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Prepared by

November 2015

Khon Kaen University Prince of Songkla University Chiang Mai University

Thailand Transport Security Master plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning FINAL REPORT

Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning Ministry of Transport

FINAL REPORT

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

Prepared by

Khon Kaen University Prince of Songkla University Chiang Mai University

November 2015

The only way to be secure is never to feel secure. Anonymous (c. 500 BCE)

ทางเดียวที่จะเกิดความม่ันคง คือต้องไม่รู้สึกมั่นคง อย่างเด็ดขาด นิรนาม

Final Report Preface

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page i

Preface

The Ministry of Transport (MOT) has assigned the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) the task of preparing a Transport Security Master Plan Phase 1 as a planning measure in support of the National Preparedness Strategy (2014–2018) which is part of the National Security Policy (2015 – 2021) and the National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan, 2015. The said national -level plans establish the administrative structure and strategies required for the handling of threatening incidents arising from natural disasters or terrorist assaults. The occurrence of such a threat may de-stabilize the nation’s transport infrastructure and disrupt the facilities for passenger and freight transport on all modes – road, rail, water and air – which is the domain of MOT’s responsibilities.

The Transport Security Master Plan Phase 1 has as its purpose a call for all units under MOT to be fully prepared with the necessary resources for tackling any threat to the security of our transport systems; and for the capability to effectively defuse it while keeping our mobility free from disruption. Each of the MOT units shall be required to prepare a Transport Security Action Plan to match its scope of duties and responsibilities. An action plan shall be furnished with key work plans, tasks, programs, measures, budget allocations, as well as resources planning in terms of personnel and provisions for countering threats from natural disasters or human-induced ones. It should address three key stages of preparedness, as follows:

1. Prevention and Impact Mitigation: These are measures to be taken before a threat has taken place.

2. Response: This involves immediate actions to take upon the incidence of a threat in order to contain it, or prevent major disruptions to our transport systems.

3. Recovery: This involves efforts to restore normalcy immediately after the cessation of a destructive or violent incident.

Details of the steps required are laid out in the Transport Security Master Plan.

All units under MOT are thus required to prepare their versions of the said Transport Security Action Plan based on the scope of their functions and assessment of

Final Report Preface

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page ii

the likelihood of the threats involved, including the risk of natural disasters and human attacks that may take any of the following forms: earthquake, flooding, tsunami, infectious outbreak, bombing raid, and cyber-attack. To plan for the three components of prevent, respond and recovery, a unit may base its criteria upon the estimated scale and severity of a threat, the time frame for advance warning, the need for coordination internally and externally, etc, in order to effectively protect our transport systems from harm or disruption. The said plan should include provisions for work programs, budgeting and personnel so required, as well as programs for training and systematic evaluation of its performance.

Bureau of Safety Planning, Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP)

Final Report Acknowledgements

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page iii

Acknowledgements

The Consultants wish to express our deep appreciation to the Project Steering Committee for their invaluable help and guidance throughout the project, especially their suggestions for the preparation of this Final Report. The names of the committee members are respectfully listed herein: Khun Peraphon Thawornsupacharoen (Director of OTP, as chair of the committee, the current position - take a position of the Deputy Permanent Secretary) and Khun Chaiwat Thongkhamkhun (Deputy Director of OTP); Khun Saritpong Boriboonsook (Director the Office of Safety Planning, OTP); Khun Chotirat Komaradat (Foreign Affairs Ministry); Khun khajornsak janpanich (Public Health Ministry); khun Thongchai Hillprasiththlphr (National Security Council); Colonel Tanongsak Tannarat (Counter-terrorism Operations Center); Colonel Surapong Youphrom (Army, Department of the Army Battle) Group Captain Panchayaphark Prathomsut (Department of Defense mobilized), Police Colonel Pitaya Garaket (Criminal Investigation Bureau, Royal Thai Police); Khun Pailin Subhakornkosai (Customs Department); Khun Nonglak Wongsuksiridacha (Land Transport Department); Khun Phithak Wattanapongphisal (Marine Department), Khun Narong Aroonpakmongkol (Civil Aviation Department); Pol.Lt.Col.Anusilp Sirivejchapan (MRTA); Khun Pisit Thesta (SRT); Lieutenant Chamnan Chaiyarit and Khun Charan Chaloumchavalit (PAT); Khun Suksri Laungaram (AOT); Khun Pornchai Pattanapongsatid and Dr.Chatchawal Simaskul (OTP). Together with the inspection committee, as well as many other officers of OTP, they have generously provided assistance for this project. The Consultants extend many a sincere thanks to them all. Our heartfelt thanks are also extended to the various public and private organizations cited above, and others too numerous to mention herein, including their operating units in the provinces, as well as many charitable organizations and transport operators who participated in the project’s hearing sessions, discussion groups and training seminars. A number of specialists have helped to explain to us the workings of their organizations. They are: Khun Danai Moosa, Colonel Tanongsak Tannarat, Khon Sujin Mangnimit, Police Lt. Col. Anusilp Sirivejchapan, Khun Narong Aroonpakmongkol, Khun Kannika Dechatiwongse, Vice Admiral Chumpol Lumpinikanon, Khun Charan Chaloumchavalit, and Khun Anant Pansakun.

Final Report Acknowledgements

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page iv

Their sharing of practical experiences and helpful suggestions are a priceless part of this project. Finally, we should very much like to thank Associate Professor Chusak Limsakul, rector of Prince of Songkla University, and the Faculty of Engineering for their enduring support throughout the project. The Consultant Team November 2015

Final Report The Consultant Team

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page v

The Consultant Team

1. Prof.Dr.Pichai Taneerananon Project Manager 2. Asst.Prof.Dr.Pongrid Klungboonkrong Deputy Project Manager 3. Assoc.Prof.Lamduan Srisakda Deputy Project Manager 4. Col.Asst.Prof.Dr.Thai Charnkol Specialist in Safety and Security 5. Dr.Pipat Thongchim Specialist in Safety and Security 6. Dr.Kerati Kijmanawat Specialist in Transport Planning 7. Dr.Preda Pichayapan Senior Transportation Engineer 8. Dr.Noppadol Kronprasert Assistant Transportation Engineer 9. Dr.Piti Chantruthai Specialist in Prevention and Mitigation 10. Assoc.Prof.Sirirat Taneerananon Specialist in Public Relations and Information

Dissemination 11. Dr.Manop Promchana Expert in Laws

Supporting Personnel

1. Mr.Narabodee Salatoom Assistant Engineer 2. Dr.Chalat Tipakorn Assistant Engineer 3. Aj.Sulkiflee Mama Assistant Engineer 4. Aj.Chuthamat Laksanakil Assistant Engineer 5. Miss.Chonnipa Puppateravanit Assistant Engineer 6. Mr.Purim Srisawat Researcher (Chiang Mai University) 7. Mr.Waranyu Auttsa Researcher (Khon Kaen University) 8. Miss.Janmanee Saeteaw Secretary

Final Report Contents

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page vi

Contents

Page

Preface i Acknowledgements iii The Consultant Team v Contents vi List of Tables xi List of Figures xiii Abbreviation xv

Chapter 1: Introduction 1-1 1.1 Preface 1-1 1.2 Objectives of the Project 1-3 1.3 Scope and Methodology 1-4

1.3.1 Legal Issues 1-4 1.3.2 Organization Situation Analysis 1-5 1.3.3 Risk Assessment 1-7 1.3.4 Preparation of the Transport Security Master Plan 1-7 1.3.5 Formulating the Transport Security Strategy 1-10 1.3.6 The Training Curriculum 1-11

1.4 Expected Outcomes 1-11 1.5 Methodology for the Preparation of Transport Security Master Plan 1-12

Chapter 2: Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws 2-1

2.1 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws for Thailand 2-1 2.1.1 Conclusion of Policies, Plans and Strategies of Existing Security 2-1 2.1.2 Summary of Transport Related Legislation 2-10

2.1.2.1 For Surface Transport 2-10 2.1.2.2 For Water Transport 2-11 2.1.2.3 For Air Transport 2-13

2.2 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws use overseas 2-16


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page vii

Contents (Continued)

Page 2.2.1 The United Kingdom (UK) 2-16 2.2.2 United States of America 2-19 2.2.3 AUSTRALIA 2-22

2.3 Mobility and Security Theories 2-24 2.3.1 Deterrence Theory 2-25 2.3.2 Terror Management Theory 2-28 2.3.3 Protection Motivation Theory 2-29

2.4 Related Transport Security Legislation and Plans 2-30 2.4.1 Hazardous materials & dangerous goods legislation 2-30 2.4.2 National Strategic Plans for prevention and handling of Emerging 2-31

Infectious Diseases, B.E. 2556-2559 2.4.3 Review of Transport Security in Border Areas 2-32

2.5 Conclusion 2-34 Chapter 3: Situation of Threats to Transport Security 3-1

3.1 Definition of terms 3-1 3.2 Threats to Security 3-2

3.2.1 Security in a Global Context 3-2 3.2.2 Situation of Security Threats in Thailand 3-5 3.2.3 Natural Disasters in the global context 3-6

3.3 Definition of risk management terms 3-9 3.4 Risk Assessment Theory and Practice 3-11 3.5 Risk Assessment 3-14 3.6 Summary of threats to transport security 3-18

3.6.1 Threats to the security of Land Transport 3-18 3.6.2 Threats to the security of Water Transport 3-19 3.6.3 Threats to the security of Air Transport 3-20

3.7 Assessment of Impact arising from Inadequacy of Transport Services 3-20 3.8 Cyber Security Threats 3-22


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page viii


Page

3.8.1 Definitions 3-23 3.8.2 World Cyber Threats Trend 3-24 3.8.3 Cyber Threats to National Infrastructure 3-26

3.9 Conclusion 3-27 Chapter 4: Causes and Risks and Their Effects on Transport Security 4-1

4.1 Introduction 4-1 4.2 Causes of transport security risks 4-1 4.3 Overview of infrastructure development 4-2

4.3.1 Land Transport Mode 4-4 4.3.2 Water Transport 4-4 4.3.3 Air Transport 4-5

4.4 Future security of land-based infrastructure 4-5 4.4.1 Border Security 4-6 4.4.2 Transport of Hazardous Materials and Dangerous Goods 4-16 4.4.3 Cyber Security 4-26 4.4.4 Truck Rest Stops 4-32 4.4.5 Supply chain security 4-34

4.5 Conclusion 4-35 Chapter 5: Current Situation of Transport Security 5-1

5.1 Duties and Responsibilities of MOT Agencies 5-1 5.2 SWOT Analysis of the transport sector 5-3

5.2.1 Land Transport modes (road and rail) 5-5 5.2.2 Water Transport mode 5-6 5.2.3 Air Transport mode 5-6

5.3 Role of MOT 5-7 5.3.1 Impact from Natural Disasters 5-7

5.4 Roles of Security Agencies 5-11


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page ix


Page

5.4.1 Counter-terrorism Operations Center (CTOC) 5-11 5.4.2 Operations Coordinating Center for the Protection of National 5-12

Maritime Interests (OCPMI) 5.5 Conclusion 5-13

Chapter 6: Transport Security Master Plan 6-1 6.1 Conceptual Framework 6-1 6.2 Vision, Missions, Purpose, Targets 6-5 6.3 Transport security strategy covering the three modes 6-6

6.3.1 Land mode (road and rail) 6-6 6.3.1.1 Plan for road transport security 6-6 6.3.1.2 Plan for rail transport security 6-9

6.3.2 Water Transport 6-13 6.3.3 Air Transport Sector 6-17

6.4 Action Plans and Case Studies 6-25 6.4.1 Scenario 1: Bomb threat at an underground MRT station 6-27 6.4.2 Scenario 2: Bomb threat at a bus station 6-33 6.4.3 Scenario 3: Threat to cross-border travelers and freight 6-40 6.4.4 Scenario 4: Risk of water pollution from oil spillage 6-49 6.4.5 Scenario 5: Risk of Aircraft Hijacking 6-56 6.4.6 Scenario 6: Risk of earthquake and landslide 6-64 6.4.7 Scenario 7: Cyber attacks on transport facilities 6-74 6.4.8 Scenario 8: Evacuation of Thai nationals from a foreign country 6-78 6.4.9 Scenario 9: Threats from Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) 6-83 6.4.10 Scenario 10: Hijacking Dangerous Goods/Hazmats Truck as weapon 6-94

for attacks. 6.5 Conclusion 6-101


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page x


Page

Chapter 7: Participative & Training Sessions 7-1 7.1 Preface 7-1 7.2 Summary of the sessions 7-1 7.3 Conclusion 7-3

Chapter 8: Guidelines for Implementation of Transport Security Plan 8-1 8.1 Introduction 8-1

8.1.1 Establishment of Thailand’s Security Agency 8-2 8.1.2 Concerns and Feasibility 8-6 8.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages 8-6

8.2 Organization Structure 8-7 8.2.1 Components 8-7 8.2.2 Missions 8-8 8.2.3 Collaboration from domestic security agencies 8-12

8.3 Conclusion 8-12


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page xi

List of Tables

Page

Table 1.1: SWOT Analysis 1-6 Table 3.1: Examples of transport security threats in Thailand 3-5 Table 3.2: Impact from natural disasters in major regions, years 1984-2013 3-7 Table 3.3: Indices of disaster risks by type of hazards 3-8 Table 3.4: Significance of Degree of Risk 3-10 Table 3.5: Degree of Risk Scores 3-10 Table 3.6: Assessment of Degree of Risk as per the Amber Zone chart 3-14 Table 3.7: Likelihood 3-15 Table 3.8: Impact 3-15 Table 3.9: Threats from Human Action 3-15 Table 3.10: Threats from Natural Disasters 3-16 Table 3.11: Outcome of assessment of threats arising from human action 3-16 Table 3.12: Ranking of human-induced threats by degree of risk 3-17 Table 3.13: Ranking of threats from natural disasters 3-17 Table 3.14: Ranking of threats from natural disasters by their severity 3-17 Table 3.15: Threats to the security of Road Transport 3-18 Table 3.16: Threats to the security of Rail Transport 3-19 Table 3.17: Threats to the security of marine and coastal Transport 3-19 Table 3.18: Threats to the security of Water Transport on inland waterways 3-20 Table 3.19: Threats to the security of Air Transport 3-20 Table 4.1: Existing transport systems (2015) 4-2 Table 4.2: Thailand-Malaysia border crossing papers 4-9 Table 5.1: Supervision and Planning group 5-2 Table 5.2: Road Transport Group 5-2 Table 5.3: Rail Transport Group 5-3 Table 5.4: Water Transport Group 5-3 Table 5.5: Air Transport Group 5-3 Table 5.6: SWOT analysis of land-mode security (pax and freight) 5-5


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page xii

List of Tables (Continued)

Page

Table 5.7: Analysis of water-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT 5-6 Table 5.8: Analysis of air-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT 5-7 Table 5.9: Role of MOT specified in National Preparedness Strategy BE. 2557 - 2561 5-8 Table 6.1: Examples of safety measures for the rail mode 6-12 Table 6.2: Additional safety measures for the rail mode 6-13 Table 7.1: Summary of the sessions 7-2 Table 8.1: Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of structure options 8-7


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page xiii

List of Figures

Page

Figure 2.1: Cycles of the steps in disaster risk management 2-7 Figure 2.2: Integrating Transport Security Plan Phase 1 with national and ministerial 2-15 policies, strategies and plans Figure 2.3: Details of data collection by PRISM 2-27 Figure 3.1: Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2014 3-3 Figure 3.2: Targets and Proportions of Annual Attacks – Years 2000 to 2013 3-4 Figure 3.3: Frequency of attacks and choice of targets in Thailand, years 2000 to 2013 3-6 Figure 3.4: Fatalities from natural disasters globally, years 1984 to 2013 3-7 Figure 3.5: Degrees of Risk in the Amber Zone, from BCI Good Practice Guideline, 2008 3-13 Figure 3.6: The transport networks between the travels and performance 3-21 in order to developing infrastructure Figure 3.7: Top trends for 2014 Global Agenda 2014 World Economic Forum 3-24 Figure 3.8: Global Organization Security Threats Trend of 2014, BCI 3-25 Figure 3.9: Real-time digital attack map - Worldwide 3-25 Figure 3.10: Real-time digital attack map–Thailand. Attacks peaked in December of 2013 3-26 Figure 4.1: Overview of Thailand’s Transport Infrastructure by 2022 4-3 Figure 4.2: Checkpoints along the border of Thailand 4-8 Figure 4.3: Departure checkpoint 4-13 Figure 4.4: Freight containers X-Ray Terminal 4-13 Figure 4.5: Comparative border management approaches —USA and Thailand 4-17 Figure 4.6: Thailand’s Provisions on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road 4-20 Figure 4.7: Examples of Dangerous Goods Carriers 4-21 Figure 4.8: Carrier of heavier-than-water liquid chemicals 4-22 Figure 4.9: Carrier of pressurized gaseous substances 4-22 Figure 4.10: Highly Flammable Liquid Carrier 4-23 Figure 4.11: Concept of data flow and organization decision following 4-29 the Cyber Security Framework Figure 4.12: Relationship between cyber security and other security domains 4-30


Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page xiv

List of Figures (Continued)

Page

Figure 4.13: The relationship between security and cyber threats 4-31 Figure 4.14: Sites of truck rest stops nationwide 4-33 Figure 4.15: Example of Supply chain 4-35 Figure 5.1: Framework for SWOT Analysis 5-4 Figure 5.2: Organization structure of OCPMI 5-13 Figure 5.3: Agencies under MOT for additional SWOT Analyses 5-14 Figure 6.1: MOT’s role within the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561) 6-3 Figure 6.2: The conceptual framework for the Transport Security Master Plan 6-4 Figure 6.3 Structure of the Civil Aviation Department (the original) 6-21 Figure 6.4: Structure of the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand office 6-22 Figure 6.5: An overview of the Master Plan 6-26 Figure 6.6: Schematic of action plan in response to a bomb attack at an underground 6-32 station. Figure 6.7: Schematic action plan for a bus station bombing scenario 6-39 Figure 6.8: Schematic action plan for responses to a threat to cross-border transport 6-48 Figure 6.9: Schematic of water pollution/oil spill clean up operations 6-54 Figure 6.10: Schematic of responses to threat of aircraft hijacking 6-63 Figure 6.11: Schematic action plan for responses to a landslide. 6-73 Figure 6.12: Schematic of responses to cyber-attack on the transport sector 6-77 Figure 6.13: Steps of evacuation/repatriation activity by MOT upon request from MFA 6-81 Figure 6.14: Schematic of responses to an outbreak of Emerging Infectious Disease 6-93 Figure 6.15: Schematic action plan for incident of high-risk cargo truck hijacking 6-100 as weapon for attacks Figure 8.1: Structure of US Department of Homeland Security 8-3 Figure 8.2: Collaboration of transport security agencies in the U.S. 8-4

Final Report Abbreviation

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page xv

Abbreviation

AEC : Asean Economics Community AOT : Airports of Thailand Plc. B.C. : Before Christ CAAT : Office of the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand CPOS : Committee for the Prevention and Clean Up of Marine Pollution from Oil Spillage” CSOC : Cyber Security Operation Center DA : Department of Airports DC : Department of Customs DLT : Department of Land Transport DM : Marine Department DOH : Department of Highways DRM : Disaster Risk Management DRR : Disaster Risk Reduction DRR : Department of Rural Roads EOD : Explosive Ordnance Disposal EXAT : Expressway Authority of Thailand ICAO : International Civil Aviation Organization ICS : Incident Command System IED : Improvised Explosive Device IGA : Intergovernmental Agreement in Surface Transport Security (Australia) IMO : International Maritime Organization LAO : Local Administrative Organization MI : Ministry of Interior MOD : Ministry of Defense MOJ : Ministry of Justice MOT : Ministry of Transport MRTA : Mass Rapid Transit Authority NSTSS : National Surface Transport Security Strategy NCSC : National Cyber Security Committee NSA : National Security Agency

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Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page xvi

Abbreviation (Continued)

OCC : Office of the Civil Service Commission OCPMI : Operations Coordinating Center for the Protection of Maritime Interests OTP : Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning PAT : Port Authority of Thailand SRT : State Railway of Thailand SRT-ET : SRT Electric Train Co. Ltd. SWOT : Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats TRANSEC : Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (UK) TSA : Transportation Security Administration (USA) TSC : Transport Security Committee TSC : Transport Security Center USA : The United States of America ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

กพท. : Office of the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand กรอ. : Joint Public Private Committee ขส.ทบ. : Department of Army Transport ขส.ทร. : Department of Navy Transport ขส.ทอ. : Department of Air Force Transport ขสมก. : Bangkok Mass Transit Authority คมช. : High Commission for National Security ตม. : Bureau of Immigration ทย. : Department of Airports นอก. : Committee for Policy and Counter-Measures to International Terrorism นอปท. : Committee for Policy and Planning for the Protection of Maritime Interests บ.ข.ส. : The Transport Company บทด. : Thai Shipping Co. Ltd. บพ. : Department of Civil Aviation ปภ. : Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation ศตก. : Counter-terrorism Operations Center ศบปพ. : Civil Aviation Issues Rectification Command

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Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page xvii

Abbreviation (Continued)

ศรภ. : National Safety Center ศอ.รศ. : Peace Keeping Command ศอฉ. : Emergency Response Command สขช. : National Bureau of Intelligence สงป. : Bureau of the Budget สถ. : Department of Local Administration Promotion สบพ. : Civil Aviation Institute สมช. : Office of the National Security Council สผป. : Bureau of Safety Planning อกรส. : Subcommittee on Counter-measures to International Terrorism

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Final Report


Chapter 1: Introduction Preface

Objectives of the Project

Scope and Methodology

Expected Outcomes

Methodology for the Preparation of Transport

Security Master Plan

Final Report Chapter 1 Introduction

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study page 1 - 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Preface Many countries today must cope with rising threat to their security due to the menace of global terrorism as well as the peril of harsher disasters brought about by climate change. Terrorist attacks frequently target the world’s communication services as wide-spread impacts and disruptions to passenger and freight transport are among the attackers’ primary goals. Aviation and surface transport systems, the latter including road and rail infrastructure, are particularly vulnerable, and the extent of attacks on them has been increasingly upsetting and unrelenting. Bombings of railway lines, particularly on the Southern routes have become a persistent problem for Thailand. On September 12, 2014 an explosion on a track near Pa Phai Railway Station in Ra Ngae District of Narathiwas province disrupted the service of 14 trains. Railway stations have also been targeted by the southern insurgency movement. From 1977 up to now, the Hat Yai Railway Station has been bombed on at least four occasions — twice in 1989, causing seven deaths; once in 2001, killing four. On May 6, 2014 three explosions were set off in the township with two of them taking place near the Hat Yai Station. Although public transport routes and bus depots in Thailand have so far been spared from violent attacks, it should be noted that the security of these facilities is deemed inadequate. Examples of the devastating terrorist attacks on foreign soil — for example, the bombing of the London Underground on July 7, 2005 which killed 52 people — should serve as a warning for the need of fundamental protective measures to ensure adequate security for our transport systems, especially the rail mass-transit networks in Bangkok.

The rapid increases of low-cost air travel have had some impact on the security of airports and aircraft since the much higher volume of passengers can lead to security lapses. A case in point is the bombing of Hat Yai International Airport on 3 April 2005 which killed 2 and injured 47. The incident sent a clear message about the danger of terrorism and the need for better security.

For ASEAN, there is a range of regional maritime security issues that also require attention: 1) Disputes on rights and benefits over sea territories; 2) Conflict situation in the South China Sea, leading to the erosion of trust among nations in the region, which may prompt the buildup of naval reinforcement on all sides; 3) Maritime safety, presently

Chapter 1 Introduction Final Report

page 1 - 2 Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study

inadequate due to presence of pirates and armed robberies, induced by economic growth in the region, in areas without rigorous patrol; 4) Terrorism on the high seas, by perpetrators with deadlier skill and networking, that could severely undermine regional security. In order to effectively address these issues, the Thai government is in the process of passing approval for a Maritime Security Plan B.E. 2558-2564. The Plan will elevate the existing Operations Coordinating Center for the Protection of Maritime Benefits (OCPMI) to an Operations Command to enable a more crucial role for the unit.

Pursuant to a December 20, 2005 cabinet resolution, the Government has set out a National Preparedness Policy and commenced the development of such preparedness. The National Preparedness Strategy 2014-2018 —the principal guidelines for all relevant agencies —will be deployed to manage incidents arising from natural and man-made threats whereby resources from all sectors will be pooled for tasks in disaster prevention, mitigation and rehabilitation. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) shall be responsible for setting up emergency support work-plans; for reinstating communication routes and networks in an event of a disaster; and for coordinating all emergency call-channels for the reporting of hazards and security problems, between its agencies and the public. In addition, other security policies and plans have been assigned the Ministry, either the role of the main actor or a supporter. These assignments are stipulated in many strategic plans, for example: the National Security Policy 2015-2021, the Prevention and Mitigation Policy 2015, the Maritime Security Plan 2015-2021, the Personnel and Resource Mobilization Plan, and the Internal Security Plan 2015-2017, and so on. To complement the aforementioned plans and strategies, it is necessary to prepare a Transport Security Master Plan to serve as an operational framework for MOT missions. The Plan shall define key areas under MOT jurisdiction that require security enhancement as well as areas where the MOT may extend assistance and support for tasks in security management to the administrative arm of the government.

As an agency under MOT, the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) is tasked with the preparation of strategic plans and policies including measures for administering security and safety to Thailand’s transport and traffic systems to enable systemic support to the overall plans and strategies mentioned above. In its role as a transport planning agency, the OTP sees the need to formulate a master plan to regulate the transport sector in the event of an emergency or an incident threatening to national security. Accordingly the OTP has proceeded to commission this study for the preparation of a Transport Security Master Plan.



Aviation security and maritime security are regulated, respectively, by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). ICAO Annex 17 stipulates that member countries must comply with its stringent aviation regulations, and the IMO similarly exercises strict controls over member countries. Given that the air and sea modes are already regulated internationally, for this study the Consultant shall therefore focus more on land transport security issues. These are the precautions the Thai Government must undertake to combat security threats to passenger and cargo transport domestically and within ASEAN. It should be noted that: although Thailand may not be a prime target of terrorism; but given the fact that it receives large volumes of tourists all year round — a condition that could present itself as target — the country is still vulnerable. Terrorists seek weaknesses where they can attack, and that can be found in a country with a lower level of vigilance and preparedness, less so in those that are vigorously equipped against attacks, such as the US, UK or Australia. Terrorists may strike anywhere when it serves their desire for media publicity and recognition of their purpose. Thus, Thailand must upgrade its level of vigilance and preparedness to international standards in order to overcome those weaknesses. An oft-quoted aphorism is: the only way to guarantee security is never to feel secure.

This Final Report contains eight chapters. Chapter 1 deals with objectives, the scope, methodology, expected outcomes and the making of the transport security master plan. Chapter 2 concerns reviews on domestic and international legal issues and planning strategies, a short discussion on the relationship between mobility and security. Chapter 3 details the risk situation analysis, definition of threats, risk assessment theories, methodologies, and analyses. Chapter 4 describes causes and risks and security on the transport sector. Chapter 5 outlines the countermeasures to present-day security threats, responsibility and duty of individual agencies in the MOT, and roles of security units. Chapter 6 describes the transport security master plan. Chapter 7 is on participative & training sessions. And Chapter 8 details the execution guidelines for the Plan.

1.2 Objectives of the Project 1.2.1 To prepare a transport security master plan that covers a range of measures to

international standards for the prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery in the event of a terrorist attack or public disaster on any of the transport modes – land, air and water.



1.2.2 To formulate transport security strategies that serve as framework and guidelines for concerned agencies under MOT, as well as other related agencies, to enable the seamless integration and alignment of their efforts in ensuring transport security.

1.2.3 To design a special training course in transport security to provide the knowledge thereof for the staff of MOT as well as other agencies.

1.3 Scope and Methodology The Consultant has studied the key components for the Transport Security Master Plan Phase I. The focus of this phase is on the safety of land transport systems including rail and road infrastructure along with the man-made hazards likely to befall them. Topics covered in the study are:

1.3.1 Legal Issues

Review of related laws, regulations, protocols and strategic plans:

National Preparedness Strategy 2014-2018. National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2015. Ministry-level Integrated Action Plan for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation in the

transport sector. UK, US, and Australian transport security plans. Laws and regulations pertaining to maritime security, and relating to those

regulated internationally by, for example, the IMO. Domestic and international maritime security strategies. Laws and regulations concerning hazardous materials and dangerous goods. Laws and regulations on aviation and inter-relating to those regulated

internationally by, for example, the ICAO. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (“The Hague

Convention”, 1970) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil

Aviation (“Montreal Convention”, 1971) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving

International Civil Aviation; Supplement of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (This extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety, 1988.)

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft_seizure.html

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_aircraft_seizure.html

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_civil_aviation.html

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_civil_aviation.html

http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_airports.html






Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988.

Convention on Plastic Explosives Marking for the Purpose of Detection, 1991.

Review of Thai laws and regulations pertaining to dangerous goods transportation:

Dangerous Materials Act (Department of Industrial Works, Department of Agriculture, Department of Fisheries, Pollution Control Department, Food and Drug Administration)

Fuel Control Act (Department of Energy Businesses) Land Traffic Act (Royal Thai Police.) Firearms, Ammunitions, Firecrackers and Imitation Weapons Act (Ministry of

Interior.) Nuclear Energy for Peace Act (Office of Atoms for Peace.) Land Transport Act (Department of Land Transport.)

1.3.2 Organization Situation Analysis

The 5C Analysis and SWOT Analysis were employed to appraise the status of risk management within MOT and outside. In addition, focus groups were conducted to gather ideas, suggestions and share experiences.

The 5C Analysis

The 5C Analysis consists of: 1) Company - the MOT; 2) Collaborators - related government agencies such as Office of National Security Council and the Royal Thai Police; 3) Customers – needs of transport-service users; 4) Competitors – threats from terrorists and natural disasters; and 5) Context – constraints arising from political, socio-economic and technological factors. The tool is often employed in business to analyze the strengths and weaknesses inherent to an organization, together with of external opportunities and threats. The outcome of such appraisal is then employed in setting up work-plans or standardized measures and operational guidelines for work units in the Ministry and related agencies.



The SWOT Analysis SWOT is a method for determining the ‘Strength’ and ‘Weakness’ inherent to an

organization or scheme; and a look outwards to ‘Opportunity’ and ‘Threat’ that may affect its operations. The features of SWOT are outlined in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: SWOT Analysis

SWOT Analysis Technique To apply SWOT, the appraiser shall require knowledge of organizational

structures, information of relevant parties, news and data from sources at home and abroad. These are necessary as an aid to analysis.

SWOT must be in tune with the organization’s vision, missions and objectives, and compatible with its resources, capability and skills. SWOT is then employed to aid the preparation of strategic plans for the organization using a minimum of items from the tabulated ‘Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.’ (Source: Adapted from Umporn Laiprasert “Organization Analysis using SWOT Technique”)

Focus Group seminar arrangement The Consultant shall arrange one or two focus groups (conditional upon the

outcome of the first seminar, the second may not be needed). Participants shall be selected from stakeholders of diverse background working in government and private sector, interested individuals and those with direct experience in threatening situations e.g., witness of an act of terrorism, bomb explosion, hostage taking, earthquake, major flood, etc. Diversity shall be necessary in terms of gender, age, profession, and special groups such as the disabled. The number of participants is to be 30 for one seminar, or 15 each for two seminars if need be. The Consultant shall moderate all focus group sessions and conclude the findings.

SWOT Analysis

Internal environment Strength (S)

Strong points, advantages Weakness (W) Disadvantages

External environment Opportunity (O)

Supports Threats (T) Obstructions



Focus Group Arrangement Procedure: Define objectives. Specify target groups for the seminar. Decide on the number of groups. Determine suitable duration and timetable. Determine the path for questions. Test the questions thus prepared. Common understanding between group moderator and note-taker. Conduct the seminar. Compile and analyze data. Write up reports.

1.3.3 Risk Assessment

The Consultant is to assess transport security risks, in particular the risks that may arise from acts of terrorism, by investigating the weakest security link in each transportation mode. Two aspects of such risks are to be assessed: 1) Extent of damage in the event of an attack; and 2) The probability of such an event. Outcome of the assessment shall be the key factor to take into consideration when recommending guidelines for effective responses to threats. Accordingly, an accurate risk assessment is of a crucial importance in the preparation of the transport security master plan.

1.3.4 Preparation of the Transport Security Master Plan

The Transport Security Master Plan is to be prepared as the framework for all security-related undertakings by agencies under MOT. The plan shall outline four stages of action to be taken, namely, Prevention & Mitigation – Preparedness – Response – Recovery, all of which shall conform to the National Preparedness Strategy (2014-2018) of the Office of the National Security Council, as well as related laws, as listed below.

National Preparedness Strategy 2014-2018 Conceptual Framework for the National Preparedness Strategy 2014-2018

National preparedness for non-normal situations. Preparation of human resources to enable a basis for immunity. Preparedness for local communities. Proactive preparedness of a work unit in prevention and mitigation.



Personnel mobilization for increased national defense capability. Encourage increased level of international cooperation. Develop and support a national resources database for security and a

national disaster knowledge bank. Promote and develop a proactive disaster management system. Establish a national-provincial-local coordinated management system. (Source: National Preparedness Strategy 2014-2018.)

The Five Preparedness Strategies: Strategy 1: Preparedness of all parties upon non-normal incidents. Strategy 2: Immunity and capacity building for people and communities. Strategy 3: Encourage more international cooperation. Strategy 4: Mobilization and integration of plans at all levels. Strategy 5: Unified and efficient management of crises.

National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2010-2014

Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Strategies: Strategy 1: Prevention and Mitigation. Strategy 2: Preparedness. Strategy 3: Response management in an emergency. Strategy 4: Recovery in the aftermath.

Disaster Prevention/Protection and Mitigation Procedures: Floods and Landslides prevention/protection and mitigation. Tropical storms protection and hazard mitigation. Fire prevention/protection and hazard mitigation. Chemicals and hazmats protection and hazard mitigation. Transport and communication protection and hazard mitigation. Earthquake and collapse of structures prevention and hazard mitigation. Tsunami protection and hazard mitigation.

Protection and Mitigation of Security Threats Procedures: Prevention and suppression of sabotage acts. Land mines and explosives risk protection and mitigation. Aviation risk protection and mitigation (Source: National Disaster Prevention

and Mitigation Plan 2010-2014.)



National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2015

Conceptual framework: Development systems for risk prevention, preparedness and immunity for

the citizens in accordance with the Sufficiency Economic Philosophy, through building the capacity and ability to quickly adjust to crisis situations and their impacts.

Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Principles and the Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) concept are applied as proactive tools to manage and mitigate public threats. The concepts shall be deployed in line with Thailand’s national development strategies in order to help ensure a sustainable overall development.

Inclusion of the Sendai Framework to reduce disaster risks. The Sendai Framework, with an active span of 15 years (2015-2030), is a vital tool for tackling disasters on the global scale. It was endorsed by 187 members of the UN at the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held in Sendai, Japan during 14-18 March 2015, and has been incorporated into Thailand’s National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan, 2015.

Disaster Risk Management Strategies: Strategy 1: Emphasis on Risk mitigation. Strategy 2: Integrated efforts in emergency management. Strategy 3: Upgrade efficiency to enable sustainable recovery. Strategy 4: Promote international cooperation in risk management.

Role of MOT pursuant to the National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan

2015: The National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2015 prescribes 18

tasks in its “Guidelines for Support to an Emergency Operation.” And each of the ministries is assigned to prepare an Emergency Operations Support Plan for the collaborative handling of disaster risks within their areas of responsibility. For MOT, the sphere of responsibility is Transportation wherein it is assigned the following tasks:

- Set out plans to facilitate work during an emergency situation. The plans shall comply with the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan.



- Carry out improvements on transport routes and networks to support supply missions, and road relocations/realignments to mitigate disaster impact.

- Install alternative routes, bypasses or temporary access roads, together with maintenance/rehabilitation and adaptation of transport facilities to support the tasks of the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Command Center, and those of its local counterparts.

- Facilitate evacuation of people from disaster sites or areas vulnerable to hazards.

- Divert traffic from hazardous routes and disaster areas. - Reinstate and/or restore communication routes that have been

damaged. - Set up a resources database on transport disaster prevention and

mitigation - Support traffic operations on affected routes. - Coordinate and maintain communications with MOT divisions, related

agencies, and with the public, regarding hazards/disasters, security matters, and emergency situations.

1.3.5 Formulating the Transport Security Strategy

Security Strategies on Transport Systems, prepared to international standards, are to be employed as guidelines by all divisions under MOT in a coordinated effort to combat terrorism. These strategies are:

Land Transport Security Strategy Water Transport Security Strategy Air Transport Security Strategy

For the Transport Security Strategy, the Consultant shall employ the guidelines set by the Transportation Research Board wherein the security of transport infrastructure, vehicles, cargos and passengers shall be realized through four areas of activity described below:

1) Deter; Doing anything to dissuade terrorism or causing a plan of attack to be aborted. Deterrents could be by 1) Lowering the importance of a target, or 2) Reducing the chance of success, or both.



2) Detect; Finding out about terrorists’ plan of attack, or intercept their resources or arsenal before these are deployed.

3) Deny; Shielding of targets, employing fences or walls, or by reallocating targets or access points.

4) Mitigate; Reducing the severity of an anticipated attack by 1) Downsizing a likely attack, e.g. reducing the size of a target; 2) Confine the forces of explosives, e.g. use wire-meshed trash containers with clear plastic bags which will lessen the damage from improvised explosive devices (IEDs.)

1.3.6 The Training Curriculum

The Consultant has prepared a technology-transfer curriculum with training sessions designed to provide knowledge on transport security for officials and personnel of MOT and related agencies, as well as public individuals. Topics covered in the two-day course include the security of infrastructure and transport systems. They range from the definition of security to approaches in handling security. The definition of ‘Security’ differs from ‘Safety’ in that the former implies deterrence of crimes, inclusive of terrorism, or an absence of dangers or threats; while the latter implies an absence of accidents. Key strategies to be discussed in the course include those preventing and countering acts of terrorism, and general security practices consisting of preparedness and prevention, protection, response and recovery. Participants in the course shall gain valuable knowledge on many areas of security, such as warning and intelligence, terrorism countermeasures, protection of prime infrastructure, preparedness and response to attacks.

1.4 Expected Outcomes

1.4.1 A Transport Security Master plan with a definitive framework and guidelines that correspond to the missions and responsibilities of MOT work units, for the prevention, preparation and response to an event, and a recovery in its aftermath. The Plan shall comply with the National Preparedness Strategy 2014-2018 of the National Security Council as well as related laws.

1.4.2 Transport Security Strategies of international standards for land, sea, and air modes, to be implemented in the operation of transportation services and infrastructure, including



airports, seaports, rail terminals and stations, railway lines, electric train facilities, and bus stations, which are vulnerable to violent terrorist attacks. The aims of the strategies are to…

Prevent and shield transport infrastructure from possible assaults. Manage risks on transport infrastructure and public transport services. Strengthen transport infrastructure to withstand the forces of a disaster.

1.4.3 Knowledge, understanding, and increased capability of officials and personnel of MOT and related agencies; the competence to effectively carry out security tasks within their areas of responsibility in accordance with strategic guidelines of the Plan.

1.5 Methodology for the Preparation of Transport Security Master Plan This consists of four steps:

1.5.1 Investigate related national-level policies/strategies/plans involving the type and extent of the security threats, including man-made hazards and natural disasters.

1.5.2 Determine the causes of disasters and risk of occurrence. 1.5.3 Appraise existing capability to counter such threats at all levels — national, ministerial

(MOT), and related agencies — together with an analysis of international security practices.

1.5.4 Develop strategies for handling security threats (Closing the Gap.)

Final Report


Chapter 2: Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws

Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and

Laws for Thailand

Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and

Laws use overseas

Mobility and Security Theories

Related Transport Security Legislation and Plans

Conclusion

Final Report Chapter 2 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws


Chapter 2: Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws

This chapter details of the Consultant’s review of the transport-security related strategic plans and laws currently in force in Thailand and overseas.

2.1 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws for Thailand A summary of the Consultant’s review of existing laws and plans relating to transport

security for Thailand is given below:

2.1.1 Conclusion of Policies, Plans and Strategies of Existing Security

An investigation of security-related plans was carried out. For Phase 1 work, our review focused on existing policies and plans for the land transport mode, as shown below:

1. National Security Policy, B.E. 2558-2564 2. National Preparedness Strategy, B.E. 2557-2561 3. Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan, B.E. 2558 4. Internal Security Master Plan for B.E. 2558-2560 5. Communications Ministry Development Strategy, 2011–2015 (Amendment) 6. Transport Infrastructure Development Strategy, 2015–2022 7. Communications Ministry Action Plan for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 8. Integrative Resources for Homeland Defense Plan Four of the major plans thus reviewed are herein cited as examples:-

1) National Security Policy B.E. 2558-2564

The policy has as its vision the following statement: “Stability and Solidarity for our nation; Sustained development free from cross-border threats; Readiness in a national crisis; A proactive role in ASEAN and international relations.” Altogether 8 benefits for the nation are envisaged, thus:

Independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Stability and Longevity of Core Institutions Stability for the nation and her people, free from all forms of threat.

Chapter 2 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws Final Report


(Especially relevant to Phase 1 Transport Security Plan) Nation’s advancement, Justice, and People’s quality of life Peaceful and harmonious co-existence in a thriving society where pluralism and

human dignity are upheld. Sustainability of Natural Resources and the environment; security in the areas of

energy and food. Maintainability of national interests in an environment of global changes Peaceful and dignified co-existence within ASEAN and the global community.

The National Security Policy is comprised of 2 sections:

Section 1: This deals with the strengthening of three key areas, as follows: (1) Strengthening of core institutions and a democratic governance with H.M. the King

as Head of State (2) Fostering justice, reconciliation, and national unity. (3) Prevention of and resolution of the unrest in the southern border provinces.

Section 2: General security issues, consisting of 13 policies (4) Overhaul of border management to prevent and resolve cross-border problems. (5) Strengthen capacity for prevention and resolution of cross-border security threats. (6) Protection of maritime interests. (7) Re-organization, prevention and resolution of unlawful immigration. (8) Strengthening capacity for internal security. (9) National security through reduction in corruption. (10) Strengthening IT and cyber security (11) Maintain security of resources and environment. (12) Strengthen energy and food security. (13) Increased preparedness for national security. (14) Build up capacity for homeland defense. (15) Efficiency upgrades for intel gathering (16) Stability in international relations.

The National Security Policy is to serve as the framework for the tasks of all concerned agencies whose subordinate strategies, plans and measures shall be compatible therewith.



Administrative mechanisms: the National Security Council (chaired by the prime minister) shall be the steering body for national-level supervision and implementation; and its board as the supporting organization for policy implementation and monitoring.

Delegation of responsibilities: Work units shall be assigned responsibilities along the 16 policy lines as well as the subordinate policies thereof.

2) Strategy for National Preparedness, B.E. 2557-2561

National Preparedness refers to all activities undertaken by government agencies, enterprises, private-sector entities, local administrative bodies, and the general public, to enable the readiness for tackling disasters, security hazards and national emergencies, with a focus on threats to national security. There are two principal plans:

1) Prevention and Mitigation of public disasters Plan B.E. 2558 – A plan to underpin hazard management in the incident of a disaster. The principal agency under the plan is Dept of Prevention & Mitigation of Public Disasters, Ministry of Interior, to be implemented in accordance with 17 ministerial action plans.

2) Homeland Defense Plan – This is supported by resource mobilization plans whereby needed resources can be mobilized from civilians, state enterprises and the private sector, to support military requirement in a crisis situation.

The concept of national preparedness calls for on-going readiness and vigilance as exemplified for the areas below:

Preparation for the handling of crisis situations – This focuses on those policies and action plans that enable the coordination and mobilization of all concerned parties to effectively combat any threat to security, public hazards, and emergencies.

Strengthening of human-resource capability in tackling security threats, or expected threats, through the establishment of information, monitoring and management systems.

Preparedness at the local level – enable participation by local people in making plans and guidelines.

Bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation with other nations, especially with the UN, in developing national preparedness.



Proactive approach in prevention and mitigation – This calls for plans, rules and procedures, regular training, to enable effective and timely response to threats.

Enhancement of the nation’s defense precaution through operational support to key military command units during peace time.

Precautionary development of databases on security-related resources; database on public disasters for early warning, evacuation, rescue and management of crisis situations, threats of military aggression and public hazards.

Proactive management of hazards – This involves the forming of networks to take part in planning, threat management; before, during and after an incident.

The Ministry of Interior plays a key role in Thailand’s internal security. The assurance made possible through a nation-wide network of collaborating work units, from national level to provincial and local areas, is crucial to the ministry’s undertakings as described above.

3) Disasters prevention and mitigation Plan, B.E. 2558

The plan for 2015 is prepared through investigations of past experiences in the handling of nature’s hazards as well as from the guidelines set forth in its predecessor plan (covering years 2010-2514). The new plan is designed for work efficiency to global standards, containing preventive as well as restorative concepts namely: Disaster Risk Management; Disaster Risk Reduction; Emergency Management; and Build Back Better.

Targets for Disaster Risk Management 1) Thailand’s risk handling system will enable the collaboration of all parties, both

at home and abroad, in order to provide fast responses to a disaster incident as well as the just and equitable rehabilitation of affected areas.

2) Local communities and stakeholders are encouraged to take part in disaster management activity.

3) Promote public awareness of safety issues, and build up local capacity for post-disaster resiliency and revival.



Objective and Policy Framework 1) The plan is to serve as a conceptual framework for operations by all work

units, from local to national levels, for aligning all efforts in preventing and mitigating the impact of natural disasters.

2) To provide a compilation of procedures and effective approaches for disaster risk handling now in use internationally, from which adaptations may be made to match the Thai context, and applicable to every tier of public administration – from the BMA down to provincial and local-area authorities.

3) To upgrade Thailand’s capability for disaster risk handling in all of the four components, i.e. Disaster Risk Management; Disaster Risk Reduction; Emergency Management; and Build Back Better and Safer, to match area potential and up to international standards.

The National Committee for Natural Disasters Prevention and mitigation Policy has set a policy framework covering the work below:

Development and promotion of disaster risk reduction. Encourage collaboration from all parties Ensure needs of disaster victims are met through rehabilitation. Development and promotion of international practices in risk handling.

Strategies for Risk Management

1) Strategy 1: This involves three approaches, as follows:- Approach 1: Standardize disaster risk appraisal systems. Approach 2: Develop measures for disaster risk mitigation. Approach 3: Encourage the creation of mitigation guidelines among all

concerned parties. 2) Strategy 2: Harmonization of emergency management – there are three

approaches. Approach 1: Standardize emergency management practices. Approach 2: Develop systems and tools for emergency response. Approach 3: Develop systems and guidelines for relief operations.

3) Strategy 3: Upgrade efficiency of rehabilitation work – there are three approaches.



Approach 1: Develop systems for Post Disaster Need Assessment (PDNA) Approach 2: Develop operating and management systems for Post Disaster

Rehabilitation. Approach 3: Promote guidelines for “Build Back Better and Safer.”

4) Strategy 4: Promote international cooperation in disaster risk management – there are four approaches.

Approach 1: Develop systems for humanitarian aid. Approach 2: Upgrade operational standards for humanitarian aid work. Approach 3: Promote exchange of knowledge and experiences on public

disasters handling. Approach 4: Promote Thailand as the focal country for disaster risk

management.

Principles of Disaster Risk Reduction Figure 2.1 illustrates the principle of risk reduction combining all necessary approaches in a cyclical order. 1) Disaster Risk Reduction – consisting of the following approaches :-

Approach 1: Standardize disaster risk reduction systems. Approach 2: Develop mitigation measures for reducing disaster risks. Approach 3: Encourage the creation of guidelines for risk reduction at all

levels, all parties. 2) Emergency Management – consisting of the following approaches.

Approach 1: Standardize measures for emergency management. Approach 2: Develop systems and tools for emergency responses. Approach 3: develop systems and guidelines for relief operations.

3) Recovery – consisting of the following approaches. Approach 1: Develop systems for Post Disaster Need Assessment (PDNA) Approach 2: Develop systems for rehabilitation management and operations. Approach 3: Promote the practice of “Build Back Better and Safer.”



Figure 2.1: Cycles of the steps in disaster risk management.

4) National Maritime Security Plan B.E. 2558-2564

Proposed by Office of the National Security Council; approved by the Cabinet on 21 Oct 2014. Key components of the plan are described below: VISION: For Thailand to have full capability in protecting, maintaining and

reaping its maritime benefit; and sustaining it according to the sufficiency principles, with the participation of all concerned whose combined efforts should result in the effective management of our maritime powers.

National Maritime Benefit: This shall consist of our sovereignty, territorial integrity, rights and maritime jurisdiction, peace and order and security, prosperity, well-being, national interests, and prestige and dignity, and international recognition for its oceanic activity.

National Maritime Objective: To protect and maintain our sovereignty, territorial integrity, rights and national boundaries from all forms of threat. To enhance our capacity in reaping the benefit of our maritime resources. To protect and maintain our maritime resources and environment. To promote the participation of all parties in such endeavors.

The National Maritime Security Plan has 6 strategies: 1) Strategy for national maritime security development. 2) Strategy for the protection of resource utilization.

Disaster risk reduction

Emergency management Recovery

Preparedness Prevention

Recovery

Response

Public danger



3) Strategy for Peace and order in resource utilization. 4) Strategy for the stability and sustainability of maritime resources and

environment. 5) Strategy for development of human resources, knowledge and awareness

of importance of the sea. 6) Strategy for the management of national maritime benefit by government

agencies. Approach for implementing plans for maritime security: a number of principal

and assisting work units have been assigned, as follows: 1) At Policy level: A committee for policy and plan for protection of

maritime benefit was established pursuant to order of the NSC, No. 1/2556, dated 20 December 2013. The committee, to be chaired by the deputy prime minister, is tasked with the preparation of policies and plans for maritime security; plus supervision, monitoring and evaluation of undertakings by related agencies and work units.

2) At Operational Level: A coordinating center for maritime benefit protection, established by a Cabinet resolution dated 17 April 1997, is tasked with liaison work and support to relevant units. The center is placed under care of the Royal Navy. The center is in the process of being upgraded, from its previous role of a liaison body, to one that is active in field operations.

Communication Ministry: is the agency responsible for two work items under Strategy 3 (peace and order in resource utilization) above. The ministry has assigned the said work to the following agencies: 1) OTP – for promotion, development and facilitation of work in networking

maritime communication routes to match existing national development plans as well as related international cooperation schemes.

2) The Marine Department – the focal agency for the promotion and support to merchant marine activity for economic gains (and assistance in security-related incidents). A range of incentives has been established, such as investment promotion, tax exemption and inducements for economic utilization within and outside Thailand’s territorial waters.



VISION: For Thailand to have full capability in protecting, maintaining and reaping its maritime benefit; and sustaining it according to the sufficiency principles, with the participation of all concerned whose combined efforts should result in the effective management of our maritime powers.

National Maritime Benefit: This shall consist of our sovereignty, territorial integrity, rights and maritime jurisdiction, peace and order and security, prosperity, well-being, national interests, and prestige and dignity, and international recognition for its oceanic activity.

National Maritime Objective: To protect and maintain our sovereignty, territorial integrity, rights and national boundaries from all forms of threat. To enhance our capacity in reaping the benefit of our maritime resources. To protect and maintain our maritime resources and environment. To promote the participation of all parties in such endeavors.

The National Maritime Security Plan has 6 strategies: 1) Strategy for national maritime security development. 2) Strategy for the protection of resource utilization. 3) Strategy for Peace and order in resource utilization. 4) Strategy for the stability and sustainability of maritime resources and

environment. 5) Strategy for development of human resources, knowledge and awareness

of importance of the sea. 6) Strategy for the management of national maritime benefit by government

agencies. Approach for implementing plans for maritime security: a number of principal

and assisting work units have been assigned, as follows: 1) At Policy level: A committee for policy and plan for protection of

maritime benefit was established pursuant to order of the NSC, No. 1/2556, dated 20 December 2013. The committee, to be chaired by the deputy prime minister, is tasked with the preparation of policies and plans for maritime security; plus supervision, monitoring and evaluation of undertakings by related agencies and work units.



2) At Operational Level: A coordinating center for maritime benefit protection, established by a Cabinet resolution dated 17 April 1997, is tasked with liaison work and support to relevant units. The center is placed under care of the Royal Navy. The center is in the process of being upgraded, from its previous role of a liaison body, to one that is active in field operations.

Communication Ministry: is the agency responsible for two work items under Strategy 3 (peace and order in resource utilization) above. The ministry has assigned the said work to the following agencies: 1) OTP – for promotion, development and facilitation of work in networking

maritime communication routes to match existing national development plans as well as related international cooperation schemes.

2) The Marine Department – the focal agency for the promotion and support to merchant marine activity for economic gains (and assistance in security-related incidents). A range of incentives has been established, such as investment promotion, tax exemption and inducements for economic utilization within and outside Thailand’s territorial waters.

2.1.2 Summary of Transport Related Legislation

The following security related laws were reviewed by the consultant.

2.1.2.1 For Surface Transport 1) Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2464 2) Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2477 3) State Railway of Thailand Act, B.E.2494 4) Highway and Bridge Toll Setting for motor vehicles Act, B.E.2497 5) Motor Vehicles Act, B.E. 2522 6) Land Transport Act, B.E.2522 7) Land Traffic Management Commission Act, B.E. 2522 8) Highways Act, B.E.2535 9) Property Expropriation for Mass Transit Use Act, B.E. 2540 10) Toll Road Concessions Act, B.E.2542 11) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2543



12) Land Traffic Act B.E.2522 with Amendment for Volume VII, B.E. 2550 13) Notification of the Revolutionary Council No. 290 (Express Transit Auth.)

In addition to the legislation above, there are a range of decrees and supplementary laws in the form of ministerial regulations, as follows:

1) MOT Regulation – Division of MOT Work Units, B.E. 2558 2) MOT Regulation – Division of Work Units for Rural Roads Department, B.E. 2558 3) MOT Regulation – Division of LTD Work Units (Vol. 2), B.E. 2558 4) MOT Regulation on the Office of Transport & Traffic Planning, B.E. 2558

prescribes responsibilities for the Office for Safety Planning, as follows: Prepare master plans and action plans on transport & traffic safety. Appraise and recommend policies, measures and related plans. Reports, analyses and trends of security and environment of transport

systems. Appraise and advise; disseminate knowledge on transport and traffic

safety. Liaise, Supervise, Evaluate operational performances and recommend

change of approach to match situation and changes in technology. Work with and provide support to the operations of related units.

For Rail Transport Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2464 Rail Track and Highway Alignments Act, B.E. 2477 State Railway of Thailand Act, B.E. 2494 Property Expropriation for Mass Transit Use Act, B.E. 2540 Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2543

2.1.2.2 For Water Transport

Vessel Detainment Act, B.E. 2534 Merchant Marine Promotion Act, B.E. 2521 Maritime Freighting Act, B.E. 2534 Vessel Mortgages and Preferential Rights Act, B.E. 2537 Vessel Collision Prevention Act, B.E. 2522 Thai Vessels Act, B.E. 2481



Thai Vessels (Vol. 6) Act, B.E. 2540 Port of Thailand Authority Act, B.E. 2494 Port of Thailand Authority (Vol. 5) Act, B.E. 2543 Vessel Operation in Thai Territorial Waters Act, B.E. 2456 Vessel Operation in Thai Territorial Waters (Vol. 15) Act, B.E. 2540 MOT Regulation on structuring of the Marine Department, B.E. 2558 Laws pertaining to maritime security and the IMO are listed below:

1) Authority for the Navy to Suppress Certain Maritime Offenses Act, B.E. 2490 2) Police Authority in Deterrence and Suppression of Maritime Offenses Act, B.E.

2496 (unlawful acts on ships or water vessels) 3) Anti-Pirates Act, B.E. 2534 4) Prostitution Suppression Act, B.E.2539 (against acts of prostitution in ships 5) Anti Human Trafficking Act, B.E.2551 6) Anti Money Laundering Act, B.E.2542 7) Narcotics Suppression Act, B.E.2519 8) Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts Act, B.E.2545 9) Measures for Suppression of Drugs-related Offenses Act, B.E.2534 10) Narcotics Act, B.E.2522 11) Hallucinogenic and Psychotropic Drugs Act, B.E.2518 12) Drugs Offenses Ruling Procedures Act, B.E.2550 13) Firearms, Explosives, and Imitation Weapons Act, B.E.2490 14) Arms Exportation Control Act, B.E.2495 15) Arms Control Act, B.E.2530 16) Control of vaporized substances Act, B.E.2533 17) Response to Unlawful Aircraft Use Act, B.E.2553

There 13 international treaties already ratified by the Thai government: 1) 1948 IMO Convention 2) Amendment 1991 to IMO Convention 3) 1993 (Amendments 1993 to IMO Convention) 4) Convention on vessel Collision 1972 (COLREG 1972) 5) International treaty on Safety of Life At Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 1974) is the

flagship treaty adopted by Thailand for the issuance of laws that comply



with its core provisions on safety and security. Clause 11/2 of SOLAS on International Ship and Port facility Security Code (ISPS Code) was the basis of Thailand’s Revolutionary Council Decree No. 58.

6) 1965 facilitation for international shipping activity (FAL 1965) 7) 1966 Convention on loading line (LL 1966) 8) Convention on international Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT 1976) 9) Operational Agreement on INMARSAT OA 1976 10) 1969 Convention on Vessel Tonnage (TONNAGE 1969) 11) Convention on Standards, Training, Certification of ship Watchmen (STCW

78/95) 12) Convention on Operation and Collaboration for Oil Spill Clean Up, 1990

(OPRC 1990) 13) Convention on prevention of pollutants from Vessels, 1973/1978 (MARPOL

73/78) Annexes I & II Two international treaties are in the process of ratification:

1) 1969 Convention on civil liability for damages from oil pollution (CLC 1969) 2) Convention on International Fund for compensation to Damages from oil

pollution, 1971 (FUND 1971) MOT Notification on “Criteria for permitting the operations of a wharf for

commercial intent that may impact upon the safety or well -being of the public” is based on Clause 3(9) of the Revolutionary Council Decree No. 58. dated 26 January 1972 (vol 2) and signed by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn. The notification is to serve as core provisions for the issuance of subsequent notices on safety matters.

2.1.2.3 For Air Transport Aviation Act, B.E. 2497 Aviation Act (Vol. 10), B.E. 2542 Response to Unlawful Aircraft Use Act, B.E. 2519 Response to Unlawful Aircraft Use (Vol. 2) Act, B.E. 2522 Airports Authority of Thailand Act, B.E. 2522 International Air Transport Act, B.E. 2558 Certain Aviation Offenses Act, B.E. 2558



MOT Regulation on the establishment of Civil Aviation Dept B.E. 2558 Altogether 12 international conventions and protocols on the prevention

and suppression of terrorism. 1) Convention on Offences & Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft

(Tokyo Convention, 1963) 2) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague

Convention, 1970) 3) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil

Aviation (Montreal Convention, 1971) 4) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against

Internationally Protected Persons (1973) 5) International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages

Convention, 1979) 6) Convention on the Physical Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials (Nuclear

Materials Convention, 1980) 7) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports

Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety), (1988)

8) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (1988)

9) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)

10) Convention on Plastic Explosives Marking for the Purpose of Detection (1991)

11) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997) 12) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

(1999)

The inter-relationship of all transport security plans with the strategic framework of all governing bodies is shown in Figure 2.2



Figure 2.2: Integrating Transport Security Plan Phase 1 with national and ministerial policies, strategies and plans

Page 2 - 15

Chapter 2 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws

Transport Infrastructure Development Strategy, 2015–2022 (1) Creating stability and security in travel and

transport. And contributes to sustainable development and friendly environment

Policy plans to synergies of forces and resources to defense Plan of Power to be sealed

(4) Developing the operational plans for civil servant, state enterprise, and private sector to respond the demand in manpower, munition, infrastructure facilities, medical and public health services, transportation communication, supply and maintenance, and public utility management as needed before, during, and after unusual events.

National Preparedness Strategies 2014-2017 Strategic plans for managing all types of security threats from both natural and manmade threats by mobilizing resources from all sectors and efficiently coordinating to protect, improve, alleviate and recover the threats and their consequences to the nation

National Internal Security 2015-2017 3) Security threats and transnational crime 4) Special security affairs 5) Southern Insurgency in the Three Border Provinces

National Prevention and Mitigation Plans 2015 Missions of Department of Transport under the National Prevenand Mitigation Plans 2015 are 1.Providing supplementary plans for operations and management during

emergency according to the national prevention and mitigation plans 2. Improving transport routes and networks to support security supplies

and missions as well as rehabilitating transport routes to protect and lessen the impacts of the threats

3.Providing the additional routes, alternate routes, or temporary routes as well as recovering and improving transportation infrastructure and facilities to support the operations of the local and national prevention and mitigation staff

4.Supporting the evacuation process of the people from the threat areas or risk areas

5.Supporting travel and traffic information to the people about the evaluating routes and evacuation areas

6.Restoring and recovering transport routes that being damaged to be ready for use as fast as possible

7.Developing the resource database systems for preventing and mitigating transport security treats

8.Providing supports in traffic operations and management in responsible routes that being harmed

9.Providing emergency response call services for security threats and coordinating with other transport agencies, other relevant agencies, and the public

National Security Policy 2015-2021 (6) Managing national maritime protection and enforcement (8) Strengthening internal security (13) Developing national preparedness systems to ensure

countrywide security

National Maritime Security Plan (B.E. 2558-2564) ( 3 ) Strategic plan for enhancing security and managing enforcement of national maritime

Operation and Integration Plans of Ministries for Prevention and Mitigation of Security Threats

(Current: Supplementary Operational Plan during a state of emergency in transport systems) Proposing operational and action plans among relevant agencies before, during, and after the event to support the main agencies under the respective missions and responsibilities

Legislations related to land, maritime, and air transportation

Examples of Transport Security Plans in UK, USA and Australia

Transport Security Plan Phase 1

Strategies for Department of Transport 2011-2015 (amended) (1) Developing network connection of transport

systems both domestic and international (2) Advancing the safety standard of transport

system



2.2 Review of Related Policies, Plans, Strategies and Laws use overseas Plans and laws relating to transport security are reviewed for three countries – the UK, USA and Australia. Findings of the review are described below. 2.2.1 The United Kingdom (UK)

For the UK, the responsibility for regulating transport security lies with the Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate, or TRANSEC, which belongs under the International Networks and Environment Group (INE) of the country’s Department for Transport.

TRANSEC sphere of work covers the security for all transport modes including the London Underground and the Docklands Light Rail and the Glasgow Underground, the Chanel Tunnel, as well as the transport of dangerous goods via road and rail. The agency also regulates the workings of transport industry bodies and transport operators.

The authority of TRANSEC is vested by the following pieces o f legislation.

Aviation Security Act, 1982 Aviation and Maritime Security Act, 1990 Security Order for the Channel Tunnel, 1994 Railway Act,1993 (sections 119-21), 1995 (section 54) EU Convention on Aviation and Maritime Security Legislature to combat terrorism, crimes and security offenses, 2001 Civil Aviation Act, 2006 Railway and Transport Security Act, 2003: Section 121A Regulation for the Transport of Dangerous Goods & High-Pressured Equipment,

amendment 1967 Peace Keeping & Anti-Crime Inspection Act, 2009

TRANSEC’s work is based on two fundamental principles: - Risk Management — concerns the assessment of threat and the vulnerability of

likely targets and the resulting impact of an attack. Outcome of such assessment indicates the degree of risk. Risks are managed through use of appropriate and practicable measures.



Practical counter measures — Design counter measures that are practicable in terms of cost and the burden on industry operators so as to ensure the sustainability of their undertaking.

Security of the Rail Mode The UK ministry of Transport adopted a Railway Security Plan, 2001 which was

reviewed and expanded after the incident of attack on the Madrid train system in 2004, and the attacks on the London Underground in 2005.

CCTVs were installed on the London Underground system. The Ministry of Transport also oversees the security of the Channel Tunnel in collaboration with the French authorities.

B.E. 2006 Bomb sniffing dogs are routinely employed on the London Underground system.

Underground station inspections, vigilance of train staff and public, are now in place. These measures are monitored by the UK MOT Inspector for compliance and effectiveness.

Maritime Security In the aftermath of the /11 attacks on US soil, the UK introduced the “International

Ship and Port Facility Security Code.” Subsequently the UK MOT has introduced further mesasures for maritime vessels

and wharfs in the effort to enhance the security of this mode along the line of the air mode.

The UK’s National Aviation Security Program has been enforced since mid 1970s. According to the program, pax and baggage are subject to security screening;

aircraft are screened upon their entering an airport’s aircraft secure zone. After the discovery of the plan to employ liquid explosive substances for an attack

on trans-Atlantic planes in 2006, a limit has been imposed on the amount of liquid allowed onboard a flight.

After an alleged bombing attack on a plane over Detroit in 2009, the UK has installed body scanners for detecting hazardous low-metal or non-metal substances on passengers.



Starting from 2003, stakeholders on airport security, overseeing agencies and the UK aviation industry, have been continuing with a program on Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessments. As a result, a law on anti-crime and peace-keeping inspections was introduced in 2009. The law requires the appointment of an independent consultant to assess risks and to report their findings to an assigned airport security administration group.

The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, in the UK Home Office, works to counter the threat from terrorism. Their work is covered in the government’s counter-terrorism strategy which is comprised of four components: Here are the four components

pursue: to stop terrorist attacks. prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack. prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.

The purpose of Pursue is to stop terrorist attacks. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest stage, disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those responsible.

For the Prevent strategy, the UK actively seeks cooperation from the international community in the arrest of terror perpetrators. This is in addition to a wide range of other programs in their effort to prevent security threats.

Protect aims to strengthen the protection against terrorist attacks in the UK or against its interests overseas, and so reduce vulnerability. In recent years, the UK Home Office is working to… strengthen UK border security reduce the vulnerability of the transport network increase the resilience of the UK’s infrastructure improve protective security for crowded places.

Prepare: The UK has aimed to achieve the following objectives by 2015:- To continue to build generic capabilities to respond to and recover from a wide

range of terrorist and other civil emergencies.



improve preparedness for the highest impact risks in the national risk assessment

improve the ability of the emergency services to work together during a terrorist attack

enhance communications and information sharing relating to terrorist attacks. Source: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism

2.2.2 United States of America

The U.S. transport security plan has been established through the collaboration of agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These agencies are Transport Security Administration (TSA), the major agency with authority over the transport security of the nation; U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the branch of the U.S. Armed Forces operating under DHS to ensure maritime safety, security, and stewardship; and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to ensure transport security. The missions of national strategy for transport security are four aspects.

1) Prevent and deter acts of terrorism against the transport systems 2) Promote preparedness and management of all types of threat to all transport

modes 3) Improve cost-effectiveness of resource uses for transport security 4) Increase public awareness and collaboration in securing transport systems

The legislation on transport security is contained in Section 49 of the United States Code, which regulates the transport sector of the U.S. It consists of 9 subsections as follows.

1) Department of Transportation – pertaining to the duties, powers, and jurisdiction of the work units under the supervision of the department.

2) Other Government Agencies – pertaining to the duties, powers, and jurisdiction of the work units other than those under USDOT, such as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

3) General and Intermodal Programs – provisions relating to intermodal transport, such as transport of hazardous materials and public transport.

4) Interstate Transportation – regulations relating to all modes of interstate transport.

5) Rail Programs – regulations relating to rail transport.



6) Motor Vehicle and Driver Programs – regulations relating to commercial motor vehicles, and drivers.

7) Aviation Programs – regulations relating to the aviation safety, airport development, and public airports

8) Pipelines – regulations relating to pipeline transport , safety, user fees, oversight agency.

9) Miscellaneous The national strategies for transport security can be classified by transport modes as follows.

National Strategy for Road Transport Security 1. Strategy for preventing and deterring acts of terrorism against highway systems.

It has three objectives. Implement flexible and efficient security plans, based on risk management

principles, to reduce risk and likely impacts, and to improve the efficiency of transport networks.

Encourage a great level of caution among the traveling public and transport-service staff.

Promote knowledge and information sharing among road transport agencies.

2. Strategy for promoting the preparedness for handling threats to road systems. It has two objectives. Manage and reduce risks associated with the major nodes, links, and flows

of traffic within critical transport systems, in order to improve overall network survivability.

Enhance the capability for rapid and flexible response and recovery to all forms of threat.

3. Strategy for improving the cost-effective use of resources for road transport security. It has two objectives. Ensure the participation of the sectors involved with the development of

road transport. Ensure the coordination and research into the likelihood ranking of threats.



Strategy for Rail Transport Security 1. Security plan for commuter rail transport. It has the following goals.

Expand the collaboration among rail transport agencies in order to increase security.

Develop the effective foundation of security practices on a regular basis. Increase the number of security agencies. Improve the efficiency of information gathering, which is an important

component of security maintenance for commuter trains and railway systems.

Use advanced security equipment to reduce risks, and employ technology and training as tools for tackling threats.

2. Security plan for freight rail transport. This is supported by the objectives below: Assess the risk to the rail sector, for example for high threat urban areas. Comprehensive reviews of the risk situation. Corporate security reviews Increasing vigilance of freight rail workers. Enhancing information and intelligence sharing among freight rail security

partners Manage and reduce possible risks to stations, tracks and major railway

landmarks Enhance the capacity for rapid and flexible response and recovery to

hazards. Align sector resources with the highest priority risks. Ensure participation among sectors in the development and

implementation of programs for freight rail protection; ensure coordination and research on the likelihood of risks.

National Strategy for Maritime Transport Security The national strategy for maritime security was developed in 2004. It has eight

supporting plans as follows. 1) National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness 2) Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan 3) Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan



4) International Outreach and Coordination Strategy 5) Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan 6) Maritime Transportation System Security Plan 7) Maritime Commerce Security Plan 8) Domestic Outreach Plan

National Strategy for Air Transport Security

The national strategy for air transport security is developed to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts in the Air Domain; to mitigate damage and expedite recovery; to minimize the impact on the air transportation sector; and to actively engage domestic and international partners.

The aviation security strategy consists of the following plans: 1. Air Transport System Security Plan 2. Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan 3. Air Transport System Recovery Plan; 4. Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Integration Plan; 5. International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan; 6. Domestic Outreach Plan; and 7. International Outreach Plan

2.2.3 AUSTRALIA

Australia divides its security apparatus into two spheres: one for surface transport, and the other for air and maritime transport. The former sphere is accounted for by individual states within the commonwealth; while the latter, under the jurisdiction of the Transport Security Committee, (TSC) which in turn is under the federal government’s Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. Security undertakings within the two spheres is governed by the following agreements and strategies:

1) Intergovernmental Agreement in Surface Transport Security, IGA 2) National Surface Transport Security Strategy, NSTSS 3) National Air Transport Security 4) Maritime Security

Australia’s transport security plans cover the following areas:



Security plan for Surface Transport (road and rail) 1) reducing the likelihood that the surface transport system will be a target for

terrorism and other security threats 2) increasing the implementation of nationally-consistent protective security

planning and preventative measures in the surface transport system 3) helping the surface transport sector across Australia to consistently and more

effectively move to higher levels of alert when required

Security Plan for water transport 1) Security for operators in the shipping industry 2) Security over maritime activities 3) Security for vessels and ISSCs 4) Security for off-shore regions 5) Security plan for berthing piers

Security Plan for Air Transport 1) Risk reduction strategy to enhance safety of passengers. 2) Strategy for effective collaboration between the government and the aviation

business. 3) Guidelines for determining the needs for rules and regul\s and guidelines for

international practices 4) Strategy for minimizing inconvenience to pax and cargo transport.

Intergovernmental Agreement in Surface Transport Security, IGA

The IGA was sealed in June of 2005 between the state and territories within the commonwealth of Australia as a governing pact for the country’s counter terrorism arrangements. It has the following objectives: (IGA) 3 2548

1) This Agreement is intended to complement and should be considered alongside the Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Arrangements which sets out a high-level strategy to prevent and deal with acts of terrorism in Australia.

2) Recent world events have heightened awareness of security issues. They have also focused attention on the need to better secure the community and



nationally-important surface transport systems from the significant economic and social damage that could occur following a terrorist attack or other forms of unlawful interference with surface transport.

3) The bombing of trains in suburban Madrid on 11 March 2004 highlighted the capability and intent of terrorists to attack surface-based passenger transport systems.

4) The Council of Australian Governments endorsed the development of this Agreement following recommendations from the Australian Transport Council and the National Counter-Terrorism Committee.

5) The Agreement is necessary because achieving sound surface transport security outcomes requires whole-of-government cooperation within jurisdictions, national coordination across jurisdictions, and the support and cooperation of surface transport operators and the community.

6) Governments play a significant role in surface transport security, including as: (a) planners and developers of surface transport systems; (b) investors in the surface transport sector; and (c) regulators of the surface transport sector.

7) Some surface transport assets or systems have been identified as nationally or state significant critical infrastructure. As a result, this Agreement takes into account the National Guidelines for Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism.

2.3 Mobility and Security Theory A demonstration of the tension between mobility and security is the common

experience of air travelers as they undergo airport screening at checkpoints operated by transportation security officers. In recent years the list of prohibited items in airplanes has grown, along with types of screenings performed.

The government of a democratic society walks a tightrope between working to alert its populace against threats and striving to maintain their reasonable expectations of safety through its security control mechanisms. The tightrope is strung tenuously among principles defined by three theories:

deterrence theory, terror management theory, and protection motivation theory.



Each theory puts forth that unless a population is mobilized against a threat, or are constantly placed in a psychological state of hyper-vigilance, its members become complacent — a situation that encourages terrorism. 2.3.1 Deterrence Theory

The theory stemmed from the military logic that imposing greater costs on a potential enemy than the prospective gains or benefits might neutralize the motivation for an act of aggression. It seeks to prevent attacks by the threat of punishment, the threat of retaliation, and proactive denial and interception of resources that could be used to perpetrate an attack. In its original application, deterrence theory concentrated more on threats of punishment and retaliation. The starkest example of deterrence theory is found in the philosophy of mutually assured destruction (MAD) that grew out of the cold war era. Its premise is based on a rational model of human behavior, which breaks down under the conditions where a geographic enemy is unidentifiable (i.e., a country) or a rational response cannot be counted on. This is because the threat of retaliation works as a deterrent only if the enemy fears annihilation. Since 9/11, Western military and intelligence strategists have come to recognize the lethality of technology in the hands of nontraditional foes; that is, those who are neither geographically identified nor conform to traditional rational choice models of decision making.

The law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities then began developing technologies that would assist in proactive denial of resources and interception of actors. But developing accurate predictive models proved difficult in attempting to account for non rational motives such as ideology or brainwashing. Because of the difficulty in predicting non-rational human behavior, most Western governments have come to rely more on a deterrence strategy of denial whereby defense and intelligence systems are aimed at thwarting attacks with information gathered extensively, and through data mining and the identification of patterns that emerge from the collection of behavioral data from entire populations. This has meant primarily the development of technologies that enable both pervasive and invasive data collection and storage of an information cache unparalleled in history. The US’s National Security Agency or NSA since 2007 has implemented the PRISM program whereby extensive data mining is made via all communications modes as shown in Figure 2.3. Operation Prism was subjected to an expose by Edward Snowden in 2013, and some aspects of its information



gathering have been revised upon orders from President Obama, as stated in his speech on 1 January 2014 which is reproduced in part hereunder.

“….This brings me to the program that has generated the most controversy these past few months -- the bulk collection of telephone records under Section 215. Let me repeat what I said when this story first broke: This program does not involve the content of phone calls, or the names of people making calls. Instead, it provides a record of phone numbers and the times and lengths of calls —metadata that can be queried if and when we have a reasonable suspicion that a particular number is linked to a terrorist organization. Why is this necessary? The program grew out of a desire to address a gap identified after 9/11. One of the 9/11 hijackers — Khalid al-Mihdhar — made a phone call from San Diego to a known al Qaeda safe-house in Yemen. NSA saw that call, but it could not see that the call was coming from an individual already in the United States. The telephone metadata program under Section 215 was designed to map the communications of terrorists so we can see who they may be in contact with as quickly as possible. And this capability could also prove valuable in a crisis. For example, if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and law enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised to conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence. Being able to quickly review phone connections to assess whether a network exists is critical to that effort.

…..For all these reasons, I believe we need a new approach. I am therefore ordering a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists, and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities we need without the government holding this bulk metadata.

…..During the review process, some suggested that we may also be able to preserve the capabilities we need through a combination of existing authorities, better information sharing, and recent technological advances. But more work needs to be done to determine exactly how this system might work.

Because of the challenges involved, I’ve ordered that the transition away from the existing program will proceed in two steps. Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization instead of the current three. And I have directed the Attorney General to work with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court so that during this



transition period, the database can be queried only after a judicial finding or in the case of a true emergency.

…..One thing I’m certain of: This debate will make us stronger. And I also know that in this time of change, the United States of America will have to lead. It may seem sometimes that America is being held to a different standard. And I'll admit the readiness of some to assume the worst motives by our government can be frustrating. No one expects China to have an open debate about their surveillance programs, or Russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other places into account. But let’s remember: We are held to a different standard precisely because we have been at the forefront of defending personal privacy and human dignity.

As the nation that developed the Internet, the world expects us to ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for individual empowerment, not government control. Having faced down the dangers of totalitarianism and fascism and communism, the world expects us to stand up for the principle that every person has the right to think and write and form relationships freely — because individual freedom is the wellspring of human progress.”

Figure 2.3: Details of data collection by PRISM



2.3.2 Terror Management Theory

In order for the government of a democratic society to implement such pervasive and invasive controls from the massive collection of information about people— approve spending and gain the compliance of its populace— it must mobilize its citizens against purported threats so that they will relinquish their privacy and certain of their freedoms.

Terror management theory asserts that in the event that preventative (deterrent) measures fail to preclude acts of aggression, governments seek to mobilize citizens by making fear appeals based on some actual or potential threat. The perception of threat is the anticipation of a psychological (e.g., assault), physical (e.g., battery), or sociological (e.g., theft) violation or harm to oneself or others, which may be induced vicariously. Therefore the theory explains the processes by which governments utilize fear propaganda for mobilization and to make vigilant a population by exploitation of the human availability bias, making even remote threats seem severe and imminent but mitigated under due care of the government’s watchful eye.

During the cold war era, a systematic institutionalization of fear appeals surfaced in the United States. American schoolchildren were shown movies of a nuclear explosion and then taught to hide under their desks. In more recent times, the American government has attempted to enlist the mass media to act as conduit for fear appeals to the public. This has contributed to the general acceptance of invasive security measures ranging from pat-downs at airports to pervasive surveillance cameras at street corners, along with acquiescence to unprecedented levels of military spending. Also at extraordinary levels is the emergence of private industries targeting the government sector and commercial security operations, on which spending has more than doubled since 9/11.

Given the government’s need to mobilize its people, such fear appeals must be re-energized once their effects begin to fade. The government must then balance fear appeals designed to mobilize its citizenry against the risk of crying wolf once too often; it needs to instill a sense of security that enables people to conduct their lives — because these psychological processes regulate the degrees of risk that people are willing to assume, for example, whether one will fly on an airplane during a code yellow (elevated) versus code orange (high) versus code red (severe) threat level.



2.3.3 Protection Motivation Theory

When a threat is perceived, people behave according to the amount of risk they are willing to accept — known as risk homeostasis. Risk homeostasis results from the perceived severity of the potential damage, such as the financial cost of repairs. Therefore, people tend to adjust their behavior in response to the extent of the damage the threat may cause. The perceived severity of threat and the associated acceptance of risk behavior are based on the premises that…

(1) people place a certain intangible value on life, liberty and property;

(2) they have a threshold level of risk they will accept, tolerate, prefer, desire, or choose;

(3) this “target level” of risk they will accept before acting depends on the perceived advantages or benefits versus the disadvantages or costs of safe or unsafe alternatives; and

(4) this will determine the degree to which people will expose themselves to a threat or hazard before taking precautions or trying to avoid a threat altogether.

Protection motivation theory further refines these principles into individual behavioral responses. It posits that how people behave will be conditioned upon their cognitive assessment of the probability or likelihood that a severe threat event will happen to them, the perceived efficacy of their available preventative measures, and their self-efficacy for implementing those preventative measures. Protection motivation theory thus translates the more global sociopolitical constructs of deterrence and terror management theories into individual-level constructs for predicting how people will behave. When fear appeals are made, individuals assess the appeals for personal impact. Extending from this line of reasoning, researchers tied the situational theory of publics and the health-belief model to issues related to bioterrorism threats.

The situational theory of publics asserts that a populace may be segmented based on the activeness or passiveness of communication behavior. The factors purported by this theory are problem recognition, level of active involvement, and constraint recognition. Problem recognition reflects the extent to which an individual recognizes a problem as relevant to him or her; that is, how likely a threat is perceived to impact the person. The level of active involvement results from a perception of how emotionally the problem is felt, such as the



perceived severity of damage to the person which is posed by the threat. Constraint recognition reflects the degree to which people perceive their behaviors as limited by factors beyond their own control. If these three factors accurately depict external conditions then the environment must change before a person will respond; but if they are merely perceived (internal), they may be changed by persuasive communication. Hence, the persuasiveness of fear appeals is a key element in whether and how people respond to messages about a threat.

2.4 Related Transport Security Legislation and Plans 2.4.1 Hazardous materials & dangerous goods legislation

In addition to reviewing the Hazmats Act B.E. 2535, the Consultant also looked into the range of regulations issued in relation to the said Act; for example, the Ministerial Regulation No. 4, issued on 20 April 2012; as well as an array of related ministerial notifications, as listed below:

Subject: List of Hazmats, year 2013 Subject: List of Hazmats, (No. 7), dated 3 November 2010. Subject: Determination of Fees on Hazmats, dated 3 November 2009. Subject: List of Hazmats (No. 6), dated 3 February 2009. Subject: Requirement of Special Personnel for Hazmats Premises, dated 18 April

2008. Subject: Storage of Hazmats under Supervision of the Public-Private Joint

Commission, dated 18 April 2008. Subject: Criteria on the Issuance of Import Approvals for un-used or used plastic

scraps, cuttage and disposables, dated 19 February 2008. Subject: Insurance Covers for the Transport of Hazmats (No. 2) year 2007. Subject: Insurance Covers for the Transport of Hazmats, 2006; dated 23 February

2006. Subject: List of Hazmats (No. 3) year 2005. Subject: Insurance Covers for Land Transport of Hazmats, dated 7 Nov 2003.

For the transport of hazmats by the water mode, the cautionary practices adopted by the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) are also in line with those described above. The PAT prescribes guidelines for the safe handling of hazmats according to the three groups listed in the IMDG Code, as follows:



Group 1: Hazmats prohibited by PAT for wharf loading or handling at Bangkok Port. Group 2: Highly hazardous freight (of Category A): wharf loading and handling allowed

by PAT provided the materials are immediately removed from the port upon discharge from vessel.

Group 3: Highly hazardous other than Groups 1 and 2 (or Category B): Temporary storage of the materials is allowed, at a storage site specified by PAT, for a period no longer than 5 working days from the day of completion of freight discharge from vessel.

2.4.2 National Strategic Plans for prevention and handling of Emerging Infectious

Diseases, B.E. 2556-2559 — under the responsibility of Disease Control Department, Public Health Ministry; approved by Cabinet on 28 August 2012 Five inter-related strategies were developed to govern a wide range of tasks in

developing systems for monitoring and control of diseases in people, urban and wild animals, and the environment in order to effect sustained efficiency for the fast and timely control of diseases, thus providing safety for at-risk groups and the general public. Measures are designed to enable a level of preparedness for effective responses to any incidence of a pandemic. All this is to add to Thailand’s disease-control capability, and to mitigate any likely socio-economic impact therefrom.

Strategy 1: Develop capability for monitoring, prevention, treatment and control of diseases. There are 5 approaches and 41 measures.

Strategy 2: Management of livestock farming systems, animal health practices to ensure a disease-free condition. There are 8 approaches and 36 measures.

Strategy 3: Develop systems for the management of knowledge, and promotion of R&D. There are 3 approaches and 19 measures.

Strategy 4: Develop an integrated system for the management of, and preparation for emergency responses. There are 4 approaches and 26 measures.

Strategy 5: Awareness campaigns and public relations on risks arising from an Emerging Infectious Disease (EID). There are 5 approaches and 18 measures.



The Steering Committee on Preparation and Response to EID, which is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, has the permanent secretary of MOT as one of its members. The Steering Committee supervises 8 appointed sub-committees; two of which contain delegates from MOT, i.e. the Sub-committee for Strategic Implementation on Preparation and Response to EID; and the Sub-committee for Integrated Management and Emergency Responses.

MOT is involved with the work on the preparation for, and control of, the Ebola virus disease whereby the ministry specifies a range of measures for the use of public transport in the event of an epidemic, as well as provides facilitation and vehicles for personnel required to travel on duty.

2.4.3 Review of Transport Security in Border Areas

Thailand has common borders with four neighboring countries. The shared border distances are: with Myanmar, 2,400km; with Laos, 1,810km; with Cambodia, 798km; and Malaysia, 647km.

The types of border trade that involve Customs inspection are:

1. Importation: bringing in goods for consumption in Thailand. Re-importation: meaning the importation of goods that had been exported beforehand.

2. Exportation: sending goods to destinations outside Thailand. Re-export: meaning the exportation of goods that had previously been imported.

3. Transit or Transshipment: The conveyance of cargo through Thailand wherein the conveyed goods are not subjected to duty.

NOTES: The treatment of cargo in transit through a land-locked country is in accordance with the 1921 Barcelona Convention. For transshipped cargo, Section 58 of the Customs Act BE 2469 shall govern. The Customs Department has issued Notification 36/2558 on rules and procedures governing transshipment, and the practice is now referred to as Multimodal Transportation. In addition, a Multi-modal Transportation Act was promulgated in 2005 to enforce and support international trade pursuant to international obligations. Section 4 of this act defines “Inter-modal Transportation” as the conveyance of goods on two or



more transport modes with the conveyance from origin to destination being governed by a single contract.

Legislation pertaining to transit and transshipped cargo

1) Plant Quarantine Act, B.E. 2507 2) Firearms & Ammunition, Explosives, Firecrackers, and Imitation Weapons, B.E. 2490 3) Livestock Epidemics Act B.E. 2499 4) Diseases and Venoms from Animals Act B.E. 2525 5) Psychotropic and Hallucinogenic Substances Act B.E. 2518 6) Control of Exportation of Arms and Ammunition Act B.E.2495 7) Fertilizers Act B.E. 2518 8) Hazardous Materials Act B.E. 2535 9) Narcotic Drugs Act B.E. 2522 10) Wildlife Protection & Preservation Act B.E. 2535 11) Plant Genetics Act B.E. 2518 12) Arms and Ammunition Control Act B.E. 2530 Cross-Border Trade: Or goods in transit, refers to any of the various forms of goods conveyance by individuals or entrepreneurs in the first country across to the second and third countries (and vice versa) for which agreement from all concerned countries on such form of conveyance has been instated.

Three types of Border Checkpoints Permanent Checkpoint: This type of check point is installed to allow passage of

people and vehicles between the two countries with mutual consent from respective governments. Approval for a permanent checkpoint must be signed by the minister of Interior following a Cabinet approval and publication thereof in the Royal Gazette. Such an installation is usually a Customs checkpoint designated by the Minister of Finance pursuant to Section 4 of the Customs Act BE 2469 and supplementary clauses given in Volume 7 of its amendment B.E. 2480.

Temporary Checkpoint: This is allowed on a temporary basis, for specific purposes and duration, and where such opening poses no threat to security or safety. The



checkpoint must be closed upon completion of the specified duration. An opening must be endorsed by a notification of the Interior Ministry obtained through prior consent of the Sub-committee on Border Opening which is a unit of the Internal Security Council.

Leniency Checkpoint: This is installed to facilitate border area livelihoods and small trade as well as to promote friendly relations of the local citizens on both sides. The local administrative bodies of both countries shall agree to such an opening. For Thailand, the provincial governor, acting upon a prior approval from the interior ministry, shall have the authority to approve this type of border opening.

The establishment of a border checkpoint is dictated by government policies which are based on a number of local factors as well as cost consideration. Criteria for the opening of a checkpoint are listed below:

Mutual consent must be sought from all parties — administrative, military, security agencies, citizens and concerned entities at the local level. In addition, evidence must be shown that indicates a measure of interfacing with authorities of the neighboring country to the stage of consent or approval for border opening.

With the feasibility thus established, the local administrative body shall propose to the Cabinet for an approval to install the planned checkpoint.

Upon Cabinet approval, a budget shall be prepared for the erection of offices and other buildings. Funds may be derived from a central or local authority and/or from private-sector donation.

The Customs Department shall prepare a draft of the proposed regulation for submission to the Council of the State for consideration. Upon approval therefrom, the minister of finance shall proceed with the issuance of a regulation which shall come into force upon its publication in the Royal Gazette.

2.5 Conclusion

Reviews were carried out on a wide collection of laws, decrees, government notifications and international engagements (treaties, protocols etc) that relate to the issues of transport security. Findings from the reviews indicate that, contrary to prevailing misconception that Thailand is in need of more laws, we already have a body of legislation that covers adequate grounds for developing our transport infrastructure while implementing security measures in



parallel. For example, for laws relating to land transport alone, there are more than 10 key pieces of legislation currently in force. In addition, many pieces of decrees, or sub-ordinate laws, are highlighted by the Consultant in order to illustrate the full extent of Thailand’s legislative readiness.

For water transport, Thailand also has active laws and decrees sufficient for the effective development of this mode of conveyance. Examples of key legislation include: a range of laws pertaining to the country’s benefit and maritime security; international engagements involving Thailand; the establishment of commissions, committees and organizations that help to safeguard our benefit and security, and empowered to investigate existing maritime treaties for conformance to the 1982 UN International Maritime Protocol, as well as regional agreements. In addition, the Consultant proposes recommendations on such aspects as: the formats and procedures for setting up new governing bodies; guidelines for dispute settlement and avoidance; guidelines for synergizing the works of existing maritime agencies for the maximum benefit to the country.

For air transport, Thailand has long been an active member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) having ratified the CICA agreement and hosted the ICAO’s regional office in Bangkok since 1955. MOT and Thailand’s aviation agencies regularly participate in ICAO’s activities, such as regional conferences, provision of aviation statistics and data. In return, Thailand has received support from ICAO in the form of technical assistance, development projects, conferences and training seminars. In 2015, two additional laws were promulgated in Thailand which deal with air transport security, i.e. Certain Offenses in Aviation Practices Act, and International Air Transport Act B.E. 2558. Outcome of the Consultant’s review indicates that Thailand’s security planning for the air transport mode is largely compliant with ICAO’s regulations as well as other related international standards.

As a member of various international agreements, Thailand must honor all of the concomitant international obligations, especially those involving transport security of all modes – land, air and water. To ensure proper compliance, it is thus necessary for Thailand to enact an array of supplementary laws to cover emerging spheres of transport operations.

Findings from the Consultant’s study over a 7-month period indicated the presence of a comprehensive range of Thai laws pertaining to transport security for all modes. The scope of these existing laws already covers practically all of the key aspects pertaining to Thailand’s



engagement in international treaties and protocols. Moreover, in view of the rapid changes that have taken place in our social, economic and cultural settings, Thailand’s National Legislative Assembly had made significant progress over the past year in amending and enacting a wide range of laws to match the requirement introduced by such changes.

What is found to be lacking in Thailand’s transport security legislation is a law specifically on anti-terrorism terms. That inadequacy should warrant attention since the same kind of law is now in place in most of the developed nations, such as: the EU, UK, Ireland, France, Belgium, Italy; and in common-law countries e.g. USA, Canada, South Africa, Australia and India. Developing countries like Chile, Peru and El Salvador all have similar laws. In ASEAN, the Philippines and Indonesia also have their versions. Therefore, it is deemed necessary that Thailand should also issue and enforce a specific Anti-Terrorism law to further strengthen her security operations.

But in the final analysis, the issue that matters and worth further investigation has less to do with the scope of the legislation as described above, but more a question of how effectively those laws are presently enforced. In other words, effective enforcement of the laws is crucial, and efforts should be made toward that end.

Final Report


Chapter 3: Situation of Threats to Transport Security

Definition of terms

Threats to Security

Definition of risk management terms

Risk Assessment Theory and Practice

Risk Assessment

Summary of threats to transport security

Assessment of Impact arising from Inadequacy of

Transport Services

Cyber Security Threats

Conclusion

Final Report Chapter 3 Situation of Threat to Transport Security


Chapter 3 : Situation of Threats to Transport Security This chapter provides a brief description of the threat to the security of nations and an assessment of the risks faced by the transport sector.

3.1 Definition of terms Related terms, such as “safety”, “security”, “disaster” and “security threat”, are defined

below:

Safety: In general, safety means the condition of being free from harm. In the context of transport engineering, the term is used to mean safety from accidents, or the need to prevent or protect travelers from injuries or loss of life due to transport accidents, e.g. road-vehicle or aircraft crashes. Devices employed for the purpose include helmets, belts or airbags.

Security: In its broadest sense, security may refer to ‘national security’. In the US, it is used in

referring to national defense and international relations, or the protection against attacks from an enemy, or protection afforded by military forces, as well as the maintenance of sensitive information of national importance. It connotes the military superiority over another country or group of countries; or friendly relations between countries, or the state of an effective countermeasure to a hostile attack. In this context, ‘security’ refers to the effort to protect a nation’s assets (physical, intellectual and people) from all forms of deliberate, hostile attack including assaults from terrorists or the common criminals. Today, the term is also used to mean the protection from harm arising from natural disasters or technical failures.

Chapter 3 Situation of Threat to Transport Security Final Report


Transport systems have been a prime target for terrorist attacks due to the massive victim casualties that are likely, also the resulting public fear and anxieties as well as possible damage to the economy of the targeted nation. Aviation facilities and aircraft are also likely targets, especially commercial airlines, since they carry a symbolic significance. It should be noted that the likelihood of an attack should not be overlooked. That no attack has ever been carried out to a locale up to now does not mean it will not occur in the future. A so-called Black Swan event manifested itself as the well-known 9/11 attacks, an incident totally unanticipated by American authorities including the US Department of Defense.

According to the National Preparedness Policy, the terms “disaster” and “threat to security” are defined as follows.

Disaster: shall mean any of the naturally-occurring or human-induced catastrophes that affect the wider public. A disaster typically results in loss of life, physical harm, or damage to property – private or state-owned – as defined by laws pertaining to the prevention of harm to civilians.

Threat to Security: shall mean a perilous or violent incident having impacts on national security as defined by laws pertaining to national defense and civic protection, for example: acts of sabotage, terrorism, deployment of explosive devices, attacks on aviation services, rioting and civil unrest, acts of war, etc. In the context of transport security, emphasis is placed on those threats that are human-induced.

In short, “security” refers to the state of being protected from all forms of threat. In transport security context, the term shall refer to protection against harm from deliberate acts of terrorism or sabotage attacks as distinct from harm from an accident.

3.2 Threats to Security 3.2.1 Security in a Global Context

The level of threat to the security of many nations is trending upwards, thus giving rise to increased anxieties and a greater need to control it. Threat can range from risks of attacks by established terrorist groups –the Islamic State and the Al Qaeda, for example – aggressions from rogue governments, to new forms of threat, such as cyber terrorism, kidnapping and regional hostilities waged by scattered militant groups. Statistics compiled by the Institute for



Economics and Peace (IEP) covering 162 countries over a 14-year span between 2000 and 2013, and published as the 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), indicate that there were some 84,000 terrorist acts in the said period by which the number of victim casualties has been steadily increasing. From 3,361 terror-related deaths in the year 2000, the figure rose to 17,958 in 2013. Countries with the top five terrorism indices for 2013 are: Iraq (GTI=10); Afghanistan (GTI=9.39); Pakistan (GTI=9.37); Nigeria (GTI=8.58); and Syria (GTI=8.12). Thailand was ranked 10, having a GTI figure of 7.19. The Figure 3.1 below shows severity of terrorism impact according to the intensity of shading on each country.

The type of targets and proportion of attacks occurring during the survey period are shown in Figure 3.2. It can be seen that in general the frequency of attacks has been decreasing, except the attacks on “police” targets which started off at 10% in 2000, and rose to 24% in 2013. At the end of the survey period, the frequency of attacks in descending order were: Private Citizens & Property (25%); Police/military (24%); Government (14%); Business (8%); Religious Figures/Institutions (4%) and Transportation (2.5%).

Figure 3.1: Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2014 Source: The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)



Figure 3.2: Targets and Proportions of Annual Attacks – Years 2000 to 2013 Source: Global Terrorism Database (GDB)

For 2013, the proportion of attacks on transport systems was only 2.5%. Despite the

small percentage, the impact caused in each attack – loss of life, injuries and property damage – was quite severe. The statistics below are from terrorist incidents taking place during September to December of 2013:

Suicide bombing incident at the train station of Volgograd, Russia on 29 December 2013 which killed 19 and wounded 35. An Islamist group claimed responsibility for the attack.

A day later, on 30 December a similar incident was repeated at Volgograd. Another suicide bombing attack was perpetrated on a passenger bus, killing 17 and injuring 28.

Suicide car bomb was set off at a bus station near Damascus, Syria on 26 November 2013. 16 persons were killed and 31 wounded.

A violent assault on a passenger bus took place at Gullumba Gana in Nigeria on 2 November 2013; 13 passengers were killed. Nigerian authorities thought the incident was carried out by the Bogo Haram group.

On 15 September 2013, a bomb was thrown from the roadside into a bus in Afghanistan causing it to smash into another vehicle. Casualties: 15 deaths and 25 injured. The attack was thought to be the handiwork of the Taliban.



3.2.2 Situation of Security Threats in Thailand

Figure 3.3 shows the frequency of terrorist attacks in Thailand and choice of targets. Across the 14-year period from 2000 to 2013, a total of 2,425 incidents involving all forms of security threat were recorded. Based on the attack frequencies, the top five targets are: people and property (859 attacks); business establishments (400 attacks); military personnel (359 attacks); police officers (308 attacks); government installations (307 attacks). The transport sector was a less preferred target being attacked 57 times over the same period. For the problematic provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwas and parts of Songkhla, the choice of targets has shifted largely to military and police personnel and installations. Violent incidents in 2013 alone totaled 477 which was made up of 162 attacks on military (34%); 81 on business (17%); 72 on government (15%); 66 on police (14%) and 66 on private persons and property (16%); with only two attacks on transportation facilities (0.4%). Over the 14-year span some 15 deadly attacks on the transport sector were recorded; examples of such incidents and related fatality figures are shown in Table 3.1 below. Table 3.1: Examples of transport security threats in Thailand

Date Incident Place Severity 11 Mar. 2013

Bombing of Toh Deng Train Station. Sugai Padi, Narathiwas 1 death

18 Nov. 2012

Bomb set off to derail train Narathiwas 3 deaths; 36 wounded

21 Jun. 2008

RKK insurgents opened fire on passengers aboard train

Yala 4 deaths; 5 wounded

Year 2007 Insurgents fired on a passenger van. 8 deaths 29 Jan. 2006

About 20 armed insurgents attacked a train station

Narathiwas 2 deaths

15 Apr. 2002

Bomb set off on a passenger vehicle at the Thai-Myanmar border

On bridge connecting Mae Sot and the Myanmar side

7 deaths; 27 wounded

A most alarming incident in terms of national security took place in Bangkok on 17

August 2015 when an explosive blast was set off at the Erawan Shine which is close to the



elevated track of the BTS Skytrain. The incident, with 20 deaths and some 120 injuries, was the most lethal attack ever perpetrated against a civilian target in Thailand.

Figure 3.3: Frequency of attacks and choice of targets in Thailand, years 2000 to 2013 Source: Global Terrorism Database (GDB)

3.2.3 Natural Disasters in the global context

Natural disasters are difficult to forecast and the extent of damage wrought may be far reaching, causing significant carnage and loss that may also disrupt a nation’s economy. A case in point is the 7.8 magnitude earthquake that struck the city of Lam Chung, Nepal on 25 April 2015. The trembles, together with two 6.6 after-shocks, killed some 8,632 people, injured more than 19,000 and brought destruction to a wide swathes of houses, sacred structures, roads and bridges.

Thailand has encountered a number of moderate and severe earthquakes; the latest incident occurred on 5 May 2015 having its epicenter at Tambon Chom Muak Kaew of Chiang Rai province. The 6.3 magnitude quake caused one fatality, 23 injuries, breakage to some 9,000 dwellings and torsion damage to a number of roads, especially Highway 118 where a 5-km section of pavement was thus rendered unusable.

Figure 3.4 below shows the number of deaths from natural disasters occurring in the thirty-year span from 1984 to 2014. Disaster-related fatality figure for any year in the period was over 10,000 with seven peaks where it exceeded 100,000 deaths, i.e. for years 1984, 1985, 1991, 2003, 2004, 2008 and 2010.

NUMB

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Figure 3.4: Fatalities from natural disasters globally, years 1984 to 2013 Source: Asian Disaster Reduction Center, Natural Disaster Data Book 2013

Table 3.2 below shows the frequency and impact arising from natural disasters by region across the 30-year span from 1984 to 2013. It can be seen that impact of such events – in terms of deaths and damage – were felt more strongly in Asia than those occurring in other regions. Table 3.2: Impact from natural disasters in major regions, years 1984-2013

Region Impact Frequency (occurrence)

Deaths

Affected persons

Damage (Billion baht)

Africa 2,099 (20.2) 726,996 (29.3) 42,3894,194 (7.0) 572 (0.8) America 2,495 (24.0) 389,148 (15.7) 204,811,734 (3.4) 27,485 (36.8) Asia 3,952 (38.1) 1,186,437 (47.7) 5,396,306,705 (88.7) 35,080 (47.0) Europe 1,398 (13.5) 176,505 (7.1) 35,344,415 (0.6) 9,608 (12.9) Oceania 432 (4.2) 5,753 (0.2) 20,431,165 (0.3) 1,940 (2.6)

Total 10,376 (100.0)

2,484,839 (100.0) 6,080,788,213 (100.0) 74,685 (100.0)

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.emdat.be Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.

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Asia is prone to severe flooding and cyclone storms. A case in point was the devastation brought on the Philippines in 2013 by the Hai Yian typhoon by which some 6,300 people were killed and 14.5 million were greatly affected. For Thailand, the highest Disaster Risk Index is recorded for flooding, followed by that for road accidents. Table 3.3: Indices of disaster risks by type of hazards

Disaster type Severity Disaster Risk Index Flooding high 2.39 Land transport accidents high 2.37 Explosion high 2.34 Storm medium 2.31 Drought medium 2.24 Fire hazard medium 2.20 Land/Mud slide medium 2.15 Quake/Tsunami medium 1.97 Illegal immigration medium 1.87 Plant epidemic medium 1.77 Human epidemic low 1.63

Source: Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation: Thailand Country Profiles 2012.

The following list describes some natural hazards and their effects in the ten-year span from 1989 to 2009.

Some 213 floods, resulting in 2,938 deaths, 7,896 injuries and total damage of 115,786.67M baht.

Transport-related incidents: 1,771,018 cases resulting in 248,357 deaths; 1,135,923 injuries, and total damage of 39,762M baht.

Land slide: 541 deaths, over 500 injuries, total damage over 2,053M baht. Cyclone storm: altogether 36,024 occurrences causing 842 deaths, 1,367 injuries,

total damage 5,051.55M baht. Fire hazard: 46,986 occurrences, 1,639 deaths, 3,775 injuries, total damage

28,418.61M baht. Drought: total damage 13,314.74M baht.



Tsunami hazard: Devastating effect of the tsunamis on 26 December 2004 covering 6 provinces and causing 5,401 deaths, 11,775 injuries and 14,491 million baht damage; and resulting loss to the economy and tourism amounting to 30 billion baht.

3.3 Definition of risk management terms

Risk means the likelihood of to err, incur damage, losses or undesirable situations at a future time whose occurrence may cause damage or result in the failure of planned undertakings to meet organization and operational aims, financial and administrative targets, which are collectively termed “impact”. Based on the consideration of impact and likelihood, there are four types of risk:

Strategic Risk Operational Risk Financial Risk Compliance Risk

Security Risk means the likelihood of an incident causing danger to the security of an organization or work unit.

Risk Factor means the cause or causes of the risk that threaten to disrupt the planned undertakings of an entity, whereby the said causes are determinable as to their origin and estimated timing. A risk factor should be based on the factual nature of the causes so as too enable their accurate assessment and mitigation measures. The factors are determinable as follows:

External factors, e.g. social and economic situations, political climate, legal constraints, etc.

Internal factors, e.g. an organization’s own rules and regulations. Situations outside the experience of workers; unfavorable work practices, etc.

Risk Identification means the process of determining the form of risk, extent of impact. Or a process to identify the persons or things exposed to risks, the likelihood and extent of damage, the time and place and the mechanisms of such occurrence — or finding the answers to the 5W-1H questions (Who, What, When, Where, Why and How).



Risk Assessment means the process to determine the degree of risk based on the analysis of its likelihood and impact.

Likelihood means the frequency or chance of a risk being realized. Impact means the severity of damage resulting from that risk. Degree of Risk means the status of a risk assessed by its likelihood and

impact. There are five degrees of risk: Very High, High, Medium, Low and Very Low.

Degree of Risk (R) = Likelihood (L) x Impact (I)

The score resulting from the above formula indicates the Degree of Risk as low or high as shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below. The significance of a risk degree is shown on the right. Table 3.4: Significance of Degree of Risk Degree of Risk Score Significance Very high 17-25 Red Risk management and control are crucial in order to

reduce it likelihood and impact. High 13-16 Orange medium 5-12 Yellow Low 3-4 Light

green Acceptable degree of risk. May implement additional control measures.

Very Low 1-2 Dark green

Acceptable degree of risk. No need to implement additional control measures.

Table 3.5: Degree of Risk Scores

Impact

Likelihood

Very Low (1)

Low (2)

medium (3)

High (4)

Very high (5)

Very high (5) 5 10 15 20 25

High (4) 4 8 12 16 20

Medium (3) 3 6 9 12 15

Low (2) 2 4 6 8 10

Very Low (1) 1 2 3 4 5

Source: Risk Management Handbook, 2010. MRTA.



Risk Management means the management process to reduce the likelihood or severity of a risk to an acceptable level. Methods of risk management are listed below:

Risk Acceptance — Accept the consequence of a risk as it is considered not worthwhile to attempt the prevention or control of that risk.

Risk Reduction— Revamp an organization’s work practices in order to reduce the likelihood or impact of a risk to an acceptable level.

Risk Sharing— Share or transfer a risk to other organizations. Risk Avoidance — When a risk is of such high degrees that it is unacceptable

to the organization, it may opt to abandon its undertakings in order to avoid the risk.

Risk Control means the implementation of policies or controlling measures to reduce the degree of risk to enable the accomplishment of an undertaking. There are four types of control:-

Preventive Control— Incorporate controlling measures into an undertaking right from its start in order to prevent mistakes.

Detective Control— Apply controlling measures upon detecting any mistake in an undertaking.

Directive Control— Apply controlling or incentive approaches to drive an undertaking to success.

Corrective Control— Apply corrective measures to any mistakes occurring along the way, or apply corrective measures that prevent the repeat of such mistakes. (Source: Risk Management Handbook, Disaster Prevention and mitigation Department)

3.4 Risk Assessment Theory and Practice

Preface The concept and work methodology of Business Continuity Management, or BCM,

require an organization to conduct reviews to understand its characteristics; and to conduct risk assessment in order to determine the degree of risk that may impact its business continuity. In addition, the organization is to make recommendations for reducing the likelihood and impact of the perceived risks. It is to establish a ranking of all the major risks or threats; this ranking is for use in preparing appropriate Incident Management Plan.



Objectives

- To identify and assess threats that might affect the security of the transport sector.

- To establish guidelines for the reduction of likelihood and impact of an incident.

- To focus on the major threats for the preparation of Incident Management Plan.

Scope The assessment of all threats against the transport sector inclusive of threats from

human action and from natural disasters.

Methodology Risk Assessment with the specific objective of creating business continuity, based on the TISI BCIM 22301-2553 Standard, employing the methodology described below:

Identify Risks or Threats Identify the major threats perceived – that may cause damage or may affect the continuity of business. The threats shall be identify according to the characteristics of the organization’s core work processes; or based on the consideration of the risks to business continuity as compiled by an internationally acknowledged body, such as the Business Continuity Institute (BCI). The assessment shall be a collaborative effort by all of the parties involved. Threats shall be identified according to the consideration of factors, internal and external, such as corporate culture, structure, personnel resources; and the prevailing socio-economic and political environment, and available technology.

Assess risks and arrange ranking Ranking shall be in a descending order i.e. from highest to lowest risk levels. These shall follow the scores obtained from the equation: Degree of risk = Likelihood x Impact.

The Degree of Risk has 5 score ranges as shown in Table 3.1. Assessment should be performed at least once a year; or whenever there are significant changes internally or externally (e.g. severely damaged IT systems, massive loss of life and property, or devastation by natural forces).



(Incident Management Plan (IMP) The Incident Management Plan, or IMP, is prepared according to the consideration of the risks that lie within the Amber Zone. These are risks with high impacts but low likelihood (probability). Examples of such risks: flooding and fire hazards, acts of sabotage, earthquakes, storms, epidemics, toxin leakages, riots and civil unrests, etc. These are categorized according to the 2008 Good Practice Guideline of the Business Continuity Institute (BCI), as shown in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5: Degrees of Risk in the Amber Zone, from BCI Good Practice Guideline, 2008

The chart above shows the four regions of risk assessment from which will be determined the appropriate response plans, based on the degree of risk as shown in Table 3.6 below.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Prepare a report on the outcome of the appraisal for submission to the Steering Committee. The nature and severity ranking of the risks (high-medium-low), together with recommendations for appropriate management measures are to be included in the report.

- For Very High, High and Medium risks, proper risk control and management measures should be installed in order to reduce their likelihood and impact.

- Risks at the Low or acceptable level may need additional control measures.

- Very Low risks shall not need any additional control measures.



Table 3.6: Assessment of Degree of Risk as per the Amber Zone chart Ranking Assessment Action to take

1 High impact, High/known probability

Reduce: Controling measures necessary to reduce probability and/or impact of risk. The cost of such remedial action should be weighed against the benefit deriving from it. For risks of very high impact, these may be avoided by the organization dropping its planned undertakings; or transfer some of its burden to other stakeholders, such as by taking insurance coverages.

2 High impact, Low/unknown probability

Plan: With the low probability, it may not be worthwhile to invest in measures to reduce the high impact. However, plans and preparations should be made ready, including an Incident Management Plan (IMP) and Business Continuity Plan (BCP), for use in the event an incident does take place.

3 Low impact, High/known probability

Control: Controling measures should be implemented to reduce the probability (and/or impact) to an acceptable level. Cost to benefit ratio of such measures should be reviewed

4 Low impact, Low/unknown probability

Accept: Risk at such low level that it can be accepted without any controlling measures. Nevertheless, some controlling measures may be employed to enhance the efficiency of an undertaking subject to a review of the cost to benefit ratio.

3.5 Risk Assessment Criteria for risk assessment The criteria for assessing risks take into consideration the relationship between the Likelihood and Impact of an incident, based on a previously agreed rating scale as shown in Tables Table 3.7 and 3.8.



Table 3.7: Likelihood Score Likelihood Significance

1 Very low 0 - 20% statistically; or 0 attacks per year 2 Low 21 - 40% statistically; or 1 attack per year 3 Medium 41 - 60% statistically; or 2–3 attacks per year 4 High 61 - 80% statistically; or 4–5 attacks per year 5 Very High 81 - 100% statistically; or >5 attacks per year

Table 3.8: Impact Score Impact Significance

1 Very low Operations disrupted for less than 1 hour. 2 Low Operations disrupted for longer than 1 hour but < 2 hours. 3 Medium Operations disrupted for longer than 2 hours but < 4 hours. 4 High Operations disrupted for longer than 4 hours but < 8 hours. 5 Very High Operations disrupted for longer than 8 hours.

Outcome of risk assessment Tables 3.9 and 3.10 display the types of threat to transport security in Thailand arising from human action and natural disasters. The frequencies and impacts of the incidents are shown.

Table 3.9: Threats from Human Action Ranking Threat Year Occurrences Yearly Ave. Impact

1 Transport accidents 1989-2009 1,771,018 88,551 Nation-wide 2 Smoke/Forest fire 1989-2009 60,307 3015 North & Southern

regions 3 Bomb planting (on

roads) in South bombs 2004-2014 3121 284 Narathiwas, Pattani,

Yala, Songkhla

4 Civil protests 2005-2014 Nation-wide 5 Chemical/hazmats 1997-2009 347 26 6 Hot-air lantern Chiang Mai 7 Community radio

interference Khon Khaen

NB: The frequency 1,771,018 probably denotes threats from bombing of train stations, rail, roads and bridges



Table 3.10: Threats from Natural Disasters Ranking Threat Year Occurrences Yearly Ave. Impact

1 Storm 1989-2009 36,024 1801 Nation-wide 2 Flooding 1989-2009 213 1.1 Nation-wide 3 Human

epidemic 2004-2014 8 0.8 Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Chiang

Rai, Phuket, Songkhla 4 Earthquake 1975-2014 27 0.57 North, South, West, Central,

Parts of Northeast, Bangkok 5 Landslide 1988-2009 9 0.45 Nakhhon Si Thammarat,

Surat Thani, Narathiwas, Phrae, Uttaradit, Tak, Phetchabon.

6 Tsunami 2004 1 Phang Nga, Ranong, Phuket, Krabi, Trang, Satun.

Based on the data in Table 3.8 the degrees of risk from human action are assessed

and shown in Table 3.11 below, together with respective management options.

Table 3.11: Outcome of assessment of threats arising from human action

Ranking Threat Risk Assessment Amber

Likelihood Impact Degree Managemt

option 1 Transport accidents Very high (5) Very high (5) Very high (25) Reduce 2 /Smoke/Forest fire Very high (5) Very Low (1) Medium (5) Control 3 Bomb planting (on

roads) in South Very high (5) Medium (3) High (15) Reduce

4 Civil protests Very high (5) Very high (5) Very high (25) Reduce 5 /Chemical/hazmats Very Low (1) Very high (5) Medium (5) Control 6 Hot-air lantern Very Low (1) Low (2) Very Low (2) Accept 7 Community radio

interference Medium (3) Low (2) Medium (5) Control

Outcome of risk assessment from the table above are ranked by their severity in Table 3.12 below:



Table 3.12: Ranking of human-induced threats by degree of risk Degree of Risk Threat

Very High Transport accidents, Civil protests High Bomb planting (on roads) in South Medium Smoke/Forest fire, Chemical/hazmats Low - Very Low Hot-air lantern

From the data in Table 3.9 the degrees of risk from natural disasters are assessed and shown in Table 3.13 below, together with respective management options.

Table 3.13: Ranking of threats from natural disasters

Ranking Threat Risk Assessment Amber

Likelihood Impact Degree Managemt

option 1 Storm Very High (5) Medium (3) High (15) Reduce 2 Flooding Low (2) Very High (5) Medium (10) Plan 3 Human epidemic Very Low (1) Medium (3) Low (3) Accept 4 Earthquake Very Low (1) Very High (5) Medium (5) Control 5 Landslide Very Low (1) Very High (5) Medium (5) Control 6 Tsunami Very Low (1) Very High (5) Medium (5) Control

Outcome of risk assessment from the table above are ranked by their severity in Table 3.14 below:

Table 3.14: Ranking of threats from natural disasters by their severity Degree of Risk Threat

Very High - High Storm Medium Flooding, Earthquake, Landslide, Tsunami Low Human infectious epidemic Very Low -



3.6 Summary of threats to transport security

The Consultant has assessed the degree of risk associated with the range of threats to transport security. Outcome of the assessment shall be incorporated in the Transport Security Master Plan which shall contain supplementary plans for the security of all transport modes: Land (road and rail), Water and Air.

3.6.1 Threats to the security of Land Transport

Assessments of the threats to the security of Land Transport are tabulated in Tables 3.15 and 3.16 which show the results for the road and rail modes respectively.

Table 3.15: Threats to the security of Road Transport Component

affected Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Transport Terminal

Storm, Flood, Earthquake, Sabotage attack

Bomb Threat, Sabotage attack, Arson, Infectious epidemic

DLT, AwPorTor, The Transport Co. (TC)

Road, Bridge, Tunnel

Storm, Bombing, Flood, Earthquake, Protest with road closure

Sabotage attack, Infectious epidemic

DOH, DRR, EXAT, Transport operators, vehicle drivers

Traffic signal control center

Storm, Floods, Cyber threat DOH, DRR, AwPorTor

Bus, Van, Car Arson, Tsunamis, Storm, Protest with road closure, Earthquake, Flood,

Bomb Threat, DLT, TC

Dangerous-goods carrier

Arsons, Tsunami, Storm, Protest with road closure, Earthquake, Flood,

Sabotage attack DLT, Private sector



Table 3.16: Threats to the security of Rail Transport Component affected

Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Train station Flood, Bomb threat, Sabotage, Fire hazard, Earthquake

SRT, MRTA, SRT-ET

Track, Bridge, Tunnel

Flood, Earthquake Sabotage, Earthquake SRT, MRTA, SRT-ET

Rolling stock Accident, Fire hazard, Flood

Bomb threat, SRT, MRTA, SRT-ET

Train operation control center

Flood, Earthquake Sabotage, Fire hazard, Cyber threat

MRTA, SRT-ET

Electric train maintenance depot

Flood, Earthquake Sabotage, Fire hazard, Cyber threat

MRTA, SRT-ET

3.6.2 Threats to the security of Water Transport

Threats to security of water transport are divided into those affecting marine and coastal shipping activity and those impacting the passenger and freight boats on inland waterways, as shown in Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 respectively. Table 3.17: Threats to the security of marine and coastal Transport

Component affected

Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Cargo wharf, passenger pier

Storm, Tsunami, Chemical leakage

Bomb threat, Sabotage, Fire hazard,

Marine Dept, PAT

Marine environment Storm, Chemical leakage

Sabotage Marine Dept, PAT

Water traffic control center

Strom, Flood Cyber attacks Marine Dept, PAT

Passenger and freight boats

Fire hazard, Tsunami, Storm, Accident

Bomb threat, Sabotage

Marine Dept, PAT, Private sector



Table 3.18: Threats to the security of Water Transport on inland waterways Component affected Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Cargo Pier Passenger Pier

Flood Bomb threat, Sabotage Fire hazard,

Marine Department, Private sector

River environment Flood, Drought Torts, Threat from toxic substances

Marine Department,

Passenger and freight boats

Accident, Fire hazard,

Bomb threat, Sabotage

Marine Department, Private sector

3.6.3 Threats to the security of Air Transport Outcome of assessment of threats to air transport security are shown in Table 3.19 below.

Table 3.19: Threats to the security of Air Transport Component

affected Realized Threat Likely Threat Responsible Agency

Airport Flood, Protest rally

Bomb threat, Sabotage Fire hazard, Epidemic outbreak, Unlawful seizure of aircraft at an airport

AOT, Airports Department, CAAT, Airline owning the craft

Cargo terminal Storm, Flood Sabotage, Fire hazard, AOT, Airports Department, CAAT, Other companies

Aircraft Flood, Bombing, Storm

Bomb threat, Sabotage, Epidemic outbreak, Unlawful seizure of aircraft at an airport

Thai International Airways

Control tower Protest rally Bomb threat, Cyber-attack AeroThai Company

3.7 Assessment of Impact arising from Inadequacy of Transport Services MOT has commissioned a study to appraise the capacity and service preparedness of Thailand’s transport sector for the upcoming commencement of the AEC. According to the study, service demand for many transport facilities has exceeded their existing capacities, hence congestion of passengers or freight are encountered frequently at airports (Phuket, Suvarnabhumi and Hat Yai); at seaports (Laem Chabang A1 and B1, Bangkok Port and Songkhla Port); and at the Nong Khai Customs Checkpoint. Accordingly, plans and budgets are being established for their expansion as shown in Figure 3.6. In the interim, the service efficiency of these facilities may be sustained temporarily with the assignment of additional staff.



Figure 3.6: The transport networks between the travels and performance in order to developing infrastructure. Source: ASEAN Economic Community: AEC

page 3 - 21

Final Report

Customs house with highest value of cargo in year 2005 • Sadao Customs House 310,052 million baht • Padang Besar Customs House 194,734 million baht • Sagklaburi Customs 108,711 million baht

Largest passenger airports in year 2005 • Suvarnabhumi Airport 52.4 million people • Phuket International Airport 9.2 million people • Chiang Mai International Airport 4.3 million people

Busiest border by passenger traffic • NongKhai Customs Boundary Post 112.80 % • Aranyaprathet Customs House 94.86 % • Mae Sai Customs Boundary Post 112.80 %

The airport with high volume of passenger traffic • Phuket International Airport 141 % • Suvarnabhumi Airport 116 % • Hat Yai International Airport 103 % The airports with high-traffic crossing taxiways• Suvarnabhumi Airport 87 % • Phuket International Airport 79 % • Don Mueang International Airport 71 % The airports with high traffic on remote bay • Phuket International Airport 85 % • Suvarnabhumi Airport 72 % • Udonthani International Airport 71 %

Border with the highest volume of crossing people.

• Aranyaprathet Customs House 4.148 million people

• Sadao Customs House 3.734 million people • NongKhai Customs Boundary Post 2.952 million people

Border with the highest volume of crossing car in year 2005 • NongKhai Customs Boundary Post 948,570 vehicles/year • Sadao Customs House 746,026 vehicles/year • Padang Besar Customs House 510,530 vehicles/year

The port with highest volume of cargo in year 2005 • Laem Chabang PORT 64.6 million tons • Map Ta Phut PORT 50.3 million tons • Bangkok PORT 17.9 million

Busiest port • Laem Chabang PORT (A1) 164 % • Laem Chabang PORT (B1) 123 % • Bangkok PORT (East dam) 115 % • Songkhla PORT 108 %

The result of the performance of the

current transportation network and station

analysis

The volume of cross countries passengers and cargo on ASEAN

transportation network.

Low-capacities rail lines • Kaeng Khoi – Klong Sib Kao junciton 44.82 % • Chachoengsao – Sri Racha junciton 33.88 % • Chachoengsao – Prachin Buri junciton 15.90 %

Infrastructure development

In 2005, Annual average daily traffic (AADT) on ASEAN highway shown a problem of traffic congestion in Bangkok Metropolitan Region and the large cities of Thailand such as Chachoengsao, Prachin Buri, Rayong, Hat Yai, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Ratchasima, Chiang Mai and the major border such as amphoe Sadao in Songkha province

In 2005, during rush hours in outskirts area and major highway found the volume of vehicle more than 50,000 cars per day. In Bangkok Metropolitan Region more than 150,000 cars per day.



3.8 Cyber Security Threats Information and communication technology (ICT) has continued to evolve in terms of efficiency and innovation to serve the demand of businesses and users everywhere. ICT is widely used as an organizational development tool, and as a mechanism to aid a country’s political, social and economic advancement, as well as military development. However, the abuse of ICT, including the subversive use of IT by the military of some countries, is one of the great dangers threatening cyber security. In the information society, a range cyber threats have manifested their potential to do harm, for example: hack/crack, spyware or back door, malware, computer virus, computer worm, Trojan horse, logic bomb, DoS/DDoS attack, BOTNET/Robot Network, spam, etc.

Some countries with superior economic or military prowess, have set the Cyber Domain as the fifth domain in addition to the traditional domains of Land, Sea, Air and Space. Measures are therefore needed to deal with the cyber threats, and to improve their military strength, including the capability for Military Operations Other Than War, or MOOT War. Therefore, such developments can be regarded cyber threats which may affect the security of a nation in many areas, including large -scale functioning of computer systems. (http://km.rta.mi.th/newkm/index.php/menu-km6/4-army-and-national-cyber-security)

Statistics on cyber threats for 2014 showed Thailand being placed at around ranking 50 in terms of cyber security rating. Web Defacement (or the breaking into a website to alter information on the webpage), is most pervasive and among the countries in ASEAN, Thailand had the highest frequency of such attack. The preparedness of Thai cyber security staff is at a very low level. The Thai government has proposed a national cyber security bill, which is part of a package of laws called Digital Security Legislation containing 10+3 codes which has been approved by the Cabinet. The said bill calls for the establishment of an Office of the Committee for Nation Cyber Security as a state -sponsored organization, but not administered as a government unit or state enterprise. In addition, a “National Cyber Security Committee” or NCSC is to be established under the Ministry of Digital Economy, to function as the coordinator and orchestrator of activities to counter cyber threats.


page 3 – 22 Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study



3.8.1 Definitions

Cyber The American Heritage & Science Dictionary define Cyber as a prefix to describe

computer or computer networks such as cyberspace where the online communication takes place.

Collin English Dictionary defines Cyber as a science related to electronics and the computer.

(Elisenda Ardevolin, 2005) in their research paper, Cyber culture: Anthropological perspective of the internet gave the definition of Cyber as the prefix referring to social activities and movements which occur via the internet such as many social activities, cybercafé, or the cyber arts, etc.

Cyber Culture There are two main types of culture, Tangible or Concrete Culture, and Intangible

or Abstract Culture. Tangible culture generally means artistic creativity such as fine arts, architecture, buildings, crafts, culinary arts, tools, etc. While Intangible culture refers to the intellect, religion, thoughts, beliefs, fable, myth, language, etc. When put together, ‘cyber culture’ would mean the norms and methods occurring in cyberspace or the internet world, which is a ‘virtual world’ as it appears nowadays.

Cyber War Security expert Richard A. Clarke has defined the word ‘cyber war’ as actions by a

nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption. Cyber warfare is the use of computers and the internet to conduct war. There are many forms of cyber attack including: web attacking or web block, politics propaganda via internet, cyber espionage by which secret data are stolen by hacker, then altered and returned to where they came from; disabling of computer-controlled military equipment, attacks on critical infrastructure such as power, water, communications, transportations, which are mostly controlled by computer systems, and are vulnerable to a cyber-attack. Real-world examples of cyber warfare are given below:

U.S. and Iran: It is believed that the United States Cyber Command was behind the so-called Stuxnet, which was a network containing the worm Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). The infected network was clandestinely deployed at Iran’s nuclear site; it caused Iran’s nuclear weapon project to be suspended.



Pakistan and India: Cyber attacks between two countries occurred when a group of Pakistani hackers infiltrated and defaced a number of Indian government websites. Subsequently, both countries have been engaging in mutual data theft up to the present day.

U.S. and China: The United States had accused China of hacking and stealing sensitive data from the American government and commercial websites, which might be used to cause damage to infrastructure such as electricity or water utilities, and financial transactions especially in U.S.; the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman has denied such accusations.

3.8.2 World Cyber Threats Trend

World Economic Forum report has shown the global concern about cyber threats. According to the top trends for 2014, cyber threats was ranked at 4 of 10 (Figure3.7 Top trends for 2014 – Global Agenda 2014, World Economic Forum). This is in line with the study of the Business Continuity Institute (BCI ), which shows that cyber attack is the most concerned issue for many global organizations.

Figure 3.7: Top trends for 2014 Global Agenda 2014 World Economic Forum Source: Global Agenda 2014, World Economic Forum



Figure 3.8: Global Organization Security Threats Trend of 2014, BCI Source: Global Agenda 2014, World Economic Forum

Many organizations have been subjected to continuous cyber attacks. Reports from the Digital Attack Map website showed that real -time DDoS Attacks are happening at all hours across the globe. (Figures 3.9 and 3.10)

Figure 3.9: Real-time digital attack map - Worldwide Source: Digital Attack Map Real-time Data – Top Daily DDoS Attacks Worldwide

http://www.digitalattackmap.com



Figure 3.10: Real-time digital attack map – Thailand. Attacks peaked in December of 2013. Source: Digital Attack Map Real-time Data – Top Daily DDoS Attacks Worldwide (Thailand)

http://www.digitalattackmap.com

3.8.3 Cyber Threats to National Infrastructure According to the above information, cyber threats not only affect networked or online information systems, but also affect critical infrastructure in all sectors. Hence, government agencies, and private sector need to be aware that their computer systems are never completely safe from attacks even if they are offline or stand -alone systems. The first case in point is the planting of the Stuxnet worm which was set to attack the SCADA system of Iran’s nuclear production facilities. Another case was the Night Dragon data theft in the years 2009 to 2011 which was system hacking and data espionage against five western energy and petrochemical companies. Yet another incident took place in 2009 when South Korea’s financial institutions were attacked with DDoS that effectively put a halt to their financial transactions. And in 2013, the country’s television stations and banks were infected with a computer virus which managed to delete all working data and put them out of service. In conclusion, it is time for government agencies and organizations, especially those in charge of key infrastructure , to take necessary precautions, as well as to employ risk management principles , in order to safeguard the public from the impact of a cyber attack . Effective frameworks should be established for the execution of prompt response to cyber -attacks as well as to effect the speedy recovery in the aftermath.



3.9 Conclusion

Acts of terrorism, as well as the devastation from natural disasters, have become a threat of global scales to the security of transport systems. Of particular relevance to this study are the ever-present threat from global terrorism that in recent years has evolved in sophistication in terms of the methods and technologies employed by the perpetrators of violence. Transport systems are vulnerable targets of terrorist acts which are designed to inflict high victim casualties in order to maximize public anxieties and significant damage to economies.

The Global Terrorism Index for 2014 put Thailand’s vulnerability to attacks at ranking 10 out of 162 countries assessed globally for the year.

Most of the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Thailand were directed at military/police personnel or installations and private properties; only a small proportion of such attacks were aimed at the country’s transport systems. Nonetheless, many of such attacks have caused severe damage leading to high levels of anxieties among the public including the regular users of transport systems. The wider repercussions of a violent terrorist incident may be felt locally and internationally thereby producing negative impacts on the country’s tourism as well as its general economy.

Natural disasters pose another kind of threat whose occurrence and severity are difficult to forecast. Damage caused by a natural disaster may be so severe and widespread that an entire economy may be seriously affected. For Thailand, major floods have often caused extensive damage to the country’s communication infrastructure and related disruption to transport systems.

Disaster risk mitigation measures are drawn up according to the results of risk assessment which, in turn, is based on the consideration of the likelihood and estimated impact of a disaster. The need for risk control and mitigation measure(s) is thus determined by the likelihood of the threat under consideration. Disaster control and mitigation measures are recommended for cases where the perceived threat level is Very High, High and Medium. Where the perceived threat level is Low, some control and mitigation activities may be specified. And where the perceived threat is Very Low, no control measures are needed. Based on historical disaster statistics, the level of threat to Thailand’s transport sector has been in the Very High category. It is thus necessary to install a range of risk control and management measures for the sector. As for the threats of destruction from natural phenomena, the risk of



cyclone storms is very high for Thailand. Outcome of the Consultant’s risk assessment is employed in the preparation of various sector strategies which are contained in the Transport Security Master Plan.

Apart from the threat of terrorist attacks and the devastation brought about by natural disasters, a new form of threat is rapidly spreading across the globe. Cyber attacks are now posing a threat to the security of nations as vital computer networks can be attacked remotely by such weapons as hacking, planting of insidious bugs, e.g. spyware, malware, Trojan horse, logic bomb, or DoS/DDoS attacks or the use of BOTNET or Robot Network, and the clogging of systems with spam and worms.

The cyber threat is ranked fourth on the 2014 World Economic Forum’s list of ten worrisome trends requiring the attention of the international community. Thailand’s current cyber security rating is at ranking 50 out of 162 countries. Thailand also has the highest occurrences of Web Defacement in the ASEAN region. What is worrisome internationally is that cyber attacks are not confined to computers, but they can be perpetrated on many infrastructure systems, which are remotely controlled by interlinking networks, whose workings may be the targets of a sabotage. It is therefore crucial for the Transport Security Master Plan to address this issue with effective strategies for the timely prevention, preparation and response in the event of a cyber attack.

Final Report


Chapter 4: Causes and Risks and Their Effects on Transport Security

Introduction

Causes of transport security risks

Overview of infrastructure development

Future security of land-based infrastructure

Conclusion

Final Report Chapter 4 Causes of Risks and Their Effect on Transport Security


Chapter 4: Causes and Risks and Their Effects on Transport Security

4.1 Introduction The previous chapter examined the situation of threats to the transport sector. Two types of threat were discussed – one from human action and the other from natural disasters. Human attacks against transport infrastructure and services can be prevented and mitigated to a satisfactory extent provided necessary precautions have been instituted beforehand. At present, security concerns for Thailand’s land transport (road and rail modes) are still in its nascent stage. This could have been due in part to the lack of experience as well as guidelines from international practices.

4.2 Causes of transport security risks

Although Thailand is not considered as a prime terrorism target, but the presence of large volumes of tourists all year round in Thailand may render the country vulnerable. Terrorists seek weaknesses where they can attack, and that can be found in a country with a lower level of vigilance and preparedness, less so in those that are vigorously equipped against attacks, such as the US, UK or Australia. Terrorists may strike anywhere when it serves their desire for media publicity and recognition of their purpose. Thus, Thailand must upgrade its level of vigilance and preparedness to international standards in order to overcome those weaknesses. An oft-quoted aphorism is: the only way to guarantee security is never to feel secure. For Thailand, many elements of the transport industry contain weaknesses that can be readily exploited by terrorists, for example: the operations of bus or train stations. A transport station is vulnerable due to its being open, which allows for easily access to people as well as freight conveyance. Connecting facilities at a transport hub may lack the necessary resources for protection, such as inadequate staffing and specialized training; lack of funds to acquire monitoring equipment or being limited to equipment of doubtful efficacy; and absence of ministerial policies, guidelines or directives to achieve a standardized level of preparedness. These are examples of areas that will need to be remedied.

Chapter 4 Causes of Risks and Their Effect on Transport Security Final Report


4.3 Overview of infrastructure development The national transport infrastructure strategy for 2015 – 2022, which has been approved

by the NCPO, aims to promote development along four strategic lines, thus: 1) develop foundations for social security; 2) promote economic security; 3) maximize the potential for benefit from the AEC; and 4) promote safety and security in transport.

Table 4.1 below lists the transport systems that are currently operational while Figure 4.1 illustrates the new developments expected to be installed by the year 2022.

Table 4.1: Existing transport systems (2015)

Transport Mode Description Distance Main road arteries Highways (inclusive of two-lane)

Motorway Tolled expressways

66,794 Km. 146 Km.

207.9 Km. Secondary roads Rural roads

Local roads 47,916 Km.

352,157 Km. Rail systems Single Track

Double track Triple Track

3,569 Km. 357 Km. 107 Km.

MRT trains MRT, 6 projects 95Km. Water mode Coastal

Rivers Khlongs Coastal wharfs River piers

2,614 Km. 1,750 Km.

883 Km. 18 Units 7 Units

Air mode Airports - Civil Aviation Department. - Airports of Thailand, Plc. - Bangkok Airways Co. - Navy airport Flight Routes - International - Domestic

28 Units 6 Units 3 Units 1 Unit

23,171 Km. 30,100 Km.

Source: Meeting of MOT Monitoring & Evaluation Committee

Final Report บทที่ 4 สาเหตุและความเสี่ยงของภัยความมั่นคงภาคขนส่ง

Thailand Transport Security Master Plan: Phase 1 Preparation Study หน้า 4 - 3

Figure 4.1: Overview of Thailand’s Transport Infrastructure by 2022 Source: Meeting of MOT Monitoring & Evaluation Committee

Chapter 4 Causes of Risks and Their Effect on Transport Security

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4.3.1 Land Transport Mode

The following are prevailing problems in Thailand’s road transport: Road networks with irregularities or bottlenecks along the outer perimeters of

Bangkok which give rise to logistical inefficiencies and reduced productivity. Lack of well-defined regulatory measures for road transport services. High road crash statistics leading to some 230 billion baht in losses every year. Transport sector is producer of greenhouse gases to 29.5% of the total GHG

produced in Thailand. Below are issues encountered in the rail transport sector...

SRT is burdened with all aspects of train operation – fixed infrastructure development and maintenance and revenue operations – leading to organizational constraints on its development.

SRT’s administrative issues and constraints on its re-structuring. Inadequate track coverage and connections to other modes; high extent of wear

and tear of rolling stock due to prolonged use; Inefficiencies arising from single track configuration which imposes excessive waiting time for train shunting.

Not enough rolling stock to meet service demand: locomotives and train bogies in poor conditions, severely limiting train performance.

No grade segregation of trains and road vehicles. On average a train-road crossing at every 2km, hence prone to accidents and delays.

Outdated signaling systems, unfit for high-speed trains and shunting control leading to delays and greater vulnerability to crashes.

Lack of operational punctuality; poor service quality. Shortage of skilled and experienced personnel due to the long (7 years) on-the-

job training required; and SRT’s institutional limits on new staff recruitment.

4.3.2 Water Transport Problems prevailing in the water transport mode.

Inadequate clearances between bridge underside and water level pose an obstacle to freight transport on the river.

Excessive Customs rules and regulations on maritime freighting leading to inefficiency and delays.



Poor connecting services from the wharf. Inadequate water channel and signage maintenance. Vessel operators are faced with high costs in financing and taxes. Shortage of vessel manpower; more experienced workers at commanding and

operating levels are needed. Shortage of utilities support for shipbuilders; shortage of qualified builders;

shortage of raw material support, e.g. steel. This leads to high costs and lengthy production time.

Outdated laws that impede the conduct of water transport business. Inadequate database relating to key areas of merchant marine activity.

4.3.3 Air Transport Issues affecting Thailand’s aviation industry:

Political uncertainties and civil disturbances having direct and indirect effects on Thailand’s development as a regional aviation hub.

High level of competition from neighboring countries – Singapore and Malaysia. Inadequate linking to other transport modes, leading to under-utilization of many

airports. Fuel price fluctuation has an effect on fuel fees and ticket prices. Failure to achieve planned development targets due to policy changes and/or

inadequate participation of stakeholders.

In MOT’s evaluation of transport infrastructure and services, as described above, no mention was made of any threat to the security of infrastructure even though a number of threatening incidents had already occurred.

4.4 Future security of land-based infrastructure Reviews were carried out covering the ingredients of road security, as listed below: 1. Border security 2. The transport of hazardous materials (hazmats) and dangerous goods. 3. Cybersecurity 4. Truck stop facilities nationwide 5. Supply chain security Details of the components are provided in the following paragraphs.



4.4.1 Border Security With the upcoming inauguration of the ASEAN Community in 2015, we can expect a much increased volume of cross-border traffic, in particular the transport of people and goods overland. Along the borders of Thailand where they are shared with Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, there are three types of border checkpoints.

Types of Border Checkpoint 1. Permanent checkpoint: This is established pursuant to the mutual consent of the

two neighboring countries on whose border the checkpoint is located. As for Thailand, the establishment of such a checkpoint must be approved by the Cabinet and authorized through a ministerial notification, duly signed by the Minister of Interior and published in the Royal Gazette. At present, there are 28 permanent checkpoints nationwide.

2. Temporary Checkpoint: This is an ad-hoc opening, allowed for certain specific purposes over a clearly-defined period of time and must be closed upon the completion of such objective. Approval for a temporary opening must be sought from the committee for border opening of the National Security Council whereupon an Interior ministerial notification pertaining thereto shall be signed by the interior minister. Only one temporary checkpoint is now in operation – at the Three Pagoda Pass, Kanchana Buri province, bordering Myanmar.

3. Leniency Checkpoint: This is installed to facilitate border area livelihoods and small trade as well as to promote friendly relations between the local citizens on both sides. The local administrative bodies of both countries shall agree to such an opening. For Thailand, the provincial governor, acting upon a prior approval from the interior ministry, shall have the authority to approve this type of border opening. Figure 4.2 shows the locations of 39 operating leniency checkpoints.

Checkpoint Passage Procedures Papers required for passing through a border checkpoint are listed below:

1. Passport — good for entry and exit at any permanent checkpoint. 2. Border Pass — is issued to local residents for use in passing the border subject to

restrictions as to the duration and zone of stay which are specified according to prior agreement between the two countries.



3. Temporary Border Pass — this paper is issued to travelers, whose domicile is outside the border area, for use in passing a checkpoint subject to restrictions as to the duration and zones of stay which are specified according to prior agreement between the two countries.

4. Other Paper — such as a facility letter which is issued by immigration officials according to prior agreement between immigration authorities of the two countries.

Section 2 of the Immigration Act, B.E. 2522 prescribes the following, “Nationals of an adjacent country may pass through the border on a temporary basis by observing the prevailing agreement between Thailand and the government of that country.”

Agreements on cross-border travels were signed between Thailand and Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia on 16 May 1997 and 21 June 1997, having the minister of Foreign Affairs as signatory for Thailand. The said agreements came into effect 90 days after the signing, i.e. on 15 August and 20 September 1997.

Cross-border travel agreement between Thailand and British Malaya was originally signed in 1940. Thailand and Malaysia have recently completed the review and amendment of the said agreement. The amended agreement shall come into force upon signing by the foreign ministers of the two nations.



Figure 4.2: Checkpoints along the border of Thailand Source: http://www.jssr.co.th/border_thailand.php



Border crossing rules and regulations of Thailand and neighboring countries have some slight differences as shown in Table 4.2 below: Table 4.2: Thailand-Malaysia border crossing papers

Paper For Thais For Malaysians PASSPORT - Issued by MFA

- No visa required - 30 day stay - For general citizenry - Country-wide visit allowed

- Issued by MFA - No visa required - 30 day stay - For general citizenry - Country-wide visit allowed

BORDER PASS - Issued by district office - No visa required - 7-day stay - For border residents - For up to 25km travel (in practice, to Kadar state, but not Penang)

- Issued by Immigration - No visa required - 7-day stay - For border residents - For up to 25km travel (in practice, to Hat Yai)

FACILTY LETTER - Issued by Immigration - No visa required - 3-day stay - For civil servants and VIPs - Travels up to Kadar and Perlis states

- Issued by Immigration - No visa required - 3-day stay - For civil servants and VIPs - Travels up to Hat Yai

Issues governing the time extension for border opening

The ministry of Interior has assigned related provincial agencies to compile data and information relating to the opening and closure of checkpoints in order to propose the same for consideration at ministerial level. The said issues comprise the following: 1. Policy Issues - Prevailing relations across a border, whether border opening extended is

appropriate. 2. Security Issues

- Situation of border communities and economy. - Severity of un-regulated gambling at the border.



- Situation of safety (life and property) for travelers 3. Readiness in operations and remedial measures

- Whether the immigration procedures in use comply with established agreements and international practices.

- Whether the imposed customs fees and duties are fair and just and to international standards

- The presence or absence of mechanisms for tackling local issues at the provincial and/or district levels.

4. Volumes of Cross-Border Trade and Travelers - Average monthly revenue for trade over the past year. - Average monthly volumes of entering and exiting travelers over the past year.

5. Pros and Cons or impact of opening, time extension; or category upgrades of a checkpoint.

- Presence or absence of impact upon local relations. - Likely contribution to socio-economic improvement in the area. - Likely impacts on border peace and security. - Estimated increase in trade and tourism revenue.

Many sections of the Immigration Act, B.E. 2522 deal with the administration of a checkpoint, as follows:

1. Section 5: The minister of Interior shall be the officer-in-charge who shall have the power to appoint checkpoint officials, and to issue regulations on the setting of fees and levies in accordance with the rates annexed hereto as well as to schedule any activity in observance of the Act.

2. Section 6: It shall be established a committee for entry review, having the Interior permanent secretary as chair; an the Chief of the Immigration Office as member and secretary. The committee shall have the authority and duties as per sections 7–10.

3. Section 11: the minister of Interior shall have the power to establish — upon a notification in the Royal Gazette — an immigration checkpoint, station, or locale; and to specify the allowable hours for entries–exits.

4. Section 14: the minister of Interior shall have the power to establish — upon a notification in the Royal Gazette — the requirements on an entering alien as to the amount of cash carried, personal insurance cover or a waiver thereof.



5. Section 16: the minister of Interior shall have the power to order a denial of entry to any alien in a case where consideration of national interest, peace and order, public morals and well-being, is against permission for his entry.

6. Section 17: the minister of Interior shall have the power, upon a prior approval from the Cabinet, to allow residency in Thailand to any alien conditional upon certain obligations prescribed hereunder or a waiver of any obligation hereunder on a case-by-case basis.

7. Section 23: the minister of Interior shall have the power to establish an immigration checkpoint, station, or locale; and to specify the allowable entry-exit hours for vehicles.

8. Section 40: the minister of Interior shall have the power, upon a prior approval from the Cabinet, to establish the number of aliens for yearly residency, provided the number shall not exceed 100 per nationality; and not exceed 50 for state-less aliens.

9. Section 53: the minister of Interior shall have the power to revoke from any alien the permission for residency in Thailand.

Source: http://fad.moi.go.th/group3/g3_aca1.htm (กองต่างประเทศ ส านักปลัดมหาดไทย) Customs procedures for in-bound freight vehicles

The transporter of inbound freight shall submit to the border customs office the following papers: bill of lading (as per Section 7 of the Customs Act – Vol 7) and application for a permit to take his vehicle into Thailand. The said papers require the information listed below:

(1) Place of Importation (2) Type of vehicle (3) Number registration vehicle (4) Owner of vehicle (5) Name person in charge of vehicle (6) Signature of person in charge of vehicle (7) Place Where goods ware laden in order of time (8) Marks and number (9) Number of packages



(10) Gross weight of packages (11) Description of goods (12) Consignor (13) Consignee (14) Signature carrier Source: www.v-servegroup.com

The establishment of a border customs checkpoint is dictated by government policies which are based on a number of local factors as well as security, staffing and cost consideration. Criteria for the opening of a checkpoint are listed below: 1. Mutual consent must be sought from all parties — administrative, military, security

agencies, citizens and concerned entities at the local level. In addition, evidence must be shown that indicates a measure of interfacing with authorities of the neighboring country to the stage of consent or approval for border opening.

2. With the feasibility thus established, the local administrative body shall propose to the Cabinet for an approval to install the planned checkpoint.

3. Upon Cabinet approval, a budget shall be prepared for the erection of offices and other buildings. Funds may be derived from a central or local authority as well as from private-sector donation.

4. The Customs Department shall prepare a draft of the proposed regulation for submission to the Council of the State for consideration. Upon approval therefrom, the minister of finance shall proceed with the issuance of a regulation which shall come into force upon its publication in the Royal Gazette.

Inspection of the Sadao and Padang Besar checkpoints was carried out. No people scanners are used at either locations, while X-ray scanners are available for checking freight containers. These are shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.



Figure 4.3: Departure checkpoint

Figure 4.4: Freight containers X-Ray Terminal

The various governmental bodies involved with the operation of a checkpoint consist of: the Foreign Affairs Division, Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior; the Royal Thai Police (Immigration); Department of Consulate Affairs, Foreign Affairs Ministry; and the Customs Department, Finance Ministry. Despite the MOT’s noninvolvement at this stage, it can be expected that with the increases in cross-border transportation in the near future, the



department of Land Transport will be likely to assume an important role in regulating for highway security. The DLT, therefore, should prepare additional resources for regulating vehicles, drivers and bus and truck stations. Of particular importance is the installation of inspection equipment, systems for linking vehicle database. And for the three risk-prone southern provinces, safety precautions and scanning equipment should be installed at bus terminals and railway stations. For Depts of Highways and Rural Roads, efforts should be made towards upgrading roads to acceptable standards, and installing good road furniture and signage. And in the case of a hazardous road accident, or a protest blockade, machinery and equipment should be available to quickly clear out road obstacles, or to reinstate a damaged section, or to erect diverted routes together with emergency traffic management. For the troubled southern provinces (Pattani, Yala and Narathiwas), the departments may collaborate with the military to increase the frequency of road patrol.

Legislation on goods in transit across Thailand The array of laws with relevance to the transit of goods across Thailand is shown below:

1. Plant Quarantine Act, B.E. 2507 2. Guns & Ammunition, Explosives, Fireworks, and Imitation Weapons, B.E. 2490 3. Livestock Epidemics Act B.E. 2499 4. Diseases and Venoms from Animals Act B.E. 2525 5. Psychotropic and Hallucinogenic Substances Act B.E. 2518 6. Control of Exportation of Arms and Ammunition Act B.E.2495 7. Fertilizers Act B.E. 2518 8. Hazardous Materials Act B.E. 2535 9. Narcotic Drugs Act B.E. 2522 10. Wildlife Protection & Preservation Act B.E. 2535 11. Plant Genetics Act B.E. 2518 12. Arms and Ammunition Control Act B.E. 2530

Adopting the US border management practices for use with Thailand’s border

security administration It should be noted that the border security practices of the USA and Thailand have a

number of differences. The borders of mainland USA are clearly defined and a protective



corridor has been built along the demarcation. The US has the full authority over the corridor and trespassers are regarded as violators of US sovereignty. The physical characteristics of the borders also facilitate the efforts in guarding against and monitoring of unlawful entries. By contrast, the borders of Thailand tend to be demarcated by geographical features such as mountain ranges or rivers, which pose a hindrance to the effective monitoring and control against unlawful entries.

Upon further study of the American practices, however, it was found that some of the management methods employed for the US situation may be modified for use with the border workings of Thailand. The feature to note is in the delegation of power to responsible units. The border control officers have the full power to deal with illegal immigration cases or other offenses along the border. And given the array of enforcement units, the degree of collaboration among them is high. This is because all of the units belong under the Department of Homeland Security, the governing body with the centralized power to administer domestic security operations at all levels.

By contrast, Thailand administrative structure is more of a flat pyramid, i.e. the business of border security is shared by a number of agencies at the same hierarchy level. Because of this, it is necessary to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved so as to align them for optimal work efficiency and for compliance with the range of policies on the issue. Therefore a focal agency is thus assigned for each strategic line of work, except where the strategic line encompasses many types of work, in which case more than one agency may be assigned.

Examples of the Thai border administration may be cited. The Department of Defense is responsible for cooperation with a neighboring country when there is a border dispute to be resolved; the Immigration Bureau for developing improved methods of immigrants screening; and the Interior Ministry for improving border relations with a neighboring country and the livelihood of local residents. As such the responsibility for border issues is thus fragmented among the three agencies, each with own sphere of work, but without the complete authority to administer all of the border functions. As such, delays are frequently encountered due to the differences in perception and procedures. And where a strategic undertaking requires the pooling together of the agencies, work duplication often results, thus causing unnecessary losses in time and budget.



Adopting the centralized management approach of the U.S. border security apparatus should provide a way to cut down the duplication of work and at the same improve the efficiency of the Thai border units. To implement this approach, a focal agency may be created that is tasked with the management of border security. Manpower of the new agency may be recruited afresh or borrow from other existing units. Such an arrangement, in effect, is a method for aligning the efforts of several agencies towards a common goal. (See Figure 4.5). 4.4.2 Transport of Hazardous Materials and Dangerous Goods

The transport of goods in transit is presently governed by bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements between Thailand and neighboring countries: (1) ASEAN Framework – wherein member countries agree to allow goods in transit across their respective borders; mutual acceptance of driver’s licenses and vehicle inspection documents; (2) GMS Cross–Border Transport Agreement – covering agreement among the six mainland ASEAN members on the introduction of pilot procedures for goods in transit at checkpoints in Thailand, Laos and Vietnam (Mukdahan, Sawannakhet, Luobao) and an adjunct agreement between Thailand and Laos on the facilitation of such transit.

Transport of goods between Thailand Malaysia is via existing 9 permanent checkpoints; among them the high-throughput Sadao and Padang Besar checkpoints. Malaysia’s rigid border control policies have continued to pose an issue for trade from the Thai side. Only a single memorandum on road freighting has been operative between the two countries, i.e. the memorandum on “perishable goods in transit to Singapore.”

The ASEAN Framework Agreement of the Facilitation of Goods in Transit contains a number of agreements many of which have yet to become operative due to the as yet incomplete ratification and signing of necessary protocols by member nations. In essence, the framework states that members shall be allowed to transport goods in transit over ASEAN without being delayed or discriminated against; and in so doing, shall be exempt from customs duties and fees other than nominal service fees. At the time of this report, nine protocols have been ratified with seven of the related agreements completely drawn up. The nine protocols are:

Protocol 1: on transit routes and service points Protocol 3: on type and number of freight vehicles Protocol 4: on vehicle specifications.



Figure 4.5: Comparative border management approaches —USA and Thailand



Protocol 5: Compulsory third-party road accident insurance Protocol 6: Rail border transit points and junctions Protocol 8: Measures for human and plant disease control. Protocol 9: Dangerous goods Two protocols, now under preparation and expected to be completed in time for the AEC commencement in 2015, are: Protocol 2: Determination of border checkpoints Protocol 7: Customs systems for goods in transit.

Protocol 9 of the ASEAN framework is based on the United Nations Recommendations

on the Transport of Dangerous Goods – Model Regulation and the European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, or ADR.

For the purpose of this protocol, the ASEAN member nations have agreed to adopt the

provisions given in the U.N. Model Regulation plus the ADR and its amendments, in particular, the provisions below.

(1) Categorization of dangerous goods (2) Packaging and labeling (3) Vehicle marking and method of packaging (4) Transport document and declaration (5) Training, and... (6) Precautions against fire and/or explosions.

Of particular importance is the prohibition against transit transport operators carrying the types of goods specified in items 3 and 4 of this protocol unless a special permit for such purposes have been obtained from relevant authorities of the country traversed by such transit transport. And in this protocol, no provisions are given in regard to the matter of customs inspection.

Supervision of dangerous-goods transport by road The ADR provisions have set out the requirements for handling the security relating to

such transport as follows: (1) Type and Class specification of dangerous goods (2) Packaging and labeling



(3) Vehicle marking and method of packaging (4) Transport document and declaration (5) Training, and... (6) Precautions against fire and/or explosions.

For Thailand, the array of laws pertaining to the transport of dangerous goods are listed below:

Hazmats Act (Depts of Industrial Works, Agriculture, Fishery, Pollution Control, FDA) Fuel Oils Control Act (Dept of Energy Businesses) Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives Firecrackers and Imitation Weapons Act. Nuclear Energy for Peace Act

It is the responsibility of the freight forwarders, trucking companies and vehicle owners to check the aspects regulated by these laws; for example, the type or class of dangerous goods in question.

Legislation pertaining to transport and traffic: o Land Traffic Act (Royal Thai Police) o Land Transport Act (Dept of Land Transport)

Customs Act There are some 4,100 freighting operators (inclusive of dangerous goods freighters and

private truckers) in Thailand who together operate more than 15,000 hazmats transport vehicles. (Note that the ASEAN framework limits the number of goods-in-transit carrying vehicles at 500 per day). The Department of Land Transport regulates the conveyance of dangerous goods in terms of the vehicle, driver and transport operator. Below are examples of the regulatory tasks by DLT.

o DLT specifies the Type or Class of dangerous goods. o Driver needs to have Class-4 Vehicle Driving Permit. o Carrying vehicle must display proper signs and labels to warn of danger. o Vehicle must be installed with the required number and size of fire

extinguishers. o No trailers allowed to transport dangerous goods. o Vehicle must meet protection standards against heat or combustible exhaust. o GPS tracking device must be installed on all trucks and semi-trailers carrying

dangerous goods.



In addition to the regulatory measures mentioned above, the transport or logistic service operators should be reminded of their important role in ensuring the security of this type of transport. Precautions should be exercised at all stages of the business, from the storage and handling of raw materials or finished products, loading and unloading, care of equipment, right through to the conveyance of goods by road.

The DLT and traffic police are responsible for the observance of the UN model only as far as road transport is concerned. The off-road aspects of care – the storage and handling of dangerous materials as stated above – still rest on the private sector who shall need good security management as well as proper training for their staff.

In an effort to adopt the “UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods” for the Thai environment, the DLT, working with specialist agencies in hazmats and GTZ, has published a Thai-language version of the provisions. The Thai Provisions on the transport of dangerous goods Vol II, or TP-II, was approved by the Cabinet on 28 December 2004 for use as official regulations for the said purpose. (See Figure 4.6.)

Figure 4.6: Thailand’s Provisions on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road

Scope of Existing Legislation The law stipulates responsibilities for DLT in the following areas: (a) DLT is to

supervise compliance with the Motor Vehicle Act B.E. 2522 which regulates the safety of



people and cars, but without provisions concerning the transport of dangerous goods; (b) Land Transport Act B.E. 2522 which regulates drivers and logistic service operators. Figures 4.7 to 4.10 show examples of vehicle types employed in transporting dangerous goods.

Figure 4.7: Examples of Dangerous Goods Carriers



Figure 4.8: Carrier of heavier-than-water liquid chemicals

Figure 4.9: Carrier of pressurized gaseous substances



Figure 4.10: Highly Flammable Liquid Carrier 1. Provisions on the transport of dangerous goods as per the Land Transport Act stipulate

controls for the following: category or type of dangerous substances Drivers of truck for transporting dangerous goods must be holder of Type 4. Display of symbols and text notifying dangerous substances. Fire extinguishers of type and in numbers as required by law. No trailer allowed Standard for exhaust shielding to prevent combustion of the exhaust gas. GPS tracking device required on truck. In order to implement the provisions of the TP-II, the DLT has issued a number of

additional notifications, as follows: DLT Notification on “Types of dangerous substances and method of conveyance”

defines “Dangerous Substances” as substances or objects that may pose danger to health and safety of people, animals and property and the environment while in transit. They are classified into 9 categories, in the same manner as U.N. classification.

Drivers of truck for transporting dangerous goods must be holder of Type 4 license. DLT Notification on “Display of warning symbols and text denoting dangerous

substances” requires all carriers of dangerous goods to affix stickers of warning, hazard number and UN number, at the front and sides of the truck.



DLT Notification on “Size, Numbers and Rating of Fire Extinguishers for freight trucks category 4 (Hazmats truck).

Land Transport Committee Notification on “Type and Condition of Trucks prohibited from registration” stipulates that trailers of type 6 are prohibited from new registration; those previously registered are allowed to continue use for five more years (the period ended in 2007).

DLT Notification on “Standards for exhaust shielding to prevent combustion of the exhaust gas.”

DLT Notification on GPS tracking system to be fitted on truck.

2. For the regulation of dangerous goods transport in the period 2010 – 2019, the DLT is moving toward the conformance to the (European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road: ADR) To that end, the DLT shall establish measures to regulate the three areas of the business, i.e. driver licensing, vehicle licensing and operator licensing.

2.1 Driver Licensing Training courses for driving license applicants; training manuals and quizzes for

testing the applicants. Amend the Land Transport Act (where it relates to driving license, life of license,

certification for driving specialized vehicles, penalties). 2.2 Vehicle Body

Update the provisions on the transport of dangerous goods by road for Thailand to match those of the ADR 2011.

Update of DLT notification on on-truck sticker display of symbols and text denoting dangerous goods.

2.3 Operator Licensing Operators of dangerous goods trucks shall observe the terms and conditions in

the operator license in the following areas: Truck selection, driver, and goods loading and unloading:- -

- Use only the carrier and container suitable for the purpose, having the safety features appropriate for the type of materials carried; and having passed inspection for road worthiness.



- Must have required papers on truck. - On-vehicle equipment and tools - Symbol and marking on truck body - Driver training. - Condition of the goods, methods of loading and unloading, stowage

and fastening. - Other features according to the requirements of ADR.

In-country Transport of Dangerous Goods (Transport Security) According to OTP’s 2007 study on Monitoring and Remedial Measures for the transport

of dangerous goods, a range of issues in Thailand have yet to be resolved. These are listed below:

Lack of interfacing among concerned agencies and absence of a focal agency tasked with the transport of dangerous goods.

Discrepancy in the standards in current use. Inadequate insurance coverage for such transport activities. Inadequacy of safety rules, regulations and control as well as laxness in

enforcement of related laws. Shortage of knowledgeable and skilled personnel for the industry. Oversight in infrastructure design for the industry, for example: failure to include

preventive features into facilities for storage and handling of dangerous goods, no control over transport routes.

No guidelines for the handling of emergencies.

The best practices to ensure the safety of the entire dangerous-goods supply chain call for the adoption of a closed system for all related activities; from storage, handling, loading, unloading, road conveyance and en route stops. The existing practices in Thailand still allow unauthorized persons to access the dangerous goods.

From the above, the following suggestions should be incorporated in the strategies for improving the security of dangerous-goods transport, from accidents or terrorist attacks:

Install measure to block unauthorized persons from accessing the dangerous goods (while in storage, loading and unloading, during road conveyance and en-route stops).



Install tracking systems to enable a timely response in the case a conveying vehicle strays from the scheduled plan (e.g. speeding, lengthy stoppages, deviations from the planned route, etc.)

Reduce the risks the road transport network is exposed to (by assessing the degree of related risk on each transport link, and determine the safest route from there.)

Increase the capacity for fast reinstatement of the road network in the aftermath of an incident.

Established measures and guidelines for Emergency Response.

An Operation Center for the security of dangerous-goods transport should be established. The center is to be under the MOT (according to OTP’s 2007 study on Monitoring and Remedial Measures for the transport of dangerous goods). In addition to the supervision of road transport, the center’s role can be extended to the transport of dangerous goods on the water and air modes. Notwithstanding the presence of such a center, the entities responsible for safety in the transport chain, i.e. the wharfs, airports, passenger or goods terminals, train stations and operating trains, etc, shall remain responsible as the “Transport Operators” in MOT context.

The preparation of manual, handbook and training curricula for government personnel, staff of transport operators, private companies, and the public on the related safety topics, is a crucial component to ensure proper understanding of the safety requirement by all concerned. 4.4.3 Cyber Security

The internet and computer networks have now become a part of culture and people’s way of life. Advances in IT have enabled people all over the world to communicate or exchange information across borders through various networks or the Internet. That connected state is called ‘Cyberspace’ or ‘Cyber World’. The cyber world is like a virtual world that takes place in parallel with the real world, but it combines spatial data or physical data, such as location or graphic items, with other data, such as personal data, financial account, health data, etc. all of which enable the users or cyber citizens to communicate and conduct any transactions without needing to meet face to face like transactions in the real world.



Cyber activities are typically prefixed with ‘E’ such as E-business, E-commerce and E-learning, etc. However, the convenience offered by the cyber world comes with a price. It contains weaknesses that ill-intentioned people or criminals choose to exploit. Such exploitations pose a threat to cyber users. And that has ramifications to real world citizens. Cyber threats can be perpetrated across borders or states, and can affect individuals, organizations, even nations in various areas of human activity including personal data, financial transaction, business, education, social, military, and etc.

The World Economic Forum’s report shows that cyber threats are causing concerns the world over. Cyber threats were ranked 4 out of 10 world trends. Reports of the Business Continuity Institute (BCI) show that cyber-attacks are among the top concerned issue for the corporate because many organizations have been so threatened. Many people may view cyber threats as sci-fi imagination, but if they had the chance to see the real time attacks report on the “Digital Attack Map” and “Akamai” websites, they would realize that cyber-attacks are, in fact, very real and occurring at all hours across the world.

As the notion of cyber security is being taken seriously today, many countries are now embarking on systematic approaches toward controlling cyber threat. For example, the United States has assigned the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop a Framework to improve the cyber security of the country’s Critical Infrastructure. The framework provides guidelines and standards for policy, organizational management, and technological development, to manage cyber risks that may affect critical infrastructure. This cyber security framework is based on “Cyber Security Executive Order 13686 — Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security” issued by President Obama on February 15, 2013. The Executive Order outlines the policy on the critical infrastructure security, and on information sharing between government and the private sector. NIST was later assigned to arrange a seminar on “Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework” to gather ideas from the public and private sectors. The program had a great success with participation from businesses and organizations whose suggestions were incorporated in a standard operating framework which was subsequently developed as the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.

NIST issued the latest Framework on February 12, 2014, which consists of three main components: Profile, Implementation Tiers, and Core. These components establish good guidelines for the management of the systems employed for 16 industrial groups engaged in



the business of critical infrastructure. The components of Framework Core for implementation are as follows:

1. Functions — the basic activities for overall cyber security. In this document, these activities are 5 basic security activities: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover (or IPDRR).

2. Categories — grouping based on the outcome of security efforts, such as asset management, access control.

3. Subcategories — sub grouping based on the results of techniques and/or management activities.

4. Informative References — standards, approaches, and procedures that are utilized for each infrastructure work group.

The Framework Core defines standardized cybersecurity activities, desired outcomes, and applicable references, and is organized by five continuous functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover:-

1. Identify — the initial step in understanding the context, resources and activities for the management of cyber threats to systems, assets, data and capabilities.

2. Protect — preparation and compliance with safeguarding measures for critical infrastructure, with the aim of limiting the impact of cyber security incident; which also covers awareness training, access control measures, and various security measures including processes, methodologies and technologies.

3. Detect — continuous monitoring to provide proactive and real-time alerts of cybersecurity-related events.

4. Respond — is preparing and implementing responses to the detected threats, including response planning, communications, risk reduction and upgrades of resources.

5. Recover — is preparing and carrying out activities as planned to enable continuous operations; or recovery planning for the quick resumption of service capacity.

When organizations are able to carry out those five functions by setting goals and operational framework to achieve each industry/infrastructure’s objectives, it would help the organizations to understand and be able to increase the effectiveness of their cybersecurity projects and systems. To implement the Cyber security Framework, an organization has to



consider the data flow and decision levels, such as executive level, business/process level, and operational level, with proper collaboration with related sections. As a sample illustration described the concept that the Executive level are required to transfer the organizational decision related data, communicate the organization important goals, available resources, and also the risks that effect organization in business/process level. In the business/process level, the information from the executive level will be used in risk management process and coordinate with operation level to communicate organization’s needs and able to conduct proper operation. The Implement/Operation level has to communicate the progress of operations back to the process level to evaluate the effects, which will be reported to the executive level to see the risk management overall, then the operation level use that information to create organizational risk awareness. (Figure 4.11)

Figure 4.11: Concept of data flow and organization decision following the Cyber Security Framework

The Cyber security Framework can be applied for every organization, not only in critical infrastructure business, and can be applied without the replacement of existing risk management process, but to be a part of or integrate with the existing process. The concept of Cyber security Framework is not different from the Governance Risk and Compliance or GRS concept, as followings;

1. Cyber security practices review



2. Prepare or update cyber security work plan which the procedure is consistent with risk management process such as prioritize the objective and scope of proceeding, identify risk factors, prepare current status (categorize by work group and results’ sub-group of cyber security), risk evaluation, preparation of target status, evaluation, and action plans.

3. Communicate cyber security requirements with stakeholders. 4. Identify the opportunity to prepare or review the standard or referred regulations. 5. Consider how to protect rights and privacy.

So the government agencies and other organizations need to be aware of cyber security risk management seriously. Only IT risk management or Information security risk management, including Application Security, Network Security, Internet Security, Information Security, are not enough, but it has to be overall Cyber security risk management, also Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and Cyber Resilience to deal with the unexpected, uncertain, unpredictable and unknown security threats. (Figure 4.12 – 4.13)

Figure 4.12: Relationship between cyber security and other security domains



Figure 4.13: The relationship between security and cyber threats

In Thailand, the government and organizations are aware of the need for cyber safety given the ubiquitous use of computer systems, telecom and data networks, the internet, etc. From the perspective of national security, such convenient cyber connection can also pose as a threat. Where organizations are without the readiness and effective preventive measures, a cyber-attack can cause enormous damage to businesses as well as to society. The Ministry of Information and Communications Technology recently established a Thailand Computer Emergency Response Team (Thai CERT), a unit under the Office of E-Commerce Development tasked with the monitoring of cyber threats. A draft legislature on cyber transactions is being perused by interested organizations. Thailand’s armed forces have established their Cyber Security Operations Center, at the Ministry of Defense level and military level, to safeguard Thailand from cyber threats. The current situation calls for Thailand to take action on the following issues:

1. Critical infrastructure development 1.1 Upgrade the capability of IT security staff to international standards; and build

users’ awareness of the risk of becoming an unwitting conduit for cyber attacks. 1.2 Revamp existing laws in order to create an environment that facilitates the work

of personnel, including the police, the judicial bodies, thus ensuring a more effective action against cyber crimes.



2. Preparation 2.1 Promote research and development in IT Security to deal with new forms of

threats; and to reduce the dependence on cyber security technology from abroad. 2.2 Strengthen the organizations responsible for dealing with cyber threats. 2.3 Establish agencies or organizations to support key institutions in dealing with

existing and newly emerging cyber threats. This move is to support the National Cyber Security Plan which is aimed at setting the direction for the integrated operations between state agencies and the private sector in the sphere of cyber threats.

2.4 Strengthen international cooperation with agencies abroad in responding to cyber threats or attacks on targets in Thailand.

2.5 Strengthen Thailand’s cyber capability, competitiveness and preparedness for the commencement of ASEAN community.

3. Integration 3.1 Integrate all efforts to build IT security awareness for users or customers of

infrastructure organizations. 3.2 Accomplish the effective processes for managing cyber threats — the processes

made possible by the integration of efforts of all concerned sectors.

Sources: www.acisonline.net/?p=4036 and www.etda.or.th/download-doc-publishing/7 4.4.4 Truck Rest Stops

Rest stops for trucks will be provided on major highways nationwide. There are two types of rest stops. Truck Amenities Center: This is appointed with a wide range of facilities, such as

parking spaces, lighting, guest rooms, bathrooms, rest areas, food court, ATMs, Postal kiosks, Control desks, Time stamp machines, maintenance services and heli-pad.

Truck Stopping Point: This is a rest stop area with a moderate array of services such as parking spaces, Lighting, Rest areas, Bathrooms, Food shops, ATMs.

The installation of truck rest stops is to be implemented in three stages: Accelerated Phase (5 years) from 2016 until 2020, comprising…

(๑) Truck amenities center, 4 sites (L red on map) (๒) Truck stopping point, 9 sites (s red on map)

Medium Term, between 2021-2025; comprising:



(1) Truck amenities center, 4 sites (L yellow on map) (2) Truck stopping point, 10 sites (s yellow on map)

Long term, between 2026-2031 (10-15 yrs) comprising: (1) Truck amenities center, 5 sites (L green) (2) Truck stopping point, 9 sites (s green)

Figure 4.14: Sites of truck rest stops nationwide

Figure 4.14: Sites of truck rest stops nationwide



From the security viewpoint, the rest stops provide the following benefits:- For drivers: The rest stops provide convenience and a few minutes of relaxation;

which can translate into improved driving behavior. For trucking operators: A factor to help reduce road accidents, and ease of tracking

since a truck would be parked at a definite site allowing easy detection. The Public Sector: A provision to help promote safety and peace of mind for the

people; a basic function of the government.

Recommendations: Basic safety features should be installed at a rest stop, such as: Entry and exit checks at the amenities building and the parking yard.- Perimeter fence around the premises. Adequate lighting for nighttime use. Clear segregation of vehicle types on the parking yard. CCTVs to monitor activities within the amenities building and parking yard. For a larger facility, security guards may be posted to ensure additional safety.

4.4.5 Supply chain security

The management of the modern supply chain needs the help of information technology in order to provide efficient industry connectivity. The activity in recent years has been identified as a potential risk to the security of importing countries. For the US market in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has called for vastly increased stringency in sea cargo inspection. New rules and regulations regarding the management of the supply chain have been instituted that have repercussions to the shipping industry in many countries, especially those that are branded as vulnerable to terrorist tampering. These newly found security rules can mean delays and additional costs on the supply side. The US Customs has enforced their Container Security Initiatives (CIS) which impose a 24-hour rule whereby the manifest of a cargo destined for the US must be forwarded to US Customs at least 24 hours before arriving at a US port. Details to be stated in the manifest are more numerous than what was customary in the past, and they include: the type, tonnage, container No., shipper’s name, contact address, address where goods are held, house bill of landing number, name of transporter. Descriptions of the cargo must be stated in full including the category, type, subtype, e.g. General cargo, Apparel, Chemicals, Food-stuff, plus further descriptions, e.g. apparel – women’s clothing, cotton, etc.



The Container Security Initiatives stipulate the following requirements as precautions against terrorism, as follows:

- Details of high-risk goods must be notified beforehand. - Container subject to opening and inspection before loading onto transport truck. - Advanced scanning technology employed for checking suspicious cargo containers. - Automated Manifest System (AMS) is mandatory whereby shipper must forward his

cargo manifest electronically to the US Customs at least 24 hours prior to arriving. The manifest must be filled by shipper or liner or exporter, who shall be held responsible, in accordance with the procedures of US Customs. This rule was put into effect on 1 February 2003. Failure to abide by the rule will result in a penalty or refusal for cargo entry.

In the case of incomplete documentation, the US Customs will detain the cargo until all proper documents are duly delivered. This will give rise to delayed shipments and associated costs.

Source: http://www1.port.co.th/knowledge/logistics/logistics1.html

Figure 4.15: Example of Supply chain source: www.teacher.ssru.ac.th

4.5 Conclusion The security of transport systems is vulnerable to two types of threat – one from human action and the other from natural disasters. Human attacks against transport infrastructure and

http://www.teacher.ssru.ac.th/



services can be prevented and mitigated to a satisfactory extent provided necessary precautions have been instituted beforehand. The threat of destruction by natural forces, however, is difficult to predict, such as the occurrence of earthquakes, landslides or flash floods. Nonetheless, certain preventive measures may be introduced that would help to minimize the impacts of a natural disaster, for example, the use of quake-resistant building design, safe materials, or even well thought-out measures to aid recovery in the aftermath of a disastrous event. Strategies to address such security issues should thus be incorporated in a Transport Security Master Plan in order to engineer the preparedness for tackling all forms of threat. At present, security concerns for Thailand’s land transport (road and rail modes) are still in a nascent stage. This could have been due in part to the absence of international regulations for the modes. By contrast, the air transport mode is rigorously regulated by ICAO in all aspects of safety and security operations; and the water transport mode is similarly controlled by IMO. Accordingly, new plans and strategies to be formulated for this Transport Security Master Plan shall focus on regulating the land transport mode, while those for the other two modes shall follow the relevant stipulations of ICAO and IMO. It should be mentioned that compliance with the aforementioned international bodies are crucial, a failure of which can lead to a loss of international confidence on the country’s aviation or shipping operations. Upon the commencement of the AEC, which is scheduled for the end of 2015, there will be increases in the movement of people and goods across borders. A greater level of collaboration between MOT and units of other ministries to cope with such increases will be necessary. MOT departments – Land Transport, Highways, and Rural Roads – will need to closely liaise with agencies such as immigration and border-control units, i.e. the Foreign Affairs Division, Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Interior; the Royal Thai Police (Immigration Bureau); Department of Consulate Affairs, Foreign Affairs Ministry; Customs Department, Finance Ministry, and so on. In view of the expected complexity, it is crucial that a preparedness in resources — personnel, technologies and equipment — be made ready in order to ensure the highest degree of transport security. The security and safety requirements for a transport station shall meet or exceed a set of internationally-prescribed minimum standards. Such standards, to be derived from international codes with appropriate adjustments to suit Thai environment, will be described in Chapter 6: Transport Security Master Plan.

Final Report


Chapter 5: Current Situation of Transport Security

Duties and Responsibilities of MOT Agencies

SWOT Analysis of the transport sector

Role of MOT

Roles of Security Agencies

Conclusion

Final Report Chapter 5 Current Situation of Transport Security


Chapter 5: Current Situation of Transport Security In order to illustrate the current situation of the Ministry of Transport, the Consultant prepared a detailed list of the agencies under the ministry’s care, including their missions/operations and carried out a preliminary analysis of such roles.

5.1 Duties and Responsibilities of MOT Agencies 5 MOT agencies are divided according to their functions into 5 groups, as follows.

1) Supervision & Planning Group 2) Road Transport Group 3) Rail Transport Group 4) Water Transport Group 5) Air Transport Group (See Tables 5.1 to 5.5)

This is in contrast to the MOT’s division which is based on internal agencies and external enterprises, as follows:

1) Internal agencies, comprising… Office of the Minister Office of MOT Permanent Secretary Department of Land Transport (DLT) Department of Highways (DOH) Department of Rural Roads (DRR) Marine Department (DM) Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP)

2) State Enterprises under care... Expressways Authority of Thailand The Transport Company Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) State Railway of Thailand (SRT) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) SRT-Electric Trains Co, Ltd. Ports Authority of Thailand (PAT) Civil Aviation Institute Airports of Thailand Plc. Thai International Airways Plc. Aero Thai Co Ltd. Thai Smile Airway Co Ltd.

Chapter 5 Current Situation of Transport Security Final Report


Table 5.1: Supervision and Planning group Agency Responsibility

Office of the Minister Administrative support to the prime minister; missions on political undertakings.

Office of the MOT Permanent Secretary

Development strategies; implementation of plans; general administrative tasks. Supervision and monitoring and evaluation of tasks by agencies under care.

Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning

Propose policies, measures, standards for transport and traffic activities. Transport planning and moving transport plans to implementation.

Table 5.2: Road Transport Group

Agency Responsibility Department of Highways

Construct and maintain highways. Develop safe and efficient highway networks for nation-wide coverage as well as connection with neighboring countries.

Department of Land Transport

Regulate land transport activity; supervision, monitoring, inspection for compliance with the law, and regulations. Planning and coordinating to enable the efficient connection with other transport modes.

Department of Rural Roads

Construct and maintain rural roads. Develop safe and efficient networks for nation-wide coverage.

Expressways Authority of Thailand

Provision of expressway networks in Bangkok and surrounding provinces. Planning for connections with major highways and the rail mode.

The Transport Company

Operate inter-city bus services nation-wide; develop terminals and maintenance depots.

Bangkok Mass Transit Authority

Operate commuter bus services in Bangkok and regions. Develop networks for connection with other commuter modes.



Table 5.3: Rail Transport Group Agency Responsibility

State Railway of Thailand (SRT)

Operate passenger and freight train services.

Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand

Rapid urban commuter train services. Develop networks for connection with other modes.

SRT-Electric Trains Co, Ltd. Urban commuter trains to airports. Develop networks for connection with other modes.

Table 5.4: Water Transport Group

Agency Responsibility Marine Department Supervision, promotion and development of water

transport and merchant marine activities. Port Authority of Thailand International port and related logistical services,

domestically and for ASEAN. Table 5.5: Air Transport Group

Agency Responsibility Dept of Civil Aviation Regulate civil aviation activities; develop air transport

routes. Institute of Civil Aviation Recruitment and training of aviation personnel; aircraft

maintenance and other related services. Airports of Thailand Plc. International airport operations; modern airport facilities for

passenger convenience and safety. Thai International Airways Plc.

Air passenger carrier, domestic and international flights with focus on passenger comfort and safety.

Thai Smile Co Ltd. Low-cost domestic passenger flights. Aero Thai Co Ltd. Air traffic control services.

5.2 SWOT Analysis of the transport sector The Consultant carried out a situation analysis of MOT’s structure and its transport security strategies using the technique of SWOT Analysis. (Figure 5.1) . The ministry’s level of



preparedness for managing security threats is assessed, and the outcome of the assessment was employed in the preparation of this Transport Security Plan. The appraisal of situational factors affecting the operations of units under MOT was performed on areas relating to the MOT’s internal and external environments, and how they measure up as strengths (Strengths) (Weakness) (Opportunity) and (Threats).

Figure 5.1: Framework for SWOT Analysis

Based on the outcome of the SWOT Analysis of the three transport modes, the Consultant hereby summarizes their review of MOT’s strategic plans and action plans. The summary is presented below:

MOT’s internal environment

MOT’s external environment



5.2.1 Land Transport modes (road and rail) The SWOT analysis of the security of these two modes, covering passenger and freight

operations, is shown in Table 5.6 Table 5.6: SWOT analysis of land-mode security (pax and freight)

Strengths Weaknesses Operating units like SRT and MRTA already have

security plans (safety plans). Training and response drills are on-going for some

agencies. Affiliated units across the country; hence agility for

response actions in an emergency. Possess skills in building tracks and infrastructure;

also automotive repairs. Some agencies (e.g. MRTA) are capable of system-

wide control. Safety precautions are in place; hence easy to add

security measures.

Security considerations not included in corporate missions or objectives.

MOT is without a security plan. Supply Chain is without contingency plans

for disasters e.g. flooding. Resource levels (manpower and revenue) are

inadequate; hence unavailability of resources for security work.

SRT infrastructure in poor condition from prolonged use (vulnerable to threats).

Passenger terminals are open structure; vulnerable to crimes/terror attacks.

Absence of protection plans and readiness. Opportunities Threats

MOT is keen to promote transport security. SRT has skills in detection and surveillance,

monitoring of workers and passengers in vulnerable regions, or skills for operational security.

Heightened collaboration with the authorities, in intelligence sharing.

Way to encourage public participation. Rail mode is being promoted nationally. With higher

patronage, security issues will get more attention. Cooperation from other countries due to AEC. Availability of new technologies, e.g. GPS RFID

SCANNER, plus social media to aid security work. Increase strength and resiliency to infrastructure.

Land mode is open system, offering easy access to users; hence vulnerable to attacks on and or hazardous goods.

Source of harm can come from overseas with cross-border operations.

Natural disasters Vulnerable to terror attacks and labor

stoppages. Increased pax density can mean greater

damage from an attack.



5.2.2 Water Transport mode The SWOT analysis of the security of this mode covering passenger and freight operations

is shown in Table 5.7. Table 5.7: Analysis of water-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT

Strengths Weaknesses MOT agencies, like Marine Department, PAT

and CPOS, possess the preparedness required.

Operating units, like PAT, already have security plans (safety plans).

Training and response drills are on-going.

Transport routes on waterways and coastal channels are open facilities; offering easy access for unlawful activities.

MOT is without a security plan. Absence of contingency budget for emergencies;

hence possible delays in responding to threats (esp. oil spills).

Thailand’s long coastline Storms, rough seas and shallow shipping lanes

may pose obstacles. Opportunities Threats

The handling of threats is receiving attention. Availability of help from agencies outside MOT.

IMO International cooperation (e.g. from IMO); availability of standardized methodologies for security work.

Water mode is open system (except at pier), offering easy access to users; hence vulnerable to attacks on and or hazardous goods

Source of harm can come from overseas with cross-border operations.

Increased incidence of terror attacks and piracy on freight carriers.

5.2.3 Air Transport mode Thailand’s aviation industry is growing. Domestic airports are regulated by the Civil

aviation Department; international airports, by AOT. The SWOT analysis of the security of this mode covering passenger and freight operations is shown in Table 5.8.



Table 5.8: Analysis of air-mode security (pax and freight) SWOT Strengths Weaknesses

Transport operators, e.g. AOT and commercial airlines, possess the preparedness required.

Already equipped with safety/security plans; convenient to adapt to international practices.

Training and response drills are on-going. Largely a closed system; hence easier to control security. A national civil aviation safety plan is in the process of

enactment.

MOT is without a security plan. Shortages of properly trained staff, e.g.

for pax screening. High costs of pax screen equipment;

and some are of doubtful efficacy. Even with standardized controls, some

loopholes or laxness may be overlooked.

Opportunities Threats Control of threats to this mode is national policy. International cooperation, e.g. ICAO, TSA of United

States, OTS of Australia and availability of standardized security practices (ICAO Annex 17).

A preferred target for terrorist attacks. Rapidly rising trends of pax, baggage

and cargo make it difficult for the mode to cope.

5.3 Role of MOT 5.3.1 Impact from Natural Disasters

The National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2558 has prescribed MOT’s role in providing transportation support to emergency aid agencies during a disastrous incident. MOT is to help in 9 activities listed below:

1. Set out plans to facilitate works in a transport emergency situation. The plans shall comply with the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan.

2. Carry out improvements on transport routes and networks to support supply missions, and road relocations/realignments to mitigate disaster impacts.

3. Install alternative routes, bypasses or temporary access roads, together with maintenance/rehabilitation and adaptation of transport facilities to support the tasks of the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Command Center, and those of its local counterparts.

4. Facilitate evacuation of people from disaster sites or areas vulnerable to hazards. 5. Provide information on traffic routes and diversions from hazardous areas. 6. Reinstate and/or restore communication routes that have been damaged. 7. Set up a resources database on transport disaster prevention and mitigation 8. Support traffic operations on affected routes.



9. Coordinate and maintain communications with MOT divisions, related agencies, and with the public, regarding hazards/disasters, security matters, and emergency situations.

Furthermore, MOT has the responsibilities as assigned by the National Preparedness Strategy 2557–2561. The five areas of responsibility are shown in Table 5.9. Table 5.9: Role of MOT specified in National Preparedness Strategy BE. 2557 - 2561

No. Purpose Issue Strategy Agency

Core Supporting

1

Build up the country’s preparedness for situations of harm.

The preparedness of all parties for handling situations of harm.

1.– Upgrade MOT’s strategies, development plans, emergency plans, guidelines and manuals so as to include all prevention and mitigation activities as well as rehabilitation of affected parties. Ensure the capability to collaborate successfully in handling any occurrence of threat at all phases; before, during and after. MOT shall be ready to harmonize the work of all of its key agencies and collaborating private-sector entities, charitable organizations, and direct them to prepare the resources and equipment required for tackling such incident of threat.

NSC MOI MOD Police

All govt agencies MOT

2.– Encourage training and drills of the procedures given in the contingency plans. Invite participation from all parties including field operatives, staff of the command center, chief of the response team, in simulated emergency drills. Maintain an awareness of the importance of such drills among the work units at all levels of the official security apparatus. Prepare training manuals with clear practical guidelines for response action.

MOI

All govt agencies MOT



Table 5.9: Role of MOT specified in National Preparedness Strategy B.E 2557 – 2561 (Cont’d)

No. Purpose Issue Strategy Agency Core Supporting

2

Promote the capability and resiliency of people and society as part of being prepared.

Promote the capability and resiliency of people and society.

Encourage the making of databases of disaster information at the local level that is capable of being linked with those of district and provincial authorities. Such information shall enable systems of disaster alerts and responses, as well as knowledge of the recover process. A local alert center may be set up to provide timely and reliable disaster warnings. Local maps may be developed to show hazard areas and evacuation routes. Prepare manuals for local residents for their initial response or protection efforts, and instructions for emergency interfacing with the provincial authorities.

MOIมท.

MOT, Local Admin Dept, พม.สถ. MOD, Provincial admins.

3

Promote cooperation with other countries in issues of security.

Promote cooperation with other countries

Outside scope of MOT.

Outside scope of MOT.

4

To ensure integration and synergy from all levels of preparedness

Integrate the plans of work units at all levels

1.– Each government agency concerned is to develop its own preparedness plan tailored to match the unit’s missions; and to be compliant with the overall National Preparedness Strategy.

NSC, MOI, MOD.

Govt agencies, MOT

2 .– Encourage the development of a manual on cooperation in combating each type of disasters. An agency shall develop such a manual, through the collaboration of stakeholders, academia and local communities, for use by the residents in a disaster prone area.

MOI.

All govt agencies, MOT.




No. Purpose Issue Strategy Agency Core Supporting

3.– Encourage the formation of clusters whose members shall collaborate in setting up a Standard Operating Procedure for tackling threats. The government agencies, private entities, local organizations, charities, volunteers are encouraged to participate in drafting the procedure.

MOT


5 To ensure directedness and effectiveness of management

Directedness and effectiveness of management

1.– The Prime Minister, his deputy, or a Cabinet minister assigned by the PM, shall be the officer-in-charge for the handling of a disaster situation.

NSC, MOI, MOD.


2. – National Security Council As for the development of national preparedness, the National Security Council, together with the Ministries of Interior and Defense, shall be the focal group responsible for the task

NSC MOI, MOD.

Core agency with 17 areas of responsibility.

3.– The National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan shall be the master strategy for the development of all supplementary programs and measures for dealing with natural disasters (preparedness). Ministry of Interior is the focal agency for all undertakings under the Plan.

MOI

MOD, NSC, Police, MOJ, MOT.

4 .– The Homeland Defense Plan shall be the master strategy for the development of all supplementary programs and measures for dealing with the threat of unrest or wars. Ministry of Defense is the focal agency for all undertakings under the Plan.

MOD MOI, NSC, Police, National Bureau of Intelligence and related units, MOT.




No. Purpose Issue Strategy Agency Core Core

5 .– For disbursement of emergency budgets, a concerned agency shall move to implement the National Preparedness Strategy, proposing programs and required budgets; and check them for compliance with budgetary rules and regulations to ensure correctness and transparency.

Bureau of the Budget

Ministry of Finance, Department of Local Administration Promotion , NESDB. MOI, and related units; MOT

6 .– Regarding the management of an incident, all concerned agencies shall support the work of the Joint Disaster Management Center, the National Disaster Prevention Command, and the local supervising body of the same. These units may be operated as an ad-hoc command center upon an outbreak of violent conflicts or war, having the readiness to support the Ministry of Defense or military operations if so requested.

MOI


From the table above, it can be gleaned that MOT is required to develop its own

strategies and plans for the protection against security threats. Doing so is a proactive move that will render for the ministry a good measure of preparedness to tackle any threat, any time.

5.4 Roles of Security Agencies

5.4.1 Counter-terrorism Operations Center (CTOC) CTOC is a unit of the Thai military operating under the supervision of the Thai Military

Supreme Command. In response to rising threat from terrorist assaults, the Supreme Command, in 1997, set up a Joint Operations Command-106 as a taskforce directly responsible



for anti-terrorism work. Six years later, in 2003, its name was changed to “Counter-terrorism Operations Center” (CTOC). Two tiers of administration are assigned to the center as a Committee for Policy and Planning against International Terrorism, which is chaired by the Prime Minister; and a Subcommittee for Rectifying Issues in International Terrorism, chaired by the military supreme commander. CTOC is engaged in the planning, execution and coordination of operations to combat international terrorism.

5.4.2 Operations Coordinating Center for the Protection of National Maritime Interests

(OCPMI) The OCPMI, established in 1997, is directly responsible to the National Security Council.

It functions as a coordinating body for operations relating to the protection of Thailand’s off-shore assets, helping to streamline maritime activities, sharing security information and preventing work duplication and so on. Undertakings of the unit are largely performed by the Thai Navy in collaboration with other maritime agencies, such Water Police, Marine Dept, Fishery Dept, Marine and Coastal Resources Dept (DMCR). Work is divided between two operating divisions.

1) Fundamental Operations: Responsible for sea operations to protect national assets and enforce maritime laws. Collaboration is from six government agencies: Navy, Water Police, Customs, Marine Dept, Fishery Dept, Marine and Coastal Resources Dept.

2 ) Joint Operations Concern the operations of government agencies for a range of functions involving the protection of national sovereignty, heritage and security, such as: Foreign Affairs, Labor & Social Security, Tourism & Sports, Drugs Enforcement, Immigration, Pollution Control, Disaster Prevention & Mitigation, Fine Arts, etc.

At present, OCPMI assumes an important role involving a wide range of operations, as listed below:

1) Collaborate with other agencies in suppressing unlawful activities, and the keeping of peace and order over the country’s maritime territories.

2) Collaborate at policy level with other agencies and maritime asset commissions in order to work toward the implementation of national plans.)

3) Compile related news and information and disseminate the same to other agencies 4) Monitor and evaluate the work of agencies under care, and publicize their

performances.



5) Direct, Control and supervise the work of OCPMI district branches. 6) Any other operations assigned to the unit.

The jurisdiction of OCPMI covers territorial waters on the Gulf of Thailand and the

Andaman Sea stretching 12 nautical miles from shore. The structure of OCPMI is shown in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: Organization structure of OCPMI

5.5 Conclusion Chapter 5 presented a review of the roles and responsibilities of the agencies under care

of MOT together with SWOT analyses of their situations. Brief discussions were presented on the workings of a couple of non-MOT agencies: the Counter-terrorism Operations Center, and the Operations Coordinating Center for the Protection of Maritime Interests (OCMPI). Also discussed are the organization setups of transport security agencies in the US, UK and Australia.

SWOT Analysis of the MOT work units helped to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats encountered in their operations. The security management models of the developed nations cited can help to provide guidance for MOT’s future development endeavors as well as for the management of emergency responses to threats.

Thailand Maritime Enforcement Center

Committee

Policy & Planning

News Communication

Maritime Information Sharing Center (MISC)

Personal Logistics

Comptroller Operation

Director

Deputy Director



Additional SWOT analyses, for agencies and enterprises under care of MOT, are contained in Appendix D. The listing of those agencies is shown in Figure 5.3 below.

Figure 5.3: Agencies under MOT for additional SWOT Analyses

On the international front, the UK has their Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC), as a focal agency overseeing transport security. In the aftermath of 9/11, the US established their Department of Homeland Security and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as key security overseers. For Australia, the security of the air and sea modes is handled by the federal government’s Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development; while that for surface transport is regulated separately by individual states.

Final Report


Chapter 6: Transport Security Master Plan

Conceptual Framework

Vision, Missions, Purpose, Targets

Transport security strategy covering the three modes

Action Plans and Case Studies

Conclusion

Final Report Chapter 6 Transport Security Master Plan


Chapter 6: Transport Security Master Plan

6.1 Conceptual Framework

Transport security is one of the most important ingredients for a nation’s social and economic development. Most developed nations thus make tremendous efforts to protect their transport systems from being disrupted by illegal acts perpetrated by humans. Extensive studies in the USA have shown that one-third of the terrorist attacks that have taken place the world over were aimed at transport and commuter systems. Data obtained from the analysis of 22,000 violent attacks over the last forty years indicated that damage and losses inflicted by the bombing of transport (including mass transit) systems tend to be quite extensive. Compared with the losses inflicted on other targets, a bombing of a transport feature can cause 2.5 times more damage. A terrorist attack on an aircraft can produce gruesome carnage, even more damage than that for a ground assault. Exceptions to this may be in cases where an attack is targeted at a huge gathering of people at a religious or tourist event. In light of the above, the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) sees the need to formulate a master plan to regulate the transport sector in the event of an emergency or an incident threatening to national security. Accordingly the OTP has proceeded to commission this study for the preparation of a Transport Security Master Plan Phase 1.

The Plan is to offer sector strategies for all three transport modes – land, water and air – to serve as the conceptual framework for all security undertakings of agencies under MOT. The strategies cover the key aspects of security operations, including the concept of preparedness, prevention and response to threats, and measures to aid the recovery after an incident of attack. In addition to measures for handling human-induced threats, plans are included for the management of threats arising from natural disasters as well.

For the preparation of the Phase 1 Plan, the Consultant has conducted document reviews of international practices in order to obtain relevant information for incorporating into our conceptual framework. All of the measures proposed for the framework are compliant with the Thailand’s National Security Policy B.E. 2558-2564, National Preparedness Strategy B.E. 2557-2561, National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan B.E. 2558, and the Integrated Resources for National Defense Plan.

Chapter 6 Transport Security Master Plan Final Report


Within the context of the above national plans, MOT’s role will be to support and interconnect with the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561) wherein MOT is required to develop the security preparedness for the conduct of the three transport modes. Therefore the current Transport Security Master Plan shall be a part of MOT’s master development plan.

The TSMP shall be prepared using the 4-step approach as mentioned in Chapter 1 of this report. The four steps are repeated below:

1. Investigate related national-level policies/strategies/plans involving the type and extent of the security threats, including man-made hazards and natural disasters.

2. Determine the causes of disasters and degree of risk. 3. Appraise existing capability to counter such threats at all levels — national,

ministerial (MOT), and related agencies; together with an analysis of international security practices.

4. Develop strategies for handling security threats (Closing the Gap.)

MOT’s role within the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561) is shown in Figure 6.1; and the conceptual framework for the Transport Security Master Plan in Figure 6.2



Figure 6.1: MOT’s role within the National Preparedness Strategy (B.E.2557 - 2561)

ง

Chapter 6 Transport Security Master Plan

หน้า 6 - 3

Policy/Strategy/Plan Government Policy National Security Policy

Government Security Policy

Develop Secure Performance

Development of National Alertness System

Governmental Plan

Governmental 4-Year Plan

Governmental Annual Plan

Security Plan

Security

Plan/Project

Development Plan Civil/State Enterprise/

Private/Local Local & Community Development Plan

District Plan

Disaster

Develop National Alertness System

Development of Army Performance

Preparedness Strategy

Prevention and Correction Strategy

Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan

Defense Plan

Province Plan Preparedness Plan

(Civil/State Enterprise/Private)

Ministry of Transport

Transport Sector

Disaster (14 Types)

Security (4 Groups)

Ministry Plan Synergistic Plan



Incident Framework for Transport Security Master Plan Guideline to study

Threats

1. Definition 2. Theory 3. Case study

Security Management

Strategy

1. Preparedness Policy 2. Preparedness Strategy 3. National Security Plan 4. National Prevention and

Mitigation Plan 5. Emergency Guideline 6. Synergistic Plan 7. Mitigation Plan, Ministry of

Defense 8. Prevention and Mitigation

Plan, Ministry of Transport

Related Department

Road Vehicle Road Rail Port Airport DLT BMTA TC DOH DRR DLT MRTA SRT SRT-ET MD PAT DCA DA CAAT Thai Airways Aero Thai CATC

Army Royal Thai Police Ministry of Public Health CTOC ONCB The Customs Department DDPM Office of the National Security Council

The Thai Red Cross Society Special Branch Royal Thai Police The Rajaprajanugroh Foundation Public Charitable Organization / Foundation / Private Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356) Thailand Maritime Enforcement Center The Prime Minister's Office & Other Ministry

Office of the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission

1. Classification and Relationship under Transport Sector

2. Integration between department

3. Develop Transport Security Plan

4. Unit responsible for action plans and measures for countering threats

Disasters in Transportation

Tsunami

Human Epidemic

Fire Earthquake Drought

Tropical Storm

Flood Animal Disease Pest Emerging Infectious Diseases

Community radio

Security threats in Transportation

Exploration

Protestation / insurrection

Floating Lantern

Wildfire Technology Hazmat Hijack Terrorism

PREVENTION and PREPAREDNESS

RESPONSE RECOVERY

1. Small Scale / Local Director

Level of Transport Hazard Management

2. Medium Scale / Provincial Director

3. Large Scale / Director of Prevention and Mitigation

Prevention Impact Reduction

Improvement

Mitigation

Response

Regeneration 4. Very Large Scale / Prime Minister

Adaptation Preparation

Final Report


Figure 6.2: The conceptual framework for the Transport Security Master Plan



6.2 Vision, Missions, Purpose, Targets

Vision: “Security and safety to international standards, for Thailand’s transport sector.”

Missions: 1. MOT is to engineer transport security to international standards. 2. MOT is to encourage the development of legislatures and regulations to match all

transport security plans, and to establish work units under the ministry for the supervision of transport security.

3. The personnel of all units under MOT shall possess the awareness of security requirement, and work toward implementing the security plans to achieve the level of preparedness necessary for the handling of security risks arising from human action as well as those caused by natural disasters.

Objectives: 1. Prepare plans for the prevention, mitigation of, and preparedness for handling

threats to the transport sector from terrorist acts and other forms of disturbance, and to reduce the number of “soft targets” vulnerable to such attacks.

2. Prepare incident-management and response plans to impart to officers, as well as volunteers, the knowledge on the proper handling of threats to transport security.

3. Prepare fast recovery plans for the quick revival of the transport sector in the aftermath of an attack.

4. Prepare flexibility plans for the transport sector to enable the interoperability of systems in the case of failure happening to a system under attack.

5. Prepare security strategies for all modes of travel (land, rail, water and air).

Targets: 1. The capability to prevent and contain all forms of threat to transport systems. 2. Enhance the preparedness for tackling all forms of threat to transport systems. 3. Upgrade the efficiency of resources deployment in the keeping of security and

safety for transport systems. 4. Build up the awareness and understanding in all areas of security-related

coordination.



6.3 Transport security strategy covering the three modes

This topic involves the preparation of transport security plans covering the three modes of conveyance: land (road and rail), water and air. The plans are to address the strategic issues and discuss the purposes, approaches, activities, and responsible agencies. For this study, we shall focus on the security plans for the land transport modes. At present, only some seasonal plans are in use, whose coverage is limited to the activities during high travel seasons. In view of this, the Consultant herein proposes new plans for sustained operations to ensure security all year round. In addition to the sustained effort to provide security, measures shall be introduced that are designed to enable the quick resumption of a service after an incident of attack. A brief discussion is also given on measures to be established for operations in the water and air modes in order to help upgrade their capacities to international standards. 6.3.1 Land mode (road and rail)

6.3.1.1 Plan for road transport security Strategic Issue 1: Impact prevention and mitigation

Purpose: To ensure security for road transport components involving roads, vehicles (inclusive of passenger buses and hazmats carriers), bridges, tunnels and bus stations.

Approaches 1. Establish standards for work in appraising risks and ways to mitigate risks.

Cooperation will be sought from stakeholders in government and the private sector in order to compile and streamline the procedures for risk assessment systems, clarification on the nature of threats and expected impact on those components.

2. Review of existing security plans. The Consultant shall work with the stakeholders involved in transport activities; in compiling physical data, operational data, property data, emergency and training practices. The information thus compiled shall be disseminated to relevant agencies.

3. Prepare a list of security implementations. The Consultant shall work with the government and private stakeholders involved in road transport activities; in specifying and listing measures to monitor security, and in developing a handbook for appraising the effectiveness of security measures.



4. Prepare a handbook for the operators’ self-appraisal on safety measures.

Strategic Issue 2: Preparedness Purpose: To increase the vigilance on the general users and operators’ staff.

Reports of suspect behavior of the high-risk groups shall be used to guide subsequent drafting of rules and regulations and their enforcement.

Approaches: 1. Training to encourage awareness and need to abide by the law. - Training

sessions to be staged in cooperation with academia, government agencies and local administrative bodies aiming primarily at creating awareness and willingness to operate for security among the drivers of passenger buses freight trucks.

2. Increase the confidence level in driver’s ability to assess a threat and his skill at avoiding it. More stringency is required in checking driver’s records and background in his application for a license to drive passenger buses or hazmats carriers.

3. Implement programs for building the capacity for security and emergency management. These can take the form of training sessions for public and private-sector transport personnel who are involved in Risk Assessment, Emergency Operations, and Evacuation Planning.

4. Training and drills pertaining to the execution of safety plans around a transport station.

5. Invite public participation, for example by using stickers with wording like “See anything suspicious. Call 911”, or by disseminating brochures or other publicity materials.

6. Change the previous security codes of Very Low, Low… to Very High to an easier system, e.g. “not expected, possible, probable, expected, certain”.

Strategic Issue 3: Management of an Emergency Purpose: Encourage the sharing of knowledge and data among the agencies

involved with the transport sector, especially the information on issues crucial to the improvement of our security keeping systems.



Approaches: 1. Set up a Command Center to act as the focal agency for directives and

efficient coordination during an emergency using ICS and having clearly defined Rules of Engagement.

2. Verify data and interface with high-potential units – e.g. military units and trained charitable organization – for rescue or aid-giving operations in an emergency.

3. Joint rescue operations by highly-trained rescuers from the government, private sector or local organizations.

4. Equipped with efficient communications devices for emergency uses.

Strategic Issue 4: Post-Incident Management Purpose: To have the capability for the quick reinstatement of transport system

components; and collection of data for future reference. Approaches:

1. Enable the quick, equitable aid to victims without unnecessary work duplication.

2. Harmonize and align all aid efforts from concerned agencies, as well as the collection of data for future use.

3. Appraisal of damage should be swift and accurate in order to expedite the allocation of budgets and aid items.

Examples of activities or measures for the prevention of threats to public transport

or impact mitigation.— station structures Alerts on unusual activities in, or leaving, the premises Passenger screening and methods for checking the maintenance of safety. More rigorous control of station access Safety precautions around perimeter of station. Restricted areas; access only to authorized persons. Safety precautions in areas at risk (target areas). Removal of visually obstructing objects. Protection of car parking areas



More rigorous control of access to the Commanding Center. Safety precautions for standby systems Uniforms for staff to aid visual identification. Reduction of vacant, out-of-sight areas Monitoring activities are to blend in with station ambience. Evacuation procedures for vehicles inside station. Cooperation with the locals as a means to solicit local help. Backing up of computer data. Amend policies to cover new, emerging threats. Emergency standby power systems

Bus-stop signs Stop sign should be positioned far from likely hiding places of criminals. Well lighted for visibility to driver. Fitted with emergency phone to enable help calls. Shelter must be sturdy enough to protect passengers from wind and quake.

Passenger Bus Driver Driver should be trained in aspects of safety Transport companies should send drivers to training. Bus should be locked for safety during a rest stop. Driver is to keep passenger safety in mind at all times. Communication devices should be available for driver to call head office for

help; or call to police upon an incident en-route. The Bus Body

Must be checked for safe operations inside and outside (seats, under seat, floor, luggage compartment, tyres and treads, horn, wipers, other components.)

Driver should have understanding of terrorist intents. Operators should train their drivers on the procedures to follow upon

encountering an undesirable incident, while keeping safety as top priorities for his staff and passengers.

6.3.1.2 Plan for rail transport security Strategic Issue 1: Impact prevention and mitigation



Purpose: To promote security of the rail transport mode, which comprises SRT trains (rolling stock, bridges, tunnels, signaling, train station); MRT systems (rolling stock, tunnels, Operations Control Centre, Substations, Maintenance Depots, MRT stations)

Approaches 1. Prepare standard procedures for risk assessment and guidelines for impact

mitigation. Cooperation shall be required from stakeholders (public and private sectors) for the upgrades of risk assessment systems, and for the clarification of threats and their effects upon key components of the rail mode including rollingstock, tunnels, Control Centre, Substations, Maintenance Depots, MRT stations. Personnel and specific approaches for each agency must be streamlined for work efficiency and avoidance of duplication.

2. Prioritize the security activity for MRT systems; increase the level of precaution to match threats. Ensure the preparedness to tackle emergencies.

Strategic Issue 2: Preparedness for tackling threats

Purpose: Extend the circle of cooperation to enhance security operations, and to sustain the development of fundamental security procedures.

Approaches 1. Initiate close cooperation between all involved entities, e.g. between

government agencies and provincial authorities in order to sustain our security and safety processes.

2. Cooperation between the government and units tasked with security keeping of SRT and MRT operations in order to better harness the resources of both organizations to create a greater level of security.

3. Establish guidelines and procedures for security keeping in order to upgrade the fundamentals of security practices.

4. Use of technology and training regimens to create preparedness. Technology is the first precautionary step that assists the detection and blocking of terrorist attacks on transport systems.





Strategic Issue 3: Management of an Emergency

Purpose: the coordinated management of an incident involving rail transport-related government and private sector agencies. Encourage the knowledge sharing relationship among the agencies with a view to improving related security apparatus.

Approaches 1. Set up a Command Center to act as the focal agency for directives and

efficient coordination during an emergency using ICS and having clearly defined Rules of Engagement

2. Verify data and interface with high-potential units – e.g. military units and trained charitable organization – for rescue or aid-giving operations in an emergency.

3. Joint rescue operations by highly-trained rescuers from the government, private sector or local organizations.

4. Equipped with efficient communications devices for emergency use.

Strategic Issue 4 : Post-Incident Management Purpose: To ensure the capability for the quick reinstatement of rail transport

systems; and collection of data for future reference. Approaches

1. Enable the quick, equitable aid to impacted persons without unnecessary work duplication.

2. Coordinate and align all aid efforts from concerned agencies, as well as the collection of data for future use.


Examples of safety measures for rail transport, and additional measures for the same mode. See Tables 6.1 & 6.2.



Table 6.1: Examples of safety measures for the rail mode

Measure Effectiveness Investment Physical or Operational

Intent of measure Outcome/Shared

Use

Fundamental Measures Lighting devices High Medium Physical Prevention Anti-theft/for

safety

Better ventilation High High Physical & Operational

Impact mitigation Safety

Fire Detection Medium Low Physical Prevention Safety Fire Fighting High High Physical &

Operational Impact mitigation safety

CCTVs High Medium Physical & Operational

Prevention /Prohibition

Traffic situation / increase efficiency

of facilities Awareness/training: Staff and Pax

High Low Operational Prevention /Impact mitigation

safety / establish systematic safety

On-foot patrol Low Operational Prevention/ Detection

safety / establish systematic safety

Staff background checks

Low Low Operational Prevention/ Detection

Screen out applicant with

unrelated qualifications

Full-scale Emergency drills

High Low Operational Preparedness Competency in obtaining info from

witnesses and communication

skills Structure to

withstand quakes and storms

High Physical Impact mitigation Lessen damage from explosions,

quakes and storms.

Cyber security, e.g. firewalls, virus

killers, data backup

High Low Physical & Operational

Prevention/Detection/ prohibition/ Impact

mitigation

Prevent damage from voltage surges/system

failure/disaster risk



Table 6.2: Additional safety measures for the rail mode

Measure Effectiveness Investment Physical or Operational

Intent of measure Outcome/Shared

Use

Add’l measures against higher levels of threat Security guards

High Low Operational Prevention/Detection/ prohibition

Public confidence

Baggage check

High Low Operational Prevention/Detection Public confidence

Sniffing dogs Low Operational Prevention/Detection Public confidence Fixed bomb detectors

High Physical Detection

Fixed/ Moveable

bomb scanners

High Low Physical Detection

System with redundancy

High High Physical Mitigation More system reliability

Robot: help High Medium Physical & Operational

Detection / bomb searches and other aid functions

Source: Introduction to Transportation Security

6.3.2 Water Transport

Two components of water transport security are looked into: 1) Security of transport on inland waterways and coastal areas; 2) Security of sea transport which is regulated by an international body with a range of regulations pertaining thereto. For Thailand, the Port Authority of Thailand is the country’s governing body for sea transport. A Port Facility Security Plan is administered by PAT along the directives of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code: ISPS Code, which in turn is regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The ISPS Code contains the following strategic issues:

Strategic Issue 1: Impact prevention and mitigation

Purpose: To prevent and mitigate the threats to the security of water transport affecting water vessels (passenger and freight) and wharfs (passenger and freight).



Approaches Monitor and implement measures to match the required Security Level. “Security level” shall mean the level of risk arising from attempts to disrupt, or an incident posing threat to, the security of this mode. The Marine Department is the organization to determine the security level based on information obtained from related safety agencies.

1. Security Level 1 refers to the fundamental safety measures which are to be maintained at all times for preventive purposes. Such measures include the following:

- Restricted areas and Control areas. - Access authorization for people and vehicles - Intruder Detection System - Body and vehicle search before entry to restrict zone - Security of service vessels, such as pilot boat, fresh-water and other

supplies vessels and garbage collection boats. - Servilities of restricted areas (CCTV, lighting devices) - On-foot patrol - Radio communications (testing and maintenance of internal

communications; contacts with sea-going vessels and outside agencies) - Car parking areas - Protection of water areas.

2. Heighten vigilance and implement safety measures level 2, which requires intensified efforts over the wharf and vessels to the match the increased likelihood of threat to safety and security:-

- Increased access screening (more stringent checking of gate passes and verification of lost passes).

- Safety precautions over restricted and prohibited areas (entry & exit points should be closed)

- Access to restricted areas (more stringent person and vehicle searches) - Install Intruder Detection System. (better records and inspection of

system alarms). - Install additional checkpoints at restricted areas, if necessary.



- Install CCTVs and additional surveillance. - More frequent on-foot patrolling. - Segregation passengers. - More security guards. - More frequent radio contacts internally and with ships. - Stricter control of car parking spaces; or parking restrictions

Strategic Issue 2 : Preparedness to tackle threat Purpose: Implement the highest level of precautions upon alerts for Level 3

measures, which calls for intensified efforts to the match the very likely occurrence of a threat. In addition, some preventive safety measures are need for a certain period of time:-

Approaches Increase stringency in the following tasks: 1. Access control and entry passes. More thorough checking of passes; and care

when collecting returned passes. 2. More stringent precautions required to secure restricted and prohibited areas. 3. Inspection searches, records of entries, additional checkpoints, more thorough

search on passengers, visitors, pass bearers, staff, crew of ships, cargo, etc. 4. Details of on-foot patrols, more water area patrols, procedures for proper

responses during an incident. 5. More security guards. Details of the additional staff. 6. Area closure and halt of work upon being directed by the traffic control

center. Prepare procedures for closing off areas, halting of wharf operations, and other emergency tasks.

7. Contact and report to the maritime incident coordinating center, and the Marine Department.





Strategic Issue 3: Management of an Emergency Purpose: Emergency management and coordination among the various

concerned agencies in the water transport sector according to the procedures set out under Section 7 of the Emergency Response and Contingency Plan

Approaches 1. Emergency task and communication control:- Nominate a commander with

the authority to issue orders; and to communicate internally and externally. 2. Conduct drills on response action, reception of alerts or bomb threats,

analysis of the emergency, and necessary steps to take to secure the situation. 3. Look for suspicious objects; prepare guidelines for suspicious object search. 4. Conduct drills on people evacuation, the steps and routes for evacuation,

safe areas. 5. Conduct drills on response to fire hazards on a ship; prepare emergency plan

for dealing with fire hazards on the wharf. 6. Conduct drill on emergency response to oil, gas or chemical leakage on

waterway or sea. Prepare plans for dealing with similar leakage on the wharf. 7. Conduct drills on emergency response to other forms of threat to wharf

security.

Strategic Issue 4: Post-Incident Management Purpose: To have the capability for the quick reinstatement of transport system

components; and collection of data for future reference. Approaches



3. Appraisal of damage should be swift and accurate in order to expedite the allocation of budgets and aid items



6.3.3 Air Transport Sector The security strategies for the air transport sector are based on the minimum

requirement of ICAO standards as prescribed under Annex 17 for the prevention of unlawful interferences to commercial aviation activity.

Strategic Issue 1 : Impact prevention and mitigation Purpose: To ensure security for the air transport sector, including airports, aircraft,

cargo terminals and control towers. Approaches

1. Establish an Airport Security Programme to mesh with the National Civil Aviation Security Programme.

2. Install preventive security measures to the prescribed standards of the ICAO Annex 17 for the following aspects.

2.1 Access Control:

Determine airport restricted areas

Establish security pass issuing system requiring the proper background check on the applicants for security passes. safety -

Define entry and exit points of restricted areas and arrange guards to conduct checks and searches of people, baggage and vehicles accessing the areas.

2.2 Airport security measures:-

Lighting along perimeter fence of airside area, and parking apron.

Regular watch over the parking aprons, on foot and vehicular patrols and CCTVs

2.3 Passenger and Baggage Screening:

Use of equipment such as Walk-Through Metal Detector, Hand-Held Metal Detector. For more stringent measures, employ the Full Body Scanner.

Use of Explosive Trace Detector, or ETD. 2.4 Baggage screening using X-ray devices and the ETD. For heightened

screening measures, use the Computed Tomography X-ray (CTX), which is employed at the Suvarnbhumi Airport.



2.5 Regarding the screening of cargo, airmail and other packages, the following measures are to be observed.

Establish security measures for the Catering chain, from the kitchen until the catered products are delivered into the plane.

Install X-ray screening measures to check air cargo, mail packages that are to be loaded into the plane.

Install measures to prevent any unlawful tampering of the inspected cargo and mail packages while they are being conveyed and loaded into plane.

Install protection measures covering the work areas of Catering and Cargo services; e.g. establish access control and regular patrols of the areas. safety

Establish regular inspections of all publicly accessible locations within the airport using on-foot patrol and vehicular patrol and CCTV coverage according to pre-defined schedules and areas.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Canine): A joint detection taskforce, consisting of AOT’s security staff, police and military officers, may be set up to perform ad hoc inspections over airport premises using explosive ordnance disposal techniques and bomb sniffing dogs.

3. Airport operation-specific security controls are listed below: 3.1 Screening of Passenger and Cabin Baggage — Thorough screening of

passengers and baggage. Unauthorized persons are prohibited for trespassing into the inspection area.

3.2 Screening of Checked-Baggage — An “inspected” sticker is affixed to every piece of checked baggage; and it shall be protected from tampering while in transit to the loading plane.

3.3 Control of Screened-Passengers — Screened passengers must be segregated from un-screened passengers so as to prevent any furtive passing of concealed weapons or hazardous objects between them.

3.4 Control of Cargo/Mail/Courier/Operator’s Stores — Carriers and vehicles for the transfer of these items must be subjected to body search and identity check before being allowed access to restricted areas. Inspectors are authorized to request the opening of any suspicious packages.



3.5 Protection of Aircraft — Any aircraft being reported as a likely target for unlawful interferences shall be served with a notification to that effect and an inspection of threat is to be carried out. The airport authority may order a special watch of the plane on request.

3.6 Authorized Carriage of Weapons — Especially firearms, for these to be carried aboard plane, prior approvals form airport authorities must be sought.

3.7 Access Control — Restricted areas to persons and vehicles, with pre-determined access channels controlled by security guards. Visitors must be subjected to body and vehicle searches.

3.8 Surveys and Inspection — These involve regular checking of the existing precautionary measures to spot any shortcomings or loopholes, which, if found, shall be immediately rectified.

Strategic Issue 2 : Preparedness Purpose: To ensure the adequacy of security maintenance to the standards

prescribed by ICAO. Implement an Aviation Security Quality Control Programme and carry out the requirement of the plan in key areas such as Survey, Audit, Inspection and Test.

Approaches 1. Sharing of intelligence with security agencies and the National Intelligence

Center in order to obtain information to aid security assessment, to adjust security precautions where needed, and to upgrade the efficiency of airport safety practices.

2. Intelligence sharing and coordination with intelligence agencies of foreign nations, such as the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Australian Office of Transport Security (OTS).



Strategic Issue 3 : Management of an Emergency Purpose: Emergency management and coordination among the various

concerned agencies in the air transport sector according to the Emergency Response and Contingency Plan



Approaches 1. Prepare airport Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan to the standards

prescribed by ICAO 2. Conduct emergency drills at regular intervals as per ICAO’s requirement,

including Full-scale, Partial and Table-top Exercises. 3. Determine the level of security preparedness of each airport to the required

standards of the National Security Council. The level of preparedness shall be based on the degree of risk assessment of the individual airports.

Strategic Issue 4 : Post-Incident Management Purpose: To have the capability for the quick reinstatement of transport system

components; and collection of data for future reference. Approaches




Restructuring of the Civil Aviation Department as per Government’s organization upgrades plan

The Thai Cabinet, in a meeting on 22 September 2015, passed a resolution approving the guidelines for restructuring the Civil Aviation Department proposed by the Secretariat of the PM’s Office. Among the range of laws proposed in the meeting was an “Executive Order on Civil Aviation of Thailand, 2015” which had been announced in the Royal Gazette and came into force on 1 October 2015.

The said Executive Order essentially splits the units under the old DCA structure into the following:

(1) Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT) which takes the form of an autonomous non-governmental agency, and

(2) Airports Department, which is a government agency, taking over the responsibilities of the superseded DCA.

Figure 6.3 shows the structure of the superseded DCA and Figure 6.4, that of the new CAAT.



Figure 6.3 The Civil Aviation Department (the original).

Transport Minister

Civil Aviation Department

- Bureau of Standard Aviation

- Bureau of Standard Airport

- Bureau of Airport Development

- 26 Airports

- Other sectors

Permanent of Transport Secretary

Committee on Civil Aviation

- Minister is the Chairman - Minister appoints committee

Technical Committees

- Minister appoints Chairman - Minister appoints Committee



Figure 6.4: The Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand office

Final Report


Transport Minister

- Bureau of Standard Aviation

- Bureau of Standard Airport

Airports Department (new) consists of

- Bureau of Airport Development (old) and

- Airports of the Civil Aviation (26 Airports)

- Other sectors

Committee on Civil Aviation

- Minister is the Chairman - Minister appoints committee

Supervisory Board CAAT.

- Permanent Secretary of MOT is the Chairman - Minister appoints committee

Regulatory, suspended action

Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand office

Permanent Secretary of MOT

Final Report Chapter 6: Transport Security Master Plan


Stipulations concerning security issues Clause 7: Civil Aviation Safety Standards Division is assigned the following duties and responsibilities:

(1) Recommend safety rules and standards for civil aviation. (2) Issue safety certificates and permits pertaining to civil aviation. (3) Supervise and inspect safety practices in civil aviation. (4) Work with or support the operations of other related units or assigned agencies.

Clause 8: Airport Standards Division is assigned the following responsibilities: (1) Recommend safety rules and standards for civil-aviation ground practices,

facilitation of air transport, use of airspace and air traffic control. (2) Issue safety certificates and permits pertaining to civil-aviation ground practices,

facilitation of air transport, use of airspace and air traffic control. (3) Supervise and inspect safety practices in civil aviation ground regulations,

facilitation of air transport, use of airspace and air traffic control, for compliance with the law.

(4) Work with or support the operations of other related units or assigned agencies. Clause 9: Airports — An airport is assigned the following responsibilities:

(1) Ensure the compliance of air transport activities under the airport’s jurisdiction with prevailing laws, rules, regulations procedures and directives, as well as all related international accords and treaties.

(2) Provide safety and facilities for aircraft, passengers and airport users including the transport of air cargo and mail services.

(3) Work with or support the operations of other related units or assigned agencies. Clause 13: Bureau of Airport Development is assigned the following responsibilities:

(1) Regulate the safety features of DCA airports’ infrastructure to prescribed standards.

(2) Implement the construction, refurbishing and maintenance of DCA airports, and supervise the management of airport environment as well as the structures and amenities for common use.

(3) Promote and support the operations of the department’s airports. (4) Work with or support the operations of other related units or assigned agencies.



Clause 14: Bureau of Aviation Standards is assigned the following responsibilities (for flight operations):

(1) Recommend safety rules and standards for civil aviation. (2) Issue safety certificates and permits pertaining to civil aviation. (3) Supervise and inspect safety flight practices in civil-aviation. (4) Act as the coordination center for search and rescue operations in the event of a

plane crash; implement measures to ensure flight safety; conduct investigations of plane crashes.

(5) Work with or support the operations of other related units or assigned agencies.

Nevertheless, at the 63/2558th meeting of the National Assembly on 16 October 2015, a resolution was passed for the approval of three Executive Orders, as follows:-

1) Executive Order on Civil Aviation of Thailand, 2015 2) Executive Order for the amendment of the Aviation Act, 1954 and 2015 3) Executive Order for the amendment of Legislature on the Restructuring of

Government Ministries, Bureaus and Departments, 2002 and 2015.

The said resolution has been published in the Royal Gazette Vol 132 Section 258 Ngor, which has the effect of rescinding the Civil Aviation Department, it being superseded by the new Airports Department. The Airport Development Bureau and 26 airfields of the former DCA are thus transferred to under the newly created Airports Department. The functions of Search & Rescue for lost planes or sea-going vessels, plus the Office of Aircraft Safety & Crash Investigation, are transferred to the Office of the Secretary General of the PM’s Office (or under the Committee for investigating accidents and serious incidents to aircraft, and Committee for search and rescue for lost planes and sea-going vessels.)

The newly established Airports Department is comprised of the following work units: Office of the secretariat, Construction & Maintenance Div, Legal Div, Treasury Div, and Airport & Aircraft Activities Promotion Div. The department is tasked with the development and promotion of airport networks for aviation safety and efficiency, plus the study of the need for and feasibility of new airfields, and the on-going operations of existing airports to the requirements of rules and regulations, economic considerations, demand of users, and high international standards.

In parallel with the above development, a Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT) was established. CAAT is to be a non-governmental administrative body, acting as the focal agency in the oversight of Thailand’s civil aviation activity and tasked with the supervision and development thereof as well as policy recommendations to the National Civil Aviation Commission.



6.4 Action Plans and Case Studies Within the framework of TSMP Phase 1, there is a master plan which covers the

security of the three transport modes; and an Action Plan that deals with the workings of related units or organizations. Content of the action plan is divided into two sections: 1) Prevention and Preparedness; and 2) Response and Rehabilitation. The action plan shall serve as examples and guidelines for concerned parties in the transport sector to emulate or build upon or simply follow in order to ensure the desired security. Figure 6.5 shows an overview of the Master Plan.

1) Prepare the Main or Overall Plan; covering all three modes, land (road and rail), water and air.

2) Prepare Action Plan (supplementary): Presents scenarios and guidelines for further action by the transport agencies. The following key issues are discussed: - • Recommend ways to achieve preparedness for security agencies. • Prepare prevention and readiness plans • prepare response and rehabilitation plans

Altogether 10 scenarios are cited to illustrate the procedures for response and rehabilitation, as follows:

1) Scenario 1: Bomb threat at an underground MRT station (Rail system) 2) Scenario 2: Bomb threat at a Bus station (Road) 3) Scenario 3: Threat to cross-border travelers and freight (Road). 4) Scenario 4: Risk of water pollution from oil leakage (Water mode) 5) Scenario 5: Risk of aircraft hijacking (Air mode) 6) Scenario 6: Risk of earthquake and landslide (Natural disaster) 7) Scenario 7: Cyber attacks on transport facilities (Cyber Security) 8) Scenario 8: Preparedness for the evacuation of Thai nationals from a foreign

country. 9) Scenario 9: Threats from Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) 10) Scenario 10: Hijacking Dangerous Goods/Hazmats Truck as weapon for attacks

A schematic for action is prepared to facilitate liaison work and incident responses. The proposed Transport Security Center (TSC) is to be the focal agency as well as a service center.



Figure 6.5: An overview of the Master Plan

Chapter 6 Transport Security Master Plan

page 6 - 25

Develop network connection

Vision: “Security and safety to international standards, for Thailand’s transport sector.”

Mission: ..................................................................................................... Purpose: ................................................................................................... Targets: ...................................................................................................... The strategy in 3 sectors : ........................................................................

Land Water Air

Rail Road

Prevention and preparedness plan Human-made hazards

Natural hazards

Major (Overview)

Incident Action plan and Recovery plan

Before Incident

Mobilization After Incident

Recommended on preparedness of related agencies (Road, Rail, water, Air) (1)

(2)

Visions: ………. Objective: …. Goals: ……….. Strategy: ……

- Measures....

(3)

Threats occur

Recovery and Reconstruction

Examples threats: relate with security threats on 1) Road, 2) Rail, 3) Water, 4) Air 5) Natural 6) Cyber 7) Service 8) EID

Action plan

During Incident

The security threats with surveillance



6.4.1 Scenario 1: Bomb threat at an underground MRT station (Rail system)

1) Recommend ways to preparedness for security agencies Prevention/Impact Mitigation

For each underground station, there should be 6 safety officers or more on duty per shift. Metal detectors should be installed at all entry points together with baggage check personnel. CCTVs should be installed for over 90% coverage. Contingency Plans should be established to guide response and mitigation efforts, as well as the dissemination of knowledge to passengers on how to behave in an emergency.

Inspection/Preparedness Regular emergency drill should be planned for the staff of all concerned

parties, e.g. counter- terrorism unit, hospitals, , police, staff of MRTA and BMCL (the train operator), etc. Evacuation plan for each station should be prepared and key features clearly displayed, e.g. gathering point, emergency lights, smoke vents, fire extinguishers, tools, emergency phones, and contact officers, etc.

Management of an Emergency A contingency response plan should be prepared as a component of risk

management strategy. In the event of an incident, all of the pre-arranged services can be quickly rallied for assistance, e.g. the police, emergency medics, hospital services, as well as staff of safety organizations from Public Health, Interior, the Military and MOT, all of which can provide assistance in fire-fighting, people evacuation, opening access routes, and first aid.

2) Prevention & Preparedness Planning

Vision: “Security of Underground MRT to international standards” Objectives:

• To enable plans, preparedness, mitigation measures for protecting our underground MRT network from the threats on its infrastructure, and to reduce the number of soft targets on the system.

• To prepare contingency plans for the response and management of incidents; detailing procedures for emergency actions for use by officers and volunteers.

• To prepare plans to aid the quick recovery of the transport sector in the aftermath of an attack.



Targets:

• Prevent and control threats to the underground transport system as well as other facilities having similar forms of management.

• Security to possess readiness plans to cope with all types of security threats including pre-incident (prevention, preparedness), during incident (response and rescue) and post-incident (Rehabilitation, aid), plus plans for the systematic coordination of security apparatuses.

strategy; Strategy 1: Extended collaboration for an increased level of security.

Measure 1: Close collaboration with the persons and units concerned, e.g. government agencies and organizations, to develop processes for raising the standard of safety for the underground MRT and other similar systems.

Measure 2: Collaboration between the government and the security-related units of SRT, MRTA, BTS to find ways to tap local resources for enhancement of system security.

Strategy 2: Sustained development of fundamental security functions. Measure 1: Develop new approaches to elevate the standard of

fundamental security functions. Measure 2: Establish the hierarchy of transport systems for planning

security precautions that match prevailing threats; Prepare security functions for timely response to incidents.

Strategy 3: More security work units Measure 1: Install more work units that have been trained for situations in

an actual attack. Measure 2: Install more supporting units, and heighten security surfeiting

to accord safety to people, especially in baggage checking at station entry points; reliable equipment and trained staff are crucial.

Measure 3: Use of trained search dogs. Strategy 4: Use of safety devices and solicit help from the public in order to

reduce threat.



Measure 1: Employ detection technology in conjunction with response training and added vigilance from the public. Technology is a key step towards the collection of information for the deterrence and prevention of terrorism.

3) Prepare Incident Response and Rehabilitation Plan

Duties and Emergency Response Functions of a security unit A bombing attack on an underground station is regarded as a threat to national

security. In the event of such an attack, where a planted bomb goes off, all security units shall act together according to an Integrated Response Plan to combat terrorism. Figure 6.6 illustrates a conceptual plan of action. Pre-incident Phase: This is incorporated in the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan.

1) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) 1.1 Work with anti-terrorism officials or the police where intelligence gathering is

concerned. MRTA and BMCL (train operator) shall also act according to the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan.

1.2 Provide instructions – on how to behave in the event of an attack – to passengers and the general public.

1.3 Ensure the preparedness of each station. Conduct thorough checks on station safety devices for proper functioning, e.g. CCTV, emergency lights, floor markings, gathering point, ventilation system, emergency contact phones and alarms. guideline

1.4 Provide trained safety officers at strategic locations to offer immediate help to passengers.

1.5 Conduct drills for all agencies involved. 1.6 Arrange service contracts or agreements beforehand with medical service

providers or public health authorities or the police, etc, for assistance in the event of an attack.

2) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC is equipped with a range of response plans and networks for close coordination with security units of many organizations.



3) Office of Transport & Traffic Policy and Plan (OTP): The agency has prevention and impact mitigation plans for the tackling of a threat.

4) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): The organization has a wide network capable of communicating with all key agencies. It monitors transport-related incidents, and broadcasts alerts to all concerned units.

During Incident: Upon a station being attacked, station staff will take control and issue

directives to manage the incident on the spot. Help will be directed toward impacted passengers. At the same time the central authorities of MRTA will be alerted and immediate contact will be made with MOT’s security units from which requests for assistance will be relayed to all supporting units, such as the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Public Health Ministry who will help to evacuate people, establish access routes, control fires and administer first aid. All of this will take place along with similar efforts from MRTA security staff and the police.

1) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC shall deploy the plans established earlier to guide their action and for response coordination with all security units under its supervision.

2) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): Disseminate news and information to related units in MRTA, Defense-Interior-Public Health Ministries, contracted hospitals and the police station nearest to the incident location.

3) Ministry of Defense: Depending on the severity of incident, the MOD supplies personnel to safeguard the area.

4) Ministry of Interior: Sends in personnel to contain the incident and fire damage (coordination with local fire stations).

5) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA): MRTA security staff shall help to evacuate passengers and injured persons to safety; and activate emergency devices within the station.

6) Ministry of Public Health and Contracted Hospitals: Administer first aid and medical help to injured persons.

7) The Police: Clear up access routes and cordon off the affected area from pedestrians and reporters; direct aid traffic and help to transfer injured people to hospital.



Post-incident: In-depth investigation of the incident; speed up rehabilitation. Amend existing plans where necessary. Find ways to improve upon the security precautions.

1) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) 1.1 Reinstate the damaged station; reconstruction and refurbishing. 1.2 Employ the knowledge and experience gained from the incident to enhance

the monitoring and preparation plans, e.g. more stringent baggage checking, use of sniffing dogs, encouraging awareness of similar incidents among the agencies and the public, etc.

1.3 Provide humanitarian aid, relief or medical compensation for the impacted parties.

2) Transport Security Center (TSC): Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing plans; review collaboration procedures with other units.



Schematic of an Action Plan

Figure 6.6: Schematic of action plan in response to a bomb attack at an underground station.



6.4.2 Scenario 2: Bomb threat at a bus station (Road mode)

1) Recommend suitable readiness procedures for security units. Prevention/Impact Mitigation

• At least two additional safety staffers at entry points on week days and more on festive holidays.

• Install CCTVs for complete coverage within a station and surrounding areas, in particular at the car parking yards. station

• Inspection of all vehicles entering to park within the station.

• Install metal detector gates; staff to check baggage at station entry points.

• Arrange staff with portable metal detectors for random checks of baggage of passengers inside the station. (A transport station is typically an open building with multiple access points.)

• Training for safety personnel, bus drivers, bus attendants and baggage handling staff to build up their skill in spotting any unseemly or suspicious behavior, especially on the part of people boarding at an interim stop. The training is to be conducted by experienced security officers.

• Establish contingency plans for impact prevention and mitigation using instructions in simple language, easy for the passengers and station users to comprehend and follow.

Inspection/Preparedness

• Conduct drills according to scheduled sessions with preliminary sessions for the staff of the bus station, bus operators and concerned units, such as the police, emergency medics, rescuers to ensure their preparedness; and full-scale drills to build up their understanding and competence for effective interfacing with relevant agencies without confusion as to their work description that might hamper their efforts.

• Establish evacuation plans for a bus station detailing such preparatory features as gathering points, emergency lights, smoke vents, fire extinguishers, emergency contact phones, escape plans, notices on emergency do’s and don’ts, etc.



Management of an Emergency

• The emergency response plan requires the Station Master to take initial control within the station, and to report the outcome of his decisions to the Provincial Transport Officer who shall relay the situation reports to DLT and to request assistance from the Transport Security Center (TSC).

• TSC Interface with safety agencies such as medical facilities, the police, military, rescue organizations, TSC officers, in order to rally immediate help for first aid, passenger evacuation, firefighting, clearing of access routes and other functions.

• DLT has yet to come up with a clearly-defined security plan. Current surfeiting activity is limited to the use of CCTVs already installed in each bus station.

• The safety officers attached a bus station are mostly the staff of private companies. The number DLT’s security guards is limited by government budgetary constraints.

• Security surfeiting at a bus station is difficult, being hampered by the fact that a station is an open structure having multiple access points.


Vision: “Inter-city bus transport security to international standards” Objectives:

• To come up with prevention, mitigation and readiness plans for the inter-city bus sector against bombing attacks on bus stations; and to reduce the number of soft targets.

• To prepare accident response and management plans with detailed procedures for action in the event of an incident.

• To prepare a plan for the quick recovery of the transport sector in the aftermath of an attack.

Targets:

• Prevent and control threats to the inter-city bus system as well as other facilities having similar forms of management



• Security to possess readiness plans to cope with all types of security threats including pre-incident (prevention, preparedness), during incident (response and rescue) and post-incident (rehabilitation, aid), plus plans for the systematic coordination of security apparatuses.

Strategy: Strategy 1: Implement flexible security plans based on risk management

principles for mitigating the impact of a threat; and at the same time allowing the efficient performance of this transport mode.

Measure 1: Establish standards for risk assessment and mitigation procedures through collaboration with all stakeholders, setting out details on the nature of threats and their likely impacts upon components of transport infrastructure – such as bridges, tunnels, vehicles – plus details of the organizations and personnel required. Such standards are of to be employed for the upgrading of security effectiveness among the concerned parties.

Measure 2: Joint review of security plans. Work with the units involved to collect information relating to the security practices of individual parties, such as: physical data, operational details, assets, emergency response methods and training. Such information shall be distributed for study by other agencies within the sector.

Measure 3: Work with stakeholders to prepare a listing of security tasks together with an evaluation of their execution. Develop a handbook for evaluating the effectiveness of security measures for bus transport.

Measure 4 Prepare a handbook for self-evaluation of safety practices. Strategy 2: Increase the monitoring of passengers as well as transport workers.

Report the behavior of high-risk groups; the information thereof can be employed for subsequent issuance of safety rules and regulations.

Measure 1 security Encourage a heightened awareness of the need to enforce the law. Work with academia, government and local agencies to organize training seminars where the need for



operators to abide by the law can be communicated. Invite trucking and bus operators to participate in such programs.

Measure 2 Increase the confidence level in driver’s ability to assess a threat and his skill at avoiding it. Driving license applicants are to be subjected to more stringent background checks.

Measure 3 Conduct training courses in the maintenance of safety.

Strategy 3: Increase the level of knowledge and information sharing among road transport agencies. Promote the friendly working relationship among them with a view to improving all related security apparatuses on a regular basis.

Measure 1 Initiate programs on capacity enhancement for security keeping and emergency response. Conduct training for transport officers in the areas of risk assessment, crisis operations, evacuation planning, etc.

3) Incident Response & Recovery Planning

Duties and Emergency Response Functions of a security unit A bombing attack on a bus station is regarded as a threat to national security. In the event of such an attack, where a planted bomb goes off, all security units shall act together according to an Integrated Response Plan to combat terrorism. Pre-incident: This is incorporated in the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan. 1) Department of Land Transport (DLT)

1.1 Conduct contingency exercise or drills with related agencies.

1.2 Disseminate info to the public with instructions on how to behave during an

incident.

1.3 Pre-arrange aid contracts with medical services providers, police and other

support units.

1.4 Conduct training and exercise on safety issues and monitoring for unusual

activities at a transport station to the station’s personnel and drivers.



2) The Transport Company (TC)

1.1 Conduct contingency exercise or drills with related agencies according to the

schedules prescribed by DLT.

1.2 Put up posters or give out brochures with instructions to the public on how to

behave during an emergency incident.

1.3 Conduct regular checks of safety equipment, e.g. CCTVs, fire extinguishers,

lighting equipment, emergency lights, signage, emergency phones, etc.

1.4 Send representatives to participate in DLT-run safety programs and exercises.

3) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC is equipped with a range of response plans

and networks for close coordination with security units of many organizations.

4) Office of Transport & Traffic Policy and Plan (OTP): The agency has prevention

and impact mitigation plans for the tackling of a threat.

5) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): The organization has a wide network capable

of communicating with all key agencies. It monitors transport-related incidents, and

broadcasts alerts to all concerned units.

During incident: Upon a station being attacked, the station chief shall take control and issue directives to manage the incident on the spot. At the same time the central authorities of DLT will be alerted and immediate contact will be made with MOT’s security units from which requests for assistance will be relayed to all supporting units, such as the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Public Health Ministry who will help to evacuate people, establish access routes, control fires and administer first aid. All of this will take place along with similar efforts from the station’s security staff and the police.

1) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC shall deploy the plans established earlier to

guide their action and for response coordination with all security units under its

supervision. security

2) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): Disseminate news and information to related

units (DLT, the Transport Company, Defense-Interior-Public Health Ministries,

contracted hospitals and the police station nearest to the incident location).



3) Ministry of Interior: Sends in personnel to contain the incident and fire damage

(coordination with local fire stations), and EOD specialists to check for un-detonated

bombs.

4) Ministry of Defense: Depending on the severity of incident, the MOD supplies

personnel to safeguard the area.

5) The Transport Company (TC): Security Staff shall help to evacuate passengers and

injured persons to safety; and activate emergency devices within the station

6) Ministry of Public Health and Contracted Hospitals: Administer first aid and

medical help to injured persons.

Post-incident: In-depth investigation of the incident; speed up rehabilitation. Amend

existing plans where necessary. Find ways to improve upon the security precautions. 1) Department of Land Transport (DLT)

1.1 Reinstate the damaged station; reconstruction and refurbishing 1.2 Employ the knowledge and experience gained from the incident to enhance

the monitoring and preparation plans, e.g. more stringent baggage checking, use of sniffing dogs, encouraging awareness of similar incidents among the agencies and the public, etc.

1.3 Provide humanitarian aid, reliefs or medical compensation for the impacted parties.

2) Transport Security Center (TSC): Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge

to enhance existing plans; review collaboration procedures with other units.

3) Ministry of Interior: Establish victims’ identities in cases where no paper IDs are

available.

Figure 6.7 shows the schematic of an Action Plan.



Schematic action plan

Figure 6.7: Schematic action plan for a bus station bombing scenario



6.4.3 Scenario 3: Threat to cross-border travelers and freight (Road)


• Increase the number of safety officers on week days and more on festive holidays.

• Place experienced and trained officers in charge of inspecting border-crossing travelers and freight. Install safety measures at the checkpoint.

• Develop IT and database for use in screen and tracking border-crossing people and gods.

• Install sufficient personnel for preventing and mitigating the impact arising from a security threatening incident, and to assist in evacuating people.

• Scenario Establish rules and guidelines as well as action plans for preventing and mitigating impacts and to enable safety and uninterrupted goods transport during a crisis.

• Develop systems for appraise= goods transport risks, and for use in the screening of such goods.

• Install CCTVs for complete coverage in and around a border checkpoint.

• Procure sophisticated devices for checking travelers’ ID, e.g. finger-print or iris scanners, for use in security screening.

• Install metal detector gates and arrange staff with portable metal detectors for random checks of baggage of passengers at the checkpoint.

Inspection/Preparedness

• Promote the understanding among travelers and checkpoint workers of safety procedures during an incident.

• Establish procedures, chain of command, approvals for the rallying of help and support from various agencies, for use during an incident.

• Conduct training for the checkpoint’s safety officers and administrative staff to familiarize them with the proposed security measures.

• Conduct drills: preliminary sessions for the staff of the checkpoint, and full-scale drills to build up their understanding and competence for effective interfacing with relevant agencies should a threatening incident occur.



• Scenario Establish emergency evacuation plans for people in the border area.

• Install document checking devices, e.g. passport scanners.

• Use of Full Body Scanners on suspicious travelers or people in the high-risk group. And baggage X-ray machines.

• Body search and X-ray scans to intercept concealed drugs, explosives, firearms, chemical and bio-weapons, and nuclear weapons.


• A contingency response plan; emergency handbook; and people evacuation plan should be prepared.

• Such plans should prescribe the required procedures and steps to be taken to rally the support of other agencies in the case of an incident.

• Work with safety agencies – medics, police and military officers, etc – in order to quickly control an incident and restore normalcy to people’s daily routines.

Current Status and Other Information

• No clearly-defined security plans in use. Surveillance is through CCTVs installed at a checkpoint — still insufficient in numbers and area coverage.

• Security Border personnel are in need of regular security training by experts in order to continually upgrade their capability. As such, our border integrity may be compromised.

• X-ray scanners are installed in numbers insufficient for routine operations. At some checkpoints, the freight scanners are positioned outside the checkpoint’s premises.

• Illegal border passage has been difficult to control. At present, the restricted areas near a checkpoint are not vigorously guarded.

• Passports issued by neighboring countries are of poor standards which pose a difficult inspection problem for Thai officers.

• Difficulties in tracking down aliens residing in Thailand due to ineffective enforcement of existing immigration laws.



• While the database of Immigration Bureau is linked to those of the Royal Thai Police, the Department of Local Administration and other security agencies, it is not linked to the database of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

• A Personal Identification and Blacklist Immigration Control System (PIBICS) is employed to maintain travelers’ entry-exit data and stated place of stay.


Vision: “Security to international standards, for cross-border passengers and cargo transport.”

Objectives:

• Prepare prevention, mitigation and readiness plans covering the transport of people and cargo by road across borders.

• Prepare an emergency response plan with guidelines for action by border control officers or volunteers.

• Prepare a quick recovery plan for the transport of people and cargo across borders in the aftermath of a security threatening incident.

Targets:

• The capacity to prevent and control any threat to the transport of people and cargo across borders.

• Security preparedness plans covering tasks before (prevent, prepare, reduce impact), during (respond to incident), and after (recovery) including schematics for emergency contacts and interfacing.

Strategy: Strategy 1: Implement flexible action plans based on risk management


Measure 1: Establish standards for risk assessment and mitigation procedures through collaboration with local stakeholders, setting out the proper procedures for controlling the passage of high-risk cargo.



Measure 2: Develop risk assessment and risk management methods for cross-border cargo transport. Employ them for screening the categories of cross-border cargo that required inspection.

Measure 3: Joint review of security plans. Work with the units involved to recommend emergency practices, methods and training for use by individual parties. Such information shall be distributed for study by other agencies.

Measure 4: Work with stakeholders to prepare a listing of security tasks. Develop a handbook for evaluating the effectiveness of security measures for the transport of cross-border cargo.

Strategy 2: Enhance the effectiveness of cross-border passengers and cargo monitoring.

Measure 1: Workshop seminars and briefing of checkpoint safety plans between the government, the private sector and local task units in order to heighten the awareness of security issues. The general public, bus operators and trucking companies, are invited to participate in the implementation of the plans.

Measure 2: Build up the capability in security keeping and the tackling of incidents affecting the cross-border transport of passengers and cargo. Organize training schemes for personnel of border units, e.g. Immigration, Customs, and other concerned agencies to prime them for the effective coping with any security threats to the checkpoint.

Measure 3: Establish procedures, chain of command, approvals for the rallying of help and support from various agencies, for use during an incident.

Measure 4: Procure sophisticated equipment or devices capable in ID detection and baggage screening in order to deter terrorist attacks — Facial Recognition, Iris Recognition, and Fingerprint recognition Systems, and Full Body Scanners.

Measure 5: Procure sophisticated equipment or devices for baggage screening in order to deter terrorist attacks — X-ray Cargo



Screening, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Detection, or CBRN. These are for use in conjunction with manual search and X-ray scans to intercept concealed drugs, explosives, firearms, chemical and bio-weapons, and nuclear weapons.

Measure 6: Establish emergency evacuation plans for people in the vicinity of the checkpoint.

Strategy 3: Increase the level of knowledge and information sharing pertaining to incident management among related agencies – government, private sector, domestic and foreign – involved in this cross-border transport mode, with a view to improving related security apparatuses.

Measure 1: Set up a Command Center to act as the focal agency for directives and efficient coordination at all levels during an emergency

Measure 2: Initiate programs on capacity enhancement for security keeping and emergency response. Conduct training for transport officers in the areas of risk assessment, crisis operations, evacuation planning, etc.

Measure 3: Verify data and interface with high-potential units – e.g. medical centers, police and military installations, trained charitable organization and hazmats specialists – for rescue or aid-giving operations in an emergency.

Measure 4: Joint rescue operations by highly-trained rescuers from the government, private sector or local organizations. Such units shall quickly move in to control an incident and evacuate affected people to safety.

Measure 5: Equip every checkpoint with efficient communications devices for emergency uses.

Strategy 4: Rehabilitate and restore damaged transport infrastructure, the environment and impacted areas around a checkpoint in the



aftermath of an incident. The knowledge and experience learned through a realized threat shall be compiled for use in improving related plans.

Measure 1: Ensure promptness and effectiveness of all aid operations. Measure 2: Proper interfacing of all help operations to align them for

maximum benefit. Measure 3: Speedy and proper appraisal of damage to enable prompt and

accurate allocation of aid budgets. Measure 4: Compile the experience from the actual operations for use in

further planning.

3) Incident Response & Recovery Planning Duties and Emergency Response Functions of a security unit

An incident affecting the cross-border transport of passengers and cargo is

regarded as a threat to national security. To respond to such a threat, all concerned

agencies shall act together under a unified Action Plan.

Pre-Incident: This is incorporated in the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan 1) Department of Customs (DOC)

1.1 Training seminars and briefing of security plans.

1.2 Rehearsal of the plans with all concerned agencies in preparation for any

impending threats.

1.3 Send own officers to participate in other unit’s training and briefing of security

plans.

1.4 Conduct regular inspection of security equipment – CCTVs, fire extinguishers,

emergency lights, illuminated signage, rescue alarms, emergency phone

numbers.

1.5 Establish rules and regulations for cross-border freighting. Issue guidelines to

checkpoints including an emergency action plan with procedures and methods

for security operations required in a crisis.

1.6 Employ specially trained operators of cargo screening devices.



2) Immigration Bureau

2.1 Provide information crucial for preparations to cope with security threats to cross-border transport.

2.2 Regular review of existing security-related rules and regulations 2.3 Prepare database and details of the steps required, chain of command,

directives, approvals for the rallying of help and support from other units. 2.4 Prepare a handbook with guidance on the proper responses to a threatening

incident. Arrange periodic drills of the procedures. 2.5 Employ personnel with experience and skills to operate screening devices. 2.6 Disseminate information relating to such security rules and regulations for the

understanding of the public or other agencies in the border region.

3) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC shall deploy the plans established earlier for

response coordination with all security units under its supervision.

During Incident: The chiefs of Customs and Immigration units at the checkpoint shall assume the responsibility for directing preliminary responses, assessing the situation, and communicating requests for help and support to DOC and MOT who in turn shall relay such requests to the Interior-Defense-Public Health ministries. Assistance shall be accorded to help evacuate people, clear up access routes, control fire damage, applying first aid, etc.

1) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC shall deploy the plans established earlier for

response coordination with all security units under its supervision.

2) Department of Customs (DOC): Security staff shall help to evacuate passengers and injured persons to safety; and activate emergency devices according to plan.

3) Immigration Bureau (IM): Forward the alerts to Defense, Public Health, contracted hospitals, Police.

4) Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Dept, Interior Ministry: Sends in personnel to contain the incident and fire damage (coordination with local fire stations), and EOD specialists to check for un-detonated bombs.

5) Police, Military, Ministry of Defense: Supply personnel to safeguard the area and people evacuation. Police and the related agencies shall designate a mustering



point for personnel and units responsible for response action in the event of a violent attack.


Post-incident: In-depth investigation of the realized threat; speed up on recovery work;

improve on existing plans; enhance security operations through addition of resources

or new methods.

1) Department of Customs (DOC)

1.1 Learn from the incident; use the knowledge to improve monitoring and action plans;

work with all concerned agencies to upgrade existing plans, e.g. more stringent

baggage checks, use of sniffing dogs; publicize findings to inform other agencies and

the public on the nature of such an attack.

2) Immigration Office (IM)

2.1 Learn from the experience; use the knowledge gained to improve monitoring and action plans.

2.2 Determine victims’ identities in cases where no identifying papers are available. 2.3 Provide relief aid, compensation and medical expenses where required.

3) Transport Security Center (TSC): Learn from the experience; use the knowledge

gained to improve monitoring and action plans.

The schematic of the above operations is shown in Figure 6.8 below.




Figure 6.8: Schematic action plan for responses to a threat to cross-border transport



6.4.4 Scenario 4: Risk of water pollution from oil spillage (water mode) (The case is not strictly a threat scenario as per the ISPS Code; but it is cited as an example of possible emergency response to an oil spill incident.) 1) Recommend ways to preparedness for security agencies

According to a Department of Pollution Control report: During the span from 1976 to 2010, a total of 124 oil spill incidents were handled by the department in conjunction with related agencies. Most of these were minor spills from the shore, or natural leakages. The most frequent cause of spillage were identified below:

1. Damaged or malfunctioning storage or pumping equipment. 2. Leakage occurred during sea transfer from a container vessel to a small carrying

boat, or during transfer from vessel to the wharf. 3. Clandestine drainage, e.g. draining out old oil to use the storage space for new

oil. Or drainage of ship’s ballast. 4. Collision with other ship, or reef, or fire hazard causing the ship to capsize. 5. Other causes, e.g. leakage from oil drilling rigs, affluent.

The Marine Department noted nine major spillages (each exceeding 20,000 liters) occurring during 1997 to 2010 in high sea and coastal areas. These leakages were caused by accidents during oil transfer at the wharf as well as other type of accidents.

Oil spills are detrimental to the marine environment, having impacts on marine habitat and damaging the seascape. Complete rehabilitation of the damaged areas is difficult and costly.

It is therefore necessary to establish a range of plans designed to prevent such a disaster and to effect the speedy rehabilitation of a damaged area. These are: Prevention and Readiness Plan; Leakage Response Plan and Spillage Clean Up Plan.

Agencies responsible for the prevention and cleaning up of spillages are: The Marine Department, Port Authority of Thailand (both being under MOT) and the Royal Thai Navy. To ensure the effectiveness of prevention and cleaning up, the Office of the Prime Minister in 2004 issued a set of regulations governing such operations, superseding their previous version of 1995.

The said Regulation prescribes the following responsibilities: • A national organization is to be set up under the name “Committee for the

Prevention and Clean Up of Marine Pollution from Oil Spillage” or CPOS. The CPOS is to have powers and responsibilities as prescribed.



• CPOS is to be structured with a Command Center with coordination units, operations and support units.

• CPOS is to establish the procedures for incident alerts and responses, and coordination of emergency operations.

NOTES: In the case of spillage on inland waterways, lakes, and wharfs, a representative of the Marine Department shall assume the role of Command Center Director. For oil spillage occurring on high seas, a representative from the Royal Navy shall act as Command Center Director.

2) Prevention & Preparedness Planning Vision: “Security to international standards, for Thailand’s water transport.” Objectives:

• Prepare prevention, mitigation and readiness plans covering the water transport sector and incidental oil spillage.

• Prepare an emergency response plan with guidelines for action by officers and/or volunteers.

• Prepare a quick recovery plan for the water transport sector in the aftermath of a security threatening incident.

Achievement Targets:

• The capability to prevent and control any threat to the water transport sector.

• Security preparedness plans covering tasks before (prevent, prepare, reduce impact), during (respond to incident), and after (recovery) including schematics for emergency contacts and interfacing.

Strategic Issues and Approaches Strategic Issue 1: Prevention

Approaches: 1) Establish standards for risk assessment and mitigation procedures

through collaboration with all stakeholders, setting out details on the nature of threats and their likely impacts upon components of oil transport infrastructure – such as shipping lanes, wharfs, oil transfer piers, procedures – plus details of the organizations and personnel



required. Such standards are of to be employed for the upgrading of security effectiveness among the concerned parties.

2) Joint review of security plans. Work with the units involved to collect information relating to the security practices of individual parties, such as: physical data, operational details, assets, emergency response methods and training. Such information shall be distributed for study by other agencies within the sector.

3) Work with stakeholders to prepare a listing of security tasks together with an evaluation of their execution. Develop a handbook for evaluating the effectiveness of security measures.

4) Prepare a handbook for self-evaluation of safety practices.

Strategic Issue 2: Readiness to cope with threats (Preparedness) Purpose: Increase the level of vigilance by transport operators and their

workers. Report the behavior of high-risk groups; the information thereof can be employed for subsequent issuance of safety rules and regulations

Approaches: 1) Encourage a heightened awareness of the need to enforce the law. Work

with academia, government and local agencies to organize training seminars where the need for operators to abide by the law can be communicated. Invite ship officers and oil transport to participate in such programs.

2) Increase the confidence level in ship officers’ ability to assess a threat and their skill at avoiding it. Applicants for work on oil and hazmat carriers are to be subjected to more stringent background checks

3) Conduct training courses in the maintenance of security and emergency response. Prepare plans for the training of transport personnel. Prepare resources (including budgets and specific trust fund) for rehabilitation purposes.

4) Conduct training courses in the maintenance of safety over the wharf area.



Supplementary info on preventive and response measures for tackling threats The prevention and handling of oil spills requires the collaboration of several

agencies to enable the effective mitigation of impacts and the recovery of the environment. The following list describes the range of precautionary measures required for such efforts:-

1. Tackle the problem of unlawful effluent from ships. The Marine Department has issued and enforced regulations on effluent management at five major ports (Bangkok, Sri Racha, Map Tah Phut, Songkhla and Phuket) requiring the proper collection and treatment of ship effluent.

2. Prevention of oil or chemical leakage during vessel-to-vessel transfer. The Marine Department requires the captains of both ships to take all of the prescribed measures before commencing a transfer operation at sea in order to prevent chemical or oil spills.

3. Establish oil spill alert systems to cover high-risk areas. 4. Identify and map high-risk areas. The maps thus prepared shall be employed for

setting rules and regulations to control shipping activity over Thai and international waters in order to prevent oil spillage.

5. Compile database of local-area information relating to oil shipping routes, types, quantities and properties of oil cargo produced and transported on the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, and the persons or agencies concerned with spillage management. Establish convenient linkages between government agencies, and offer easy data access to the public and other units, especially the local administrative bodies.

6. Prepare guidelines for managing spillage where it concerns the monitoring, control and supervision of agencies, private operators, and local administrative bodies. Define shipping routes, and allowable hours for oil shipping on sea, ship tracking mechanisms and reporting in order to effectively identify the culpable parties in the event of unlawful discharges of oil waste.

7. Promote the awareness of social responsibility on the part of the operators reminding them of the damaging impact on the environment and society. Set up a central fund to support operations in preventing and rehabilitating the natural resources affected by oil spills.



8. Establish local networks of vigilantes to aid the workings of the Marine Department in monitoring and inspecting oil spills. Provide them with basic training and knowledge in oil spills prevention and handling. Source: http://www.mkh.in.th/index.php/2010-03-22-18-05-34/2011-08-24-04-53-01

Strategic Issue 3: Management of an Emergency (Response) Purpose : Promote a greater level of knowledge and information sharing

pertaining to incident management among related government and private sector agencies engaged in this transport mode. Encourage the knowledge sharing relationship among the agencies with a view to improving related security apparatuses.

Approaches: 1) Set up a Command Center to act as the focal agency for directives and

efficient coordination during an emergency using ICS and having clearly defined Rules of Engagement.

2) Verify data and interface with high-potential units – e.g. military units and trained charitable organization – for rescue or aid-giving operations in an emergency.

3) Joint rescue operations by highly-trained rescuers from the government, private sector or local organizations.

4) Equipped with efficient communications devices for emergency uses.

Strategic Issue 4: Post-Incident Management (Recovery) Purpose : To ensure the capability for the quick reinstatement of oil

transport infrastructure, recovery of marine and coastal environment; and collection of data for future reference.

Approaches: 1) Enable the quick, equitable aid to impacted persons without

unnecessary work duplication. 2) Coordinate and align all aid efforts from concerned agencies, as well

as the collection of data for future use. 3) Appraisal of damage should be swift and accurate in order to expedite

the allocation of budgets and aid items.



Oil Spill Management Procedures (During Incident Phase): [[FIRST HALF]]

Responsible Agency: The rectification of water pollution arising from oil spillage is the responsibility of the Commission for the prevention and remedy of marine Pollution from Oil Spills, or CPOS which was set up on 6 January 1995 following a PM’s Office regulation issued in the same year. CPOS is comprised of a number of pollution control units, namely Operations Control Center, Coordination Center, Operating and Support units as shown in the schematic below (Figure 6.9)

Figure 6.9: Schematic of water pollution/oil spill clean up operations CPOS: Tasked with the control and supervision of water pollution remedial actions, and

publicity for the tasks in oil spill clean up and reporting of such incidents to the Cabinet.

The Coordinating Center (operated by the Transport Security Center): is responsible for reporting an incident to the core operational units, coordinating of clean up operations, and publicity for a clean up operation. The center is to work with the Marine Dept to collect evidence for subsequent legal action against the perpetrators of the oil spill.

Operations Control Center: A joint operation between the Marine Dept and Navy; tasked with the preparation of spill clean up strategies and methods; requests for resources and appraise the level of clean up success. Upon the successful completion of an operation, the center shall report to the CPOS and request the approval to terminate the operations.

Protection and Removal Oil Disposal Committee

Coordination center

Operation control center

Support team Operations team



Operational Units: Comprising personnel from the Marine Dept, Royal Navy, local admin body, BMA, and the oil industry. The units are to carry out missions according to orders from the Operations Control Center, as well as the reporting of the progress or obstacles associated with such operations.

Supporting Units: Comprising the Air Force, Army, Civil Aviation, Water Police, Meteorological Dept, Disaster prevention dept, Office of natural resources and environmental planning, Pollution Control Dept, Fishery Dept, Marine and Coastal Resources Dept, Bureau of Cloud Seeding and Agricultural Aviation, Customs Dept, MOT, International Treaties Dept, Comptroller General Dept, Bureau of Immigration, PAT, CAT, Natural Fuels Dept, Industrial Works Dept, TAT, and Natural Reserves, Wildlife and Forests Dept. These organizations are to supply assistance and resources, technical and otherwise, upon request.

Oil Spill Clean Up methods: Several methods may be employed subject to the consideration of the type, quantity of the spill; direction and velocity of prevailing winds, geography of he affected area. There five major methods as follows:-

(1) Natural bio-degrading: For cases of minor spills with highly degradable oil types, e.g. diesel oil, the spill may be left to degrade by itself. However, monitoring of the spill is still required in order to prevent any impact on the environment.

(2) Spill containment and collection: Booms are used to block in a spill and to build up its density before applying either skimmers, or absorbing materials to collect the oil. ) (Skimmer)

(3) Use of dispersing agents: A method for cleaning up in a relatively short timeframe; by using dispersing agents or organic bio-surfactants without harmful after effect on the marine environment.

(4) Burning: practicable before the spilled oil has undergone changes in its physical and chemical properties; and for a spill of thickness no less than 3 millimeters. For this method, fire-resistant booms are used to black in the spill before igniting it. This method requires special skill and good planning.

(5) Coastal Clean Up: Employed for cases where the spill has been swept to shore. Manpower and equipment – ladles, shovels and plastic bags, for instance – are required for the physical removal of the liquid as well the congealed materials.

Source: http://www.mkh.in.th/index.php/2010-03-22-18-05-34/2011-08-24-04-53-01



After Clean Up Procedures (Post-Incident): Learn from the experience; use the knowledge gained to improve monitoring and action plans as well as resources. 1) Committee for the prevention of Water Pollution from Oil Spill: Learn from

the experience; employ the knowledge thus gained to enhance existing plans; review collaboration procedures with other units.

2) DR and PAT and Royal Navy, together with the following units Pollution Control Dept Fishery Dept Industrial Works Dept Natural Fuels Dept Water Police Science & Technology Ministry via GISTDA Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) NESDB, National Security Council National Research Board Private-sector organizations, e.g. Fishery Industry Association, Wildlife

Protection Foundation, Thai Maritime Shipping Ltd, Ship Owners Association, etc.. are to assist, as per their respective responsibilities, in the following tasks:-

- expedite the rehabilitation of the affected areas; - learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing

plans; work with other units to improve upon existing plans and to create awareness of such threats;

- provide relief aid, compensation and medical expenses where required. 6.4.5 Scenario 5: Risk of Aircraft Hijacking (air mode)


Prepare emergency action plans for each security unit, setting out clear procedures, chain of command and directives. Carry out regular maintenance and upgrades of screening and other safety equipment for the airport including skills of staff and the range of devices such as CCTVs, baggage checking, explosives detection, etc. Promote awareness of



the issue among airport users. Encourage the understanding of the action plans in order to help mitigate the impact arising in the event of a hijacking.

Detection/Preparedness Conduct regular drills and exercises on the action plans, both internally and

externally with other units under MOT as well as the range of support agencies such as the military, police, public health, medical aid workers, firefighting and rescue, etc. Take stock of staff and resources for assessing their readiness for tackling a threat. Develop collaborative networks with all of the concerned units in order to promote the preparedness as desired.


Carry out contingency plans. Set up security units under MOT for coordinating functions with the military, police, fire fighting and rescue and other local units (electricity utilities, hospitals, local admin offices), etc. in order to summon help for the speedy control of an incident and to mitigate its possible impacts.


Vision: “Security to international standards, for Thailand’s air transport” Objectives:

Prepare prevention, mitigation and readiness plans covering the air transport sector, protecting it from aircraft hijacking and other incidents of threat.

Prepare an emergency response plan with guidelines for action by officers and/or volunteers during a hijacking incident.

Prepare a quick recovery plan for the air transport sector in the aftermath of a security threatening incident.

Achievement Targets: The capability to prevent and control any threat to the air transport sector Security preparedness plans covering tasks before (prevent, prepare, reduce

impact), during (respond to incident), and after (recovery) including schematics for operation commands and clear work procedures.

Strategy: Strategy 1: Upgrade the protection capability against threats.



Measure 1: Upgrade airport safety rules and regulations for better efficiency and facilitation of work in the protection against threats.

Measure 2: Establish clear guidelines for the effective response to incidents of threat.

Measure 3: Take stock of the personnel and resources within the unit for the assessment of its capacity and preparedness in aiding the management of threats.

Measure 4: Enhance the competence of human resources; employ expert staff to operate security screening equipment, such as CCTVs, baggage and explosives scanning devices.

Strategy 2: Establish cooperation networks among the related agencies to pool resources for the prevention of aircraft hijacking.

Measure 1: Establish a dedicated security unit to coordinate all security activities with concerned parties, internally and externally.

Measure 2: Encourage the sharing of knowledge on risk management among the concerned parties. Promote the common understanding of security requirement and operations during an incident.

Measure 3: Establish cooperative networks with citizens for these to become a part of the our security apparatus.

Strategy 3: Promote the awareness of mitigation measures for an aircraft hijacking incident order to reduce its severity.

Measure 1: Prepare action plans for the citizenry. These are to serve as guidelines for the handling of an incident.

Measure 2: Publicize/promote the understanding among the citizenry of the threats to air transport security in order to enhance their capacity for coping with an incident.

3) Duties and Emergency Response Functions of a security unit

Aircraft Hijacking is regarded as a threat to national security. The key ingredients of the hijacking prevention and mitigation plan are a range of measures for preparation and



response to the threat. These are essentially pre-emptive actions designed to prime the airport operators and their work units for the effective handling of an incident; and at the same time to mitigate as much as possible the damage to life and property within and around the airport premises. The plans include measures to speed up the airport’s return to normalcy in the aftermath of such an incident. The followings are guidelines for the measures to be implemented by the agencies involved with air traffic security.

Pre-Incident: Emphasis is on the planning of pre-emptive measures, as well as ways to mitigate the impact in the event of an incident taking place. The tasks required of each agency are described below:

1) Department of Civil Aviation 1.1 Issue rules, regulations and guidelines for aviation practices and an airport

Incident Management Plan, setting out the steps and methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after.

1.2 Conduct regular reviews and updates of all airport safety procedures. 1.3 Establish database of airport infrastructure, aircraft, pilots and their

experience, aviation equipment, tools, communication equipment. Ensure the functional readiness of the same.

1.4 Establish work steps, chain of command, approval procedures, methods for pooling assistance and support among the units in the event of an incident.

1.5 Prepare a handbook with guidance on the proper responses to a threatening incident. Arrange periodic exercises/drills of the procedures.

1.6 Employ personnel with experience and skills to operate screening devices. Establish safety procedures for the airport premises.

1.7 Conduct regular reviews and updates of the Incident Management Plan of each airport.

1.8 Disseminate information relating to safety regulations for the understanding of the public or other agencies in the industry.

2) Airports of Thailand Plc. 2.1 Prepare AOT’s own protection plans, setting out the steps and methods of

work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after.



2.2 Establish database of airport infrastructure, aircraft, aviation equipment, tools, communication equipment. Ensure the functional readiness of the same.


2.4 Prepare a handbook with guidance on the provision of assistance and support to the focal agency for the prevention and mitigation of a threat. Arrange periodic drills of the procedures.

2.5 Employ personnel with experience and skills to operate screening devices. Establish safety procedures for the airport premises.

2.6 Encourage the understanding of safety regulations among the public and other agencies in the airport premises.

3) Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. 3.1 Prepare own protection plans, setting out the steps and methods of work

for each phase of an incident: before, during and after. 3.2 Establish work steps, chain of command, approval procedures, methods for

pooling assistance and support among the units in the event of an incident. 3.3 Prepare a handbook with guidance on the provision of assistance and

support to the focal agency for the prevention and mitigation of a threat. Arrange periodic drills of the procedures.

3.4 Develop competent personnel for the readiness to deal with threats. 4) Transport Security Center (TSC):

4.1 strategy Prepare TSC’s own protection and mitigation plans, setting out the steps and methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after

4.2 Establish inter-agency security networks for dealing with threats. During Incident: Upon an incident of threat, the Control Tower reports to internal units

in charge of safety and aviation operations. Reports are also relayed to MOT’s transport security units who in turn forward the alerts to other agencies including fire-fighters the police, medics, for assistance in securing the situation. The following list describes the functions of each agency.



1) Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. 1.1 Control Tower immediately alerts the airport’s safety and airport operations

departments, and at the same time, issues a NOTAM (Notification To Airmen) to inform pilots and flight operators.

1.2 Attempt to direct the hostage plane to park at the K1 Stand which is specially designated for a craft under siege.

1.3 Notify other aircraft in order to clear the runway to facilitate the handling of the incident by ground personnel.

1.4 Interface with MOT’s Transport Security Center for help in rallying for additional assistance.

2) Transport Security Center (TSC) 2.1 Act as coordinating center between the airport’s internal units and related

external authorities. 2.2 Supervise the work of the external units in responding to the threat.

3) Department of Civil Aviation 3.1 Act according to the Incident Management Plan. 3.2 Rally the help of officers, vehicles and upon request from the troubled

airport. 4) Airports of Thailand Plc. AOT separates the functions of airport staff into

two divisions, as follows: 4.1 Safety Division

1) Upon being advised on the hijacking, the safety division chief shall station himself at a Fixed Command Post, and direct the airport’s responses via cooperation with the police, such as in carrying out negotiations with the hijackers.

2) Gather response staff at a mustering point to wait for orders from the safety chief for them to move in to rescue the passengers held in the plane.

4.2 Airport Operations Division 1) Initiate Emergency Operations. The center shall be supervised by the

airport’s director general, his deputy, or the chief of Flight Operations. It shall coordinate the activities of all units of the airport.

2) Airport Operations Division shall alert the fire-fighting and rescue department and airport medical center.



3) Obtain details of the hijacked plane from its owner airline. 4) Facilitate the evacuation of affected passengers.

4.3 Fire Fighting & Rescue staff are posted at a mustering point to wait for orders to act.

4.4 Airport medical staff with equipment are stationed at the mustering point. 5) The Police shall work with the Airport Operations Div. to set up the mustering

point where emergency and rescue workers are ready to move in to provide help. Policemen are to help subdue any acts of violence as well as to evacuate passengers from the affected plane.

6) Fire Fighting & Rescue shall have personnel, vehicles and equipment at the ready to assist the Airport Operations Division upon request.

Post-Incident: Speed up the recovery process; compile the results of the emergency

operations for use in upgrading the security and safety measures for greater rigor and efficiency so as to help prevent a repeat of the undesirable event.

1) Transport Security Center (TSC) 1.1 Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing

plans; review collaboration procedures with other units 2) Department of Civil Aviation

2.1 safety Compile the outcome of the operation for the updates of security regulations and guidelines.

2.2 Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing plans in collaboration with other units

3) Airports of Thailand Plc. 3.1 Render the speedy reinstatement of damaged airport components in order

to quickly return the airport to normalcy. Compile the results of the work for use in updating the monitoring and readiness measures.

3.2 Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing plans in collaboration with other units

4) Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. 4.1 Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing

plans in collaboration with other units Schematic action plan for the above activities is shown in Figure 6.10




Figure 6.10: Schematic of responses to threat of aircraft hijacking



6.4.6 Scenario 6: Risk of earthquake and landslide (natural disaster)


Set up a unit to carry out 24/7 coordination with disasters monitoring organizations to ensure a speedy response in the event of a catastrophe, especially the ability to rally aid from all agencies within and outside of MOT. Prepare emergency action plans for the unit to enable effective responses and mitigation measures. Promote awareness of emergency procedures to cope with a natural disaster.

Detection/Preparedness Carry out regular drills or exercises with other agencies of MOT as well as those of

other organizations, e.g. the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Dept of Defense Ministry, the Public Health Ministry, Police, Medical aid workers, rescue workers, etc. Take stock of the personnel and resources within each unit for capacity assessment of its and preparedness for the management of disasters.

Management of an Emergency Establish contingency plans with response procedures, chain of command,

approval procedures, methods for pooling assistance and support among the units in the event of an incident. MOT security apparatus shall request assistance and support from other agencies, e.g. the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Dept, Police, Medical aid workers, rescue workers, etc. to help evacuate people, open access routes, and to facilitate the work of all related agencies in an affected area.


Vision: “Efficiency in handling and integrative management of any disaster event.” Objectives:

Prepare prevention, mitigation and readiness plans to support the work of the response team in the event of a natural disaster (earthquake or landslide).

Prepare an emergency response plan with guidelines for action by officers and/or volunteers during an earthquake or landslide.

Prepare a quick recovery plan for the transport sector in the aftermath of an earthquake or landslide.



Targets Support the work of security units in quake-hit areas to ensure the efficient

management of relief operations. Security preparedness plans covering tasks before (prevent, prepare, reduce

impact), during (respond to incident), and after (recovery) including schematics for operation commands and clear work procedures.

Strategy: Strategy 1 Enhance the potential for security management in quake-prone areas.

Measure 1: Establish clear guidelines for the effective response to incidents of threat.

Measure 2: Take stock of the personnel and resources within the unit for the assessment of its capacity and preparedness in aiding the management of quake threats.

Measure 3: Enhance the competence of human resources; employ the latest technologies in the handling of quake threats.

Strategy 2 Establish collaborative quake management networks with other units. Measure 1: security Establish a dedicated security unit to coordinate all

security activities with concerned parties, internally and externally.

Measure 2: Promote collaborative knowledge and information sharing pertaining to incident management among the related agencies and encourage the common understanding of quake management procedures.

Strategy 3 Promote the awareness of mitigation measures for an earthquake incident order to reduce its severity

Measure 1: Prepare action plans for the citizenry. These are to serve as guidelines for the handling of an earthquake (or land slide).

Measure 2: Publicize/promote the understanding among the citizenry of the threat from an earthquake in order to enhance their capacity for coping with an incident.



3) Duties and Emergency Response Functions of a security unit Earthquakes and landslides are natural phenomena with highly destructive forces that

can harm people and property in a wide area. Their position and time of occurrence are difficult to predict which militate against any attempt to prevent and manage an incident when they hit. The best approach in damage mitigation is to muster all available aid services for concerted action in a timely manner. Guidelines for prevention and responses are described below:

Pre-Incident: The action plan for this phase focuses on preventive and mitigation measures

which are require of each concerned agency, as follows:

1) Office of MOT Permanent Secretary 1.1 Implement policies and guidelines for the overall of the action plan. 1.2 Establish budgets and programs for the action plan to enable the effective

execution of the planned missions.

2) Department of Land Transport (DLT) 2.1 Prepare own protection & mitigation plans, setting out the steps and

methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after. 2.2 Establish database of active cargo and passenger terminals, department’s

personnel, materials and equipment currently in place at all DLT depots in order to prepare for deployment of the same in the event of an incident.

2.3 Establish work steps, chain of command, approval procedures, methods for pooling assistance and support among the units in the event of an earthquake. Designate relief coordinators centrally and for disaster areas.

2.4 Prepare a handbook with guidance on providing assistance and support to the focal agency for the prevention and mitigation of a natural disaster. Arrange periodic drills of the procedures.

3) Department of Highways (DOH) 3.1 Prepare own protection & mitigation plans, setting out the steps and

methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after



3.2 Establish database on own vehicles, equipment and tools and communication devices in normal use, as well as those the agency has in possession for rescue and disaster relief operations, and ready for use.

3.3 Work with DRR to plan alternate routes, and prepare to deal with any likely damage on the main communication channels during an incident.

3.4 Establish work steps, chain of command, approval procedures, methods for pooling assistance and support among the units in the event of an incident. Designate relief coordinators centrally and for the disaster areas.


4) Department of Rural Roads (DRR) 4.1 Prepare DRR’s own protection and mitigation plans, setting out the steps

and methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after.


4.3 Work with DOH to plan alternate routes, and prepare to deal with any likely damage on the main communication channels during an incident



5) State Railway of Thailand (SRT) 5.1 Prepare SRT’s own protection and mitigation plans, setting out the steps






5.4 Establish contingency plans for using SRT trains as alternate transport mode in the event of a natural disaster.

6) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) 6.1 Prepare MRTA’s own protection and mitigation plans, setting out the steps



6.4 Prepare a handbook with guidance on the preparations required for dealing with a natural disaster. Arrange periodic drills of the procedures.

7) Expressways Authority of Thailand (EXAT) 7.1 Prepare own protection and mitigation plans, setting out the steps and

methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after. 7.2 Prepare a handbook with guidance on providing assistance and support to

the focal agency for the prevention and mitigation of a natural disaster. Arrange periodic drills of the procedures.

8) Marine Department 8.1 Prepare own protection and mitigation plans, setting out the steps and

methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after. 8.2 Establish database on own vehicles, equipment and tools and

communication devices in normal use, as well as those the agency has in possession for rescue and disaster relief operations, and ready for use.





9) Airports of Thailand Plc.) 9.1 Prepare AOT’s own protection and mitigation plans, setting out the steps





9.5 Provide instructions to the airport users on how to behave during a natural disaster.

10) Transport Security Center (TSC): 10.1 Prepare own disaster protection and mitigation strategies to cover all

target areas, setting out the steps and methods of work for each phase of an incident: before, during and after

10.2 Encourage the setting up of security coordination networks within the various transport organizations.

11) Office of Transport and Traffic Planning and Policy (OTP): Prepare own prevention and mitigation plan for the handling of an incident.

12) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): Disseminate news and information to related units (the agency is well networked with all key safety bodies in Thailand).



During Incident: The Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Department (DDPM) of the Interior Ministry is the focal agency for the handling of an emergency arising from a natural disaster. The department liaises with a number of emergency bodies in the provision of relief and aid to an affected area. The emergency units include the local agencies, such as the provincial office of DDPM, local military and police forces, medical aid workers, volunteers, who perform services on the affected site; and support units who provide assistance and supplies to the field workers.

MOT operates as a support agency, being responsible for the quick repairs of access roads and communication channels; support the dispatch of reinforcements, evacuation of impacted persons, and traffic information. Responsibilities of the agencies under MOT are listed below:

1) Transport Security Center (TSC): operates as the coordinating center of MOT according to the emergency action plan. TSC receives all natural disaster alerts, security alerts and emergency reporting and liaise with units within MOT, other related units and interested public. It also oversees the work of the units under MOT. MOT

2) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): Disseminate news and information to related units (Defense-Interior-Public Health Ministries, contracted hospitals and the police) in order to facilitate the coordination and information sharing between MOT and its field units in disaster areas.

3) Department of Land Transport (DLT): Supplies officers, vehicles and equipment to help evacuate people, and to assist aid workers in the affected area.

4) Department of Highways (DOH): Arrange quick repairs of access roads and communication channels; support the dispatch of reinforcements, arrange diverted or alternate routes, and other logistical help. Support the work of the National Command for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.

5) Department of Rural Roads (DOR): Perform similar functions to those of DOH. 6) State Railway of Thailand (SRT): Provide human resources, vehicles and

equipment upon request from the affected sites. Prepare trains as an alternate emergency transport mode.

7) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA): Prepare personnel and trains for evacuation efforts if need be.



8) Expressways Authority of Thailand (EXAT): provide support to facilitate access to an affected site.

9) Marine Department: Provide human resources, vehicles and equipment upon request from the affected sites. Prepare vehicles and alternate evacuation routes.

10) Airports of Thailand Plc.: Carry out emergency tasks as planned should an airport become an affected site. Arrange for the immediate evacuation of people from the site.

11) Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Dept: The focal agency for the supervision of all emergency measures. The department is supported by the Disaster Relief Center and local aid agencies who dispatch local resources to the rescue of an affected site.

12) Ministry of Interior: Mobilize the ministry’s resources to support the emergency operations.

13) Ministry of Defense: Mobilize the ministry’s resources to support the emergency operations

14) Ministry of Public Health: Mobilize the ministry’s resources to provide first aid and other medical help.

15) Clear up access routes, block out curious onlookers, direct aid traffic and injury transfers.

Post-Incident: Expedite the recovery process. Compile the results of the work for use in upgrading the existing security plans as well as the reponse of all units to any future threats.

1) Transport Security Center (TSC): Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing plans in collaboration with other units.

2) Department of Highways (DOH): Render the speedy reinstatement of damaged highways. Compile the results of the work for use in updating the monitoring and readiness measures.

3) Department of Rural Roads (DOR) Render the speedy reinstatement of damaged roads. Compile the results of the work for use in upgrading the monitoring and readiness measures

4) State Railway of Thailand (SRT) station render the speedy reinstatement of damaged tracks, stations. Compile the results of the work for use in upgrading the monitoring and readiness measures.



5) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) station Render the speedy reinstatement of damaged commuter lines and stations. Compile the results of the work for use in updating the monitoring and readiness measures.

6) Expressways Authority of Thailand (EXAT): Render the speedy reinstatement of damaged expressways and facilities. Compile the results of the work for use in updating the monitoring and readiness measures.

7) Airports of Thailand Plc. (AOT): Render the speedy reinstatement of damaged airport components in order to quickly return the airport to normalcy. Compile the results of the work for use in updating the monitoring and readiness measures.

Schematic action plan of the above tasks is shown in Figure 6.11 below:




Figure 6.11: Schematic action plan for responses to a landslide.



6.4.7 Scenario 7: Cyber attacks on transport facilities (Cyber Security) Security issues have increasingly changed from the traditional forms to non-traditional,

notably the security of cyber space. Cyber security now covers a wide range of issues relating to computer uses and computer networks. A cyber attack is any assault perpetrated against computer systems, networks and related devices, to disrupt, harm, or destroy the systems, resources, and the critical cyber infrastructure. The effects of a cyber attack are not limited to the targeted computer systems or data, but they may harm the workings or the control capabilities of a computer-driven system. Attracts are typically carried out through the use of digital media, peripheral devices, electronics transmitters, or embedded code; or through human accomplices such as systems operators.

1) Prepare contingency plans for tackling threats All concerned units shall act together according to action plans in order to counter

cyber terrorism.

Pre-Incident: This is incorporated in the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan 1) Agencies or service organizations in transport sector;

1.1 Develop a framework for strengthening cyber security of critical infrastructure. The framework is to provide guidelines and standards covering cyber risk management according to the regulations set by the National Cyber Security Committee (NCSC).

1.2 Incorporate the cyber security plans of agencies such as the Cyber Security Operation Center (CSOC), Ministry of ICT; the MoD Cyber Operations Center, Armed Forces cyber units, Police Cyber Command, TSC as well as MOT’s safety-related units.

1.3 Develop cyber security personnel for tasks in combating cyber threats. Build Culture of Awareness on cyber security.

1.4 Prepare Standards and Procedures for combating cyber threats and for the recovery of computer systems in the event of an attack. Identify the resources and tasks required; conduct regular detection and monitoring programs.



1.5 Conduct drils and exercises, such as Cyber Incident Action Plan Exercise and Cyber Emergency Response Exercise.

1.6 As cyber threats can affect the safety of transport services, it is thus necessary to integrate all response plans with passenger safety plans or evacuation plans, plus related disaster impact mitigation plans in the event of an attack.

2) Transport Security Center (TSC): Establish contingency plans and coordination networks with all cyber security units, in particular those involving with transport security.

3) Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP): prepare prevention and mitigation plans for dealing with a situation of attack.

4) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): Disseminate news and information to related units. (the agency is well networked with all key safety bodies in Thailand).

5) Cyber Security Operation Center (CSOC), Ministry of ICT: promote international cooperation in the sharing of Cyber Attack data; initiate cooperative networking between state agencies and internet service providers (ISP).

During Incident: A cyber attack may block access to vital information or business systems, initiate or stall the workings of controls or signal systems in order to inflict damage.

1) Transport Service organizations or agencies: Follow required procedures in the event a cyber attack is detected. Cooperate with related cyber security organizations, and proceed along the related prevention and mitigation plans.

2) Transportation Security Center (TSC): proceed along the plans that have been agreed upon with other transport security units. Assist in coordinating all response actions.

3) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): Disseminate news and information to security units in the event of a cyber attack.

4) Cyber Security Operation Center (CSOC) and MoD Cyber Command: carry out the procedures to monitor the attack and respond to situation to reduce



impact, and assign the Cyber Emergency Response Teams (CERT) to support and cooperate with other service organizations.

5) Other supporting organizations: support other matters according to the related plans.

Post-Incident: Learn from the experience; speed up the recovery process; upgrade existing plans and security resources.

1) Transport service organizations or agencies 1.1 Carry out the activities as planned to enable continuous transport

operations, including recovery plan for targeted capability and services. 1.2 Review and evaluate cyber security regulations, create or improve the

existing plans using the attack incident as case studies to revamp the procedures consistent with risk management process.

1.3 Carry out the post-incident procedures for cases of related situations. 2) Transportation Security Center (TSC): Learn from the experience; employ the

knowledge to enhance existing plans in collaboration with other units. Schematic action plan for the above is shown in Figure 6.12.



Figure 6.12: Schematic of responses to cyber-attack on the transport sector




6.4.8 Scenario 8: Evacuation of Thai nationals from a foreign country (Foreign Affairs) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the focal agency for the emergency evacuation

of Thai citizens from a country affected by a life threatening event. Requests for help are to be relayed to MOT who shall determine the transport mode appropriate to the situation. MOT is thus required to engineer its preparedness for such emergency task.

1) Evacuation Readiness Plan (Foreign Affairs Ministry) 1.1 Update the ministry’s name and contact database of Thai citizens and firms

under the care of the Thai embassy in that country. 1.2 Prepare a listing of Thai Embassy staffers and local employees, together with

their contact details; and disseminate the info to the Thai citizens under the embassy’s care.

1.3 Prepare a listing of local agencies with their chief officers and coordinators (e.g. foreign affairs, security agencies, aid agencies, transport authorities, airports, etc) together with their contact details.

1.4 Prepare a listing of Thailand’s diplomatic corps, friendly contacts and international organizations, together with contact details.

1.5 Prepare a listing of Thailand-based emergency agencies and their coordinating officers, together with contact details.

1.6 Prepare a registry of the embassy’s property, categorizing the items according to their functions in an emergency.

1.7 Inspect the condition of embassy premises and its security features. Strengthen or improve where necessary.

2) Roles of Thai Embassy staff during an emergency (by official position)

2.1 The Ambassador — Policies and action plans; high-level intelligence; supervision of emergency operations.

2.2 Charge d’Affaires — Assisting the Ambassador in all of the emergency undertakings.

2.3 Embassy Officials — Duties are assigned by the ambassador for the officials as follows: Monitor the situation, gather news; coordinate with the ministry, local

offices and the diplomatic corps.



Maintain safety measures at the embassy. Prepare travel documents, and all correspondences on emergency

assistance to local agencies. Set aside budgets, vehicles and supplies in preparation for an evacuation. Liaise with local authorities to request protection of the embassy premises

when necessary. Other duties as assigned.

2.4 Local employees Assist in interfacing with local authorities and other units. Maintain safety of the premises and the ambassador’s residence. Heighten stringency in visitors screening. Inspect the condition of vehicles and communication device to ensure

their proper functioning. Other duties as assigned.

Pre-Incident: This is incorporated in the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan . 1. Maintenance of premises safety

Embassy staff is to inspect the entire compound to locate any shortcomings and, if found, to remedy them accordingly. Provide additional lighting, CCTVs, proper locking of the gates; more security watchmen. Immediately report to the local authorities upon seeing a threat is imminent. 2. Safe keeping of embassy property and documents.

Prepare an inventory of properties and documents; categorize them in terms of importance and confidentiality and the need for secure storage. List out those that need to be transported in the event of an evacuation. Notify the local authorities for protection of the same. Check the embassy’s vehicles for their proper working order and in sufficient numbers. 3. Maintenance of people’s safety

Name tags for embassy staff. Single entry and exit point. Embassy gates to be locked at all times. Security guards at entrance. Details of visitors to be logged. Visitors body

search if necessary.



During Incident: Responsible agencies

Emergency Action Plan for Thai Embassies 1. For situations where disturbances can be anticipated (e.g. civil unrests, impending

wars), the following procedures are to be followed:- 1.1 Monitor and appraise the situation with discretion, and report to MFA. Connect

with the embassy’s networks, including local authorities, international organizations and diplomatic establishments.

1.2 Advance notifications to Thai citizens under embassy’s care for them to arrange early preparations for an emergency.

1.3 Determine site of temporary refuge for them. 1.4 Set aside budgets, vehicles and supplies in preparation for an evacuation. 1.5 Liaise with local authorities to request help when necessary.

2. For situations where disturbances are difficult to predict (e.g. terrorist attacks, natural disasters), the following procedures are to be followed 2.1 Report the incident to MFA; liaise with local authorities where practicable. 2.2 Contact leaders of Thai communities to request help should evacuations

become necessary. 3 Evacuation Plan

3.1 Procedures Assess the situation and, if evacuation is deemed necessary, request help

from the MOT or DOF to repatriate the impacted people, or to transport them to a safe third country.

Notify local authorities about the temporary closure of the embassy. Store embassy property and documents at a safe place and request protection from such authorities.

Interface with local units, diplomatic community, international organizations in the event joint evacuation becomes necessary.

Determine the evacuation route and transport mode in collaboration with Thai community leaders.

3.2 For an evacuation by flying, the following steps are to be observed. Determine the suitable time; rehearse the plan; interface with local

authorities and airport, airlines; either book regular commercial or chartered flights; arrange transfer vehicles and guards.



3.3 For an evacuation by a land mode, the following steps are to be observed Determine the shortest and safest route; liaise with the third-party country

for assistance in transiting or temporary stays. Report to MFA to request help along the evacuation route.

Set aside budgets for the journey. Arrange transport to ensure sufficient numbers of vehicles as well as

grouping of vehicles in the case of multiple and sequential departures. Arrange for protection from local authorities (if possible). Stock up sufficient amount of essential supplies.

3.4 For an evacuation by water mode:- Determine the shortest and safest route; liaise with the third-party country

for assistance in transiting or temporary stays. Report to MFA to request help along the evacuation route.

Arrange for the safe transfer to the port. Source: Website of Royal Thai Embassy in Hanoi

3) MOT Action Plan upon request for assistance from MFA MFA may request the assistance to repatriate Thai citizens from the Ministry of Defense

or from MOT. Figure 6.13 below shows the steps involved in such a task.

Figure 6.13: Steps of evacuation/repatriation activity by MOT upon request from MFA

Minister of Transport

TSC Royal Thai Army

Minister of Defense

Marine Department

Embassy

The Transport Co.,Ltd. Thai Airways International

Public Co.,Ltd.

Minister of Foreign Affair

Department of Land Transport

Department of Civil Aviation

Royal Thai Navy Royal Thai Air force

Thai Maritime Navigation Co.,Ltd.



The minister of MOT shall issue directives to related transport agencies to supply vehicles and other resources for the purpose.

Three scenarios of evacuation from neighboring countries:-

1) Via land vehicles: TSC requests DLT to arrange vehicles for transporting Thai evacuees back to Thailand. DLT instructs the Transport Company to organize buses for the purpose.

2) Via water mode: TSC requests the Marine Department for assistance. The Marine Dept requests the Navy or private sector companies to supply boats for the purpose.

3) Via the air mode: TSC requests the Civil Aviation Dept for help. DCA arranges for aircraft from Thai International Airways to transport the evacuees back to Thailand.

Post-Incident:

1) MFA: Instructs Thai embassies to prepare evacuation plans for each respective country.

2) Royal Thai Embassy: Learn from the experience; expedite the recovery process; and upgrade the existing security plans.

3) MOT: Instructs agencies under care to ensure preparedness for similar evacuation tasks.

4) TSC: Rectifies any weaknesses in the existing evacuation procedures.



6.4.9 Scenario 9: Threats from Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID)

1) Recommend ways to preparedness for security agencies

On the basis of the National Strategic Plan for Prevention and Remedy of Emerging Infectious Diseases (2013 – 2016) under the care of the Disease Control Department of the Public Health Ministry, a rage of action plans have been formulated for joint operations with concerned agencies, in particular the MOT, in order to create a sustained readiness for the handling of EID at all times.

Given the fact that the characteristics of EIDs are constantly posing new challenges in the knowledge and preparedness for handling each epidemic case, the concerned agencies should therefore conduct regular personnel training to familiarize themselves with methods of prevention and response upon the outbreak of an EID. Furthermore, as a pathogen may evolve to new forms of spreading or contagion, such as recent developments in diseases like Avian influenza, Ebola and Corona viruses, SARS and MERS, all concerned agencies should therefore keep abreast with the latest information and accordingly update their response methodologies in order to maintain the efficacy of their work at all times.

For this task, the MOT has assigned OTP with the responsibility for compiling the action plans of 14 agencies under its supervision which comprise: DLT, Department of Airports, DOH, SRT, SRT-ET, BMTA, EXAT, MRTA, Thai International Airways, AOT, Aero Thai, The Transport Company, PAT and Civil Aviation Institute, all of which have a role in the development of emergency management and responses including the handling of EIDs.

2) Prevention & Preparedness Planning Vision: Thailand’s capability to international standards, for the prevention and

control of EIDs in all related areas including knowledge, personnel and crisis management.

Objectives:

• To reduce the impact arising from EIDs including contagions, deaths and related effects upon society, economy and the environment.

• To effect a sustained preparedness for the prevention and remedy of EIDs to international standards.



• To evolve a system for integrated crisis management and preparedness as a guiding model for use by all MOT-affiliated agencies in their response to EID threat as well as for the recovery from it in order to prevent disruptions to the country’s transport services.

Achievement Targets • A comprehensive collaborative scheme, covering the spheres of public

health, animal and wildlife health, and the ecosystem, for the surveillance, prevention, treatment and control of EIDs.

• An integrated knowledge base on EIDs and promotion of related research and development efforts.

• A comprehensive crisis management system with the preparedness for the effective tackling of EIDs.

• The Thai public to possess proper knowledge and understanding of EID preventive requirement and confidence in the authorities tackling of EIDs.

• Availability of contingency plans covering the issues of security and disaster management for the pre-incident phase (prevent, prepare, mitigation), during incident phase (response) and post-incident (recovery), plus emergency contacts charts.

Strategies Strategy 1: Evolve a system for surveillance, prevention, treatment and control

of EIDs along the international “One Health” concept. Encourage collaboration in monitoring, prevention, treatment and control

of EIDs based on the One-Health concept in order to enable the building of such capabilities for all concerned agencies. There are five approaches, as follows.

Approach 1: Strengthen the prevention capability against EIDs. Approach 2: Evolve an integrated system for the surveillance of EIDs among

people, domestic animals, wildlife and the ecosystem. Approach 3: Strengthen the capability of laboratory networks. Approach 4: Evolve a system for the diagnosis, provision of care and control

of EIDs. Approach 5: Strengthen the capability for disease investigation and control.



Strategy 2: Evolve a system for managing knowledge base and promoting R&D. This is to enable the management of a comprehensive knowledge base, as

well as enabling the sustained application of that knowledge especially for R&D activities on EIDs. There are three approaches as follows:

Approach 1: Systematic management of knowledge base. Approach 2: Comprehensive development of knowledge into policies and

practical application. Approach 3: Evolve a system for promoting R&D, engineering and design.

Strategy 3: Evolve a comprehensive management system and encourage the preparedness for tackling EID emergencies.

This is to enable a system of management, coordination and tackling of EIDs that meets the requirement of the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan (2010 – 2014). And to encourage the preparedness among the government agencies and the public for handling EIDs, complete with the necessary resources and supply logistics to enable the effective handling of any EID emergency including the successful reduction of contagion, deaths, and impacts on society, economy and the environment. There are four approaches, as described below:

Approach 1: Establish a comprehensive system for the management, prevention of and tackling the spread of EIDs.

Approach 2: Evolve an integrated system for interfacing the work of partner networks at home and abroad.

Approach 3: Engineer for the readiness to tackle EID emergencies. Approach 4: Evolve a system for supporting resources and supply logistics.

Strategy 4: Communications and publicity relating to risks associated with EIDs. This is to create mechanisms for coordination, dissemination and publicity

on the risks involved in order to enable the timely and effective control of EIDs at national and international levels. And to enable proper knowledge and understanding among concerned agencies and the public on methods of patient care and control of EIDs. There are five approaches.



Approach 1: Develop communications networks for disseminating news of risks and related publicity.

Approach 2: Prepare strategies for communicating EID risks and related publicity.

Approach 3: Develop personnel for communicating news of EID risks and publicity.

Approach 4: Expedite work on proactive publicity on preventing EID contagion and disease control.

Approach 5: Evolve efficient systems for communicating news and publicity.

3) Incident Response and Recovery Planning Duties and Emergency Response Functions of a security unit

The National Preparedness Plan for the prevention and remedy of EID (2013 – 2016) is deployed on the basis of the 2005 International Health Treaty, the Asia-Pacific EID Strategy, and the ASEAN Collaborative Framework. The said range of agreements are designed to encourage the collaboration of all stakeholders in the public-private sectors in all regions and localities including the preparation of a Business Continuity Plan for use in the tackling of EIDs as well as natural disasters.

An outbreak of EID may constitute a threat to national security. Hence, all concerned agencies shall have collaborative action plans for the surveillance, prevention, treatment and control of a possible pandemic. (Schematic of response actions is shown in Figure 6.14).

Pre-Incident: This is incorporated in the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan.

1) Office of the PM.: 1. Prepare an action plan for the dissemination of news and publicity in order to

impart proper knowledge and understanding of a threat to the public and government agencies.

2. Collaborate with related units in deploying policies, strategies or measures on EID responses in order to achieve the objective of the EID strategies.

3. Prepare the unit’s own Business Continuation Plan in preparation for a possible EID pandemic.



2) Ministry of Public Health: 1. Encourage the creation of preparedness and EID response drills, at national

and provincial levels. 2. Compile statistics for use in the decision to declare states of pandemic, areas

of contagion and severity of the spreading illness, when necessary. 3. Prepare inventories of available medical resources; collaborate with medical

and public health authorities. 4. Update database on medical facilities, personnel, equipment, as well as safe

locations for possible evacuations. 5. Prepare crucial resources such as medics, materials and equipment,

pharmaceutical supplies, laboratories and hospices. 6. Establish emergency medical service networks nationwide. 7. Prepare healthcare services, health facilities, disease prevention facilities.

Enable the readiness of the facilities upon the outbreak of an epidemic. 8. Set up a rigorous disease surveillance system equipped with rapid mobile

units for fast investigative and control actions. 9. Disseminate information to the public on disease prevention and control,

and preliminary health-care practices. 10.Set up an epidemic warning system using advanced communication

technologies and efficient linking with related agencies and collaborative networks.

11.Work with international organizations to enable preparedness and response to EIDs. Encourage personnel training for all units concerned to impart knowledge and understanding of the EID handling strategies.

12.Collaborate, coordinate and implement related policies, strategies and measures in conjunction with all concerned agencies in order to achieve program objectives.

13.Encourage the preparation of a Business Continuation Plan for the organization to ensure the preparedness for tackling EIDs nationwide.

3) Ministry of Agriculture & Cooperatives: 1. Encourage the farming of disease-free livestock. 2. Prevent and control livestock epidemics



3. Control and inspect the transport of livestock and carcasses. 4. Set up warning systems for livestock epidemics. 5. Establish animal culling procedures, disposal of carcasses, and standardized

livestock trading systems. 6. Develop personnel for knowledge transfer to livestock farmers,

entrepreneurs and farm hands. 7. Prepare crucial resources such as veterinarians, materials and equipment,

pharmaceutical supplies, and laboratories for use in the prevention and control of EIDs.

8. Set up livestock disease surveillance systems. 9. Set up ad hoc disease control taskforces for all areas across the country. 10. Collaborate, coordinate and implement related policies, strategies and

measures in conjunction with all concerned agencies in order to achieve program objectives

11. Encourage the preparation of a Business Continuation Plan for the organization to ensure the preparedness for tackling EIDs.

4) Ministry of Natural Resources & Environment: 1. Monitor, prevent and control epidemics among wildlife and the animal

population. 2. Develop natural resources and the ecosystem towards sustainability, free

from risk of infectious diseases. 3. Monitor, investigate and assess the impacts upon the ecosystem arising from

residual contaminants from EIDs. 4. Rehabilitate and restore balance to the ecosystem thus making it supportive

of life and people’s livelihood. 5. Collaborate, coordinate and implement related policies, strategies and

measures in conjunction with all concerned agencies in order to achieve program objectives.


5) Ministry of Interior: 1. Support and facilitate the creation of preparedness and training along the

contingency plans for tackling EIDs.



2. Liaise, direct and support provinces and local administrative bodies in the procurement of materials and tools, equipment for the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.

3. Direct, oversee and assist impacted people with the timely and adequate provision of essential commodities, and welfare packages.

4. Conduct evacuations and provide temporary shelters for impacted people. 5. Declare disaster zones; provide relief aid as per MOI rules and regulations

pertaining thereto. 6. Maintain peace and order, safety. Prevent or quell panics. 7. Provide relief for impacted people; interface for aid from charities and

private organizations. 8. Collaborate, coordinate and implement related policies, strategies and



6) Thai Red Cross Society: 1. Procure blood plasma, pharmaceuticals, equipment and essential goods for

distribution to alleviate the plight of impacted people. 2. Training for Red Cross members, volunteers and the general public to prime

them for the giving of first aid and basic healthcare to impacted people. 3. Collaborate, coordinate and implement related policies, strategies and



7) Ministry of Defense: 1. Direct, coordinate and supervise the work of MOD personnel in giving aid to

sufferers; in tackling situations, and reinstating damaged infrastructure to enable their fast and efficient relief operations.

2. Provide assistance to disaster-affected people as per the regulations of the Finance Ministry.



3. Establish publicity apparatus using the equipment of MOD or through the media in order to announce warnings or reports of the situation, as well as to offer advice and suggestions to the victims.

4. Support and facilitate the creation of preparedness and training along the contingency plans for tackling EIDs.

5. Provide medical assistance and other forms of help upon requests. 6. Collaborate, coordinate and implement related policies, strategies and



8) Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1. Liaise with international organizations to prepare for a likely emergency. 2. Publicity on the screening of travelers at strategic venues such as airports or

border checkpoints. 3. Encourage international collaboration in disease control, as well as the

protection of national interests. 4. Ensure correct understanding by the international community of the health

situation in Thailand. 5. Collaborate, coordinate and implement related policies, strategies and



9) Ministry of Transport: 1. Disseminate information on EIDs and methods of prevention and disease

control to people engaged in the provision of public transport services. 2. Implement measures to prevent transport areas and vehicles from spreading

contagion. Arrange areas for patient screening and temporary quarantine prior to transferring them for medical attention.



3. Install measures to ensure clean and hygienic public transport systems, thus preventing them from harboring or spreading diseases.

4. Disseminating information on EIDs to public transport users, plus tips on safe commuting on public transport systems.


6. Provide assistance in the form of vehicles and drivers for the transfer of patients.

7. Facilitate the travels of health officers on duty. 8. Participate and provide support for other agencies to enable the

implementation of policies, plans and measures, plus training exercises in order to achieve program objectives.

10) Private-sector entities, charitable organizations and the public: 1. Support and provide assistance to the working of government agencies. 2. Assist the efforts to monitor and control EIDs through collaboration in

disseminate news and information to the public; encourage public awareness and compliance to help control diseases.

During Incident: To prevent the spread of diseases, the public shall comply with official instructions

and assist in disease investigation; all concerned units are to collaborate and work towards preventing contagion. The following actions should be undertaken:- 1) The public should keep abreast with the situation, obtaining news information

and following the advice of specialists or authorities. Private businesses should carry out preliminary precautions and provide health tips for their workers.

2) Employ communications technology to set up alert systems, information and emergency advisory services. These should be effectively linked with the focal agencies and related work units.

3) Transfers or evacuation of patients or individuals suspected of having contracted illness.



Assess the situation; report to the ministry in charge. Upon confirmation of the need to evacuate, request for assistance from the Ministry of Interior or Defense.

Deploy detection tools and/or trained officers at venues likely for the transmission of diseases, such as airports, wharfs, border checkpoints, etc.

Establish medical records for patients or suspected patients under surveillance.

In the case of patient transfers from abroad... Determine the shortest and safest route; liaise with the third-party

country for assistance in transiting or temporary stays. Report to MFA to request help along the transfer route

Set aside budgets for the journey. Arrange transport to ensure sufficient numbers of vehicles as well as

grouping of vehicles in the case of multiple and sequential transfers. Arrange sufficient amount of essential supplies. Confine the patients or suspected patients until such time that safety

from contagion can be assured. 4) Support the work of disease-control officers. Arrange medical supplies and

equipment, plus a sufficient amount of daily essentials. 5) Monitor the development of the incident; assess the situation; liaise closely

with key operating agencies; dispatch regular reports to the officers in charge.

Post-Incident: In-depth investigation of the realized threat; speed up on recovery work; improve on existing plans; enhance security operations through addition of resources or new methods. 1) Learn from the incident; use the knowledge to improve surveillance and action

plans; work with all concerned agencies to upgrade existing plans, e.g. more stringent baggage checks, use of detection equipment; publicize findings to inform government agencies and the public on the nature of an EID incident

2) Provide relief aid to patients, help with medical expenses where appropriate. 3) Follow up on the health of the recovered patient in order to prevent relapses

or renewed spread of a disease.




Figure 6.14: Schematic of responses to an outbreak of Emerging Infectious Disease

Security Plan

Security Threats

Plan/Projects

All Sectors

Public Hazard

Emerging Infectious Diseases

Before Incident

During Incident

Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation

Transport Security Center (TSC)

Patients

Learning

Strict checking and import Tools-Equipment Follow the patients, continuously

Make research to solve this problem Improve Security Plan

Public surveillance Updating NEWS

Public health and medical authorities.

Recovery

Emergency management

After Incident

ขบ.

ทล.

ขสมก.

ทอท.

บกท.

ทย.

รฟฟท

กทพ.

รฟม.

บวท.

รฟท.

บขส.

สบพ.

กทท.

Other Sectors

MOT

Training / awareness / Public Relations about the

Emerging Infectious Diseases

Make a Plan for sectors/ Training/ Prevention/

Preparedness for Emerging Infectious Diseases

Field-location management/ Tools-Equipment

Coordinate/ Communicate/ give

Knowledge

MOT

Support the evacuation of patients

Confined in the area

Other relevant agencies

Relief

Checking passengers in-out

Public Relations / give Knowledge, News / Notifications Collection



6.4.10 Scenario 10: Hijacking Dangerous Goods/Hazmats Truck as weapon for attacks.

1) Recommend ways to preparedness for security agencies Prevention/Impact mitigation

• Operators of hazmats trucking service should install vehicle tracking devices (e.g. GPS or IVU (In-Vehicle Unit)) which allow the checking and/or control of vehicle speeds as well as locations.

• Set up truck inspection/control centers for 24/7 operation. There are systems whereby a truck is fitted with four peripheral cameras plus one aiming at the driver. In the event of unusual activities – such as running off pre-determined route, or frequent sudden braking, or excessive speeding – alerts will be sounded at the control center.

• Carefully plan carrying routes. A route should be planned to avoid busy population centers, water supply areas or locales at risk of terrorism.

• Work with DLT to register all such trucks. Regulations to ensure safety and security should be adhered to. Standardized management practices for safe operations should be encouraged.

• DLT should have the power to inspect a trucking company’s data relating to safety and security management. Such data may be digitally linked with DLT’s database.

• Heightened control measures should be installed at border areas. All customs checkpoints should be equipped with X-ray scanners.

• Provide knowledge, coordination and additional training for government officials on the issue. Work with the private service operators to build up their prevention capability. A preparedness plan for this issue should be drawn up and compliance of all concerned parties accordingly enforced.

2) Prevention and Preparedness Plan Vision: “Safety and security to international standards for the transport of

dangerous goods and hazmats” Objectives:

• To draw up an incident management and response plan, for use by officials or volunteers, covering the procedures for response and work coordination during an incident.



• To prepare a prevention/mitigation and readiness plan for the dangerous goods trucking business in order to establish a means for the remote control of the operating trucks.

• To set up a fast recovery plan for the aftermath of an attack on the trucking system in order to minimize the impact of such an attack on society, the economy and governmental supervision.

Targets:

• Prevention and containment of the threats on hazmats carrier trucks.

• Security preparedness plans covering tasks before (prevent, prepare, reduce impact), during (respond to incident), and after (recovery) including schematics for operation commands and clear work procedures.

Strategies Strategy 1: Implement flexible action plans based on risk management


Measure 1: Establish standards for risk assessment and mitigation procedures through collaboration with local stakeholders, setting out the threats involved and their outcome. Compile all the data and suggestions for use in streamlining the risk assessment procedures.

Measure 2: Joint review of security plans. Work with the units involved to recommend emergency practices, methods and training for use by individual parties. Such information shall be distributed for study by other agencies

Measure 3: Work with stakeholders to prepare a listing of security tasks. Develop a handbook for evaluating the effectiveness of security measures for the transport of high-risk cargo.

Measure 4: Prepare a handbook for self-evaluation on safety and security practices.



Strategy 2: Heighten the level of care in incident management and control, and the eventual issuance of rules/regulations to be enforced.

Measure 1: Encourage a heightened awareness of the need to enforce the law. Work with academia, government and local agencies to organize training seminars where the need for operators to abide by the law can be communicated. Invite trucking and bus operators to participate in such programs.

Measure 2: Increase the confidence level in driver’s ability to assess a threat and his skill at avoiding it. Driving license applicants are to be subjected to more stringent background checks.

Measure 3: Conduct training courses in the maintenance of safety. Strategy 3: Increase the level of knowledge and information sharing among

road transport agencies, especially among the carriers of such high-risk cargo. Promote the friendly working relationship among them with a view to improving all related security apparatuses on a regular basis

Measure 1: Initiate programs on the enhancement of capability for security keeping and emergency response. Conduct training for transport officers in the areas of risk assessment, crisis operations, evacuation planning, etc.

3) Incident Response & Recovery Planning Duties and Emergency Response Functions of a security unit

The hijacking of high-risk cargo truck for use as a weapon for attacks is regarded as a threat to national security. In the event of such an attack, all security units shall act together according to an Integrated Response Plan to combat and contain terrorism.

Pre-incident: This is incorporated in the prevention, mitigation and readiness plan.

1) Department of Land Transport (DLT): 1.1 DLT should have comprehensive data of all high-risk cargo trucking companies to

enable the checking of their security and safety records.



1.2 Disseminate info to the public with instructions on how to behave during an incident.

1.3 Establish networks of security collaboration between DLT and trucking operators. Install modern tracking devices to aid inspection and control of all trucking activities.

1.4 Conduct training and exercises on work plans, trucking routes, inspection & control, intelligence gathering and surveillance of suspicious activities.

1.5 In addition to providing knowledge on hazardous materials, training course may incorporate topics relating to the engineering of safer practices; certain engineering designs may help to improve the mechanisms for incident control. The use of such devices should be made mandatory in due course.

2) Operators of dangerous goods and hazmats trucking services: 2.1 Work with their counterparts in the industry and the DLT in order to create

networks of safety and security practices. 2.2 Conduct regular training exercises in order to standardize on good security

practices and to build up preparedness for the handling of a threat at pre-, during and post-incident stages.

2.3 The use of tracking devices, such as GPS tracking, or imposition of speed limit are encouraged for trucks carrying high-risk cargo (and even for passenger buses). Vehicle control centers with 24/7 operations should also be established.

3) Customs checkpoints: These facilities are equipped with personnel and detection devices for truck inspection.

4) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC is equipped with a range of response plans and networks for close coordination with security units of many organizations.

5) Office of Transport & Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP): The agency has prevention and impact mitigation plans for the tackling of a threat.

6) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): The organization has a wide network capable of communicating with all key agencies. It monitors transport-related incidents, and broadcasts alerts to all concerned units.

During Incident: Equipped with remote truck control systems, the Vehicle Control Center of a trucking operator shall dispatch alerts to DLT, Highway Police, Local Police, and other transport security units of MOT to request assistance. Where necessary,



requests for help shall be forwarded to the Interior and Defense and public Health Ministries. Depending on the severity of an incident, extra help shall be available in the forms of clearance or closure of access roads, evacuation of people in an affected area, firefighting units, emergency medical aid, etc.

1) Operators of dangerous goods and hazmats trucking services 1.1 The vehicle control center of a trucking operator, or truck driver, shall dispatch

alerts to DLT, Highway Police, Local Police, and other transport security units of MOT to request assistance.

1.2 The vehicle control center shall immediately activate on-board truck safety devices, such as the speed regulator.

2) Transport Security Center (TSC): TSC shall deploy the plans established earlier to guide their action and for response coordination with all security units under its supervision.

3) Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356): Disseminate news and information to related units (DLT, the Transport Company, Defense-Interior-Public Health Ministries, contracted hospitals and the police station nearest to the incident location).

4) Ministry of Interior: Sends in personnel to contain the incident and fire damage (coordination with local fire stations), and EOD specialists to check for un-detonated bombs.

5) Ministry of Defense: Depending on the severity of incident, the MOD supplies personnel to safeguard the area.


Post-incident: In-depth investigation of the incident; speed up rehabilitation. Amend existing plans where necessary. Find ways to improve upon the security precautions.

1) Department of Land Transport (DLT): 1.1 Reinstate the damaged infrastructure; reconstruction and refurbishing. 1.2 Employ the knowledge and experience gained from the incident to enhance the

monitoring and preparation plans, e.g. more stringent control of trucks, specialized training in the area of high-risk cargo; encouraging awareness of similar incidents among the agencies and the public, etc.



1.3 Provide humanitarian aid, relief or medical compensation for the impacted parties.

1.4 Establish collaboration networks with the trucking operators; issue revised rules and regulations; work closely with the trucking companies to enable the installation of necessary systems for security checking.

2) Operators of dangerous goods and hazmats trucking services: Work with their industry counterparts in order to standardize on safe operating practices; exchange info and experiences in security management; conduct regular joint exercises in security training.

3) Transport Security Center (TSC): Learn from the experience; employ the knowledge to enhance existing plans; review collaboration procedures with other units.

4) Ministry of Interior: Establish victims’ identities in cases where no paper IDs are available.

Schematic for the response actions is shown in Figure 6.15.




Figure 6.15: Schematic action plan for incident of high-risk cargo truck hijacking as weapon for attacks.

Security Plan

Security Threats

Plan/Projects

All Sectors

Public Hazard

Hijacking Dangerous Goods/Hazmats Truck as weapon for attacks

Before Incident Prevention and Mitigation

Preparedness

Have a practical guide

Planning the trips

Install the In-Vehicle Unit to the truck

Fire equipment tools

Control Center 24 hr.

Training Plan together

Link with intelligence agencies

Order

Transport Safety Center–MOT (1356) (1356)

Volunteer

Police

Highway Police

DLT

MOT

Witness/victims

Transport Security Center (TSC)

MOD

Other Sectors

MOI Ministry of Public Health

threats

Learning

relief

Networking interoperability Install the In-Vehicle Unit to all trucks

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Improve Security Plan

Networking interoperability between DLT and company

Internal officer

Other security sectors

Control the Vehicle

During Incident

After Incident

Recovery

Support staff, evacuate the passenger, clear routes/areas, firefighting first aid

Emergency management

http://eng.moph.go.th/



6.5 CONCLUSION Through an array of methods, including literature review, study of existing procedures,

SWOT Analysis and discussions with the authorities involved with security practices, the Consultant has compiled a comprehensive pool of information that helped to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses in the workings of such agencies. In addition, the security management approaches of the UK, USA and Australia are also looked at, and many of their inherent strengths are adopted for this study. The outcome of our efforts is a master plan covering practically all spheres of transport security operations.

The conceptual framework of this plan is compliant with the key provisions of the national-level strategies, namely the National Security Policy B.E. 2558-2564, National Preparedness Strategy B.E. 2557-2561, National Disaster Prevention & Mitigation Plan B.E. 2558, and the Resources Mobilization for Homeland Defense Plan. These master strategies call for the means to ensure the readiness for coping with a security threatening incident, and the means to reduce its impacts. In keeping with that aim, the resulting Transport Security Master Plan thus recommends a wide range of measures to be implemented for all relevant transport units — measures covering all phases of operations: before, during and after the occurrence of a security threatening incident.

To serve as pilot for the eventual implementation of security measures for the units under MOT, the Consultant hereby illustrates some of the future requirements through use of ten scenarios covering the land, rail, water and air transport modes, plus threats from natural disasters and cyber attacks, the facilitation of transporting impacted persons from an incident of strife, the handling of infectious epidemics, and a hazmats truck hijacking. Each of the scenarios contains suggestions for the effective handling of a threat, response and recovery procedures, together with schematics of the steps involved.

Final Report


Chapter 7: Participative & Training Sessions

Preface

Summary of the sessions

Conclusion

Final Report Chapter 7 Participative & Training Sessions


Chapter 7 : Participative & Training Sessions

7.1 Preface The scope of work for this project had stipulated the requirement for the Consultant to

present a clarification of the work; and to arrange for the discussion and collection of input from all concerned public and private organizations for review and inclusion in the final report. Accordingly, the Consultant has arranged two public hearing sessions; two focus group meetings and two training & technology transfer sessions. The sessions were attended by some 255 participants.

7.2 Summary of the sessions Details of the sessions including, venue and programs, names of participants, contents

of talks or discussion, comments from the floor, evaluation, hand-outs, and photographs of the events, are shown below:

Chapter 7 Participative & Training Sessions รายงานฉบับสมบูรณ ์

page 7 - 2 โครงการศึกษาจดัท าแผนหลักดา้นความมั่นคงในภาคการขนส่ง ระยะที่ 1

Table 7.1: Summary of the sessions

Participative Session Date & Venue Topics discussed Participants 1) First Focus Group

Meeting 14 May 2015, Royal Princess Hotel

Threats to transport sector, rationale for study, objectives, scope, methodology, expected outcome.

40

2) First Group Discussion/hearing

13 July 2015, Pullman King Power Hotel

Introduction of the study, related security laws, Transport security strategies of the UK, Australia, USA. The role of Cyber Security in transport

68

3) Second Focus Group Meeting

20 August 2015, The Sukosol Hotel

Awareness of past bombing incidents, Definitions of threat, Security consideration for the border checkpoints, SWOT Analysis, Draft security strategy for road and rail modes

41

4) Second Grp Discussion/hearing

1 October 2015, Pullman King Power Hotel

Transport Security Master Plan, Action Plans and Scenarios, findings from discussion groups with personnel of the four modes.

101

5) 1st Training & Tech Transfer session

5-6 October 2015, OTP office

Overview of national security, Threat awareness and fundamentals of counter-terrorism practices, Safety & security for road transport, bridges and tunnels, Assessment of risk to transport security, prevention and preparedness of infrastructure (before an incident), Brief overview of the project, rehabilitation, field training (at Hua Lamphong station, Queen Sirikit underground station, Moh Chit bus terminal).

57

6) 2nd Training & Tech Transfer session

12-13 October 2015, Novotel Hotel & PAT

ICAO Annex 17 measures for airport protection – security precautions of airports and airlines, study trips to Suvarnabumi Airport, Security situation of Thailand’s maritime sector, security strategy for ships and wharfs as per IMO requirement, Threats and scenarios of PAT, on-site training session at Khlong Toey Port.

99

Final Report


Final Report Chapter 7 Participative & Training Sessions


7.3 Conclusion

The Consultant has conducted the required sessions to clarify the nature and objective of the project, exchange ideas and compile suggestions from the participating audiences. The sessions had been designed to inform participants on the need to create Transport Security Awareness and overall understanding of the strategies for combating security threats, including the concept of “Prevent, Prepare, Response and Recovery. The requirement of proper emergency management was emphasized for all stages of an incident: before, during and after. Training topics were discussed and examples given including a table-top exercise. The spectrum of the participants included mid-level executives and chiefs of security units, mid-managers of supporting units and chiefs of public-service units.

Final Report


Chapter 8 Guideline for Implementation of Transport Security Plan

Introduction

Organization Structure

Conclusion

Final Report Chapter 8 Implementation of Transport Security Plan


Chapter 8 : Guidelines for Implementation of Transport Security Plan

8.1 Introduction Prior to 2004, Thailand had never experienced man-made threats to the country’s

transport systems. Such threats, which by now are being regarded with greater attention by the government, signify a new pattern of security issues. They include terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage, such as plane hijacking and bombing of transport installations. On this front, it is deemed that the security preparedness of related agencies under the MOT is presently inadequate; MOT has yet to effect timely response to these new security threats as exemplified by a number of recent incidents. Although the National Preparedness Plan 2557–2560 has been introduced, its implementation is lagging due to the absence of security challenges, or the so-called Black Swan event, such as the 9/11 attacks in the USA. However, the serious incident during June-July 2015 regarding the laxness of the national airport in weapon screening was enough to expose the shortcomings of Thailand’s prevention and preparedness in security matters. Thus, it is crucial now for the government to initiate and build an efficient security apparatus for the country as a proactive move to prevent recurrence of the Black Swan event.

The Consultant’s review of transport security organizations in developed countries, such as UK, the US and Australia, indicated variations in the administrative structure employed for each country.

With the UK model, a Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC) is set up specifically to handle the security side of transport. TRANSEC is organized under the International Networks and Environment Group (INE) which is a peripheral unit under the UK Department for Transport.

In Australia, the administration of transport security is divided into 2 areas; one for surface transport which includes the road, rail and inland waterborne modes, and the other for air and maritime modes. The administration of the first area is by individual states and territories of Australia and its missions are under the supervision of Transport Security Committee (TSC). TSC is supervised by a senior committee associated with transport infrastructure, operational rules, and security regulations. The second area (air

Chapter 8 Implementation of Transport Security Plan Final Report


and maritime transport) is under the federal government’s Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development. The responsibilities of these agencies are similar; they develop security plans for each transport mode and propose programs to other related agencies for implementation.

In the US, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for safeguarding the country from man-made threats having the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), as its agency to oversee the security of the transport sector. 8.1.1 Establishment of Thailand’s Security Agency

Based on the review of security operations in other countries, particularly those of the US and UK, the Consultant hereby proposes a conceptual structure for administering transport security for Thailand. The structure can take a form according to any of the three options described below:

Option 1: Establish a Ministry of Homeland Security This concept mirrors the workings of the US Department of Homeland Security. A

Ministry of Homeland Security shall be the government’s security arm having the authority to administer national-level security policies and plans as well as the flexibility to coordinate with other external agencies, domestically and abroad. For the US set up, Homeland Security oversees the work of 7 peripheral agencies as shown in Figure 8.1.



Figure 8.1: Structure of US Department of Homeland Security

- U.S. Customs & Border Protection oversees the border security of the nation. - U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services oversees the citizen and immigration services

of the country - U.S. Coast Guard oversees the security along coastline. - Federal Emergency Management Agency oversees the emergency response and

incident mitigation. - U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement oversees the security related to customs

and immigration services. - U.S. Secret Service oversees the personal protection - Transportation Security Administration oversees the security of transport systems One of the key features of Homeland Security is collaboration between its internal and

external agencies including Transport Security Administration (TSA), Coast Guard (USCG) and Department of Transportation (DOT) and related functions as shown in Figure 8.2. The three agencies collaborate with the Government and Sector Coordination Councils (GCCs). TSA plays the major role in security management, while DOT and USCG supplement it to help achieve the strategic goals.



Figure 8.2: Collaboration of transport security agencies in the U.S.

For Thailand, a structure with a Homeland Security governing body should enable a high degree of flexibility in administering and defining the role and duty of each related agency since the Ministry shall have an overall authority to do so. As such, security management can be centralized and the scope of each agency will be better defined. The proposed Ministry of Homeland Security shall have the ability to work directly with the government to expedite key decisions. This setup should also help to streamline work among the related agencies, minimizing overlap which is often the case with fragmented systems. Having a single security organization can help to minimize operational errors and inter-agency conflicts.

Nevertheless, the proposed setup may have its limitations particularly on the question of its limited resources (both staff and budget). As an overseer of all security operations, the proposed organization would require a substantial budget, not to mention a long setting up process. Another point to note is on the transfer of existing work and staff to the proposed ministry; this should be well defined and managed properly so as to avoid issues that might interfere with the operations of other agencies.

Option 2: An Office or Department of Transport Security Putting transport security functions within an Office or Department setup under the MOT

is similar to the security models of UK and Australia. There is no single specific ministerial body to look after security functions; the work is distributed among several related Ministries, and the parts orchestrated by a security arm under the Ministry of Transport.



The UK’s TRANSEC works to oversee the security of all transport modes and critical transport infrastructure. Systems under the agency’s protection include: road, rail (i.e., London subway, Docklands light rail, and Glasgow subway), British Channel Tunnel, and hazmats transport, plus many other industrial transport services, such as railway, aviation and shipping. TRANSEC also proposes security programs for implementation.

The key advantage of this option is: with the Office/Department structure, the outfit can be split into supplementary units, each being responsible in its area of specialization and manned by professionals and experts in that specific area. . In addition, with this structure, it is easier to establish than that of a full Ministry, given that the existing resources of an existing ministry can be reassigned to the Office/Department in such a way that it does not disrupt the workings of its parent ministry too much. .

Because this option decentralizes the security arrangement to individual sections, defining the power, roles and responsibilities of each section thus becomes crucial. If scopes are poorly defined, the coordination of work may be snagged, or duplication of work may result. A disadvantage of this option compared with the Ministry structure lies in its being less streamlined due to the need to coordinate among many different ministries which can cause delays in the response to a threat.

Option 3: A Transport Security Bureau, under OTP The proposed Transport Security Bureau would be set up under OTP and tasked with

preparing plans and guidelines for maintenance of security for transport systems and coordinating with external agencies. Given that its work is primarily in planning and coordinating, the size of the unit need not be large, and the associated setting up process should take less time than those for the other options. , .

Nevertheless, the efficiency of such a Bureau may be constrained by its size and inadequate resources. It may not be able to respond to all types of threat. The need to coordinate with a multitude of external agencies at all stages may hamper the successful completion of the aid process. Table 8.1 compares the advantages and disadvantages of three proposed structures.



8.1.2 Concerns and Feasibility In Thailand, there is as yet no security organization being established, particularly for

land transport (road and rail) sector. The Ministry of Interior currently has a Transport Safety Center which serves as a coordinating center for road-crash emergency aid operations. For the aviation and maritime sectors whose security concerns are global, The ICAO and IMO have a battery of international rules and regulations to regulate the industries, and Thai organizations are bound to adopt them. Therefore, to ensure the flexibility in managing transport security, it is necessary to establish a transport security body to oversee the transport industry as a whole and to upgrade the rules and regulations for consistency with those of the international regulating agencies.

The proposed security regulating body should be under the Ministry of Transport equivalent to that in Australia and U.K. It may take the form of a committee or bureau with a structure similar to the MI’s Transport Safety Center. The Bureau/Committee should not duplicate the work of other existing agencies, but help to enhance the integration of efforts and the efficient use of resources. The work of the Bureau/Committee should lead to the fruitful synergy of efforts, especially in the event of a security threat, either man-made or naturally occurring. 8.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages Advantages: Having an efficient transport security organization will help to upgrade Thailand’s transport systems to international standards. It will benefit users by ensuring security and service satisfaction. In addition, structuring it as a Bureau/Committee shall not duplicate the work, help save costs, and optimize use of resources. It capitalizes on existing workforce with more efficient assignment of responsibilities. It allows the recruitment of professionals to suit the specific requirement of work. Disadvantages: the Bureau/Committee structure may pose an obstacle to the continuity of, and the commitment to, work since a member’s tenure is limited to a short span. However, this problem may be remedied by specifying clear scopes of work beforehand.



Table 8.1: Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of structure options Option Advantage Disadvantage Option 1: The organization as a new Ministry of Homeland Security

- High flexibility in administration - Clear scope of responsibility - Efficient implementation and fast

response to security threats - Minimizing inter-agency conflicts

and overlapping work.

- High cost; must recruit more workers.

- Setting up procedure can be long and complicated.

- High impact on the structure of the existing agencies

Option 2: The organization as a new Department of Transport Security under MOT

- Involved with highly responsible agencies on security

- Low impact on the structure of the existing agencies

- Encouraging the integration of relevant agencies to maximize the efficiency of security management

- High cost; must recruit more employees.

- Setting up procedure can be long and complicated.

- Conflicting and duplication of work, if not properly assigned

- Work coordination may be complicated hampering fast response to threats

Option 3: The organization as a Bureau of Transport Security

- High flexibility - Low cost and minimal

recruitment. - Simple and fast setting up process

- Low capability for response to threats

- Inadequate manpower - Limited coordination due to its

being low-level organization

8.2 Organization Structure

8.2.1 Components The proposed Transport Security Committee shall comprise the following:

1. Minister of Transport Chair 2. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Transport 1st Vice Chair 3. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Interior 2nd Vice Chair 4. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Defense 3rd Vice Chair 5. Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 4th Vice Chair 6. Secretary–General of the Council of State Member 7. Secretary-General of National Security Council Member 8. National Police Commissioner Member



9. Secretary–General of Internal Security Operations Command Member 10. Director General of Dept of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Member 11. Director General of Customs Department Member 12. Director General of Department of Pollution Control Member 13. Director General of Department of Disease Control Member 14. Director General of Marine Department Member 15. Director General of Department of Land Transport Member 16. Director General of Department of Highways Member 17. Director General of Department of Rural Roads Member 18. Director General of Department of Airports Member 19. Governor of Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand Member 20. Governor of State Railway of Thailand Member 21. Director General of Port Authority of Thailand Member 22. Governor of Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand Member 23. Governor of Expressway Authority of Thailand Member 24. Director General of Bangkok Mass Transit Authority Member 25. President of Civil Aviation Institute Member 26. President of Thai Airways International Public Company Limited Member 27. President of The Transport Company Limited Member 28. President of Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited Member 29. President of Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd. Member 30. Chief Executive Officer of SRT Electric Train Company Limited Member 31. Director General of Office of Transport and Traffic Policy

and Planning Member & Secretary

8.2.2 Missions The missions of the Transport Security Committee are as follows.

1. Designate the policy of transport security in compliance with national security plan 2. Review a transport security plan before submitting it for Minister’s approval. 3. Approval of strategies and plans relating to transport security 4. Issue notifications or directives or guidelines to enforce compliance. 5. Suggestions and recommendations to the Minister on security matters 6. Other work as assigned by the Minister



Transport security subcommittees consist of 1. Road Transport Security Subcommittee 2. Rail Transport Security Subcommittee 3. Maritime Transport Security Subcommittee 4. Air Transport Security Subcommittee

the Transport Security Committee has the following duties and responsibilities 1. Develop policy strategies plans and guideline on transport security. 2. Mobilize plans and budgets for prevention, preparedness, response to threats. 3. Administer, oversee, assess and coordinate the operation and management of

other government offices and related agencies for consistency with security policy. 4. Develop database and analyze the risk associated with all forms of threat. 5. Encourage research on transport security and educating the personnel on same. 6. Publicize and share the knowledge about transport security. 7. Promote staff morale; give accolade to outstanding workers. 8. Annual Report of operations to the Transport Security Committee 9. Recommendations to the Transport Security Committee on matters concerning

regulations and guidelines. 10. Invite representatives from relevant government offices to share facts and

opinions and request documents for review. 11. Other duties as may be assigned by the Committee.

Developing Preparedness for Transport Security: Actions necessary to ensure preparedness of each agency are listed below: 1. Office of the MOT Permanent Secretary

(1) Follow the plans and guidance for managing transport security given by Transport Security Committee

(2) Assign duties relating to assistance and support to the focal agency for transport security.

(3) Mobilize budget and programs to ensure the efficient performance of missions (4) Develop the database on resources, and ensure the linking of data between

concerned agencies.

2. Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) (1) OTP is to serve as the secretariat of the Transport Security Committee; to

oversee the carrying out of the action plans at the ministerial level.



(2) Network the communications systems of MOT such that it can be used as an alternate system in the event of an emergency.

(3) Evaluate the deployment of action plans; review and improve upon action plans.

(4) Develop manuals for coordinating the implementation of ministerial action plans by agencies under MOT.

3. Other agencies under MOT shall have the following responsibilities: (1) Develop security action plans to cover all types of disaster and over all

areas. Set out approaches and methodology for operations right from the preparation stage, to the occurrence stage and recovery in the aftermath.

(2) Database of available workforce, machinery and maintenance, equipment, telecom devices for normal use and those for emergency use.

(3) Provide support – vehicles and drivers, maintenance equipment, transport units, rescue and relief aid, fuel – and coordinate with private sectors for special assistance

(4) Provide assistance and support to rescue operations; prepare alternate routes and repair or modify road facilities for the alternate routes to enable their functioning.

(5) Establish chain of command, approval procedures for aid operations and collaboration between the central units and those on site.

(6) Develop operational manual for coordinating emergency aid missions. Conduct regular drills of the operational plans.

Source: Integrated Action Plans for Disasters Prevention and Mitigation, MOT Coordinating agencies under MOT during emergency operations

Guidelines are given for the coordination of MOT agencies during an emergency. The agencies are divided into three groups, as listed below: 1. Administrative segment; consisting of

(1) Office of the Minister — is responsible for coordinating the assistance and support from other ministries for the handling an incident.

(2) Office of the MOT Permanent Secretary — is responsible for developing the databases of resources, transport networks, alternate routes; and serving as



a call center for all MOT agencies, as well as the impacted public, during an emergency.

2. Supporting Segment; consisting of: (1) the OTP — responsible for initiating transport security plans.

3. Operations Segment; having 4 units as per transport modes. Road Transport consists of (1) Department of Land Transport — responsible for developing the database

of freight distribution location, passenger station locations, emergency equipment, telecom devices, public buses, and commercial trucks available within each area; and coordinating with private sectors in order to request support vehicles, drivers, transport units and fuel to transport people and goods during an emergency.

(2) Department of Highways — for maintaining road networks and preparing evacuation routes or alternate roads; for reinstating damaged roads.

(3) Department of Rural Roads — for tasks similar to those of DOH. (4) Expressway Authority of Thailand — for supporting traffic operations along

their expressway corridors. (5) The Transport Company and Bangkok Mass Transit Authority — for

supporting vehicles, drivers, transport facilities as well as fuel for people evacuation.

Rail Transport consists of (1) The State Railway in Thailand — responsible for supporting trains, drivers,

rail transport facilities for evacuating people and goods from an affected area.

(2) Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand — supporting trains, drivers, for evacuating people within the Greater Bangkok Region.

Water transport consists of (1) Marine Department — responsible for developing database of ports, ships,

marine transport facilities, telecom devices available within each area, and coordinating with private sectors for additional manpower, boats and other facilities.

(2) Port Authority of Thailand — responsible for providing facilities for transferring people and cargos as well as fuel stockpiles at their ports for use during an emergency.



Air Transport consists of… (1) Department of Civil Aviation — is responsible for developing database of

airports, aircraft, aviation and telecom equipment within each region; and coordinating with private sectors in order to request additional manpower, transport facilities and fuel.

(2) Civil Aviation Training Center — for developing database of trained personnel for recruiting additional pilots for emergency operations.

(3) Airports Authority of Thailand — for providing airport spaces, aircraft, personnel, facilities, and fuel for transporting passengers and cargos from/to airports.

(4) Thai Airways International Plc their subsidiaries — are responsible for supporting aircraft, crews, facilities, and fuel for transferring people and cargo.

(5) Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd, — for supporting air traffic control.

8.2.3 Collaboration from domestic security agencies With the involvement of the chiefs of key security units, who are assigned duties as members of the proposed Transport Security Committee, collaboration among the units should not be an issue. Each Committee member is required to implement their respective preparedness measures; therefore upon an emergency request, support operations can be mounted immediately. Each organization is required to operate under the National Preparedness Strategic Plan 2557–2560 and Natural Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Plan 2558.

8.3 Conclusion At present, severity of threats have intensified across the country. They significantly cause social and economic impacts and losses. The establishment of national transport security organization to oversee the transport security management is one of the efficient stages to react against security threats. Specifically the comprehensive management of the threats attacking the transport sectors is very essential because transport sectors play an important role in the social and economic development of the nation. Therefore the efforts to establish the organization responsible for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery against transport security threats is the most effective implementation plan to upgrade the capability of national transport security management. The study reviews and analyzes the



structure of the security administration and management organization around the World including the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. The study then recommends the most suitable structure of the transport security organization in Thailand. The structure of national transport security organization is proposed in three options.

1. As the Ministry of Homeland Security – The idea conforms to the establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the major organization overseeing the national security. It puts forward the security plans and oversees all security agencies to launch the security strategic plans and collaborate with external agencies.

2. As the Office or Department of Transport Security under the Ministry of Transport – The idea conforms to the establishment of TRANSEC in UK and Transport Security Committee in Australia without having a special department. The organization assigns the responsibilities to different security sectors. This organization is the Office or Department under the Ministry of Transport to oversee transport security.

3. As the Transport Security Center – The idea underlines the feasibility of implementation. The proposed organization is low-level under the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning. It is responsible for developing plans and guideline for security operation and management as well as being a mean to coordinate among other relevant agencies.

After comparing and analyzing the pros and cons of each organization option, the most suitable option is to be as the Office of Transport Security under the Ministry of Transport, which is similar to that in Australia and the U.K. However, the organization is proposed to be as the Board of Committee which consists of the Head/Director of various security organizations of the country and other agencies who are dealing with security administration. The Committee Chairman will be the Minister of the Ministry of Transport, while the Secretary is the Director of the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning. The nominated committee is responsible for designating transport security policies which conform to national prevention plans; defining guidelines for operation; sharing ideas and recommending to the Minister. Moreover, it should develop the transport security strategic plans for all transport sectors through sub-committees for each mode of transport, such as subcommittee for roads, for rails, maritime and civil aviation. The launch of transport security organization will improve the performance of both national and international transport systems. In particular, the Transport Security Committee (TSC) will avoid the duplication of roles and responsibilities among agencies, minimize the



costs and resources because it utilizes the available resources of each agency and maximize the utilization. This is indeed the integrated transport security services. It is easy to coordinate with other agencies to react to threats since the Heads/Directors of all relevant agencies are the members of this committee and they are willing to support, if needed. Nevertheless, Transport Security Committee (TSC) may have a limitation on the continuation of work because most of the committee members will administer the department within a specific term. It is essential to specify the scope of work clearly so that each committee can administer and manage constantly and efficiently.

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