testing the radiological operations support 14... · predicted hot zone for 21 jul 2014 23:38 utc...

Bill Irwin, Sc.D., CHP

Vermont Department of Health

Testing the Radiological

Operations Support Specialist (ROSS)

Role

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In today’s world, our greatest fear, & where the greatest need for radiological emergency preparedness exists, is the improvised nuclear device (IND).

Unfortunately, it is also a situation where we do not have enough skilled people & adequately resourced agencies. Those we do have are widely distributed across the nation.

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We have great planning guidance.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CAcQjRw&url=https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/20431187/exxonmobil-response-guidance-for-first-response-to-maritime-&ei=NDA8VeWIGeySsQTOz4CYBA&bvm=bv.91665533,d.cWc&psig=AFQjCNFJCDmWiEemEtyzzvraQTcioKRgPA&ust=1430094207005790

http://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=images&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CAcQjRw&url=http://mylocalhealthguide.com/2011/04/07/u-s-health-system-unprepared-for-major-nuclear-emergency/&ei=kTE8Ven1FrDPsQSn34DwAw&bvm=bv.91665533,d.cWc&psig=AFQjCNHzAizMFlLtEfdHXBNry8JMFCjWQQ&ust=1430094556196406

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We have exceptional information to study beforehand & consult when the time comes.

US DHHS Radiation Emergency Medical Management. http://www.remm.nlm.gov/index.html

Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute. http://www.usuhs.mil/afrri/outreach/guidance.htm#MedManageHandbook

http://www.remm.nlm.gov/index.html

http://www.usuhs.mil/afrri/outreach/guidance.htm#MedManageHandbook

http://www.usuhs.mil/afrri/outreach/guidance.htm#MedManageHandbook

National Council for Radiation Protection & Measurements. Medical Quick Reference. http://www.usuhs.mil/afrri/outreach/pdf/ncrp65section2_may2005_1.pdf

CDC Radiation Emergencies Information for Clinicians. http://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/clinicians.asp

http://www.usuhs.mil/afrri/outreach/pdf/ncrp65section2_may2005_1.pdf

http://www.usuhs.mil/afrri/outreach/pdf/ncrp65section2_may2005_1.pdf

http://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/clinicians.asp

http://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/clinicians.asp

We have great communications guidance specific to an IND.

The message: Get inside. Stay inside. Await further instruction.

We have tested emergency response & recovery infrastructure.

We know what to be prepared for.

What is a Radiological Operations Support Specialist or ROSS? A health physicist with detailed

knowledge of the health & physical effects of radiological & nuclear emergencies with extensive experience in exercises resulting in thorough knowledge of the resources available for response & recovery.

The ROSS is not a federal agent.

Having detailed knowledge about how state & local emergency responders work is critical to being able to integrate early & effectively into the incident command structure at an Emergency Operations Center or Incident Command Post.

Though this presentation is focused on the IND, the ROSS concept is being tested for other rad/nuc scenarios. 8

Yield

(kT)

Range

for 50%

Mortality

from Air

Blast (m)

Range for

50%

Mortality

form

Thermal

Burns (m)

Range for

4 Gy

Initial

Nuclear

Radiation

Range for 4

Gy Fallout

in First ½

Hour after

Blast (m)

0.01 60 60 250 1270

0.1 130 200 460 2750

1 275 610 790 5500

10 590 1800 1200 9600

The yield helps determine the distance for impacts from the blast (From NCRP 138, 2001).

An improvised nuclear device is of a much different magnitude when compared to a strategic nuclear weapon.

The human & physical effects of the device.

Student Guide Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Modeling & Response Planning: National Capital Region, Prepared for DHS FEMA by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2011

Immediate Blast & Thermal Effects

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The geographical extent is a function of yield.

From draft of revised Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, 2015.

Water sources & supply methods Food sources, suppliers & distributors Transportation routes – car, rail, air, boat Emergency response assets – fire, EMS, law enforcement Electricity Communications Government Employers Schools Medical Providers Extreme amounts of non-radiological hazardous materials, too.


Valuable time must not be wasted on decontamination.

The bigger issue is the dose contribution from groundshine.

Get inside! Stay inside! Await further instruction.


Fallout, generated by the simultaneous neutron activation & explosion of site materials, rises more than a mile into the atmosphere. Much is visible. Little is deeply respirable.

Too many response models are designed around decontamination-oriented community reception centers. Instead, people should be instructed to brush the material off.

This is very different than the paradigm for nuclear power plant accidents or radiological dispersal devices

Oak Ridge Institute for Science & Education Radiation Emergency Assistance/Training Site. http://orise.orau.gov/reacts/ Radiation Injury Treatment Network.

http://www.ritn.net/

Where to get medical help for the acutely exposed.

Guidance for health care providers

A network of ARS specialists & facilities

http://orise.orau.gov/reacts/

http://www.ritn.net/

This was the first test of the ROSS in a full-scale exercise.

I played the ROSS with two evaluators following me around.

The first two days of the exercise, I played at the incident command post at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center.

Days three & four, I played at the SEOC in Indianapolis.

Day five was devoted to after action review.

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I tried to provide the incident command with a picture of what they were facing, asking them to remember images of Hiroshima & Nagasaki, but placing the epicenter near the Indianapolis Motor Speedway.

The team was experienced with tornadoes & flooding. They had little idea as to what to do with a nuclear detonation, mass fatalities & scarce resources.

They focused on the things that made them comfortable – writing an IAP.

They got distracted – they started debating ICS.

With elements of the FRMAC on site too, they did not know what to do with all “the scientists.”

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Emergency responders were sent into severe damage & dangerous fallout zones with lethal dose rates with only limited accountability & no dosimetry or meters.

Command staff were essentially paralyzed after learning what the blast & radiological effects were.

The incident command post was too close:

The wind shifted & the primary ICP had to be moved hastily;

Unlike natural disasters, ICPs for an IND must be further from the damage zones.

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The most important resources were scarce, & the conditions for medical care were far from normal;

Self-decon, not mass decon, was needed;

Guidance for health care providers on triage, treatment & transport of hundreds of thousands of people;

Fatality management for more than 100,000 people;

More than 100,000 people to be registered for follow-up;

A seemingly infinite geographical spread of evacuees;

Immense supply needs, including from the Strategic National Stockpile;

Adaptation of Community Reception Centers to acute radiation syndrome assessment centers;

Widespread mental health problems for both responders & the public. 23

Over the course of two days, my role grew from one only able to help write a safety plan for the IAP to one where I could work as an integral part of the ICS.

A key project with their Operations & Planning Chiefs & their GIS people was identifying specific locations for access control points along the perimeter of the severe damage & dangerous fallout zones & creating an RTR medical care plan.

The forward most RTR sites also became access control points for managing work within the hot zone.

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RTR1 sites near the epicenter with residual radiation & victims with blast injuries & other major traumatic injuries including radiation exposure.

RTR2 sites are near the plume of fallout with varying amounts of residual radiation present & most victims are ambulatory.

RTR3 sites are collection & transport sites with little or no radiation present & victims with varying injuries & radiation exposures.

Medical Care (MC) sites are predetermined sites of definitive care.

Assembly Centers (AC) are predetermined or spontaneous sites where displaced & evacuating persons go. No medical care is available.

The RTR Model: Radiation Triage, Treatment & Transportation.

This was developed to aid with worker exposure control.

The sites were used for evacuees leaving the impact zones & as worker control points for those entering to save lives & repair critical infrastructure. In addition, a worker exposure control plan had to be created, along with methods to track worker doses using the Health Department epidemiologists.

Specific road intersections were identified for radiation triage, treatment & transportation (RTR) sites by incident command post GIS specialists using these dose contours as overlays.

After meeting most of the key players, I sat in on a couple of Policy Group meetings.

Good things had already transpired by Day Three: The DOE & Advisory Team were

on duty & providing great guidance & data products;

There were experienced state people who had been brought in to augment the generally inexperienced, relative to rad/nuc, incident management team.

My Play of the ROSS at

the SEOC.

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Some bad things had also already transpired by Day Three: Well intentioned people were

handling the situation like a nuclear power plant radiological release;

The mayor discontinued shelter-in-place orders before allowing for registration of the exposed.

Evacuees were being decontaminated without registration, & the injured, many who might be expectant, were creating a medical surge.

I saw work I could help with: Tens of thousands of people

received acute doses & needed immediate medical attention. Most of them did not know this;

It was critical to manage emergency worker dose.

The Command & General Staff were working well, but

needed more focus on the immense health risks. As a state person myself, I knew

with whom & how to connect.

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Predicted Damage Response Zones Immediate structural damage caused by blast

(with overlay of Dangerous Fallout Zone area added for reference)

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE Vibrant Response 2014: Exercise

(39.78040,-86.22550) Nuclear Detonation at 21 Jul 2014 11:38 UTC

Severe Damage Zone (SD) - Limit response activities until

Moderate Damage Zone response has progressed

significantly. Expect dangerous levels of radiation. Total

Population: 3740 Area: 3.2 km2 Extent: 1.0 km

Greatest potential for life-saving. Triage and dose

minimization required. Debris-blocked streets. Total

Population: 12,500 Area: 10.7 km2 Extent: 1.8 km

Light Damage Zone (LD) - Some injuries, most minor. Streets

generally passable. Total Population: 84,400 Area: 55.7 km2

Extent: 4.2 km

Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) - Dangerous radiation levels

exceeding 10 R/h at 21 Jul 2014 23:38 UTC.

Notes: Actual effects are not uniformly radial as shown. Irregular areas of intensification or attenuation will occur due to channeling, reflection or shielding of the blast. Accessibility to inner zones will become increasingly difficult due to blocking debris, fires, and increasing radiation levels. Beware of dangerous fallout radiation, which may extend well beyond these zones (see Dangerous Fallout Zone product for complete representation).

Assumptions: Assumes 10 kt detonation at 0 ft elevation. Areas shown are model predictions based on an estimated source term but no measurements. Radioactive cloud has passed area displayed, radiation from fallout remains a serious hazard.

Briefing Product for Public Officials

Current: 21 Jul 2014 12:38 UTC

Check for updates EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE

Technical Details: CMHT 702-794-1665

Advice & Recommendations: A-Team 866-300-4374

page 1 of 8 ProductionT.rcE22971.rcC1

Predicted Hot Zone for 21 Jul 2014 23:38 UTC Use for worker protection and to prioritize shelter/evacuation

Presented in 6 time steps



Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) - Dangerous radiation

levels exceeding 10 R/h. Refer to Predicted

Dangerous Fallout Zone product for details. Total

Population: 20,200 Area: 18.8 km2 Extent: 10.7 km

Hot Zone (10 mR/h to 10 R/h) - Monitor worker dose

carefully and limit worker stay times in this area.

Stage response assets outside of the Hot Zone.

Total Population: 580,000 Area: 7,216 km2 Extent:

246 km

Notes: Immediate adequate shelter, possibly followed by evacuation, is strongly preferred, particularly in the first hours. Plan evacuation routes away from the DF/Hot Zones to minimize dose during transit. Shortest route may not guarantee minimal dose. Size of Hot Zone grows for 1-3 days then shrinks with time. Fallout and radiation extend well beyond the Hot Zone, particularly downwind, but at a reduced level of concern. Assure health physics professionals supervise emergency workers in the Hot Zone, workers must not exceed dose limits.

Assumptions: Assumes 10 kt detonation at 0 ft elevation. Areas shown are model predictions based on an estimated source term; confirm with measurements. Model assumes that no shelter or other protective actions have been taken to decrease exposure.







Predicted Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) for 21 Jul 2014 23:38 UTC Dangerous fallout zone posing immediate threat to survivors and responders

Presented in 6 time steps



Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) - Dangerous radiation

levels exceeding 10 R/h. The best initial action is to

seek adequate shelter. Delay responder entry

(several hours) unless undertaking a carefully

planned mission with sufficient benefit to justify

the anticipated radiation dose. Total Population:

20,200 Area: 18.8 km2 Extent: 10.7 km

Notes: Communicating protective actions to the public is critical. Generally, advise public to seek and remain in adequate shelter to avoid exposure to fallout until instructed to evacuate. Evacuation through heavy fallout may increase dose and decrease survivability. The highest hazard from fallout occurs in the first hours but rapidly declines as the fallout decays. The radiation levels in the zone and the size of the zone rapidly decrease over time. Dangerous Fallout Zone is entirely embedded in Hot Zone (not shown here, see separate figures Predicted Hot Zone ).








Predicted Area for Potential Fallout Casualties at 29 Jul 2014 11:38 UTC Total external dose from radioactive fallout during first 192 hr of exposure

leading to near-term (days to weeks) illness or death



Fallout lethal to most without adequate shelter

(exceeds 450 rad). Best action is early shelter

followed by informed evacuation to control

exposure. Total Exposed Population: 29,300 Area:

25.1 km2 Extent: 12.2 km

Dangerous fallout levels can cause death, injury or

illness (exceeds 100 rad). Zone of greatest

opportunity for life saving and injury reduction.

Dose management for first responders essential.

Total Exposed Population: 119,000 Area: 103 km2

Extent: 28.0 km

Notes: The best initial action is to seek adequate shelter immediately. Sheltering with delayed evacuation is preferred, unless evacuation can be completed before fallout arrival. Highest radiation hazard during first hours, then rapidly declines. Expect few deaths or serious injuries due to radiation outside the maximum extent of these regions. Area size will increase rapidly the first few days, then vary slowly, as they show total dose accumulated since detonation.








This data product was used by the US Department of Health & Human Services DMORT Team to assist decision makers on a fatality management plan.

This data product was developed to get those with acute radiation doses to health care providers.

Because evacuees were not registered as they left the impact areas, the public was instructed to assess their own dose on the basis of this plot. Physicians were provided survey tools to assess dose from symptoms as well as location, & guidance as to where to send patients for appropriate medical care.

As Day 4 unfolded, people started looking at actual field measurements, toward managing the ingestion pathway, at livestock management & protective action guidelines for chronic human doses.

Preparing them for the devastation.

Providing facts for press releases.

Preparing the state for the onslaught of federal agencies that will come to help which might be equally challenging for them.

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HOOSIER RESPONSE AREA OF OPERATIONS

Fort Wayne

Indianapolis

Terre Haute

Gary

Evansville

Nobelsville

Bloomington

Jasper

New Albany

Michigan City South Bend

Columbus

Muncie

Kokomo

Shelbyville

Marion

Lafayette

Lawrence

1 3 2

5 6

7

8 9 10

4

AO NORTH

AO HOOSIER

AO SOUTH

I I

113

X

181 IW

X

122 FW

I I

76 STB

I I

1-150

I I

1-151 I I

1-152

I I

2-151

I I

113

I I

638

81 TC

38 CAB

76 IBCT

219 BfSB

ANG

LEGEND

I I

113

X

181

X

81

I I

1-163

X

76

XX

38

X

122

IW

FW

I I

76 STB

I I

1-150

I I

519

I I

1-151

X

219

I I

1-152

I I

638

I I

190

I I

2-151

I I

1-293

I I

193 MP

I I

2-152

I I

113

X

38

X

38 I I

2-238 I I

1-137

I I

38 STB

NGRF 1-163FA

218

1-151 IN

437

2-150 FA

219

1-152 CAV

344

938 MP

21

TF SECFOR

(219th BfSB)

2592

2-152 CAV

162

384 MP

62

1-293 IN

546

387 MP

99

381 MP

55

2-151

375

TF Sustain

(38th Sust. BDE)

878

519 CSSB

318

438 SIG

34

Greenfield

Plymouth

190th TRANS BN

426

HHC 38 SUST

100

113 BSB

0

113 EN

0

215 ASMC

51

738 ASMC

49

TF RESPONSE

(HQ 113th EN)

100

122 FW

39

181 IW

39

2-238 GASB

259

1-137 AVN

157

1-376 AVN

22

JFHQ-IN

20

JTF 81

46

TF CBRN

HRF (OH)

66

52nd CST (OH)

~22

CERFP (OH) 53rd CST (IN)

22 CERFP (WI)

~22

54th CST (WI)

~22

19th CERFP (IN)

35th CST (WV)

22 CASE (OH)

UNK 41st CST (KY)

22

TF SECFOR

(219th BfSB)

1-151 IN 1-152CAV

1-163FA

2-150 FA 384 MP

387 MP 2-152 CAV

381 MP 938 MP

INGRF

2-151

384 MP

1-293 IN

TF Sustain

(38th Sust. BDE)

519 CSSB

113 BSB

438 SIG

HHC 38 SUST

190th TRANS BN

TF RESPONSE

(HQ 113th EN)

113 EN

215 ASMC

738 ASMC

TF Aviation

JAOC

516

Det 1 B STB (UAS)

0

CAIN

TF Aviation

JAOC

1-137 AVN

2-238 GASB

3-238 GASB

1-376 AVN

122 FW

181 IW

Det 1 B STB (UAS)

Legend UNIT

No. Personnel

Indiana NG

Out of State

As of 221729JUL2014

NGRF MP

Notional

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High level skills & knowledge In radiological & nuclear sciences;

Special knowledge in medical &/or environmental sciences.

Thorough knowledge of the roles, responsibilities & capabilities of federal resources.

A level-headed & confident emergency responder.

Good written & verbal communications skills with different types of people, including decision makers, field teams & the public.

Can integrate within the incident command structure at high levels.

Able to generate “actionable” guidance that is easily incorporated into the response and recovery activities of the ICS.

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I need not say more

42 [email protected]

Thank you!

mailto:[email protected]

testing the radiological operations support 14... · predicted hot zone for 21 jul 2014 23:38 utc...

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