THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961

The Cuban Revolution Some Whys and Wherefores

Andrew Guilder Frank

Did the Cuban Revolution grow out of the dictatorial repression of Batista ? Yes, certainly, but the repression of Batista generated no more cause for revolt than that of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic ot Jimenez in Venezuela,

Is it a movement to liberate Cuba from American domination of its economy ? Undoubtedly, but other Carribean countries, like Guatemala and Honduras, are no less famed for American influence in their economic life.

Does the Cuban Revolution represent a battle against poverty, hunger disease and illiteracy ? Cer­tainly', but poverty in Haiti is much more severe than in Cuba. Indeed per capita income in Cuba- is higher than almost anywhere else in Latin America.

The absence of indigenous Indians perhaps facilitates the success of the Revolution, but Costa Rica similarly has no Indians, nor does Uruguay.

The author does not attempt to describe or explain the Cuban Revolution exhaustively. He merely wants to expose for inspection the background and the sources of the developments that Cuba and the world now witness.

He leaves it to the understanding and research of others to explore the many questions only raised

here.

C U B A N S p roc l a im themselves the f i r s t free country in L a t i n

Amer ica . W h a t do they m e a n ? W h y d i d the revolut ion which is developing in Cuba take place pre­cisely there and not elsewhere? W h y does the Cuban Revolu t ion take the f o r m it does rather than the f o r m , for instance, of our of the L a t i n Amer ican revolutions w h i c h preceded it ?

Several causes of the Cuban Re­vo lu t ion immedia te ly suggest them-solves, but none of them singly or in combina t ion appear to offer a satisfactory explanat ion of the t ime and place of the Revolut ion. D i d the Revolution grow out of the d ic ta tor ia l repression of Batista ? Yes. cer tainly i t d i d . Bu t the re­pression of Batista generated no more cause, for revolt than that of T r u j i l l o in the Domin ican Republ ic or that of Jimenez in Venezuela ; yet the Domin i can Republic has witnessed no revolut ion at a l l , and Venezeula one w h i c h has taken a f o r m qui te different f rom the Cuban Revolu t ion .

Is the Cuban Revolut ion a move­ment to l iberate Cuba f r o m A m e r i ­can domina t ion of i ts economy in the fields of sugar, pub l i c ut i l i t ies , and large parts of commerce? U n ­doubtedly . Bu t other Carr ibean countries, l i k e Guatemala and H o n ­duras, are no less famed for Ame-r ican influence in the i r economic l i f e , Honduras has witnessed no

revolut ion and Guatemala one wh ich took a different f o r m .

Does the Cuban Revolution re­present a battle against poverty, against hunger, disease and i l l i tera­cy ? Cer ta inly . But pover ty in H a i t i is much more severe than in Cuba. Indeed, per capita income in Culm is higher than almost any­where else in Lat in America. M a r be it is this very relative wealth which has given Cuba the ab i l i ty and the strength to make so far-reaching a revolut ion. But such resources are available in concen­trated f o r m also in the Montevideo of Uruguay or the Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paula regions of Braz i l .

The absence of indigenous Indians probably facilitates the success of the Cuban Revolu t ion . But Cost a Rica s imi la r ly has no Indians, nor does Uruguay .

Maybe it is less the absence of Indiana than the presence of a middle class and of a pool of potential intellectual leadership which has faci l i tated the Cuban Revolu t ion . But Braz i l , Argen t ina , and Chile have s imi la r sources of potential leadership; and there is evidence that in Mexico , wh ich witnessed its o w n revolut ion f if ty years ago, it is precisely the m i d ­dle class which is the source of the increasing conservatism w h i c h mi l i t a t e against the extension of economic development i n t o the M e x i c a n countryside. Thus, w i t h o u t

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invoking the charisma of Fidel , an exhaustive causative explanat ion of the Cuban Revolut ion may not be possible. At any rate. I cannot provide one.

Historical Source

However a Iess ambi t ious expla-nat ion should not be beyond our reach, Every resolution is a reac­tion to the past, and that past is certainly open to our inspection. Indeed, today's revolut ion is a p ro­duct as well of past reactions, that is. of earlier revolutionary at­tempts. By looking at the earl ier at-tempts to deal w i t h s imi la r problems, pa r t i cu la r ly by p r i o r re­volutions in La t in America , we should be able to suggest how some al ternat ive forms of the Cuban Re­volut ion may have come to be excluded. Fur thermore , no revolu­t ion can change every th ing . Para­doxical ly , a revolut ion must re ly on well-entrenched social forms, such as paternal ism in Cuba, to effect a radical change in other forms of social relations. Thus, a study of social and c u l t u r a l forms wh ich d i d and d i d not exist in the Cuba of o l d should y i e ld some indicat ions of the revolut ionary possibilit ies for the Cuba of tomorrow. The present paper, then, is an attempt to explore these three sources of explanat ion of the Cuban Revolu­t ion : the his tor ical source of the revolu t ion , al ternative solutions- to L a t i n A m e r i c a n p r o b l e m s w h i c h

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have been found want ing , and the socio-cultural forms wh i ch deter­mine not on l y the revolut ionary necessities, but also the revolut ion­ary possibi l i t ies. In pursu ing these explorat ions, we should not how­ever expect to find impor tant ans­wers as instead we find impor tant new questions.

The history of L a t i n Amer ica might be summed up by saying that the Spanish came to exp lo i t and their successors remained to exp lo i t . The main social features of large parts of La t in Amer ica were well known : the consolida­t ion of agr icu l tu ra l lands under la t i fundis la ownership, the role of the church in keeping people quiet and of the army if they were not, the role of the r is ing middle classes based in commerce and the profes­sions wh ich account for the very one-sided economic development that does occur, the al l iance of Amer ican capi ta l w i th a l l these groups, the r igh t -w ing dictatorships that are the capstone wh ich ties the social fab r i c together by force and terror. Probably more than total mass poverty and ignorance, it has been the exclusion of the vast ma­j o r i t y of Lat in Americans f r o m the social, po l i t ica l , and economic bene­fits enjoyed by some people in these societies wh ich has resulted in the many sporadic social upheavals ranging f r om changes in the palace guard to fu l l scale social re­volut ions.

Structure of Latin American Society

The Cuban Revolut ion has its roots in this general s t ructure of La t in Amer ican society, in this same Lat in Amer ican social move­ment to wh ich that social structure has given risie ( indeed, in the twent ieth century wor ld revolut ion as a whole) but it has its own his­tory as wel l , in the pecul iar Cuban condit ions arid the long history of revo lu t ionary and l iberat ion move-merits which have t ime and again attempted but failed to alter sub­stant ial ly the structure of Cuban society. Near ly a century ago, in 1 8 ' 8 , Cuba revolts against Spain . The revolut ion is intel lectual ly in­spired and led, though it has some measure of popular suppor t . The revolut ion fa i ls and Spain retains i ts po l i t i ca l supremacy. In the years wh ich fo l low, Amer ican capi­t a l begins seriously to be invested in Cuban sugar. Indeed,, a U S

consular report of 1878 notes that " commerc ia l l y Cuba has become a dependency of the Un i ted States al though po l i t i ca l ly it remains a dependency of Spa in . " By 1895 Cuba is ready to wage a f u l l scale revolut ionary war of independence against Spain. Three years later, in 1808, the Un i ted States enters the war against Spain on the side of Cuba. V iewed in the context of a hundred years of U S and Confe­derate designs on Cuba, combined w i th more recently acquired direct economic interests, the Plat t Amendment of 1902 wh ich reser­ves the r ight to the United States to intervene at its pleasure in the domestic af fairs of the supposedly sovereign Cuba need come as no surprise, Cuba, exhausted by its war of l iberat ion against Spa in , is faced w i th the choice of ou t r igh t annexat ion by the Uni ted States as befell P i e r t o Rico and the P h i l i ­ppines or presumpt ive sovereignty w i t h Amer ican intervent ion. I t chooses the latter and is visi ted by Amer ican m i l i t a ry intervent ion three times unt i l the repeal of the Piat t Amendment in 1933 and by other forms of intervent ion un t i l this day.

In the meantime the in t roduct ion of rai l roads and electr icity into Cuba rad ica l ly increases the dis­tance over which sugar cane could bo transported and the size of the mi l l s in wh ich it could be process­ed. As a result, the ear l ie r small holdings of land and l i t t le mi l ls in ­creasingly become consolidated in­to large-scale la t i fund is la holdings of land and of large sugar centrales which re ign over the landscape l ike feudal castles. As elsewhere in La t in Amer ica to this day, this fer­ti le ground fo r r igh t -w ing dictator­ships easily produces and supports the dictatorship of Machado d u r i n g the nineteen twenties. When this dictatorship is over th rown in 1931, the re fo rm movement wh ich seeks to remove some of the social, po l i ­t ical , and economic sources of such dictatorships fai ls, and, let i t be noted, fai ls w i th the a id and inter­vent ion of the U S Department of Stat? and Embassy in the person of Sumner Wel les who supports the conservatives, and on ly a moderate re form prevai ls.

When the effects of the depres­sion and the decl ine of Cuba's sugar for tunes were combined w i t h the substantial cont inuance of the

o ld regime and after the temporary r u i n of the second war has again disappeared, the t ime is r ipe fo r a renewed dictatorship of the Ma­chado type. A f te r years of va ry ing amounts of inf luence, Batista takes power in the coup of March 10, 1952. In the years of his power, he k i l l s and often tortures twenty thousand people. As a nutshell i n ­dex of the fortunes of Cuba du r i ng these years past, one might observe that f o l l ow ing the 1895 war of l iber­at ion the l i teracy rate grew mar­ked ly ; du r i ng the years of Ma-chado's dictatorship the l i teracy rate again dec l ined; i t rose s lowly dur­ing the years after Maehado's exit and before Batista's e n t r y ; and l i teracy decl ined again du r i ng the six years of Batista's government.

Not Made in a Day

The current revolut ion in Cuba was not made in a day. It was born out of three hundred years of h istory and at least a hundred years o f p r i o r revolut ionary act iv i ty . But even as the revo lu t ion was born in the decade of the 1950s it d id not, l ike Athena, emerge ful l g rown out of Fidel Castro's head. Indeed, the fo rms which the revolut ion was to take and sti l l w i l l take in the fu ture grew out of its own eight-year his­tory in Cuba and the revolut ionary experience elsewhere in La t in A m ­erica. To understand even in the most superf ic ial sense the nature and causes of the radical ism which characterizes the Cuban Revo lu t ion today, it is necessary to examine the Revolut ion in the l igh t of this recent h istory wh ich has made it what it is. But as we do so, it w i l l again he possible to do no more than raise questions as to how and why certain circumstances led to the decisions that were taken. In a sense what the f o l l o w i n g explora­t ion can do is roughly to map the road of the revolut ion ind ica t ing some of the road fo rks at wh ich choices had to be made to guide it one way or another. Much closer acquaintance w i t h circumstances of the times wou ld be neceteary to as­sign serious explanations to these choices.

Elections were scheduled for the s p r i n g of 1952. When i t became clear that the impend ing vote wou ld not b r i ng h i m in to office, Bat ista as­sumed power by a m i l i t a r y coup on M a r c h 10, 1952. Soon thereafter, F ide l Castro, then a lawyer, fi led a b r ie f in the courts changing Batista

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w i t h several count a of v io la t ion of the Cuban Consti tut ion of 1940. Th is b r i e f represents Fidel Castro's first pub l ic challenge. But as an attack on the i l l ega l i ty of the Batista dictatorship rather than as an attempt to in i t ia te a far-reaching social revolut ion, this first challenge of the statua-quo was a far cry f r o m the revolut ion w h i c h Fidel 's name has become associated. T h i s revolu­t ion was to assume its present f o r m only as a result of many events st i l l to come in the six years fo l lowing .

Weapons for Legal Arguments

The f i rs t fur ther development in the direct ion of radical ism was to substitute weapons where legal arguments had fai led. On July 26, 1953, Fidel led 125 men in an at­tack on For t Moncada in the hope of cap tur ing the weapons and sup­plies which might be used in an attack on the a rmy, the real source of Batista's power. The attack was unsuccessful. Most of the attackers were k i l l e d , not so much in battle as after becoming prisoners. Through a series of fortunate accidents. Fidel 's l i fe was spared and he was brought to t r i a l . A c t i n g as his own attorney for defense, Fidel spoke four hours in defense of his attack against an unconsti tut ional govern­ment. His defense ended w i t h the words, "Condemn me. I don't care. H i s to ry w i l l absolve me.'' Under that t i t le his defense plea has be­come famous as an impor tan t docu­ment of the Revolu t ion . Most of Fidel 's discussion was devoted to the circumstances immedia te ly sur­round ing the i l l-fated attack of July 26. But a par t of his defense was devoted to the reform pro­gramme fo r which he had fought and the measures he wou ld have in i t ia ted had his rebel l ion been successful.

Fidel l i s ted f ive revolut ionary laws w h i c h w o u l d have been imme­diately procla imed. They dealt w i t h the re- inst i tut ion of the Constitution of 1940 and the assumption of legislative, executive and jud ic i a l powers by the revolut ionary move­ment, the g ran t ing of property in land to those who work , two profit-shar ing measures, and confiscation of i l l -got ten gain . He went on in five pages out of eighty to outline the six major problems w i t h which a Cuban Revolut ion would have to deal : land re form, industr ial iza­t i on , housing, unemployment , edu­

cation, and health, "along w i t h the restoration of publ ic liberties and po l i t i ca l democracy." He offered solutions to on ly two of these— land : expropr ia t ion , redis tr ibu­t i o n and agr icu l tura l co-operatives; and housing : cut t ing rents in half and financing new housing. I em­phasize this revolutionary docu­ment because it is today widely claimed in Cuba that "His to ry W i l l Absolve M e " represents the blue­p r i n t of the revolution we are now witnessing. I suggest that this widespread Cuban view is mistaken. It does not appear that the fo rm the Cuban Revolution takes today was conceived in 1953. Examina­tion of the document w i t h this ques­t ion in mind — the emphasis on recourse to legali ty, the relative moderat ion of the five immediate laws, the fa i lure to indicate, much less to spell out. any programme of attack on the six major p r o b l e m s -w i l l , I believe, demonstrate that " H i s t o r y W i l l Absolve M e " may have contained some, goals and direct ional signposts, but that it cer­tainly was not a b luepr in t , plat­form, or programme, wri t ten in 1953, of the revolution which was to take place after 1959. To say so does not. and is not meant; to con­demn either Fidel's 195 3 position or his I 9 6 0 act ion. It is only to say that to find the roots of today's revolution we must look a good deal further.

Landing in Oriente The next step in the development

of the revolut ionary movement, wh ich by then had taken the 26th of July as its name, was s t i l l fur­ther to radicalize the means of revolut ion. F ide l had, of course, been condemned by the court, but had regained his freedom shortly thereafter as a result of a general amnesty which Batista declared to reduce the g rowing pressure against his regime. Fidel used his free­dom to plan a well-conceived co­ordinated m i l i t a r y attack on the Batista government. On December 2, 1956, he landed wi th eighty-two men on a beach in Oriente Pro­vince. The land ing was to have coincided w i t h an upr i s ing in San­tiago. Orientes largest c i ty . Bad weather delayed the ship's a r r i v a l f rom Mexico, the upr i s ing alerted the government, and the l and ing force was all but w iped out. Twelve men escaped death and reached the protect ion of the Sierra Maes-tre Mountains . It is probable that,

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had this 1956 rebel l ion succeeded, Cuba would not be experiencing the radical and profound social revolution wh ich the wor ld is w i t ­nessing today. For even then the revolu t ionary movement had not developed and matured into the radical ism and profundi ty which i t was to have more than two years later. St i l l other events had to transpire, experiences had to arise, before the revolution could assume its present form.

Fidel had selected his landing place in Oriente not only because of the tactical advantage that the mountains could afford. There are mountains as well elsewhere in Cuba. However, Oriente has long been at once the poorest and the most mi l i tan t ly rebellious province in Cuba. Possibly due. in part, to the much greater prevalence of small pr ivate holdings in the coffee and tobacco country of Oriente, its peasants and its intellectuals at the provinc ia l University of Oriente had been more active supporters of the revolutionary movement of the hundred years preceding. Fidel counted on their support.

Ear ly in 1957 Fidel and his ele­ven companions sought to init iate gueri l la warfare against Batista's a rmy from their mounta in hideouts. Batista had sometimes fifteen thou­sand, sometimes twenty thousand men under arms: Fidel had twelve. What were the sources of the sup­port Fidel needed to fight such odds? The Communist Party, w i t h a membership of possibly ten thousand, mostly in Havana, offer­ed no support whatever. Not sur­pr is ingly , it regarded F ide l as a romantic. latter-day version of a Lord Byron or Robin Hood. Nor d id the peasants of the Sierra, on whose account Fidel had landed there, support h i m or his move­ment. If they were interested at a l l . they regarded Fidel w i t h sus­pic ion and his movement as another intellectual and middle-class re­fo rm, not unl ike that of 1933, wh ich would promise no improve­ment in the lives of the large pea­sant major i ty . Who , then, d i d lend support to Fidel ? Students mostly in Santiago, rather than Havana, and members of the middle-class in Havana. Not un l ike the peasants, they thought that Fidel's movement was one of middle-class reform. The middle-class supplied the money for weapons, and the students

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of Santiago supplied the com­mi tment and courage to smuggle them into the mountains .

Movement Rallies Support D u r i n g 1957 and 1958 Fidel 's

group waged guer i l la warfare in the mountains and sent an expedi­t ion across the plains of Camaugey. W i t h the matura t ion and attendant repression of the Batista dictator­ship and its combattal by Fidel 's group, the Movement of the 26th of Ju ly increasingly ra l l ied support to its side. Seeing some peasants and Fidel 's men fighting side by side, other peasants came to gain confi­dence in Fidel and his cause. Havana Negroes had lent some sup­port to Batista, apparent ly because the combinat ion of his Mul la to blood w i t h his rise to power bad appealed to them, as a symbol of thei r own ascendance and recogni­t ion in the society. In the mean­time, in Oriente (the only other pro-vince in which Negroes l ive in large numbers ) , Negroes came to sense that Fidel's movement represented so thorough a movement toward social equal i ty that it augured emancipat ion for them as wel l . The g r o w i n g popular support for Fidel's movement, combined w i t h the com­plete fa i lu re of the M a r c h 1959 general str ike wh ich represented the capstone of their earlier tactics against Batista, resulted in the sup­por t of and subsequent collabora­t ion w i t h the 26th of July move­ment of the Communis t Party of Cuba in A p r i l 1959.

Add i t i ona l sources of support , campaigns against urban m i l i t a r y garrisons w i th gun in one hand and microphone in the other ; demora­l i z i n g Batista's a r m y by d isa rming prisoners and then setting them free, that is, t reat ing them as fellow vic t ims of Batista rather than as his defenders, increasingly faci l i ta­ted Castro's m i l i t a r y campaign. Late in 1958, three hundred men under arms withstood and even­tua l ly destroyed the arms of twen­ty thousand men which sent a sin­gle expedi t ionary force of twelve thousand men to crush the rebellion once and fo r a l l .

Peasants Influence Movement

But for the long r u n of Cuba and o f L a t i n Amer ica , possibly more impor t an t than Castro's i n ­fluence on the peasants and others was the influence of the peasants on Castro and his movement. Not­wi ths tand ing Fidel 's emphasis on

land reform in 1953 and his selec­t ion of r u r a l Oriente as the place f r o m w h i c h to wage his war, the two years he and his men spent f ight ing and l i v ing among the peasants in the mountains undoub­tedly resulted in an empathy and a depth of understanding of the pea sants and their problems which they would have lacked had the 1956 attempt, to say noth ing of the 1953 attempt, been immediately success­fu l . The events and experiences of the years 1957 and 1958 thus be-came cruc ia l ly impor tan t in shap­i n g the form that the. revolution eventually was to take, and, to ant i ­cipate an argument below, for the lesson that La t in Americans have undoubtedly learned about the dif­ference between a resolution fought in ihe city and a revolution fought in the country .

No Reliance on Professional Army

On New Year's eve of 1958 Batista flees the country, and on January 1, 1959 Fidel Castro and his forces take control of the go­vernment. The rebellion against the dictatorship of Batisla which grew out of 1952. 1953 and 1956 had ended in 1958. But the Revolution, whose antecedants were 1492. 1808, 1895 and 1933 had only just begun on that same day. In a sense, the six year rebellion was only the la­bour w h i c h made possible the b i r t h of a revolution conceived in 1492. How would the new-born revolution develop, what fo rm would it take ? I ts per iod of pregnancy and indeed its period of labour would deter­mine the form it wou ld take, but so would the environment into wh ich i t was born and into w h i c h it must grow. The first act of the revolutionary movement was to establish a government headed by a president, a pr ime minister, and important ambassadors.

What f o r m might the Cuban Revolution take ? In a sense, any of a large variety of forms. W h y does it take precisely the f o r m that i t does ? It is probably impossible to say. But the foregoing sections have pointed to the nature of Cuban society ( i t must be left to the reader to fami l ia r ize himself w i t h the themes and details of Cuban and L a t i n Amer ican society) , and they have sketched the develop­ment of response to these condi­tions. We have seen that some reforms have been relied upon in

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the past and have been found want­ing . Cubans have seen it too, and i t should not be su rpr i s ing i f they w o u l d geek not to make the same mistakes again. A rough and ready classification of some other alter­native forms the revolution migh t take can be gleaned f rom the ex­perience of other La t in Amer ican countries in their attempts to face in part s imilar problems. An out-sider cannot, of course, c la im that this experience elsewhere Mas steer­ed the Cuban Revolution precisely into the course it has taken. But it is certain that the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, and in a less sophisticated way large masses of the Cuban people, have fami l ia r ized themselves w i t h this L a t i n A m e r i ­can revolut ionary experience and that they have sought to avoid its mistakes. We may thus briefly review this La t in American expe­rience and suggest some lessons which, f rom the Cuban point of view, this experience has to offer.

It is common knowledge that in recent decades the largest par t of rapid pol i t ica l change in La t i n America has taken the f o r m of intra-army changes in the palace guard . It is as obvious as it is f ami l i a r that such rebellions are s t i l l b o r n and in no way further the revolut ionary reform movement which Cuba has harboured all these years. Moreover, given the role that the La t in Amer ican army t y p i ­cal ly plays in safeguarding the con­servatism of the .society, keeping the professional army intact means that a major road block to social change has failed to be removed. Exiling the o l d leadership, as is so customary in La t in America , s imi­l a r l y maintains or provides a nu­cleus for the resurgence of the o ld regime. An alternative, impor tan t if the rebellion has been long and violent, is that the o ld leadership is mobbed by the angry people, in French Revolution style. But this alternative is also costly to the peo­ple themselves. Thus reliance on revolut ionary courts. even though they may look l ike kangaroo courts and convict ion and execu­t ion hold impor t an t benefits over the other two l ike ly alternatives. So does rehabi l i t a t ion of lower echelon leadership where i t is possible. In this context, Cuban reliance for the rebellion on m i l i t a r y forces out­side of the professional army, and its subsequent destruction and e l i ­mina t ion of the dic ta tor ia l leaders

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seems a plausible course f o r the pursu i t of the reforms al ready in-tended by generations of Cuban revolutionaries.

Shift from City to Country

To the extent that L a t i n A m e r i ­can rebell ions have involved large-scale f igh t ing , this f igh t ing has, w i t h the notable exception of the Mexican and Bol iv ian cases, occur­red p r i n c i p a l l y in the major c i ty or c i t iea Th is m i l i t a r y action in the cities has been at the same t ime symptom and cause of the urban rebellions wh ich have so wide ly characterized the ru ra l societies of L a t i n A m e r i c a . These urban rebel­lions have in tu rn resulted p r i m a r i ­ly in urban reforms. Where they have led to changes in the ru r a l society as we l l , these changes have been largely brought to, if not for­ced on, the countryside. Even the most cursory acquaintance w i th urban- rura l conflict, denied though it may be by generations of Soviet and Western wri ters , w i l l forbode unhappy consequences for this pro­cess. The more intensive and ex­tensive changes in the ru ra l and rura l -urban social relations wh ich have been associated w i t h the pa r t i ­c ipa t ion of Zapata's peasants in the Mexican revolut ion of 1910 and the two years of gueri l la warfare by Castro's forces in the mountains of Cuba foreshadow a shift in the lo­cus and nature of rebell ion and revolu t ion f rom c i ty to country in the L a t i n Amer ican upheavals which arc soon to come.

Argentina and Venezuela

An alternative f o r m for the Cu­ban Revolut ion, more radical than the clearly inadequate changes of the palace guard considered and rejected above, may be represented by recent reforms in Argent ina and Venezuela. Peron's government in Argen t ina adopted the course of a welfare state. In facing Argentina 's economic problems, Peron sought to rely on the re-dis t r ibut ion of the income pie i m p l i c i t in the welfare state, w i t h h a r d l y any concern for increasing the size of that pie. Ur ­ban workers were favoured, and in the meantime agr icu l tu ra l produc­t i v i t y decl ined. To continue to enforce the d i s t r i bu t ion his govern­ment desired, Peron became increas-singly d ic ta tor ia l and his govern­ment increasingly repressive. In the mean t ime far ther no r th , Jimenez dealt w i t h Venezuela's economic

problems by resort ing neither to re­d i s t r ibu t ion , nor to investment in g rowth , w i t h the exception of the pet roleum industry which filled the coffers of his treasury, but whose benefits ha rd ly t r ick led in to the countryside beyond Caracas' luxu­ry housing and l u x u r y highways. In both countries, but pa r t i cu la r ly in Venezuela, socio-political in­equali ty was felt us repression by the rura l majori t ies. Both dictators were overthrown after the mid-1950's. Both dictatorships were re­placed by substantially middle-class based holders of power w h i c h have, pa r t i cu la r ly in the United States, been widely hailed as "Democrat ic Reform Governments." "Free elec­tions" and par l iamentary coalitions have accompanied the Frondiz i go­vernment in Argent ina and the Bentacourt government in Venezuela. Note that the first step of the Cu­ban Revolu t ion also resulted in filling the h igh government offices w i t h s imi la r h i g h l y respectable middle-class personnel. In several years of office, neither the Frondizi nor the Bentacourt government have brought any notable re form to the countryside, neither socially, p o l i t i ­cally, nor economical ly; not land reform, not education, not invest­ment, nor, in the case of Venezuela, channel l ing the large income f rom its petroleum industry into diversi­fied economic development.

F r o m where the Cubans sit, hav ing fai led to introduce any re­fo rm in the structure, par t icu la r ly in the ru ra l structure of these societies, the pressures which La t in Amer ican .social structure exerts on governments to become increasingly r igh t -wing dictatorships (or to put it the other way around, the condi­tions which permit these dictator­ships to flower have reasserted themselves), and both countries al­ready find themselves again threa­tened w i t h imminen t re turn to Peron-Jimenez type dictatorships — just as Batista inevi tably grew out of the undisturbed roots of the Machado regime in Cuba. F rom the Cuban point of view and f rom that of this wr i t e r , the fact that as these pages are being wr i t t en , Bentacourt is p a t r o l l i n g the ci ty w i t h tanks and shooting students in the streets is not an accident. Such are the f rui ts of r e ly ing on the ou tward t rappings o f democracy wi thou t any at tempt to reform, never m i n d democratize, the society. I t should

come as l i t t l e surprise to discover that the Frondizi Bentacourt f o r m of revolution or type of r e fo rm is what the Uni ted States and, indeed, the middle and upper class ele­ments in Cuba and L a t i n Amer i ca would l ike to have seen as the f o r m of the Cuban Revolut ion. But i t should come as no less of a surprise that the leaders of the Movement of the 26 th of July should have interpreted Argent ine and Vene­zuelan experience as a sign that more radical and more wide-spread social change must be wrought in Cuba if the sacrifices of the rebel­l ion and the past are not to have been made in va in .

Guatemala and Bolivia

A model of the fo rm more rad i ­cal than that discussed above may be found in the revolutions of (Guatemala in 1944 and Bol iv ia in 1952. Both revolutions were in part ru ra l in character, in socio-political and economic change in the coun­tryside. Yet, as is well known, both revolutions fai led. The Bol ivian one never even really got off the ground. The governments of Are-valo and later Arbenz in Guatemala d id introduce social change to the countryside. but they d i d so gra­dually and on a catch-as-catch-can basis. The revolut ion d id call for some popular par t ic ipa t ion , though not in the f o r m of m i l i t a r y defense by the armed populace; and when the counter-revolution attacked in 1954. the reform governments and wi th them ten years of work were an easy pushover. (As a sidelight, some Cubans have observed that the presence at the time of the re­volutions of the American ambassa­dor Bonsial in Bol iv ia and in Guatemala and then again in Cuba may not have been altogether coin­cidental.)

F ina l ly , i f none of the foregoing models for a L a t i n Amer ican revo­lu t ion appear to promise the results which revolu t ionary Cubans desire and require, the example of Mexico, w i t h the oldest, longest, and most far-reaching revolut ion which L a t i n Amer i ca has- witnessed, st i l l remains available fo r examina t ion . . The Mexican Revolut ion of 1910 came on the heels of the Diaz dictator­ship of the preceding century wh ich has universally been charac­terized as an alliance between p r i -vate land owners, the Church, and A m e r i c a n investment interests in Mexico . The rebellion was fought

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long and h a r d by various factions, some of w h i c h represented the pea­sants; it resulted in a revolut ion wh ich made sweeping land re forms; eventually, though not un t i l decades later, conducted a widespread and successful l i teracy campa ign ; i n ­creased educat ion; expropr ia ted a l l p r iva te and fore ign holdings of subterranean minera l and petro­leum resources in 1936; began the indus t r ia l iza t ion of the coun t ry ; and, has raised the investment rate to a respectable 10 per cent per annum. Yet , per capita income in Mexico remained one-haIf of what i t is in Cuba, the peasantry seems to have been a l l but bypassed by economic development, and every government since that of Cardenas in the mid-thir t ies have moved increasingly to the r igh t un t i l the middle-class i n ­dustr ial and commercia l govern­ment of Lopez Mateos is today regarded as excessively conserva­tive, even by Time magazine.

Forced into More Radical Forms

W i t h o u t going in to the details of the r e fo rm measures undertaken by the revolut ions reviewed above and the revolut ion now un fo ld ing in Cuba, it appears clear to this wr i t e r that, if the Cuban Revolut ion is no also to be either s t i l lborn or to die in infancy, Cuba is forced in to s t i l l more radical forms of revolu t ion than any of those yet seen in L a t h Amer ica . The haste w i t h which re­volu t ionary reforms are being under taken; the exp ropr i a t ion of la t i fundista ownership of sugar am grazing lands; the d i s t r ibu t ion of land and agr icu l tura l credit to small holders; fo rmat ion o f ag r icu l tu ra l co-operatives for diversif icat ion of crops and employment of the. eight to twelve month unemployed rura l prole tar ia t which characterize Cuba's popula t ion as it does no those of many of the countries exa mined above; the immediate dr ive for indust r ia l iza t ion, small and large, l i gh t and heavy, the establish­ment o f I N R A (Nat iona l Institute of A g r a r i a n Reform) as a sort of super T V A ; 64 per cent increase of pr imlary school enrolment and the three-fold increase of first-grade enrolment in the very first year of the r e v o l u t i o n ; the d i s t r ibu t ion of f ire-arms to the near ly one m i l l i o n m i l i t i a (na t iona l guard) members; the asceticism of those active in the revolu t ion f r o m the smallest r u r a l communi ty to the office of the p r i m e min i s t e r ; a l l these dist in­

guished the Cuban Revolut ion as one more radical , more serious, more active, than any p r i o r L a t i n Amer ican revolut ion wh ich Cuba migh t use as its mode).

Thus, the very experience of so r i a l re form movements elsewhere in L a t i n America and in Cuba's own history itself, which has led Cuba to adopt revolut ionary forms more radical than those for which models are available also leaves Cuba in the posi t ion of having to make and find her way in revolut ionary t e r r i ­tory unchartered by earlier exper­ience in L a t i n America . The radi-calisrn of the Cuban Revolution, in­duced par t ly by necessity and p a r t l y by design, has already set Cuba on a path for which history can no longer serve as a guide. It is im­pl ic i t in the preceding discussion that the Cuban Revolution finds it­self at this poin t wi thout a pre-for-mulated procedure which might guide the revolut ion along its way Moreover beyond the design for re­be l l ion against the o ld dictatorship and the general intent for land re­f o r m and other reforms announced in " H i s t o r y Wi l l Absolve Me ' , the revolu t ion lacked these guides as wel l d u r i n g the recent years that it has already traversed.

Finds its Own Way

Not. unl ike other social move ments. and probably more than many, the Cuban Revolution mus and does find its way substantially in the dark as it goes along its way. Under the circumstances, i should not be surpr is ing if many Cubans seek, and some yearn, for a model that might serve them as a guide. Quite obviously the West, and par t icu la r ly the United Slates, can offer it no such model. Even where some Amer ican experience might serve as a guide, the Uni ted States has sought to close the chan­nels of t ransmit ta l of such exper­ience by w i t h d r a w i n g technical and material a id and trade, while par t i ­cular American measures which m i g h t of themselves be inoffensive have come to be associated w i t h the offensiveness of American imper-ial ism in La t i n Amer ica as a whole. In the meantime, the Un i t ed States, far f r o m making an effort to isolate the acceptable f r o m the offensive, insists on cont inuing to sell the Amer ican way as a package deal.

L o o k i n g between East and West, i t is possible to f ind a " T h i r d

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Force" or a t h i r d or fou r th way. But; to the extent to w h i c h they exist, these models and sources of possible al ignment are largely in the f ie ld of in te rna t ional po l i t i cs . I n d i a , Burma , the Uni ted A r a b Republ ic , the new A f r i c a n states may offer alternatives in the United Nations, but they have no economic pro­gramme that Cuba might make its own. To this observer, among coun­tries which are not al igned on either side of the cold war, only Yugo­slavia appears as a source of any potential guide to a country l i k e Cuba. The presence of a substan­tial number of Yugoslavian techni­cians in Cuba suggests that Cuba may yet come to look in that direc­t ion .

West Offers No Guide

There remain, then, only two other places for Cuba to look for guid­ance to its fu tu re ; one is toward Russia-China, and the other is at home. The model of the Socialist camp, of course, holds profound attraction for any country or people who, l ike Cuba, have only just be­come determined to shape their own future. Even if the West were not so in t imately associated w i t h I m ­perial ism, be it of the Br i t i sh-French or the American variety, the Western and pa r t i cu la r ly American programmer would suffer seriously f rom their heavy emphasis on eco­nomic problems alone, But f rom the Cuban, and in genera] the L a t i n Amercian-African-Southeast-A s i a n point of view, the problems they fare are in the first instance and probably most important ly prob­lems of social and poli t ical change. But it is to precisely these prob­lems that the West offers no guide and Western supported elements in the "emergent" societies offer no programme.

It is commonplace among Western economists to miss the boat even on economic problems. Though they r igh t ly po in t out that only increa­ses and not changes in the d i s t r ibu­t ion of the economic pie can u l t i ­mately serve to meet the problems of economic development, they are f rom this led to conclude and ad­vise that the wor ld-wide attempts at re-dis t r ibut ion are misplaced. But f r o m the po in t of view of Cuba, or any other semi-Feudal country, i t is clear that re-d is t r ibut ion of wealth and therewi th power are necessary to render possibly the increase in

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output w h i c h Western economises prescribe. I t i s thus not surpr i s ing i f Cubans look toward Russia and China as the only sources of models for fu r the r ing social, po l i t i c a l and economic change.

Most Important Solutions Home Grown

Though the Cubans may look in p a r t toward Russia and China, they work at home and the largest and most impor t an t solutions to thei r revolu t ionary problems are met w i t h solutions home-grown on the spot. Even a casual observer can readi ly note how Cuba is r e ly ing on var ied solutions to the problems of g u i d i n g their revo lu t ion th rough unchartered t e r r i to ry , and how these solutions in t u r n give rise to var ied new pro­blems. That is their revolut ionary pro­gramme, and its procedure is large­ly devised where and when occasion demands. Viewed f rom the perspec­t ive of a place of s tabi l i ty , the Cu­ban Revolut ion appears as a tangle of confusion, of people r u n n i n g off in a l l different directions, of many projects started and few concluded of changes in d i rec t ion . But viewed f r o m the standpoint of the revolu­t ionary , these are the very marks of v i t a l i t y ; they are the marks not of weakness, but of strength. Yet, not every th ing can be changed. In his analysis of the Ana tomy of Revolu­t ion , Crane B r i n t o n suggested that no revolut ion can change everything, that the new must be bu i l t upon the o ld .

Bu t for a revolut ion , the old is not only a legacy and a base, it is also an i n s t r u m e n t Paradoxica l ly , it is the very radicalness of change to be in t roduced in Cuba which necessitates reliance on the o ld well-entrenched and thus re l iab le social arid cul tura l forms as vehicles for the in t roduc t ion of that change. An attempt at wholesale subst i tut ion of a new society and cul ture for the o l d would surely result in no society, new or o ld . Thus, s t i l l another source of understanding of the Cu­ban Revolut ion lies in an examina­t i o n of the old and existing socio-c u l t u r a l forms wh ich serve as vehi­c l e fo r the Revolut ion, and wh ich thereby help to define the possibili­ties and l imi ta t ions of social change th rough the Cuban Revolut ion .

Family and Kinship

Now, as before, in Cuba as in most other parts of the w o r l d , f a m i l y and k insh ip relations serve

as the most impor t an t bond and channel of communica t ion between people. M a n y things are necessary to w o r k a far-reaching change in a so­ciety, but one of them surely is to communicate the new, the changes in social relat ionship that have already occurred, the new opportuni t ies and responsibili t ies, the s p i r i t of the revolut ion — to the people. A n y vis i t to Cuba's countryside, to its villages and towns, and if one looks more closely, to its cities, w i l l show that television and other mass me­dia, commercial and w o r k relations notwi ths tanding , the extended f a m i l y serves as the Revolution's most im­por tant medium of communicat ion . It is the fami ly which reaches f rom the countryside to the town, f rom one region to another, f r o m the provinces to the capital , in short f r o m one po in t of contact w i t h re­vo lu t iona ry experience to another. A n d the experience w i t h the revolu­t ion wh ich is meaningful and im­portant , wh ich permits a sense of pa r t i c ipa t ion and produces a feeling of empathy, that experience is the one which is communicated between one member of a f a m i l y and another.

The Patron Relationship

It is the experience of the son in a new school, the cousin in a new co­operative f a r m , the uncle in Hava­na, much more than Fidel 's TV speeches, newspapers, mass rallies, or even cracker-barrel discussions w h i c h lend meaning to the revolu­t i o n . At the same t ime i t is exist­i n g f a m i l y relations which continue in many instances to serve as the vehicles for the d i s t r ibu t ion of the new oppor tuni t ies and responsibil i­ties ar is ing out of the r evo lu t ion in land ownership, education, and out of the new tasks created in the revo­lu t ion in general. Thus an acquain­tance w i t h the Cuban f a m i l y can afford much understanding of the points at which change is or must be int roduced, how it can be com­municated and accepted or rejected, in short, of the possibilities f o r re­vo lu t ion and the l imi ta t ions on change wh ich Cuba's most impor ­tant ins t i tu t ion bodes fo r the Revo­l u t i o n .

Probably the most i m p o r t a n t social relat ionship in L a t i n A m e r i ­can and Cuban society, bo th inside the f ami ly and out is the au thor i ty of the father, paternalism or the "pat­r o n " relat ionship. In the absence o f this time-tested f o r m of social in-

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tercourse, i t wou ld be impossible for Cuba to organize the construc­t ion of the new schools, roads, fac­tories, and most impor t an t , to in ­troduce any new forms of enterprise l ike ag r i cu l t u r a l cooperatives. Des­pite, may be because of, the less " indigenous" nature of Cuba com­pared w i t h other Carr ibean society, paternalism has in Cuba played an even more pervasive role than else­where. However, a colleague of mine suggests that Cuban paternal relations have been less regu­larized and reciprocal than those of feudalism or heavi ly Ind ian popu­lated societies l ike Bol iv ia . Thus, Cubans have often had to approach their pa t ron w i t h requests rather than r e ly ing only on his fulf i lment of already specified reciprocal ob l i ­gations.

Administrators Run Cooperative Farms

Consider agr icu l ture . As one strolls th rough cities and towns al­most anywhere in the wor ld , A m e r i ­ca, Russia, Europe, Af r i ca , other Carr ibean countries, one encounters outdoor markets in which 'nearby farmers sell vegetables and often meat of the i r own produc t ion . Not so in Cuba. And the reason is s imple : much less than other ru ra l countries does Cuba have small holders who are In a position to raise and market such produce on their own . Such small holders as there are tend to be isolated in the mountains, where they raise coffee and tobacco as cash crops and pro­duce for subsistence. Most other Cuban peasants, if one may even cal l them that. have long been landless agr icu l tu ra l labourers, a ver i table r u r a l proletariat . They worked (on ly par t of the year) on large and medium size landholdings, and the relat ionship between them and employers and supervisory per­sonnel was substantial ly paterna­l i s t ic . Bu t in large part many pea­sants were not therefore automati­cally total ly cared fo r . The term "guajero" , now generalized to refer to all peasants, developed as the name of peasants who bu i l t their shacks along the roadside, for lack of any other land on which to l ive .

When Castro moved to establish cooperative farms, for sugar and other produce as we l l , the w o r l d expected a repet i t ion of the collec­t iv iza t ion problems which had pla­gued Russia, Eastern Europe and

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China , They need have had neither fear nor de l ight . I N R A (Na­t iona l Ins t i tu te of A g r i a r i a n Re­f o r m ) appoin ted adminis t ra tors f o r each cooperative f a r m , and in i m ­por tan t ways Cuba proceeded w i t h business as usual. The commun i ty elders who pointed to the p ic ture of ex-sugar m i l l adminis t ra tor hanging in their company-provided club house and who noted w i t h salisfac l ion that, though the p ic ture is lar­ger than that of Fidel Castro on the other w a l l , they have no reason to remove i t , were saying just that . In many ways, the Revolut ion has, at least for the present, passed much of the i n i t i a t i ve in the paternalistic re la t ionship to the patron. In sugar lands already in product ion , the co-op members elect a "coordinator" f r o m among their members, bu t the au thor i ty is vested in the I N R A -appointed, non-member, "adminis­t r a t o r " for the first l ive years or un t i l the membership has learned itself to assume responsibi l i ty . In the new ag r i cu l tu ra l co-ops, w h i c h are largely breaking new lands and only just beginning construction, membership has generally not been established yet.

Continued Paternalism The establishment of the f a rm is

under the au thor i ty of the adminis t ra tor , who in t u r n is under the d i rec t ion of the chief of his agr i ­cu l tu ra l zone; and the work is done by a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers h i red by the day. Indeed, some of these farms, the largest, w i l l never be t ransformed in to cooperatives bu t w i l l be maintained as "Granjas del Puelbo" w i t h employed workers re­miniscent of Soviet state farms. For the t ime being, none of these farms are real ly cooperatives in the sense thai responsibil i ty, and the rewi th benefits and costs residual ly rest w i t h the par t ic ipants . Even casual conversation w i t h either the pea­sants or the supervisory personnel easily demonstrates that thei r ex­perience in the past has been of paternal ism and that they continue to re ly on i t for the present. The government has not t r ied to substi­tute cooperatives for small pr ivate landholdings where it does exist, and it is no accident that Cuba is p robab ly the only country in the w o r l d in wh ich serious land re fo rm has not resulted in an i n i t i a l decline i n ag r i cu l tu ra l ou tput .

The cont inued paternalism exhi bi ts i t s e l f in the relat ion between

i n d i v i d u a l peasants and the new agr icu l tura l extension and credit agencies, the new "stores of the people" which supplement and re­place the pr ivate and company stores in r u r a l areas. Paternal ism and conversely lack of i nd iv idua l responsibi l i ty remain evident in stu­dent-teacher relationships in the many new schools. But at the same t ime the youth and non-professional­ism of many of the new teachers and the ind iv idua l in i t ia t ive which underlies the very school attendance on the par t of many teenagers and young adults, undoubtedly attenuate the paternalism in the student-tea­cher relat ionship. The 20-hour t r i p by three friends of mine, 18, 19, and 20 years of age. f rom isolated Sagua de Tanamo to previously strange and distant Havana to see the Minis te r of Education and ask h i m to bu i ld a technical h igh school in their town was undoubtedly visualized by both parties in the context of paternal ism, but the same event w o u l d not have occurred before the Revolut ion.

There is. thus, a difference in the qua l i ty of the paternal ism then and now. Though the au thor i ty and mutual responsibil i ty and respect largely remain the basis of organiz­ing the tasks of the Kevolut ion as they d i d the tasks of o ld , both " f a the r " and "son" appear to sense a difference in the source of that author i ty and respect. This change in source or base may be traceable in part to the very deep and wide­spread sense of pa r t i c ipa t ion in the Revolut ion and the new Cuba, and it m i g h t be due in par t to the un­usual youth of all at the top of much of the local leadership in the Revo­lu t ion . The new Cuban paterna­l i sm has a qua l i ty of fraternal ism. A n d this already represents and forebodes a profound social revolu­t i o n .

Obligations Particular and Personal

Thus, a closer examinat ion of paternal ism in Cuban society can increase our understanding of how the new can come to be int roduced and accepted, how real cooperatives w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l and collective responsibil i ty they i m p l y can come in to being, w i t h worker par t ic ipa­t i on in management, maybe on the Yugoslavian style, can and w i l l be in t roduced, what f ru i t s the educa­t iona l re form w i l l bear.

Another q u a l i t y o f L a t i n and Cuban social relations, not unrela­

ted to paternal ism, is their p a r t i ­cular ism and personalism. In Catho­l ic societies more than in Protestant ones, obl iga t ions are pa r t i cu l a r and to persons rather than universal and to pr inc ip les . Glance at any news­paper photograph of the revolu t ion­ary leadership, l isten to any state­ment by "defectors who were close to Castro ' , and the intense personal qua l i ty of the recru i tment in to posi­tions of leadership and au thor i ty and of the con t inu ing relations among those so recruited is imme­diately evident. The same personal-ism is the source as well of many of the social contacts between top leaders and other revo lu t ionary actives and among the lat ter them­selves. In the absence of such strong personal ties and their im­portance, how would people in en­t i re ly new and often cont inua l ly changing revolu t ionary roles and incumbencies relate to each other, how could the revolu t ionary leader­ship coordinate its activities at a l l?

A n d yet, a t least in practice i f not in design, the leadership of the Cuban Revolut ion scrupulously practices the dictates of two ul tra-universalistic values: honesty and asceticism; no charges of f raud or financial self-aggrandizement have come to my ears — even f r o m the l ips of those most unf r i end ly to the government, and the spartan exist­ence and hard work of those active in the Revolut ion is common know­ledge. W h a t the source and appeal of this behaviour in La t in America is, I do not know. Possibly, and paradoxical ly , it is to be traced in part to the much stronger influence that N o r t h Amer ican culture has exerted in Cuba than anywhere else in L a t i n Amer ica . Cer ta in ly the early days of the Mexican revolu­t ion were not famed for honesty or asceticism.

Northerners have long regarded Lat ins as au thor i t a r i an and yet as ind iv idua l i s t i c , free-wheeling and rebellious as w e l l . No revolut ion can change nat ional character, i f that is wha t the above represents, o v e r n i g h t ; and i f the revolu t ion is to in t roduce and change, i t must r e ly on exis t ing cu l tu ra l forms as vehicles of that change. A n d so one may encounter cooperative f a r m adminis t ra tors who w i l l tell you that he w i l l plant where and how the agronomist (there he sits, fresh out of school) tells h i m to. because only he has the necessary knowledge,

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whi l e another adminis t ra tor , or i n ­deed the same one, w i l l p o i n t w i t h p r ide to the new br ickworks or new fu rn i tu re factory he has established entirely on his own in i t i a t ive and wi thou t the advice or consent of anybody; and if someone doesn't l ike i t . they can go to he l l . So much of the old serves to shape, and also to b r i n g f o r t h , the new.

Pragmatic and Personalised

The pragmatism of the Cuban Revolution in its development and the var ie ty of its current forms sug­gests that, as I argued earlier, the Revolut ion has no ideology. But as the past gives way to the future , as the focus of attention and as the variety of at tempted revo lu t ionary forms seems increasingly to dissi pate the revolut ionary force, pres sures w i l l surely fo rm to create and adopt an ideology for the Cuban Revolut ion. Maybe that t ime is al­ready here. To serve its purpose, that ideology must be widely com­municated, and to be communicated it must be readi ly symbolized. Wha then are the exis t ing forms of sym-bol ic ism and imagery which can serve to carry the ideology and there­

w i t h the Revolut ion? One answer, but only one, is personalism again. Signif icant L a t i n images, as w e l l as social relations, tend to be h igh ly personal. Thus, probably more than the social movements of northern countries wh ich tend to be more ideal is t ical ly symbolized, the Cuban Revolut ion may become increasingly associated wi th the leadership and personality of F ide l . "We are a l l Fidelistas," Cubans say. If the Re­volut ion is so personalized, how wou ld Fidel's death affect the Revo-Iution's course?

The foregoing discussion has not been an at tempt to describe or ex­p la in the Cuban Revolut ion exhaus­t ively. Its intent has been on ly to expose for inspection three sources of background and explanat ion for the developments that Cuba and the wor ld now witness: The Cuban ancien regime and the development of the revolut ionary movement w i t h ­in i t , the experience elsewhere in L a t i n America w i t h attempts to handle s imi la r problems, and some socio-cultural factors in Cuban l i fe which inev i tab ly must influence the course of the Revolut ion. I t must

be left to the understanding and re­search of others to explore the many questions on ly raised here.

T u b e F a c t o r y

T H E Commonweal th Development Finance Company w i l l provide

a loan of £ 175,000 for the manu­facture of non-ferrous tubes, pipes, rods, and sections in Ind ia .

The loan w i l l provide the for­eign-exchange requirements for a factory being erected in Bombay by Kamani Tubes Private L t d , in col­laborat ion w i t h Yorksh i re I m p e r i a l Metals L t d . an associate of Imper i a l Chemical Industries, which has arranged the procurement of plant in the Uni ted K i n g d o m , and w i l l assist in the early per iod of run­n ing , under a 10- year technical collaborat ion agreement.

The Yorksh i re I m p e r i a l Metals ' part in the scheme is largely one of supply ing know-how. They also hope to provide assistance, f rom t ime to t ime by means of short visits to India by technicians f rom Leeds.

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