The Changing Structure of Industrial Relations in South Africa

ROBERT A. JONES Department of Business Economics, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

This is the second of two papers dealing with the emergence of black shop-floor union power and the changing structure of industrial relations in South Africa. This paper examines union developments in the post-Wiehahn era, the policies of the major union federations and the impact of the black unions’ emphasis on shop-floor bargaining. It is clear that the established unions, the State and individual company managements have been significantly affected by this development. The main issue in the near future is seen to be the dividing-line between managerial prerogatives and worker-participation.

INTRODUCTION

The Wiehahn Commission Report (1 979) marks a watershed in the evolution of South African industrial relations. By legitimizing the existence of black trade unions and de-racializing the labour situation, a dynamism has been injected into the system of work- place relations. This has prompted renewed emphasis on training, not only in manual crafts but in manage- ment development, particularly in human resources skills. Reaction has also been prompted from the established white unions, who for many decades had been stagnant in membership and complacent in their attitude, content to limit their presence to industrial- council level and allow shop-floor organization and representation to decay. Industrial relations and trade union development in South Africa are now under- going a fundamental transformation. They are enjoy- ing a vitality never previously experienced.

T R A D E UNIONS SOME FACTS AND FIGURES

Not surprisingly, black unionism has expanded con- siderably in the post-Wiehahn period. At the beginning

of 1978 (i.e. before the Wiehahn changes), a total of 201 trade unions were operating in South Africa, a remarkably large number in view of its circumstances. Combined membership was approximately 740 000 440000 whites, 230000 coloureds and Asians and 70000 blacks. All the whites and coloureds were organized into 174 registered unions, whilst all the blacks were in 27 unions that could not be registered by law. Table 1 shows the details.

The importance of whites-only trade unions is clearly revealed. Almost half of the total number of registered unions restricted their membership to whites only in terms of their constitution, and the overwhelm- ing majority of whites were organized into these unions.

Following the Wiehahn amendments it now makes increasingly less sense to categorize unions according to their racial composition. More and more unions are deciding on multi-racial status, but their reasons for doing so are diverse. Some are previously con- servative white unions that now wish to control and de-radicalize black workers in their sphere of operation: others are previously white unions with more liberal motives: still others are basically black unions with a non-racial constitution. By the beginning of 1983 the number of whites-only unions had fallen from 84 to 71; coloureds-only unions from 49 to 46;

Table 1. Trade Unions: Numbers, Membership and Racial Composition (as a t early 1978) Registered Unregistered (by law)

Number of Membership Number of Membershrp Racial composition unions Whites Coloureds unions blacks

Exclusively white 84 390 000

Bi-racial 41 50 000 1 30 000 Exclusively black 27 7 0 000

Total 174 440 000 230 000 27 7 0 000

Source: Wiehahn Commission Report (1 979). Part 1, p. 15.

Exclusively coloured 49 1 00 000

CCC-0143-6570/85/ooO6-0217$04.50

0 Wiley Heyden Ltd., 1985 MANAGERIAL AND OEClSlON ECONOMICS, VOL. 6, NO. 4, 1985 217

and bi-racial unions from 41 to 16. A remaining 83 unions were either multi-racial or restricted to blacks only, with a small number catering for blacks and coloureds only, making up a grand total of 216 unions: 191 registered and 25 unregistered. Total membership was approximately 1386000: 477000 whites, 330000 coloureds and 579000 blacks (210000 of these in unregistered, unaffiliated unions).

With an economically active population of ap- proximately 10 million, and with 1386000 members crowded into 216 unions, South Africa boasts a relatively large number of unions but of small average size (6400 members) and low union density (14%). Increasing maturity over the next decade will obviously see a large rise in this percentage figure, accompanied by a reduction in the number of unions and an increase in their average size resulting from mergers and natural growth.

The largest trade unions are the old-established Boilermakers Society and the Garment Workers Union of the Western Province, with memberships approaching 60000. Some of the new general unions claim larger memberships of approximately 100 000, but there is considerable suspicion whether these figures represent solely fully paid-up members in good standing. About 75% of unions have a membership of less than 5000, and more than 35% have less than 500. By the beginning of 1983 only about 25 unions (12%) could boast more than 20000 members.

THE ESTABLISHED UNION MOVEMENT

The old-established white and coloured unions are affiliated either to the liberal, multi-racial TUCSA (Trade Union Council of South Africa) or the conservative, whites-only SACOL (South African Confederation of Labour). However, a great many unions have preferred to remain unaffiliated. TUCSA affiliates were organizing blacks into unregistered ‘parallel’ unions prior to the Wiehahn amendments, and these unions subsequently have either remained as entities in their own right or else have merged with their ‘parent’ into a malti-racial organization. TUCSA is the largest umbrella body with over 50 affiliated unions and approaching 500 000 members: 130 000 whites, 260000 coloureds and 110000 blacks. Many of these blacks are trapped into a TUCSA union by the closed shop negotiated at industrial-council level. In addition, as many as another 100000 blacks belong to company or ‘sweetheart’ unions in such organiza- tions as the railways and the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM). Blacks in TUCSA unions or company unions are referred to as constituting the ‘non-independent’ black movement in South Africa.

SACOL (127000 members in 12 all-white affiliates) refuses any accommodation with black or coloured workers.

THE INDEPENDENT BLACK UNION MOVEMENT

The remainder of the black unions are part of the ‘independent’ movement, which comprises FOSATU, CUSA and a motley collection of unregistered, un- affiliated unions (plus one or two registered, unaffiliated unions). An examination of these group- ings will give a good impression of the policies, activities and aspirations of black unions in South Africa at the present time.

Fosatu

The Federation of South African Trade Unions was formed in 1979 and has the following set of objectives

policies:

A united labour movement independent of race, colour, creed or sex; Broadly based national industrial unions instead of general worker unions, craft unions, white- collar unions, splinter groups and other small unions; Emphasis on worker-democratic factory-floor organization, representation and negotiation through shop-steward structures and branch official-influence; Union government ‘by the members’ rather than ‘with the consent of the members’, with leaders and officials acting as spokesmen rather than negotiators with unlimited mandates, necessitat- ing frequent report-backs to grass-roots meetings; Sole bargaining rights in workplaces for unions with majority support; On-going worker-education programmes; Social justice for all workers; Decent standards of living, social security and fair conditions of work for all affiliated members and the working class as a whole; Comment on, advance or oppose any policy of any authority or institution affecting the workers’ interests in general and the interests of the labour movement in particular; Independence from any political organization.

FOSATU operates with strong central leadership. Their affiliates are non-racial but have developed from solid black union roots. Over 80% of membership is black and the remainder coloured. Only a handful of whites belong to FOSATU unions. There are, however, a relatively large number of whites in leadership and advisory positions. It is suspected that a substantial portion of leadership does not share the TUCSA belief in the benefits of free-enterprise capitalism. Rather it is more economically radical than this, being antagonistic towards the basic tenets of capitalism. It also rejects the notion of co-operation with manage- ment.

FOSATU leadership is politically aware, condemn-

21 8 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS. VOL. 6, NO. 4, 1985

ing apartheid and being sharply critical of most aspects of Government policy. It also rejects the TUCSA belief in ‘pure and simple’ unionism, holding that unions should not confine their activities solely to workplace issues but should operate on a much wider basis in view of the black person’s discriminated position in the wider context. However, despite these beliefs, FOSATU affiliates have confined their practical activities solely to factory organization and workplace issues. This has led to the accusation that FOSATU is indifferent to wider political issues, which is clearly not the case. It strongly demarcates long-term ideology from short-term practicalities, preferring not to dissipate its energies and limited resources at this stage of its development. The reasons for the demise of previous waves of black unionism have been well assimilated, and FOSATU desires to build a permanent base of secure shop-floor structures before embarking on more ambitious projects.

Its sympathies do show through, however, in the passing of political resolutions at its congresses, such as: rejecting the Homelands policy; demanding one- man one-vote majority rule in South Africa; condemn- ing, and requesting a worker-boycott of, the new tri- camera1 constitution, and supporting the call for a nationwide work-stoppage protesting against the death of a unionist in detention.

After an initial hesitation, FOSATU unions have now unanimously decided in favour of registration. They have also displayed a keenness to make use of legal machinery to obtain redress for workers and establish important precedents.

FOSATU has concentrated on shop-floor organi- zation and recognition. It is in favour of industry-level bargaining as long as it is not meant as a replacement for plant-level bargaining. For reasons stated earlier, FOSATU has grave reservations concerning the operation of industrial councils and initially refused to join them. However, several of its affiliates have now reached the stage where it is difficult to administer the large number of separate recognition-agreements signed with individual companies and, having established a sound shop-floor presence, they feel the time is right to join the respective industrial councils to provide a focus around which workers can unite their demands. Their reservations about the councils remain, however. They see many potential dangers in membership, and have formulated a set of principles in regard to continued membership of such councils. In its letter of application to the Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry, the Metal and Allied Workers Union stated that it is a union committed to shop-floor bargaining. Industry-wide bargaining may be supplementary but can never take the place of workplace bargaining, and the Council should not attempt to limit or discourage MAWUs activities in this direction. The union insisted on facilities for reporting back to its members during negotiations in view of the fact that it is democratically controlled by its members, with union representatives being mandated at all stages of negotiations by shop-

steward committees. The union refused to be a party to any agreement or action taken by the Council with which its members did not agree, and undertook regularly to review its decision to enter the Council and to withdraw if necessary.

By mid-1983, FOSATU had a total of eight affiliates with a combined membership of 84300. It is parti- cularly strong in the engineering and metal industry (20 000 members), motor-assembly industry (18 300 members) and textiles (16 000 members). Other in- dustries in which it has a presence are, in order of membership: sweets and food (9000 members), transport (8000 members), chemicals (6500 members), paper and wood (6000 members) and jewellery (500 members).

Cusa

The Council of Unions of South Africa was formed in 1980 after its affiliates failed to resolve various differences with FOSATU. The points made about the policies and activities of FOSATU also apply to CUSA but with two essential differences:

(1) CUSA unions dislike strong central direction and operate as a loose federation;

(2) CUSA adopts the ‘black consciousness’ philosophy of black exclusivity in order to develop black leadership.

Both FOSATU and CUSA share the long-term objective of creating a non-racial labour movement, but whereas FOSATU believes that this can only be achieved by having a non-racial organization from the beginning, CUSA believes that for the short and medium term blacks and whites do not face common circumstances and cannot be regarded as equal partners in South Africa. No affinity is felt towards whites at the present stage of the country’s develop- ment and, hence, non-racial trade unionism does not provide a realistic solution to current problems. CUSA believes in developing black leadership in order to come to grips with the exploitation of the black worker by the more sophisticated and developed race groups. To be led by whites in not a feasible solution, for blacks will never acquire the necessary leadership skills and responsibility. Accordingly, CUSA recruits only black workers under black leadership. The eventual object of the establishment of a non-racial, non- exploitive, democratic society will only be attained through the development of blacks in leadership. Only when all people are truly equal will a non-racial labour movement be embraced.

By mid-1983, CUSA had a total of 11 affiliates with a combined membership of 141 600. It is particularly strong in the mining industry (35 000 members), steel and engineering industry (20 600 members), municipalities (20 000 members), chemical industry (1 5 000 members), building and construction industry (12000 members) and the food and beverage industry (10000 members). Other industries in which it has

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, VOL. 6, NO. 4.1985 219

a presence are, in order of membership: transport (9000 members), motor industry (8000 members), hotels, liquor and catering (4000 members), laundry, dry-cleaning and dyeing (4000 members) and textiles (4000 members).

Unregistered, Unafiliated Black Unions

These unions comprise a motley and vociferous crowd with a spectrum of opinions. Generally, they can be described as economically and politically radical. They remain outside the official negotiation system, rejecting registration, industrial councils and the official dispute-settling mechanism. Several of them are general unions, recruiting workers over a wide range of industries. In addition, several of them are community-based unions, taking their inspiration from broad township issues and concerning themselves with the ‘wider popular struggle’. Although they stress workplace recognition and bargaining, their factory structures tend to be weaker than FOSATU and CUSA unions, and they rely upon popular leaders, using mass meetings as an organizing device. They appear to be making the same mistakes as the previous generations of black unions. Internal dissension has already led to power struggles and breakaway move- ments in several instances, revealing the inherent in- stability of these types of organizations. By concerning themselves with all the laws and regulations under which their members suffer they are spreading their resources thinly. They are extremely outspoken and have adopted confrontationist approaches to manage- ments and the State, thus attracting the attention of the security police.

With some exceptions they are non-racial in character, often having whites in leadership and advisory positions, although their membership is almost totally black. Some of them claim very large memberships, but because they tend to have looser organizational structures than FOSATU and CUSA unions these figures are unreliable and probably grossly exaggerated.

Leading unions are:

SAAWU (South African Allied Workers Union) GWU (General Workers Union) BAWU (Black Allied Workers Union) OVGWU (Orange-Vaal General Workers Union) MGWU (Municipal and General Workers Union) AFCWU (African Food and Canning Workers Union) MWASA (Media Workers Association of South

MACWUSA (Motor Assembly and Components

BAMCWU (Black Allied Mining and Construction

Africa)

Workers Union of South Africa)

Workers Union).

Black Trade Union Unity

Several attempts have been made during the post- Wiehahn era to bring together these different black

trade unions and federations into a broader union unity. Due to personality clashes and differences in policies, this has proved to be an illusory objective. The best chance of unity seems to be among unions sharing the following two characteristics:

(1) They organize on an industrial rather than general basis;

(2) They have established sound factory structures and concentrate primarily on workplace-level issues, rather than being community unions which spread their resources over broader township issues and the ‘wider popular struggle’.

With these two issues in mind, the following six black trade unions and union federations,

FOSATU CUSA GWU AFCWU CCAWUSA (Commercial, Catering and Allied

CTMEA (Cape Town Municipal Employees Workers Union of South Africa)

Association)

announced in March 1984 that plans to form them- selves into a new federation representing over 300000 workers organized on an industrial basis (one union per industry) were well advanced. General unions linked to community groups do not meet the criterion of industrial unionism laid down by the proposed new federation and have been excluded.

THE IMPACT OF THE EMERGING

BARGAINING UNIONS’ EMPHASIS ON SHOP-FLOOR

The emergence of the black unions has had a dramatic impact on the activities and policies of the established unions, the State and company managements.

Impact on the Established Unions

TUCSA’s policies of pure and simple unionism, co- operation with management, belief in free-enterprise capitalism, divorced from politics, and acceptance of the official negotiation and dispute-settling machinery have all been opposed by the emerging unions. These differences have been exacerbated by the nature of the two types of leadership. TUCSA’s leaders are of the ‘old school’-working class, early school-leavers with few academic qualifications, and rising through the ranks to union leadership-in contrast to the young, white, middle class, well-educated leaders particularly evident in FOSATU and a few other unions who have been catapulted to high union positions. They are viewed with suspicion and antagonism as being infiltrators with questionable motives.

220 MANAGERIAL A N D DECISION ECONOMICS, VOL. 6, NO. 4, 1985

TUCSA has condemned the emerging unions’ rejection of anything conventional, State-created or white-union supported as an exercise in vindictiveness and contrary to the principles of trade union brother- hood. The refusal of unregistered unions to accept the discipline of confining themselves to certain con- stituencies, the poaching of members, the blatant confrontationist tactics and the receiving of overseas finance are labelled by TUCSA as ‘irresponsible’, creating a negative image for trade unionism by breaking the codes of behaviour and brotherhood that unions are expected to abide by.

TUCSA, in turn, is condemned for being ‘pro- Government’ and ‘to the right of employers’. It is accused of establishing parallel unions, forming alliances with management and restrictively employ- ing the closed shop in order to keep out independent black unions, slow down their growth and capture a large and often unwilling black membership with minimum effort. After at one time being labelled by officialdom as left-wing and even Communist, TUCSA is now dismissed by the emerging unions as a Government agent and puppet. Its past actions are labelled as paternalistic. Parallel unions are dismissed as crude exercises in control, largely seeking to protect blacks from political unions and de-radicalize their aspirations.

However, behind the war of words a crisis has developed within the ranks of the established unions. ‘Integration from above’ is being threatened by the ‘challenge from below’. The closed shop is coming under pressure as black unions are demanding, and winning, workplace-level ballots, and palace revolts are undermining TUCSA membership strength in a number of significant companies. As an increasing number of emerging unions are applying for, and taking up, seats on industrial couiicils, TUCSA unions are realizing that their Achilles’ heel lies in their lack of workplace structures. The organization did run successful shop-steward training courses throughout the 1960s, and employed a full-time Educational Officer, but the programme was eventually mothballed through complacency. However, the need is now returning, as TUCSA unions realize that in order to gain and retain black membership they must strengthen their shop-floor presence. There is also a need to take cognisance of the increasing volume of grievances now emanating from more skilled white and coloured workers as wage differentials are eroded and job-security threatened. TUCSA area meetings are becoming increasingly voluble, with discussion dominated by the threat from the emerging unions and the need to be more active at shop-floor level. TUCSA has responded by raising affiliation fees by 60% per member per month to provide funds for the Educational Department and shop-steward training programme to be rescusitated and to improve services all round.

Even the non-TUCSA-affiliated white unions, not threatened by loss of membership, have responded to the challenge. The ultra-conservative Yster and Staal

(Iron and Steel Workers Union) has been impressed by the though bargaining and shop-floor presence of the FOSATU union in the motor-assembly industry, prompting it to retaliate by introducing a course to upgrade the bargaining skills of its shop stewards. The Boilermakers have also responded in this way. The Amalgamated Engineering Union has publicly admitted that the convoluted dispute-settling mechanism works to the advantage of employers, and has weakened the bargaining power of established trade unions. Under more threat than they have ever been, the established unions are now taking a more militant stance towards employers, calling several disputes during 1984 and viewing Government policy more critically than ever before. Certainly, the challenge from the emerging unions has revitalized the established unions. The clinging apathy that has surrounded them for so long is rapidly disappearing under the realization that complacency is no way to respond to the threat.

Impact on the State

The State now finds itself coming under suspicion and criticism from two opposing phobias. Legislation, proposed changes and recommendations in regard to such matters as unregistered unions, the system of registration, the role of works councils and the enforceability of recognition agreements are seen by the emerging unions from the point of view of in- creasing State control and interference, and by the established unions from the point of view of tampering with the tried and tested principles of the official ‘orderly’ system, thus undermining their power base and creating the basis for ‘chaos’ and indiscipline in the industrial relations structure.

However, the thrust of the State has been mainly in the direction of trying to contain the situation and channel the shop-floor energies of emerging unions towards solving disagreements through conciliation and legal methods, rather than the destructive path of strike action. Thus it has ‘opened up’ the conciliation procedures and forums, making them more attractive and accessible by:

(1) Granting unregistered unions access to concilia- tion boards, thus affording them the ability to ‘force’ employers to talk to them, and opening up the way for criminally binding agreements and legal strike action;

(2) The introduction of status quo orders (returning a situation back to the original pending the settle- ment of the dispute);

(3) The establishment of the Industrial Court to adjudicate on unfair labour practices.

This approach appeared to have worked in 1983. Strike actions and the numbers of workers involved had increased steadily since 1979, peaking in 1982 at 394 strikes involving 141 OOO workers. These fell back in 1983 to 336 strikes involving 64000 workers.

MANAGERIAL AN0 DECISION ECONOMICS. VOL. 6, NO. 4, 1985 221

Indications that greater use of the statutory machinery was being made was reflected in a quadrupling in the number of cases appearing before the Industrial Court and a doubling in the number of applications for conciliation boards. Twenty-three applications were made for status quo orders in December 1983 com- pared with only one application in January.

Impact on Management

However, in steering unions into the official bargain- ing machinery the State has provided the emerging unions with the type of weapons they need in their campaign to prise concessions from employers at workplace level. The turning point in the battle for factory-recognition and wage-bargaining came at Colgate in 1981, when the company informed FOSATU’s chemical union that recognition was dependent upon wages being negotiated only at in- dustrial-council level. The company eventually backed down in the face of potential damage to its corporate image through the threat of a legal strike, consumer boycott and internal and international pressure. By the end of 1982 FOSATU unions were able to boast 173 recognition agreements covering such matters as access, stop orders, shop-steward committees, time off for shop-steward meetings, training, report-backs and grievance-handling, and regular meetings and negotia- tion rights with management.

However, with the onset of recession, increased employer-resistance, and the problem of administering the large number of such agreements, FOSATU was forced into the realization that industrial-council membership was the only pragmatic approach. By the end of 1983 formal recognition agreements had been signed with 285 companies plus informal recognition agreements with a number of other employers, and four affiliates (in metal, sugar, knitting and jewellery) sat on industrial councils.

The next step in their development was the creation of company-wide combine committees linking shop stewards in the different plants of a company’s organization. This was achieved in 1983 by FOSATU’s metal union in the Barlow Rand organization, followed by the paper and wood union at Mondi in early 1984. Mondi management, however, refuses to recognize this committee, insisting that the union joins

co-ordinating ideas, formulating common policies and objectives, infusing support and providing a focus for extra-factory issues.

Wages

The initial workplace issue taken up by the emerging unions was wages. Too many companies used, and still use, Poverty Datum Lines as their yardstick against which to set the level of their wages. Most unions had not evolved the infrastructure for wage- bargaining before late 1982, but in 1983 the FOSATU unions began pressing for the payment of a ‘living wage’ which they set at R2 per hour or R350 per month. Their impact on black wages is difficult to evaluate. They achieved success in some companies, but not many, and mainly in the multinational com- panies which possessed the ability to pay more and were under pressure from overseas. They also achieved success in raising the lowest level of wages in many companies, in some cases quite dramatically in per- centage terms but from a very low base. But, generally speaking, the unions have not been as successful as they would have wished in forcing up wages. The reces- sion overtook them almost immediately, and the unions quickly realized their vulnerability as employers responded to higher wages by increased retrenchments of black workers followed by their ‘endorsing out’ to the Homelands. Unions do not have a lot of bargaining power in this area. Black workers are plentiful, cheap, low-skilled and easily replaced, and in the face of influx-control measures unions do not have a lot of room to manoeuvre.

Job-security: Dismissals and Retrenchments

Consequently, as the recession deepened the unions changed emphasis from wages to job-security. The unions became preoccupied with fighting ‘unfair’ retrenchments and dismissals in 1983, winning several significant Industrial Court cases when workers were awarded with compensation, back-pay and reinstate- ment. Consequently, ‘few employers would now risk their old habit of informing workers in their Friday pay packet that they need not report for work on Monday’ (FOSATU, 1983).

the existing ‘house’ agreement with established unions under the auspices of the industrial council. However, Inroads into Managerial Prerogatives

it refuses to sit down with ‘minority’ unions in view of its insistence on sole bargaining rights in factories for majority unions.

A further FOSATU development has been that of shop-steward councils. These draw together shop stewards from different plants in a sub-sector of an industry (for instance, foundries) or shop stewards from different plants in different industries in a common region (for instance, Germiston Shop Stewards Council), (Germiston is an industrial centre to the east of Johannesburg), and afford the opportu- nity for joint negotiations, exchanging information,

Areas in which unions have successfully exerted pressure in 1983 and 1984 include disciplinary and dismissal procedures, grievance procedures, re- dundancy agreements and health and safety matters. South African managements have become accustomed to making unilateral decisions in these areas, often in an arbitrary, unfair and inconsistent manner. Manage- ment has considered it its prerogative to lay down unilateral decisions in these areas. ‘The function of management is to manage’ is the philosophy that is perpetrated in most South African boardrooms, and if managerial prerogatives are removed it becomes all

222 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS. VOL. 6, NO. 4,1985

but impossible to operate effectively. Unfortunately most foremen and first-line supervisors correlate management skills with coercion, intimidation and bullying tactics-‘the art of dealing with blacks’. The skills of communication, consultation and negotiation are alien to them and are equated with an abrogation of power. Management is considered to be effective only when exercised through compulsion backed by prerogatives.

Participation not Paternalism

The introduction of the concept of an unfair labour practice has been instrumental in turning the tide in favour of management by consensus rather than management by dictation. For too long black workers in South Africa have been at the mercy of management. They have been insulted, victimized and systematically stripped of their dignity. In two separate surveys, Webster (1983, p. 64) found that the majority of black workers joined a union not for the benefits it offered (in most cases these being small-a RlOO funeral allowance) or for the prospect of very significant wage increases, but rather to defend their rights against what they saw as arbitrary and unfair treatment by management. ‘I joined the union’ one worker said ‘because workers are not treated like human beings by management’.

Human Dignity and Freedom from Arbitrary Management

A major worker need therefore is for human dignity and freedom from arbitrary management, and it is a need that their unions are well placed to satisfy by winning enforceable rights within the factory aimed at the proper treatment of black workers and a restora- tion of their sense of dignity and pride. The mere threat by unions of employing the legal machinery has been enough to soften up many employers and convince them to negotiate in good faith. The success, therefore, of these recent legislative changes cannot be measured simply by the number of applications for conciliation boards or the number of cases brought before the Industrial Court and the types ofjudgements awarded, because it appears that many employers would rather settle the matter domestically and quietly rather than risk potentially damaging media exposure through a long and expensive legal procedure. These numerous successes can be largely attributed to the ‘Sword of Damocles’ effect in the form of the threat of Industrial Court action.

The formal definition of an unfair labour practice is extremely wide, encompassing any practice or change in practice that has or may have the following or similar effects:

That any employee may be unfairly affected or that his employment opportunities, work-security or physical, economic, moral or social welfare may be prejudiced or jeopardized;

(2) That the business of any employer may be unfairly

(3) That labour unrest is or may be created or

(4) That the relationship between employer and em-

affected or disrupted;

promoted, or;

ployee may be detrimentally affected.

This definition is substantially different from its counterpart in US law and allots to the Industrial Court the task of establishing in precise terms those activities that should be designated as unfair labour practices. Every case, therefore, potentially creates new laws and guidelines of fairness and contributes towards the establishment of a ‘labour code’-by judicial precedent developing a body of case law of fair employment guidelines.

It is evident from this definition that it is not feasible to give an exhaustive list of all possible unfair labour practices. All circumstances of an alleged unfair practice would have to be examined and especially whether the accused party has any grounds for justification in respect of the practice complained of. Fairness has nothing to do with legality. Something can be ‘unfair’ even though it is quite legal. Rather, the Court, in deciding which matters are unfair, bases its decisions on considerations of equity and fair play that relate to such matters as:

(1) The manner in which an event has taken place; (2) The reasons for acting in this manner; (3) The effect this will have on sound industrial

relations within the company and the economy.

Of the cases reaching the Industrial Court, the vast majority have been won by the unions. Perhaps the most significant victory relates to the obligation of employers to recognize and negotiate in good faith with a representative trade union. The concept of the unfair labour practice is now poised to introduce far- reaching changes into South African industrial rela- tions matters and other issues which trade unions are eager to test before the Court include:

(1) The ability of employers to dismiss workers on legal strike;

(2) The ability of employers to dismiss a whole work- force and then selectively re-hire individual workers;

(3) The ability of employers to dismiss workers who disobey instructions to work in conditions they consider unsafe;

(4) The obligation of employers to ‘open their books’ to unions, particularly in wage negotiations.

Unions certainly cannot complain about the Court’s objectivity so far. It seems to be aware of the unequal power-relationship between employers and black workers in South Africa and the necessity to equalize that power struggle. The decisions of the Court have been in line with international labour practices and also those of the more reputable and progressive South

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS. VOL. 6. NO. 4, 1985 223

African companies. Cheadle’ argues that the Court is ‘legitimizing these developments and leading to a coherent body of norms to govern industrial relations’. In so doing it is forcing ‘rogue employers into line with accepted practice’.

There can be little doubt that managerial preroga- tives are under threat in this movement towards a new industrial relations equilibrium. Unionists are increas- ingly arguing that no area of management decision- making is sacrosanct, but it is a subject on which managements are reluctant to concede ground. There has been a substantial employer-backlash with demands that the definition of an unfair labour practice should be tightened up. The concept itself is under pressure, with organized employers increas- ingly arguing that changes in practices should be left to the collective bargaining process and not decided by an Industrial Court. There has been much debate on the erosion of managerial rights and prerogatives. Many employers feel their effectiveness is declining in the new era of uncertainty, for they are unsure how to act in any given situation for fear of being accused of acting unfairly. Obviously, the transition from paternalism to participation is proving too painful and too rapid for many companies. But clearly the Industrial Court is succeeding in establishing clear guidelines for the management of the employer- employee relationship. The hasty and ill-conceived employer actions of the past are becoming fewer in the new ‘enlightened’ era as managements are forced to ponder seriously the ramifications of their actions.

Employer-fears are groundless as long as they conduct their affairs in the following manner:

(1) They recognize and negotiate in good faith with a representative trade union;

(2) They formulate mutually agreed and well- communicated industrial relations codes of practice within the company and adhere to these codes objectively at all times.

No employer could then be accused of acting un- fairly. It appears that the Court is moving towards the position that management actions are unfair that are taken arbitrarily, unilaterally and according to principles, if any, that were not adequately com- municated and known to the worker in advance, so that he was unaware of what was expected of him, how to behave and the consequences that could flow therefrom.

Unions are keen to negotiate disciplinary, dismissal, redundancy, grievance, health and safety and shop- steward agreements to take away from managements their ability to rule by arbitrary decree. Under such a participative management regime decisions would be made objectively and consistently according to codes that have been mutually negotiated. Workers are then placed in a situation of certainty-‘they know where the line is’-and deviations from this line will attract the necessary, agreed reactions. Unions do not wish to take power away from managements. They still

retain the right and power to discipline, dismiss and retrench- but fairly, and not according to arbitrary whim. This improves rather than decreases manage- ment effectiveness and simultaneously restores some dignity and certainty to the position of the worker now that he is freed from subjective and inconsistent management decisions.

CONCLUSION

The emergence of black trade unions and their emphasis on shop-floor activities and power has led to a dramatic change in the structure of industrial relations in South Africa. Webster (1983, p. 72) high- lights three achievements of the emerging unions: the winning of certain enforceable rights in the workplace through an emphasis on factory-floor organization and the establishment of plant agreements, restoring to black workers some measure of dignity and pride; the emergence of national mass-based industrial unionism in a number of significant industries; and the establishment of the defucto right to strike as part of the normal collective bargaining process. These unions have developed as independent schools of democracy with substantial worker-leadership. The bargaining power of labour has been increased, opening up the opportunity for black people to participate democratically in organizations with the potential to play a leading role in the process of change.

The significance of the post-Wiehahn era is that it has laid the organizational foundations for challenging the inequality inherent in the South African system. The whole power structure of the society is being challenged and the workplace appears to be one of the main areas at which this challenge is being directed. Employers are now having to adapt to a new and more difficult set of relationships. The traditional system of management is under threat and the process of limiting the power of the employer is well under way. A good deal of labour relations in the near future will be concerned with the direction in which the workplace balance of power will be moving.

Labour-management relations are in transition from an essentially authoritarian, paternalistic system to a participative one. There have been two distinct phases in the evolution of these relations: phase 1 in which the black labour movement has become struc- tured, legitimized and institutionalized, and phase 2 in which a new common perception of the legitimate functions of labour and management is established. The objective is participation in the areas currently considered as managerial prerogatives. The views of the majority of employers are that the challenging of the sole authority of management, the surrender of their prerogatives and power-sharing within the workplace are tantamount to diminished and ineffec- tive management rather than being a challenge to better management decisions through participation with workers on certain matters that affect them directly. Control and authority is a ‘zero-sum game’.

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This misunderstanding between management and unions is likely to have a serious impact on industrial relations for some time to come. According to Steenkamp,* ‘conflict over defining the boundary line between management prerogatives and worker parti- cipation in decision-making may disrupt labour peace far more than disputes arising from collective bargain- ing in the decade ahead. He considers that ‘there is not as yet by any stretch of the imagination a common perception shared by labour and management of the boundary line between prerogatives and participa-

tion.. . my thesis is that managerial prerogatives will be increasingly challenged not only by the black labour movement, but also by the courts, the legislature, and perhaps also by an emergent conventional wisdom’. Prerogatives are sustainable only if they are exercised justly, consistently and with on-going regard to the wellbeing of employees, but if authority is used as a smokescreen for injustice and exploitation manage- ment may well in the fullness of time lose its right to manage.

NOTES

1. The view of H. Cheadle as quoted in the South African 2. The view of N. Steenkamp as quoted in the South African Financial Mail, Whose prerogative? 4 May 1984. Financial Mail, Drawing the line, 18 November 1983.

REFERENCES

Wiehahn Commission Report (1 979). Report of the Commission Annual Report. of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, Parts 1-6, 1979-81, E. Webster (1983). New force on shop floor. Management, Government Printer, Pretoria. (September), 64-72.

FOSATU (1983). Federation of South African Trade Unions,

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