Rule by Law Hypothesis: Confirmed

•  Fulltime delegates more active in overseeing cohesiveness of legal code and implementation

• Power Sharing Hypothesis: Disconfirmed •  Party elites rarely speak in the VNA •  Occurs within party institutions

• Co-optation Hypothesis: Disconfirmed

•  Business/Non-Party delegates do not raise sensitive issues or act more aggressively in oversight

•  Occurs within party institutions

23

Page 24: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Party Crasher?

24

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung

National Assembly Delegate Nguyen Minh Thuyet

Was his behavior intended by the party?

Page 25: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Party Crasher? •  I have one question that up until now has not been

answered. Outside the leaders of Vinashin who else must take responsibility for the violations? The government report says it has responsibility and has conducted internal criticism, but specifically how? From my perspective, in this situation all the government officials involved must face criticism and discipline from the National Assembly…

25

Page 26: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Generalizability and Implications Generalizability •  Rule by Law can explain range of reforms not involving

increasing parties •  Co-optation may occur in hybrid legislatures •  Power sharing occurs within party, not legislative institutions

Implications •  Professionalization can impact the role of legislatures •  Professionals may use acceptable means to challenge the

regime in unexpected ways

26

Page 27: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Thanks!

27

Page 28: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

More coherent laws… •  Therefore, to ensure the consistency of legal code, I

propose that Paragraph 5 of Article 7 in Section 2 be changed as follows. The National Assembly should not oversee the use of capital but instead the National Assembly should oversee the implementation of the legal code related to the management of public debt so that the general decision will be consistent with the Constitution as well as the Law on the Organization of the VNA, and the Law on National Assembly Oversight Activities. With the change, the oversight will be oversight of implementation of the Constitution, law, and decisions not oversight of the use of state resources or related specific activities

28

Page 29: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Ensuring Government Compliance • My second point concerns the more than 10 localities

renting more than 400,000 hectares of forest in border regions to foreign organizations. Why were the relevant government offices slow to realize this until the issue was raised by retired cadres? Could the deputy prime minister please let us know outside the responsibility of the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development which other departments and who must take responsibility regarding this issue…

29

Page 30: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Issue areas • Speeches concentrated in legislative, economic affairs

30

0 500 1,000 1,500Number of Speeches

Foreign Affairs

Defense and Transportation

Youth, Sports, Education

Justice

Science, Tech, & Environment

Social Affairs

Budget and Finance

General

Legislative

Economics

Page 31: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Cluster validation: “Legal Words”

31

.002

.004

.006

.008

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

General

.022

.024

.026

.028

.03

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Science and Tech

.015

.02

.025

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Economics

.04

.045

.05

.055

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Legislative Affairs

.026

.028

.03

.032

.034

.036

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Justice

.01

.02

.03

.04

.05

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Defense and Transportation

.015

.02

.025

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Budget and Finance

.014

.016

.018

.02

.022

.024

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Youth Sports and Culture

.02

.022

.024

.026

.028

.03

Fulltime Central Non-Fulltime Central

Social Affairs

Page 32: ARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL OGIC OF LEGISLATIVE … · 2018. 5. 14. · PARTY CRASHERS: THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONALIZATION UNDER SINGLE PARTY RULE Paul Schuler

Cluster validation: “Responsibility Words”

32

.003

.0035

.004

.0045

.005

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

General

.008

.01

.012

.014

.016

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Science and Tech

.02

.025

.03

.035

.04

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Economics

.006

.007

.008

.009

.01

.011

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Legislative Affairs

.005

.006

.007

.008

.009

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Justice

.015

.02

.025

.03

.035

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Defense and Transportation

.01

.012

.014

.016

.018

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Budget and Finance

.02

.025

.03

.035

.04

.045

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Youth Sports and Culture

.01.012.014.016.018

.02

Fulltime Local Non-Fulltime Local

Social Affairs