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THE CONCEPT OF PLEASURE PROPOUNDED BY

NASIR-I KHUSRAW

Ghulam Abbas Hunzai

A thesis submitte.d to the Faculty

of Graduate Studies and Research

in partial fulfilment of the

requirements for the degree

of Master of Arts

Institute of Islamic Studies

McGill University

Montreal

May 1993

«.? Ghulam Abbas Hunzai

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Abstract

8utb..Qr: Ghulam Abbas Hunzai

Title of the Thesis: The c.oncept .of Pleasure Propourded by Nf~ir-i Khusraw

D.smartment: The Institute (If [slamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal

1~: Mast.er of Arts

This study is intended to investigate the concept of pleasure as developed by Na~ir-i

Khusraw, a prominent Isma""ill philosopher and theologiln of the fifth century hijrah.

This concept seems to be one of the central themr;~ of Na~ir's thought system.

From Nâ~ir's works, it appe,ars that according to him the concept of pleasure is not

!>imply an ethical problern but a cosmic principle active and functionaI on all the

existential levels. Every being experienees pleasure in !ts specifie way by performing

the function assigned to it. Through this function or activity every being perpetua tes its

existence and preserves ils well-being. On the sub-human levels Le. mineraI, vegetativf:

and animal, the principle of pleasure is a driving force which enables these levels to

preserve their respective well-being. However, from the human level till the level of the

Universal Soul this principle gains an increasingly epistemological character as it is

connected with the soul's .activity of acquiring knowledge.

Na~ir has extensively quoted and criticised Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya-yi Râzï's views on

pleasure. This situation has called for a comparative study of their concepts of p1easme

in their respective metaphysical and historical contexts. This comparative study reveals

that Na~ir and Razï's conœpts of pleasure are ultimately grounded in their metaphysical

principles, and their intel'pœtations of pleasure are influenced by Aristotelian and

Platonic interpretations respectively, as these models ~uited their respecth,e metaphyskal

world-views .

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Auteur:

Titre de la thèse:

Département:

Degré:

Resume

Ghulam Abbas Hunzai

Le Concept du Plaisir développé par Na~ir-i Khusraw.

Institut des Etudes Islamiques, Université de McGill. MontréHI.

Maitrise d'Arts.

Cette étude a pour but d'investiguer le concept du plaisir exposé par Nii~ir-i Khusraw.

éminent philosophe et théologien IsmlicnI du cinquième siècle de t 'hégire. Cc concept

semble être un des thèmes centraux du système de pens.!e de Nii~ir.

D'après l'oeuvre de Na~ir, il apparalt que le concept du plaisir n'est pas seulement un

problème éthique mais aussi un principe cosmique actif et fonctionnel à tous les niveaux

de l'existence. Chaque être fait l'expérience du plaisir d'une façon qui lui est spécifique

en performant la fonction qui lui est assignée. C'est par cette fonction ou activité que

chaque être perpétue son existence et préserve son bien-être. Aux niveaux sous-humains,

à savoir minéral végétal et animal, le principe du plaisir est une force conductrice

permettant à ces niveaux de préserver leur bien-être propre. Cependant, du niveau

humain jusqu'à celui de l'Ame Universelle, ce principe gagne un caractère

épistémologique croissant puisqu'il est connecté à l'activité de l'âme de l'acquisition de

la connaissance.

Na~ir a considérablement référé et critiqué les vues de Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya-yi Razï

sur le plaisir. Cette situation a demandé une étude comparative de leurs concepts du

plaisir dans leur contexte historique et métaphysique respectifs. Cette étude comparativ~

révèle que les concepts du plaisir de Na~ir et de Râzï sont fondamentalement fondés sur

leurs principes métaphysiques et que leurs interprétations du plaisir ont été influencées

par les interprétations respectives d'Aristote et de Platon, puisque ces modèles

convenaient à leur conception respective du monde.

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Abstract

Resume

Table of Contents

• , , ••••••• , ••••••••••• , •••••• 1 •••• , •••••••

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2

Ackno\vledgements .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4

Note on Technicalities .................................... 6

Chapter l .,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7

Introduction .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7

Endnotes to Chapter 1 .. ............................. 16

Chapter 2 ............................................ 19

Biography ....................................... 19

Endnotes to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 36

Introduction to the Zad al-Musàfirïn and its Edition . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 36

Translation of Chapter Eighteen of the zad ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Endnotes to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . , . . . . . 68

Commentary ...................................... 68

Endnotes to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 103

A Comparative Analysis of the Concepts of Pleasure of :f\la~ir and Razï. 103

Endnotes to Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 119

Conclusion .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 123

Bibliography ............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

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Acknowledgements

During this procrastinated study severa! individuals have extended their heip and

guidance in various ways. 1 consider it a moral obligation to acknowledge this faet. First

and foremost my thanks go to my supervisor Professor Hermann Landolt from whom

1 gained tremendous insights whenever 1 had the occasion to discuss Illy project.

Although due to various circumstanees 1 spent relatively little time with him, he has

however, been a constant source of encouragement.

It wac; Ustad Dr. Faquir Muhammad Hunzai who originally guided and motivated me

to come to McGill University for higher studies. His he!p and guidance has bccn a

constant source of encouragement throughout the difficu!t phases of this study and 1

would therefore, like to acknowledge his role and ex tend my profound gratitude to him.

1 would also like to express my deep gratitude to Rashida Hunzai for her practical help,

encouragement and support during the years of thlS work .

1 am also grateful to the Institute of Ismaili Studies who initially sponsored me to

McGill for higher studies. My thanks are due to Tazim Kassam for her genuine hr.lp in

the initial phases of the'·project. 1 extend my sincere thanks to Professor Muhaqqiq,

Professor Kamali and Professor Weiss for the useful suggestions they gave during my

discussions with them. 1 can not ignore the support that the Ismaili Tariqah and

Education Board, U.K. provided in the process of completing my work. My colleagues

in the Tariqah Board, particularly, Bashir Ladha, Sadru Hassam and ex Administrative

officer Amjad Salam have been extremely supportive, for which 1 am extremely

grateful. 1 would like to record my sincere thanks to Aziz Punja and Zahir Lalani for

their invaluable help in editing the language and formatting the project on the computer,

respecti vel y .

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FinaIly, 1 acknowledge the help and co-operation of the staff of the McGill and the Ils libraries and exprec;s my deep gratitude for their kindness. My appreciation goes to

Rahman Rener for translating the abstract into French .

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NOTE ON TECHNICALITIES

The transliteration system used in this thesis is the Persian vCision of th~ lnstitute of

Islamic Studies McGill University with the following exceptions:

Tashdïd in waw and ~' is represented with double waw and double ~'

instead of ÜW and~.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This stlldy is intended, mainly, to investigate the views of Na~ir-i Khusraw on a cardinal

rcligio-philosophical ' concept, that is, pleasure2 and to eventually locate it in its

historical contcxt by attempting to find out the origins of its philosophical explanation.

The introduction to this stlldy forms a brief discussion on the overaIl significance of the

subject of study, leading to its position in the general structure of Nà~ir's thought

system. It also includes the thematic scheme of the ensuing chapters and an analysis of

Zakariyyâ-yi Râü'Sl controversial relationship with Na~ir in particular and with Isma91ï

thinkers in general.

Pleasllre and pain are two integral principles in the general make-up of the human being

and they, therefore, play a vital role in forming the human ethical attitude. Having

occupied sllch a fllndamental position, the concept of pleasure has been a permanent

subject in the history of discursive thought and religion. However, the systematic

exposition of this subject seems to have started with Plato (427-343 B.C.t and Aristotle

(384-322 B.e.)l. Although the development of the concept of pleasure continued as a

permanent feature in the post Greek philosophical tradition, the two major trends set by

Plato and Aristotle's interpretations of pleasure remained more or less unchallenged.

In Islamic intellectual circles the philosophical debate as to the nature of pleasure started

with the introduction of Greek philosophy into the Islamic world. Muslim philosophers

continued the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions with sorne modifications. The

atmosphere for a debate on such a subject in the Islamic intellectual circles, was

considerably conducive, due to continuing discussion on the nature ofParadise and Hell.

In other words, the question was being discussed mainly in a theological context and

Greek philosophy added to it the philosophical dimension6 •

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Na$ir appears on the scene of Islamic history when the thcmc of pJc .. lsure was being

extensively discussed both theologically and philosophically and various views had bccn

propounded. He seems to have participated in this debate cnergetically and contributcd

substantially to the continuity and growth of this important theme in the Ishmlc

philosophical and theological tradition.

Na~ir's participation in the debate on the problem of pleasure can be lookcd at from two

different perspectives. The tirst perspective is theological i.e. the Isma.'ïn l'orm ofislam;

the second is philosophical, being the conti nuit y of the Greek trmiilion. Na~ir as a slrong

advocate of the harmony between "two wisdoms" (~ikmatayn)\ i.e. philosophiral

wisdom and religious wisdom, attempted to harmonise thesc two pcrspecti',lcs anti

advance an interpretation of pleasure, the constituent elements of which have bcen takcn

from both religion and philosophy.

According to Na.$ir, the concept of pleasure is related to, rather inscribed upon the

secolld ontological principle, the Universal Soul (nafs-i mu!laq)8. The Univcrsal Soul

experiences pleasure in its universal activity or movement to actualise and perfect itself.

Since aIl the lower hierarchies of being proceed From the Universal Soul, the principle

of pleasure is operative as a living facto!' on all the leveis. The concept of pleaslIre

exists ev en on the inorganie level in the fOTm of specifie fllnctions assigncd to ~he 110n­

living beings. This function is inbuilt within the design of each being which is

responsible for its active survival. Na$ir caUs this principle the "Divine guidance"

(hidayat-i ilahï)9.

Religiously, Na~ir considers Paradise as the ultimate source of pleasure. The moral

virtues of ethical men are aimed at attaining that ultimate sourcelO•

The scope and functioll of pleasure clearly suggests its significance in the understanding

of Na~ir's thought system. Na$ir has devoted a specifie chapter in his magnum opus the

Zad to give an outline of his concept of pleasure. This chapter however, only presents

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a skeletal picture of his notion of pleasure. He has expounded and developed this

concept further in the chapter on eschatology and under various other themes which

have a direct or indirect bearing on this concept. This study attempts to piece together

the scattered statements on pleasure from the available works of Nà~ir and compares it

with other key concepts to determine its exact position in the author's system of ideas.

Na~ir seems to be the first of the Isma91ï thinkers to attempt to expound a fully

dcveloped theory of pleasure. Other Isma"ilï thinkers who preceded Nâ~ir have only

parti ail y touched upon it, a short account of which is given in the fourth chapter. This

study examines whether or not Na~ir adopted a position on pleasure consistent with his

Ismà"ïlï predecessors.

As far as the chapter on pleasure in the Zàd is concerned, Nâ§ir has devoted the tirst

half to critically analyze the concept of pleasure developed by Razï. Therefore a proper

study of Na~ir's concept of pleasure entails a comparative study of Razi's concept of

pleasure. This, in turn, caUs for an investigation into the problem of why Nà~ir chose

to quote and attack Razi, rather than any other preceding or contemporary philosopher.

This problem seems to be deeper than it tirst appears, for most of the IsmaCflï thinkers

who preceded Na~ir consistently chose Ràzï as their target for criticism and Na~ir not

ollly continued this tradition but made it more tierce. Razï, seems to be the most quoted

adversary of Nâ~ir in the latter's extant works. And ironically Nâ§ir's quotations are one

of the major surviving sources of Razi' s metaphysical ideas ll•

The controversy between Ràzi and Ismacni dà9:s started with Abù J:Iatim al-Ràzi (d. 933

A.D.), a compatriot and contemporary of the former. Abü I;Hitim al-Razï composed a

whole book entitled the NJam al-Nubuwwah, to refute Mu~ammad Ibn Zakariyya-yi

Razï's phiIosophical doctrines, particularly his views on prophethood and the five

eternals. They also indulged in public debate to refute each other's viewsl2• F,Iamid al­

Din al-Kirmanï (d. after 1021 A.D), one of the most prominent Isma9:li thinkers, aIso

wrote a book exclusively devoted to the refutation of Razï's treatise on ethics, al-Tibb

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al-Rü~anï (The Spiritual Physick) and in defence of Abü l:Hitim's arguments against

Razi'l •

Na~ir has not authored a separate work to counter Razï's philosophy in general, but

quoted him extensi~ely in his works to refute him. Nà~ir has confined his criticism of

Razi to works which are more philosophical in nature such as Zâd and Jamie. It appcars

from these quotations that Nà~ir has covered the central themes of Razï's philosophy.

The question as to why IsmaCjlï thinkers were so concerned about RazÏ's controversial

philosophy and subjected it to such scathing criticism has been a topie of sorne

discussion among writers in the field. According to Henry Corbin, the underlying reason

for this intellectual clash was Razï's attack on prophethood, because the mission of the

prophethood, in the esoteric interpretation of Islam, is indispensable for the spiritual

birth of the devoteel4•

Majid Fakhry notes in his book A History of Islamic Philosophy that the cause of the

clash was that Razï rendered revelation superfluousJ5• It should be borne in mind that

RazÎ not only rendered prophethood superfluous, but he also attacked the prophets as

being incarnated evil souls who set people against each other and caused wars in the

world.

The general structure of the Ismà91ï critique of Ràzï does indicate that the fundamental

reason for the conflict was Raii's fierce attack on prophethood. However, there is

another significant aspect of this reason which caused added con cern to IsmaT.ï thinkers,

which is that the falsification of prophethood necessitates the falsification of the doctrine

of Imamat, which in tum falsifies the dacwah organisation in its entirety'6. Na~ir's tone

of criticism is more severe perhaps because Na§ir's long intellectual search led him to

conc1ude that human reason necessarily needs a Divinely chosen guide to explain the

purpose of the universe whereas, according to Razï's conclusion, the same guide is not

only unnecessary, but also the source of evil.

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Another line of conflict, which is more philosophical than theological in nature, emerges

from two markedly different trends of thought which were set forth by Plato and

Aristotle and later entered into Islamic philosophical thought.

This state of affairs indicates that the IsmacnI dà,s were battling on both the theological

and philosophical fronts, to defend their specifie stand point which stood for a particular

type of harmony between philosophy and religion. On the point of difference, the

IsmàL]Ï thinkers upheld the supremacy of the revea1ed religion. Razï explicitly took the

line of pure philosophy, discarding revealed religions altogether. Most of the other

Muslim philosophers such as Farabi and Ibn-i Rushd made a relatively weak attempt to

harmonise religion and philosophy and seemingly aceepted both religion and philosophy

on equal terms. Thus the relationship between Isma'1lï dàCjs and RaiI emerges as a

unique one. More discussion on the Râzï-Na~ir controversy is covered in the fifth

chapter .

After this brief discussion on the contl'oversial relationship between the IsmaCUI dà,s,

incJuding Na~ir, and Razï, it seems appropriate to outline the general scheme of the

present study. This inc1udes a brief introduction to every chapter to establish the organic

and logical Hnk which binds the entire study together.

Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter deals with the biographical

problems of Na~ir-i Khusraw. No genuine study on Na~ir ean afford to gloss over the

problems found in his biography. An analysis of these problems may facilitate an insight

into his personality and the time in which he lived and these two aspects are relevant to

this study. The brief survey of these problems al~o provides an opportunity to examine

the views of sorne major authors who have contributed substantially to the studies on

Na~ir, in the recent past17•

Na~ir's biography is plagued with serious problems due to the non-availability of any

genuine and complete biography or autobiography. In this biographical discussion, only

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selected problems are analyzed. In other words, only the most significant issues have

been chosen for investigation. The first problem one encounters is the debate concerning

Na~ir's family and educational background. To investigate this problem, differing views

concerning this issue have been recounted and analyzed.

The second major question under investigation is Nà~ir's religion before he decided to

embrace Ismà91ism. Writers on Nà~ir differ as to what religion he professed before his

conversion to Ismà91ism. Differing conclusions have been drawn by various authors in

an attempt to solve this problem. By analysing these conclusions, an attempt has been

made to establish whether this problem is solvable on the basis of the information

available at present.

Another controversial phenomenon in Nà~ir's biography is his famous vision or dream

(rüyà). Biographers of Nà~ir have debated the nature of the dream, whether it was literai

or symbo1ic. The question whether he accepted Jsma"llism bcforc expcricncing the

dream or after, is closely connected to the kind of interpretation one offers of his dream .

In other words, if the dream is considered to have been symbolic th en il is more likely

that he may have accepted Isrnà91ism weil before the commencement of his long

joumey, because the dream could have symbolised the change of religion. This critical

issue is investigated in the light of the various views expressed by different authors.

Nà~ir's stay in Egypt presents another enigma worthy of s:.)rious consideration. Na~ir's

exact relationship with al-Mu'ayyad (1078 A.D) and the Imam of the time, poses

another problern. An attempt has been made to analyze these issues, particularly with

reft:rence to his Qasidah-yi ictiràfiyyah which contains certain helpful allusions.

Nà~ir's retum to his homeland, Khuràsân, as a Fatimid missionary, marks another

significant period in his adventurous life, which unfortunately, is another area of

ambiguity. Na~ir's eventual refuge in Yumgan, which was productive from a Iiterary

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point of view, is examined in sorne detail. Lastly, the date of Na~ir's death, is briefly

discussed.

The chapter on Na~ir's biography provides an historical background. The following

chapter, i.e. the third, actually initiates the main theme of the present study, which is

the author's concept of pleasure. The third chapter consists of the translation of the

Chapter on Pleasure from Na~ir's work the Zad 18. This is preceded by a brief

commentary on the significance of the book and a cursory look at the quality of its

edition. This is the only chapter which Na~ir has exclusively devoted to the exposition

of the concept of pleasure. This chapter is aIso important in relation to its position

among other subjects in the book, because the book rcpresents the author's world-view

in which the position of each subject has been carefully chosen. However the translation

in the third chapter in this work serves as the base upon which the subsequent structure

of the main discourse is built.

The translation was difficult, because the entire text of the work has been badly edited .

Doubtful terms and their possible alternatives have been notified in the end notes in order

to make sense of the text where necessary.

The fourth chapter has been devoted to piece together all the relevant elements of the

subject of pleasure from the entire available corpus of Nà§ir and discusses a fully

developed concept as understood by Na§ir. This chapter also attempts to determine the

scope of this concept by Iocating it in Nà~ir's thought system and draws the implied

relationship with other key concepts which constitute the essential elements of his

system. The specifie themes which this chapter seeks to investigate are:

1. An anaIysis of the nature and function of pleasure in the metaphysics of Na~ir,

particularly its relationship with the Universal Intellect and the Universal Soul, which

also involves a certain amount of discussion on the comparison between pleasure and

happiness .

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2. A thorough investigation of the scope and nature of pleasure on the human level

which is c~ntred around sensory pleasure (la~~at-i ~issï) and intellectuai pleasure (1a~~at­

i caglO, the two major kinds of pleasure, according to Na~ir.

3. Intellectual pleasure, according to Na~ir, is the most significant pleasure for human

beings, so a detailed survey of its nature and scope has been carried out. The account

of Na~ir' s intellectual pleasure involves a significant amount of his epistemology,

particularly the sources and the structure of knowledge. This discussion raises a whole

set of questions such as: What is the significance and the role of the senses in the

formation of knowledge? What is the nature and function of the demonstrative reason

in the acquisition of the true knowledge? Is unaided human reason capable of attaining

the true knowledge which is the source of the intellectual pleasure?, etc.

4. There is an in separable link between Na~ir's concept of intellectual pleasure and

eschatology because without the principles of pleasure and pain, any eschatology can

hardly be conceived. This situation calls for an examination of the nature of Paradise

and Hell and their relationship with the concept of pleasure. This issue acquires added

significance because it is a major meeting point of philosophy and religion.

5. The concept of pleasure, according to Na~ir, is not confined to human and

transhuman levels only, rather it is operative on ail conceivable ontological levels,

therefore, pleasure is effectively functional on all sub-human Le. animal, plant and non­

living levels as weIl. Following the existential order, as understood by Na~ir, tirst

pleasure on the animallevel is investigated, thereby determining its role in the animal

kingdom. Thereafter, the function of pleasure on the plant level is examined and

compared with the pleasure found in the animal kingdom. The lowest plane of existence,

according to Na~ir, is the inorganic level, that is the level of the four elements qaba'jC-i

chahar-ganah). Na~ir maintains that the concept of pleasure is functional on this level

as well. The pleasure in this kingdom is inbuilt in the form of Divine guidance. Na~ir's

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account of pleasure related to this kingdom is also anaIyzed and compared with other

levels.

Tracing and examining the principle of pleasure on the entire existentiaI scale, facilitates

the comprehension of the nature, scope and role of this concept in the thought system

of Nâ~ir-i Khusraw. Thus, at the end of this chapter, the emergent concept has been

briefly recounted as a conclusion.

Keeping the foregoing background in mind, a cursory comparison between Nà~ir and

Razi's metaphysical ideas lias been carried out in the fifth chapter. This comparison

seeks to reveal whether the differences in the interpretation of pleasure have any

relevance to their respective metaphysical systems. This comparative analysis identifies

the major areas where the authors clash violently and tries to establish the causes of the

clash. The issue whether the differences in other aspects of their thought have any

bearing on their respective concepts of pleasure is aIso examined in considerable detail.

Then a close comparative study of Na~ir and Râzï's concepts of pleasure in the context

of their metaphysical views, is carried out.

The comparison between Na~ir and Razi's concepts of pleasure is followed by locating

their differing positions in an historical context. This investigation inevitably leads to

a brief comparison between Platonic and Aristotelian positions on pleasure, which helps

clarify the historical roots of both the thinkers under study. LasUy, the question of how

the Greek philosophical positions on pleasure entered into Islamic thought and prepared

the ground for Na~ir and Razi's conflict, is analyzed by presenting a brief survey of

some important positions developed in the history that preceded Na~ir. FinaIly, the

epitome of the study is presented in the conclusion .

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1.

Endnotes ta Chapter l

The concept of pleasure seems to be corn mon to religion, philosophy and ethics.

Since ethics itself is a discipline common to religion and philosophy, therefore

pleasure is a subject corn mon to both religion and philosophy.

2. Although the concept of pleasure is the focus of this study, its opposite state,

pain is also discussed adequately wherever the need for comparison arises.

3. His full name was Abü Bakr Mu~ammad Ibn-i Zakariyya-yi Razi (Latin: Rhazes)

d. 320 A.H./932 A.D. (M. Mu~aqqiq, Faylasüf-i Rayy MlI~aml11ild Ibn

Zakariyyâ-yi Razï, Tehran, 1974 p.5 (English section». He was one of the

greatest physicians in Muslim history. The discussion on Razï, in the present

study, is Razï as a philosopher rather than as a physician. Sorne of his

philosophical views, relevant to our study, are briefly presented and analyzed in

the fourth chapter. Hereafter, this book will be referred to as Faylasüf.

4. John S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, London: University Tutorial Press, 1954.

p.123.

5. Ibid., p.123.

6. For more detailed information on Muslim thinkers' views on Plata and

Aristotle's interpretation of pleasure, refer to the ninth chapter of Mu~aqqiq's

book, Faylasuf. Also refer LO the fifth chapter of Opera Philosophica

republished by Revival of Arabie Culture Committee, Beirut, 1982. This book

was earlier edited by the late Paul Craus. Hereafter. this work will be referred

to as Opera .

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7 . Nâ~ir has authored an entire work to demonstrate the Isma'1lï version of the

relationship between philosophy and religion. This work is called Jamie al­

J:1ikmatayn (The Combiner of Two Wisdoms). However, it should be borne in

mind that whenever there is a conflict between the two, the author opts for

religion. Hereafter, this work will be referred to as Jamic•

8. Na~ir-i Khusraw, Zad al-Musàfirïn Ed. M. B~l al-Ra~man. (Berlin:Kaviani

a.M.B.H.) 1923. p.229. Hereafter, this work will be referred to as Zag.

9. Ibid., p.246.

lO. Ibid., p.230.

Il. These quotations are carefully pieced together by Paul Kraus in his compiled

work Opera .

12. The debate between the two Razïs forms a separate chapter in Abü Hatim al-. RazI's book the AClâm aJ-Nubuwwah. Paul Kraus has reproduced this chapter as

the final section of his book~.

13. ljamid al-Din KirmanI composed his work al-Aqwal al-~ahabiyyah to refute

RazI's views on ethics expressed in the latter's work al-Tibb al-Rü~anï.

Hereafter, this work will be referred to as AgwaI.

14.

15.

Henry Corbin, "Na~ir-i Khusraw and Iranian IsmaC'fiism". The Cambridge

History ofIran, Edited by R.N. Frye, Cambridge; (Cambridge University Press,

1975) Vol.4. p.540.

Majid Fakhry, A HistOl:y of Islamic Philosophy, (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1970) pp. 105-6 .

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16 . In Qnm, Paul Kraus has made an important attempt to piece together variolls

Ismacnr critiques on Razï.

17. Numerous studies have been carried out on Na~ir, but it seems that O1ost of them

concentt"ate either on his Safar-Namah or his poetry. Only a Iimited few have made

a serious attempt to analyze his thought in any comprehensive O1anner.

18. The theme of pleasure forms the eighteenth chapter of the zad, however, the book

com:ists of 27 chapters and the concept of pleasure has been freqllently dealt with

under various other themes as weil .

18

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Chapter 2

Biography

This chapter concentrates on the key issues related to Na~ir's biography. It is by no

means a detailed reconstruction of Nà~ir's life story, because this is not the emphasis

of the present study, but it does aim to crysta1lise and analyze certain relevant issues.

This discussion includes an analysis of the comments made by previous writers such as

W. Ivanow, H. Corbin, M. Tarzl, A. E. Bertels, M. Mu~aqqiq, J. Rypka and 1. K.

Poonawala', on certain problems of Na~ir's biography. On the one hand, the

biographical analysis can reveal sorne of the important historical circumstances in which

he Iived, on the other hand, it can inform us, at least summarily, about his social and

intellectual life.

There is no complete biographical or autobiographical account of Na~ir-i Khusraw. The

only genuine sources available to consider his biographical issues are his Safar-Namah,

(travel account) of his seven year journey and the biographical allusions made in his

works, particularly the Diwan. Due to the ahsence of a proper record of Nà~ir's life,

a number of spurious biographies have been written at various points of time, after his

death. These biographical accounts have depicted him either as a supernatural figure or

as a purely devilish character. These accounts, however, seem to be the imaginary

projections of his admirers and enemies. For our present purpose, we shall confine

ourselves only to those sources generally considered to be genuine.

Na~ir's full name, which he himself gives in the Safar-Namah, was Abü Mu;n l;iamïd

al-Din Na~ir bin Khusraw al-Qubadiyani al-MarvazP. He was born in 394 A.H.llO04

A.D. in the town of Qubadiyàn near Balkh3• He appears to have emigrated from

Qubàdiyan to Balkh in his ear)y youth and later to Marv as a civil servant in the

government.

19

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•

No detailed or clear account of Na~ir's family background is available. From the

autobiographical allusions in the Diwan" it appears reasonably clear that he belonged

to a well-off family, who owned land and held high positions at court. Thus most

biographers, including Ivanow, agree that Na~ir came from a sound tinancial and social

background. However, apart from his own statements, no detailed and reliable history

of his family is available.

On Na~ir's educational background, again no details are available, except Na~ir's own

allusions. This has caused considerable controversy among writers on Na~ir-i Khusraw.

Ivanow maintains that Na~ir had "limited schooling". To justify this claim, he says that

"his works offer ample evidence of his not being highly trained in theological matters"l.

Rypka concurs with Ivanow and observes that, "his education does not appear to have

been thorough"6. Rypka generally appears to agree with Ivanow on most of the latter's

conclusions on Na~ir. However, Browne, Bertels, Corbin, Tarzi, Taqi Zfidah and

Mu~aqqiq, draw a different conclusion, according to which they consider that Na~ir had

a sound education al background. Bertels wonders why Ivanow looks at Na~ir's "virtues

and achievements" suspiciously7. Corbin says that Na~ir's "complete mastery of his own

ideas and of the Persian language in which he expressed them" offer sufficient testimony

to conclude that he had a sound grounding in educationB•

Referring to the literary merit of Na~ir, E. G. Browne rernarks that Na~ir is "one of the

rnost attractive and remarkable personalities in the Persian literary history "9. After

twenty years of studies on Na~ir, Na~r Allah Taqawï describes him as a "Divine sage

O#iklm-i rabbani) Il and regards the Diwan as possessing lia substance of heavenly

revelation (mayah i az wa~y-yi asmanï darad) Il 10. Although virtually no details are

available concerning his educational background, Na~ir's ability to develop ideas

structurally, and his references to past individual philosophers and schools of thought,

Greek and Islamic alike, testify that he was well educated and weIl grounded in the

various contemporary disciplines. It seems that Na~ir did not consider it necessary tl)

record details of his early education" .

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Concerning Na~ir's life hefore the famous "vision", probably the first fourty years of

his life, the details are extremely scant and skelchy, and especially the vexing question

as to which religion he professed before his conversion to Ismà'11ism, still remains

unsolved. Ivanow maintains that "he must have been a Shi'''Cite''12 because he "invariably

passes over in silence" when he cornes to the I~nacasharr doctrine, whereas "his

references to Sunnism are invariably hostile" 1) . Conversion into IsmaCUism from Twelver

Shr:ism wa~ simply that of changing a dynasty. Ivanow also attempts to substantiate his

conclusion historically by referring to the fact that many I~nacasharï Shï"ites tumed to

IsmacrIism and attained high positions in the latterl4 . Rypka follows the same line as

Ivanow regarding this question.

Bertels, however, main tains a different view, and says that Na$ir belonged to the Sunni

faith, but developed serious doubts conceming his faith u • Tarzï maintains aImost the

same position as Bertels 1nd states that Na$ir was a "liberaI minded" Sunnil6. Corbin

keeps this question open in his introduction to Jamicl7 .

Ivanow's views are not convincing. Nâ$ir's non-critical attitude towards the Twelvers

does not necessarily indicate that he was a twelver before his conversion to Isma91ism.

In fact, Nâ~ir should have adopted a critical attitude towards a religion which he

considered necessary to abandon for another. And also, one cannot ascertain his exact

position, conceming the twelvers with any degree of certainty, because a considerable

number of Nâ$ir's works are not extant. He may have put forth his views about the

doctrines of the twelvers in one of his lost works. However, one of the reasons for

Na$ir's tolerance of twelvers, if he has the same attitude in his non-extant works, may

be that, they were not involved in his persecution.

The fact that Na§ir was critical of Sunnï Islam lends a degree of credibility to the view

that he might have been a Sunni Muslim prioI to becoming an Isma91i Muslim, but it

is by no means cOi;~lusive. However, it can be said with certainty that initiaIly he was

not an Isma'11i .

21

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Na~ir's conversion poses another set of difticult problems, such as, was Na~ir convcrted

before setting out on his famous journey or was he converted later in Egypt? Was his

vision, which seems to be inextricably related to his conversion, real or merely

symbolic, etc? Na~ir's extant works do not help much in solving these problcms. The

traditionally held view that Na~ir was converted in Egypt is now being questioned by

the modern writers such as Corbin and Bertels. Most of them maintain the position that

Na~ir was converted weIl before he set out on his long journey.

Ivanow holds the view that Na~ir was tirst converted and later summoncd to Cairo for

higher training. He substantiates his view by referring to the suddenness of his dcparture

and the unusual route he took for I;Iajjl8. Corbin also maintains that he must have becn

converted to IsmaCflism before the journey. Bertels holds the same view as Ivanow

concerning this question 19 •

The suddenness of Na~ir's departure and the lInusual route to Hajj do not necessarily

provide sufficient ground to assume Na~ir's conversion before the jOllrney. Keeping

Na~ir's confessional ode, qa~ïdah-yi iCtirafiyyah20, and his vision in view, it is safer

perhaps to state that he must have studied Fatimid doctrines extensively and met an

Isma<-UT da~ locally and discussed Isma~ism in general terms. In the ga~ïdah, which can

be considered his brief intellectual autobiography and in certain other ve:-ses in the

Diwan, Na~ir states that he studied the different schools of Islam and discussed them

verbally with their respective authorities. Thus he must have studied and discussed

Isma<-Üism before he set out on his journey. He may th en have found the Isma'11ï

approach, in principle, acceptable to his understanding. This initial agreement may have

prompted him to undertake the journey for an advanced understanding. The suggestion

for the journey could have come from a local da'ï. Na~ir's meeting with al-Mu'ayyad

fi al-DTn al-ShTrazT in Cairo and complete "healing of his chronic ail ment" may be

interpreted as Na~ir's evolution and preparation for the highest rank of ~ from the

level of mustajïb (initiate) .

22

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•

•

•

Another example of conversion on a similar pattern is that of l:Iasan-i Sabbary, who was

first converted to IsmàCjJism by a local dà~ and subsequently sent to Egypt for further

training.

The problem of Nà~ir's conversion is closely related to his famous dream because it

played a crucial role in the process of his conversion, Na~ir has mentioned the dream

only in the Safar-Nàmah and not in the ga~ïdah-yj iCtirafiyyah which provides, however,

an indication of the period21 in which the dream took place and as a consequence of

which he started the journey22, The text about the dream reads: "On a certain night 1 saw

in a dream that someone said to me, how long are you going to go on drinking the

potion that ruins human reason? Il would be better for you to become sober, 1 answered:

The sages have not invented any better means for the purpose of reducing the sorrows

of the world. He (the man in the dream) said: Senselessness and unconsciousness do not

bring peace of mind. One cannot be called a wise man who leads people to

unconsciousness. 1t is necessary to search for something that increases reason and

wisdom. 1 asked, where can 1 find that? He replied: Those who search will find, He

waved his hand in the direction of the Oiblah (which was also the direction of Cairo)

and said nothing more'lll.

Il is extremely difficult to determine the exact nature of this dream. Corbin and Bertels

are in agreement, in a broad sense, on its interpretation. Tarzï aIso quotes Corbin and

tacitly agrees with his interpretation.

The summary of Corbin's interpretation of the dream is that, "drunkenness and sleep"

symbolise "ignorance and unconsciousness". The messenger who came in the dream was

an Ismà'ïlï dà~ who came to awaken him24, Ivanow on the other hand, thinks that the

dream was forged by Na~ir and the person in the dream is either the Prophet or the

Imam. The reason behind the forging of this dream, according to Ivanow, is to "show

exceptionaI piety"2S .

23

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Although the issue of the dream, by virtue of its very nature, lends possibility to various

interpretations, however, Corbin seems to advance a more acceptable interpretation

within the broad context of the then existing circumstances. And thus the dream might

mark the initial awakening of his consciousness, which is expressed in the Diwan as the

beginning of an active search for wisdom by Na~ir's rational SOUF6. And this search

might have been instigated by a dacwah dignitary because the personage in the dremn

does not reveal the truth rather he shows the direction towards truth. Thus, il appe.'lrs,

that the process of Nâ~ir's conversion did start before he arrived in Cairo but in Cairo

it came to a spiritual fruition.

After the dream, the next phase of his life starts with his famous journey, which began

in 437/1045 and came to an end in 444/1 052. This period is relatively c1ear as he

recorded it in his famous Safar-Narnah. In this period, Na~ir's stay in Egypt poses a

difficult problem because his activities in Cairo have not becn stated in detail in his

extant works. Although Na~ir's Safar-N3mah provides valuable information about

Cairo's economic prosperity and physical structure, it does not, however, c)early reveal

Nà~ir's own activities, his relationship with the rutwah dignitaries and the Imam of the

time. Il seems that highly significant information has either been deleted from the

original Safar-Narnah by hostile hands or Na~ir has deliberately avoided mentioning il,

considering it to be a secret. In either case, the vacuum has left room for speculation.

From the qasidah-yi iCtirafiyyah, a vague picture of Nà~ir's activities in Cairo emerges.

This picture shows lhat Na~ir eventually arrived in the city (shahr)27. This city, however,

is not the city of Cairo rather it symbolises the Imam. Nà~ir met the ward en (ri*wàn)21

of the city. Warden probably represents the then dât'j ai-duCat (chief da]), al-Mu'ayyad.

The next image is that Na§ir presents himself as a patient to the warden. The illness is

spiritual whereby the soul has become extremely feeble. The warden daims to be the

doctor who can cure his illness. The doctor tells the patient to describe the ilIness full Y .

This means al-Mu'ayyad tells Na~ir to ask aIl the questions which have bothered his

24

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rational soul. Na~ir asks the major questions, the dominant theme of which seems to be

the reconciliation between reason and revelation. AI-Mu'ayyad commences the cure,

giving the medicine of reason and demonstration (~ujjat wa burhan). The doctor presents

witnesses of afiiq (horizons or physical world) and anfus (souls or spiritual world)

(41:53). The treatment was not givcn in one day, it continued for several days, or

months or perhaps even years, because Na~ir says the dose was given everyday stage

by stage 29. After the treatment and the oath of secrecy, Na~ir mentions the giving of

allegiance (batat) on the hand of the Prophet. This hand is perhaps the hand of the

Imam. Then he praises al-Mu'ayyad profusely. AI-Mu'ayyad is the teacher (ustad) ,

doctor (!abTh) and the one who Teceived ta'yid (spiritual help) from the Imam

(khudawand).

From the qa~idah it appears roughly that Na~ir was educated and trained in esoteric

sciences mainly by al-Mu'ayyad, then taken to the Imam for bayCat (oath of allegiance).

Professor Bertels is not certain that Na~ir had the opportunity to meet the Imam30 •

Na~ir returned to his home town in 444 A.H.lI052 A.D. after seven years, probably,

as an Isma91i missionary with the Tank of ~uiiaf' in the dacwah hierarchy. From here

Na~ir starts another phase in his life which again is shrouded in mystery. From his

works, particularly the Diwan, the general idea that he travelled to Khurasan,

Mazandaran, Nishapür and Sistan to advance the cause of the dacwah can be gleaned.

Everywhere he met with stiff resistance. He was perhaps forced to flee to a relatively

safer, but probably more strategically important place, Yumgan.

Na~ir's life in Yumgan constitutes the last but one of the most important phases of his

life, because most of his literary works were either completed or written entirely in

Yumgan. The Diwan bears testimony to the fact that Yumgan was not Na~ir's first

choice for a place to settle in, and circumstances forced him to live there. Several

questions remain unanswered concerning this period, for example, exactly when did

Na~ir arrive in Yumgan anc!l how many years did he spend there? Was he in contact with

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Cairo? Did he try to con vert the local population, in other words, did he actively engage

in the dacwah activities or did he confine himself only to composillg his wor~:s'] Lastly,

when exactly did he pass away?

It is extremely difficult to ascertain exactly when Na~ir arrived in Yumgan. He returned

to Khurasan from his prolonged journey in 444/1052, and the next reliable date that

appears in the ZaQ, is 453/1061, the date when he completed the liLQ in Yumganl2• It

seems that Na~ir came to Yumgan sometime between 1052 A.D. and 1061 A.D.,

probably in the later half of this period. Nothing more can be said with certainty at this

stage. on Na~ir's arrivaI in Yumgan.

The question as to why Na~ir chose to take refuge in Yumgan is open. General opinion

seems to be that Na~ir was forced to flee to an area out of the reach of the Saljuqids,

cAbbasids and his fanatic religious opponents. This is cer~inly one rea~:on for he

required a peaceful atmosphere to carry out his literary work. However, a second re.1son

which seems to be more important, is that he went to this "land" (Yumgan) on the order

of the Imam33• Thus Ivanow's position on this issue seems to be valid that Nà~ir went

and stayed in Yumgân on orders from Egypt'4.

The biographical problems relating to Na~ir's Yumgan period leave room only for good

conjecture. The first question that arises concerns Na~ir's relationship with the people

of Yumgàn and whether there was an IsmaCflï population in the area before his arrivaI.

No answer can be advanced with certainty, but keeping circumstantial evidence in mind,

it can be opined that there may have been Isma91is in that area as a result of the

activities of other da9's before Na~ir. Na~ir may have acquired information about them

in Cairo. The fact that C Alï bin Asad", the Amïr of Badakhshan had cordial relations

with Na~ir, suggests that the former may have been a follower of the Fa!imid Imams

prior to Na~ir's arrivaI. Also the fact that the Amïr had the versified questionnaire of

another IsmaCjlï, Abü al-Hay§am A~mad Ibn al-1;Iasan JurjanP6, also indicates that there

was a certain level of dacwah activity aIready taking place in that particular region .

26

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Otherwise there was little Iikelihood of Na~ir being protected despite his continued

criticism of his fanatical adversaries, particularly in the work written at the request of

the Amïf'.

.'

Nà~ir's stay in Yumgan was certainly productive from a literary point ofview, because

he completed his major works such as the zag, the Jamie and the Diwan here. This

indicates that Nà~ir had the time, the facilities and security in Yumgan, aIthough the

geographicallocation and climatic and physical conditions were harsh and inhospitable".

He was lone1y and away from his home, relatives and friends.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Na~ir may have b~n deeply involved in daCwah

activityand that he propagated IsmàCflism in Yumgan and its surrounding areas, which

wcre less known to the rest of the world and certainly less threatening to the C Abbasids

and the Saljüqids. This conclusion can be substantiated by the fact that there are

hundred~. of thousands of Ismà'ï1is in the mountainous regions of Central Asia, who

relate their origin as Isma"ï1ïs to Na~ir and revere him as the founder of the Isma'1li

11acwah in this area.

An in-depth study of the history, religious ceremonies and literature of these IsmàCflï

communities of Central Asia may shed new light on Na~ir':) dacwah activities in these

mountainous and inaccessible regions. Professor Bertels and Ivanow have attempted to

form sorne idea of dtwah developments subsequent to Nà~ir. But their efforts have been

Iimited and fraught with difficulties, because they only concentrated on Badakhshan,

leaving out the other areas such as, Chitral, Gilgit and Hunza.

Ivanow in his work Problems describes the present IsmàCUïs of Badakhshàn as migrated

lranian IsmàCUïs, the original stock of Nà§ir's era having long since disappeared39• Thus

he does not trust the claim of the existing Ismà'ï1ïs of Badakhshan that their ancestors

were converted by Nà~ir Khusraw. Bertels, on the other hand, maintains that according

to the research done in Russian on that area, the existing stock has been living there for

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approximately two thousand years40• In other words the existing population is original

not rnigrated.

However, aIl the Isrnà91ï communities of Central Asia, now divided into Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Russia and China, unanimously consider Na~ir-i Khusraw as the founder of

the Isrnà91ï dacwah in Central Asia. One particular document relating to a specific

religious cerernony is corn mon to all th,e Central Asian IsmaCjlïs. This document is callcd

"Chiragh-Namah" or "QindTI-Namah (Book of the Lamp)"~I. Both these tenns have

roughly the same rneaning. This document which consists of Persian poetry and selected

Qur'anic verses, is recited on two occasions: one at the end of a night vigil (whole night

prayer) and the other, to mark the third day after the death of an individual. The former

is called daCwat-i baga and the latter daCwat-i fana. This ceremony is supposed to have

been started by Na~ir-i Khusraw. A proper study of this document and the related

ceremony could rnake an interesting therne for a separatc research. Such rcscarch could

shed a considerable amount of light on the influence of Na~ir's daCwah activities in

Yumgan and its surrounding areas~2.

As to the question of exactly when did Na~ir pass away in Yumgan, no definite answer

can be given. However, most biographers, such as Bertels41, A1tâf l:Iusayn l:Ialr.,

Mujtaba Mïnavï~s and ~ara~6 consider l;lajï Khalïtà's date Le. 481 A.H. most reliable.

Poonawala thinks that this date, although most quoted one, cannot be ascertained

because Il sorne authorities put it between 465/1 072 ,and 498/11 04 1147. In the pïwiin41,

Na~j: mentions his seventieth birthday, which means that he was certainly alive in

464 A.H .

28

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1.

Endnotes to Chapter 2

For the secondary sources on Na~ir's biography refer to:

Ismail K. Poonawala, Bibliography of Isma9'1ï Literature, (Malibu: Undena

Publications, 1977), pp. 112-114.

2. Na~ir-i Khusraw, Safar-Namah, Ed. and annotated by Nadir WazIn Pür (Tehran:

Chap Khanah-yi Sipehr, 2536 Shahinshahi), p.l. Hereafter, this title will be

referred to as Safar-Namah.

3. A.E. Bertels, Nasir-i Khusraw wa Isma9'1iyan, Tr. by Y. Âryan Pür (Tehran:

4.

Intisharat-i Bunyad-i Farhang-i Iran, 1346 A.H. shamsI), p.168. Hereafter, this

work is referred to as Isma'TIiyan.

Na~ir-i Khusraw, DIwan, Ed. by Sayyid N~r Allah TaqawI (Tehran: Chap

Khanah-yi Sipahr, 1339), pp. 253-54 .

5. W. Ivanow, Problems in Na~ir-i Khusraw's Biography (Bombay: Isma'TII Society

Bombay, 1956), p.11. Hereafter, this work will be referred to as Problems.

6. J. Rypka, History of Iranian Literature, Ed. by Karl Jahn (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,

1968), p.185.

7.

8.

From Rypka's account of Nà~ir in the above mentioned book, it appears that the

author, in order to understand Na~ir, has relied entirely on secondary sources,

particularly those of Ivanow.

Bertels, Isma9'1iyan, p.166.

The Cambridge History of Iran, Ed. by R.N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1967) Vol.4, Chap.16, p.532. "Na~ir-i Khusraw and Iranian

29

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9.

10

Il.

IsmâCUism", by H. Corbin. Hereafter, this chapter will be referred to as

Cambrid~e History.

E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, Vo1.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1956), p. 211.

Na~ir, Diwan, p. 543.

Ivanow observes that it has becn a tradition among Isma'TIï thinkers to ignore the

recording of autobiographical details in their works.

12. hanow, Problems, p.l?

13. Ibid., p.17 .

14. Ibid., p.18.

15. Rertels, Ismâ91iyan, p.176.

16. A. Tarzi, Nâ~ir-i Khusraw-i Balkhï, (Kabul: Bayhaqi Book Publishing lnstitute,

1976), p.36. Hereafter, this title is referred to as Balkhï.

The author engages in a detailed discussion concerning Na~ir's religion prior to

conversion. The major thrust of the discussion is to prove that Na~iT was a rebel

against the excessive formalism of the SunnI culama of his time.

17. Na~ir, Jamie, p.28.

18. Ivanow, Problems, p.20, Bertels, Ismacniyan , p.176.

19 . Bertels, Ismâcniyan, p.176.

30

• 20 .

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26 .

• 27.

28.

29 .

•

This is the longest poem in Na~ir's Diwan (pp.172~ 177) which is perhaps the

richest poem in terms of autobiographical allusions. It also represents the gist of

his spiritual quest.

Nâ~ir, Diwân, p.173.

Ibid., p.l74.

Nâ~jr, Safar-Nâmah, p.2.

Cambridge History, p.534.

Ivanow, Problems, pp. 19-20.

Na~ir, Diwan, p.173.

Ibid., p.l7S.

Ivanow in his book Problems (p.39) observes that shahr symbolises "the ideal

CAlid State". According to Corbin, the marvellous city refers not to the material

city of Cairo but to the dacwah as a "virtual Paradise" (Introduction to Jamic,

p.32). According to Na~ir himself, shahr symbolises the Asas and not the "ideal

cAlid State" or the "dacwah" because, in bis book Wajh-i Din (pp.99-100), Na~ir

main tains that the ta'wTI of the Qur'ànic expression "al-ba1ad al-amin (the city

of peace 95:3)" actually symbolises ~ for "due to bim the wise attains

protection from the doubt of the exoteric (dimension of religion". (Wajh, p.99).

Na§ir, Diwan, p.175.

Ibid., p.176.

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30. Bertels, Ismacniyan, p.179 .

Referring to his experience of meeting with the Imam, Na~ir states in the DiwÜn

(p.273), "When the light of the Imam of the time shone on my soul, 1 became

(like the lu minous) sun of the forenoon, (whereas prior to that) 1 was (like) the

longest and darkest night tl•

31. Ivanow maintains that Na~ir was not, in reality, a ~ujjat, and that he himself

adopted this title (Problems P.49). Rypka also shares this vicw with Ivanow.

There seems to be no reason to doubt that Na~ir did hold this rank because in the

Diwan he calls himseif the ~ujjat of Khurasan ( pp.9, 10, 17, 51) in clear tenns.

However, when exactly he was given this rank, is an open question.

Nonetheless, it does appear that he did acquire this rank at an early stage of his

life as a missionary - either before leaving Cairo or soon afler hc arrived in

Khurasan because he uses this title extensively in his Diwan. If the Diwan

records Na~ir's early poetry with this tiUe, th en this vicw gains more credence .

The term "ryujjat" literally, means "proof", but technically, il was the highest

rank in the IsmaCUi' dacwah hierarchy after the rank of the Imam. Under the

Imam there were twelve ~ujjats corresponding to twelve jaziras (regions,

lit. islands) of the dacwah. Therefore, the ~uüat is also called ~a~ib-i jazïrah (Ihe

custodian or the master of the region). Abu al-Macalï, a contemporary of Na~ir,

in his book Bayan al-Adyan mentions Na~ir as ~a~ib-i jazïrah (p.144). ln the

light of both internaI and external evidence, one can safely conc1ude that

Ivanow's position concerning this issue appears to have no basis.

Mu~ammad bin CAbd Allah, Abu al-MacàlI. Bayan al-Adyan, cd. C. Schefer,

(Amsterdam: Chrestomathie Parsane, 1885)

Also refer to chapter-4, EN-69

32

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•

•

32 . Bertels, IsmaCiliyan, p.184.

33. Na~ir, Jamie, pp. 16-17.

34. Ivanow, Problems, p.49.

35. Na~ir mentions CAli bin Asad, the Amir of Badakhshàn, in Jamie on pp. 15, 17,

18, 100,314,315,316.

36. Na~ir states that al-Hay§.am was "one of the adherents (mutaclliQàn) to and lovers

(mul.1ibban) of the progeny of the Prophet". Jamic, p.217.

Not much is known about the figure of al-Hay§am except a short description

given in the Tatimmah Siwân al-I;Iikmah of CAlI bin Zayd al-Bayhaqï. Bayhaqï

says, "I have not seen any literal'Y work (of him) on wisdom except his Persian

poem which is commented on by Mu~ammad (bin) Sar~ (1) Nisàbürï. Abü

Hay~am has a reputation among the generality of sages, (however), neither a

work nor a discourse of him, whereby a dimension of his position in knowledge

could be known, has not reached me ". P .132.

CAli bin Zayd al-Bayhaqi, Tatimmah Siwan aI-J:likmah, Ed. by M. Shatr

(Lahore: 1935). See also introduction to Jamic. PP.48-50.

37. Despite Amir's esteem for Nà~ir, it seems that Nà~ir kept a relatively low profile

in the small kingdom of cAli bin Asad. 1t appears that Na~ir was not permanently

attached to the Amir's court and that he probably preferred to live in the far

flung village of Yumgàn which was within the Amir's kingdom. Nà~ir's decision

to rernain in Yumgàn and mainrain a cordial relationship with the Amir, might

have been useful from the dtwah point of view .

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38. This fact is reflected in several verses in the Dïwan. He considers Yumgan as

a cave (p.286), a mountain (p.286) and a stony prison (p.36) etc. Despite the

rugged and harsh physical environment of Yumgan, Nâ~ir praises the inhabitants

of Yumgan and caUs them an army of angels (lashkar-i firïshtagan), Diwan,

p.128.

39. Ivanow, Problems, pp.45-47.

Ivanow conjectures that the local inhabitants of Yumgan belonged to the Darda

and Shina tribes. This seems to be a wild conjecture, because the term Darda

applies to several different tribes and races of Gilgit and Baltistan but Shina is

a particular tribe within the network of Darda tribes in Gilgit.

40. Bertels, "The views of some of the Mystics and I§nacasharï Shi"ïtes regarding the

value of Na~ir-i Khusraw's Literary Heritage". Firdawsï University. Yàd­

Namah-yi Nasir-i Khusraw, (Mashhad: Mu'assasa-yi Châp wa Intishararat-i

Danishgah-i Firdawsï, 1976), p.lO!.

41.

In the first part of this article, Bertels attempts to analyze Ivanow's assessment

of Na~ir.

Ivanow has published its Persian text and analyzed it in an article published in

Revue Iranienne d'Anthropologie 3 (1959). The tiUe of the article is, "Süfism

and IsmliCflism: Chiragh-Namah" . Bertels has analyzed it in Yâd-Namah pp. 103-

111. It seems that lvanow and Bertels' texts of the Chiragh-Niimah are

incomplete as there are severa! other manuscripts with more verses and detailed

descriptions of various procedures in Chitrâl, Gilgit and Hunza. One such

manuscript is with Faquir MutIammad Hunzai of the Institute of IsmâCflï Studies,

London.

42. There is a considerable wealth of oral traditions concerning Na~ir and the history

of the Isma;n dacwah in ChitraI, Ghizr and Hunza. In Chitral, there are several

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43.

44.

spots where Na~ir is supposed ta have stayed and meditated for prolonged

periods. This is an area with considerable scope for further research.

Bertels, Isma91iyan, p.188.

Farhang-i Iran Zarnïn. Qadirn-tarin MUQaddirnah-yi Farsï Bar Safar-Narnah-yi

Nasir-i Khusraw pp.112-13. Tehran, 1967,70. I;Iali has analyzed other dates

given by different historians and found Hajï Khalïfah' s date to be the most

reliable one.

45. Mujtaba Mïnavï, Nasir-i Khusraw. Majallah-yi Danish-kadah-yi Adabiyat wa

CUlüm-j Insani, VoU. Mashhad; p.203.

46. ~abï~ Allah ~ara, Ta'rïkh-i Adabiyat dar Ïran, Vol. 2. (Tehran: 1363), p.452 .

47. Poonawala, BibliQgraphy, p.111.

48. Ivanow, p,47 .

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Chapter 3

Introduction to the Zad al-Musafirïn and its Edition

IncJuding a Translation of Chapter 18 on IIPleasure'~.

Before embarking upon the translation of the eighteenth chapter of the Z.üd, which is on

the subject of pleasure, it seems appropriate to briefly introduce the book and its cdition.

The Zad is a classical IsmaCfU work which attempts to propound Na~ir's version of the

Isma'11ï philosophical world-view in the fifth century.

As far as the coptents of the book are concerned, they are the elaborate responscs to the

three fundamental questions: (1) Where has man come from? (2) Where will he go'! and

(3) How should he go? Man is travelling from pre-eternity to j,%t-eternity. The human

life on earth forms a crucial phase in this process of travelling. As every travellcr nceds

provision or sustenance on his way, similarly man needs the spiritual provisIOn (Zad)

on his journey towards his destination. Nà§ir cIaims that he has written this book to

provide that "provision" for the traveller. This provision in essence is the "awarcness

and knowledge" relating to the fundamental questions stated above'. Chapter eightccn,

in particular, deals with the therne of the present study i.e. the concept of pleasure,

which is related to the soul's progressive movement in this process of travelling.

Through proper provision, the soul ,.equires perfection through this travelling. In the

proce::;s of achieving perfection, the soul acquiTes pleasure.

According to Na~ir, the concept of pleasure is essentially a religious one: it is, in an

absolute sense, inscribeè. on the page of the Soul as part of the "Divine writ"2. The

theme of pleasure has béen placed in this particular position, in the overall scheme of

the book, because the preceding chapter deals with "The Divine writ and Word (QllYiD"I.

Given the then prevailing socio-political circumstances in Khurasan and Na~ir's

objectives in this region, it seems that this work is mainly aimed at the intcllectual

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circles of the society, who were weary of the narrow interpretation of Islam advaneed

by the jurists (fugaha'). The jurists considered philosophy unIslamic and phiIosophers,

hereties.

Edition: The translation is based on the edition prepared by B~l al-Rai) man. It was

published in Berlin in 1922 by Kaviani Press. The editor has relied on two manuscripts,

one belonging to the Kings College Cambridge University Library and the other found

in the Bibliotheque Nationale, in Paris, of which, however, he had only a transcript

made by Kâ~im Zadeh. Claiming that the Cambridge manuseript is less reliable, the

editor has reIied more heavily on the Paris manuseript. Ivanow has indicated that there

is one more manuscript in "Astarlah Le. Imam Ri~ Shrine Library" in Mashhad4•

The editor has undoubtedly rendered a valuable service by taking the step to publish it

but, the quality of the edition is not satisfactory. As was pointed out by Professor

Bertels, the edition clearly indicates, on severaJ occasions, that the editor has not been

able to understand the content and therefore the scribe's mistakes remained uncorrected' .

Such mistakes have been indicated in the end notes to the translation.

There seems to be no valid reason to doubt the authenticity of this work because Na~ir

has referred to it in his DIwan (p. 145) and in Jamie (p. 306) but, even a cursory textual

anaJysis reveals that the work has undergone serious tampering. In particular, it seems

that a calculated attempt has been made to eliminate sorne of the content which explicitly

reveals Na~ir's adherence to IsmaCJIism. For example, in the Paris manuscript as

indieated by the editor, the expression, "through the medium of the Lord of our time

al-Mustan~ir bi-Allah" is not found6• In the Cambridge manuscript, pages 469 to 479 of

the edition, which contain the subjects of lmàmah, Wi~ayah and Risalah, are missing.

Discussion on Risalah is missing probably because the argument for Risiilah according

to Na~ir leads to the necessity of Wisayah and Imàmah. In the same manuscript, on the

last page Le. 486, the expression Khudawand-i Zaman (the Lord of the time), which

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refers to the Imam, has been replaced by Khudawand-i tacata (the exalted Lord), which

refers to God.

The facts expressed above clearly reveal that Zàd requires a new edition based on an the three available manuscripts. This new edition should include an introduction to

determine the position of the book in the IsmàCUï and Islamic philosophical tradition .

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Translation of Chapter Eighteen of the Zâd

ConcerninE the Proof of (the Reality)1 of Pleasure {La~~OS

At this point in our book, it becomes necessary to deal with the exposition of pleasure,

[228] for the absolute pleasure (lazzat-i mutlaq) arises from the Divine writ (kiffibat-i -- . iJahD\ [discussed in the previous section]l°, which (God) has inscribed on the page

(sahifah) of the Absolute Soul (nafs-i mutlaq)lI. The concepts of absolnte pleasure and . . Absolute Soul in my doctrine, (entail the notion) that the grades (darajat) ofpleasure are

in accordance with the grades of the sou!. That is, the nobler the souI, the greater the

pleasure. Thus, since the human soul (nafs-i mardum) is nobler (sharïf-tar) than the rest

of the souls, it has a variety of pleasures, in which the speechless (Le. non-rational)

animais have no share (nasib).

Absolute pleasure is like the genus, whose existence (~abat) depends on the existence

of the species (kinds) of pieasure that faU under il. Likewise, the Absolute Soul is also

a genus, and the vegetative, sensory, rational etc. (souls) are its species. Since

recognition ofpleasure provides for the soul an understanding which will help strengthen

certainty and faith, whil~ weakening doubt and heresy, 1 am going to refute the doctrine

of Mul]ammad-i Zakariyya-yi Razï, who concerning pleasure, claims that:

"It is nothing but the disappearance of pain and if the-~ is not prior pain, no pleasure

can emerge".

If 1 assert that "through the proof of (the reality ot) pleasure, religion is strengthened

and heresy weakened", il is because true religion is founded upon the affirmation ûjab)

of Paradise, which is the source of ultimate pleasure and wherein pain definitely does

not exist, for the righteous and obedient people. As God, the Exalted, said regarding the

reward (§awiib) of Paradise-dwellers after having enjoyed various pleasures: "Reclining

therein upon couches, they will find there neither (heat of) a sun nor bitter cold. And

shade thereof is close upon them and the clustered fruits thereof bow down". (76: 13-14)

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And (true religion) is aiso founded upon the imposition of Hell upon the disobedient

ones and evil-doers, which is the place of ultimate pain wherein no pleasure whatsoever

exists. As God describes the Hell-dwellers: "And those in the Fire say unto the guards

of HeU: Entreat your Lord that He relieve us of a day of the torment. They say: Came

not your messengers unto you with clear proofs? They say: Yea, verily. They say: Then

do ye pray, although the prayer of disbelievers is in [229] vain." (40:49-50)

And justice, wherein lies the well-being of people, abstinence, truthfulness, forgiveness,

love, faithfulness, tendemess and other excellent virtues (akhHiQ-i sutüdah) - ail these

have been disseminated among the people by virtue of the hope of a pleasure-filled

Paradise and fear of an affliction-filled Hell. And oppression, wherein lies the

corruption of people, aggressiveness, shamelessness, mercilessness, cruelty and

insolence .. all these have been spread among the heretics and unbelievers by virtue of

their denial of the (reality ot) reward and punishment (in the life hereafter). Reward (in

the hereafter) is ultimate pleasure and punishment (in the hereafter) is uHimate affliction .

The attainment by the human soul of various (kinds ot) pleasures as weIl as various

(kinds of) pain (in this life) is a testimony to the fact that the source of ultimate painJess

pleasure, namely, Paradise and the abode of reliefless pain, namely, HeU exist for its

sake. This is the Divine writ inscribed upon the human soul to the exclusion of other

sou1s. 1 shaH discuss the issue in detail as 1 corne to the exposition of (various kinds ot)

pleasure (later) in this discourse.

Discourse on the proof of Paradise. which is the source of pleasure wherein pain does

not exist: and on the proof ru Hell. which is the abode of pain wherein pleasure does

not exist.

Now by way of demonstration we will speak on proof of Paradise and Hell that the

above mentioned excellent virtues, such as, justice, equity, truthfulness, trusteeship,

lovf.', loyalty, forgiveness, etc. have become widespread among people due to (their)

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hope of acquisition of paradise and to escape Hell. And it is these virtues upon which

depends the well-being of the world and the people. This is the first (valid) premise

according to sound reason.

Thus it is c1ear that these virtues are the effects of Paradise and HeU, and that Paradise

and Hell are the causes of the existence of these excel1ent virtues, wherein there is well­

being of the people among the people. This is the second valid premise. The conclusion

which results from these [230] two premises is that since the effects are present,

there fore , their causes must necessarily be present. For it is impossible for an effeet to

exist while its cause does not exist. This is a logical proof (burhan-i man~iqi)'2.

Now 1 shall first describe what Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya has said in his treatise on

pleasure and thereafter point out his contradictions. Then 1 shaH explain that the grades

of pleasure are in accordance with the grades of sauls. And in doing so 1 seek Divine

assistance .

MlI~ammad-i Zakariyya's discourse concemin~ pleasure and pain.

According to Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya, "pleasure is nothing but relief (ra~at) from pain

(rruti>, and it does not emerge except in consequence ~) of pain". And he maintains

that "when pleasure is uninterrupted it turns into pain". And he says that, "The state

which is neither pleasure nor pain is (caUed) the natural state (~)\3, which cannot

be perceived through sensory experience ~)". He further maintains that "pleasure is

a perception which provides relief and pain is a perception which provides affliction.

Perception is the impression (~ of the sensible Una~süs) upon the possessor of

perception (khudiiwand-i hiss) Le. the recipient, and the impression is the action (f[l) . of the lJJ1pressor (Le. the sensible) upon the recipient (i.e. the perceiver)'4. And the

reception of an impression entails the changing of the recipient's state (~a]). And the

state is either natural or extra-natural" .

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He further continues that "when the sensible causes the recipient to leave his natural

state (h~i1-i tabn), then pain and affliction are produced and when it causes the recipient . . to retum to his natural state, then pleasure is produced. Thus the recipient experiences

the perception from these two ways (Le. in going out of and returning towards the

natural state) , until he retums (fully) to his natural state. The perception that he thus

experience does not occur in this middle state (~al-i mutawassip".

Then he says, "thus the perceiver receives pain and affliction when he is drawn out of

the natural state and attains pleasure when he returns to the natural state after having left

it". Then he says that, "The retum to the natural state through which he receives

pleasure, does not take place except after being drawn out of [231] it, through which

he had experienced pain". Then, he declares, "it is evident that pleasure is nothing but

relief from pain". And he asserts that "the naturaI state is not perceptible due to the fact

that sensory experience takes place (only) through perception (of the sensible) and

perception of that object serves to change the (naturaI) state of the recipient. The natural

state is that (original state) which has not been arrived at from any other state through

change or perception. Since the natural state is not arrived at from any other state,

therefore, perception has not taken place and (consequently) the recipient cannot

perceive anything in it. To experience (an object) through perception is to (be affected)

change, which is, either departure from the natural state or return to il. Thus, the

natural state (per se) is neither a departure from the natural state nor a return to it".

(After that) he says, "1 have made it clear that the natural state is not perceptible, and

that which is not perceptible is neither pleasure nor affliction". He also maintains that

"when one perception is followed by another, opposite to it, the [latter (perception)]

occasions pleasure to the recipient and continues to do so as long as the former

perception is not diminished entirely, and the recipient has not fully returned to his

natural state. When the first perception is totaIly diminished and the recipient has

returned full Y to the naturaI state, then the same perception which first provided pleasure

to the recipient (now begins) to provide pain and affliction". "The reason for this is

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that", he says, "when (the second perception) diminishes completely, the former

perception and drives the recipient back to the natural state again, it begins to cause him

to depart from the natural state in an opposite direction. This departure from the natural

state brings pain to the recipient. So, the latter perception that draws the subject back

to the natural state (thus) brings pleasure to him. But when he is fully reverted to the

natural state, his pleasure cornes to an end. As this last perception continues, it begins

to make him depart in the opposite direction from the natural state again, and hence

slarts to bring him pain". Therefore, he says, "it is clear that the natural state for the

recipient is like an intermediate stage between departing from it, [232] which brings

pain and affliction, and returning to it, which brings pleasure and composure. The state,

being naturaI, is itself, however, one of neither pain nor pleasure".

The discourse (guftar) of Mu~ammad son of Zakariyya.

Zakariyya's son subsequently elaborates this foregoing assertion and says: "The example

of this is the case of a man who is in a house which is neither so cold that he shi vers

nor 50 hot that he perspires. As long as his body remains accustomed to (the internal

temperature of) that house, he feels neither cold nor heat. Then suddenly, the hou se gets

so warm that the man feels severe pain from the heat and becomes extremely weak.

Thereafter, a cool breeze gradually starts blowing into the house. (As a result), the man

who has been in severe pain from the heat having departed from the natura1 state to

which he was (accustomed), starts to feel pleasure from that coolness, for he is returning

to the natural state, so long as coolness drives him back to his previous (state) which

was neither cold nor hot. Thereafter, if the coolness continues, he begins to receive pain

from the same coolness which (previously) caused him pleasure, (because) he is now

departing (again) from the natural state in the opposite direction. And if after that

(excessive) cold, the house starts receiving heat, the man again begins to feel pleasure

from that heat because it brings him back to the natural state. Accordingly, he

(continues) to enjoy pleasure until he has reached his natural state"l5 .

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Thus he says, "it is clear that the sensory pleasure is nothing but relief from pain; and

pain is nothing but a departure from the naturaI state; and the natural state is one of

neither pain nor pleasure". Then he goes on to say that "if (the process ot) departing

from the naturai state is graduaI and (the process ot) returning to il is sudden, then

pleasure is sensed but not pain. And if the departure from the natural state is suddcn and

the return is graduai, [233] (théll) pain is sensed, but not pleasure". Thus he holds that

"This sudden return to the naturai state has been named pleasure although it is (merely)

relief from pain".

He further maintains that IIthirst and hunger, for example, may cause a graduai (littIe

by little i.e. imperceptible) pain to man. And for him, this (graduai increase of pain)

entails (objectively) a departure from the naturaI state to the point where he is (in fact)

extremely hungry and thirsty. Then if he suddenly takes food or drink, thus rClurnil1g

(instantly) to his original state, he thereby attains pleasure. (In this way) pleasure is

sensed by him, for, he returned to the natural state suddenly, whereas the pain of hunger

and thirst, due to the fact that it had gradually brought him out of the naturai state, was

not sensed by him. Returning back to the painiess state was called pleasure, whereas it

was nothing but a sudden relief from the sum total of pain which was accumulated (in

him) gradually (Le. imperceptibly)". And he says that, "when a healthy man suddenly

receives a wound, thereby departing suddenly from his natural state, he receives

affliction and pain therefrom. And when he achieves his healthy state after graduai

recovery from the wound, he does not experience any pleasure. Thus, this sudden

departure from the natural state was ca11ed pain and affliction, since pain and affliction

are in this case, noticeable. But his (graduaI) return to the prior state was not called

pleasure, since pleasure was not, in this case, noticeable".

The discourse of Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya concerning sexual pleasure.

Then, concerning sexual pleasure, he asserts that "it is also (produced in the same way

as explained above), for, a substance is accumulaled in a highly sensitive place which

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is extremely receptivel6 to (tactile) sensation. And when that substance (keeps on)

accurnulating over a long time and cornes out of that place, ail at once, pleasure is

produced thereby". He says that, "the li1œ of this pleasure is (found) in the pleasure that

a man feels in scratching an itchy spot". [234]

Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya's discourse concerning the 21easure of seeing good-looking

people and hearing a melodious voice.

Concerning the pleasure acquired by seeing good-looking people, he says that, "it

(pteasure) takes place because man gets tired of his uncongenial and ugly fellows and

is thereby driven out of the natural state". And he states concerning the hearing of a

melodious voice that IIthe same order exists (here), for whoever hears a delicate voice

(for too long) and (then) hears a robust voice thereafter he attains pleasure". And he

further says that lIalthough man receives pleasure by means of seeing light, but when

he sees Iight excessively, he also attains pleasure from closing his eyes and from

darkness ll •

The foregoing account is the doctrir.e of Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya, (propounded) in a

tieatise which he has exclusively devoted to the exposition of pleasure'7• 1 shaH affirm

whatever is true and shaH indicate whatever is contradictory, in this man's doctrine (of

pleasure) for the wise people with (the help of) Divine guidance.

Concerning the refutation of Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya's doctrine.

1 assert that this man has stated at the outset of the treatise that "sensory pleasure is

nothing but relief from pain, and pain is nothing but departing from the natural state,

and pleasure is nothing but return to the natural state. And the return does not take place

except after the departure therefrom". Then he has said that, "it is therefore clear that

pleasure does not take place except following pain and getting out of it". He has also

asserted at the end of the treatise that "man receives pleasure by means of looking

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towards light, but when he sees light excessively, he can aiso attain plC<1sure by c10sing

the eyes and experiencing darkness".

Now this last assertion of his contradicts the premise that he has formulated at the

beginning of the treatise, namely, "pleasure does not emerge except in the consequence

of pain" and (also) , "pleasure does not emerge except by a return to the natural state

after departure from it". And he says that, "The natural state is the intermediary

between pain and pleasure but cannot (itself) be perceived". He should tell us, therefore,

what is the n"tural state between [235] looking into the light and looking into the

darkness?

And when man obtained pleasure through seeing light, to what natural state did he

return? Since according to this man's own admission, the seer obtained pleasure from

seeing light, and that (pleasure) was, for him, a return to the naturai state whcrefrom

he was drawn out, therefore, either his premise is invalid or his conclusion is false and

illegitimatelB •

Then he held that "when man gets tired of seeing light, he also attains pleasure by

means of darkness and closing his eyes". This statement is also cOfitradictory and

invalidates the premise (in which) he maintained that "pleasure does not emerge except

when the recipient returns to his previous state after having departed from it". For, the

departure of the seer from his natural state, to which he was accustomed, towards Iight,

was with pleasure, not with pain; and this contradicts the judgement of Zakariyya's son.

Accordilng to him, the return to that (natural state) also is with pleasure. And there is

no intermediary state which is neither seeing nor not-seeing, as he claimed that "il is

neither pain nor pleasure", but (here) both (seeing and not-seeing) are pleasure. And he

further maintained that "man attains pleasure by seeing a beautiful woman due to the

faet that he had been in pain from seeing an ugly woman". This is an utterly flimsy and

meaningless statement, for a man does not obtain pleasure from seeing beautiful persons

simply because he has become tired of seeing an ugly person previously, but rather,

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bccause (the capacity to) attain that pleasure is "substantial" (Le. essential) to the human

sou!. And other animaIs do not share in attaining this pleasure, nor in the p]easure

attained by pleasant audition and properly worded poetic cadences.

Also, this assertion is contradictory to the (previous) assertion he made concerning the

meaning of pleasure attained through seeing towards Iight and darkness, for if the

premise were true, it would necessarily foJJow that, whoever saw neither beautiful nor

[236] ugly persons would be in the natural state and should experience pain as soon as

he saw a beautiful person, for thereby he would depart from his natural state.

Thereafter, if he saw an ugly person, he should attain pleasure, for thereby he would

return to the natural state. But (the actual) state of affairs is contrary to this.

Thus, 1 have made it clear that the premise of this man in which he stated that "pleasure

does not emerge except in the consequence of pain" is invalid. The followers of this

philosopher should answer the foUowing: When a person sees a beautiful woman or a

beautiful image thereby attaining pleasuTl', to what natural state does he retum and when

had he departed From that natural state by returning to whieh he attains pleasure? Renee,

(since they cannot answer it), it is evident that the seer of a beautiful countenanee

attained pleasure not because of his prior departing from his natural state, which,

detinitely, was not seeing any (person) at all, either beautiful or ugly. Therefore,

Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya's statement that "pleasure does not emerge except by retuming

to the natural state", is (demonstrably) invalid.

Agnin concerning the refutation of Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya.

To proceed further with my refutation of the view of Zakariyya's son, name]y, that

"sensory perception occurs only through an impression which the sensible makes upon

the recipient whereby the perceiver receives (experiences) of that (sensible). By means

of this perception, the recipient undergoes change by being drawn out of his natural state

and thereby experiences pain. This is the tirst perception. Subsequently if he experiences

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a second perception, opposite to the first one which brings him back to the original

state, he thereby expericnces pleasure".

For example, when, someone capable of seeing and hearing, sees a bc<'\utiful image (i.e.

person) or a delightful garden or an embelli shed form, after having been in a state of

non-seeing and non-hearing, which l9 is his natural state, he undergoes a change of state,

a departure from his naturaI state; and thereby attains pleasure. Likewise, when he hears

a (properly) measured harp-tune composed by a master (ski lied) harpist, [237)

accompanied by an agreeable song with fluent and measured poetry, he also undergoes

a change of state thereby. And this would mean for him a departure from the natural

state. Then the result is the opposite of what this philosopher's premise suggests, for this

man attains pleasure through leaving his natural state, (and not through returning to il.)

Then, if this man having ga'led excessively at the beautiful woman and attaincd pleasure

by her being in sight, and thereby having departed from his natural state, is not able to

continue to gaze at her, experiences such severe pain from his not seeing her, thal he

exposes himself to high risks in search for her, not caring even for his own life. Il is

(precisely) this (painful) not-seeing that constitutes a return to the natural state in which

the person existed before seeing the (beautifuI) woman. Therefore, the conclusion proves

to be the very opposite of that premise which our philosopher postulates in the beginning

of his treatise: for, he made the proposition that "pain is produced as a result of the

recipient's being drawn out of his natural state by experiencing the perception from lhe

sensible, and pleasure when he returns to his naturaI state". The man (in our example)

was, before seeing the beautiful wornan, in the natural state, but departed from it (his

state) as soon as he saw her. According to our philosopher's judgement, this man

should, of necessity, have been in pain, but enstead) he attained pleasure. And when

the vision of the beautiful womélil disappeared and he returned to his natural state, then,

according to the judgement of this philosopher, he should, of necessity, have attained

pleasure, but (instead) he experienced pain. How can a clearer refutation and a more

valid rebuttal be devised against this philosopher than what we have done here .

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The same holds true with respect to the discussion of the state of the hearer of a

melodious voice and (pleasant) poetry: Wh en he hears them, he departs from the natural

state, and thereby attains pleasure. When he is deprived of them or afterwards hears the

braying of a donkey or the crying of a mule, he thereby returns to the natural state, but

experiera;es pain. 1 would assert that this man's statement that [238] "aIthough one

attains pleasure from excessive hearing of a delicate voice, one also attains pleasure

From hearing a robust voiee thereafter", eontradicts the premise that "pleasure cannot

be attained except by returning to the natural state after having departed from it". For,

the natural state of a hearer is to hear nothing at all, whether delicate or robust, as the

natural state of the recipient of tactile sensation is to feel or touch (nothing at ail), either

cold or warm, either hard or soft.

And when the hearer hears a delicate voiee (reciting) a poem, he departs from his

natural state in a certain direction and attains pleasure therefrom, contrary to our

philosopher's proposition that "the pereeiver experienees pain in departing from the

natural state". 1 wou Id argue with him about the pleasure that he received from the

sound of the harp and the beautiful harpist who let him hear it by a sui table poem.

According to the judgement of our philosopher, that man' s returning to his natural state

must, of necessity, be a state opposite to the one l have mentioned. And that (returning

to the natural state) will be through the braying of a donkey accompanied by the abuse

of the robust-voiced donkey-man, so that the auditory sense of that man, who had been

drawn out of his natural state through hearing the harp and the fine melody, may revert

to his natural state and thereby attain pleasure. But everyone knows that nobody receives

pain from a pleasant song and a tune of a harp and nobody receives pleasure from the

braying of a donkey. Even (supposing to be true what) our philosopher has said,

namely, that the man would have attained pleasure if he had heard the delicate voice

(and) after that, the robust voiee, his judgement would still be wrong; for the man

wou Id (then) have attained pleasure both by hearing the delicate voiee, thereby departing

from his natural, and by hearing the robust voice, thereby returning to the natural state .

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Yet his judgement is that "man receives pain not pleasure by departing l'rom the natural

state" .

Man, in fact, attains pleasure from a delicate or a robust voice [239] not by virtue of

the delicateness or robustness of the voice, but by virtue of the harmonious composi tion

of either type of voice. Do you not observe that no sound is more delicate than that of

the (flapping ot) the mosquito-wing and no voice more robust than that of the braying

of the donkey, and men attain pleasure from neither of them. Thus, to argue in this

manner does not make for (genuine) philosophy, but rather represents ignorance and

foU Y • The same point may be made with respect to pleasure which people att~lin through

the tactile sense. No tactile object is softer than air. If a person sils nakcd (in air) so that

his body becomes acclimatised to it, this would be said to be his natural statc. If he,

thereafter, puts on a fur coat thereby departing From his natural slate, he will not rcceive

any pain but will (instead) atlain pleasure, contrary to the judgement of our philosopher,

according to whom "pain is received by departing from the natural state and pleasure

is attained by returning to it".

As regards the gustatory sense, 1 note that when man has not tastcd anything, his

gustatory sense is in the natural state. Wh en he puts a certain amount of honey. in his

mouth, his (gustatory) sense changes its natural state and departs from it, and he as a

result, attains pleasure. But according to the judgement of our philosopher, he should

have experienced pain, for the honey drew his gustatory sense out of the natural state.

The (honey) is (in this case) the tirst sensible affecting his gustatory sense. If he

thereafter, tastes the pulp of the colocynth20 as a second sensible, the latter being

opposite to the former, it has the effect of taking him back to the natural slate from

which he had been drawn out. According to the judgement of our philosopher, he should

have attained pleasure thereby. However, from the perception of that which brings back

to his natural state he (in fact) receives pain, while by tasting honey which drew him out

of his natural state, he attained pleasure. (Since), by lastillg the pulp of the coJocynth,

which returned him to the natural state, he received pain, it is cJear that the opinion of

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our philosopher in this matter is incorrect. Thus the case is not such that the taster of

sugar and honey al ways retums to the natural state [240] and the taster of the

myrobaJan21 and colocynth always departs from the natural state.

And 1 would further note that our philosopher said in the beginning of his treatise that

"sensory pleasure is the attainment of relief from pain, and pain is caused when the

perceiver is drawn out of the natural state". As proof of his view, he refers to the

perception of hot after cold and vice versa. Then he states that "the same hoIds true with

respect to the rest of the senses". He further states that "1 made it c1ear that pleasure

does not emerge except in consequence of pain. So-called pleasure is thus relief from

pain". To refute this statement, 1 would argue as follows:

Suppose there is a healthy man with sane senses and another person appears and puts

sugar in his mouth, holds a bladder of musk and a bouquet of roses in front of him,

sings beautifully a meaningful poem, and spreads an embroidered brocade before him

and dresses him in soft attire, with the result that aIl his natural states undergo change.

According to the view of our philosopher, which is that "when the natural state of a man

changes he receives pain", this man should, of necessity, experience extreme pain from

tasting the sugar, smelling the fragrance of the musk and the roses, hearing the melody,

wearing the soft attire and seeing the embroidered brocade.

However, ail intelligent people know that the state of this person would be

(diametrically) opposite to what this philosopher'sjudgementcalls for. Ifthejudgement

of our philosopher were true, aIl the unpleasant things, to the pain of which man in

particular in contrast to the animaIs is exposed, would not have existed in this world.

It is c1ear to all intelligent people that when the human being touches the fur of sableu,

[241] he departs from the naturaI state and that he does so aIso when he touches a

coarse woollen cloth or a prickly thorn. Yet from the one he attains pleasure and from

the other he receives pain. Wh en a man through his visual sense sees a beautiful maiden

attired in silken clothes, he departs from his natural state, and does likewise when he

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sees a blind, dirty old Negro covered in a filthy blanket. Again, he attains pleasure from

the one and pain from the other. When, (through) the auditory sense, a man suddenly

hears (the news) that his wife gave birth to a handsome boy, he departs from the natural

state, just as he does wh en he hears (the news) that his brother has died and that the

king has confiscated his property. But his state is not the same in these two departures

from the natural state as the judgement of our philosopher suggests. The gustatory sense

of man departs from the natural state when he smells the fragrance of ambergris2' and

odiferous herbs and likewise when he smells stinking carrion and dllng. But he seeks the

former departure (from the natural state) and avoids the latter.

1 wOllld ask (at this point) why is it that this philosopher's judgement is not applicable

to certain forms of the tactile sense or to the tactile sense as a whole? That is to say,

that this (philosopher's) judgement is applicable only to the experience of intense heat

and cold which cause man the affliction of pain. When a man receives heat aner a

painful cold, he does indeed attain pleasure. But they (cold and heat) represcnt only Cl

part of the whole tactile sense. For, along with hot and cold, the tactile sense embraces

four other meanings, namely, soft, rough, mobile and inert. And it is a fact that, a man

does not experience these other qualities in the same manner as he does hot [242] and

cold. Man does not aUain pleasure by touching a rough abject after having touche<! a

soft one, nor does he attain24 pleasure by touching a mobile object after having touched

an inert one.

The true position of Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya.

1 have shown that the tactile sense embraces three (pairs) of opposing (qualities) that is,

heat and coldness, softness and roughness, mobility and inertia. The judgement of our

philosopher holds true for only one of these three pairs but is false for the other two.

As regards the four other senses, that is, visual, auditory, oifactory and gustatory, this

judgement is faise .

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In <makingl this judgement. Mu~ammad-i Zakariyya resembles a man in the desert who

has never seen any fruit.

In making judgement concerning pleasure that man attains by means of the five senses,

and asserting that (pleasure) is nothing other than relief from pain and cannot be attained

but as a consequence of pain, this man (Mu~ammad-i Zakariy)à) resembles a man in

the desert who has hitherto never seen any fruit. (This man) cornes across a dish

containing fresh unpeeled walnuts2S, dates, figs, almonds and water-melon. He picks up

the fresh walnut with its peel and tastes it. (When) its disagreeableness registers on his

tongue and palate l he (immediately) passes the judgement that all the fruits (in the dish)

are equally bitter, disagreeable and tongue-biting, without thinking of the possibility that

something more agreeable may exist under the peel or that the other (fruits present in

the plate) may be different from the one he tasted. (The fact of the matter is that) none

of these (fruits) are bitter. This man's judgement resembles that of our philosopher in

that (the latter) understood the meaning of one third of one of the five senses and

jumped to the conclusion that the same holds true for all the other five senses. [243]

When this üudgement) is (criticaIly) analyzed, his ignorance and thoughtlessness become

evident, as 1 have made his ignorance and foolishness evident.

The difference between pleasure and relief «(rom pain).

Let me say that pleasure is one thing and relief from pain is quite another. As for

pleasure, it is that which when man reaches it from the natural state, he becomes happy

and invigorated and if he is separated from it, he experiences pain. Accordingly when

a man acquires riches, food, drink, supporters, companions etc., from a state of

poverty, hunger, thirst and loneliness, he becomes happy and invigorated. When he is

separated from them, he does not remain26 in his prior state, rather he experiences pain.

And relief from pain occurs when man returns (from a state of pain) back to his naturaI

state (and) he stays in it. For exampIe, when he becomes ill after having been healthy,

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he experiences pain; and when he recovers from that illness, he returns to his prior

state, attaining thereby definitely neither pleasure nor pain.

Since 1 have now fini shed with the refutation of this man on this subject, and have

distinguished between pleasure and relief from pain, 1 shaH now deal with lite grades

of pleasure as 1 promised (to do so) at the outset of this discourse.

Statement concerning grades of pleasure.

1 say that attaining pleasure belongs to the soul. We recognise the soul by virtue of the

manifestation of its functions. The function of the soul is manifested in (the natural

character of the) elements (~ba'icy7. Nature consists of three grades. The tendency and

motion of one of them is centrifugai, whereas the tendency and motion of the second

is centripetal. The motion of the third one is around the (celestial) elements (ummahlit)21

that have settled around the centre.29 Likewise, the soul, which exists through the

manifestation of its function, [244] consists of three grades. One is the vegetative soul

(nafs-i nabatD, which acquires nutriment and grows. The other is the sensory (animal)

soul (nafs-i ~isSï), which is capable of making voluntary motion. The third one is the

rational soul (nafs-i natiQah), which differentiates between things.

The description of Divine guidance (hidayat> and Cavour CCinayatl with which beines are

endowed.

1 would state that these two (types of) substances,30 that is, material elements qabii'jC)

and souls (nurus), are preserved by Divine guidance which they have received from the

supreme sphere (falak-i aç~m), which the philosophers have called the Pedestal of God

(kursiyy-i khuda,)31. And the guidance is manifested in them that each one of the

elements and souts has struggled to preserve their well-being û.IliW~). Accordingly,

the well-being (~aJa~) of the earth lies in the fact that it should stay in the centre, so that

it may avoid disintegration and be able to accept the forces of the (heavenly) bodies and

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the water wherein lies the beauty of earth, flow and stand over it. Its motion and

tendency is centripetaI under the force (gasr) that has overwheImed it, which is also

called nature (!abC). 1 have discussed this (subject) in its due pIace32

•

Likewise, the well-being of water lies in the fact that it should stay higher than the

earth, 50 that it may not be destroyed. And its particular function is to flow from high

to low and to rise up in the air by means of vapour, so that it may become pleasant and

grow vegetables. Us motion is also centripetal (but) higher than the earth. And the

positioning of the earth and water at their respective levels is due to the nature that they

possess, with regard to remaining in these positions, along with the motion that they

have received.

The same is true with respect to air, tire, the spheres and the heavenly bodies: each one

of them possesses a tendency by nature towards a place wherein lies its respective well­

being and the perpetuation of its essence, and where it remains in its respective position .

And each one of them associates with another, for, the well-being of each [245] also lies

in association with a respective counterpart: like the association of earth with water and

air with tire, so that they should not be destroyed but should (rather) attain beauty and

vitality. Bach one avoids certain others, for, the well-being of each also lies in avoiding

one or another of its counterparts, so that it is not subject to corruption nor prevented

from its function, like the mutuaI avoidance of water and tire, or of air and earth. It is

c1ear that for the recipient of pleasure, there is in it, growth (ziYddat), beauty (jamal)

and vitality (baga), whereas in pain there is corruption (fasiid), destruction (fana) and

loss (nug~an).

There is pleasure for naturai elements in association and loss and pain in (mutllal)

avoidance.

Given that those two natural elements which do associate with one another attain

prosperity, strength, beautyand growth through association, we will say that they attain

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pleasure through this assocîation. Contrariwise, those two elements which, when

confronting each other become disturbed, subject to corruption and loss and are diverted

from their (normal) function, also receive pain and affliction from one another. Since

each one of these physical bodies (ajsam-i VibD) moves by means of a motion wherein

lies the preservation of its well-being, (therefore) this is an indication that there is

pleasure for these elements in these motions and that there is affliction and pain for them

in the opposite motions. For, if the earth rises up in the sky, it will become disturbed

and subject to corruption; (consequently) it will not be able to perform its particular

function (assigned to it). Through affliction and pain, each one of ils particular functions

is hindered and through the attainment of pleasure it can perform it (sllch a function).

Thus, 1 have clearly shown that the elements enjoy Divine guidance in preserving their

weB-being. That which preserves its own well-being [246] attains pleasllre in its weB­

being. The Divine guidance whereby the elements preserve themselves from corruption,

mortality and affliction, stands in the position of soul (n11\) in relation to these elements,

for they do not (themselves) possess the faculty of perception.

The same Divine guidance is also conne.cted with souls according to a hierarchical scale.

Thus, the vegetable has, through it, struggled for its weB-being according to the dcgree

of the nobility of its soul, in obtaining nutriment, achieving growth and producing its

like through seed and root. Through this guidance, the animal (likewise) seeks suitable

nutriment for itself and avoids whatever is detrimental, be it something internaI (in the

form of) unsuitable nutriment or something external (in the form of) an enemy to be

avoided. And il seeks its (sexual) mate so that it may perpetuate its ~pecies by means

of reproduction (zayish) .

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The share lnasIbah) of Divine 2uidance in the human (species,! is 2reater than 111 the

Qther kin2doms of nature (mawiind); thereafter (the share is ~reater) in the animal

(species). and so on.

Man, who possesses a soul which is nobler than the souIs of (a11) other animaIs, has thus

a greater share (nasTb) of Divine guidance than that of the animais, 'wherein lies the

pleasure of the souls. Then from this, the guidance which the animal (species) possesses

is greater th an that possessed by the vegetable (species), and the vegetable (species in

turn) has a greater share than that of the elements. According to the interpretation 1 have

set Forth no being whatsoever is devoid of Divine guidance, for each being has

permanence (as a species) and the permanence of beings (in tum) depends on Divine

guidance. Ali guidance cornes from God's assistance (yarD to the beings, while His own

permanence is by Himself. If this Divine guidance had not been bestowed upon man,

an unschooled person would neither know that the part is less than the whole, nor would

he understand that a number of things equal in measure to another [247] thing are equal

in measure among themselves. By Divine guidance this is a principIe (elementary truth)

which exists innately in the intellect.

A description of the pteasure of beings.

1 maintain that the manifestation of the particular function of each being, its quest for

nutriment, and the preservation of ilS well-being, are the Divine endowment upon il. AlI

beings exist by virtue of these three endowments, which the sages have called the Divine

govemance (siyasat-i ilàhn. Thus for the vegetable which possesses the vegetative soul

(nafs-i rüyandah), there is pleasure in obtaining suitable nutriment, achieving growth and

reproduction of its like through its seed and fruit etc. The pleasure of the animal which

possesses the sensory soul (rü~-i ~issU exceeds the pleasure of the vegetable, for it

possesses senses and performs Îtself motion volitionally, and (in addition to that) it

possesses imagination (takhayyuI), (the capacity for) alertness (ha~ar) and appetite

(raghbat) .

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The pleasure of man who possesses the rational soul (riih-i natigah) is greater than the , . pleasure experienced by the rest of the animaIs, for in fact, man enjoys two kinds of

pleasures: sensory and intellectuaI. The animai shares sensory pleasure with man

because it possesses the senses, but (even) this share is limited, and the sensory pleasure

in its totality belongs (only) to man.

If man pond ers over the sensory pleasure that he attains through the gustatOl'y sense by

means of foods, which have variegated tastes such as sweetness and sourness, and

various tastes, from each of which raw or cooked, raw aIone, cooked alone, mixed raw

or mixed cooked, man experiences a distinct pleasure, (then) he will realise that the

speechless animal's pleasure from food is in rel~tion to man's pleasure from food, what

the atom is in relation to the total body (infinitely little). The speechless animaIs have

no share at ail in corn mon with the human being, except in the pleasure of food and sex.

[248]

The varieties of human pleasure.

The speechless animais do not have a share in the (types ot) sensory pleasure which are

particular to man such as hearing melodious voices and pleasant news]) about coming

events, such as the arrivaI of friends or the destruction of enemies, whether or not the

event referred to actuaIly materiaIises (reaches him). (And also animaIs do not share

with man in) the pleasure that he attains from beautiful images, delightful gardens, the

sight of good looking people and smelling the sweet fragrance of musk, camphor and

fresh odiferous herbs, etc. So in this respect, man enjoys a mueh greater variety (of

pleasure). Moreover, the pleasure that man acquîres from precious gems, metals Iike

gold, silver, etc. and from valuable possessions, high office and rulership, constitutes

still another kind (of pleasure).

Then there is the pleasure of knowledge, which the human soul attains by means of a

nobler tàculty among its faculties. Il is nobler than sensory pleasure and greater in

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quantity; in fact, it is infinite. For the rational soul attains this pleasure through the

essential faculty. ft is beyond doubt that the soul which is a simple substance is infinite.

If an object is infini te, its essential power is also infinite. The acquisition of knowledge

by the human soul is an essential property.

From each (kind of) knowledge which reaches him, man attains a (corresponding)

pleasure. Then, with the help of that (acqllired) knowledge, he acquires a (further)

loftier knowledge, the pleasure of which is also greater. As he (continues ta) acquire

higher levels of knowledge, his pleasure is accordingly increased. And it is not possible

for the human soul ta reach astate where it is no longer able to acquire any further

knowledge. For, the definition of the substance of the human soul is such that it receives

its own attribute (Le. knowledge) infinitely, as 1 have noted earlier in defining soul and

bodt4• And each acquired learning assists the soul in the acquisition of further learning

and never prevents it from this.

It is not possible for man to become such that no knowledge remains for him to be

acquired, for only God, the Exalted, possesses aU knowledge. And it is not admissible

[249] that the created should become like the Creator. Since man cannot become like

God in knowledge, it c1early follows that he does not have access to all knowledge, and

thus he cannot cease learning.

1 have thus made it clear that man possesses sensory pleasure in great variety, and that

it is not attained by his returning to the natural state after having departed From it. Since

intellectuai pleasure is infinite to man, and the human soul tums to another state after

departing from its natural state as it attains (any kind of) knowledge and in consequence

attains pleasure as weil, (therefore), it is c1ear that the view of the one who says that

"pleasure is nothing but a return to the natural state after having departed from it" is

incorrect. Rather, the pleasure of the lifeless elements is through Divine guidance in the

preservation of their forms through the motions which operate in them as their souls and

which 1 cali Divine guidance .

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The pleasure of the vegetable exists in obtaining nutriment and in preserving its species

through the seed and fruit etc. As 1 have said (earlier), the pleasure of the speechless

animal is greater than the pleasure of the vegetable. As for man's sensory pleasure, it

is of greater variety, rather he (alone) possesses it in its totality. As for his intellectual

and speculative (na~arD (pleasure), it is infinite. It is c1ear From our explanation that the

pleasure of the soul is in accordance with the grades of ils nobility and ignobility.

Those who attain intellectual pleasure are less atlracted to sensory pleasurc.

The nobility of the soul lies in its share of intellect, and intellectual pleasure knows no

bounds. Every soul which has an experience of the infinite intellectual pleaslire is less

attracted to the finite sensory pleasure, beyond that amount which is indispensable for

the (purpose of) seeking knowledge. This was the reason why the prophcts (peace be

upon them) and sages who experienced intellectual pleaslire withdrew thcll1sclves from

sensory worldly pleasure, and [250] regarded worldly life as mere play when compared

with the eternity of the world beyond. Accordingly, God says to people through the

prophet: "Know that the life of this world is only play and id le talk ~nd pageantry and

boasting among you, and rivalry in respect of wealth and children; as ~he Iikeness of

vegetation after rain, whereof the growth is pleasing to the husbandman, but afterward

it drieth up and thou seest' it turning yellow. then it becometh straw. And in the

Hereafter there is grievous punishment, and (also) forgiveness From Allah and His good

pleasure, whereas the life of the world is but a matter of illusion". (57: 19-20)

The reason for bringing man into this mansion of the world.

Wise is the one among the people who aims at (attaining) intellectual pleasure, so that

he may acquire universal ple..'isure, the source of which is the higher world CaJam-j

culwD. Man has been brought into this world to attain that (universal plcasure). Since

it is by learning that man attains pleasure, of which other animaIs are unaware, and

given that every level of knowledge opens up other horizons for him, and that

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knowledge is infinite (Le. that there is no end to knowledge, i.e. to learning),

(therefore) this state is an indication that man has been brought onto this earth in this

(particular) form in order that he may attain this (universal) pleasure and thus he should

never tire of learning.

Attaininc (intellectua)) pleasure contains. for man, the

command of the (Divine) ~uardian who arouses him to learn.

The attainment of pleasure from knowledge, for man is like (having) a guardian or a

Divine commander who urges him to leam as long as he is alive. For, as is obvious,

the eater will not stay away from eating as long as he attains pleasure from eating. And

this pleasure [251] (from eating), is like a commander who commands man to eat'5

more. This state is an example for that (state of attainment of intellectual pleasure).

Accordingly, attaining pleasure from knowledge commands man to learn more. This

also is one of the instances of Divine writ, imprinted upon the tablet of the human soul

(nafs-i insiinï) .

1 would thus state that man who is the fruit of the tree of the world has three souls, that

is, the vegetative (nahan), sensory (~issï) and rational (nu~QD. At first, he receives

vegetative pleasure, in order thereby to obtain his nutriment. Thereafter, he receives

sensory pleasure. If he had not received vegetative pleasure, he would not have received

sensory pleasure. The last sensory pleasure he receives is sexual pleasure, whereby he

preserves his species through reproduction. This (sexual pleasure) constitutes the

fuI fil ment (maturity) of his body. After that, he does not receive any new (sensory)

pleasure. (However), when he reaches the stage of self-evident intellectual operation,

knowing thereby that the part is less than the whole and that things of the same quantity

are equal in quantity to one another, then this is the beginning of his intellectual

pleasure .

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Man's teachin~ his own species is like spiritual reproduction .

1 have described this (intellectual) pleasure as infini te, and the human fulfilment as

regards this pleasure lies in that he is able to lead others towards knowledge. And this

is his spiritual reproduction through which he preserves both himself and others, as the

prophets, peace be upon them, and the sages did.

Had sensory pleasure not existed, the creation of pleasurable objects would have becn

purposeless, and the growth of vegetables and generation of animais would not have

been possible. Had sensory pleasure not existed, God would not have possessed (the

attributes of) grace and mercy. (As it is said in the Qur'àn):

"Our Lord! Thou createdst not this in vain. Glory be to Thee! Preserve liS from the

doom of Pire". (3: 191)

The wise should contemplate the wisdom of God as it underlies the creation of plec1sure

and its recipients, so that he may understand that ail things exist by virtue of the

existence of varicus kiVds of pleasure. (He should thus consider) how the knowledge of

the AlI-wise and All-knowing/6 granting various kinds of sensory pleasures (to His

creatures) encompasses ail of them, and has known that, through the attainment of

pleasure, creatures desire (staying) in this world and preserve themselves from

annihilation for a given span of time, whether individually or as a species, by obtaining

(nutriment) and tasting (other pleasures). Here 1 close this discussion .

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1.

2.

3.

Endnotes to Chapter 3

Refer to Na~ir's preface to the Zad, pp.1-4.

Nà~ir, zad, p.229. (Tr. p.36)

This chapter is crucial to the understanding of Na~ir's epistemology which in

turn, seems to be necessary to understand Na~ir's concept of "intellectuaJ

pleasure". A detaiIed analysis of this theme is carried out in the fourth chapter

ofthis study.

4. Ivanow, Problems, p.63. See editor's preface (p. h and w)

For a full account of mss. see:

A. Monzavi, Fihrist-i Nuskha-ha-yi Kha!~i-yi Farsi, Vo1.2, Part.1 (Tehran:

Mu'assasa-yi Farhangi-yi Khatti-yi Tehran, A. H. 1369 shamsï). pp. 799-800 .

5. Bertels, Isma<ïJiyàn, p.197.

6. Na~jr, Zad, p.4.

7. The term i§.bat, which frequently occurs in aU Na~ir's works, see-ms to mean

establishing or proving the form ijürat) or the true nature of an object or

concept. In the present context, it may also con tain the connotation of the

"affirmation" o,f the independent existence of the principle of pleasure, as against

Râzi, who maintains that pleasure is relative to pain which leads to the negation

(nafi) of its independent nature.

8. The tenu la~~at can, aIternatively, be pronounced le~~at in Persian, cf. M.

Mul'jn, A Persian Dictionary, (Tehran, 1977), p.3577. The word la~:at (the

plural form of ]a~Ylt has been rendered into English as singular, Le. pleasure,

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9.

10.

for it usually takes a generic form. But if the plurality of pleasures is to be

emphasized, its English counterpart also has to be rendered plural.

The correct word seems to be Kitâbat not Kitâb-hâ.

For a detailed discussion on the Divine writ, refer to the Ist and 27th

Chapters of the Zad ..

Il. By Absolute Soul (nafs-i mu!lag), Na~ir seems to mean the Soul in an absolule

sense - the collectivity of different levels of soul. Correspondingly, the absolute

pleasure is "pleasure as such" which is found in ail thcse souls collectivcly.

12. This syllogism seems to be based on Na~ir's doctrine of dual worlds which is

traceable as far back as Plato, who systematically developed the theory that

beings of the corporeal world are the effects or the impressions of the bcings of

the spiritual world. The beings of the corporeal world are sensibles (Illal~süsat)

which are empirically verifiable, whereas the corresponding spiritual substances

are intelligible (maçgümt).

13. In the forthcoming commentary on the text, the concept of the "natural state" has

been dealt with in considerable length.

14. Na~ir in his works, while dealing with the theory of perception, employs a

variety of terms which convey the same meaning in that particular context. Three

sets of the most commonly used terms are given as under:

hiss (perception) mahsfis (sensible) hass (recipient) . . . ta'~r (perception) a~ar-kunandah (sensible) a~r-pa~ïr (recipient)

idrak (perception) mudrak (sensible) mudrik (recipient)

These terms may have a different meaning if they are taken out of the perceptual

context.

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15 . In his work (al-Tibb al-Rü~ànD Ràzï has, to convey the same sense, used the

example of a man who goes out into the hot desert, from a restful shady spot,

then cornes back to his former place and his body returns to hs original state,

thereby experiencing pleasure (p.39).

16. Instead of the word bayandaEï, yabandaEI as given in the Cambridge manuscript,

seems preferable.

17. Only fragments of this book, mainly in the form of quotations, in the present

chapter of the zad, have survived. See Paul Kraus's Opera for further details

concerning this issue.

18. The word .and should be replaced by the word âmad as given in the Cambridge

manuscript.

19. Kih an appears to be correct instead of g .

20. Colocynth (~an~al) is a herbaI fruit the size of a small melon (kharbüzah). Due

to its bitter taste, it is called the melon of Abü Jahl (kharbüzah-yi Abü Jahl)

CAli Akbar Dih Khudâ, Lughat-Namah-yi Dih-Khuda, Vol. 15, (Tehran: Sazman-i

Lughat-Nâmah, 1946-79). p.819.

2l. Myrobalan (halnah) is a tree grown in tropical regions, the fruit of which is

consumed for medical purposes (Lughat-Namah-yi Dih-Khuda, Vo1.29, p.257).

It is a]so famous for its bitter and disagreeable taste.

22. Sable (samür) is a carnivore in Northem Asia and Europe, prized for its valuable

fur. (Lughat-Namah-yi Dih-Khuda, Vol.21, p.635) .

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23. Ambergris eabïr) is a wax-like substance of ashy colour found Ooating in

tropical seas. It is used for perfumery .

24. Na-yabad should be r~1d instead of yabad, for the latter lends a meaning which

goes against the context.

25. Instead of angürï, glizï-tar ha plist as given in Cambridge manuscript, should be

read.

26. Na-mànad should be read, as given in the Cambridge manuscript,

instead of bi-manad.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

The word !aba'iC (natural elements) refers to carth (khak), water Gill), air (hnwij)

and tire (iitish). Fifth ~abrat is the form of spheres (~ürat-i aOak) (Zad p.4S).

Ummahat also means four natural elements. Nü~ir says in Zad, "Ummnhat that

are nattlral clements (~aba'iC)", p.l. Ba-süyi should be replaced by ba-ginl as

given in the Cambridge manuscript.

For a detailed treatment of the concept of matie,", refer to the 6th chaptcr of the

Zad.

Na~ir detines the substance (jawhar) as Ua thing which exists on its own and

accepts opposing qunlities (Sil1it)" (Jamie p.87).

Na~ir says in Zad that "The sages of true religion callcd the Supreme Sphere

(falak-i ûC~am), the Divine throne, for the Divine (sublime) effects Œ~ar) descend

to the centre of the world from there (Divine throne)". (zad, p.130).

Na~ir deats with this subject i.e. nature, in the chapter on motion in the Zad.

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33. Khabar-ha should be read as given in Cambridge manuscript, lnstead of chiz-ha .

34. For a detailed di!;cussion on "body" and "soul" refer to fifth and seventh

chapters of the ZM respectively.

35. Khür should he read instead of khüd.

36. Read ha ankih as given in Cambridge manuscript, instead of bi ankih .

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Chapter 4

Commentary

The commentary on the translation of the 18th chapter from the zad forms a

comprehensive analysis of the concept ofpleasure as reflected in Na~ir's thought system.

In this analysis the concept of pleasure is related to Nà~ir's major metaphysical

principles in order to locate its position in his ontological framework. Therc.'lfter the

function of this concept on all the existential levels is analyzcd. This is followed by a

thorough examination of sensory and intellectual pleasure. Finally the rclationship of

Na~ir's concept of intellectual pleasure with other key concepts in his world-view will

be explored. This extended commentary involves all the eX~'lnt works of Na~ir so as to

piece together all the relevant aspects of his thought'.

Na~ir-i Khusraw's metaphysics begins, as is the case with othe,r Isma~Ti thinkers, with

a discussion on the doctrine of taw~ïd (Unit y of God),.because according to him, souls

attain permanence (baga) through the recognition (shinakht) of this Unity. The

knowledge of the Unit y of God is attained by recognising His transcendence from both

anthropomorphism (tashbTh) and denial (taC~ïl) of the existence of God. That is to say,

nothing whatsoever can be predicated of Him. Even existence cannot be attributed to

Him, for existence is the opposite of non-existence, and He is the Originator (mubdiC

or padïd-arandah) of opposites and the cause of aIl causes2•

The absolutely transcendent God originated the tirst being from nothingness (nïstï or Qi:

chïzD through His command (rum) and combined the former with the latter. This tirst

being is the Universal Intellect CCagJ-i kull) which is the tirst principle or the cause

ccmat) of ail subtle and corporeal beings Oa!a'if wa ka~a'iO. Thus, the Intellect

comprehends every being inc1uding itself, except God Who, by virtue of being its

Originator, transcends the scope of its comprehension .

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The UniversaI Intellect, being the first principle of the all existence, is perfect Ocamil),

complete (tamàm) and actual (bi-a)-fi~). Being complete and actual, it is in a state of

perfect happiness, rather "The absolute happiness (khurramï-yi mu!lag) has been

imprinted on the Universal Intellect during its origination ", hence, "happiness (shadD

is inseparable from the Universal Intellect"'. In the Jàmic Na~ir maintains that

"happiness (surür)4 is called the substance of the Intellect (jawhar-i Cagl), the substance

of which is Paradise of the ab ode (jannat al-ma'wa)"s.

The ab ove statements imply that according to Na~ir, the UniversaI Intellect is identical

with the "absolute happiness" and "Paradise". The essence of aIl the three is the same.

The relation of happiness to the Intellect has been dealt with at a later stage, but it

seems expedient now to discuss the Universal Soul (nafs-i kull) which is the second

ontological principle and directly related to the concept of pleasure6•

In the cosmology of Na~ir, the UniversaI Soul proceeds from the Universal Intellect as

a result of the motion (junbish or ~arakat) it makes to express its gratitude and

appreciation for the Originator with the complete consciousness of its incapacity to

comprehend Him. As the motion of the UniversaI Intellect is a non-temporal act, so aIso

the creation of the Universal Soul is non-temporal (bi-zaman)'.

As proposed by Na~ir the Universal Soul is the Second (~anD in the hierarchy of

existents, and the first being created from the Universal Intellect. A similar position was

taken by c1assical Hitimid thinkers who preceded Na~ir. As to the relation of the

Universal Intellect to the Universal Soul, the latter is like the former in its being

potentially complete lba-guwwat tamiim) and unlike it in being actually incomplete <ha.: tiCI nii-tamam). The relation between the Universal Intellect and the Universal Soul is

described as being like that of a father to his son. The son is unlike his father when he

is separated from the latter in the form of sperm, but becomes a complete man like his

father after proper rearing (parwarish)' .

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The Universal Soul makes a motion to actualise its potential complcteness and will

consequently become like the Uni versaI Intellect. The Universal Soul, receives benefit

(fâ'idah) from the Universal Intellect to compensate for its deficiency (nuqsàn), and the

Intellect, being perfeet and actual, bestows upon the soul, the required bene fit. From

the motion of the Universal Soul, Prime Matter (hayüHi) came into being and the

Universal Soul raised forms in Matter according to its needs. The Universal Soul also

raised other noble souls (nafs-hà-yi buzur~-war) through which il could eventually attain

the position of IntelIect9•

The deficiency of the Universal Soul in relation to the Universal Intellect is the

deficiency of knowledge, thus the Universal Soul undertakes this enormous action from

fear of ignorance (bïm-i nadanD. The motion of the Universal Soul with the help of the

Universal Intellect generates the world and it (the Universal Soul) sends prophets to

communicate to people the knowledge of the Unit y of God, who as a consequence, by

becoming wise, help the Universal Soul to recover its deficiency in knowledge.

Therefore, through this motion, the Universal Soul seeks its completion and fulfilment'o .

Na~ir's statement that "absolute pleasure arises out of the Divine writ which God has

inscribed on the page of the Absolute Soul"", becomes clearer when it is understood in

relation to the great struggle of the Universal Soul for perfection involving the entire

creation. On the basis of the overalliogic one can suggest that the Universal Soul attains

pleasure, fulfilment and actuality by attaining knowledge. Pleasure, being "Divine writ"

on the Soul, tS inseparable From the latter just as happiness is inseparable From the

Intellect. Owing to the fact that the Universal Soul manifests itself in creation, the

principle of pleasure is found in creation in different forms and varying degrees of

perfection and fulfilment/2• The relation of pleasure with happiness is discussed in

greater detai! in due course.

According to Nà~ir, the Universal Intellect and the Universal Soul constitute the spiritual

world ealam-i r(j~anD and the Universal Intellect is superior in nobility <.s.bamf) in the

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hierarchy of the spiritual world. The corporeal counterpart of the spiritual world is the

material world in which is found the human existencell• ln Na~ir's cosmic scheme, man

has been placed next to the Universal Soul. He stands at the pinnacle of the corporeal

hierarchy of existents as he has the capacity to enter and participate in the eternal,

spiritual world.

According to Na~ir, human existence is structured on the model of existence as a whole.

Existence has two parts: the corporeal Ciismanï) and the spiritual (rGl)ànD. Similarly, the

human being also possesses two aspects in his basic constitution 1 namely, body and soul.

In view of such a constitution, "(man) has been furnished with two kinds of instruments

(3Hit)"14, to experience both aspects of existence. These instruments are the external and

the internaI senses. The recipient in both kinds of experience is the rational soul (nafi:i

natigah)U, for the rational soul combines both the elements of soul and intellect. As a 1

result of these noble elements, the human soul can possess a conscious understanding

(pindarD of the principle of pleasure'6 •

The dual structure of. man enables him to have dual perception, pleasure being a

"harmonious (muwatig) perception (ta'~ïr)", is also dual Le. sensory or intellectual17•

The soul ex peri en ces the sensory pleasure through the external senses (hawass-i zahir) . . and intellectual pleasure through the internai senses (~awas'J-i ba\in). In both cases, "it

is the soul which attains pleasure"". This means that corresponding to the two aspects

of the human being and the two kinds of instruments for experiencing these aspects,

there are two kinds of pleasure, the sensory and the intellectual. A discussion on sensory

pleasure precedes a discussion on intellectual pleasure, for in the development of man,

sensory pleasure cornes first, before intellectual pleasure.

According to Na~ir, through the existence of sensory pleasure (lazzat-i hissD, man is -- . able to nourish and develop his physical body which carries the senses, and only after

this can he start to receive intellectual pleasure'9• Mortal, sensory pleasure stands as a

symbol (ramz wa ma~al) in relation to the permanent Q.la.QD, spiritual pleasure (1a~~at-i

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nafsanD~O. As such, sensory pleasure is a reminder of the Universal ple<lsure, which is

the Paradise in which thertl is no pain21• Thus, it seems that according to Na~ir, sensory

pleasure is an indispensable means for attaining higher, spiritual pleasure. With this

brief description of the general significance of sensory pleasure, an analysis of Nà~ir's

account of sensory pleasure follows.

In the Zâdn, while defining pleasure in a broad sense, Na~ir maintains that "it (pleasure)

is that which when man reaches it from the natural state (~lH-i t.abIJ) becomes happy

(shadmanah) and invigorated ~; and when he is separated from it, expeTiences pain

(ranjah shawad) '123. He then gives an example: "When a man acquiTes food, drink,

supporters, cornpanions, etc., after being in a state of poverty, hunger, thirst and

loneliness, he becomes happy and invigorated. When he separated from them, not only

does he not rernain in his prior state, but in fact he experiences pain "24.

The exact connotation of the above definition of pleasure becomes clear when the key

terms involved are analyzed. These key terms are: ~à1-i !abi"'i (the natural state), shâdi

(happiness) and ranj (pain).

I:Hil-i ~abïTs: No precise definition of the natural state is found in Na~ir's discussion on

pleasure. An irnplied sense that emerges from his critical assessment of Razï's concept

of the natural state is that it is the state the recipient is in prior to any kind of

perception, either of pain or of pleasure. The natural state itself is imperceptible. Il is

therefore, the starting point for both the perception of pleasure and of pain.

As soon as the recipient experiences an object of pleasant or unpleasant perception, he

moves out of the natural state. This departure from the natural state occasions either

pain or pleasure to the recipient. If the recipient departs frorn the natural state as a result

of the perception of pain and thereafter, returns to his prior state which was his natural

state, he is relieved from pain. The relief from pain which the recipient attains by

regaining his natural state after the perception of pain, according to Nâ~ir, is not

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pleasure; rather, it is simply a restoration of the prior state which the recipient had lost

as a result of the perception of pain. On the other hand, if the recipient experiences

pleasure, thereby moving out of the natural state, when he returns to his prior natural

state, he then perceives pain. He will not be able to attain his prior natural state again

after the perception of pleasure. The implied reason for the recipient's inability to regain

his natural state after perceiving pleasure, is that the soul attains astate which now

becomes i ts new natural state and prepares for another perception of pleasure, because

attaining pleasure is the soul's essential function. If the soul reverts to its prior natural

state after the perception of pleasure, it is sent in a reverse direction and this goes

against the essentially progressive nature of the soul.

Shadï: The end result of the attainment of pleasure, according to Na§ir, is the "state of

happiness" and "freshness". Although he does not say anything explicitly in the chapter

on pleasure on happiness and its relation to pleasure, he seems to imply in the definition

of pleasure that the end result of the experience of pleasure is a state of happiness and

freshness. In the broad context of Na~ir's thought, pleasure is concomitant with the

process of actualization which is basically the property of the soul and happiness

prevails along with actuality which is the character of the intellect.

In sensory terms, pleasure is the process of the fulfilment of sensory needs and desires,

and happiness is the state of the soul which it receives as a result of the fulfilment of

these desires. Na§ir's example of a socio-economically deprived person who is denied

the meeting of his sensory needs and who later becomes capable of fulfilling them, can

be understood in this context. In other words, a pOOl' person after becoming rich, is

happier and this happiness is the result of providing the soul with the needed sensory

perception which he lacked due to his impoverished condition. If the same poor person;

after experiencing the pleasures of wealth, reverts to his former impoverished state, he

will suffer far more pain than when he was in that state before experiencing the pleasure

of wealth .

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RanF6: Na~ir does not specifically deal with the problem of pain, but the general sense

that can be understood from his discussion on pleasure is that pain is an unpleasant

perception which drives the recipient out of his natural state. Accordingly, there are two

ways of experiencing such a perception which dispels pleasure from the recipient. Na~ir

does not consider pain as a necessary precondition for the recipicnt to attain plCc1sure.

The concept of pain has been discussed in greater detail later, in the discussion on

intellectual pleasure and also when dealing with the principle of pleasure on sub-human

levels. Following an attempt to give a preliminary explanation of the key terms used in

the definition of pleasure, it seems logical to discuss the sc ope and the structure of

sensory pleasure in sorne detail.

The scope of sensory pleasure (1a~~at-i ~issD is the same as the scope of the sensory

soul (nafs-i ~issl). In relation to the rational soul, "the sensory soul is like the branch

and leaf (barg wa shakh) which grows before (the fruit) on the trec'm. Simi1arly, in

relation to intellectual pleasure, sensory pleasure is also like the branch and lear'. The

scope of the sensory soul encompasses the animal kingdom and extends partially over

the human kingdom as well. Therefore, sensory pleasure is available on these two

levels. Since the scope of the animal soul is limited, the scope of "sensory pleasure is

(also) not without limit (bT-nihayat)"~9.

According to Na~ir, at the animal level, sensory pleasure is extrcmely limited in

comparison to sensory pleasure at the human level. In fact, except for the pleasures of

eating and sexual satisfaction, they share no other pleasures. For animais, sensory

pleasure accompanies the satisfaction of instinctual drives. Their struggle to satisfy their

instincts implies an uiiconscious desire to preserve their species (nigah-dasht-i naw-j

khwïsh) and to avoid harm (ma~.arrat) and destruction (fana)30. To scrve this end, each

animal possesses the necessary external senses whereby it can satisfy its instinctual

impulsesll •

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Lacking cognition, animals cannot manipulate or diversify their objects of sensory

pleasure which in tUrIl, limits the variely of pleasures accessible to them. Although the

phenomenon of sensory pleasure is finite in itself, for human beings, it is total and

complete12 because the rational faculty (guwwat-i cijgilah) of man renders his sensory

faculties (quwwat-ha-yi ~issD nobler than those of animaIs". And through this cognitive

faculty, man can control, manipulate and multiply his sensory pleasures. To give an

example, only man can attain pleasure from owning precious pearls, properties, high

office and rulership14.

It seems the structure of Na~ir's concept of sensory pleasure consists of three essential

components: the recipient or the animal soul; the five senses; and the sensibles or

objects of pleasure. The absence of any one component inevitabJy exc1udes the

possibility of experiencing sensory pleasure. Individual, sensory pleasures vary in

quality and quantity. Sexual pleasure, according to Nâ§ir, is the most intense and

significant, for the perception of this pleasure marks the sign of the maturity of aIl other

sensory pleasures15• Moreover, through the existence of sexual pleasure, man and animal

both preserve and perpetuate their respective species16•

Na~ir, through his own account of the sensory pleasure and his critical analysis of Razï's

concept of pleasure, attempts rigorously to prove the independent existence of sensory

pleasure as opposed to Râzi who considers it to be relative and main tains that "pleasure

is nothing but relief from pain 1137

• This subject is discussed in detail in the comparative

analysis of Na~ir and Râzi's theories of pleasure. Secondly, Nâ~ir seems to place great

emphasis on the positive nature of sensory pleasure which develops and prepares the

body for the rational soul, which, in tum, uses the body to actualise itself by means of

obedience (i~acat) and acqll'iring knowledge through external and internal sensesll•

To conc1ude this discussion on sensory pleasure, Nâ~ir considers sensory pleasure to be

an indispensable means to~a nobler end, namely, intellectual pleasure. He also, however,

warns in his Diwan19 and other works against excessive indulgence in sensory pleasure,

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which results in the ûvershadowing of intellectual pleasure. This discussion has been

concerned with Na~ir's views on sensory pleasure which the sout attains through the

external senses.

We now proceed to anaIyze Na~ir's doctrine of intellectual pleasure, which the rational

soul attains through the internaI senses. This discussion inevit.1bly il1volves a

considerable amount of Na~ir' s epistemology and eschatology. The account of this

notion found in the relevant chapter does not deal much with the nature and structure

of inteUectuaI pleasure, but simply describes its general significance and superiority over

sensory pleasure.

In Na~ir's understanding, intellectual pleasure is the most important and tlte noblest of

aU pleasures, for it is attainable by the rational soul and the rational soul is the highcst

and the noblest of aU souls. In order to appreciate Na~ir's conception of intellectual

pleasure, it is. not out of place to provide a brief description of the rational soul which

is the recipient of intellectual pleasure.

According to Na~ir, "the soul has three grades (sih martabah): the vegetative, the

sensory and the rational".o. He considers these three grades to be three species of their

genus, the Univenal Soul, which is the source or the origin ~) of aIl souls41• Among

these three souls, the rational soul is the noblest because it is the unit y of both lire and

cognition, which, in tutn, are the effects of the Universal Soul and the Universal

Intellect, respectively. Through life, the rational soul performs volitional motions and

by virtue of the cognitive faculty, it auains knowledge <:ilm), which is its distinguishing

feature, Le. differentia. In the Jamie, Na~ir says: "I-ness belongs to the rational soul

which is an intellectual substance Gawhar-i caqlD, and is wise potentially and active by

nature"42. ~n other words, activity is inherent in the rational soul and this activity is

knowledge· oriented, through which the rational sou] actualises itself.

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The rational soul actualises itself and becomes wise by attaining knowledge through its

instruments (alat-ha). The most important of these instruments are the external and

internai senses. Only through the senses the rational soul does come into contact with

the sensible world. The externaI senses supply empirical data to the internaI senses,

which in turn extract meaning from the sense-data. Na~ir's view of the rational soul and

his epistemology inevitably require a brief discussion of the senses, because it is through

the senses that the rational soul is capable of attaining knowledge.

According to Na~ir, the senses are of two kinds (dü-günah)C3: external and internal.

Corresponding to the two kinds of senses, there are two kinds of objects of perception:

the sensibles and the intelligibles. The external senses perceive the sensibles, whereas

the internaI senses perceive the intelligibles. These senses are the only point of contact

between the rational soul and existents both sensibles and intelligibles.Thus, both forms

of senses have been elaborated further, in the following.

The external senses (~awass -i ~ahir):There are five external senses out of which two, the

auditoryand the visual senses, are essentiaI to attain knowledge. The function of the rest

of the senses is related more to the maturity and maintenance of the body which is the

soul's dwelling. Through the auditory and visual senses, the rational soul can hear

speech (Qawl or guftar) and read writing (kitabat or nawishtah)44. Hearing and seeing

supply empirical data to the internal senses which differentiate and crystallise concepts

out of the given sensory data.

Na~ir maintains that aIl knowledge is available only in the form of speech (rum1) and

writing (kitabat), for the sensible world CCalam-i ma~süs) is composed of forms (~Grat­

ha), and these fonns are knowable to the rational soul only through the senses. Na~ir

considers forms as the Divine writ (kitabat-i ilàhD through which God addresses human

beings. Man, with his soul, has been placed in a world which is composed of forms and

is given the capacity to understand them through his auditory and visual senses·s •

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Of these two senses, "the former is nobler and subtler than the latter4\ "for in the case

of the audi tory sense, the presence of both the speaker and the listener is necessary,

whereas, in the case of the visual sense, the writing represcnts somcone who is not

present. Renee, someone who hears is nearer to the source of knowledge tlmn one that

reads. Because of this nearness, the former is more accu rate and certain in his

knowlcdge than the latter. On the other hand, writing represents the speech of the writer

which has been recorded in writing. The reader, in this sense, "hears" the speech of the

speaker through the eyes which play the same role as the auditory sense. Thus, the

reader attains knowledge through the visual sense indirectly, unlike the Iistener, who has

direct access to the meaning contained in the speaker's speech.

From Na~ir's extensive discussion on the concept of writing (kitflhat) and speech (gawl),

it becomes clear that the entire creation and revelation are reducible to Divine writing.

Divine writing, in turn, is reducible to Divine speech, because writing is speech which

is written. Speech is the verbal form of the meaning which the speaker's soul possesses.

The verbally expressed meaning is the will of the speaker which he wishes to express

and convey to the hearer. "The sensible part in speech is sound Œwiiz) and spoken

names expressed in letters and in writing, Hnes and written letters; and the intelligible

part both in speech and writing is the meaning"·'.

The internaI senses (~awas·s-i biitin): In Nii~ir's theory of perception, the externat senses

suppl y the sense-data to the internai senses which extract the intelligible meaning and

leave aside the sensation··. The internaI senses cannot function by themselves; rather the

rational soul uses them as tools for differentiating and organising the undifferentiated

sensory material provided by the sense data. In the zad, Na~ir maintains that the

"internaI senses are many"·9, but he names and explains only five: takhayyul

(sensorium); ~if~ (memory); wahm (estimation); fikr or fikrat (reflection); and ~ikr

(remembrance). They are briefly explained here, for they play an essentiat role in

Na~ir' s epistemology .

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Takhayyul {sensorium)50: Na~ir maintains that sensorium "is that which abstracts the

forms found in the sensibles from prime matter and preserves them ... and hands them

over to the faculty of the retentive faculty (guwwat-i ~afi~ah)"51. It seems that this

faculty of the soul stands between the sensible and the intelligible worlds and transforms

the sensible into the intelligible. The sensorium is like the "writer" which commits

forms lo the memory in soul after extracting them from the matter.

J:Iif~ (retention): This faculty of the soul receives the abstracted forms from the

sensorium and stores them in its memory. It aIso compares the newly received forms

with the already existing ones to find out whether the former is totally new or whether

its like already exists in the store of its memory. This faculty is like the "written" word

in the SOUP2.

~ikr (rememberance): The faculty of remembrance recollects and brings to the surface

of consciousness, the required forms from the depository of the retentive memory. It

cannot remember a form which has not already been stored. This faculty is like the

"reader" of what is imprinted in the SOUP3.

Wahm (estimation): "It is one of the facuIties of the sensory soul which imagines

sensory objects"5., It seems that estimation is not ('oncerned with the correspondence of

the imagined object with the external counterpart which is in fact a function of the

reflective faculty, Estimation, although based on sensory perception, is more of a hazy

imagination which guides the instincts and plays the part of the intellect in animalsH,

Sometimes estimation can be based on misperception,

Fikr (retlection): In the Jamie, Na~ir defines reflection as "one of the faculties of the

rational soul which differentiates between objects that resemble each other6• Due to this

capacity of being able to differentiate, "the intentional movements (~arakat-i qaS® of

man (unlike those of animais, which are based on wahm) are due to reflection which is

one of the motions of the intellect"57, This assertion of Na§ir reveals that reflection has

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a profound significance in this epistemology, for aIl actions proceed from the intentions

of man.

Na~ir maintains that the internal senses are subtle and not spatial (jay-gïr), because the

user, that is, the rational soul, of these tools is itself subtle and non-spatial. The external

sensibles are mutually exclusive but their representative intel1igibles are storcd in the

soul without danger of mutual exclusion, for the character of the soul and its concepts

are spiritual. Therefore, he asserts that the "soul is the place of abstract fonns ~iirat-ha­

yi mujarrad)"38.

In the light of the preçeding discussion, it is not difficult according ta Na~ir, 10

determine the way knowledge is acquired: the recipient, i.e. the rational soul, with its

Insatiable desire to grasp abstract forms, is confronted with é1 world of sensible forms

ready to meet the needs of the soul by providing it abstract forllls through the senses.

Thus, there is constant interaction of perception and intellection betwccn the rational

soul and the sensible world; and through this interaction, the ignorant soul extracts

intelligibles from sensibles and actualises its potentiality by attaining wisdolll. This

intellectual actualization of the rational soul represents the actualization of the Universal

Soul. As the Universal Sou! attains pleasure in its actualization and completion, so also

does the rational soul.

Na§ir-i Khusraw thinks that the above epistemological process is possible for man

because he has becn provided with the capacity to intuit certain self-evident principles

which furnish him with the foundations for building the edifice of knowledge. These

self-evident truths consist of the innate knowledge of laws such as lia part is lcsser th an

a whole", or lia number of things of the same measure are equal in measure among

themselves lls9•

Through the application of the self-evident principles, the rational soul begins to altain

intellectual pleasures, because it is through the knowledge of these innate principles that

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the rational soul attains the acquired knowledge and thereby it also attains self­

completion.

Na~ir seems ta maintain that the rational soul, after developing its epistemological tools,

continues to acquire knowledge ad infinitum. The process of attaining knowledge can

broadly be divided into two phases: in the first phase, the seeker of knowledge attains

acquired (iktisiibD knowledge and in the following one, he receives given ea!3-'D or

(ta'yidD knowledge. In the first phase, the rational soul acquires the knowledge of

creation and religion through ordinary means and processes. These constitute every

cognitive act of the rational soul, including all kinds of sciences such as mathematics

(riya!.D, logic (man~iq) and medicine (~ibb). Na~ir places particular emphasis on the

knowledge of nature. In the Glishayish, he says that "whoever does not understand the

natural world, his soul will remain bound within its circumference"60. This is because

for Na~ir, creation (afirïnish) is the essential epistemological object of the rational soul.

The seeker of knowledge can have two purposes in his mind while acquiring the

knowledge of creation. Firstly, he may endeavour to acquire the knowledge of creation

as an end in itself. Secondly, he may do so to go beyond creation and attain recognition

of the higher world CCalam-i culwD, which according to Na~ir, is the origin of the

manifest creation. Na~ir thinks that philosophers are content with only the knowledge

of creation,61 whereas the people of Yùli! (Divine support) go beyond and realise the

soteriological purpose of creation. Na~ir believes that the recognition of the spiritual

world becomes possible through the proper understanding of this world (creation), for

the material world is like the body (kàlbad) and the spiritual world is like the soul; and

access to the soul is not possible except through the body.

"The knowledge of this non-living house (sara-yi murdah) i.e. the material world leads

to (the recognition of) that living house (sara-yi zindah) Le. the spiritual world and

through the proper recognition of both the worlds, the (knowledge of) the unit y of God

becomes complete (dUTlist shawad)"62 .

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Na~ir seems to maintain that the seeker of true knowledge should follow the direction

set by revelation (wal]y) and the Divinely appointed guide Le. Prophet (pay~ham-bar)

and the legatee (wa~iyy) or the guide (Imam). Here he differs strongly with philosophers

who would insist upon following their \Jwn individual reason wherever it may lead them.

Na§ir considers submission (i!acat) to the guide necessary to attain true knowledge,

because he believes that the order (tartib) of the universe is such that "submission to the

higher (beings) is inscribed upon lower (beings) among cre.:'ltures (makhlliq)"OJ. Through

submission to higher beings, the lower beings are transformed and cvolve into the

former. The human form is the most developed of the physical forms and has come into

bf:ing through the same principle of submission. Higher th an a human being is his

creator (~aniC), therefore those human beings who submit to their creator, receive its

rank64• Human beings achieve this position through submission to the guide, for the

latter have been raised by ttie Universal Soul with Divinely supporled souls6~. Na~ir says

in the zad that "Whoever obeys the creator of the world becomes united (paywastah)

with Him and receives such pleasures and favours which description ~D, speech

(gawl) and hearing (~amC) cannot encompass"66.

Man carries out the act of submission by means of his cognitive faculty (mlwwaH

calimah) and active faculty (quwwat-i camiJah). He acquires knowledge of creation and

revelation by means of the cognitive faculty and performs actions based on that

knowledge67• By implication, Na~ir seems to put more emphasis upon knowledge,

although deeds are also indispensable, for even in the code of conduct, prescribed by

the Universal Soul through the Prophet, there is inner meaning for the soul.

The traveller (musafir) in the joumey of knowledge enters into the second phase when

he begins to receive given knowledge eilm-i ta'yïdï). Nà~ir says the human soul cannot

receive ta'yïd except through (regular performance of) action <JlLIll!l) and (relentless

acquisition of) acquired knowledge. He further asserts that the eye cannot have eye-sight

except if it is protecte.J from defect, pain and disease; similarly ~ like eye-sight

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(rÜshanâ'ï-yi chashm) does not accompany anybody except the one whose action and

knowledge is purified (pakïzah) and whose soul is (also) cleansed from material

impurities (aIayish-ha-yi ~abrat) by means of the water of action and knowledge68•

On the level of ta'yïd, the rational soul starts receiving knowledge from the spiritual

world without physical means. The rational soul becomes capable of receiving

intelligibles without sensibles. The knowledge of the rnu'ayyad is therefore revelatory

in nature and not discursive. When this knowledge is expressed and conveyed, it has to

be expressed through sensible means. According to Na~ir, he who attains the level of

ta'yïd through knowledge and action is called ~ujjar9 (the proot). Nabiyy, WaSiyy and

Imam receive ta'yïd directly from the higher world ealam-i Culwï), whereas hujjat •

becomes mu'ayyad (the one who receives ta'yïd) through them70•

According to Na~ir, mu'ayyad is not only capable of receiving knowledge without an

external medium, but he can easily perceive the soteriological content in aIl of creation.

His intellect constantly meditates on the forms of creation and is capable of deciphering

the syrnbolic structure of creation. He can read the Divine writ inscribed on Prime

Matter. At the same time, he is capable of taking back to their origin, the apparent

symbols of revelation, and has access to the inner meaning (ta'wTI) of external

revelatory form (tanzïl). Since the entire epistemological process of this magnitude

occurs in the consciousness (rational soul) of the contemplator, he experiences the

integration of his soul with creation and revelation. The mu'ayyad mirrors both the

worlds within his soul, for the original form (sürat) of aIl three is one and the same. At

this point, he becomes aware of where and why he himself and other beings in existence

stand in the entire cosmic scheme.

The epistemological development of the rational soul can also be explained in terms of

its actualization or completion (tamamD. In the observable part of existence, it is easy

to notice that the form of a being becomes complete wh en its formation is complete .

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Likewise the intellectual pleasure of the rational soul is connected to the degree of its

completion, just as sensory pleasure is related to the maturing of the body.

Na~ir maintains in the Shish Fasl that "the reproduction (zayish) and rearing (parwarish)

of the soul is exactly the same as the reproduction and rearing of the bodies"11. If the

seed of life (sperm) is properly conceived and developed into an organised form, only

th en can the baby grow into an healthy adult with sound senses after birth. With the

physical growth of the body, the person develops the ability to enjoy and appreciate

sensory pleasure'l2.Physical maturity (baJaghat-i jasad) of man, according to Na~ir, is the

tirst perfection (kamal-i awwalrl• This perfection is completed when man develops the

capacity to experience sexual pleasure and thereby he attains tilt: ability to perpeluate his

species through reproduction. This perfection can also be called the completion of the

physical form of man.

The human body accorqjng to Na~ir, is raised by the Universal Sou\. The purpose

behind raising it is to unite the rational soul with itself, so that "this agreeable mount

(markab-i shayistah i.e. human body) may carry the soul from the house of potentiality

(manzil-i guwwat) to the city of actuality (shahr-i fiC 1) 1114 . Actualization of the rational

soul means completion or perfection of the spiritual form. That spiritual form is the

form of knowledge because "it (human soul) has been brought into this world to receive

the form of knowledge ~ürat-i Cilmï) so that thereby, it can experience the favours of

the spiritual world"15.

Given the correspondence between physical and spiritual creation this world is like the

womb of the mother for the soul to prepare (rast kardan) its form76 just as a body whose

conception is complete becomes capable of enjoying worldly pleasure, a properly formed

soul becomes capable of enjoying the pleasure of the spiritual world .

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Conversely, just as an ill-conceived baby's growth is stunted and remains deformed

lhroughout ilS worldly life, unable to enjoy worldly pleasures, so also, an undeveloped

soul becomes deformed and incapable of experiencing spiritual pleasures.

Upon the first perfection, Le. the maturity of body, man begins to enjoy sexual

pleasure, whereby he acquires the capacity of perpetuating his species through

reproduction. Likewise, when the spiritual form Le. the noetic form of a person

becomes complete, he becomes capable of communicating knowledge to the members

of his species, which iol a kind of spiritual reproduction (zayish-i nafsanD, whereby he

preserves and perpetuates his sou) and the souls of those who receive his knowledge77•

The completion of the form of the human soul marks the second perfection (kamal-i

dllwllm). This perfection is the complete maturity of intellectuai pleasure.

The foregoing discussion on knowledge and pleasure, or more precisely, the pleasure

of knowledge, reveals the fact that Na~ir's doctrine of pleasure is linked to his

eschatology. This is because according to him, a proper understanding of the principle

of pleasure leads the rational soul to Paradise the original source of pleasure. In Wajh-i

Din, Na~ir says that "it is obligatory upon the believer (mu'min) to recognise the other

world (an Calam); and he should know that Paradise, in reality, is the other world.

Whoever recognises that world in reality, his sou! (jan) enters that world"78.

"The (original) form of that (the rational soul) is after the pattern of the form of the

higher world eaJam-i CulwD't79. The form of the rational soul is the form of knowledge,

therefore the higher world i.e. paradise is "all spirit and knowledge (hamah jan wa

dànish) "80. The rational soul develops its form of knowledge first, by observation of

cr~'ltion, then by contemplating upon the intelligibles. Observation and contemplation

must be combined with action, because good and bad actions produce good and bad

impressions (nigar) upon the soul respectivelyB'. The form of the soul which is

developed out of knowledge and good action, becomes beautiful (nïkü) and that which

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develops out of ignorance (nadani) and bad actions, becomes ugly (zisht); the substance

of soul is such that it accepts both kinds of forms, i.e. good and badll'l.

If, in reality, knowledge is Paradise, then "ignorance (nadànï), in reality, is HeU"". The

spiritual world, which ~s in fact the Universal Soul, ftnds an ignorant soul

disharmonious to itself and does not accept it, for it began this gigantic task CCamal-i

Ca~ïm) Le. motion, out of fear of ignorance, ignorant souls remain in eternal pain and

affliction84•

Describing the eschatological pleasure Na~ir says, "when man uses his practical

movements related to action fully by perceiving various sensory pleasures, sllch as

seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching, then reaches him a plc<'\sure which is the

highest of all sensory pleasures, which as yet had not reached him. And that pleasure,

for him, is the pleasure of sexual intercourse, which reaches him during the completion

of the connection of soul with the body. This state is an indication of the fact that whcn

man uses his noetic movement related to knowledge by perceiving various pleaslires

from conceiving intelligibles, then he reaches a pleasure which is the highest of (the

pleasures of) aIl intelligibles, which as yet had not reached him, which for him, is the

pleasure of recompense (~awab). It follows necessanly that his reaching this ultimate

intelligible pleasure is possible when his soulleaves the body completely, equivalent to

the pleasure of which is the ultimate of the sensory pleasures which reaehes him when

his soul is completely connected with the body. When that ultimate sensible pleasure

which is the pleasure of sexual intercourse is found by the soul through the tactile sense

which is specifie to the body which is inferior to the soul, it follows that ultimate

pleasure of the intelligible pleasures which is the recompense can be round by the soul

through the rational faculty, which is specifie to the intellect, whieh is superior to the

soul. Then we say that ultimate (pleasure) of the sensory plcasures is sueh that nobody

can be aware of it except the one who has found it, nor can a narrator describe it, nor

can a hearer con ce ive it from the narrator, nor can its nature (occur) to the thought of

an under-age. Then it is more befitting for the intelligible pleasurc which is the

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recompense of the rational soul, not to be describable, visible and passable to the human

heart, except the one who reaches it. As the Prophet says about the description of the

Paradise by this saying:

"In it is that which no eye has seen, no ear has heard, nor has it occurred to any

human heart8s • Il

Na~ir attempts to explain the same theme in the language of revelation by relating this

world to the exoteric form (sharïcat) of religion, and the world hereafter as the esoteric

fonn (ta'wïl) of religion. TanzTI is like this world, because this world existed in the

Universal Soul in a subtle (lati!) form before its appearance in the form of sensible

matter (hayüHi-yi marysüs). In other words, it is the act of condensing (ka~ïf kardan) the

subtIe world and tanzTI is the knowledge of the Universal Soul condensed and clothed

in symbolic fonns received through the prophets. Ta'wTI is like the spiritual world

bccause it is the process of deciphering these symbols and tracing their literaI meaning

back to their original meaning contained in the Universal Soul itself - the spiritual

world. This is a process of rarifying condensed forms of knowledge to attain their

original subtle forms86•

TanzTI is related to the body and its function, whereas ta'W11 is related to the sou!. If a

man performs action based on knowledge, he becomes like (manand) the Universal Soul

and when he returns to the Universal Soul after leaving his body, he attains the spiritual

kingdom of eternal pleasure and reposell7•

This brief survey of Na~ir's concept of intellectual pleasure reflects the fact that he

rigorously atte:npts to interpret the nature of existence in teleological terms and to

discover the relationship that exists among its major constituents, namely, creation,

revelation and humanity. His attempt gives rise to a cosmology in which the same

spiritual principle, Le. the Universal Soul, manifests itself through creation, revelation

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and humanity. He holds that the essential nature of ail three cOllstituents of existence is

one and the same.

The unit y between these three realms of existence rises in the human soul as a result of

its Divinely guided struggle to understand the teleological content of existence. The

graduaI realisation of the unit y underlying the apparent variety of existence is an

actualization, perfection, completion or self-realisation of the human soul. The proccss

is graduaI, for the structure of aIl three spheres of existence is hierarchical and Illulti·

levelled. In the realisation of this unit y, Nal?ir considers ail thrcc constituents equally

indispensable, because only through this necessary combination can a coherent world

view be built. Otherwise to advance a system of thought which lcaves out any of the

essential constituents of existence, is pointiess.

The ultimate aim of the human soul in this world is to realise itself, which as nolcd

above, means to perceive the underlying unit y of existence. This graduaI realisation or

completion invoives several states through which the human soul develops and rises

above the sensory lev el and experiences extra-sensory levels representing different

ontological planes. The states of the soul are the states of knowledge. As soon as the

human soul perceives a new state of knowledge, it is changed from its previous state and

thereby experiences pleasure. Thus, each new perception of knowledge elevates the soul

to a loftier state which i9 accompanied by an equally loftier pleasure88•

In Nal?ir's doctrine of intellectual pleasure, each new state of the soul becomes its

naturai state, for the attainment of knowledge is the soul's essential activity, and each

new noetic experience develops the essence of the sou) because that new knowledge

becomes part of its nature. The experience of pleasure in attaining new knowledge and

changing from the present "naturaI" state to another is a Divine indication to the rational

soul that, it should continue to attain higher knowledge and more pleasure, in the same

way that a hungry man is indicated to keep on eating until he is completely satiated. The

soul cannot cease acquiring knowledge for, the soul, unlike the physical senses, has an

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infinite capacity for the intake of knowledge and therefore, an infinite capacity for

experiencing intellectual pleasure.

On the other hand, if the rational soul remains ignorant and does not actualise its

potcntiality by carrying out 1ts function of attaining knowledge, it will remain incomplete

and dcfective, which causes real pain to the soul. Pleasure is attained by the unimpeded

function of the soul, whereas pain is occasioned in the opposite state, namely

impediment in function.

Terms such as function @), completion (tamamD, perfection (kamal) represent a

process, and a process represents a motion (~arakat). The experience of pleasure is

related to this process of motion. According to Na~ir, the Universal Soul and every

being under it is in sorne form of motion. The motion is either forced (gasrD or

voluntary (ikhtiyaT'i). The motion of the rational soul is voluntary whereas all other pre­

determined beings carry out their motion under compulsion .

As has been discussed previously, the Universal Soul undertook the gigantic motion

along with the beings below itself to actualise its potential knowledge and become

actual, complete and petfect as the UniversaI Intellect wherefrom its existence

proceeded. Thus, Na~ir's motion of pleasure is related to the motion of the Universal

Soul towards perfection. Any motion towards perfection, on any level, partakes in the

motion of the Universal Sout.

The state of the Universal Intellect is actual and perfecto Na~ir maintains that due to this

state of actuality, happiness (shadï) is intrinsic in the Universal Intellect. In fact,

happiness is the substance Gawhar) of the Intellect. Thus hy impliC4~tion, the difference

between pleasure and happiness is that pleasure resuIts from the process towards

perfection and happiness is the final result of that plea:..ure which is the permanent state

of actuality and perfection. Therefore, Nà~ir asselts that "all pleasures return to

happiness"B9 .

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Thus far the discussion has been focused on Na~ir's concept of intellectual pleasure and

i ts place in his epistemology. In addition, the functinn of the concept of ple.1sure on the

human plane has also been discussed. Now we shaH proceed to discuss the animal

kmgdom following the natural order of the principle of pleasure in Na~ir's hierarchy of

existence.

According to Na~ir, the animal kingdom is higher than the plant kingdolll, but lowcr

than the human kingdom, for the animal kingdom has receivcd a lesser share (rullih)

from the effect (asar) of .the soul than man, but more tlmn the plant kingdom~. On the

level of the animal kingdom, the soul manifests itself through the animal soul (rii~ or

nafs-i ~aywanï) which is also called the sensory soul (nafs-i ~issD due to its capacity to

perce ive sensibles through the senses. By virtue of its senses, an animal is capable of

performing voluntary motion (harakat-i iràdD. li

According to Na~ir, the principal of pleasure plays a crucial role in the animal kingdom

because the desire to attain sensory pleasure exists intrinsically in the animal soul and

thereby the animal soul is activated to attain it. Animais seek pleasure through the blind

urge of the facuIty of attraction (quwwat-i ja~ibah). They are guided by their instincts

in their search for pleasure and avoidance of pain. Although they attain pleasurc through

the given senses guided by instinct, due to their lack of rationality ~), the sphere of

their sensory pleasure is extremely Iimited and only man is capable of exploiting the

entire range of' sensory pleasures91•

"The perfection (kamal) of the animal lies in its life and reproduction (of its spccies)"'Tl.

And this perfection is attainable through two kinds of motions i.e. sensory motion,

(harakat-i hissD and voluntary motion (harakat-i iradï). These motions constitute that .. . share which it has received from the Soul and this share distinguishes it from the plant

(nabat)9'. In other words, the animal soul actualises and completes itself through

performing activity inherent in it by means of senses and motion and in doing 50 the

animal attains pleasure. Thus the animal soul is the motivating force behind and this

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activity, In turn, is directed to atlain pleasure. In attaining pleasure there is well-being

for animais.

Na~ir holds the view that nobility within animais themselves depends upon the degree

of their obedience (itâcat) and usefulness to man. Man keeps submissive and useful

animais dear (Cazïz) to himseIr\

In the order of existence, the vegetative or plant kingdom is lower th an the animal

kingdom and the principle of pleasure on this level is active according to the scope and

character of the vegetative sou!. Since pleasure is co-extensive with the soul on aIl

levels, the quality and quantity of pleasure is in accordance with the quality and quantity

of plant soul.

The vegetative soul is characterised by its capacity for growth, so Na~ir sometimes calls

it the growing soul (nafs-i ruyandah). The vegetative soul draws nutriment for its growth

l'rom the natural elements (~aba'iC). Thus the principal function of this soul is to draw

the required food From the natural elements in order to grow and thereby it maintains

ils well-being and perpetuates its existence. Through the unhindered and smooth function

of these inherent qualities plants actualise themselves. Na~ir says in the Zad, that plants

altain pleasure in drawing nutriment for growth and reproduction. Prevention From the

above function is pain or punishment to the plant95•

Na~ir seems to maintain that the purpose of creating vegetation is to feed animais.

Vegetation actualises and develops itself to become food for animaIs which consume

them and threreby transform them.

The lowest level of the existential hierarchy consists of the mineraI kingdom (maCadin)

or the inanimate (jamad) part of being. Na~ir aIso caUs it the physicai body (jism-i

labï'])96. In this part of existence soul does not inhere, rather it is controlled and moved

by the Divine force (Quwwat-i ilàhï) without any tools (hi àJatD97 •

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-------------------------------------------------------------------

The mineraI kingdom comprises the four natural elements (!aba '1~-i chahar-ganah) i. e .

earth (khak), water ŒQ.), fire Gitish) and air (haw~i). These e1cmcnts arc contro1Jcd and

organised by their respective motions. A detailed discussion on this subjcct is available

in the original text, and will not be considered further here.

The implication in Na~ir's discussion on the inanimatc level of existence and its relation

to the concept of pleasure is that this level Le. inanimate, is harmoniously organised by

the motion that controls and guides the elements in a certain direction. Âccording to

Na~ir, the motion does not inhere in the elements, rather it is imposed from outsidc as

a result of which the harmonious integration of opposing qualitles of the natural

elements becomes possible. The harmony among the elements crC<1ted by the dominating

motion provides favourable conditions for the growth and developmcnt of plants and li fe

in general Plants in turn transform the lifeless beings into life, by uniting with

themselves the material which serves the plants as nutriment.

Each being functions in a certain fashion governed by their respective motion. If the

function of a being is in accordance with its motion, th en it plays a positive role in the

overall harmony of existence. Such a being is considered to be attaining pleasure t'rom

performing its function smoothly. And in this performance there is obedience and the

act of actualization. If any being is hindered from carrying out its assigned function, il

becomes disturbed and disintegrates which is pain for the being in question.

In the foregoing discussion, an attempt has been made to shed Hght on Na~ir's concept

of pleasure which seems to be actively operative on the spiritual and corporeal levels

of existence. The whole discussion can be concluded by stating that pleasure is related

to the essential function of any being (spiritual or material) and the functlOning of a

being is the pursuit of something whlch it does not have. And the "something" which

beings, including the Universal Soul, do not have is perfection, completion or

fulfilment. Thus the process of attaining this perfection and fulfilment provides plC<lsure,

whereas hindrance From this occasions pain .

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1.

Endnotes to Chapter 4

Although only the genuine works of Na~ir have been have been takcn 1I1to

consideration, serious tampering in the extant works cannot be rulcd out.

2. Na~ir, Shish Fasl, Edited and Translated into English by W. Ivanow (lsmaili

Society Series B, No. 6. Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1949), p.4. Hcrcafter. this book is

referred to as Shish.

3.

See also:

Zainoo1, R. Kassam. The Problem of Knowledge in Na5ir-i Khusraw.

Unpublished M.A.thesis. (The Institute of Islamic Studies, McGiIl University,

Montreal: 1984). 3rd chapter.

See also:

H. Landolt, "Ghazalï and "Religionswissenschaft", Asiatische Studicn xlv. 1,

1991 pp.I9-72. FN-98.

Na~ir, Khwan al-Ikhwan, Ed. e An Qawïrn (Tehran: Kitab- Khanah-yi Bahramï,

1338 A.H. shamsï), p.177. Hereafter, this work is referred to as Khwàn. ThIs

passage reproduces Sijistànï's Yanabi". ed. Corbin, p.42. See also H. Corbin,

Trilogie Ismaeliene, (Tehran: Departement D'IranologglC De L'Institut Franco­

Iranien, 1961) French part, p.60f for parallel passages.

4. Na~ir, Jamie, p.116.

5. Na~ir seems to distinguish between "happiness" and "plcasure" by using

expressions such as khurramï, shadï and surür to denote happiness and la~~at to

denote pleasure .

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6 . At this particular point it seems necessary to clarify that Na~ir inseparably

associates happiness with the Universal Intellect and pleasure with tne Universal

Soul, probably because happiness is linked with the "actuality" and "perfection"

and pleasure is linked with the process of "actualization" and "perfection". And

the Universal Intellect and the Universal Soul are linked with the state of

actuality and actualization respectively. This theme is analyzed further in this

chapter.

7. Na~ir, Shish, p. 44.

8. Na~ir, Shish, p.16. Jamie, p.230.

9 Nâ~ir, Shish, p.iS.

10 . Na~ir, Wajh-i Din, Ed. G. R. Nwfu1ï (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of

Philosophy, 1977), p.SI. Hereafter, this book is referred to as Wajh.

If Soul's "fear of ignorance" is construed as "pain of ignorance" out of which

Soul is struggling to move towards the Universal Intellect, then Na~ir' s position

on pleasure appears to be the same as Razi 's, according to which, "pleasure is

nothing but relief from pain". If the ab ove is construed as part of actualisation

of Sout 's pOlential and not coming out of pdn, then, "fear of ignorance" seems

to purport fear of being stagnant Le. hampering Soul's essential function

whereby it actualises its potential for knowledge. In the latter case, soul does not

appear to be in pain, instead it initially has lesser degree of pleasure and through

the process of actualisation - moving towards the Universal Intellect it perfeets

its pleasure. Thus, keeping the overall context of Na~ir's theory of pleasure, one

Illight suggest, that Soul's movement towards Universal Intellect out of "fear of

ignorance" does not seem to mean Soul's suffering from the pain of ignorance,

rather display of Soul 's inbuilt desire to perfeet its knowl~ge with awareness of

its incompleteness .

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II. Na~ir, Zad, p.229. (tr. p.39)

12. Ibid., pp.264-65.

13. Na~ir discusses the ~piritual and corporeal worlds in the fourth and ~ixlh chaptcrs

of Wajh respectively.

14. i,~~ir, Zad, p.169.

15.

16 .

17.

18.

19.

20.

The internaI and external senses appear to be crucial in ordcr 10 have propcr

grasp of Na~ir's epistemology. His works are rcplete with rcfercnccs to the

senses. However, the tirst four chapters of the Zad, the twcnty thinl chaptc\' of

the Jamic and the tirst chapter of the Khwan deal with this subjcct cxtcnsivcly.

Ibid., p.169.

Ibid., p.229. (tr. p.39)

Na~ir, Khwan, p.224.

It appears that in this particular chapter Na~ir has U.,ed terms sllch as, rat~al

(relief or repose), shadï (happiness), and laEat (pleasul'e) synonymously.

Na~ir, Zad, p.244. (tr. p.54)

Ibid., Zad p.41O.

In Na~ir's .vorks, it appears that intellectual pleasure (la~~al-i caqill and spiritual

pleasure (h\~~at-i nafsanï) have the same connoœtion.

Ibid., p.395.

Na~ir, Jamie, p.4 .

95

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•

•

22. This is the only definition of pleasure available in ail of Na~ir's extant works .

23. Na~ir, Zad, p.244. (tr. p.53)

24. Ibid., p.244. (tr.53)

25. For other views on the concept of !abr'at, held by Muslim philosophers refer to

"The Lexicon of Speculative Scienses by Sayyid Jacfar Sajjadï (Tehran: The

Islamic Iranian Acadt!my of Philosophy, 1982), pp. 334-35.

26. It appears that Na~ir has employed terms such as alam and shiddat

interchangcably to connote "pain".

27.

28 .

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34 .

Na~lr, Khwan, p.lOO.

Na~ir, Zad, p.396.

Ibid., p.447.

Ibid., p.248. (tr. p.57)

For a fuller treatment on the varying significance of differing senses in the

animal kingdom refer to the third chapter of the zad.

Na~ir, Zad, p.250. (tr. p.60)

Ibid., p.454.

Ibid., p.249. (tr. p.:;9)

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35. Ibid., p,45!.

36. Ibid., p.17.

37. Ibid., p.23l. (tr. p,41)

38. Na~ir, JamÎc, pp.105-106.

39. Na~ir, Diwan, p.43.

"(lnternally) you have been in love with camaI pleasure; yOll (apparclltly)

abstain from it because your (so called) title is sage (I}akimL"

40. Khusraw, Na~ir, GlIshayish wa Rahayish, Ed. by Sa7d Nafïsï (Tclmm: Sàzman-i

chap-i kïhan, 1961), p.19. [91] Hereafter, this work is rclt.rrcd 10 as

Ghllshayislt .

41. Ibid., p.19. [91]

42. Na~ir, Jamie, p.lOl.

43. Na~ir, Zad, p.169.

44. Ibid., p. 7.

45. The theme of "Divine writ and speech" is an important principle in Na~ir's

thought, and it forms the fundamental basis of his epistemology. Hs significance

can be derived from the ultimate supremacy of the "Divine command" which is

in the form of "Word" (kalimah) and is united with the Ulliver~al Intellect. On

the leveJ of the Universal Intellect, Na~ir's ontology and epistcmology are

identical because the Universal Intellect is the ultimate source of both "existence"

97

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46.

47.

48.

and "knowledge". For further details on the above theme refr.!r to the first,

second and seventeenth chhpters of the Zad.

Na~ir, Zad, p.7.

Ibid., p.23.

For further reading on Na~ir's theory of perCepLJn refer TO:

Zad: 1 st and 4th chapters. Marginal notes on the zad, p.490.

Jamic: 23rd chapter

Khwan: 1 st chapter

The entire fourth book of Avicenna's De Anima which consists of four chapters

deals with the investigation of the internaI senses. De Anima is the psychological

part of Kitab al-Shiffi'.

Avicenna, De Anima, Ed. Fa~l al-Rat)man, (Oxford University Press,

London: 1959) pp. 163-201.

See also:

Mishkat al-Dinï, cAbd al-Muf]sin, Ta~olq Dar l1aqTqat-i cIIm, (Intisharat-i

Danishgàh-i Terran, Tehran:1344 A.H. shamsi) pp. 81-155. The author has

attempted to compare the views of medieval Islamic l')hiIosophers and

contemporary western thinkers on internaI senses.

49. Nà~ir, Zad, p.23.

50. By the term takhayyul (sensorium) Na~ir seems to mean what Ibn Sina caUs ~iss­

i mushtarak (corn mon sense), for the ryiss-i mushtarak is the faculty of a~cepting

the forms (from the external world). (l&xicon of Speculative Sciences, p.224).

51. Na~ir, Zad, p.24.

98

52 . • 53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59 .

• 60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65 .

•

Ibid, pp.24-25.

Ibid., p.24-25.

Na~ir, Jamie, p.94.

Na~i.. Zad, pp.23-24.

Na~ir, Jamie, p.94.

Na~ir, Zad, p. 23.

Na~ir, Zad, p.2S.

Ibid., çp.247-48. (tr. p.57)

Na~ir, Gushayi!lh, p.70. [128]

Na~ir, Jamie, p.16.

Na~ir, Gushayish, p.70. [128J

Na~ir, Zad, p,455.

Ibid., p.212.

Wherever the term "creator" has been used for the Univcral Soul it has been

written with a small "c".

Na~ir, Khwan, p.80.

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•

•

66 . Na~ir, Zad, p.212.

67. Ibid .. pp.482-83.

68. Na~ir, Khwan, p.239.

69. During Na~ir's time , the rank of ~uiiat (proot) was the highest after the rank of

the Imam, in the hierarchy of the Isma9'n dCwah . The ~ujjat was also called

~ahib-i jazïrah (the custodian of the region, lit. the owner of the island). There . were twel\-e ~lIjjats under the Imam. And the ~lIjjat believed to have spiritual

communication with the Imam. Na~ir says, "and every Imam has twelve ~üjjats

through whom the hght of taw~ïd (unit y of Allah) rj3aches to the people of this

worId. (Wajh, p.33l). Describing the relationship of ~ujjat with Imam and other

believers, Na~ir says, "thus in each period Imam of the time is the father of the

believers and his ~ujjat their mother and believers are their spiritual children.

(And) this Imam is the hlljjat to the people and the ~3hib-i jazïrah Le. huiiat (the . "

rank) is the "proof" of the Imam and the da1 is the "proof" of sa~ib-i jazïrah.

(Wajh, p.323). This paragraph indicates that Na~ir uses the term ~ujjat both

technically and in its ordinary sense therefore, its exact meaning can only be

determined by the specific context in which the author uses this term.

In a general sh~te <:ontext the term ~uijat has been used for the "religious guide"

Le. the Imam. Wajh, p.ll. Al-Kati, p.38.

Al-Kulaynï, Mu~ammad, AI-K~ifi, Vol. 1, al-U~ül, Part. 1, (Tehran: 1978)

Also see EN-31 of the 2nd chapter.

70. Na!jir attempts to expound his doctrine of ~ in the 20th, 69th, 86th and 91st

chapters of the Khwan.

71.

100

n. Ibid., p.28 . • 73. Na~ir, Zad, p.304.

74. Ibid., p.309.

75. Ibid., p.484.

76. Na~ir, Khwan, pp.22-23.

77. Na~ir, Zad, p.252. (tr. p.61)

78. Na~ir, Wajh, pp.32-33.

79 . Na~ir, Khwan, p.215.

• 80. Na~ir, Wajh, p.n.

81. Na~ir, Khwan, p,59.

82. Na~ir, Zad, pp.440-41.

83. Na~ir, Wajh, pAl.

84. Ibid., p.39.

85 Na~ir, Zad, p.451.

86 . Na~ir, Gushayish, pp.109-J 10. [157-158]

• 101

87 . Ibid., pp. lOY-I 10.

• R8. Na~ir, Zad, p.250. (tr. p.59)

89. Ibid., p.465.

90. Ibid., p.339.

9l. Ibid., p.248. (tr. p.58)

92. Ibid., p.17.

93. Ibid., pp.39-40.

94 . Ibid., pp. 179-80.

• 95. Ibid., pp.247-48. (tr. p57).

96. Ibid., p.35.

97 . Ibid .• p.35.

• 102

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Chapte .. 5

A Comparative Analysis of the Concepts of Pleasurc of Na~ir and RazT

As has becn noted earher, the causes of the diffçring approach~s of Na~ir and RZllï to

the concept of pleasure can be traced back to the differcnces III thcir mctaphysical

outlooks. To discover the root causes of their di ffercnccs and to ~an y out a sound

compaiison between their respectIve theories of pleaslIre, it i~ ncccssary to dlscuss those

aspects of Razï' s metaphysics which are rele'/ant to the dIScussion on pl~asurc.

None of Razï's major works which focus on mctaphysical I~SllCS are exlant l, whercas

his major medical works have not only becn wcll-prcscrvcd, but have also becn

tran!>lated ir.to Latin~. They were considered to be mastcrpieccs of mcdical SCIl'nœ

because Razï was "undoubtedly the greatest physiclan of the Islamic world and one of

the greatest physicians of ail time"J. Only fragmentary quotations of lm Ima works on

philosophy have survived in the works of various authors. One of the maIn ~OUf(:cs of

Razï's ideas is Na~ir himself, who quoted RazÏ extensively 111 order to rcfute him.

Hence, the only way to have access to Razï's ph!losophicaJ vicws is by piec1l1g togelhcr

these quotations and reconstructing a general structure of hls thought.

From his own works and from other sources which contain 11Is qllolatlon~, il is not

difficult to estabJish that Razï rejected the traditional fonn of religIon, bccau')c of Its

seemingly contradictory nature and developed an alternative mclaphysical I)ystem

drawing upon different elements of ancleut philosophies WhlCh were bél~ed mainly on

discursive reasoning4• Razï's metaphysks, which eventually took the form of a pcrs\.nal

religion, were not, in any sense, Jess mythological or abstract in character than any

revealed religion. This suggest!\ that his thought was not influenccd, al least In any

crucial way, by his medical experimentation, which by its very nature i~ cmptrlcal. With

these pre1iminary remarks on the peculiar character of Razi's thoughl, we shall now

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attcmpt to give a general outline of his thought which has a close relevance to his theory

01 plcasurc.

The cntire metaphyslcs of Razï appears to be based mainly on his doctrine of the five

cternal principles (qudama'-yi khamsah), i.e. God (Allah), Soul (nafs), Time (zaman),

Space (makfUl) and Prime Matter (hayüla). Ibn Khaldun succlOctiy describes Razï's

JustIficatIOn for hls doctrine of the five eternals as follows:

What is pcrcclvable is matter composed of form and :.his form occupies space, moreover

as forrn changes, it a!so requires tlme. Because part of creation is alive, the soul is

nccessary and ~tnce wisdolP exists in the world, a wise Creator is necessari. The

discussion on three of these eternals i.e. God, Soul and Prime Matter is directly re!ated

111 varying degrees to Razï's theory of pleasure. They are therefore, treated briefly in

the follO'.ving. God and Sou! are analyzed under separate headlOgs whereas Matter has

becil dlscw,~ed under the same head1l1gs wherever the need has arisen .

QQd: AccordlOg to Râzï, G6d is our Creator and He fiimself is Absolute Knowledge,

Justice and Mercy6. For Razï, ~ince creatIOn "ex nihilo" is loglcally untenaole, God does

not create anything from nothmgness, rather He composes beings from the co-eternal

Prime Matter (hayuHi). As God knows everything, He knew that the Soul would incline

towllrds Matter, attaining "matenal pleasure" due. to its ignorance. But sm ce He is

Merclful, He bestowed Upùll man the intellect from HIS essence, which is itself pure

knowledge, 10 rescue the soul from the trap of matter. Râzï maintain~ that reason alone

is capable of releas1I1g the soul from material bondage. Only philosophy employs pure

reason, thus through philosophy, man can attain salvation7• Râzï repeats the old

definition of phllosophy that "it is the imitation of the Almighty in so far as it lies within

man's power"".

Ràzï's concept of God differs substantially from Na~ir's concept. Na~ir believes in the

utter transcendence of God Who originated the Universal Intellect through His command

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(amr). But He Himself is beyond the comprehen .. ion of th~ Intellcci. According 10 RÜIÏ .

God IS one of the t!ve co-eternal prinrlples. He oacs nol origlllall' thlllgs. ralhe! Hl'

creates and composes them from the prvexlsting uncornposed Prllne ~ lattrr.

Na~ir's doctnne of Universal Intellect. in one sense, IS Sllllll.u 10 Rati's concept of

Godhead, for Just as Razï's God IS pure knowledge, so IS Na~lr's Unlversal Intellect.

In Razi's theology, the partial intellect IS given to human bClIlg by Gud, and Na~lr abo

bdieves that the human intellect IS the etTcct of the Universal Intellect. According 10

Na~ir, the Universal Intellect I~ H .... tirst pnnciple of creation l'lOir wlllCh ail lowl'r

beings proceed in hierophanles whereas from Razï's God, thlllgS do not procl'Cd. ratller

He creates them from co-eternal substances and they arc not nec:e.,~anly Illl'r.lIchical.

According to Razi, God appeaes to be a supcnor pnncrplc along,>rdc four olller

principlts. Razï does not dISCUSS, at lcast in his l'xtant works and qllotation~, the

principles of happllless and its relation to God, as Na~lf docs ln the conlext of the

Universal Intellect.

Soul: The Soul is the next co-eternal to God. The existence of the Soul is manifcl)tl'd

through ammate beings. God is pure knowledge whercas on the contrary, the Soul, IS

ignorant. Owmg to this ignorance (nadànD, the Soul is int~ltl1atcd wlth Prime Matter,

resulting in its descent from the original abode. The reason behllld the SOlll's desccnt

and attachment with Prime Matter was its desire to attain sensory plcaslire (\a~~at-i

jismanD·

In order to extract material pleasure, the Soul began to work out fceble forms on Prime

Matter. Reacting to the action of the Soul, Prime Matter was about to be rcbcll1olls. On

seeing such a state of affairs, God Who is Merclful, intcrvened and composcd Prime

Matter and placed into It strong and durable forrns Csiirat-ha-YJ qawï W(\ darÙ)

wherefrom the Soul was able to attam matenal pleasure .

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Realising the Soul's blind desire for the attainment of material pleasure and its disastrous

consequencc~, God the Merciful sent the intellect tsgl) to human beings to awaken the

~oul frorn the kthargy it had fallen mto, due to its intense mdulgence in material

pleasure. The intellect reminded the soul that "Pleasure is nothing but relief From pain"

and that the onginal abode of the soul is not this world.

Only philosophers, through their superior knowledge, know about the original abode of

the Soul, which is the place of corn fort and bliss, and inform others about the existence

of that world, so that they rnay be freed From captivity9.

Rfizï's concept of the Soul reveals that it is co-eternal with God and is essentially

Ignorant in Hs nature. Na~ir upholds the opposite view, that the Soul has proceeded from

the Intellect and that it is the wisest, second only to the Intellect. In fact, the Soul is the

Intellect, in potentia and according to Na~ir the difference between the Intellect and the

Soul, is one of degree and not one of kmd. Therefore, the Soul actualises its potential

by rcmovlf1g the dlfference between itself and the Intellect. The Soul attains pleasure in

removing the difference through actualising its potentiality.

Rfizi thinks that the present structure of corporeal existence came into being due to the

mistaken deslre of the Soul for material pleasure, despite the fact that it does not possess

any independent, real existence. Na~ir holds a contrary view Le. the present structure

of the material part of existence was created by the Soul to actualise its potential

knowledge. Thus, rnaterial pleasure stands as a symbol (rarnz) for spiritual pleasure.

Razï's belief in the ignorance of the Soul and its subsequent attraction to material

pleasure, marks a sharp conflict with Na~ir, who considers the Soul as the second

Archangel, which in the Qum 'nie language, is the Guarded Tablet Oawh-i mahfiiz)10. . .. Above aIl, according to Na~ir, the Soul is the place of return for aIl weil formed souls.

Nature (~ab'j\at) with aIl its forms, is created by the Universal Soul to actualise the

individual souls and thereby to actualise its own potentiality. The process of

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actualization takes place through knowledge and knowledge is attained through the fOrlm

(sürat-hà), i.e. the epistemological objects contained in nature. Thus c.lch being in the

world exists for a loft y purpose. The phenomenon of pleasure ltself is a forlll cr~'\ted

by the Soul, the understanding of which according to Na~ir, leads to the original source

of pleasure. i.e. the spiritual world or Paradise.

Thus there is an unbridgeable gap between these two doctnnes on the Soul and their

relation to the concept of pleasure. The only meeting point is that both Nà~ir and Razï

believe in the supra-sensory existence of the Sout, which is the source of lire in the

sensory plane of being.

Another sigmficant point of difference emerges from their view concerning the source

of knowledge and salv~tion. Razï is reputed for his uncondition(ll advocacy of discursive

human reason as being the only source of knowledge and salvation. According to him,

the cognitIve faculty was bestowed upon man by God to remind the Soul of its original

abode and of the relative existence of pleasure. Due to its search for pleasure, the souI

becomes a pitiful captive ot matterll•

Razï did not believe in prophecy or any kind of intermediary between God and man. He

rejected all forms of religion and opted for philosophy because of the apparent

contradictions among religions. Another reason for his rejection of religion is that he

considered it "unthinkable that God should have selected certain men for the purpose of

glving them superiority over the masses. The daims of the prophcts arc, for him,

responsible for the dogmas of inter-contradictory religions and, consequently for the

wars and massacres unleashed in the !lame of vain beliefs"12.

While rendering prophets and the revealed religions redundant and unnecessary, Ra.zï

admires philosophers and philosophy. He believes that philosophcrs, by practising

reason, can attain salvation for the soul, otherwise the soul remains in the trap of matter

107

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I.e. ln pursuit of material pleasure which, in fact, does not exist as an independent

phenomenon.

Adequate discussion has already been undertaken on Na~ir's position on this issue but

to put it in a nutshell, he not only believes in the necessity of the past revelations and

prophets, but also in the eternal chain of Divine guides, through whom the human souls

attam completion. This clearly shows the sharp contrast between Razi and Nà~ir, the

former ruling out the necessity of an intermediary between God and man for human

salvation and the latter confirming this necessity.

ln his extant works Ràzï praises reason eagl) highly and describes it as "God's greatest

blessing (a'~am nicam Allah)". Apart from the other profitable attainments through

reason we al50 achieve "the knowledge of the Almighty, our own Creatcr"lI. This

statement reflects clearly Razi's high regard for reason. Apart from such assertions no

elaborate epistemology of Razï is extant. This creates a serious gap and poses

considerable difficulty in any comprehensive comparison of his theory of pleasure with

Na~ir's.

A comparison between the central princlples of Ràzï and Na~ir's metaphysics which

have a direct relevance to the concept of pleasure, reveals that the controversy is far

more profound th an it actually appears in the chapter on pleasure in the zad. Henry

Corbin in his introduction to the Jamie and Histoire de Philosophie Islamique, has made

an atlempt to understand this controversy and identified three main areas of contenthn.

These areas are nature (~abi"at), soul (naf~) and prophecy (nubuwwah)'·. Corbin has also

disCliSSed the concepts of motion and the prime matter but he has done this mainly

within the context of nature.

Corbin rightly indicates t,hat the main thrust of the conflict centres around Razï's

position against prophethoodl!. This particular jXJ~nt has already been discussed in the

first chapter .

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However, Corbin seems to have ignored two other key concepts on which the authors

in point have serious disagreement. These are the concepts of God and time. And these

disagreements seem to have sorne bearing on their views on ple.ïsure.

Na~ir and Razï's concepts of Godhead have becn discussed in the bcglllning of this

chapter. Therefore, the concept of time will now be brietly compared. According to

Razï, "time is eternal" and a "passing substance" (jawhar-i rawand!1h)"'". But Nà~ir

considers time as "the measurcment of the motions of the body"l1. Na~ir maintains that

any thing changeable and divisible cannot be a substance. Time has parts i.e. the past

the present and the future. The past continuously goes into nothingness (bï-chï7D and

the future has not yet arrived. Thus we are left with the present which is going to be the

past soon. Thus time by its nature is not a substance. If God creates the world in lime

which is passing then He Himself becomes temporal. Therefore, according to Na~ir,

such a doctrine of time is "a great mistake and a big loss (kha!a-yi ca~ïm wa ziyan-i

buzurg)'8 .

In brief, according to Râzï, the motion of the body does not produce time but reveals

it, whereas according to Nâ~ir the motion of the body does not reveal ti:ne rather it

produces time. The implication of these views OP. time is that for Razï the perception

of any kind of pleasure cannot occur without time because time is co-eternal with the

Soul and tht Soul attracted to Matter for the sake of pleasure. For Na~ir only sensory

pleasure can be perceived within time and intellectual pleasure transcends the limitations

of time.

As has been indicated in the introduction, in the Isma91ï - Razï controversy the question

of pleasure is specifie to Na~ir and RazÏ. No other Ismacnï author exctpt Kirmani has

developed a rebuttal of Razï's concept of pleasure. Kirmani devoted only one paragraph

to refute Razï's concept of pleasure in his work al-AQwal which was written in

refutation of Razi's work al-Tibb al-RühanL . .

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The roots of the differences between Na~ir's and RazI's concepts of pleasure seem to

emerge from their differing concepts of Soul and the life hereafter. Razï's attitude to

pleasure is determined by the Soul's ignorance which prompts its blind fascination for

pleasure. The Intellect enables the Soul to reaJize that pleasure is nothing but relief from

pain and pleasure cannot be attained except as a consequence of pain.

If the above definition is accepted as universally valid th en the concept of Paradise and

Hell is denied by implication. Na~ir seem to have a serious concern with this

implication, which he indicates in the beginning of the c!1apter on pleasurel9•

Another important dimension which is necessary for a comparative unde;"standing of

Na~ir and RazT's concerts of pleasure is contextual. Razi discusses the concept of

pleasure in a strictly ethical context, whereas Na~ir discusses il in an ethico­

epistemological context. Na~ir seems to main tain that pleasure cannot be understood in

a comprehensive manner if it is taken in a limited context. And he accuses Razï of

jumping to sweeping conclusions too hastilio .

Apart from Na~ir's quotations from Razï's treatise on pleasure, we find in the fifth

chapter of al-Tibb, Razï's summary ~ccount of the theory ofpleasure. This account does

not contradict Na~ir's extensive quotations of Razï but rather encourages us to rely on

Na~ir. Another important feature of the discussion and references to pleasure in Razï's

two extant ethical works, Le. al-Tibb and al-Sirat al-Falsatiyyah/ I is that pleasure is

being discussed most of the time as related to passion (hawa) which opposes and rebels

against reason. And the task of reason is to control and discipline passion.

Razi seems to have devised a code of conducl based on his metaphysical views, to

discipline his soul and release it from material bondage. He considered himself a

philosopher like Socrates and Plato and attempted to live a philosopher's way of life.

Razï's professed master was Socrates, but he was also decidedly influenced by Plato and

IW

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•

Galen. Thus in order to lead a philosopher's life, he propoundcd ethical id~lls .Uld thcn

endeavoured to discipline himself accordingly.

Na~ir, on the other hand, certainly would not like to calI himself a philosopher in the

sense in which Razï uses the term. Rather, he calls himself a ~ujjat (prooO in the Ismà~lï

dacwah hierarchy. Na~ir, like Razï, attempted to follow the moral dictates of his faith.

After his conversion, he seems to have disciplined his soul in accordance with the

ethical principles of Islam.

Both Na~ir and Razï, despite their restrained and disciplined attitude to'vards material

pleasure, have differing views concerning pleasure. Thelr immediate diffcrenccs C'ln

directly be witnessed in the text of the chapter on pleasure. Here the major points are

discussed with the explanation necessary to put them into a general context.

In his work al-Tibb, Razi states that "pleasure consists simply of the restoration of lhat

condition which was expelled by the element of pain, while passing From one's actual

state until one returns to the state formerly experienced, hence philosophcrs have dcfincd

pleasure as a return to the state of nature"n. He says further that "thcrc cannot in fact

be any pleasure except in proportion to a prior pain, that of dcparting From the state of

nature". The state of nature is neither pain nor pleasure, rather it is imperceptible. Then

he says that "it is the same with aIl other pleasures". The definition is "universally valid

and aIl embracing":!3. The underlying content of the ab ove account of pleasurc scems to

be the same as that quotcd by Na~ir in the Zad al-Musafirin. This account of pleasurc

can be further condensed and crystallized in the following points:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

The natural state is imperceptible.

Pleasure cannot begin from the natural state for, going out of natural S~'lte

always occasions pain.

Pleasure can only be experienced in returning to the natura! state.

The natural state is the intermediary between the perception of pain and pleasure.

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(e)

(t)

There must be prior pain to be able to perceive pleasure.

Due to the universal nature of the statement it is also applicable to the level of

intellectual pleasure.

The implicatIOns of the above assertions seem to be as follows:

(a) Pleasure is not an independent phenomenon, but is relative to and dependent on

pain.

(b) Pain is an independent phenomenon upon which pleasure is dependent.

(c) If the statement is understood in the "universal" sense as it seems to suggest,

then the permanent independent existence of the supra-sensory pleasure, whether

it be intellectual pleasure or Paradise, becomes relative and dependent on the

sllpra-sensory pain or Hell.

Apart from the differences concerning the metaphysical genesis of pleasure, Na~ir does

not agree with Razï's concept of sensory pleasure either. He passes stricture on Razï's

account of pleasure and his criticism is summarised in the following:

(a) Going out of the natural state does not necessarily produce pain, it may produce

either pain or pleasure.

(b) Similarly, returning to the natural state is not necessarily pleasure, it can be

either pleasure or pain or relief from pain.

(c) The natural state is (lpt necessarily an intermediary state between the perception

of pain and pleasure.

(d) Na~ir particularly rejects R1izï's view of the necessary existence of pain prior to

pleasure, for it entails grave implications for intellectual pleasure and the

existence of the source ofpleasure i.I!. Paradise. Na~ir maintains that the rational

soul experiences pleasure in harmonious (muwafiq) perception, and that it Illay

be material or spiritual and experiences pain in disharmonious or opposing

(mukhaliO perception, but experiencing pleasure is essential (jawhari) to the

sou!.

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Whenever Razï deals with the subject of pleasurc, he seems to rcfer to scnsory pleasure

only. Apart from his epistle which is exc1usively designed to expound his theory of

pleasure, he discusses pleasure frequently in his two extant works on ethics. And he

always seems to refer to material pleasure. Since Razï bclieves in the life hereafter,

there must be a parallel pleasure on the supra-sensory level which can be attained as a

result of releasing the soul from material bondage. He once makcs a passing rcfcrcnce,

to such a kind of pleasure in his book aI-Sirat al-Falsafiyyah which says "since the

pleasures and pains of this world come to an end with the end of life itself, whilst the

pleasures of the world where no death is, are everlasting, unending and infinite "24•

This statement clearly shows that he believed in a higher kind of pleasure but he never

mentions and elaborates upon it in his specifie discussions on pleasure.

Na~ir identified the weak spots in Razï's theory of plcasure and launched an ail out

attack. The disagreement on the concept of plcasure is a part of the general

disagreement in their phi1osophi~s, which has already becn partly discussed. On the

other hand, Na~ir's concept of plC<..sure has a broader scope and it seems to be at work

on the whole spectrum of existence, therefore the scope is as wide as the scope of

existence itself. Na~ir a,ttempts to explain the principle of pleasure as an active force

even on the inorganic levels of being. Rlizï's concentration, on the other hand, is

focused only upon human sensory plcasure, the origin of which is found in the inherent

ignorance of the soul. For Na~ir, the principle cJ pleasure is the source of survival of

each being, because cach being attains pleasure in the act of existing, whereas for RaZÏ

pleasure seems to contain an inbuilt negative element which causes lethargy and prevents

man from carrying out his proper rational activity.

When we look into the historical development of the concept in point, it seems that this

concept became topical in Muslim philosophical circles along with other impor~'mt issues

of Greek philosophy. As has been pointed out in the introduction it became much more

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relevant perhaps to the Islamic milieu due to its potential affinity with the pleasures

found in Paradise. The concept of pleasure has been relevant and will remain relevant

to human life in general because pain and pleasure are necessary conditions of human

life, whether their interpretation is done on the physical or metaphysical levels.

Although the relevance of plea!lure to lluman beings seems to be as old as humans

thcmselves, a systematic understanding of this intrinsic principle appears to have started

with Plato and Aristotle. These two giant Greek philosophers interpreted this concept

ln their own ways thereby setting two parallel trends for the subsequent writers on moral

philosoa-'hy. These two trends survived and gained currency in the Islamic world with

the translation of Greek philosophy into Arabie.

Plato (427-343 B.e.) developed his theory of pleasure in the context of his own moral

philosophy. He made a deliberate and thorough attempt to examine the phenomenon of

pleasure in the broader context of the good life, in his dialogue Philebuli. The discussion

of pleasure, to a relatively lesser degree, also appears in his dialogues Phaedo and

Republic.

In the afore-mentioned dialogues, Plato establishes a general model for pleasure

according to which "pleasure is always remedial of a prior pain 1125. As for the perception

of pain, Plato mail"tains that "my position is that this is what happens to creatures wh en

our physical harmony is being dissolved: at the precise moment of the dissolution of the

natural state there occurs the onset of pain", 26 and when describing pleasure, Plato

asserts that "when harmony is being restored, and the natural staie of harmony is

approached, the pleasure arises"27. He also says, "when tite natural state of any creature

is being disrupted by aggregation or disintegration, replenishment or lack, in short, by

any development or decline, the result is pain, discomfort, distress and their cognates"28.

Plato's motive behind yoking pleasure with pain seems to be his contempt of hedonism.

By making pleasure relative to pain, Plato seems to wam hedonists not to try to

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maximise pleasure, for an increase in the amount of pleasure necessarily entails an equal

amount of pain. This he does by explaining the relativity of sensation. Btlt his

generalisation is based on too few examples. The existence of the naturaJ state is

genuine in certain cases, but it becomes hypothetical in others. For example. there is

no natural state in the perception of sight, smel1 and hearing.

Aristotle (384-322 B.e.), Plato's student, later developed his own notion of plcasurc.

In the Nichomachean Ethics, ~ristotle examines Plato's concept of plcasure and (inùs

it unsatisfactory and advances his own alternative concept. Aristotle founù plc.1sure

inseparably related to "activity". Intellectual pleasure is attained through the activity of

intellect and sensory pleasure is attained through the actlvity of the senses. He says "the

best actlvity is that of the best conditioned organ in relation to the tinest of Ils objects.

And this activity will be the most complete and pleasant"29. This statemcnt implics that

each sensory organ is assigned an activity and to carry out the pcrceptua! aclivity il

certainly needs an object. If the organ is sound and the objecl exists, then plc.:1sure is

inevitable.

Aristolle believes that "pleasures are different in kind; for those derived from noble

sources are different from those derived from base sources"30. ri also depends upon the

percelver of pleasure; the "virtuous man" will seek the noble plcasures, whcrcas a lIlan

with "pei'lerted taste" will pursue "base" pleasures. In any case, pleasure is

accompanied by an activity, and the activity itself may be eithcr good or bad, scnsory

or intellectual.

Aristotle maintains that life itself is an activity, and that people desire pleasure because

they aim at life. Pain occasions when the activity is hindered or destroyed. Pleasure

perfects the activity and the more perfect activity is concomitant with more pleasure.

Pleasure cornes to an end with the end of the activity"31 .

115

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Apart From Razï, notable thinkers in Islamic History, who upheld the Platonic tradition

are I:Itlnayn hin Ts~aq, Tbn Miskawayh and the Brethren of Purity. The most notable

trcatment of the concept of pleasure among those above, is found in the Brcthren of

Purity. This treatment may prove to be useful, to a c:!rtain extent, in trying to discuss

Na~ir's intellectual link with the Brethren of Purity because certain wrilers have drawn

the conclusion that the zad is simply an abridged form of the Brethren of Purity l~ A

short summary of the theory of pleasure given in the Thirtieth Epistle of the Brethren

of Purity is presented here. According to the Brethren of Purity, pleasure is of two

kinds: physical Ciismaniyyah) and spiritual (rühaniyyah). "The physical (sensory)

pleasure is the relief (ra~at) which is perceived by the animal soul during the

dirninishing (zawfil) of pain wherC<îS pain is perceived by the animal soul during the

departure of the ('physical) disposition (mi7.aj) from the 'equ ilibrium (iCtidal)

of the natural state towards cither ex cess (ziyadah) or loss (nuqsan) due to a cause ".

The animal souls are intrinsically prone to perceive sensory pleasu~e so that they may

maintain mOderation and balance, wherein there is well-being for their bodies. And

indced, in the well-being of their bodies th cre is well-being for their souls .

The spiritual pleasure is that which one perceives through the human soul and is mainly

of two kinds: that which is perceived through the medium of the body and that which

is perceived without the medium of the body. Man attains spiritual pleasure through

faith, knowledge (maCrifah), ethics and good conduct and rcceives pain througt'

ignorance, wrong beliefs, and wrong doingsH•

The above account is sufficient ta establish the fact that the Tkhwan's concept of sensory

pleasure is different from that of Na~ir. Rather, it accords with Razï's notion and both

of them are Platonic in essential character with the diffc:rence that Rlizï does not discuss

spiritual pleasure at aIl.

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On the other hand, Aristotelian interpretation of the thcory of plcasurr wa~ hl'ld hy Ibn

Sïna, al-Ktrmanï, Fakhr al-Dïn Razï, Nasïr al-Dïn TOsï and Mulla Salira".

Concerning pleasure, Ibn Sïna maintains that "Il is a perception and attainmcnt of the

occurrence of something wherein lies goodness and perfection, in sofar as it is suclt, for

the perceiver. Likewi!Je, pain is a perception and attainmcnt of occurrence of something

wherein lies evil and harm for the percetver"16. The "pei zeption" in Anstote~ian terms

is the "activity" which involves the process of actualization of the potcnltal perfection.

Kirmanï seems to hold a similar posItion concerning pleasure III his book ai-Agwill.

After criticising Razï's notion of pleasure, Kirmanï !Juts forth his own vtew and states

that pleasure accompanies the progression of essence ~) towards its perfectIOn. If the

perfection is sensible then its existence becomes transitory (7~l'tl) i.c. mceting of

recipient and the object perceived. On the other hand, mtellcctual pIeasure is etcrnal

when the soul realises its perfect fonn and it experiences a pleasurc which never

diminishes17 •

There have also been certain thinkers in the history of Muslim philosophy who have

advocated the view t'lat there is an underlying unit y between Platonic and Aristotclian

notions of pleasure. The difference is merely in language (ikhtilaf-i laf~ï)lti.

The foregoing comparative analysis of Nâ~ir's and Razï's concepts of pleasl1re c1early

shows that these thinkel s represent two distinct!)' ~iffering points of view on the subjcct.

These differences can be understood in the ove rail philosophical context.

Also their differences on the concept of pleasl1re have an historical dimension as weil,

for these thinkers have not developed a radically new interpretatton of pleasure rather

they adopted and modified two existing traditions originaIly founded by Plato and

Aristotle .

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Nâ~ir however was the first of the IsmaCUï philosophers to propound a sophisticated

philosophico-theological interpretation of pleasure. His interpretation is clearly in line

with Kirmânï's interpretation advanced in his book al-Aqwal.

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1.

2.

Endnotes to Chanter 5

The reason for the 10ss of Razï's works may be that hls anti-rcligious vicws did

not relate to Islam and therefore t'.arned few or no followcrs intcrcsled in

preserving them.

Razï's medical works as opposed to his phi!osophical work'i an: wel1 preservcd.

The greatest medical work of Razï was the Kitâb a:-I:Iawï which was translated

into Latin under the title of Continens in 1279 A.D. His other major mcdlcal

work the Kttab al-Mansürï was rendered into Lat111 in 1481 A. D. under the tltle

of Liber Almonsori~.

3. Abü Bakr Mul)ammad Zakariyya-yi Razï, al-Tlbb al-RliI)anï, Tr. A. 1. Arbcrry

(London: John Murray), p.6. Hcreafter, thls work is rcfcrred to m; al-Tlhh .

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9 .

The controversy on the necessity of prophethood is found 111 the Nlam al­

NlIbllwwah of the Isma"ïlï da'-1 Abu J:Iatim al-Razï ed. by S. al-~awy and Gh. R.

ACwanï, Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977, EnglIsh

introduction by S. H. Na~r.

Mahdi Mu~aqqiq, Faylasuf, pp. 277-78.

A. J. Arberry, Aspects of Islamic Civilisation, (London: George Allen and

Unwin Ltd .• 1964), pp. 127-28.

Na~ir, Zad, pp.74-76.

Arberry, Aspects of Islamic Civilisation, p.128.

Na~ir, Jamie, pp.211-13. Zad, pp.115-16.

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10. Qur'an: 85:22

Il. Corbin, Cambrid~e History of Iran, p.538.

12. Ibid., p.541.

13. Ràzï, aJ-Tibb, p.20.

14. Henry Corbin, Histoire de Philosophie Islamique, Translated into Persian by

Asad Allah Mubashshirï (Tehran: Mu'assasah-yi Amïr-i Kabïr, 1341), pp. 190-

29.

15. Corbin, Histoire de Philosophie Islamique, p.192.

16 . Kraus, Opera, p. 267.

17. Ibid., p.266.

18. Ibid., p.268.

19. Na~ir, Zad, p.229.

20. lt seems, according to Razï, that the Soul's blind attraction to pleasure is grossly

unethical. Ali pleasures are therefore, the effects of this primary ethical

violation. As far as Na~ir is concerned it appears that sensory pleasure can be

treated in a partially ethical context. It needs strict discipline to give way to

intellectual pleasure. This clearly suggests that intellectual pleasure is experienced

through the .moral discipline of sensory pleasure. Sensory pleasure itself is an

indicator or the stepping stone to intellectual pleasure .

120

21. Razï's work al-Sirat al-Falsatïyyah sketches the moral lite of a philosopher.

• Among the six fundamental principles of moral life, he devotes two to explain

the significance of exercising restraint on worldly pleasures.

•

•

22. Razï, al-Tibb, p.39.

23. Ibid., p.39.

24 .

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30 .

Paul Kraus, in his introduction to the Sïrah, quotes Na~ir' s definition of ple.lsure

as, "pleasure is not an established or proven state (kayfiyyat-i ~abit), ralher it is

(only) the returning of the body to its natural state after disordering (the original)

state as a result of the perception of pain", pp.84-5. Strangely enough, this IS the

very definition that Na~ir has tried so hard to disprove. One can only conc\ude

therefore that Paul Kraus has mistaken Na~ir's quotation of Razï as bcing Na~ir's

own view.

Arberry, Aspects of Islarmc Civilisation, p.123.

Plato, Philebus, Tr. R.A.H Waterfield (London: Penguin Books, 1982), p.IS.

(47c.)

Ibid., pp.85-86. (31d.)

Ibid., p.86. (31d.)

Ibid., p.106. (42d.)

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Tr. by David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1984), p.256. (l174b.)

Ibid., p.253. (1l73b.)

121

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•

1.

3l. Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, (New York: Calton House), p.228.

32. Rypka, in his work, History 'lf Iranian Literature, has referred to H.H

Schaeder's conclusion that zad is Ilothing more th an a compendium of the corpus

of the Brethren of Purity. p.188. This conclusion seems incorrect because at

lcast there is rernarkable difference between the concept of pleasure of Nà~ir and

that of the Brethren of Purity.

33. Ikhwan al-Sara', Rasa'il, Vo!.3 Ed. Tura~ al-Arabi, (Beirut: Dar ~adir, 1957),

pp.52-53.

34. Ibid., p.'/1.

35. Muhaqqiq, Faylasüf, p.253.

36 . Ibn Sïna, al-Ishàrat wa al-TanbThât, Translated into Persian by J:Iasan Malik

Shâhï (Tehran: Soroush Press, 1984), p.4l7.

37. Kirmani, al-AQwàl, p.75.

38. In his work Faylasüf, Mul]aqqiq has mentioned at least two such Muslim

thinkers i.e. Abü al-Hasan Tabarï and Abü al-Hasan cAmirï who held the view .. . that the difference between Plato's interpretation of pleasure and AristotIe's is

merely verbal. p.254.

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Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of Na~ir's concept of pleasure leads to the conclusion that the

concept of pleasure according to Na~ir, is not confined to an ethical context ollly but is

a universal principle operative in ea·:h and every being. It is universal because it

proceeds originally from the Universal Soul's motion to perfect itsclf ~nd bccolllc Iike

the Ulliversai Intellect through removing its deficiellcy in knowledge.

The entire creation came into being due to this gigantic motion of the Univer~11 Soul,

thus the "motion", "activity" and "function" of every being is rcceived from the

Universal Soul and is aimed a~ perfection on its own level. The Univcrsal Soul has

assigned specific function to every being according to its form (sürat).

Pleasure is associated with this specifie funetion received by cvcry bcing accord mg to

its form. Thus there is one universal or "absolute" Utlu!lag) principle of pleasllre which

takes different forms on different levels according to the "nobility" that they reccive

from the Universal Soul.

At ail the existentiallevels below human, the concept of pieasure is inbllilt and fllllctions

as a driving force to enable them to maintain and perpetuate their own survival. On the

human level, sensory pleasuré perpetuates physical existence and intellectual pleasure

perpetuates the spiritual existence. A healthy body enjoys sensory pleasure because it

i.e. the body, performs its normal function. In case of il1 health, material pleasure

cannot be fully appreciated. The assigned function of the human intellect is to

continuously acquire the knowledge of creation because the creation is constituted of

signs, through the knowledge of which the human soul attains nearness to the Universal

Soul. This is the intellectual activity from which the rational soul expericnces intellectual

or spiritual pleasure .

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Just as the human body acquires physical maturity or perfection (kamal) over a number

of years through experiencing sensory pleasure, similarly the intellect attains intellectual

maturity through experiencing intellectuaI pleasure. Na~ir considers this maturity the

second perfection. The second perfection can also mean the rational soul's union with

the Universal Soul. This, a~cording to Na~ir, is Paradise.

The rational soul needs the support and help of the Divine guide to acquire this

intellectual pleasure because he represents the UniversaI Soul on earth. He is the

spiritual parent and as such he forms and nourishes the spiritual senses which are

necessary to enjoy intellectual pleasure.

Human sensory pleasure is the symbol (ramz) or represent.ative of intellectual pleasure

and thcrcfore man should aim at intellectual pleasure through the example of sensory

pleasure. Although animais and humans share sensory pleasure, only man has the

capacity to muItiply this pleasure infinitely because he possesses the rational soul.

The main contention between RazI and Na~ir concerning sensory pleasure is that Ràzï

considers this pleasure as being nothing but relief from pain. In other words, pleasure

is relative to pain and therefore it does not have an independent existence. Nà~ir seems

to be concerned with the metaphysical implications of this definition. Such as, if

pleasure is relative to pain then Paradise, the ultimate source of pleasure relative to

Hell, the ultimate source of pain. This shakes the foundations of religion in which an

independent existence of Paradise as the ultimate reward for the virtuous believer is

promised.

Ràzï's approach to pleasW'e appears negative because according to him, the Soul has

tallen into the trap of matter due to its desire to experience pleasure. Nà~ir, on the other

hand, believes that physical pleasure is a reminder of intellectual pleasure which in turn,

is related to the pleasure of the UniversaI Soul. This cIearly reveals that the concepts

of pleasure of both the thinkers are strongly influenced by their metaphysical principles .

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And their differences in the interpretation of the concept of pleasure originally stem

from their far deeper differences in their general philosüphical approach. Howcver,

Na~ir' s criticism of Razï forms a part of an older tradition of Isma~1ï critique of Razï.

This study shows that the activity-related notion of pleasure is Peripatctic in origin and

it is more suitable to the IsmâCUï world-view, whereas Râii's concept of pleasurc is

based on the Platùnic model which tends to emphasize the "relativity" of plcasure.

This study also shows how the individual concepts are organically rclatcd to othcr

central concepts in a consistent thought system of an indlvidual thinker and the

individual thought system in turn is interlinked with historical trends of thought.

125

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•

•

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