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The dynamics of Blue-Red interaction

in the networked online reality.

Case study: Online dimension of an Israeli operation in Gaza strip

(winter 2008-2009)

Course: Media and Politics in the Islamic World

Professor: Marc Lynch

By Gregory Asmolov

MA Candidate, Global Communication

Elliott School of International Affairs

The George Washington University

August 12, 2009

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The best way to learn about the rules of combat is watch the battle.

Gadi Wolfsfeld

The Internet lays a good foundation for a battle of ideas, but it does not necessarily favor a winner. From ‘Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere,’ Berkman Center report

Introduction:

Only few weeks ago, we have seen social networks and new media play a significant role in a conflict.

Twitter, Facebook, Youtube and other Web 2.0 and networking platforms changed the coverage of

Iranian protests against the re-election of Ahmedinejad as president of the Iranian Republic. The role of

these technologies in organizing and coordinating offline protests is debatable. So far, there is no

credible way to show the impact of online activity on actions in the physical dimension1. However, even

without proven consequences in the physical dimension, online protests have a tangible impact. First

they influence the agenda setting and framing not only of new, but also of traditional media. It happens,

when the same content is distributed through viral marketing as well as through traditional media when

these two distribution paths intersect. Second, online protests include new strategies of information

distribution and it shapes new patterns of cooperation and engagement. Third, we may assume that

new strategies for agenda setting/framing as well as new patterns of engagement/cooperation, both in

the global dimension, have effect on shaping social networked-related identity as well as shaping a

social reality (Walter Lippmann, and later Berger and Luckman explained what role information plays in

construction of social reality)2.

It is in particular interesting to understand the new patterns of engagement and cooperation in a

situation of conflict. The situation of conflict creates a unique information reality. It has an ability to

cause a significant change in agenda from a local to a global context. Research on “Mapping the Arab

blogosphere” at Harvard shows that the audience in the Arab world is focused on their local daily life

more than on Pan-Arab topics, with one exception – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict3. The same situation

1 Same dilemma was raised by events in Moldova in Spring 20092Lippmann W, Public opinion Berger P. L. and T. Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966

3 Etling Bruce, John Kelly, Robert Faris, and John Palfrey, Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics, Culture, and Dissent, Berkman Center Research Publication, June 2009

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might be witnessed in a big country as Russia. People tend to focus on their daily local lives; however a

conflict such as a war with Georgia becomes the main topic of the day, independent of the distance

from the front. Similarly, the internal conflict in Iran quickly made its way to the center of the global

news agenda.

While these cases are different, we can assume with a high degree of confidence that conflicts have the

ability to change the priorities of news agenda from local to global. The first reason for this is the

entertaining nature of conflicts, which provide action and dynamics for any news. The second reason

depends on the ability of spectators to identify themselves with one side of the conflict. The media will

try to provide framing that makes it possible for the audience to identify itself; it is a good way to

achieve higher ratings. Similar to a sports game, if one is European, one will probably not be interested

in a game between two African teams. But a game between good and evil, a totalitarian force and the

democrats, will raise interest and engagement, since one wants the good side to win. Therefore, the

Western media provides a framing that clearly distinguishes who is bad and who is good. For instance, in

Moldova, the bad side are Communists; in Iran the bad side is the Basij and supporters of Ahmadinejad .

In other words, conflict is a situation of emergence of another set of agenda priorities from focus on

local daily life to a more global common denominator.

However, the situation of conflict is not only about a change in agenda priorities from local to global.

Maurice Blanchot says that true community is achieved only at time of crisis and conflict4. For instance,

people feel togetherness when they find themselves as soldiers on a battlefield. New information

technologies provide an option for an audience to feel as soldiers on a battlefield. Social networks serve

as a mechanism of global “socialization of conflict” (the concept developed by Schattschneider that

emphasizes the government’s role in preventing from audience to be involved in conflict as a method to

preserve stability)5. They not only provide an option of “watching together,” but also of “acting

together.” The range of possible activities is wide, from creating, uploading, promoting and distributing

content, to violating it on the rival side (e.g. hacktivism). Since information is the basic matter of social

reality (according to Lippmann the information based pseudo-environment is more important than the

real environment), distinguishing between offline and online information might be less important. Even

if the focus is on the online representation of a conflict, it is still a part of the social reality, and it still has 4 Willson M. A. Technically together, Rethinking Community within Techno-Society. Peter Lang, 2006

5 Schattschneider E. E,.The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1975.

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a significant impact on decision making by millions, and consequently on the physical reality. To

conclude, the situation of conflict causes both a change in agenda from local to global as well as an

increase in degree of cooperation due to the fact that new information technologies provide an option

for the spectator to be a “soldier on the battlefield” (these two factors are certainly interrelated).

Consequently, the situation of conflict has its own consequences for dynamics in social networks’

cooperation and competition.

The Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip during December 2008-January 2009 has been chosen here as a

case study for conflict situation with online dimension. On December 27, 2008, Israel launched a military

campaign in the Gaza Strip, codenamed “Operation Cast Lead.” During the first days, Israeli air strikes

caused a significant number of victims on the Palestinian side, including numerous civilians. It created a

significant image problem for Israel as a wave of international protests demanded that Israel cease fire.

This operation was not the first conflict for which information technologies played a visible role. The

Second Lebanon War (Summer 2006) was probably the first major conflict in Israeli history in which new

media technologies, social networks, and user-generated content played a significant role in painting the

image of the war. However, the online pro and anti-Israel activities were rather chaotic and unmanaged

by state actors. At the time of the operation in Gaza, not only did information technologies play a role,

but all the sides of the conflict and the actors taking part in it, including the governments (at least on

the Israeli side) were aware of the significance of the social media role and the necessity to initiate an

online presence for their policy.

To understand the dynamics of online content-oriented collaboration, we should look at three

dimensions of analysis:

1. Intrasystem: the dynamic inside the social network (e.g. within pro-Palestinian networks)

2. Intersystem: the dynamics between rival networks (e.g. between pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian

networks)

3. Metasystem: the dynamics between two levels: state actors and online social networks (e.g.

between the Saudi government or Arab League and a pro-Palestinian online network).

The Arabic information environment provides a unique platform for conflict socialization in a global

dimension. Marc Lynch’s description of the Pan-Arabic network society explains how powerful it might

be on the field of online cooperation and viral distribution of content:

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“It comprises Islamic networks and mosques, NGO and transnational organizations, and prominent

public figures and intellectuals. It includes a vast Arab Diaspora that is increasingly able to maintain

contact with and actively engage with the politics of the Arab world through information and

communication technology – whether by watching Al Jazeera in San Francisco or by emailing friends

from Denmark. The new Arab public is actually composed of multiple, overlapping publics that should be

defined not territorially but by reference to a shared identity and a common set of political arguments

and concerns. Ironically, perhaps, the Arab world has achieved something of which European

enthusiasts only dream: a transnational public sphere united by a common language and a common

news agenda. “6

The analysis of Intrasystem dynamics within the Arab informational environment, social networks and

social media, requires knowledge of Arabic. Therefore it will be beyond framework of this paper. The

interaction between government and social networks is one of the most sensitive topics. It demands an

access to inside information and a deep knowledge of the political and social reality. On the Arab side it

is especially difficult since there is no single state actor (as in the Israeli case) but numerous state actors

and organizations on the Pan Arab level, which are affiliated with state actors. Therefore, this level will

be also, mostly outside of this paper’s framework.

I would like to focus with regards to the Intersystem level on the mutual impact of the pro-Israeli

networked activity and the Pro Palestinian networked activity. I would like to claim that the dynamics

of one system and its patterns of behavior depend on the patterns and dynamics of the rival side. In

this case we might witness two main patterns in intersystem dynamics:

1. Mutual monitoring and studying of each other’s networked content related strategies

2. Mutual mirroring – one side copies the strategy/ tactics of the other side to prevent it from

achieving any advantages.

Following this hypothesis we can ask a question if these intersystem dynamics can cause a balance, with

neither side reaching any significant advantage.

In previous research I defined a few main fields of an Israeli online activity during the operation in the

Gaza Strip:

6 Lynch M. Voices of the New Arab Public. Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics today, Columbia University Press 2006, p. 22.

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1. Online institutionalization of networked leadership: creating web platforms that attempt to

coordinate/ manage pro-Israeli networked activities within social networks.

2. Offline institutionalization of networked leadership: creating situational rooms in the physical

dimension that attempt to coordinate/ manage pro-Israeli networked activities.

3. Multiplatform/ Multilanguage/ Multicontent approach – creating a situation in which the same

content exists in various web platforms/ various languages/ in various forms (text/ pictures/

video).

4. Coordination of reaction to rival content and polls management strategies

5. Technological assistance to network members to bridge the technological skills gap and make

the cooperation more effective and synchronized.

In this paper I will present a few examples of the symmetrical activities on the pro-Palestinian side,

including online and offline Institutionalization, technological assistance and coordination strategies. I

will also describe briefly the role of Al Jazeera in online coordination and management. The description

of the case studies will be followed by analysis and conclusions.

It should be mentioned that the research has a few methodological limitations. The case studies are

limited to the English language segment of social networks. This analysis is based on ethnographical

approach of following and monitoring some of social networks groups. These groups are used only as

examples, and there no doubt that they are not the only platform of online activities within information

warfare during the operation in the Gaza Strip. The paper does not tend to present any conclusions

based on data with statistically proven significance, but reflect the dynamics of online interaction

between the pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian networks.

Case study:

Israeli side:

At the beginning of the conflict, a U.S. based pro-Israel advocacy organization called “Stand with us”,

together with the Communication School from the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya (Israel),

established three situation rooms for coordinating online networked activities. At the same time, a

special website Helpuswin.org was created by the school activists. Both initiatives were online and

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offline platforms for network management that were interrelated. The main missions of the situation

rooms, which were also reflected at the website, included:

1. Content monitoring in the overload information reality (discovering the pro-Israeli items to promote

and the anti-Israeli items to refute).

2. Development/ expanding of pro-Israeli networks within global social networks platforms (creating

pro-Israeli groups). Development of relations and coordination with Diaspora’s online networks (Israelis

out of the country or emigrants inside Israel).

3. Pro-Israeli content distribution/ promotion through Social networks, Search optimization, Social

Bookmarking on a Web 2.0 sites, like Youtube, and within traditional online media platforms.

4. Participating the discourse: sending pro-Israeli Internet users to respond to pro Palestinian content/

comments in traditional media comments, forums, and polls.

5. Development and translation of content for promoting within foreign social networks.

6. Assistance and advice to pro-Israeli activists (e.g. providing talking points).

The role of situational room was focused on monitoring of Internet content, brainstorming, online

campaign management and being in touch with different government and non-government pro-Israel

organizations. The online platform was used as an instrument to coordinate activity of pro-Israeli

networks and provide guidelines.

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The page provided content in an eight languages (reflected by the eight flags), different mediums of

content, widget and pictures that could be uploaded to private blogs and also served as a hub for

various pro-Israel links. As a part of multiplatform policy and an attempt to expand the networks, Help

Us Win opened a Facebook group and Twitter account. Both, the website and Facebook group provided

a list of major steps that should be taken by those who want to help to Israeli advocacy effort:

Make your voice heard - 7 Things you can help us win this battle:

• Join Groups and post comments on Media Websites

• Join our mailing list and we will send you updates

• You can change your Facebook picture to show your support ( you can get the Israeli flag pic

here )

• You can add the QassamCount application on Facebook

• You can help us and Digg for israel.

• Follow us on Twitter

• Spread the word anyway possible

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A special attempt was made to manage the flow of pro-Israel Internet users to specific sites where

according to the Israeli point of view, the presentation of Israeli side was wrong or/and Israeli reaction

was required. “More articles to respond. Decent article in “The Washington Times”. Less than decent

responses. Please Post.” – says one of the directions that were published on the “HelpUsWin” website, It

is only one of hundreds of examples. The special online tool “Giyus-Megaphone” was distributing calls

for different pro Israel online actions including voting for the Israeli side in different online pools. It was

also supported by initiating chain letters.

But probably the most successful action of the IDC situation room was developing of the online

application “Qassam counter.”7 Every time a Qassam rocket fell in Israel during the war, the Qassam

Counter automatically changed the Facebook status of anyone who subscribed.

At its peak, 75,000 users from 150 countries had "donated" their Facebook status to the Qassam

Counter. Niv Calderon, one of the situational room managers said that he knew that it was a success

when a woman from Thailand wrote to him asking, "What is a Qassam? It demonstrates the situation

while ICTs provide the ability to set an agenda in a place, where this agenda has never emerged before

and might be not understood due to a lack of the relevant knowledge or context.

The Qassam count also followed multiplatform strategy and expanded to different social media web

sites (e.g. Twiiter).

7 Developed by Dan Peguine and Arik Fraimovich

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It should be mentioned also that in the Israeli case, coordinated activity took place also on a hacktivism

field (e.g. providing software for contributing a computer for Botnet). However, promoting and

distribution of content as a part of agenda setting and framing strategies were much more significant in

the Israeli case than any hacker’s activity. The latter is more about violating content of the rival side than

promoting your own.

Palestinian side:

This chapter will show that the Palestinian side had platforms and strategies which were very similar to

the Israeli side and actually reacted and interacted with the Israeli activities. The first example is online

platform for network leadership and coordination:

“Gaza Talk is a site created as a tool of the new resistance, and to show the crimes of the occupation

and what is happening in Gaza. We also gathered here photos ,videos and reports ,which reflect the

massacres taking place in Gaza. You can contribute and share pictures, videos or articles of

demonstrations and supported to Gaza , sent it to info@gazatalk.com” – says the website Gazatalk.org –

the main hero of Al Jazeera’s program, which was dedicated to online warfare.

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The website provides a list of instructions on”How to resist Online” which in many areas reminds of the similar the list at HelpUsWin.org. This is the list:

1. Twitter is the most popular microblogging platform and it’s one of the main streams for news.

Tweet about Gaza news, photos and videos of the massacre and Israeli aggression. Join the

conversation against Israelis and Pro Israelis and occupation. There is a war against us there and we

must win it. Don't forget to add #Gaza to your tweets.

2. Write in your blog about situation in Gaza, about the Holocaust against Palestinians in Gaza.

3. Upload photos to Flickr, your videos to Youtube about terror in Gaza, civilians killed by Israeli

occupation and for demonstration supporting Gaza in your country. ( Don't forget to choose good Tags

and description )

4. Change your account avatar everywhere to one of these suggested pictures or any one

supporting Gaza.

5. Put Al-Jazeera death toll widget in your blog (Widget here ).

6. Help to build Al-Jazeera interactive map about War in Gaza.

7. Go into demonstrations supporting Gaza on the second life.

8. Spread all links supporting Gaza in social networks. ( Facebook, MySpace, Digg, etc..).

9. Help us to spread GazaTalk as a source for THE TRUTH.

10. Send us any helpful material to publish it on GazaTalk to info@gazatalk.com.

The website was supported by situational room In Doha. The story of situational room was also told at a

special Al Jazeera program which was dedicated to online warfare. From the video footage, we can clearly

see at the report, that the situational room in Doha was following the Israeli “Help Us Win” website.8

Facebook also provided a hub for pro-Palestinian network at the group” Let's collect 500000 signatures to

support the Palestinians in Gaza” (later the name was changed to one million). “We are Taking the lead in

Fighting the Propaganda War,” said the headline of the group. At the end of the operation, more than

600000 users were members of the group. It is interesting, that unlike the pro- Palestinian side, the Israeli

side tried to create many small Facebook hubs since according to Facebook policy, you cannot send

message to more than 5000 group members at one time. The Facebook group has also included a list of

directions to its members.

8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAz6jpg9LiM

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This is ”Let's collect 500000 signatures to support the Palestinians in Gaza” page with the following instructions for network members:

1. Join2. Invite you friends to join.3. Become informed. Read non-biased news.4. Tell your friend what your learn.5. Contact the media in support of Gaza.6. Contact your elected official to put pressure on Israel.7. Contact the UN security council and other agencies.

In both lists of directions we can see that almost any guideline has a similar one on the Israeli side. The

group mission of the pro-Palestinian Facebook page was translated into 25 languages. The page also

served as a hub for pro-Palestinian links. It also included a text of a letter to President- elect Obama with

a call to support the Palestinian side. Another interesting point is that the page’s forum included

discussions about Israeli methods of information warfare.

So far we have seen that the Palestinian side has the same organization of online campaigns (online and

offline institutionalization) and the same strategies (multiplatform presence, Multilanguage approach,

similar lists of guide lines). However the most interesting case could be witnessed on the field of

technological assistance.

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Facebook users were asked to “donate their status,” that would automatically display a running count of

the Palestinian dead and wounded9.

The developer of the page Abdallah Ehab confirms that it was made as a reaction to the Israeli

application:

“This application was developed to reply to some Zionist developers who developed Facebook

applications that update subscribers' status periodically with the number of missiles launched by

Palestinian resistance. They seize the Facebook platform development tools and the huge

numbers of subscribers who will receive these updates through their friends lists to portray

Israel as the victim who is defending itself and win the international compassion and support.

Especially that the western-targeted media don't broadcast the real picture about the current

cold-blooded attack on Gaza and its justification.”

Recently Facebook change its policy and now automatic update of status is not possible anymore.

“According to these new policies the application can no longer update the user's status automatically, as

the user has to approve the status content first “ says the Supportgaza page.

Israelis against Palestinians- Platform for Struggle:

One of the interesting illustrations to the dynamics of the internetworks activities are online polls. Some

of polls were managed by Israeli, Arab and Western media. Other polls were created on the

independent platforms. I would like to briefly discuss the result of poll at the web site Israel-vs-

Palestine.com. At the end of the Israeli operation in the second half of January, 433,000 users voted for

Israelis (Blue on image) and 531,000 voted for Palestinians (Red).10

9 http://apps.facebook.com/supportgaza.10 Today the situation is a little different with Israelis leading with 51.7% and Palestinians reaching 48.3%

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As I mentioned earlier, the online Polls were one of the most significant targets for network

management activities from both sides. I would like to claim that the results of the poll don’t represent

the public opinion but the dynamic of the internetwork relations. In most of the polls, as well as in

many discussions following an article on the traditional media web sites, responses tended to represent

both sides equally11. When the comments were anti- Israel, they were followed by few pro Israel

comments, and vice versa.

The poll on Israel-vs-Palestine.com might be a good example for internetwork dynamics. I can offer

several explanations for its results. First, people are more motivated to react if their side is less

represented. It means if you are Israeli and you see that your side is losing the poll or have only one pro-

Israeli comment against ten pro-Palestinian, your motivations to take an action will be higher. Second,

people be more motivated to engage their friend (their social network) if their side is less presented and

therefore will actively use viral marketing methods (chain letters, posting on personal blog, Twitter,

Facebook status etc.). Third, the actors which are dealing with network leadership, will try to make any

effort to identify (as a part of monitoring) platforms that their side has weak representation on them

and use all instruments to engage maximal number of platforms and networks to change the situation

and make their side winning. Due to the fact that, so far we have seen that each side is monitoring and

11 This thesis certainly demands empirical research and statistical analysis.

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following the other side, and using the same methods, probably both sides will act according to the

same strategies.

We can see from the statistics of the poll (in the picture) that the number of voters from Israel (148.000)

is almost equal to number of pro Palestinian voters from Egypt (50.000), Saudi Arabia (51.000) and

Jordan (49.000) combined. It might be surprising to some extent, since the populations of these three

Arab countries are much larger than the population of Israel. The same kind of surprise might be seen

when we look at the total results of the poll, since we may assume that the number of potential

members of pro-Palestinian networks (all of the Arab world, all of the Islam networks, and most of the

European countries) is more significant than the potential number of pro-Israel networks (Israel, the U.S,

Jewish Diaspora in other countries).

We can explain it by claiming that the Israeli side has the advantage of access to the Internet and higher

average Internet skills among its population. However, in my opinion, this explanation is not enough,

since even despite the digital divide, Arab countries have a relatively large Internet audience. The

Internet Penetration Rate in Arab States as a % of Population at the end of 2008 (at the time of the

operation in the Gaza Strip) was 22.7% in Saudi Arabia, 18.2% in Jordan, and 10.5% in Egypt.12 The

absolute number of Internet users in these countries is more than total population of Israel.

Furthermore, we should take into account the unique characteristic of the Arab public sphere according

12 Source: www.internetworldstats.com

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to Lynch, (“a transnational public sphere united by a common language and a common news

agenda”),which provides additional advantage to the Pro Palestinian side.

Another explanation to the success of the Israeli side might be language advantage, since the rate of

English speakers in Israel is probably higher than in the Arab countries. However, we should remember

that voting is a very simple procedure, and it can be simplified even more by light technological

assistance and network leadership. If the Israeli side has no clear technological or significant language

advantage to overwhelm the pro-Palestinian numerical advantage, we should look for other

explanations. The first explanation for this situation might just claim that the pro-Israel side is more

motivated than the pro Palestinian (including not only voting, but also using viral marketing strategies to

engage in voting its own social network). We may also assume that the networked leadership on the

pro-Israel side is more significant than that on the pro- Palestinian side, since the Arab networked

sphere is bigger and more fragmented between different actors who can claim leadership, and therefore

the numerical advantage of the pro-Palestinian networks is bridged by the relative efficiency of the

Israeli networked leadership.

However, we have seen that online and offline institutions for network leadership, as well as content

oriented strategies, exist on both sides. We have seen also seen that the networks from both sides tend

to follow each other, learn from each other and replicate each other’s activities.

Therefore, I would like to offer another explanation. The relative balance in representation of both sides

is a result of inter-network dynamics. It might be considered as a property of new informational system.

The activity of both sides decreases when the representation of two sides reaches approximate balance.

The reason is that particular members of networks, as well as hubs of networks leadership continue to

put an effort to change a situation when they lose. However, when the inter-network dynamics reach a

point of balance, they focus on other platforms. The inter-network dynamics in this case work as

pendulum, until the point of approximate balance is reached. Another possible reason for balance is

that both sides replicate methods of each other to make an impact. If it is right, it means that results of

polls have nothing to do with public opinion. They are only a reflection of inter-network dynamics.

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Al-Jazeera and the Network leadership collaboration model.

In my previous papers I have claimed that in a situation of conflict, state actors look for ways to

approach networks and build an impact in the new informational environment. In the Israeli case,

government on the one hand and network leadership hubs that were created by academic institutes and

NGOs on the other hand created a channel for mutual collaboration. The Israeli government provided

not only the main messages, by but also video footage for distribution through social networks. The

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Israeli military (IDF) for the first time uploaded content to

Youtube, which made this content friendly to be promoted virally. ”. Content provision by the

government was crucial since the Gaza Strip was closed for coverage by traditional media.

The significance of government’s role as video footage provider can be seen from the Russian example.

During the Russian-Georgian war the lack of video footage from the Russian side (South Ossetia which

was closed military zone) was very visible and significant comparing to a lot of footage from Georgian

side, which was open to media. As a consequence, the pro-Russian social networks had nothing to

promote. Therefore, we may explain the high activity of Russian hackers, who violated rival content, as

a consequence of a lack of ability to promote their own content.

On the Palestinian side, the monopoly on video footage belonged to a few TV companies who had TV

crews inside the Gaza Strip before the start of Israeli operation and the decision by the Israeli

government to close Gaza to the media. It included primarily Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya and local TV agency

Ramatan. Here I would like to focus on activities of Al Jazeera and claim that during the operation in

the Gaza Strip, AL Jazeera played not only the role of the traditional media, but also those of a

provider of content for online networks and, to some extent, network leader for the pro-Palestinian

networks. In other words, the roles that were played in the Russian and Israeli cases by government,

academic institutions and NGOs, in the Palestinian case was played by a satellite TV station. In my

opinion, it is another facet of Al Jazeera’s emergence as a virtual state13. I would like to list here few

actions that were taken by Al Jazeera including creating, engaging and empowering networks.

First, as a TV channel that is available to most of the Arab world, Al Jazeera has a significant ability to set

the Pan-Arabic agenda. At the outset of this paper, I have mentioned that the first condition for creating

conflict network dynamics is the ability to define the situation as a conflict for members of these

networks. Al Jazeera is the most successful mechanism of conflict socialization inside the Arab world. By

13 As an extension for thesis from Seib’s The Al Jazeera Effect

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providing news about conflicts as the first and sometimes only story, it was effective in creating the

agenda shift from local (economical, political, social as well as entertainment) to global conflict issues. In

other words, Al Jazeera was one of the main mechanisms of creating a conflict-related common

denominator in the Arab world, which was required for shaping the identity of network members and

the emergence of networked conflict- related collaboration.

Al Jazera also created presence on almost all Web 2.0 platforms including Youtube and Twitter. This

presence provided “distribution friendly” first-hand content from the Gaza Strip for the networks’

members who were interested in promoting pro-Palestinian content. To some extent, Al Jazeera as a

Gaza footage monopolist played the same role as Israeli ministry of Foreign Affairs and IDF when they

established their Web 2.0 platforms, which provided first hand video footage from the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, Al Jazera chose to replace the usual “all rights reserved” restriction by the “Commons 3.0”

license, which encourages editing, sharing and commercial and non-commercial distribution of the

content. It was a clear signal that the TV channel hoped the material would find its widest possible

audience via social networks and Web 2.0 platforms.

Mohamed Nanabhay, the head of Al Jazeera’s new media department, explained that from the

channel’s point of view, this strategy was a way to bridge the gap of limited representation in the U.S.

He called this strategy “distributed distribution”14—syndicating content online via YouTube, Real,

Independent.co.uk, the LiveStation and Zattoo apps and a host of other outlets,15 to allow them to reach

people Al-Jazeera may not otherwise have reached, especially youth. Other distribution platforms

included apps for iPhone and Facebook. As we have seen earlier, software tools not only provide

effective ways to distribute content, but also make cooperation easier when a large number of people

use the same tools.

However, either it was only a new strategy to substitute the lack of access to the U.S. market through

Web or not, the fact that Al Jazeera engaged and empowered pro-Palestinian networks was still there.

14 The “distributed distribution” strategy changes the definition of media. We cannot anymore distinguish between private and public content. Any content which is transferred from one node (network’s member) to another exist not only in the context of personal conversation, but also in the context of network. It means that at some point it might be distributed by viral mechanisms through the networks and even reach traditional media as well as traditional media content might be distributed through social networks. In this case traditional media is not a separate platform from the social media, but just huge hubs with a big number of connections.

15 Andrews R. Interview: Mohamed Nanabhay, Head Of New Media, Al Jazeera: Winning Over The Skeptics Online, paidcontent.org, Mon 02 Feb 2009

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Moreover, we should underline the fact that it happened within the escalation of the conflict. Networks

without content in a situation of conflict are like blood system without blood. Al Jazeera provided the

blood for the system and made it work.

There is another point that made Al Jazera’s position connected to the position of state actors.

Traditional media actors are usually motivated by a search for profit. State actors’ motives, e.g. the

Israeli military’s motives, are not related to monetization, but primarily to national, political, and

security interests. In this case, Al Jazera was closer to being a state actor as opposed to being a

traditional media outlet due to almost unlimited budget provided by Qatar. “Everyone would like to

see a business model and some profit emerge but, at this point, we’re all about distribution and making

sure whoever wants to see us can see us.”, - said Mohamed Nanabhay.

Al Jazera activities included examples of engagement and empowerment normally seen by networks.

First, it advertised the online warfare. According to Harvard University’s report on “Mapping Arab

Blogosphere,” the video on online warfare was among the 20 most linked Youtube clips in the Arab

blogosphere. Al Jazeera also used crowdsoursing technologies developed by Ushahidi16 to create a

visualization of events based on the audience’s information. It also asked its audience to submit

contributions through http://yourviews.aljazeera.net/.

Having almost unlimited budget, political flexibility, a wide audience, access to a closed area of conflict

and multi platform existence made it possible for Al Jazeera to take on the roles of content provider and

engager for networks. We may claim that this is another way in which Al Jazera acts as a virtual state

entity.

Another reason for the unique role of Al Jazera is the role of new media in the Arab world. According to

Lynch, the Arab media tend to take an active role in attempting to mobilize the public to become

politically involved17. Al Jazeera’s traditional emphasis on the public18 and its activity on new

mediaplatforms make it a mobilizing actor. Lynch describes the Arab world as a weak international

public sphere that lacks institutionalized mechanisms for affecting policy.19 In the case of conflict on the

16 Ushahidi.com17 Lynch. Voices of the New Arab Public. Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics today, Columbia University Press 2006, P. 52

18 It was expressed recently by the TV channel general director Muhammad Khanfar in his public speech in DC.19 Lynch Voices of the New Arab Public. Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics today, Columbia University Press 2006, 53-55

20

social networks field, Al Jazeera has provided mechanisms which made social networks activities more

influential and effective. It facilitated an Arab public that shares the conflict agenda as a common

denominator, it then empowered that public with content, engaged it in “distributed distribution” and

through this, created a framework for networked coordination.

In the Arab world, states are too local to build an impact in the Pan-Arabic network. Their impact is

limited by political struggles and conflicts between various Arab states. Furthermore, there is another

development that makes state actors weaker. According to Wolfsfeld, states’ advantage is an ability to

dictate the rules of the game in the media, and not only to play the game20. But the emergence of the

networked reality, especially in networks which share one identity among many states, limits states

ability to dictate any rule of the game.

Al Jazeera’s policy is adjustment to the new networked reality by, for example, creating linkages

between traditional media , social media and social networks. In this case a state (Qatar) creates an

actor that is more flexible and more global, and as a consequence can build a networked impact much

faster that state itself. The Pan-Arabic dimension of Al Jazeera also makes possible to reach a status

when it can create rules for state actors, which is the opposite of the Wolfsfeld’s thesis (since media

shapes the rules). In this case, the question is if the created actor (Al Jazeera) starts to be more powerful

than the creator itself and what does it mean?

Analysis:

Mernissi reminds us that “the Umma, the very concept of the community in Islam, "means a group

moving towards the same goal”” and defines Muslim dream as transformation toward “a debate-linked

20 Wolfsfeld G. Media and political conflict: News from the Middle East. Cambridge University Press 1997

21

planetary community into a virtual reality”21. The Umma’s concept as well as the media system with a

common language and ability to set the same agenda for entire Arab world (as described by Lynch)

makes the Arab public sphere an ideal informational environment for global networked activity and

cooperation, and consequently conflict socialization.

The immediate question that might be raised is if this tendency might have any significant impact on the

physical dimension. One may claim that it even has an opposite effect. The anonymous Egyptian blogger

Sandmonkey described “Facebook status warfare” as “A form of masturbatory self-congratulating cyber

activism that doesn't really cost you any time or effort” and “doing something while really they are

doing nothing”22. David Farris points out that Facebook activist have a low commitment to physical

action.23

According to Lynch, the power of the Arab Street is limited by lack of mechanisms of policy affecting.24

The question is if the “networked street” is a shift only in horizontal dimension of activities’ organization

(street mobilization), or this shift also includes emergence of new abilities to make an impact within the

horizontal dimension (effect of street on decision makers).

As it was mentioned at the outset of this paper, online content oriented activities take a part in social

construction of reality. Therefore, even if we don’t see any immediate consequences of online

networked cooperation, it has an impact on decision making. Furthermore, collaboration by itself

contributes to situation definition as a conflict (agenda setting) and expands the range of engaged

networks through traditional/ social media and viral marketing.

However, in my opinion, the probable impact will not be limited to the social reality shaping by agenda

setting and framing. The networked Umma is still only in its beginning. But we may assume that a

decrease in the digital divide as well as in digital illiteracy will make it more and more powerful. As a

consequence, the potential impact of the Networked Umma within conflicts will also increase. The

content-oriented networked activity as a mechanism of uncontrolled “conflict socialization” will play a

more major role. It will be more and more significant since the dynamics of expanding the range of

21 Mernissi Fatema The Satellite, the Prince, and Scheherazade : The Rise of Women as Communicators in Digital Islam22 Sandmonkey, On Facebook Status Warfare, Sandmonkey.org, 11 Jan 200923 Will Ward, Social media in the Gaza conflict Arab media and society, Arab Media & Society, February 2009

24 Lynch Voices of the New Arab Public. Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East politics today, Columbia University Press 2006, p. 75

22

conflicts has a tendency to increase as an avalanche, due to the nature of the Web 2.0 environment and

culture of distribution (e.g. retweeting, reposting in social network, embedding video content in blogs,

social bookmarks etc.).

The rate of networked activism will also increase with emergence of a new ”digital born” generation

acquiring new participatory practices and skills. We can already witness the process of skills

development. Lynch points that the real significance of reality TV in the Arab world reality is that “TV

fans have been innovators in the use of technology to organize and mobilize across distances”25.

According to Lynch the skills of online and networked organization inspired by Reality TV “may be more

transferable to the political realm than some realize”.

Another factor that might contribute to the increase of impact of the “networked Umma” is people’s

mobility in global dimension and immigration. Due to globalization and immigration flows there are

groups that in a situation of conflict might belong to different worldwide networks while being in the

same country. Their commitment to a particular network might be more significant than their

commitment to a state.

The last point is the increase of our dependence on the online world. This increase will make the role of

online world in social reality construction more significant. In addition, gradually, the online world will

become the live environment, and not only a source of information.

However, even if we are talking about networked content-oriented activities only as an instrument for

shaping social reality and community building, understanding of its dynamic is important. The inter-

system dynamic hypothesis which was suggested here talks about new logics and mechanisms of social

reality shaping. Moreover, it provides not only an answer for the question on the nature of the patterns

but also on the possible consequences of these dynamics.

The dynamics which were offered in this paper included “mirroring” (mutual monitoring, learning and

reacting) and balancing. In the area of mirroring, we have seen the same multi platform and

multilanguage strategies, the same directions to network members on both sides and the same

technological tools. Hacktivism was not under investigation in this paper, but we could see the same

patterns on both sides’ hacker activities.

25 Lynch M. 'Reality is Not Enough': The Politics of Arab Reality TV

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The question of whether the balance is a result of network leadership or a function of self organization

(or both), as well as is if it happens due to both sides of conflicts using the same methods remains open.

If we claim that the Israeli ability to balance the Arab side due to its Network leadership advantage (the

side which is more successful in promoting of its agenda is the side with more organized mechanism of

network leadership) as well as language, technological skill and access to the Internet, the question

which should be asked is if at some point the Israeli ability to balance will be broken. It might happen at

the point when the pro/pan-Arab networks advantage (due to number of nodes in the network) will be

unreachable for the number of nodes that the pro-Israeli side can mobilize, engage and manage. In

other words, the question is whether balancing is a permanent property of networked systems, or a

temporal situation due to current state of the networks on both sides. In the latter case, in the future

the pendulum might be found only on one side.

Since the network that includes more nodes is more powerful in its agenda setting/ framing ability,

expanding the networks is crucial to expanding the ability to make an impact on agenda/framing. This is

a situation of a “relationship race” which was described recently by the new Undersecretary of State for

Public Diplomacy Judith Mc Hale26. “Relationship race” means both an ability to promote your agenda

and framing from a position of significant other27, as well as the ability to engage people in promoting of

your agenda/framing. The success of this strategy depends on the state’s ability to maintain lasting

relationships. The increase in the size of networks makes “race of relationship” and maintaining

relationship a crucial factor in the state’s ability to make its agenda dominant. Therefore,

government/state actors are trying to connect to their citizens as “friends” on their network. In other

words we, may witness a governments’ attempt (or actors affiliated with state) to penetrate to personal

social networks.

Consequently, we may assume that the attempt of different actors to expand their networks will cause

turf battles over different audiences. For instance, Muslim Americans may be an audience for both the

“networked Ummah” and the “democracy and U.S. values” affiliated networks. Probably, in their daily

lives, people can be members on both types of networks. However, a conflict might create a situation in

which nodes cannot hold two networked identities at the same time. The dominance of the networked

identity that relates to the place where the node lives is not certainly guaranteed.

26 McHale Judith A, Public Diplomacy: A national security imperative. Address at the Center for a New American security. June 11, 200927 I use this term in its sociological context. My assumption in this case is that the members of private network as a subject to interpersonal interaction are more significant information sources that web search or traditional media.

24

I would like to finish this analysis with dealing briefly with 3 questions:

1. Do social networks promote with higher probability for peace or conflict due to the reality

described in this paper?

2. What is the role of bridge bloggers in the reality of conflict socialization?

3. Is the Arab public sphere united or fragmented? Do the results of this paper support the

conclusions of Harvard’s “blogosphere mapping” report, which states that the Arab blogosphere

is state-oriented and not global?

The Contact Theory against the “Clash of Networks”.

“Social theorists, from Mill and Dewey to Benkler and Sunstein, stress the importance of open dialog

between differing perspectives as a key practice underlying democracy, ” – says Berkman’s “Mapping

Arab blogosphere” report. It concludes that a view of the Internet as primarily a vehicle for radicalization

is wrong and hopes that “the Internet will empower political movements that can move Arab societies

toward democratic values and governance.” However, the focus of this paper was not internal (inside

the Arab world) but on the dynamics between the Arab world and the other networks. What are the

dynamics of the emerging global networked public sphere? Is the global networked sphere a

combination of personal social networks, state related networks, culture/ language related networks or

something else?

During the presentation of the “Mapping blogosphere” research, its authors mentioned the “Contact

theory”. According to this theory, the more contact that groups have with one another, the greater their

level of understanding and the lower the chances of conflict. However, it looks like that contact can

contribute not only to understanding but also create friction and as consequence, increase tension. If in

the past, rival sides of a particular conflict had a problem reaching each other, today the reality is

different. The “blue-red” discourse over the Internet is a characteristic of almost any conflict during the

last years. This paper shows that contact in a situation of conflict in most cases only contributes to

polarization.

According to the homophily concept ,people tend to form relations with others who are similar to them.

In a situation of conflict, the common enemy becomes a strong cause to form networks. Social networks

today become more and more the mechanism of data mining. In the reality of information overload,

25

people prefer to consume content that is consumed/ recommended by their friends (and not an

anonymous majority expressed as a page rank by Google’s algorithm). In the new reality, everyone is a

gatekeeper for his or her network. This situation demonstrates also a shift from the influence of a

limited number of “significant others” (family, close friends) towards a more expanded circle of weak

social connections (as explained by Schirky in his recent book “Here comes everybody”).

As a consequence, membership in a particular network, especially in a situation of conflict, increases the

role of “selective exposure” that reaffirms the network’s identity. The choice of being a member of

particular social networks is a choice as to what information you want to be exposed, and what

information you will expose/distribute to members of your private social network. The members of

different networks live in absolutely different reality. For instance, members of pro-Israel networks have

a lot of friends with the Qassam count application, but no friends with the Body count application, and

the opposite is true for pro-Palestinian networks. Consequently, one person might get hundreds of

message about Qassams, and no messages about people who were killed in Gaza. In addition, every

network develops its own spiral of silence (a theory by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann) which prevents the

minority within the network to express their voices openly.

The network polarization and ability of contact between rival networks might contribute to people

engaging in conflict. If in the past, in order to meet your enemy, you had to go to the battlefield, today

there is no limit to accessing the sphere of conflict. Therefore, we might think that a reality that might

develop in the future is not clash of civilizations, but a clash of networks, while the ability of inter-

network contact is the engine of the confrontation. It will be a clash of agendas, a clash of frameworks,

and a clash of identities while every side looks for expanding its own network (“Relationship Race”). To

some extent, this reality was described in the Netwars concept by Arquila and Rosenfledt28. But both

authors talked about limited networks that are looking for achievement of particular goal. Currently we

are talking about a global engagement in which everyone is a part of a network, and any conflict might

become global due to uncontrolled and very fast conflict socialization The globalization on the

one hand and network fragmentation on the other hand remove any borders from the

socialization of conflicts, make the socialization process worldwide and decrease stability.

28 Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt, “What Next for Networks and Netwars”, in Arquilla J. & D. Ronfeldt (Eds.) “ Networks and netwars : The future of terror, crime, and militancy”, Rand, 2001.

26

What is the role of bridge bloggers in conflicts?

In a paper on“Blogging the New Arab Public,” Lynch names the three categories of bloggers in the Arab

world: public sphere bloggers, activists and bridge bloggers. According to Lynch:. “Bridgebloggers

primarily address Western audiences, usually writing in English with the intention of explaining their

societies.”29 Since the main role of bridge bloggers focuses on interaction between different networks,

their role have to be considered as a part of intersystem dynamics analysis.

The Harvard’s research shows that the agenda of bridge bloggers blogs is different from other bloggers.

“Bridge bloggers are important interpreters of their home countries’ politics and cultures, perhaps

allowing us to get beyond cartoonish views of one another, appreciate the complexity of views in the

Arabic blogosphere” – says Berkman’s report. Therefore the question that we should ask should focus

on content as dependent variable and include two independent variables: “bridge bloggers” and

“situation of conflict”.

Haugbolle describes the impact of situation of conflict on the blog’s content. He mentions three sorts of

discourse in Lebanese blogs during the 2006 war with Israel: “mudslinging” (between opposite

viewpoints), “cleansed” (spaces for agreement and propaganda) and tempered spaces (where opposite

viewpoints argue rationally)30. This categorization belongs to analysis if intra-networks dynamic which is

beyond this paper. However even here, the authors confirms that an increase in conflict changes the

borders of discourse: “As the death toll of civilian Lebanese started to mount, a profound gap opened

up, and conversation became nearly impossible”.

What is the intersystem function of Bridge bloggers within a situation of conflict? The recent examples

include Twitter users from Iran and Moldova. Despite the fact that only a very few people in these two

countries use Twiiter, and even less Twittering in English – their coverage had a huge role in

empowering and engaging global networks outside the countries, in the global dimension. Evgeny

Morozov, an author of “Net Effect” blog make a very interesting analysis of Bridge Twitters31.

I would like to offer three optional hypothesis for shift in bridge bloggers activity.

29 Lynch., M. Blogging the New Arab Public, Arab Media & Society, February, 200730 Haugbolle Sune From A-List to Webtifada: Developments in the Lebanese Blogosphere 2005-2006, Arab Media & Society, February, 2007

31 Morozov E., Twitters revolution is not a myth, Net Effect, Foreign Policy.com, 10/04/2009

27

1. First, bridge bloggers are gate keepers in conflict framing. The voice of bloggers is considered to

be authentic, and therefore they might have an impact. They are focusing on translation of the

reality of conflict from “local” to “global”. To some extent, they are between being providers of

content and its distribution.

2. The main strategic goal of bridge bloggers is to expand the network of English readers who are

loyal to the Arab world through content distribution.

3. Due to good English (and other languages) skills, they can become a hub for network leadership

inside Arab society (monitoring the English language field of battle).

Arab public sphere: united or fragmented?

According to Harvard’s research on the Arab blogosphere, personal life and Local Issues are most

Important than pan-Arabic, foreign and global topics. “More developed national networks focus more

attention inward”, - concludes the Berkman’s report on the Arab blogosphere mapping. The mapping,

which the authors also call the “MRI of social mind” also demonstrates clearly blog-clusters which are

related to states.

However, according to the research, the one political issue that commands the most attention of

bloggers across the Arab world is Palestine (and in particular the military operation in Gaza in Winter

2008-2009). According to the same report, among the top 30 most popular Youtube movies in the Arab

world, eight are about the Israel/Palestine conflict, and six are about Gaza in particular.

This paper tried to build the case that in a different context, the “MRI of the social mind” is very

different. In particular, the blogosphere/ soc. networks’ MRI in a conflict situation in the Arab world, as

well as in the global dimension, will be looked very different from the daily life.

We may think about a long menu of different kind of agendas: local, national, pan-Arab, pan-Muslim,

global. However in a time of conflict, the socialization of conflict flow through the blood system of social

networks cause a change in agenda from local to more global. Same shift might be witnessed in a self

definition of node’s identities when every member of network will be with a high probability affiliated

with particular framing of this conflict. Therefore, situation of conflict is at the same time situation of

emergence of globalization (socialization of conflict in global dimension) and fragmentation (affiliation of

every node with particular network and high commitment to network which is a side in a conflict).

Networked globalization and fragmentation at the same time is the most dangerous combination for the

world’s stability.

28

Conclusion :

In this paper I tried to sketch the dynamics between different social networks in the situation of conflict

and to estimate the consequences of this dynamics. The paper provides a framework and few

hypotheses for further research. In addition to statistical analysis of internetwork dynamic and

balancing, the same kind of dynamics should be checked in a context of other conflicts.

However, despite the lack of strong methodological basis I believe that the topic of this paper has a

significant importance. The potential of social networks has not only advantages, but also challenges

that might increase the instability in the global dimension. Therefore, social networks dynamics in a

situation of conflict is something that we should study and understand.

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