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The Discordance Between the Axis Powers

Karen Armstrong

I. Introduction

World War II was the great battle of good vs. evil in the history of the world. The noble Allied Powers went up against a genocidal maniac and his flunkies to save the day and preserve peace and democracy for all. Or so popular media and our culture would like us to believe. In reality, perhaps obviously, World War II was not so simple. The Allied Powers did their fair share of unsavory things (including betraying established treaties themselves, particularly in the relations between the United States and Japan), and the Axis Powers were not "evil:" every single one of them had reasons, in some cases not unreasonable ones, for doing some of the things they did. In addition, the Axis certainly were not the organized gang of thugs they are sometimes made out to be. While some contemporaries at the time, such as Leo Strauss, a Jew who left Germany in 1932 and never looked back, believed Germany was the ultimate aggressor and the rest of the Axis were simply following along, a closer examination of the facts proves this not to be true. All of the Axis Powers, though this paper focuses on Germany's relationship with Italy and Japan specifically, had their own agendas and goals, and none of them truly had much control over the others, in spite of what Germany clearly wanted: to be the ringleader during the war and then draw back and isolate itself into the perfect German-only state Hitler desired. Because of this, cooperation and communication were poor, and there were many problems between the Axis Powers as a result, including trying to "use" each other as distractions, unclear and problematic treaties, overhyped senses of self-importance, personality clashes, and political betrayals. In reality, Germany cared little about the well-being and interests of Italy and Japan so long as they could be used to Germany's advantage, which resulted in discordance that would ultimately lead to the defeat of Germany and her allies and the fall of the Third Reich.

II. Shared Histories

It is important to understand the histories of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the inter-war era and even a little before that, into the late 19th century. Germany's problems began the minute German troops marched into France near the beginning of World War I in a failed strategy to cripple their powerful neighbor to avoid fighting a two front war against both France and Russia. Needless to say, all did not go as planned and Germany was locked in trench warfare on the Western front for four bitter years with little to no gains at exponential cost in life and finances. The Treaty of Versailles, signed at the conclusion of the war, was widely unpopular in Germany because of its harsh treatment of Germany, especially because the Germans had technically won on the Eastern front against Russia, which had crumpled and withdrawn from the Great War in 1917 to enter into its own bloody civil war. With that win, the Germans had gained significant territory in Eastern Europe, that they were then forced to relinquish under the treaty they signed at Versailles. The onset of the Great Depression also did not help, which threw many German civilians into poverty, and all these events combined left many Germans destitute and unsatisfied with the politics of the Weimar Republic. It was the perfect time for a young upstart from Austria to put his charismatic talents to work on the German people.

Germany's road to World War II and her allegiances with Italy and Japan began when Hitler was elected chancellor of Germany in 1933. He made quick work of getting rid of opposing political parties, especially communists, and placing his own fascist party in complete control of the German state. Hitler's policies and ideals (especially those involving his desire for fascism and his hatred of communism) were instrumental in his and the other Nazi leaders' decisions to create alliances with whom they did, which will be detailed later in this paper. As a country with a new fascist government and a lot to say, do, and gain on the world stage, Hitler got straight to work, with disastrous results.

Italy was the first of the three major Axis powers to become fascist. In fact, it defined the fascism revolution with the rise of Mussolini's government in 1922. His rise to power was the result of a coup that took over Rome and instilled itself as the ruling power in Italy, unlike both Hitler and the Japanese government, which were "fascist" on account of their citizens electing them into power. Like Germany, to see why Italy is a major player in the Axis Powers it is important to look at her history, especially the swath of time after World War I. "Italy had intervened in the War for two main reasons. The first was the desire to complete its unity by adding to the territory the Kingdom the Italian provinces still held by Austria-Hungary. The second was the hope of securing colonial outlets for its superabundant population." Both of these desires and the issues facing Italy at the conclusion of World War I led Italy to a pact with Germany that would last from the late 1930's to the mid 1940's.

The last major member of the Axis to go over is Japan, which was an important member of the Axis in spite of its location relative to its allies. Like Germany in World War I, throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japan also struggled to make a place and name for itself on the increasingly relevant international stage. To do this, the Japanese people began consuming Western culture. They did their best to become "modern." They went to cafes, dressed in western clothes, and went to clubs. In other words, Japan did their absolute best to become just like America, France, and Britain so they would be seen as equals, even though it is unlikely that ever would have happened under the general Orientalist attitudes predominating Western culture at the time. When Japan still found themselves being treated as "Asians trying to be Western" and not taken seriously by the Western powers, Japan slowly grew more and more bitter at the West, beginning to raise an empire of its own and turning against the countries it had once held close ties with.

However, the real mystery to historians, both inside and outside Japan, was how an industrialized, democratized country (Japan fought on the side of America, France, Russia, and Britain during World War I) became the nation that allied with Nazi Germany and infamously bombed the US Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, drawing the United States into World War II. One factor in the answer to this question is, like Germany and Italy, Japan was not happy with the outcome of the Versailles System. Japan felt she had gotten next to nothing even after helping the Allies win the war.

Unlike Germany and Italy, Japan's "fascist" government did not seize control of the country and its political field by force. ("Fascist" is in quotes because while the government of Japan at the time might not have been fascist per se, they clearly saw similarities between themselves and their soon-to-be Western allies in order to want to unite with Germany and Italy because of ideological reasons, who were fascist.) Rather, they hijacked the existing political system and kept it in place throughout the war and even afterwards with some minor modifications after America presented them with a new constitution to follow post-occupation. However, various crisis at home and abroad, such as "economic depression, intense social conflict, military expansion, and the assassination of prime ministers and leading capitalists" eventually led Japan away from democracy to embrace a form of fascism in the 1930's.

III. The Forming of the Axis

The Axis Powers officially formed on September 27, 1940, when Germany, Italy, and Japan all signed the Three-Power Pact in Berlin. The pact stated that:

The governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized.

At this point, there were many reasons why such an alliance made sense and why it was ultimately implemented, especially due to similar ideology [fascism], similar hatred for another ideology [communism], practicality for a war that no one wanted (presumeably) but looked possible, and similar shared histories, such as late industrialization. However, there were some early indications that problems were already showing.

A major reason these three countries in particular chose to ally with each other was because they shared a similar political ideology. Italy became fascist first, in 1922, while Germany and Japan followed suit in the 1930's. Fascism was seen as the next big global revolution to these people, especially in Germany where there was a rampant fear of communism after the Russian Revolution in 1917. Japan also held a disdain for communism, both because of their want to be like the capitalist West but also because of their long-standing and bitter relationship with the Soviet Union. Italy also had a desire to not see communism spread.

Another major reason for the alliances was practicality for the coming war. Hitler and Nazi-led Germany wanted to create an isolated German state in Europe but knew they would need distractions to keep the other Western powers out of their way while they conquered other nations to build it. Japan's reasons for involvement in the war were painfully obvious: to combat communism and allow for the spread of their own budding empire. Ever since emerging as a modern power, they had taken on the Russians and the Chinese in the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) and Sino-Japanese (1894-1895) wars respectively, and done extremely well, building an empire for themselves in East Asia. With the Western powers moving towards war it seemed like a good opportunity for Japan to seize more territory from China, Russia, and in the South Pacific: "As Hitler's regime moved toward war in Europe, the Hinamura government was attracted to the idea of an alliance with Nazi Germany to counter both Soviet and Western power in Asia." However, Germany really only wanted to use Japan as a device to keep the United States, as well as England and France and any other Western power that was a threat to them, neutral and distracted while Hitler achieved his goals in Europe: "Germany's chief aim in the Western Hemisphere was to keep the United States at least temporarily neutral, and to that end she tried to use Japan as a counterpoise."

The Axis Powers all had some interesting commonalities in their histories, especially a somewhat late industrialization. In the case of Germany and Italy, they were both also new states geographically because unification of many smaller states had happened in both cases. Back in World War I, this was actually something German propaganda drew on, portraying their country as somehow special and more modern than their enemies. They were the heralds of change, while France and Great Britain were relics of a bygone era socially, despite how technologically advanced they were. Western powers, as well as Japan itself, eventually began to feel that Japan was special too, for having industrialized in only thirty years to catch up with the rest of the world.

Another reason was simply hurt feelings still lingering from World War I, which have already been explained as a major reason for the fascist revolutions in both Germany and Italy. Japan also felt, like Germany, that it had been shortchanged at Versailles after contributing, in their eyes, greatly to the war effort during World War I and getting next to nothing out of it. With a fledgeling empire in the face of imperialism falling out of fashion in the West, as well as several diplomatic betrayals from the United States (which Japan was not unjustified in feeling) Japan began to drift further and further away from its once-allies in the West. Italy also faced similar issues, with a number of rows with Great Britain and France ultimately culminating in the fascist coup that brought Mussolini to power.

In reality, the alliance between Japan and Germany went back even further than Germany's alliance with Rome. In 1934, a young Japanese military officer, Oshima Hiroshi, was assigned to be Japan's military attach in Berlin. It was through his diplomatic actions that the Anti-Comintern Pact was forged in the first place, laying the framework for Japan's later complete and utter alliance with Germany and Italy in the Three-Power Pact Between Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Germany's initial relations with Italy were rocky at best, despite the fact that Hitler had long wanted Mussolini as an ally. The main concern was Austria, since while it had always been on Hitler's mind to annex Austria, "Mussolini preferred the independence of the small Austria created by the 1919 peace treaties to the alternative of having a much more powerful German neighbor on the northern border." Austria remained a problem, however, because while Austria had many ethnic Germans that Hitler had a self-professed interest in, and it was clear that one of his main goals was to conquer his native Austria and return it to its proper place as part of a greater German state, Italy also had interest in Austria because Austria "still held the Italian-speaking provinces on the northern and northeastern frontiers." How to proceed on the matter of Austria caused a divide between Germany and Italy from the beginning. Finally, Germany succeeded in repairing relationships with Austria over the common goal of ensuring Spain emerged fascist from the revolution and civil war it was undergoing at the time. Despite Mussolini's personal dislike of Hitler, which will be discussed later, he believed an alliance with Germany was a good move militarily: "In demographic, economic, and military strength, . . . the trends were clearly in Germany's favor." Spain is an entirely odd matter on its own, because while Hitler personally liked Mussolini he absolutely hated Franco, and this seems to be a major reason for him simply not wanting to engage in an alliance with fascist Spain, even though it would stand to reason that the countries with newly-formed fascist ideologies should stand together against their communist enemies as well as more moderate Western powers who did not like what they were seeing. While it is true Hitler wanted to use the ongoing conflict in Spain to buy his own armies time to rearm, it is odd that he, and his regime, did not seem to want fascist Spain as an ally alongside Italy and Japan, since another Fascist country in Western Europe would have undeniably helped the Axis war effort.

It is also odd that Hitler was so willing to seek help from non-"Aryan" nations, due to his extreme views on race and superiority. Perhaps political ideology trumped race in some cases in his mind. This is especially true in Japan's case, because Japanese certainly would not have counted as "Aryan," but Italy was not exactly ethnically German either. It makes one wonder what Hitler's plans for his allies would have been had the Axis won the war. Would he have wanted to take what they had obtained in the war as well? Or would he have simply not cared what they did so long as they left his perfect little German state alone?

A possible answer to these questions is that Hitler simply did not want to ally with anyone, and his alliance with Italy was based mostly, if not solely, on his hero worship of Mussolini. After all, "Even when Germans were at the height of their power, Hitler rejected any attempt to forge alliances with subordinate powers. . . . He rejected meaningful collaboration with other fascist movements on the continent; the only exception was his alliance with Italy." Japan was on the other side of the world and Hitler simply did not care one way or the other what they did, so long as they acted as a distraction for the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. This shows in the multitude of failed communications in military matters between the two fascist states.

Germany, and Hitler in particular, seemed to have wanted to keep Fascism alive, but not in any way as to threaten Germany's dominance on the continent. When von Hassel, the German ambassador to Rome, reported back to Hitler in January of 1936, he said:

We must do everything to prevent the various opponents throughout the world of the authoritarian system of government from concentrating upon us as their sole object. But apart from this it was also in our interests that Italy as a piece upon the European chessboard should not be weakened too much. There was a time, especially after Mussolini's well-known demonstrations at the Brenner Pass, when perhaps we might not have wished to see Italy emerge from the conflict too great or too victorious, but nowadays this danger surely no longer existed to any considerable degree. On the contrary, it was much more to be feared that Fascism, and indeed Italy herself, might be destroyed or at least emerge seriously impaired by the ordeal.

This statement shows just how Germany viewed her alliances. They were only worth it if Germany could use them as a means to an end, such as acting as a distraction for Germany's enemies or for keeping Fascism alive in the form Hitler and his people wanted it to be, and they should never be allowed to surpass Germany in power.

Obviously there was a lot of hypocrisy in official statements as well. When Ribbentromp made a trip to England in late 1936 Hitler urged Ribbentromp to: ". . . get Britain to join the Anti-Comintern pact, that is what I want most of all. . . . But if in future all our efforts are still in vain, fair enough, then I'm ready for war as well. I would regret it very much, but if it has to be, there it is." While it is arguable that Hitler did in fact want war, it does not seem like he did. In other words, Hitler and Germany were playing the field completely to their advantage, did not care who liked them and allied with them or did not like them and fought with them as long as Germany emerged as an isolated, ethnic German state.

Digging deeper into the "Jewish Question" as well as the "Final Solution," it seems that there was some effort, or at least the Allies thought there was some effort, on Germany's part to convince the other Axis Powers of Hitler's views on the Jews, and this would not be a stretch. In the speech "The Re-Education of the Axis Countries concerning the Jews," given by Leo Strauss (who was Jewish himself) on November 7, 1943 at the New School for Social Research, he clearly seems to believe that there has been some coercion and forcing of Germany's anti-Semitic policies on the rest of its Axis allies. He states:In the remarks which I am going to make, I shall limit myself to Germany, in the first place, because I have some firsthand knowledge of Germany, whereas I have none of any other Axis country. It is only fair that I should add that even my firsthand knowledge of Germany is very limited: I left that country in 1932 and never returned to it afterward. Secondly, the problem before us concerns Germany much more than any other country. The other European Axis countries are as much the victims as they are the allies of Germany.

This statement heavily implies that Leo Strauss believes Germany is the aggressor, and it is Germany that is the problem, not the rest of the Axis Powers, though it is unknown if he is referring only to the smaller countries (which he does mention) or them as well as Italy and possibly even Japan (which he does not mention, but also says that is not his primary topic). But in a way he seems to be trying to excuse these other countries from any actions they might take against their Jewish residents because Germany was the one goading them on. Now whether or not this extends all the way to Italy he does not say, though given how Hitler personally met Mussolini and corresponded with him many times throughout their alliance as well as Hitler's obsession with eradicating the Jew from Europe, it is not impossible to assume that at some point he tried to convince his "ally" of this "necessity."

There are some issues to take with Strauss' position, however. Granted, this man was Jewish and undoubtedly wanted the Allied Powers as well as the rest of the world to just blame Germany for the mass killings that had begun happening in Germany and German-held territories at the time, but the reality is Anti-Semitism had existed for centuries in Europe (as a matter of fact it was completely accepted, even fashionable, before the Holocaust) and Hitler simply made it the forefront of his policy and took advantage of a hatred that was already present. It is wrong of Strauss, good as his intentions may be, to excuse the other Axis countries of any blame in the war, as well as in the Holocaust, though once again he does not mention that because he probably did not know the extent of what was going on in the concentration camps in 1943, at the height of the killings.

IV. How It Fell Apart

As early as 1939, problems began to show in the communication and trust the Axis Powers had in each other. Indeed, Elizabeth Wiskemann wrote in 1946 that: "No serious person supposed in 1940, when Mussolini went to war with Great Britain and France, that the Axis alliance was popular in either Italy or Germany."

In the Anti-Comitern Pact between Germany and Japan, signed in 1936, they state they would "mutually keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communistic International, [and] will confer upon the necessary measure of defense, and will carry out such measures in close co-operation." The pact had a five year span, and it is unclear whether or not it would have been extended if things had gone better for the Axis. This sounded fine and was in perfect agreement with both Germany and Japan's anti-communist rhetoric at the time. However, when Hitler forged a nonaggression treaty with Stalin in 1939 (which he would famously later break himself) the Japanese government got understandably upset and the prime minister at the time, Hinamura, angered and ashamed by the betrayal, resigned. Japan had a right to feel this way, because Germany had also been carrying out secret meetings with the Soviet Union. In August 1939, the Reich Foreign Minister met with Stalin and attempted to "explain away" Germany's alliance with the Soviet Union's foremost enemy in the East: "The Reich Foreign Minister stated that the German-Japanese friendship was in no wise directed against the Soviet Union. We were, rather, in a position, owing to our good relations with Japan, to make an effective contribution to an adjustment of the differences between the Soviet Union and Japan." Germany was essentially trying to paint its relationships with the two mortal enemies as a good thing to pacify the Soviet Union, that Germany was interested in peace between Japan and the Soviet Union, when in reality Germany was in it for herself and did not particularly care what happened to her allies so long as she got what she wanted out of the deal. The document is also labeled as "Very Secret! State Secret" on the top, showing that at the time Germany and the Soviet Union did not want anyone on either side of the upcoming war to know these meetings were taking place. This going behind the backs of her Japanese ally, and later her Soviet ally, was not a smart move for Germany and would ultimately lead to her downfall.

General Togo, who would later become one of the most despised names to emerge from World War II, was not in favor of any sort of military alliance between Japan and Germany. "Togo felt that a German-Japanese military alliance would be of no help in Japan's efforts to end her war with China, and that it would eventually involve Japan in a conflict with Hitler's European adversaries." It was Oshima who helped push the measures through and convince Japan that a military alliance with Germany was in both countries' best interests. This only goes to show that even Germany's allies were uneasy about getting into an alliance with her, fearing that they would get drawn into a European war that Japan undoubtedly felt was none of its business.

Japan also initially did not respond well to what Germany wanted them to do: "She [Germany] attempted to persuade Japan to attack the Dutch and British empires, and later to attack Siberia. The Japanese, however, refused to go along, and even tried to come to some agreement with the United States." Only when those negotiations failed did Japan bomb Pearl Harbor, and Germany (and perhaps Italy) must not have liked this because mere days after Pearl Harbor happened, the Pact Between the Axis Powers Barring a Separate Peace with the United States or Great Britain was signed, on December 11, 1941. This pact forced all three countries to do exactly as its title states. This goes to show the attempts Germany made to try and get its allies to do what it wanted them to do, to no avail. Instead of working together they each tried to outdo each other, which helped lead to their downfall.Personality clashes were another major issue that the Axis faced but were unable to overcome, especially in the Rome-Berlin Axis. While Hitler had completely and utterly praised Mussolini: "What will rank Mussolini among the great men of this earth is his determination not to share Italy with the Marxists, but to destroy internationalism and save the fatherland from it," by all accounts Mussolini did not like Hitler personally and only agreed to the alliance because he believed in the benefits the alliance would offer both him and Italy. Mussolini also did not like Mein Kampf, and reportedly never read it because he could not get through it. Their personal correspondence shows us this much. In letters written in August 1939, Hitler goes on and on, asking Mussolini about his opinion on various foreign policy issues and explaining himself thoroughly, as if a lot of thought and caring were put behind his words. Mussolini's reply letter, on the other hand, is very short and curt, portraying a "Yes, Hitler," or "No, Hitler," feeling, as if he had nowhere near the same enthusiasm Hitler did about their relationship.

There was little to no coordination between the Axis Powers and their governments, despite the promise of cooperation. The idea was simply that Germany would take most of Europe, while Italy could have southern Europe and the Mediterranean and Japan could pretty much do whatever they wanted in East Asia, because Hitler did not seem overly concerned. This is spelled out in the Three Power Pact in the first two articles. Article One reads: "Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishment of a new order in Europe," while Article Two reads: "Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in greater East Asia." While it is agreed that the three governments will cooperate to achieve these goals, the way they were going about it was still extremely fragmented, giving one government complete control over a certain region but nothing else. And it does not specify which parts of Europe Italy and Germany were respectfully in charge of. Many treaties between countries of this nature are very specific when it comes to dividing up territory, usually through landmarks such as rivers or mountain ranges, or even exact coordinates. This vagueness of wording therefore opens up the possibility of quarreling over who is entitled to what, which did happen, as will be talked about next in regards to Croatia and the issue of Austria as mentioned earlier in the argument.

There was even some outright competition between the supposed allies, especially between Germany and Italy in Eastern Europe. In his article, "Rivalry between Germany and Italy in Croatia, 1942-1943," Srdjan Trifkovi goes over some of the things the Nazis did, though not in the open, to assert their control, especially in economic matters, over a country and region that had been agreed upon to belong to Italy. There were reasons for this, but the result was ultimately distrust that began to manifest itself between the two allies:Hitler and his aides constantly reiterated to their Italian allies that Italy enjoyed precedence in Croatia. However, by the second half of 1942, Germany was beginning to play an ever increasing role in Croatian military and political affairs. Two factors contributed to this. One was the rise of insurgent activity, which occasionally threatened key military and economic interests, such as the railroad from Belgrade to Zagreb and the mining of strategic minerals in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The other factor, potentially more serious, was the external threat to the Balkan peninsula. For the first time, German commanders had to consider the possibility of an Allied landing on the Adriatic coast. In order to deal with both threats, the Germans had to disregard old Italian claims to precedence in the Independent State of Croatia. At first, it seems, this did not happen due to an elaborate design, but more or less incrementally and spontaneouslyjust as most German arrangements in occupied Europe tended to proceed.

Perhaps this was a by-product of the issues surrounding Hitler's foreign policy, because it does not seem that he, or his party, had any real specific ideas of what the world would look like once the war was over: "Competing ideas and designs for a New Order only had to fit into the Fuhrers overall framework. However, except for his anti-Jewish obsession, there was little guidance or consistency in Hitler's 'vision' of the new Europe." Such poor planning and even disregard for his allies was an early sign that these "alliances" were not going to work very smoothly: "Admittedly, the primacy of Germany was always implicitly taken for granted, even in relation to its 'partner', Italy." This shows Hitler's rather blatant and inflated sense of self-importance, and when applied to the whole of Germany, this attitude was disastrous for holding allegiances and working together to win such a major war.

There were other problems between Italy and Germany as well, particularly in the keeping promises department. As Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, complained, Germans "had broken their promise of May 1939 to keep the peace for four or five years." On the other hand:

. . . in the eyes of the Germans [Ciano was also guilty of] two other anti-Nazi actions: first, on August 31, 1939, of having told British Ambassador Sir Percy Lorraine that Italy would not join Germany in its attack on Poland, thus inducing the Allies to declare war on Germany; second, to have told the Belgian ambassador to Rome on January 2, 1940 that Germany was planning to attack the Netherlands.

Later in the war, the mere fact that it became necessary for Mussolini to "prove" himself to Hitler. "Mussolini was able to show Hitler the kind of power he still exercised over the Fascist party. . . The Duce also proceeded to complete the first purge of the army high command." This also goes to show how rocky the Rome-Berlin Axis was at times, when showing each other that they were still in power became something they were actively thinking about.V. The Axis Breaks

With such major personality clashes such as Hitler adoring Mussolini but Mussolini despising Hitler, as well as the lack of communication or coordination with a Japan whose government had several major changes after the Three-Power Pact was formed, it is not that surprising that the Axis Powers and their relationships with each other began to fall apart as World War II began and dragged on.

The major reason for the final breakage was a simple one: the Axis Powers had been defeated by the military might of the Allies. "It would be ridiculous to suggest that the Axis alliance collapsed independently of the growing strength of the nations allied against it; indeed there is ample material for an estimate of the part played by the Allies' military achievements." Though it is important to scrutinize her comments carefully since she was writing after the war had been won by the Allies, Wiskemann is correct in that the Allies, especially after the United States eventually entered the War on the side of the Allies, achieved many military victories against the Axis.

Hitler's double-crossing of Stalin, attacking the Soviet Union even after forging a nonaggression treaty with it, was one of the last major mistakes Germany made, as well as invading the Soviet Union in the middle of winter (ironically echoing the same scenario that led to Napoleon's downfall). The disastrous defeat at Stalingrad in particular was a harsh blow to Germany and to her allies, as well as the failed campaign in North Africa, where Germany had to bail out the Italians who were losing horribly and thus divert troops from perhaps more important campaigns and spreading her military might too thinly. Issues on the home front, as both Hitler and Mussolini's governments began rapidly losing popularity as the war drew on, also contributed to the Axis' downfall. In the end, the Axis fell one by one.

Italy fell first to the Allies, and the arrest of Mussolini, in 1943, was one of the major nails in the coffin for the Axis Powers. Without that "distraction," as Hitler had undoubtedly used Italy as, the Allied Powers in Europe could then focus on Hitler and therefore achieve victory by throwing everything they had at Germany alone. The desperation in Germany at the turn of the tide on the military front could be felt in the spike of killings in the concentration camps that year; the higher-ups in the Nazi Party undeniably wanted to cover up the mass atrocities they had been committing.

Germany finally fell in 1945 when Hitler committed suicide on the 30th of April. By that point, many Germans had lost faith in their Fuhrer, and while they still loved Germany, they were forced to acknowledge that they had lost the war and waited in trepidation for what supposedly horrible consequences awaited them at the hands of the enemy, their defeat in World War I undoubtedly at the forefront of their minds.

Japan was the last to surrender, after the United States dropped two bombs on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. This led to the downfall of the wartime government, the execution of most of its leaders, and ten years of American occupation of the Japanese islands afterward. The small island of Okinawa to this day holds a major US military base, which is deeply unpopular in Japan and even more so amongst the natives of Okinawa, who have had to give up half their island. The echoes of World War II and the atrocities that happened still cast a shadow over the former Axis Powers to this day.

VI. Conclusion

The tale of the Axis Powers and Germany's relationships to her two allies was a very complicated one. Germany did not have as much control over her allies as she probably thought she did or wanted to have. Personal issues were a problem, such as the unrequited appreciation Hitler had for Mussolini but his stubborn refusal to accept help from or further other fascist revolutions in Europe, particularly Franco's in Spain, when it would have been politically to his advantage to do so. These personal problems were not just reserved for the leaders, though. The people in both Italy and Germany had issues with higher-ups on the other side for supposed "wrongdoings" or "insults." Unclear and problematic treaties were another issue. Germany and her allies agreed to several treaties that did not define goals, specifically the goal of the establishment of a "new order." Political rhetoric on all sides was detrimental, because it resulted in an overhyped sense of self-importance to the point where some Germans, such as von Hassel, wanted to see Germany reign as some sort of supreme king over the fascist movement, with other countries following in Germany's footsteps but never gaining enough power as to surpass her. This was undoubtedly the result of Hitler's preaching about the innate superiority of the German race and this rhetoric was not helpful in gaining, working together with, and keeping any sort of ally in the long term. Perhaps the most damning tactic used by the Axis, but particularly Germany, was the practice of trying to "use" each other as distractions, particularly Japan but also the civil war in Spain and to some extent Italy as well. Political betrayals were also a significant factor in the downfall of the Axis. It is fairly safe to say that these three governments did not cooperate with each other well enough to be effective in policy or on the battlefield. All three countries were guilty of poor planning for after the war too, especially Germany, who was so caught up in the "great idea" of Hitler's "new order" without any real idea of what the world would look like once all was said and done. Ideology and practicality are two very different things, and it seems the Axis Powers had a hard time separating those two concepts in the years leading up to, during, and even after, World War II.

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