THE CONSTITUTION AND THE IMPEACHMENT TRIALSubmitted by webadmin on Sat, 04/13/2013 - 13:37

I.  IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Senate as Sole Judge

The characterization is in fact not accurate, because the constitutional provision reads as follows:

Art. XI, Sec. 3, 6: The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.  When sitting for that purpose, the senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.  No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all members of the Senate.

In what does the exclusive power of the Senate consist?  Clearly, in light of the paragraphs both preceding and succeeding the cited provision, reference is to the trial of one who has been impeached by the House of Representatives.  Is the respondent guilty or not?  That is the issue that the Constitution reserves to the exclusive province of the Senate.

The Senate, however, may not claim too much.  Nothing in this grant of power to the Senate derogates from powers given to other branches of government.  When therefore a question of law is raised such as: “Does an impeachment proceeding constitute an exception to the absolute confidentiality rule of the Foreign Currency Deposits Act?”, that is quite a distinct matter from the guilt or innocence of the respondent.  In fact, the case would not be an impeachment case.  It would be the case either of the respondent, or the bank concerned asserting its right under the law, against the Senate’s demand that it produce the documents the law forbids it from disclosing.

A corollary point needs stressing.  An impeachment trial does not engender a fourth branch of government that rises above all others – as some senators seem to believe.  The court of impeachment is nothing other than Senate performing, it is true, a non-legislative function.  But it is precisely because it is Senate of the Philippines that it has the power to try in cases of impeachment.  Thus ordains the Constitution:  “The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment xxx”.  Put more directly, it is precisely because Senate is the Senate that it tries an impeachment case.

However, it is not only in respect to impeachment cases that the Constitution vests the chambers of Congress with exclusive jurisdiction.  In respect to the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals, the provision reads thus: “The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.”

But, complains Rep. Rodolfo Farinas, the Supreme Court has intruded into judgments of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals and, again he complains, Congress has been tolerant of such intrusions.  The trouble with Rep. Farinas is that he wants the Constitution to read otherwise, but does not take the effort to cause its amendment!

The Scope of Judicial Power and of Judicial Review

The definition of judicial power in Article VIII, Section 1 is crucial: “Judicial Power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”

Which branches, offices, agencies, or instrumentalities of government – no matter how they may be acting or by what colour of title or legality they may claim power – are excluded from the pale of judicial review? The clear answer is: none, because until the Constitution is amended, the judiciary shall have the duty (not only the power) to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Does this not give ‘undue’ power to the Supreme Court over other branches of government?  In the first place, what powers are due the branches of government is a question of apportionment, and that is a question that the Constitution is supposed to have settled.  In thus granting so-called broadened “certiorari” power to the Supreme Court to include “any branch or instrumentality” of the government, thus did the Constitution apportion power.  If there be lopsidedness – in fact an exacerbation of what constitutional theorists call the counter-majoritarian difficulty – the solution is to amend the Constitution, not to ignore it!

This is the reason that Rep. Farinas is whining in wrong direction.  Do not fault the Supreme Court, much less bully it into submission by threatening to impeach its members; blame the framers of the Constitution, but that will be nothing but throwing an inutile tantrum.  What can be done is to re-write the Constitution, something the present President claims he has no interest in doing!  Who then is to blame?

The Senate President, at the February 14 hearing, read into the record his statement in which he articulated key principles: the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the law and the interpreter of the Constitution; the scope of judicial review is such that all agencies and branches of government are subject to it when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion; the Senate alone may try the respondent in an impeachment case and render a verdict of guilty or not guilty; Separation of powers and the coordinateness of the branches of government made it necessary for the Senate, sitting in an impeachment trial, to heed TROs and injunctive orders by the Supreme Court, as long as these did not tread on the ground that the Constitution exclusively reserved for the Senate.  It was a necessary statement emanating from a seasoned lawyer and a statesman, especially in the light of one Senator’s reckless declaration that he was ready to disregard all ‘unlawful orders’, implying that he was the ultimate judge of what was a lawful order of not!

Even in the United States, where the power of judicial review is neither express nor as extensive as in this jurisdiction, the US Supreme Court has asserted, in relation to the impeachment case of President Richard Nixon, the power of the courts to interpret the Constitution.  Chief Justice Burger, in United States v. Nixon, taught:

Our system of government ‘requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch’.  Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the judicial Power of the United States vested in the federal courts can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power.  Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government.  We therefore reaffirm that it is the

province and the duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’ with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.

When one senator therefore rose to announce that he was taking exception to some of the propositions the Senate President asserted, that kept me wondering which of them he was doubting or denying, considering that they were all foundational principles of political law.

It is not only by certiorari that the Supreme Court may pass upon interlocutory orders or resolutions of the Senate.  When, by reason of a citation for contempt, a witness seeks relief from the High Court by way of a petition for habeas corpus, it is precisely the province of the writ to examine the legality of the detention.  In doing so, the Supreme Court exercises the ‘original jurisdiction’ granted it by the Constitution to issue writs of habeas corpus and to rule thereby on the legality or lack of it of the contempt citation.

Marbury v. Madison and its Progeny

In American constitutional theory, Marbury v. Madison (1803) is commonly taken as the landmark case on judicial review and on the powers of the judiciary.  There are, to be sure, many law professors who have warned against reading too much into this case.  To obviate that danger then, it will be safest to read from the judgment of the US Supreme Court itself through the pen of Chief Justice Marshall.

“If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?  Or, in other words, though it be not law, does i constitute a rule as operative as it was a law?  This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. xxx  It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”

Thus has the US Supreme Court held to be the ambit of its power.  Wherever a question of what the law in fact provides – in short of interpreting the law in order to resolve a dispute – there, judicial power will lie.

And yet, it must be pointed out, the US Constitution does not grant the express review power that the Philippine Constitution of 1987 vests on our judiciary.  The point should be made clear that the Philippine Supreme Court is by no means exaggerating its claims to the exercise of judicial power.  Most certainly, the eight who voted for a TRO against the sub-poenae of the dollar accounts of respondent Chief Justice Renator Corona, were not committing an impeachable offense.  They were exercising a sworn duty, unless of course ‘impeachable offense’ now means anyone who crosses Congress’ path!

One of the senators rose to advance a rather strange theory: that Supreme Court precedents did not necessarily bind the impeachment court because of the ‘sui generis’ character of impeachment proceedings.  Obviously, this is an good example of a non sequitur.  The case of Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003) surely constitutes binding precedent precisely because it dealt with the power of judicial review vis-a-vis impeachment cases.   

First, quoting Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the proponent of the provision on judicial review as now enunciated in our Constitution, explained its breadth in no uncertain terms:

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. (I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436, 1986), emphasis ours.

Consistent with the intendment of the Constitution, the Supreme Court through Madame Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, now Ombudsman, the Court ruled:

x x x

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."  Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

Unless Art. 8 of the Civil Code has been amended – the latest time I checked, it was still there – then judicial decisions interpreting laws form part of the legal system.  As long as the impeachment court deems itself to be operating within the Philippine legal system (otherwise, which?), then it is bound by precedent as well.

US Constitutional Theory on Judicial Review in Impeachment Cases

One of the senators, in her remarks, citing American jurisprudence, sought to give the impression that judicial review in impeachment cases was anathema to American constitutional theory.  Without doubt, that is one persuasion in the United States, but by no means is it the only one nor, necessarily, the most persuasive.  In a well received article, “Impeachment: Trials and Errors”, Prof. Irving Brant also examines the claim of the Senate to the ‘sole power to try all impeachments’.   Brant was attacking a House Manager’s (John Bingham) position totally excluding judicial review.  Argued Brant:

Had the clause relating to the Senate’s ‘sole power’ stood alone, there would be some slight plausibility to Bingham’s interpretation.  But the true meaning is found in its relation to a preceding clause.  Putting the two together:

‘The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole power of impeachment.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.’

In combination, what are these but a mere division of functions between House and Senate?  They say that the Senate shall have no part of the power to impeach, and that the House shall have no part of the power to try impeachments.

x x x

Every unconstitutional action of Congress that works definite and substantial injury to a specific individual gives that person standing to present a ‘case in law or equity’ to the courts of the United States.  The only question, therefore, is whether removal by impeachment in violation of the Constitution produces substantial injury.  Financially, it may be no injury at all, but in social standing and human dignity the penalty is fearful...What about the provision that the party convicted may be disqualified ‘to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States?  Nobody, surely, would contend that this lifelong punishment, if imposed in violation of the Constitution, is too trivial to give rise to a case in law or equity.

There is yet another important point Brant argues: Should Senate convict on the basis of Articles of Impeachment filed in violation of Constitutional requirements, the conviction would be in the nature of a Bill of Attainder that both the Philippine and the American constitutions expressly proscribe.

What Francisco Teaches:

The question of whether or not Articles of Impeachment have been validly filed is, we know in the light of Francisco, a justiciable question.  It in fact raises the question of whether or not the requirements for a trial by the Senate have been complied with.  There are constitutional standards by which to abide, and that the House of Representative, as indicting agency, must comply with.  If there are standards, judicial review will lie.

Until the Constitution is amended and the vast power of judicial review now expressly vested by Article VIII, Section 1 is pared down, then the power of the Supreme Court to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion by ‘any branch or instrumentality’ of government will extend precisely to that: any and every branch or instrumentality of government.  Most certainly, that includes the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.

What the Certiorari Powers Cannot Reach

Whatever upsets the balance of powers established by the Constitution and impairs one or the other branch from performing a constitutionally assigned duty will not be reached by judicial review.  The Supreme Court may very well declare a sub-poena to be in violation of law; it may declare that certain acts or orders of the Senate in an impeachment trial, or of any of the officers of the court, violate the rights of the respondent; the Supreme Court may also declare evidence inadmissible, if the reason for inadmissibility is constitutional in

nature.  But the Supreme Court cannot, by a TRO, a writ of injunction, whether provisional or permanent, stop the impeachment proceedings.  That would be to usurp a constitutionally assigned duty of the Senate.

The Supreme Court has itself laid down the parameters of “grave abuse of discretion”.  The pronouncement in United Coconut Planters Bank v. Looyuko is merely a reiteration of what he has commonly held:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.  It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.

A writ of certiorari, as understood in this jurisdiction, is not a writ of error.  When all that one alleges is that there has been an error in the application of the law or in the appreciation of facts these might properly constitute assignments of error on appeal, but not for a writ of certiorari, especially when, as in this case, the writ has the effect of the judicial branch reaching into the prerogatives of another branch of government.

Can a judgment of conviction by the impeachment court be reviewed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the judgment was rendered with grave abuse of discretion?  In the first place, the Constitution provides for no appeal in impeachment cases.  It would therefore seem that to turn to the Supreme Court by a petition for a writ of certiorari, when this would result in an appeal – the vacation of judgment of conviction – would be to provide a remedy that the Constitution does not grant.  The Senate has the sole power not only to try, but also to decide!

But Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals provides some guidance.  There, the Supreme Court held that it is not the office of the writ of certiorari to delve into the merits of a case, but is limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction only.  The writ of certiorari therefore points out the grave abuse of discretion that amounted to lack of jurisdiction, and then the court that issues the writ remands the case to forum a quo for the latter to correct its own jurisdictional error.  In case, therefore, it is alleged that a judgment of conviction resulted from grave abuse of discretion (e.g., a complete disregard of the evidence, or the admission or constitutionally excluded evidence), then the respondent could turn to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.  If the Court is convinced that the abuse of discretion is properly characterized as “grave” so as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, then all that the Court does is point out in what the grave abuse consisted and remand the case to the impeachment court for it to act in accordance with the findings of the Supreme Court – which need not mean a reversal of its judgment of conviction, but may call for the clarification of the findings of fact or application of the law on which the judgment was based.  But it is the Senate that must ultimately decide.

While it is true that a written judgment is not even required and that all that the Constitution requires is that the senators vote on the verdict, still because the procedure is a trial and the senate sits as a court of record, it stands to reason that the judgment arrived at must be based on evidence.  Anything short of this results in a Bill of Attainder.  And if there is appreciation of evidence, there can be grave abuse of discretion that can consist in totally ignoring the evidence presented.  Obviously the same avenue is open to the prosecution, for although

impeachment proceedings have been characterized as highly penal in nature, I do not feel inclined to make the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy apply in impeachment cases.

I. IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES

The issue of what constitutes an impeachable offense does not arise only now.  James St. Clair, counsel to President Richard Nixon raised the issue when he argued that ‘the president could only be impeached for criminal conduct’.  While the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry of the House Judiciary Committee did not subscribe to this limitation, it nevertheless laid down useful parameters:  Impeachment could be based upon conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles of our government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of the presidential office.

Art. XI, Section 2 of the Constitution enumerates these grounds: "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”  Unless these deliberately vague phrases are handled carefully, the impeachment process could be so easily trivialized by applying it to trivial cases.  It may be argued, for example, that an impeachable official who purchases a pirated DVD has betrayed the public trust, since the public trusts that its officials will be law-abiding, even if most of the public will patronize optical and magnetic media pirates!  But are we prepared to say that the framers of our Constitution, and the very structure of our government, allow the impeachment process to be used for such purposes?

If the provisions of our Constitution are read in light of the comments of the House Judiciary Committee of the US, then what must be presented competently before the Senate sitting in impeachment proceedings is proof that the respondent violated the Constitution in such wise as to transgress the constitutional form and principles of our government, and the betrayal of public trust must be such that they have rendered him or her incapable of the proper performance of constitutional duties of high office?  Stringent?  Perhaps, but necessarily so, lest the impeachment process be trivialized.

In an American case, it was held that “failure to perform just one duty required by law would not be sufficient to uphold the action, but there would have to be a general failure to perform official duties.”

What is also clear is that the respondent may, prior to trial, object to the sufficiency of the articles of impeachment. This, to me, would be analogous to some procedures in ordinary judicial proceedings, one of these being the Motion to Quash the Information, or the hearing conducted by the Sandiganbayn in cases over which it has jurisdiction in R.A. 3019 cases to determine the due filing and sufficiency of the Information for purposes of preventive suspension.  Theoretically, therefore, the sufficiency of the articles is open to inquiry – and the conformity of the allegations with the grounds set forth by the Constitution – can be the subject of pre-trial argument and examination. 

It is my position that despite the fact that there are constitutional standards – culpable violation of the constitution, betrayal of public trust, other high crimes, etc. – the framers left them ‘open-ended’ in anticipation of the convoluted ways of human iniquity and the various forms that high officials may later prove undeserving of high office.  The Constitution has set minimal standards and while these minimal standards do constitute constitutional standards that, by the Francisco doctrine, would provide an opening for judicial review, it would be best for the Supreme Court to decline a petition for judicial review on the question of whether or not a particular article or allegation rises to the level of an impeachable offense since the very nature of the issue is intimately linked to and inseparably bound with the guilt or non-guilt of the respondent.  To ask whether non-disclosure of assets in the SALN rises to the level of an impeachable offense overlaps the question: Is the

respondent guilty of a crime for which he may be impeached – and the latter question, quite very clearly, is left to the sole authority of the Senate sitting in an impeachment trial.

That having been said, is it open to the defense to raise the issue of whether or not the House Managers have, in the Articles, in fact alleged impeachable offenses at any time during the trial?  Prevailing jurisprudence suggests an affirmative answer.  The impeachable offenses enumerated by Article XI of the Constitution are the ground for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Senate sitting in an impeachment trial.  When the defense then challenges the articles because they do not allege impeachable offenses, it is in fact raising the question of the jurisdiction of the impeachment court, and it is a settled rule that jurisdiction is a question that may be raised at any time during the proceedings, particularly when not precluded by estoppel.  But the challenge must be addressed to the Senate for the reason discussed above.

It has always been my position that the articles of impeachment that arise from cases decided by the Supreme Court should be given short shrift by the Senate.  In fact, they can properly be the subject of what would be analogous to a Motion to Quash.  In the first place, a Supreme Court judgment is always a collegial judgment and not even the ponente may be held to account for a court judgment.  More importantly, however, turning a decided case into an article of impeachment is an ill-disguised assault on judicial independence: that structural feature of the Philippine Judiciary guaranteed by such constitutional provisions as have to do with the appointment of judges and justices, the fiscal autonomy of the court and the prohibition against the reduction of its budget and the exclusivity of its rule-making power.  Unless it is clearprima facie that a judgment was rendered totally bereft of basis in fact and in law, and it is alleged that the respondent coerced, intimidated or deceived his colleagues into rendering the questioned judgment, an impeachment trial should not be a remedy for a lost case before the Supreme Court.

I.  CONDUCT OF TRIAL AND CONDUCT OF SENATORS

When the Senate sits in trial in an impeachment case, it sits as a court of impeachment, and as a court of record, and its officers are officers of the court.  If follows that the conduct of trial and the conduct of the senators who sit in judgment must conform to the requirements of due process. 

What popular sentiment might be, as polls and surveys show, should be irrelevant to the judgment the senators arrive at, or to their votes on interlocutory matters.  A judge rules and decides according to law and evidence, and public preference is neither.  It is, for purposes of a trial, noise!  Much confusion has been occasioned by reference to a phrase that is not found in the Constitution: “political justice”.  What this means should be nothing more than that the task of doing justice is entrusted to a political branch of government and to men and women not appointed to the judiciary but elected to their positions.  It must also mean that in reaching a decision, policy considerations are relevant, principal among these being the consideration of whether the respondent has acted in a manner that makes him absolutely unfit for office. 

The basic persuasion of adversarial proceedings is that the judges, who are supposed to be neutral umpires, are in the best position to arrive at a judgment when either side is given free rein to present the facts and the law most favourable to his or her position.  Obviously, the dynamics of an adversarial process is radically altered when over-zealous partisans, sitting as judges, rush to the succour of either side and, through a tendentious line of questioning, make up for the insouciance and lapses of counsel of either side.  In a separate opinion, Justice Ricardo Francisco, observing that the number of questions propounded by Presiding Justice

Francis Garchitorena (a jurist whose memory I revere)  far outnumbered those of the prosecutor, had this to say:

For starters, the court questions were so numerous which, as per petitioner Dans’ count, totalled 179 compared to prosecutor Querubin’s questions which numbered merely 73.  More noteworthy, however, is that the court propounded leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical questions all rolled into one. xxx

The court questions were far from being clarificatory. They were, in the main, queries that have no basis on the records. It has been said that purely abstract questions, assuming facts or theories for which there is no foundation in the evidence, are not admissible as a matter of right, although such questions may be permitted on cross-examination for the purpose of testing the knowledge of the witness as to the subject on which he has testified.  But cross-examination is the exclusive function of the advocate. Thus any trend of court Anchorquestioning which shows even slight semblance of cross-examination is already offensive to fundamental requirements of due process.

In fact petitions for inhibition which constitute yet another hindrance to the continuous flow of proceedings are occasioned by the inappropriate posturing of senators.  Since the senators rightly assert that in impeachment trials, they constitute a court, then the rules governing trials including the conduct expected of judges must be limitations and checks on their actions they must freely and voluntarily submit to.

The Senate has been repeatedly asked to relax the rules.  In fact the Rules of Court that are suppletory to the Senate Rules on impeachment contain an in-built provision on relaxation: They are to be liberally construed so that the ends of justice may not be defeated by technical requirements.  What may not be relaxed, however are the rules that guarantee the respondent due process.  Hearsay evidence, for example, cannot be admitted, as this denies the respondent the chance to cross-examine the source of the statement.  Neither may the rules that deny the respondent an adequate defense of himself be set-aside on the pretext of relaxing the rules, otherwise, the constitutional directive that Senate conduct a ‘trial’ is ignored.

Conclusion:

That impeachment attempts in the past did not go so far – or at least as far as they have gone in the present case – is no reason for the Senate, or for any branch or instrumentality of the government, to go ‘free-style’, where anything goes.  That would cease to be the Rule of Law, and the point to the sacrosanct character of the Rule of Law is accountability of citizen and State alike to the law, particularly to the Constitution.  We are not really on terra incognita here.  Aside from clear statements of intendment on the part of the framers of the Constitution that should aid in the interpretation of nebulous constitutional provisions, argument can rightly be constructed from the very structure of our government: a tripartite system of co-equal, coordinate branches with a delicately calibrated system of checks and balances between them.  There are finally, usefully clues from American jurisprudence, particularly because our impeachment clauses find their origin in the US Constitution, to which, however, must be added to the all-important caveat that nowhere in the US Constitution is there granted to the Supreme Court as an express and as broad a power of review as does the Philippine Constitution of 1987.