The Application of the Rational Actor Model

To The Catholic Church in The Cuban Revolution

Tayra de la Caridad Antolick Religion and Politics in Latin America

Professor Tim Steigenga CPO 4305 • ISS 4932

Table of Contents

Introduction ..............................................................................................................1-3

The Rational Actor Model .......................................................................................4-9

Church-State Cooperation...................................................................................5-6 The State’s View..............................................................................................5 The Church’s View.......................................................................................5-6 Church-State Conflict........................................................................................6-9 State-Initiated Conflict..................................................................................6-7 Church-Initiated Conflict..............................................................................7-9 Origins of Church-State Conflict ................................................................... 9-11 Marxism ..................................................................................................... 9-10 Protestantism............................................................................................ 10-11

History of the Catholic Church in Cuba............................................................. 12-32

Colonial Times to the 1950s.......................................................................... 12-14 The Batista-Revolutionary Period: 1953 to 1958 ......................................... 14-19

Historical Evidence.................................................................................. 14-18 Assessment of Gill’s Model .................................................................... 18-19

Early Post-Revolution Relations: 1959 to 1963 ........................................... 19-28 Historical Evidence.................................................................................. 20-24 Castro’s Ideological Goal........................................................................ 24-26 Assessment of Gill’s Model .................................................................... 26-28

Church-State Relations: 1963 to 1999 .......................................................... 28-36 Historical Evidence.................................................................................. 29-35 Assessment of Gill’s Model .................................................................... 35-36

Flaws In Gill’s Model ......................................................................................... 37-39 Conclusion........................................................................................................... 40-41

Bibliography........................................................................................................ 42-43

Introduction

In his book Render Unto Caesar, Anthony Gill presents an economic model to explain why

the Catholic Church sometimes pledges allegiance to an authoritarian government and why sometimes

it does not. He explains that the parties involved in church-state alliances are rational actors and they

make choices for alignment to each other depending on whether that decision maximizes their

influence and control over their society. In economic terms, the choice whether or not to form

alliances depends on whether the benefits of the arrangement exceed the costs. The costs and benefits

may not necessarily be monetary. For example, for either the Church or the State, the costs may

come in the form of lost legitimacy or lack of material resources. Although the paradigms within

which costs and benefits are assessed are different, the rational actor process of assessment is the same

for both. I will test Gill’s model applying it to three segments of Cuba’s political history within the

years 1953-1999 to determine whether the Church’s actions are predictable given the presence of

certain independent variables.

Gill argues that if an authoritarian regime comes to power and there is competition from

Protestantism and other religions, the Catholic Church cannot afford to remain aligned to the state and

will take an anti-authoritarian stance. However, if there is no competition, the Church will remain

aligned with the government. Competition usually occurs in rural areas where the presence of priests

is rare or non-existent. Therefore, the Catholic Church is presented with two options: it spends its

resources in the rural areas to attract the campesinos, risking alienating the urban elite of the Church

and the state, or it spends it resources to maintain its ties to the elite and ignores the peasants (Gill, 48).

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Cuba is a unique case study because the revolution occurred prior to Vatican II in 1962-65. It

also occurred prior to the Second Latin American Bishops Conference in Medellín, Columbia in 1968

where liberation theology was first introduced to Christendom (Rosado, 273). The significance is that

the Church’s centuries-long neglect of the poor had not yet received the official acknowledgement

from the hierarchy during the revolutionary years from 1953 through 1959. At that conference, the

worldwide council of bishops brought to the forefront the Church’s collective conscience the necessity

to reevaluate its relationship to the world. This required that the Church ponder its purpose and nature

within the context of an ever-changing world with evolving ideologies. Since the Cuban Revolution

began in December of 1959, the idea of assessing the importance of historical changes within a

religious paradigm and influencing society according to those changes was not yet officially available

to the Cuban Church. Vatican II viewed the Church as a “Pilgrim People of God” whose journey in

this life can have meaning within a historical context. For some Catholic Churches in Latin America,

this reassessment allowed them to take on a socialist stance, defining society through Marxist

ideology. As a result, at the 1978 CELAM II meeting of Latin American bishops in Puebla, Mexico,

the “preferential option for the poor” was introduced as a legitimate mission of the Church, seeking to

change the socioeconomic condition of the poor through Base Ecclesial Communities, raising the

consciousness of the poor in their condition, and encouraging them to be proactive in improving their

lot in life through knowledge of Biblical prophecy.

Finally the Church acknowledged its historical neglect of the poor and sought to include them

as a legitimate component of the religious flock. Although historically the Catholic Church had been

conservative, elitist, disinterested in lower class and indigenous parishioners, and often times abusive

of its power against them (Levine, 21-25), now it was ready to take an active role in liberating the poor

from the societal structures that held them in a perpetual state of oppression. Some portions of the

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Latin American Catholic Church developed a liberation theology, incorporating Marxist definitions of

class divisions and warfare with Biblical prophecies interpretations centering on the poor.

But the change to embrace the poor came too late to change Fidel Castor’s opinion of the

institutional Church. Had the Vatican’s campaign to address the plight of the poor been in place

during the revolution, perhaps Castro’s distrust of the Catholic Church would not have been so

entrenched, and vice versa. This distrust set the stage for conflict that produced decisions on the part

of the Church that are sometimes rational and sometimes not, according to Gill’s definition of rational.

Furthermore, Castro’s Marxist declaration sent such a shock wave throughout the religious

community that all the churches were ill prepared to adapt to the change, feeling utterly betrayed and

dumbfounded by his actions.

In this essay I will test the relevance of Gill’s model for the Catholic Church’s choices in Cuba

during four historical stages: the Batista-Revolutionary years from 1953 to 1958, the early post-

Revolutionary years from 1959 to 1963, the Revolutionary years from 1991 to 1999. I will determine

whether his model holds true in each era, showing whether the Church acted rationally or irrationally

in light of economic and membership losses. I will also suggest flaws in his argument, showing that

there are some independent variables Gill neglects to consider in his model. Gill’s argument is better

applicable to cases where authoritarian regimes are challenged or come into power after the Second

Latin American Bishops Conference in Medellín, Columbia in 1968. He fails to consider a country’s

religious-political history, he treats the Church1 as a unitary actor, and he minimized the importance of

deeply entrenched opposing ideologies as independent variables.

1 In this essay, the word “Church” will always refer to the Catholic Church.

The Rational Actor Model

In trying to explain why the Catholic Church would support an authoritarian regime in one

country and not in another, social scientists have used poverty, repression, and internal changes in the

Church as independent variables. Gill rejects these variables because they have been present in

countries where the Church has aligned itself with both authoritarian and non-authoritarian

governments (40-46). In turn, he offers a different variable to explain the choice: competition. The

Church as a rational actor makes the best “economic” choices to fulfill its divine mission and maintain

its predominance in the country. Gill describes these choices in microeconomic terms of marginal

benefit and marginal cost (72). If the marginal cost of aligning with an authoritarian government

exceeds the marginal benefits, then the Church will not align itself with that government, and vice

versa. If competition from another religion like Protestantism or Spiritism is also present, the Church

must choose whether it will spend its resources attracting the civil and social elites to secure privileges

or spend its funds on attracting believers away from the competing religion, thus maximizing its

membership base. Gill is confident that he can predict how the alignment will go if competition is

present. If there is competition and the government is authoritarian, the Church will not align itself

with the authoritarian regime and use its resources to bring proselytized members back from the

competition and to bring in new converts (76).

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Church-State Cooperation

The State’s View

According to Gill, an authoritarian state’s top priority is to minimize the costs of ruling its

people. It can do this three ways: through coercion, patronage, or ideology (Gill, 50). The least costly

of these is ideology. If the government can somehow make the people internalize its ideology, and if

its values and norms are legitimated by the Church, then the government does not have to spend

resources on police action or on providing privileges. The norms and values are self-legitimizing and

self-perpetuating within the people’s psyche. Because the Church has a comparative advantage over

the state to foster and maintain ideological norms, the state will facilitate the Church’s opportunity to

do so. Gill summarizes the state’s choice thus:

Proposition 1: State Incentives for Church–State Cooperation. Given that 1) states seek to minimize the costs of rule, 2) ideological legitimation is the cheapest from of rule, and 3) religious leaders have a comparative advantage in the production of norms and values, state actors will cultivate cooperative relations with religious leaders more often than not (54).

The Church’s View

On the other side of the argument, the Church wants parishioner “maximization” either by

proselytizing or by “minimizing parishioner losses” (55). It needs to provide services, products, and

“compensators” that are superior to that of its competition (56). In order to do this, the Church must

also make full use of its revenues. One sure way of maximizing revenues is to align itself with the

state so that the state will use its coercive powers to limit the competition through legislation and to

extract revenues from society to minimize free riding—those who take benefits but do not pay for

them through offerings (57).

In the religious marketplace, the Catholic Church has to maintain its monopoly in order to

maximize its revenues and influence in society. However, it is much more costly for a priest to enter

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that market place than it is for a Protestant pastor. Protestant, especially Pentecostal pastors, do not

need years of training to establish a congregation. The barriers to entry are relatively low for them.

The converse is true for Catholic priests; therefore, the Church will seek state subsidies to maintain its

superior position in the society. Thus, Gill provides a second proposition:

Proposition 2: Church Incentives for Church-State Cooperation. Given that 1) religious leaders want to maximize parishioners, 2) religious leaders also want to maximize resources, 3) religious compensators are susceptible to competition, and 4) religious goods are susceptible to free riding, religious leaders will seek church-state cooperation more often than not (61).

Church-State Conflict

Why would a regime or the Church disestablish its relationship from the other? According to

Gill, they would do so if the costs of maintaining the relationship exceed the benefits.

Proposition 3: General Conditions for Church-State Conflict. Church-state conflict occurs when the opportunity costs of cooperation for any one party exceeds the present or future benefits of cooperation (63).

State Initiated Conflict

The state would initiate severance from the Church when the regime finds an alternate source

of legitimacy, when it wants to discredit and undermine the pillars of the previous regime if the

Church supported it, and when it wants the Church’s assets to finance it own goals (63-4).

One alternative source of legitimacy is the regime’s own ideology. If its ideology is strong,

the government does not have to pay for legitimacy from another source. Discrediting the Church can

shift the people’s endorsement and free the state from its patronage to the Church. Furthermore, if the

Church endorsed the previous regime, the current government will do all within its power to destroy

the opponent’s strength. The state may also take the Church’s resources by expropriating its assets,

mainly land. Secularizing certain previously performed Church activities like marriage, burial, and

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education will divert funds from the Church to the state. Gill’s fourth proposition in his model

follows:

Proposition 4: State Incentives for Initiating Conflict. Given their desire to secure political survival and maximize revenue, state actors will initiate conflict with the church when the opportunity costs of church-state cooperation exceed the benefits of religious legitimation. This is most likely to occur when there are alternative secular ideologies to legitimate the state or when the church holds financial assets valuable to the state and expropriation is the only means of obtaining these assets (62-66).

An example of a state initiated conflict is that of Juan Perón in Argentina. Although he

supported issues contrary to the Church’s position such as legalizing divorce, maintaining the

separation of Church and state, and safeguarding secular education, Perón received Catholic

endorsement only because the opposing party, the Unión Democrática, openly published the support

of these issues in its platform. However, once he had acquired legitimacy and was in power, he

implemented justicialismo, which the Catholic prelates saw as the usurpation of the Church’s

traditional role in society. Justicialismo called for the formation of labor unions and other types of

organizations and also took on the Church’s role as charity-giver. The programs increased Perón’s

popular support thus eliminating his need for Church legitimation. However, since he was not

Marxist and since Protestant competition was not a threat, the Church chose to ignore the military

atrocities, remained silent, endorsing the regime by default (Gill, 122, 157-59).

Church Initiated Conflict

According to Gill, the Church will disestablish its relationship with the state if there is

religious competition or if Marxism is lurking behind political maneuvers (72-76). If alignment with

the state increases the exit option of its parishioners, the Church will turn from the regime to maximize

its parishioner base. If there are no exit options, the Church’s membership base is not threatened if it

is neglected. However, if competing religious organizations begin to pay attention to the neglected

masses, which usually are in rural areas, and are successful in promoting defection, then the Church is

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obliged to pay attention to those Masses. Paying attention to them, however, will split its allegiance

with the elite who are usually closely involved in the government and whose interests do not lie with

the poor. The Church assesses that such a split is not as costly as losing its parishioners to another

religion (66-69).

The Church’s decision for disestablishment also depends on whether or not the regime is

popular. If the Church supports an unpopular regime, the people are complaining about the regime,

and there is an exit option for the people, the Church will join the people and critique the government.

This alignment with the people is facilitated by outside funding. If foreign religious groups and

individuals supplement the Church’s finances, it has no incentive to remain faithful to an unpopular

government (66-70).

Proposition 5: Church Incentives for Initiating Conflict. Religious leaders will initiate conflict when the opportunity costs of cooperation exceed the benefits, typically measured in the ability of the church to maximize its parishioner base. The church’s opportunity costs of cooperation depend on three variables: the degree of religious competition, the popularity of the regime, and the availability of nonstate funding. The likelihood of conflict increases with a rise in competition and access to external funding and a decrease in the government’s popularity (70).

Contrasted to the Church in Argentina, the Church in Chile did confront both Marxism and

growth in Protestantism. Because of the increasing presence of the “foreign ideology” of

communism, the Church had to decide whether to maintain its allegiance to the Conservatives or

spend its resources on reaching the working class. The Conservatives were the political and social

elite with whom the Church had traditionally aligned. It depended on elite-initiated policies such as

the Permanent Law in Defense of Democracy and the Law of Peasant Unionization to curb socialist

advancement (Gill, 129). It also depended on the Conservatives to eradicate Protestant growth;

however, Protestants did not pose a threat to the government, therefore, it had to deal with the problem

on its own (Gill, 132). Both communism and the Protestants were targeting the same group of

people—the peasants. The Church had historically ignored this segment of the population and

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therefore it had to compete for their loyalty (Gill, 133). Thus, it was the Church’s best interests to

alienate itself from Augusto Pinochet’s regime and concentrate on bring the peasants into its fold

(Gill, 136).

Origins of Church-State Conflict

For four centuries the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has enjoyed patronage with

the political elite to such an extent that its attention toward those outside that realm was easily ignored.

However, once the “preferential option for the poor” was introduced at Medellín and Puebla, the

atmosphere changed. The Catholic Church was forced to make the choice whether to support the poor

or be faithful to the elite. The deciding factor was whether there was not only religious competition

but also political hostility.

Marxism

Marxism challenged the Church in two ways: 1) it was fundamentally atheist; and 2) it opened

some Catholic theologians to analyze society with the Marxist class-analytic sociological method,

which is the basis for liberation theology. Most of the governments in Latin America were dependent

on the United States, who had a vested interest in assuring that communism did no spread beyond the

Cuban borders. Gill contends that the Church aligned with the conservative governments only if they

were able to deal with the Marxist threat (72-74). However, in some Central American countries the

episcopacy was split between loyalty to the conservative regime and loyalty to the poor.

In Nicaragua, the official stance of the hierarchy was against the socialist Sandinista

government. Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo promotion to cardinal sent a message to those

bishops who were pro-Sandinista that Rome did not approve of the regime (Berryman, 44). Since the

competition came from political ideology instead of Protestantism, the Church chose not to officially

endorse the regime, although it also did not endorse the reformist priests for the same ideological

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reason. This is evident in Rome’s reprimand of Ernesto Cardenal, Fernando Cardenal, and Miguel

D’Escoto, three priests who served in the Sandinista government (Berryman, 28, 44).

Protestantism

There are several reasons why Protestantism grew in Latin America beginning in late 1800s

and early 1900s. Freedom of religion laws made it possible for missionaries from the United States to

come to Latin America, especially since the threats of war in Asia and Africa made missionary work

dangerous. The product that these missionaries were presenting was a different interpretation of the

Christian religion. It was less hierarchical and more autonomous than the Catholic structure. By the

1950s, Pentecostalism grew in popularity because it was a close substitute to “folk” or popular

Catholicism, which directed its attention away from the elite, was more emotional, and was

individualist than traditional Catholicism. Furthermore, Pentecostals were indigenous and more active

than the Catholic elite. Because of this competition, the Church sought government subsidies to train

its pastoral agents and government sanction of teaching Catholicism in the pubic schools. Thus, the

Church would have an endless supply of souls who would be adherents to Catholic theology at an

early age.

As a rational actor, the state would have to determine whether it would benefit by giving the

Catholic Church privileges that would handicap Protestantism. Would the costs of paying for the

privileges the Catholic Church wants and abolishing its rival be worth the benefit of securing

legitimacy or funds? Would the state benefit from alienating a potential voting block? If the state

sees no reason for eliminating Protestantism, then it would be preparing fertile ground for sewing

discord with the Church (Gill, 74-76).

The Church, on the other hand, would have to evaluate whether Protestantism provides a

significant “exit option” for discontented parishioners (Gill, 66). If it does, then the Church would

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have to channel its resources to maintain or increase its membership. If there is no exit option, then

the Church can ignore the parishioners and align itself with the interests of the elite. Brazil is an

example of an episcopacy that disassociates itself from the government because of Protestant

competition. During the 1930s and 1940s, the bishops were able to secure that Protestant missionaries

would not be able to enter the country. However, after World War II, Protestantism became more

indigenous and gained popularity, prompting the Church to accelerate its pastoral commitment to

maintain its prominent status. However, once the military took power in 1964, the Church could not

abandon the peasants if it were to maintain credibility. Because of competition, it abandoned instead

its affiliation with the government (Gill, 112). On the other hand, Argentina did not face Protestant

challenges; therefore, it remained on the side of the regime.

With the Cuban case, Marxism would serve as the stronger point of opposition than the

growth of Protestantism on the island. There are two tenets of Marxism that are considered

indispensable to its ideology: atheism (Rosado, 285) and anti-capitalism/imperialism (Rosado, 149,

160, 285). The Catholic Church is obviously theistic and, in Cuba, it was conservative, with strong

ties to the United States. The history of the Catholic Church in Cuba demonstrates why the Church

sometimes acted irrationally in light of lost benefits.

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History of the Catholic Church in Cuba

Colonial Times to the 1950s

Christopher Columbus was the person who introduced Catholicism to the inhabitants of Cuba.

During colonial times the island had little importance for both the Spanish government and the Roman

Catholic authorities. Its indigenous population was also insignificant. The Spanish conquistadores,

who were supported by the clergy, slaughtered most of the Indians of the island. The Indian chief

Hatuey was the leader of the resistance and the prime subject to be captured. When he was finally

captured and sentenced to burn at the stake, he was given one more opportunity to become a Christian.

To this he replied that if these Spaniard would be going to heaven because they are Christians, he

didn’t want to be a Christian (Rosado 1985, 259).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the clergy in Cuba was allied to the Spanish

crown through patronato real, a key instrument used to consolidate the empire. The Church’s

approval of priests appointed by the monarch achieved this consolidation. The island served as both a

holding place for mischievous peninsular priests exiled for punishment and as well as a place of

refuge for those conservative priests and religious who were fleeing newly independent Spanish

colonies. The predominantly foreign clergy congregated in metropolitan areas where they taught the

children of the elite and had access to politically powerful (Rosado, 273). The presence of priests in

the rural areas was historically low or non-existent. The distance from the rural folks and the abuse of

power to improve the priests’ living conditions provoked a strong anti-clericalism in the countryside.

Thus, the traditional indicators of commitment to the institution, such as Mass attendance, were also

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historically low. Furthermore, the clergy’s criticism of independence and its loyalty to the Spanish

crown also decreased its popularity (Crahan 1999, 88; Rosado, 260-61).

However, Catholic values and beliefs ran strong in the people. In times of crisis, Christian

values exerted a much stronger cultural presence than the institutional Church (Crahan, 1980, 240-41;

1990, 259; 1999, 88). This attitude toward the institutional Church was unified in one voice, that of

the patriot José Martí. Rosado (265) confirms his disgust with the Church, which he ardently

criticized for “selling salvation” and portraying a distorted God, placing Him in the role of a precursor

to liberation theology:

The priest also says that he will baptize [the new-born son] so that he may enter in the kingdom of heaven. But he will baptize [him] if you pay him money, or grain, or eggs, or animals: if you do not pay him, if you do not pay him something, he will not baptize him… That God which haggles, who sells salvation, who does everything in exchange for money, who sends people to hell if they do not pay him, and if they pay him he sends to heaven, that God is a species of moneylender, or usurer, of shrewd operator. No, my friend, there is another God.

For this criticism Martí was excommunicated from the church. He was also exiled for his

support for independence from Spain. However, Martí did not oppose the belief in God. Rosado

quotes (264-67) Martí’s sentiment that belief in God was essential for the well being of society:

There is in a man an intimate, vague, but constant and impotent knowledge, of a GRAND CREATOR BEING: This knowledge is the religious sentiment, and it’s sentiment, and it’s form, it’s expression, the way by which each human group conceives of this God and worships him is what is called religion…Every people needs to be religious. Not only are they essentially so, but for their own good they need to be… [W]e are thus able to arrive, by natural ambition, to its perfection; and for a people it is indispensable to affirm natural belief in the rewards and punishments and in the existence of another life…An irreligious people will die, because nothing in it nurtures virtue. Human injustices dislike it; it is necessary for celestial justice to guarantee it.

Because of his position against injustice both in the political and religious realms, José Martí is

considered the father of patriotism in Cuban history.

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By the mid twentieth century, statistical data confirmed the attitude against the institution of

the Catholic Church birthed during colonial times. In a 1954 survey, of the 80% who claimed to be

Catholic, only 24% attended Mass regularly. Other scholars place the percentage much lower: 4-6%.

Of college students, 96.5% believed in the existence of God, but only 17% regularly attended services

(Fernández, 52). Another survey conducted in 1957 by the Agrupación Católica Universitaria

interviewing 400 rural heads of households revealed that 53.51% of them had never seen a priest and

36.74% knew one only by sight. Only 7.81% had had actual contact with a priest. Furthermore,

41.41% claimed no religion, 52.10% claimed to be Catholic but 88.84% of them had never attended

Mass. Only 4.25% attended Mass three to more times a year and 3.43% said that the church had

assisted in improving their economic condition, as opposed to 68.73% crediting the government for

economic assistance and 16.72% crediting their employers (Crahan 1999, 89). In 1960, a survey of

4,000 Cubans from all the provinces revealed that 72.5% professed to be Catholic and 19% claimed

no religion as their own. By 1966, another survey of 4,000 agricultural workers showed that only

0.7% respondents attended Mass more than four times a year, 93.5% did not attend Mass at all, and

88.8% of professing Catholics had not attended Mass in a year (Crahan 1980, 244, 249). These

figures show that Catholicism was weak in the countryside. In addition, its alliance with the United

States and its ties with the foreign Roman Church left the Cuban hierarchy handicapped and

vulnerable against strong political forces.

The Batista-Revolutionary Period: 1953 to 1958

According to Gill’s model, it is easy to predict the Church’s behavior under Batista’s regime.

Like in other Latin American countries, the Church initially held to its alliance with both the political

and social elite in order to maintain its prestigious position in society. However, by 1958, the

relationship began to be costly. According to Proposition 3, the costs of being aligned with Batista

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were outweighing the benefits. One of the costs was the influential relationship the Church had with

the United States embassy. Once the United States abandoned support of the regime, it would not be

beneficial to remain loyal to it. Furthermore, there were priests and lay members who were active in

the opposition. Even Archbishop Enrique Peréz Serantes of Santiago in essence rescued the

revolution when he convinced Batista to spare Castro’s life after his attack on the Moncada Army

Base. Therefore, Proposition 5 holds in this time period; in this case, the Church turns away from a

conservative authoritarian government.

Historical Evidence

Cuba was never truly independent from the influence of major powers. It was first under

Spanish rule, and after its independence, it was economically dependent on the United States. The

Church was also foreign controlled and, because of this dual dependency and its weakness in the

countryside, it never had the opportunity to develop a strong national institution. The priests were

concentrated in the major urban areas, close to the civil and religious elites (Crahan 1990, 255).

According to a Protestant analyst who synthesized a 1940 survey of 400 Protestant congregations, the

Evangelical churches were urbanized, middle-class, democratic, Anglo-Saxon religious group seeking

expansion in the rural areas left unattended by the Catholic Church. Some examples of Protestant

presence of among the poor are La Progresiva, a Presbyterian school in Cárdenas that encouraged

social action, and the Baptists in Oriente who had a strong presence in rural areas. When it came to

their stand on Batista’s regime and Fidel Castro’s revolutionary opposition, both the Catholic and

Protestant churches either proclaimed neutrality for fear of being persecuted or criticized both of them,

the former for his suppression of democracy and the latter for his use of violence (Crahan 1999, 89-

90). Although there was some indication of Protestant growth both in numbers and in educational and

social status, the Catholic Church remained the stronger of the two (Ramos, 43; Crahan 1999, 89).

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Batista’s wife Marta Fernández had excellent relations with the Catholic hierarchy, although

Batista himself occasionally contributed to his Quaker alma mater in Banes, Oriente. His regime also

had strong connections with the United States Embassy and, and so did the Catholic Church. In the

1940s Cardinal Manuel Arteaga Betancourt kept Ambassador Spruille Braden informed of

governmental developments, thus enabling the ambassador to intervene and negotiate with the

Batista’s government whenever the need arose (Ramos, 46). The Church remained aligned with

Batista until its lay leaders, some involved in Catholic Action, and many Cuban aristocrats decided to

oppose him, despite his donations and government-sponsored privileges. Catholic Action was a group

begun in 1928 by the Spanish Catholic hierarchy primarily to counteract the growth of Protestantism

in Latin America, to promote Church involvement, and to help its members adapt to changing

circumstances (Crahan 1980, 242). Together with the Cuban Council of Evangelical Churches,

Catholic Action asked for Batista’s resignation and the dissolution of Congress (Ramos, 43, 45-6, 57).

Furthermore, the magazine Bohemia, the island’s most widely read magazine, also attacked the

Batista regime but came short of demanding an outright overthrow of the government (Ramos 57).

In response to the demands from the Catholic Action, the bishops signed a pastoral letter

asking for a solution to the conflict. They also mediated in the formation of the Commission for

National Harmony to negotiate a cease-fire (Ramos, 56). However, on December 27, 1958, U.S.

Ambassador Earl Smith informed Batista that the United States felt he could no longer keep the

country under control and therefore would not extend further support of his government (Ramos, 59).

The Catholic Church consistently proclaimed its neutrality in the struggle and found no

religious reason to be active in the conflict. Since Batista’s coup d’état in 1952, the Catholic Church

had been divided between the hierarchy and the laity. Crahan (1999, 90) mentions historian Hugh

Thomas’ account of the Church’s reaction to the coup:

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Cardinal Arteaga congratulated Batista, and other bishops backed him. Two or three opposed and a Franciscan priest, Fr. Bastarrica, publicly denounced the golpe, as did several prominent lay leaders, such as Andrés Valdespino, president of Juventud Católica… In June the police broke up a Catholic Action meeting at Guanajay. It became clear that while some members of the hierarchy and the regular clergy would tolerate the new order only too easily, most Catholic laymen and priests would not.

In 1958 the division was still evident. Although Catholic Action was vocal in its opposition of

the regime, the hierarchy did not take an official stance against Batista. A Jesuit recalled historical

precedence of the Church’s lack of involvement with revolutions by stating, “In the 1933 revolution

the Church took very little part.” (Crahan 1999, 88). Now as then, it was the laity who most ardently

opposed the regime. The increasing opposition to Batista was evident in the actions of some priests

who were supportive Fidel Castro’s guerrilla activity. One of the priests was Father Guillermo

Sardiñas who served as chaplain for the rebel army (Ramos, 51). Officially, however, the Church did

not take any stance for or against Batista.

During the Revolutionary period of the mid to late 1950s, the Catholic Church sympathized

with the anti-Batista revolution for three reasons: 1) the Church opposed Batista’s “satanic” atrocities;

2) the unofficial participation of Catholics and Catholic organizations in the revolutionary movement;

and 3) the “apparent reformist agenda of the 26 of July Movement.” The 26th of July Movement is so

named after Castro’s attach of the Moncada Army Base in Santiago on that date. It was the first

significant insurrection against the Batista regime. Fernández (54) defines its significance: “It was

reformist, nationalist, democratic, and middle class. It called for the reinstitution of the progressive

Constitution of 1940, social justice, economic diversification, agrarian reform, political honesty,

elections, and national sovereignty. It reminded the Church of the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum

and Quadrajessimo Anno.” In the January 1959 edition of La Quincena, Fernández (55) quotes

Rodólfo Riesgo:

17

We can summarize by saying that the socio-economic program of the Revolutionary government, and the social thought of Fidel Castro, are very far from the utopic and unnatural postulations outlined by the theoreticians of Marxism-communism, and are close to without reaching them fully, the social and economic principles presented in the pontifical encyclicals “Rerum Novarum” and “Quadrajessimo Anno.”

Dodson (77) cites The Rerum Novarum, the papal encyclical issued by Pope Leo XIII that served to

intervene in defense of the working poor:

There is no question whatever that some remedy must be found, and found quickly, for the misery and wretchedness pressing so heavily and unjustly at this moment on the vast majority of the working classes… Hence by degrees it has come to pass that workingmen have been surrendered, all isolated and helpless, to the hardheartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition.

Catholic empathy for the Revolution manifested itself early in the struggle. When Castro was

imprisoned for the attack, the archbishop of Santiago, Enrique Pérez Serantes, convinced Batista to

spare Castro’s life (Crahan 1999, 92). Most of Castro’s rebels were Catholic and he himself was

schooled at a Jesuit high school, Belén, the most prestigious school on the island (Fernández, 54).

Catholic sentiment ran high for the revolution because they saw nothing in its agenda that was

threatening, like communism. According to a liberal Catholic leader quoted in La Quincena, the

Catholic Church’s magazine with the largest circulation, “[I]t is possible that in Latin America there is

no other case of such collaboration of Catholics with a revolutionary movement… [T]he collaboration

was not the result of plot organized hierarchically; it was a spontaneous reaction against very serious

violations of human dignity and human rights.” (Fernández, 55).

Assessment of Gill’s Model

Gill’s model fits the Batista-Revolutionary period. The Church had something precious to

lose if it aligned itself with Batista: the approval and support of the United States government. The

first indications of the U. S. abandonment of the his regime came when a shipment of arms headed for

Cuba was embargoed due to pressure from Reverend Adam Clayton Powell and other U. S.

18

congressmen (Ramos, 58). Furthermore, it could be said that the U. S government directed Batista to

resign, making it known the U. S. would no longer support him (Ramos 59). Finally, the Church was

expecting good relations with the Castro regime (Crahan 1999, 91), and since the United States had

supported the Batista coup in 1952, the Church had no reason to believe the United States would not

back the Revolution. According to Gill’s Proposition 3, the Batista government had become a

liability for the Catholic Church’s relationship with the U.S. And, according to Proposition 2, the

Church would be more likely to maximize its resources if it stayed faithful to the powerful North

American ally.

Furthermore, the Batista regime had grown unpopular because it neglected the needs of the

people and became increasingly violent. Because it was extremely difficult for Batista’s men to

capture the guerrilla, he turned on anyone whom he suspected of supporting Castro, whether they

were students or members of the middle class (Skidmore, 275). Sympathy for the tortured and killed

students, like Baptist leader Frank País and his brother Josué, turned the people away from his

government (Fernández, 52). According to Gill’s Proposition 5, unpopularity of an authoritarian

regime will be enough cause for the Church to retract its loyalty. The revolutionary ideology did not

seem to conflict with papal declarations, therefore it was safer for the Church to align itself with the

safer of the two warring factions. With the United State’s withdrawal of military and political support

for Batista and the perception of a new dawn of democratic opportunities presented by Castro, it was

predictable that the Church would abandon its alliance with the outgoing regime.

Early Post-Revolution Relations: 1959-1963

It is during this period that the Church turns from being sympathetic to the Castro regime.

Once he radicalizes and emphatically declares the Revolution Marxist, the Church-state relationship

19

deteriorates quickly. Of Gill’s two causes for conflict relevant—Protestantism and from Marxism—

Marxism poses an immense threat. Protestantism is too weak to be any great challenge to the Church;

however, Marxism was intolerable. Although the authoritarian regime is now leftist, the Church still

refuses to endorse it because of ideological incompatibility. At this time, Vatican II, Medellín, and

Puebla had not yet taken place, so the Church had no prior models from which it can draw examples

of successful co-existence with a socialist-Marxist regime.

Historical Evidence

In the March 6, 1959 edition of La Quincena, Archbishop Serantes’ pastoral letter entitled

“New Life” established links between God and Castro and depicted him and Camilo Cienfuegos as

divine. The magazine used Catholic symbols in connection with the revolution, such as a close-up

photograph of Cienfuegos’ striking resemblance to Jesus Christ. There were correlations between

Castro and Jesus like the twelve members of the embryonic rebel army and the white dove perching

itself on his shoulder as he delivered his victory speech on January 8, 1959. (Fernández, 55, 56, 63).

In November of 1959, the “weakest Catholic Church in all of Latin America” turned out over

a million people to gather at the Plaza de la Revolución in Havana for the National Catholic Congress.

The Catholic Church turned to endorse the Revolution and its lider maximo Fidel Castro, el barbudo,

expecting to have cordial relations with the new regime, with the hopes of improving its status on the

island (Crahan 1999, 91). José Ignacio Lasaga, one of the lay leaders of the Agrupación Católica

Universitaría, delivered a strong anti-communism speech:

Liberal capitalism allows there to be a few proprietors in the face of a multitude of dispossessed. Communism, and in general all totalitarian socialist regimes, converts all persons into the dispossessed, since there exists only one proprietor, that is, the State. An ideal social order would be one that permits all persons, in one or another form, to feel as if they were proprietors, in the fullest sense of the word.

20

His speech was received with shouts from the crowd: “¡Cuba sí, Communismo, no!” (Crahan

1990, 253). Herein is the wedge that two years hence would divide the Catholic Church from its

triumphant hero and his regime. The Catholic Church was sure to be the primary friend of the new

government, although it was receiving as well as giving warnings concerning indications of the new

regime’s communist affiliation. In response to rumors that the revolution was a product of a

communist conspiracy, Fr. Lucas Iruretagoyana replied with such words as “De Communismo nada,”

(of communism nothing). He was quoted in La Quincena’s January, 1959, edition as saying, “As a

priest I only found assistance for my ministry, high morale in the troops and a Christian spirit in all.”

Furthermore, Fr. Ángel Silvas, another priest who ministered to the troops, concurred: “The immense

majority of the members of the troops were Catholic. We did not find one that was communist or

atheist.” (Fernández, 55). However, Castro’s deliverer from Batista’s hand Archbishop Serantes

indirectly let the regime know the he expected the new government to lead to a democratic republic,

not a “utopian egalitarian” state, the catch phrase for communism (Crahan 1990, 257; 1999, 92).

In March of 1961, Castro spoke to a youth group declaring, “imperialism and the high

hierarchy of the Church are one and the same thing.” (Fernández, 57). This statement was the

precursor to his declaration on April 16 of that same year that his new government was Marxist-

Leninist (Malone 1996; Ramos, 70). There are two tenets integral to communism: atheism and anti-

imperialism, and in declaring the revolution Marxist, Castro cleanly alienated himself from the

Catholic institution. The Marxist leader Blas Roca affirmed Castro’s sentiments in an article

published in the newspaper Hoy entitled “Martí combatió a la jerarquía católica” (Martí Fought the

Catholic Hierarchy). He fused “communism with patriotism and anti-imperialism while depicting the

Catholic hierarchy as pro-Yankee and pro-imperialist, feeding the anti-clerical sentiments of the

Cuban people. Castro, on the contrary, was portrayed as the leader of a revolution of, by, and for “los

21

humildes” (the poor).” (Fernández, 57. The Church was obviously not atheist, had strong ties with the

United States, and was weak with the peasants, the people whose support of Castro was significantly

higher (Fernández, 63). Because of this stance, the religious population felt strongly betrayed and

duped, having welcomed the Revolution’s victory with anti-communist cries.

The betrayal deepened when the regime implemented several radical measures. Some of these

measures were the execution of Batista collaborators, one being a Protestant pastor (Fernández, 55;

Ramos, 68), the closing down and nationalization of private schools (Crahan 1990, 257; Fernández,

55), the suspension of religious radio and television broadcasts (Ramos, 73), the implementation of

obligatory military service in the UMAP, Military Work Brigade for Aiding Production (Crahan 1990,

260; Ramos, 76), agrarian reform (Ramos, 68), and the government’s demand that all congregations

register as “associations” (Ramos, 74). Of these, the closure of private schools was the most

devastating because it deprived the Church of its principal means to perpetuate its ideology and of its

major source of income (Crahan 1990, 251; Malone 1996). This action by the regime was in response

to the participation of several priests and several Protestants in the April 17, 1961, Bay of Pigs

invasion (Crahan 1990, 258; Ramos, 71, Malone 1996). As a direct consequence, a mass exodus

ensued. By 1963 70% of the 723 priests and 90% of the 2,225 religious had fled the country; 5% of

the 2,948 priests and religious were expelled from the island because of their perceived

counterrevolutionary activities (Crahan 1990, 258-59; Crahan 1999, 95). Between January 1, 1959

and October 22, 1962, the first of three exodus waves totaling over 268,000 exiles left Cuba, ending

with the Missile Crisis (Rosado, 149). To explain the situation, Crahan (1999, 95) quotes Father

Carlos Manuel de Céspedes:

When the Bay of Pigs took place, many of the leaders of the invasion were Catholic, and a number of priests came with them. Everything happened very fast at that time. Fidel had admitted that our revolution was a Marxist one, and I imagine that, generally speaking, those who solidly backed the revolution looked

22

on Catholics as their sworn enemies. For their part, Catholics felt the same: it was a Communist revolution, hence intrinsically bad. You had to fight it or flee. Only the most perceptive and tranquil minority could imagine themselves joining it. In the summer of 1961, just after the nationalization of education, most of the religious who had been teaching in Catholic schools left Cuba. Many other priests also got out—some because they had been involved in counter revolutionary activities, others out of fear; some expelled by the revolutionary government, others voluntarily.

Castro, like Martí, had a disdain for the Catholic Church as an institution: “imperialism and

the high hierarchy of the Church are one and the same thing” (Alfonso 1985, 97), although, unlike

Martí, Castro did not see religion as a necessity for societal welfare. To Castro, the Church’s

ideological posture was in direct opposition to the Revolution, and he would not tolerate such

opposition (Fernández, 57). During that era, the Church was profoundly marked by conservative and

anti-communist sentiment. Concurrently, international communism was marked by an acute anti-

clerical position (Bolívar), as Castro’s words reveal in the August 11, 1960 edition of Revolución

quoted by Rosado (272):

The Revolution [is] with the poor, the Pharisees [are] with the rich… Whoever condemns a Revolution that is with the poor and preaches justice and equality among men, that practices truth and well-being among men; whoever condemns this condemns Christ, and would be capable of crucifying the same Christ because he did what we are doing.

Crahan notes that because of the Church’s failure “to develop a theology and pastoral

strategies rooted in Cuban condition, dependence on foreign personnel and their opinions, the urban

concentration of clergy and religious, and the focus on elite education,” the Church appeared as a

bourgeois institution (1990, 259) thus making it even less appealing to the new regime. The United

States backed Bay of Pigs incident made the Catholic Church the institutional opponent of the

Revolution (Crahan 1999, 91, 93). In addition, because this time period was pre-Vatican II, the fear

of socialism and the support for the sanctity of private property made the Catholic Church predisposed

to oppose the Revolution (Crahan 1990, 257).

23

Once Bay of Pigs invasion failed, the Church could not spend its resources on competing

against the Protestants or on fighting the regime. With little resources, the Church focused on

reorganizing internally; it became reactive instead of proactive, lacking the ability to formulate

alternatives to loyalty to the regime. A new bishop for the diocese of Cienfuegos had to be named

since the media had made certain accusations against the former bishop, and a new rector needed to be

appointed for the Catholic University of Santo Tomás de Villanueva. The Church had little time and

funds to implement any programs to replenish its membership base. The institution’s unpopular

stance with the regime actually forced many people to defect to other religions that offered

“alternative communities for those who resist[ed] integration into the socialist society being built in

Cuba” (Crahan, 1980, 247).

In summary, there were three things going against the Catholic Church in this period: 1) the

great betrayal and mass exodus had left institution with only 30% of its priests and 10% of its

members; 2) the lack of financial resources left the Church crippled to reorganize itself and to focus on

proselytizing, even though there was no significant competition from the Protestants; and 3) the

Church’s rigidity and inability to shake off its counterrevolutionary image hindered its position not

only with the regime but with its own parishioners. Comparatively speaking, even though the

Catholic Church was larger than all the Protestant churches put together, had a national presence, and

had a foreign, globally recognized center of power in Rome, it had to start at ground zero like all the

other churches on the island.

Castro’s Ideological Goal

In order to understand why Castro had to radicalize the Revolution, an understanding of his

goal is imperative. Rosado (149) cites Castro’s definition of the communist society he envisions as

the ultimate classless society:

24

A communist society means that man will have reached the highest degree of social awareness ever achieved; a communist society means that the human being will have been able to achieve the degree of understanding and brotherhood which man has sometimes achieved within the close circle of his family. To live in a communist society is to live in a real society of brothers; to live in a communist society is to live without selfishness to live among the people and with the people, as if every one of our fellow citizens were really our brother. [But] if a revolution in 1868, in order to be called a revolution, had to begin by [abolishing slavery], a revolution in 1959, if it wanted the right to be called a revolution, had as an elementary question the obligation of [abolishing capitalism].

The departure of many of the elite during the first wave of the exodus made the process of

political socialization much easier for the regime. The transformation entailed the inculcation of the

regime’s political information, values, and practices in the population, thus creating the “new man” of

the new Cuban society, a true communist conscience (Rosado, 149). According to Caleb Rosado, the

Cuban communist model is “Puritanical,” concerned with removing evil from society (Rosado, 149).

Since the Church failed to eliminate societal evils and actually perpetrated them by oppressing the

working class and aligning itself with the capitalist United States, the Catholicism taught in schools

had to be eradicated from the collective psyche of the people. In order to control the collective

behavior of the population, Castro formed the Committees for Defense of the Revolution, which was

“ ‘a system of revolutionary collective vigilance so that everybody will know everybody else on his

block, what they do, what relationships they had with the tyranny, what they believe in, what people

they meet, [and] what activities they participate in’ (Castro, 1960).”

Just like schools served as the means by which the Church guaranteed itself a perpetual source

of membership and ideological indoctrination, so did Castro view schools as the secure means to mold

the values of his new society in the minds of the young, guaranteeing a continual source of fresh

revolutionaries. According to a speech he made in1961 speech, “[t]he task of the schools, the

fundamental task of the schools, is the ideological formation of revolutionaries, and then, by means of

the revolutionaries, the ideological formation of the rest of the people” (Rosado, 151, emphasis

25

added). Another task of education was to teach within the scientific materialistic framework. The

1971 Declaration based on the findings of a government-commissioned study examining the religious

situation in Cuba concluded that “ ‘the raising of the cultural level of the people’ was to be

accomplished through the scientific, Marxist/Leninist, materialist teaching. This would be

accomplished through the teachers, educating the minds of the young.” (Rosado, 284). Like in the

Bible, conversion requires a clean break from the “old man,” the man that represents evil and death.

Likewise, in the revolution, the “new man” had to break from the old man who represented the church

hierarchy and imperialism. In order for the new man to emerge, the old man had to be done away.

Six years after the formation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Party’s

newspaper Granma made this report as cited by Rosado (153):

The construction of Communism demands, as its fundamental element, the struggle for the formation of the new man; and it will not terminate until this job has been completed. All the political, economic, and social tasks entrusted to our mass organizations have to be inspired by this principle…We see the new man as arising from the huge educational programs that the Revolution has started, from the troops that protect our Fatherland against the threats and aggressions of the imperialist enemy… from the efforts undertaken by the labor movement and the Union of Young Communists to incorporate thousands of workers into agricultural jobs.

To add to the regime’s ideological assault against the teaching of religion in schools, there was

staunch opposition to it from other fronts. Understandably, Protestants were totally against the

teaching of Catholicism in public schools. Aníbal Escalante, a Marxist leader who was president of

the Baptist youth training union before joining the Popular Socialist Party and Euclides Vásquez

Candela of the daily Revolución, the official organ of the 26th of July Movement considered the

teaching of religion in public schools as infiltration by the clergy (Ramos, 69).

Assessment of Gill’s Model

In order to implement the societal “new man,” the regime had to initiate conflict with the

Church as mentioned in Proposition 4. The benefits that the regime would acquire by opposing the

26

Church in order to build a new society outweighed the immense cost of establishing it with the

Church’s approval, the cost being the violation of the Revolution’s Marxist ideology. Castro had to be

radical in order to effect radical changes in the new society. As mentioned above, the nationalization

education was Castro’s main vehicle to accomplish his objective. In addition, the government took

approximately 100 schools whose buildings were very valuable (Ramos, 74), also supporting Gill’s

Proposition 4. This saved the regime the cost of building new schools. Furthermore, taking over the

educational system gave Castro a relatively inexpensive way to indoctrinate the young with the

ideology of the new society (Rosado, 275).

On the other hand, the Church, although depleted of funds and membership, did not align

itself with the regime because of the blatant assault against it and its anti-atheistic position. First of all,

to be a Christian was diametrically opposed to being a Marxist. Secondly, although Castro found no

“incompatibility between being Catholic and maintaining loyalty to the Revolution” as long as

Catholics do not undertake counterrevolutionary activity, he was vehemently opposed to the

institution of the Church because the bourgeois class used it to accomplish imperialist objectives

(Castro, 1971). With the clergy fleeing the island by the hundreds, its schools and access to mass

media gone (Ramos, 73), its more progressive members joining the revolution (Malone 1996), and no

means to generate income within the island, it would have behooved the Church to align itself with the

regime quickly, especially since there was no significant competition from the Protestants. However,

since it was conservative, not yet made pliable by Vatican II and Medellín, and threatened by

communist ideology, the Church could not take the step. The regime betrayed and attacked it. The

antagonism was so profound and the exile so debilitating that the Church could not but have a

repulsed reaction to the regime.

27

Thus, in this period of Cuban Church history, the decisions the hierarchy made to oppose the

regime fit Gill’s model. During this time, the state initiated conflict to secure an immediate, drastic

change in the trajectory of the society. Because of the radical nature of the Revolution and the

upheaval it caused, the Church was too shaken, weak and disoriented to align itself with the regime

even though it was costing it members, clergy, and resources.

Church-State Relations: 1963 to 1999

It is in this time period that Gill’s model breaks down. The turning point occurred in 1991

when the Castro government removed the word atheist from the constitution and replaced it with the

word secular. If the main source of conflict is ideological and the conflict is removed, why would the

Church remain rigid and not officially endorse the regime? Now the Church had other Latin

American countries from which it draw examples of co-existence with leftist regimes. There is

evidence that some progressive priests would like to be openly supportive of socialist policies. Yet

their efforts are being thwarted by suspicion from both the hierarchy and the regime. Instead of a full

endorsement, the Church backs only isolated favorable policies. Gill neglects the profound

importance of religious ideology and the political-religious history of a particular country, variables

which may lead the Church to behave irrationally. Furthermore, also occurring during this period is

the increase of Protestant competition. One source of conflict is replaced by another. Since the

Protestants were receiving concessions from the government because of their supportive stance of the

regime, would it not be logical for the Church to ease its official stance and become involved in the

government? Even after the Pope’s visit the Church has remained critical of the regime. Finally, Gill

does not apply his model on factions of the Church. If he would allow himself the liberty to do so, his

model would hold true a much higher percentage of the time. A global entity like the Catholic Church

28

is much too large to be universally homogeneous in ideology concerning the governments under

which it has to exist.

Historical Evidence

In 1971, the government conducted a study to examine thoroughly the religious condition in

Cuba prior to the First National Congress on Education and Culture. The goal of the study was to

provide information toward the formulation of an official policy on religion. Rosado (283)

enumerates the seven principles governing religious policy summarized in the study’s 1971

Declaration:

1. The religious phenomenon is not to be considered as the center or element of priority in our task. Our fundamental effort must be directed at constructing [a] socialist society, with the obligation in this specific case, however, of guiding and defining the steps the Revolution must take in its ideological battle.

2. Complete separation of State-Church, School-Church in all fields. 3. No encouragement, support or help will be given to any religious group, or

any favors asked of them. 4. We neither share any religious belief nor support any religious group, nor

participate in any cult. 5. The Revolution respects religious beliefs and cults as an individual right.

The Revolution does not impose nor persecute nor repress anyone for religious beliefs.

6. With socialist construction as its focus, the Revolution offers possibilities and opportunities in its work of transformation to all and everyone independent of whether or not they profess religious beliefs.

7. The obscurantist and counterrevolutionary sects must be unmasked and fought.

By the time of this study, the Church was on notice that the regime would not tolerate any

counterrevolutionary activity (“¡Viva la Revolución!” But don’t you dare revolt against me!). If the

individual right of believers went contrary to the regime, the person would be punished. Therefore,

although principle 5 secured no persecution or repression for religious beliefs, if those beliefs violated

the legitimacy of the regime, the belief should remain silent. Article 54 of the 1977 Constitution

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defined and finalized the Cuban government’s official policy on religion. The Article reads as

follows:

The socialist state, which bases its activity and educates the people in the scientific materialistic concept of the universe, recognizes and guarantees freedom of conscience and the right of everyone to profess any religion and to practice, within the framework of respect for the law, the belief of his preference. The law regulates the activities of religious institutions.

It is illegal and punished by law to oppose one’s faith or religious belief to the Revolution; to education; or to the fulfillment of one’s duty to work, defend the country with arms, show reverence for its symbols and fulfill other duties established by the Constitution. (Rosado, 296; Crahan, 103).

Within the “framework” of the Constitution, believers were free to engage in religious activities;

outside that “framework” they were not free. The Church was limited to publish literature only for its

members. Proselytizing, the means by which the Great Commission given by Christ to the believers

is achieved (Matthew 28:16-20), was considered counterrevolutionary and punishable. Furthermore,

although the official stance was tolerant, unofficial action against believers was prevalent. Through

the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, those who previously had no position of power

began to abuse it. Members of the committees closely monitored those who made open profession of

faith, job promotions were denied to them, and schools ridiculed children for their religious beliefs in

Christ and the Bible (Rosado, 276). Also, although the Constitution prohibited discrimination based

on race, color, national origin, and gender, it did not mention religion. The Party prohibited Christians

from becoming members or joining the Union of Communist Youth (Crahan 1990, 263).

Against this backdrop of unofficial persecution, the Church had three avenues from which to

choose to respond to Cuba’s new society: leave the country, accept the fate of living in a socialist

country but take a critical stance, or join the regime. Because ideologies were polarized, the

government was actually competing with the Church for complete loyalty of the people and the

regime continued to restrict any opportunity the Church could have to mold public opinion through

30

education and mass media (Crahan 1999, 105). Therefore, if the Church was to have more influence

in society, it had to decide if it could be a good revolutionary without being a good Marxist. Crahan

(1999, 105) cites a professor at the Catholic seminary in Havana who put it this way:

Socialism is the only economic solution available to us. As our witness to God we must work inside the process for mutual social goals. We are “Christian revolutionaries.” That is possible. What is not possible is to be “Christian Marxists.” That would be like putting a circle in a square. In Cuba the word “Marx” means atheism; the word “revolutionary” does not.

Once the first exodus was over, the Church was left with the two remaining paths, but it was

divided as to which path to follow. Some lay leaders felt the Church needed to establish credibility

by admitting its role in the counterrevolutionary activities and by praising the regime for its

accomplishments in the areas of health and education. Others believed the Church needed to work

with the government while maintaining a critical stance when necessary. A third group wanted no

rapproachment with the government. Finally, in 1969, the Church decided to follow the path of strict

rapproachment and issued two pastoral letters calling for “the end of the US trade embargo of Cuba

and [urging] Catholics to support the government’s developmental programmes, and to respect the

positions of atheists” (Crahan 1990, 261; Malone 1996). After a representative from Rome came to

Havana to mediate on the differences with the political stance the Church should take, the bishops

decided to rebuild the Church’s credibility without taking a critical posture (Crahan 1990, 261).

Crahan (1999, 99) quotes political scientist Jorge Domínguez, who states four principle motives of the

two pastoral letters:

[a] desire to reinsert the church into the existing political system, the influence of developments resulting from Vatican II, the growth of progressive trends in the international church, and ecumenical dialogue.

These elements prodded the Church to acknowledge living in a socialist society, but because

the prelates were more concerned with improving the Church’s relationship with the

31

government rather than reasserting its influence on the Cuban society, the Church remained

marginalized (Crahan 1999, 99).

By this time, the 1968 Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops at Medellín

had already occurred. The focus on the poor in Latin American Churches gave Catholicism a

socialist tone. At this time the Cuban Church could have softened its stance and followed the

Vatican’s lead and perhaps adopted some socialist ideals without betraying its position on

communism. Besides, in a 1977 speech to the Jamaican Council of Churches, Castro reassured the

attendees that there existed “no contradiction between the aims of religion and the aims of socialism.”

(Ramos, 78) opening space for improving relations.

Several developments occurred in the mid to late1980s that began to turn the tide for the

Church and the state. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev began to open up the society with Glasnost.

Some countries of the Soviet bloc like Poland and Czechoslovakia had already exhibited signs of

rebellion against the Soviet command. In 1985, against this backdrop of unrest, Castro wrote a book

entitled Fidel y la religion (Fidel and Religion). The series of conversations with Brazilian Catholic

cleric Frei Betto published in the book revealed several admissions. Castro admitted that his

government had made several errors toward religion, and promised to correct them. He praised the

contribution Protestant schools like La Progresiva had made to the revolution and stated he was

favorably impressed with liberation theology. He further commented, “We didn’t want to create an

image of the Revolution throwing priests into prison…We didn’t want to play into the hands of the

forces of reaction and the imperialists by presenting the image of the Revolution executing priests.”

(Malone 1996).

Another significant event that same year was the creation of the Office of Attention to

Religious Affairs. This was unprecedented because in a socialist state the government is to meet all

32

the needs of the people, including the spiritual ones, making religion useless for lack of need (Rosado,

304). Furthermore, the Cuban government initially went against Lenin’s policy to allow Christians

membership in the Party (Rosado, 292). Therefore, to reverse the position was truly extraordinary.

According to Cepeda (1963, 265) the creation of this office showed that

…the attitude towards religion in Cuba [was] changing in a positive direction. It also suggests reciprocal action, in that just as the Church has been improving its relations with the government, and cooperating with it at various levels of social involvement, without compromising its faith, so the government is changing its attitude and action towards the Church, without compromising its ideological doctrine. However, on this latter point, the creation of a separate department in the Central Committee to deal exclusively with religious matters, may suggest the eroding of Marxism’s central thesis about religion, which a Cuban Marxist admitted to Rafael Cepeda years back. “The one Marxist thesis still to be proved and so far falsified by the facts is the dogma that religious faith is a bourgeois hangover which will disappear as revolutionary indoctrination is intensified.”

By 1991, the Soviet Union was no longer in existence, discrediting communism worldwide.

That same year, Cuba’s Fourth Communist Party Congress delegates voted to allow Christians and

other religious individuals to obtain party membership and run for office, the Protestants taking

advantage of the opportunity. In March of 1993, Rev. Raul Suarez was the first Baptist pastor to be

elected to the Congress (Wirpsa, 1993). The bishops welcomed the change, but added, “if the Party

continued its dogmatic stance of atheism and materialism, ‘it is morally impossible for a Catholic to

belong to such a party.’ ” (Malone 1996). The Fourth Congress delegates did vote to change the

constitutional status from atheist to secular (Malone 1996) but to date there have been no Catholics in

the hierarchy actively involved in the Revolution.

Why, then, has the Catholic Church remained distant from the regime since the atheist status

of the regime, which is the cornerstone of Marxism, was deleted from the constitution? The distrust

has been so deep and damaging that the Church has been unable to endorse the regime, although it

praises isolated policies. The Church has remained uneasily and silently acquiescent (Malone 1996).

However, as late as 1993, conservative Cuban priests still complained about the oppression of

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fundamental rights, like the right to migrate and freedom of expression. Even progressive Catholics

are having problems. After Medellín and Puebla, the priests who committed to the “preferential option

for the poor” felt doubly marginalized because the regime was suspicious of them and because the

hierarchy rejected them. The regime did not trust all Catholics, and the Catholic hierarchy as well as

fellow parishioners did not want to identify themselves with liberation theology, which would have

similarities with the regime’s social goals. Thus the priests embracing liberation theology formed

grass roots, underground organization named after reformist Archbishop Oscar Romero through

which they could minister without the official endorsement of either the Church or the regime.

(Wirpsa 1998).

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s economy was seriously crippled and the discrediting

of communism did not alleviate the situation. Therefore, it would be to Castro’s benefit to ease his

grip on the religious to gain the credibility lost and to solicit economic assistance. The economic crisis

precipitated several events. For the first time since the early criticisms of the regime, the Catholic

Church issued two pastoral letters condemning the government’s lack of economic control.

Temporarily displacing the priority of ideological concerns with economic ones and responding to the

pastoral criticism, the regime allowed foreign donations from religious groups. However, the

decentralizing nature of economic reform “unintentionally loosened many of the mechanisms for

social control. Therefore, once the crisis was over, Castro once again had to assert authority” (Malone

1996).

The Clinton administration did not help matters when in 1992 he presented the Track Two

policy, encouraging greater people-to-people contact between the two countries. However, to avoid

accusations of being “soft on Castro,” Clinton declared the policy as a means of subverting the Cuban

regime. Thus, a number of Cuban churches were identified by the Castro regime as subversive

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(Malone 1996). The sinking of a hijacked tugboat headed for the United States in July of 1994

prompted the Catholic Church to openly criticize the government. The Archbishop of Havana Jaime

Ortega openly lamented the death of approximately forty people. Rev. Jose Conrado Rodriguez, a

Catholic priest from Palma Soriano, wrote a critical letter to Castro condemning “the absence and

inexistence of a space for freedom,… [and the] hypocrisy and deceit, insincerity and lies, and a

general state of fear that affected everybody on the island.” (Malone 1996).

Protestant competition had been growing since the mid 1960s because Protestantism provided

an alternative for the Cuban religious to distance themselves from the discredited Catholic Church.

According to Rev. Oscar Boliolo, Latin America and Caribbean director for the New York-based

National Council of Churches, the Protestants never had real power and thus they were sympathetic to

the revolution and were unthreatened by it. Furthermore, Anthony Stevens-Arroyo, president of the

Program for the Analysis of Religion Among Latinos, observed that “the Catholic Church

overestimated its power against the regime and paid a dear price.” (Rifkin 1998). Because of the

Protestant’s anti-critical stance or outright support for the revolution, the government has allowed the

Cuban Council of Churches to broadcast on state radio during Christmas and Easter, while denying

that privilege to the Catholics (Rifkin 1998).

By the time Pope John Paul II visited Cuba in 1998, it was the first Spanish speaking, Western

Hemisphere country in which the number of practicing Protestants almost equaled the number of

practicing Catholics (Rifkin 1998). Now that competition is actually significant, this variable so

central to Gill’s model for predicting the Church’s anti-authoritarian stance finally comes into play.

However, it is obvious from the Church’s decisions since 1959 that competition was not the major

deciding factor.

35

Assessment of Gill’s Model

During the time between 1963 and 1999, the Church had continued its conservative stance

against the regime. Although the Church approved policies and accepted the reality of existing in a

socialist society, it had not officially aligned itself to the regime, thus behaving as an irrational actor

according to Gill’s model. Several factors support this conclusion: 1) competition from Protestants

has been growing, 2) the Church will not receive any privileges or favors from the government, 3) its

members have been defecting to churches that are less critical of the regime, and 4) improvement in

the relationship have precipitated only because the regime initiated them in order to restore credibility

or alleviate economic crisis, not because the Church legitimated the regime. In the Cuban case, the

mistrust between the two entities has been deeply historical and ideological. It seems that the Church

will back policies which are for the social good and don’t violate religious values. But it is unlikely

that the Church as an institution will wholeheartedly endorse the regime.

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Flaws in Gill’s Model

There are a few problems with Gill’s rational actor mode as applied to the Cuban case. First,

the Church’s preferential option for the poor was non-existent in the pre and early post Cuban

revolutionary periods. Second, he does not consider the history of the case study as a foundational

variable affecting religious-political decision; third, he treats the Catholic Church as one unit, not fully

considering opposing factions within it; and fourth, he also ignore pure religious belief as one of the

deciding variables.

My main criticism with Gill’s model is that it is better applicable to cases where the

authoritarian regime is challenged or comes into power after 1968. He states, “Where competition for

the souls [of] the popular masses was fierce, a pastoral strategy of a preferential option for the poor

was adopted” (71). Such an option did not exist during the early years of the Cuban Revolution, yet

the Church still chose officially to be anti-authoritarian. This is significant because had Vatican II,

Medellín, and Puebla influenced the Church in Cuba, it may have implemented pastoral strategies

more compatible with the regime’s ideology. Conversely, had Castro seen the Church taking a

significant interest in the poor and the working class before or during the Revolution, he may not have

been so negative against the Church. Another element to consider is that the Revolution was the first

of its kind in the Western Hemisphere at the height of the Cold War. Anti-religious dogma was

preeminent in the communist ideology.

Furthermore, Gill ignores the history of the Catholic Church in the particular country being

discussed. Cuba was a stop-off island and insignificant to Spain and the hierarchy. The annihilation

of the indigenous inhabitants was particularly brutal and sanctioned by the Catholic priests. The

37

perpetual lack of priests in rural areas only helped to entrench a silent disdain for the religious

institution. Priest representation was sparse and disproportioned in favor of urban centers and it

increased after the exoduses. From the time of Hatuey, the Catholic Church has been largely

discredited. Although the Cuban people were very religious and very Catholic in their values and

norms, they were not highly committed to the institution (Crahan 1980, 241). Therefore, the Church’s

unpopularity with the people, especially the peasants, added to its unpopularity with Castro’s regime.

Because of its history the Church was not about to align itself with a regime that not only opposed it

ideologically, but that also betrayed the little trust it placed on the revolution. Historical factors may

make an actor behave irrationally even to its detriment.

Thirdly, Gill speaks of the Church as one unit ignoring that there may be conflicting factions

within it who would make contradictory and unpredictable decisions. The Church in Cuba was

divided and vulnerable to the winds of change, especially in the period between 1959 and 1963. It did

not function as a unit; it was too confused, scattered and dumbfounded by the avalanche of radical

policy. It did not speak with one voice on every issue. After 1963, the conservative and liberal camps

of the Church have become more defined, the more liberal groups forming its own organization

named after murdered Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador. If Gill considers the Church to refer

only to the official final voice on a particular issue, then perhaps that voice can fit into his model as

one variable. However, there are other voices within the organization that take contrary action despite

the official proclamation.

Finally, Gill’s model ignores the variable that is purely religious. Being faithful to a religious

belief that will receive its reward only in heaven does not fit his model. If religious faith is irrational,

as some political scientists claim it is, then choices springing from it may also be irrational. Once the

Church realized that the regime was communist, it could not officially endorse it even if it cost

38

membership, property, and credibility, and even if, because of its inflexibility, its religious

competition, the Protestant churches, grew.

39

Conclusion

I applied Anthony Gill’s rational actor model to three historical time periods—the Batista-

Revolutionary period from 1953 to 1958, the early years of the Revolution from 1959 to 1963, and the

years from 1963 to 1999—and found that the predictability of the Church’s behavior was not

consistent across the three epochs. During the Batista period, the Church maintained its traditional

posture of conservatism that it had in Latin America for four hundred years. It was aligned with the

Cuban government and the United States, catering to the political and religious elite in the cities but

neglecting the poor and rural population. Once Batista’s regime became unpopular and the United

States withdrew its support of the government, the Church shifted its allegiance to the Revolution.

The shift is predictable through Proposition 5 of Gill’s model.

When Batista fled the country under the strong suggestion of the United States and Castro’s

and his rebels won the war, the Church was eager to renew relations with the new government under

the assumption that the status quo would be maintained. Unaware that the Revolution was going to

be radicalized and declared Marxist-Leninist, the Church wanted to continue teaching Catholicism in

schools and to retain access to mass media. However, once the declaration came and Castro

implemented the new program to nationalize education, some factions of the hierarchy became

involved in counterrevolutionary activity, notably, the Bay of Pigs invasion. Perhaps hoping that the

United States would wipe out the Revolution, the Church withdrew its support of the regime, in spite

of the fact that it was losing members and clergy by the hundreds. Competition from the Protestants

was non-existent, since they too were losing clergy and believers. According to Gill, the Church

40

should have aligned itself to Castro once it realized that the United States was not going to rid the

island of the new communist threat but it did not, at least not officially or wholeheartedly.

From 1963 to 1999 the Church has had to accept the societal conditions in which it has to

function, occasionally issuing pastoral letters endorsing individual policies. However, the Church has

also issued condemning letters critical of official policy, with which the regime retaliated with

renewed restrictions. The historical distrust runs so deep, and the radicalization of the revolution with

the betrayal from the regime was so drastic and profound that to this day both entities remain

suspicious of each other. The visit of the Pope was helpful in easing relations, but most of the

concessions have been initiated by the regime to regain the international legitimacy and economic

support lost by the dismantling of communism.

Gill’s model does not fit as neatly as he would like his readers to think. Political choices the

Church has to make are too complicated and the variables too numerous to be arranged in a sterile

formula defined by micro economic terms. These terms are definitely a part of the whole picture, but

there are many other variable that need consideration, and still then, the behavior of the actors may not

be predictable.

41

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