the concept of verbal root in indian grammar (a propos of pāṇini 1.3.1)

The Concept of Verbal Root in Indian Grammar (A Propos of Pāṇini 1.3.1)Author(s): Rosane RocherSource: Foundations of Language, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Feb., 1969), pp. 73-82Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000363 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 08:45

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foundations of Language.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 92.63.103.61 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:45:57 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000363?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


ROSANE ROCHER

THE CONCEPT OF VERBAL ROOT IN

INDIAN GRAMMAR

(A PROPOS OF PXNINI 1.3.1)*

One of the greatest merits of the Indian grammarians consists in that they considered the words used in the language as composite aggregates which could be divided into separate parts. The Greek and Latin grammarians never acquired the same insight, nor did more recent grammarians in the

West independently of the Indians. Within the analysis elaborated by the Indian grammarians the central and most important element, both from the

morphological and semantic points of view, is, no doubt, the verbal root, dhdtu.

As might be expected, a concept as important as that of the root became

the subject of long and varied discussion among the Indian grammarians. I do not intend here to give a complete survey of these discussions. Nor do

I intend to study exhaustively all the arguments raised a propos of such sutras as 1.3.1, i.e., in the texts devoted specifically to the problem of the verbal root. Leaving aside all details and all points which are more closely related to the commentators' dialectics than to the concept of verbal root, I shall try to extract the fundamental problems raised in connection with these roots, and the conclusions to which they have led.

In no siitra of the Astadhyayi are we provided with what might be called

either a definition of the verbal root, or a description of its semantic role.

To find out Panini's theory of the root from a morphological point of view, it is necessary to take into account no less than 29 siutras, located in two

different and widely separated sections of the Astadhyayi. First, there is sutra 1.3.1: bhivddayo dhdtavah 'the roots are bhu etc.' This siutra classifies

as verbal roots those elements which are contained in the list of roots an

nexed to the Astadhyayi, the Dhatupatha. Next, there is the group of sfitras from 3.1.5 to 3.1.32, enumerating a whole series of forms which, even though they are of a composite nature, go under the name dhdtu. Going through this series of forms, one might be tempted to distinguish two different cat

egories, although such a distinction was completely foreign to the Astadhyayi. To the first category belong those forms which are already composed of a root and a suffix. These are what Western grammar would call the stems of

the desiderative, intensive and causative forms, as well as the present stems

* Text of a paper read at the XXVII International Congress of Orientalists, Ann Arbor, August 1967.

73

Foundations of Language 5 (1969) 73-82. All rights reserved.



ROSANE ROCHER

of the roots of the 10th class. To these should be added a number of other,

similar combinations containing root + suffix. To the second category be

long a number of aggregates composed of a substantive and a suffix, or,

according to Western terminology, denominative stems. The conclusion to be drawn from all these sutras is an important one, and

fully in accordance with Paninian methods. Panini did not intend to give a

definition including the entire homogeneous group of elements which might be called verbal roots. Panini's sole purpose was to list, as roots, as wide as

possible a range of elements which behave in the same way with respect to

other, heterogeneous elements. These latter elements combine with the former to create new composite forms. In other words: the important thing for Panini was not to formulate a logically perfect definition of the verbal

root, but to provide a solid basis for later rules, in such a way that gram

matically correct forms could be obtained by treating anything called verbal root in accordance with certain regular processes. It is around the central element called dhdtu that the forms will be built, by means of a subtle game of prefixation and suffixation. This is another example of the typically Paninian procedure which consists in isolating the various elements so as to be able afterwards to combine them into more complex structures.1

Turning from morphology to semantics, we see that certain sftras, too numerous to be quoted here, clearly indicate that, in Panini's mind, the notion expressed by the verbal root is that of action (kriya)2. However, it

should be said again that no sutra contains more than an indication of this; nor is any sutra intended to define the semantic role of the root.

In short, as far as Panini is concerned, the concept of a verbal root is free

from ambiguity; and this is true both from the morphological and semantic

points of view. However, as in the case of several other fundamental concepts of Paninian grammar, the author of the Astadhyayi did not feel the necessity to formulate actual definitions.

The commentators on the Astadhyayi too, do not endeavor to formulate a definition of dhdtu. They are not concerned with systematizing Panini's

teachings, and they should not be expected to have worked out the dispersed data of the Astadhyayi into a coherent whole. Here, as elsewhere, the

commentators do not concentrate on the ideas which underlie the Paninian

rules, but pay attention primarily to the formulation of the relevant sftras.

1 It is striking that Panini never used the technical term dkhyata which, with some of his predecessors and his successors, indicates a verb, i.e., a fully established verbal form. 2 It is worth noting that each of the three fundamental technical terms 'action', 'agent', and 'object' is derived from the same root kr: kriyd, kartr, and karman, respectively. In

the same way, the generic term to designate the factors of the action (agent, object, locus, etc.) is kdraka.

74



THE CONCEPT OF VERBAL ROOT IN INDIAN GRAMMAR

Their point of view is a purely formalistic one. Their task consists not in the

creation of a more perfect treatise than the Astadhyayi, but in a demon

stration of the correctness of Panini's teachings. Thus they have to show that

each sutra, in its actual wording, covers all cases for which it was designed, and excludes all others. Moreover, they try to demonstrate that each letter

used by Panini in his sutras is essential.

A propos of sutra 1.3.1 the commentators engage in a discussion which

is an excellent example of its type. From their formalistic point of view the

wording of sutra 1.3.1 (bhuvddayo dhdtavah 'the roots are bhi etc.') raises a number of problems. However, while discussing these problems in their characteristic way, the commentators elucidate their own ideas concerning the verbal root. Thus, even though the commentators do not mean to pro vide a definition of the root, we are nonetheless able to obtain a good insight into their views on the subject. Although the discussion was amplified by one commentator after another, its essential features were determined as

early as Pataijali's Mahabhasya.3 The formulation of sutra 1.3.1 of the Astadhyayi raises two problems for

Patanjali. Although these two problems are utterly formal, they are definitely of importance for our purpose. Indeed, Patanijali, a skillful commentator, later makes use of the very peculiarity of the sutra's formulation to explain

away, from a more fundamental and theoretical point of view, some of the

difficulties presented by the sutra. The first problem derives from the fact that, according to the rules of

sandhi, for the expression 'bhi etc.', one would expect bhvddayah, not

bhivddayah as in the siitra. If so, Panini used a vowel which could have been

dispensed with, which is impossible in the eyes of his commentators. How ever, at this point, Patanjali proposes as a solution, that the letter i was

added in the sitra to maintain intact the element bhu, which has an auspicious value.

The second problem concerns the use of the word ddi in bhivddayah. The

plural of the root bhu could, by itself, mean 'bhi etc.', as is the case else

where in the Astadhyayi. Why then did Panini use the seemingly unnecessary word ddi? Patanijali answers the question by saying that, by the word ddi, Panini intends to refer the student to the list of roots, the Dhatupatha, which

exists outside his grammar itself, and the first item of which is the root bhu.

But this leads Patanijali to a more serious problem, one which touches

3 Even earlier, since several elements already appear in the varttikas (presumably by Katyayana) and karikas quoted by Patanjali. These elements do not, however, constitute a coherent argument when they are abstracted from Patanjali's commentary. For all practical purposes, I shall consider the whole argument as Patafijali's, it being well understood that his Mahabhasya is greatly indebted to previous commentaries otherwise lost to us.

75



ROSANE ROCHER

upon the very bases of the Paninian siutra. Patanijali states that, by saying bhavddayah, Panini cannot have meant that the roots are to be sought in the

Dhatupatha. There are two reasons for this. First, it would not be possible to distinguish the verbal roots from their eventual homonymous forms,

which would, therefore, also receive the appellation dhdtu. According to the commentators the semantic data which now figure in the Dhatupatha texts

are later additions; the original Dhatupatha being simply a sequence of

phonic elements. Hence, the Dhatupatha - or, to be more precise, the term

bhivddayah - as such, when it includes div, does not distinguish between div 'play' and div 'heaven.' The latter div too, belongs to the bhfivddayah, and would rank among the roots referred to in sutra 1.3.1. The second reason

why the expression bhfvddayah cannot be simply a reference to the Dhatu

patha is this: since the Dhatupatha is an uninterrupted chain of phonic elements, suitra 1.3.1 would be of no help in determining the exact length of each of the phonic sequences that deserve to be called roots. How could

one establish that bhiu and edh are two distinct roots, and that they should

not be read as a whole: *bhvedh?

In an effort to avoid these difficulties Patanijali decides to appeal to a

regular definition of the verbal root, and to specify its semantic role. Quite naturally, he turns first to the semantic definition which, as said before, appears at least indirectly to have been the one adopted by Panini himself:

the verbal root is the element which denotes action, kriyd.

However, Patanijali does not stop there. On the contrary, to say 'the root denotes an action' raises the serious problem of how to define 'action'.

Because of the complex nature of action, this is not easily done. An action

cannot be grasped at once in its entirety. Understanding an action implies in each case a reference to anumdna 'inference'. The idea put forth here by

Patainjali was taken up again and again by later commentators. Such a late

commentary as the Padamanijari, for example, discusses the problem in great detail. What is called an action really implies a continuous series of separate

events; and, although these events taken individually can be perfectly captured by the organs of sense, the action as a whole is beyond the range of pratyaksa 'perception' and belongs to the field of anumdna 'inference'. In reality, an action is the whole series of specific events which contribute to the realisation of one and the same result.

Patainjali himself does not go as far as the later commentaries. He restricts

himself to raising the problem and to referring to some of the difficulties

involved in the definition 'the root expresses an action'. Having done so, he

abandons this abstract approach, and tries to find an easier way to recognize the element which expresses an action. As kriyd 'action' expresses the

meaning of the root kr 'do, act' from which it is derived, it is safe to assume

76




that any element which can be samdnddhikaralna 'on the same level' with kr

also expresses an action, and, hence, is a root. An easy way to find out what

these elements are is to ask the question kim karoti 'what does he do?', and

see what answers can be obtained. An answer like pacati 'he cooks' is

perfectly acceptable; therefore, pacati expresses an action.

Pacati, however, is a finite form, and the expression of the action is

grasped from the form in its entirety. By using the argument of anvaya -

vyatireka4 'concurrent presence and absence (of a grammatical element and a particular meaning', Patanjali shows that the suffix ati indicates that there

is an agent - and only one -, and has nothing to do with the expression of

the action. In pacati, the action is expressed by the element pac, which, therefore, is a root.

Patanjali has also to show that a preverb is incapable of expressing an

action. His position on this point, which was much debated in later commen

taries, is that the role of the preverb is to qualify the action expressed by the

root. Even where the meanings of such compound forms seem to be at

variance with that of the root when used alone, the elements in the com

pound forms that express all the various meanings are the roots. The role

of the preverb consists only in determining which of the meanings of the root is intended, never in expressing any action in its own right.

From a morphological point of view, Patanijali succeeds thus in isolating the verbal root. But, semantically speaking, the theory of the root being 'on the same level' with kr in its turn creates a problem with regard to such

roots as as 'be', bhi 'be, become', and vid'know'. Indeed, these roots cannot be put on the same level with kr. Asked kim karoti 'what does he do?' one

will never reply asti 'he is'. Patanjali touches here upon a problem with which Western grammarians too have been familiar, namely: the distinction be tween verbs expressing an action, and verbs denoting a situation or state. But Patanijali is not concerned with correctly drawing the distinction between the two categories; he is merely looking for a formula to include all roots

without exception. Since the notion of action seems to exclude such roots as as, bhu, and vid, Patanijali seeks a broader definition.

All activities or events expressed by the various verbal roots presuppose and imply one common characteristic: existence, of which they are merely different manifestations. Hence Patanijali proposes to define the verbal root as that element which expresses bhdva. Just as kriyd was earlier considered

by Patanijali to be the specific meaning of the root kr, bhdva is now explained

4 A paper on 'Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian Grammar' by G. Cardona was presented, like the present text, at the XXVII International Congress of Orientalists at Ann Arbor. It will be published in the Raghavan Felicitation Volume.

77



ROSANE ROCHER

as the very meaning of the root bhu 'be, come into being'.5 And just as

Patanijali, intending to prove that roots express kriyd, tried to find out which elements are 'on the same level' with the root kr, so he now proceeds to

determine which elements are 'on the same level' with the root bhiu. But this is not as easy to establish as in the case of kr. To prove that pac 'cook' ex

presses an action, it was sufficient to ask 'what does he do?', and find that

to such a question the answer 'he cooks' is perfectly acceptable. The only equation which Patanijali can establish between pac and bhi is of a quite different nature: bhavati pacati, bhavati paksyati, bhavaty apdksit. This ex

ample created by Patanijali is obviously artificial. In view of the explanation given by the author himself, it seems to allow of the following translation:

'cooking exists: NN. cooks, NN. will cook, NN. has cooked.' Whereas karoti and pacati were exactly on the same level and appeared in the same

tense, person and number, bhavati remains in the present tense and in the

singular, whatever form pac may assume. In fact, says Patanijali, pac etc. are

not 'on the same level' with bhi, but the various actions such as 'cook' are

the agents of the action 'exist'.6 Patanjali therefore proposes the definition that the root is the element that expresses the agent of the action 'exist'.

It seems, however, difficult to accept such a definition, because it would also include elements which are not verbal roots: trees, for example, have

an existence; they are agents of the action 'exist', and yet they are expressed

by nominal stems, and not by verbal roots. Fortunately, there is a way to

get around this difficulty. Varttika 12, presumably by Katyayana, says that the compilation of a Dhatupatha, i.e. an exhaustive enumeration of all

Sanskrit roots, is intended to exclude all nominal stems and all Prakrit roots.

Since the nominal stems are excluded by virtue of this varttika, one may

safely accept the definition of the root as the element that expresses bhdva, i.e. the element that expresses the agent of the action 'exist'.

This view has an additional advantage in the eyes of a faithful commen

tator in so far as it does not necessitate a correction of the seutra. There is

no need to add explicitly to the sftra the definition that the root expresses

bhdva; the wording of Panini's rule is such that, if correctly interpreted, it

5 This double aspect of the root bha makes bhava a term which is not easy to translate.

I have decided on 'existence' as the least misleading translation. It should be recalled, however, that 'existence' does not imply here anything static, but involves process, or transformation, as exemplified by the existence of living beings. The 'coming into being' is but the first of all processes involved. 6 Notice that, although at this point of the discussion Patanijali works on the assumption that the root expresses existence, he goes on using the definition he has proposed earlier, and to which he will later return, that the root expresses action. He does so even with

regard to such roots as bhu about which it had been argued that they could not express action.

78




already expresses the idea. It is enough to consider bhfivddayah not as a

compound from bhf and ddi, but from bhu and vddi, the latter being an anomalous derivation from the root vad. Bhuvddayo dhdtavah must, then, be

interpreted as 'the roots say bhi', or, in other words, 'the roots express bhdva'.

In spite of this achievement, to say that the roots express bhdva raises

another serious problem. The point is that bhdva is a technical term well

known to the Astadhyayi. And, according to the Astadhyayi, bhdva is ex

pressed by means of nominal suffixes and impersonal passive suffixes. Conse

quently, if one interprets sfitra 1.3.1 as meaning that roots are all elements which express bhdva, this erroneously includes all suffixes expressing bhdva. In order to exclude such suffixes, the definition must be made more specific. It must state that, in a verbal form, the root is the first element which can

express bhdva.7 It is clear at this point that, although he does not say so explicitly,

Pataijali is conscious of the fact that the Astadhyayi does not really authorize his statement that the root expresses bhdva. He therefore returns to the former

alternative, according to which the verbal root expresses an action. However, to do so, he has to do away with the objection which gave rise to the bhdva

interlude. In other words, he has to prove that as, bhi, and vid too, express an action. This he does in three different ways.

In the first place, Patanjali proposes a definition of action which includes

such roots as as, bhi, and vid. In my opinion, it is an excellent definition of

verbal action: kdrakdndm pravrttivis'esah kriyd "an action is a specific mani

festation of the factors involved". When various factors (kdraka) are

present, they can act upon each other in various ways, each one of which

is an action. Even when it comes to a phenomenon such as eating, all sorts

of variations are possible depending on the circumstances; as, for instance, on the kind of food one is taking. In the same way one may consider that

the factors of the action manifest themselves in a different way in case of

existing or dying. In short, even in those circumstances referred to by the

7 Varttika 11 formulated that proposition in such an aphoristic way that it gave rise to various interpretations. The varttika only says prathamabhdvagrahanarn ca 'and one should mention the first bhdva'. Before coming to the interpretation I have mentioned, Patanfjali rejects two others. Prathamabhdva does not mean that the first element of a verbal form

must express bhdva; that would exclude from the roots the denominative stem (considered as a root in Indian grammar, as noted above). For example in putriyati 'he desires a son', the first discernable element is putra 'son', which does not express bhdva. Nor does pratha

mabhdva mean that the root is the element which expresses the first bhdva, for that would include impersonal passive suffixes. In sisye 'one is asleep', for example, the impersonal passive suffix and the root express the very same bhdva, and therefore they both express the first bhdva. The varttika must be interpreted as stating that the root is the first element in a verbal form that is capable of expressing bhdva.

79



ROSANE ROCHER

root 'exist', the factors manifest themselves in a specific way. Therefore, the root as does express an action.8

The second method by which Patanjali tries to show that as, bhu, and vid

express an action is also of interest. He notes that, without action, it is not

possible to distinguish subdivisions of time. If nothing is done, if no action is performed, one has no means to measure time, and one is unable to dis

tinguish past, present, or future. Now, even such roots as as 'be' are used in all tenses. That means that they do express an action.

Pataijali's third and last way of proving that as, bhiu, and vid express an action derives directly from the objection itself. The reason why as, bhiu, and vid were said not to express an action was that, when one asks kim karoti 'what does he do?', one cannot obtain the answer asti "he is". But, says

Patanjali, the fact that one does not reply 'he is' to the question 'what does

he do?' does not imply that as cannot express an action. The only thing proved by this is that, when one asks the question 'what does he do?', one does not mean to inquire about the existence of the agent. One accepts his existence as an established fact, and the question has a different purpose.

After having thus proved that the definition: 'the verbal root expresses an

action', is valid for all roots, the only task which is left for Patanjali as a

good commentator is to show that the Paninian sutra is worded perfectly

requiring neither correction nor addition. To do so, Pataijali proposes as a new interpretation of the term bhavddi, that it is neither a compound from

bhiu and ddi, nor even from bhi and vddi as had been proposed at an earlier

stage, but a three member compound, composed of bhui, vd, and ddi, ddi

being connected with both previous terms. Such a compound allows of a

twofold interpretation. If one adopts the definition that the verbal root

expresses an action, the siitra bhuvddayo dhdtavah can be interpreted as follows: "roots are bhzu 'exist' and those following after it in the Dhatupatha, and vd 'blow' and similar ones (i.e., roots expressing an action)". If, on the

contrary, one prefers the definition that the root expresses existence, one may interpret thus: "roots are bhi 'exist' and similar ones (i.e., roots expressing existence), and vd 'blow' and those following after it in the Dhatupatha".

The striking fact is that, in his final analysis, Pataijali thus allows both

semantic definitions to subsist alongside one another. He abandons the dis cussion here, as he does frequently, leaving open various possibilities. This does not mean that Patanjali was himself unable to choose one possibility over the others. As on many other occasions in the Mahabhasya, all elements

indicative of a preferential solution are present in the text, but the author

8 What Patanjali means to say is that each action is a unique phenomenon. In a completely different context - on sutra 1.3.14 - the Nyasa states that no action can be done twice; all that can be done is a new action that resembles the previous one.

80




refrains from making an explicit choice, leaving it to the reader to draw his own conclusions. If the root is taken to express existence, sutra 1.3.1 must be interpreted as: 'roots are bhi and similar ones, and vd and those which

follow after it in the Dhatupatha'. However, vd is not the first root of the

Dhatupatha. It appears only as no. 41 of the second class. So it becomes

necessary to adapt the Dhatupatha in such a way that vd becomes its first

root, as noted by the commentary on the Mahabhasya, the Pradipa.9 On

the other hand, if the root is taken as expressive of action, such an adap tation of the Dhatupatha is unnecessary. Indeed, sutra 1.3.1 then means:

'roots are bhu and those following after it in the Dhatupatha, and vd and

similar ones'. Now, bhi is indeed the first root listed in the Dhatupatha. Given the fact that all commentators, and Patanijali in particular, are ex

tremely reluctant to change the traditional reading of texts such as the

Dhatupatha, there can be little doubt that Patanfjali prefers an alternative

which obviates the need for such emendation. As a matter of fact, elsewhere

in his commentary, Patanfjali unequivocally accepts the point of view that a verbal root expresses an action. On the occasion of sftra 5.1.118, for

example, he asks the question kah punar dhdtvarthah 'what does a root ex

press?' and replies immediately: kriyd 'action'. The Kasika knows the three analyses of the compound bhavddayah suc

cessively proposed in the Mahabhasya. It quotes a karika (the first half of

which was already cited in the Mahabhasya) that enumerates them: 1. bhu

+ddi 'bha etc.' (with the unusual sandhi for the sake of auspiciousness); 2. bhu + vddi 'express bhdva'; 3. bhi + vd + ddi'bhi and the like and vd

and the following roots'.10 But it expressly states its opinion that bhzvddayah is a compound of bhu and ddi and means: 'bhu etc'. In other words, the

Kasika shares the interpretation according to which in sutra 1.3.1 Panini

simply wants to indicate as roots the elements contained in the Dhatupatha. But the Kasika too, thinks it necessary to add a semantic definition of the

root, which is the same as the one in the Astadhyayi and the Mahabhasya; i.e. roots express actions. However, the Kasika assumes that there is no

reason to modify the sutra so as to include this definition. Moreover, it

presents a justification which is not only ingenious, but quite simple. Panini borrowed the technical term dhdtu from his predecessors. This means that

the term has to be taken with the meaning which the pre-Paninian gram

marians gave it. And the latter did define the root as expressing an action.

9 G. B. Palsule, 'A Survey of the Pre-Paninian Grammatical Thought in the matter of the Verbal Root', Indian Linguistics 18 (1957) 135-139, has convincingly refuted the opinion of I. S. Pawate (The Structure of the Ashtadhyayi, pp. 5-6) and K. C. Chatterji (Technical Terms and Technique of Sanskrit Grammar, part I, p. 72), according to which the

Mahabhasya knew another Dhatupatha, the first item of which was the root vd. 10 Cf. Palsule, op. cit., p. 136 and note.

81



ROSANE ROCHER

Thus, the Kasika too, although in a completely different way from the

Mahabhasya, is faithful to the Paninian point of view.

To sum up, Panini did not himself define the semantic role of the verbal

root, but a number of rules indirectly indicate that, in his opinion, the root

expresses an action. Patanjali explicitly cites this definition, and, although he does not completely discard the point of view that the root expresses existence, it is clear that that opinion does not carry, for him, the same

weight. For the Kasika there is no doubt that the root expresses an action, and nothing else. Thus, even though the commentators display originality in analyzing sutra 1.3.1, the fundamental ideas remain unchanged.

The notion of a root has become so familiar to us, that we accept it

without question, as something self-evident. The main purpose of this paper is to draw attention, first, to the fact that the concept of a root was in reality not so obvious at all. For indeed Western grammarians were unable to

perceive its existence until they started learning Sanskrit from the Indians.

Second, the paper has shown that the Indian grammarians not only dis

covered the root at a very early date, but also devoted to it profound and

interesting discussions that throw light upon its nature and semantic role.

Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (Belgium)

82



the concept of verbal root in indian grammar (a propos of pāṇini 1.3.1)

Documents