Techniques of Clandestine Arms Deliveries

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Interdiction Principles

Detect close to the Point of Departure Disruption of network operating capability Use clandestine shipment profiling mechanisms Document cross-examination and extraction

National coordination / multi-layered approach Targeted sanctions against known actors International cooperation, support and

information sharing

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Detection of deliveries as close to the Point of Departure (POD) as

possible

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Disruption of network operating capability

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Deployment of clandestine shipment profiling mechanisms

for use by arms export, transport and traffic control, customs and

law enforcement agencies.

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Apply document cross-examination and extraction

(DOCEX) techniques

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National coordination and multi-layered approach

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Targeted national and international sanctions against

known actors

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International cooperation, support and information sharing

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Arms Transfers Profiling and Indicators System (ATPIS)

A proposed system that could assist the process of arms transfer analysis.

Produces a ‘Risk Rating’ based on past evidence of known illegal shipment routes, techniques and trends, which are updated on a regular basis.

CD based / limited distribution.

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Market Dynamics

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Market Dynamics

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Market Dynamics

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Market Dynamics

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Profiling and Profile Indicators

Air movement

Maritime movement

Land movement

End users

Brokers/Freightforwarders

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Profile Indicators

TYPE PROFILE INDICATOR

Aircraft type

Country of registration

Routes and flight planning

National Registries and ‘Flags of Convenience'

Shipping Route

Vessel Type and Size

Shipping Company Size

Land Mixed shipments of weapons with, for example, drugs

Final Destination

Inventory Discrepancies

Registered Location

De facto Operations Centre

Operating History

Air

Maritime

End User

Broker/ Freight Forwarder

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Air Transportation Profile Indicators

Aircraft type:

AIRCRAFT TYPE PAYLOAD RANGE RISK RATING

Ilyushin (IL) 76 M, MD, T, TD 50.0 Tonnes 4,000 km HIGH

Antonov (An) 12 20.0 Tonnes 4,000 km HIGH

Antonov (An) 24 7.8 Tonnes 550 km HIGH

Antonov (An) 28 1.0 Tonnes 1,365 km HIGH

Boeing (B) 707 Freighter 35.0 Tonnes 7,800 km HIGH

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Air Transportation Profile Indicators

Country of aircraft registration:

CAA REGISTRY CODE AIRCRAFT TYPECURRENT RISK

RATINGBulgaria LZ IL76 LOWDemocratic Republic of Congo TN All types HIGHEquatorial Guinea 3C All types HIGHKazakhstan UN IL76, An24 MEDIUMKyrgyzstan EX IL76, An24 MEDIUMLiberia EL All types HIGHMoldova ER All types LOWRussia RA IL76, An24 HIGHSao Tome S9 All types HIGHSierra Leone 9L All types MEDIUMUkraine UR IL76, An24 HIGH

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Air Transportation Profile Indicators

Flight plan routing indicators:

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Maritime Transportation Profile Indicators

Flag of

convenience?

Vessel type and size?

Shipping company size?

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Land Transportation Profile Indicators

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End-User Profile Indicators

End-User Certificates (EUC)• Forged?• Obtained from original entity after issue?• For countries with a higher risk?

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Broker / FreightForwarderProfile Indicators

Exports involving brokers? Especially if combined with ‘off-shore

‘transportation sources Brokers based ‘off-shore’

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Types of Clandestine Delivery

Post-Delivery Onward Diversion (PDOD) Point of Departure Diversion (PDD) Circumvention and Concealment (C&C)

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Post-Delivery Onward Diversion (PDOD)

Genuine End-User Certificate Acting on behalf of people in the End-User

State Intent is then to move items onwards from the

End-User State “Grey Market”

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Point of Departure Diversion (PDD)

Fake or abused End-User Certification Ammunition not delivered to End-User

suggested on fake Certification Likely to minimise exposure by working

through local agents

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Circumvention and Concealment (C&C)

Popular in the “Ant Trade” Concealment generally involves hiding items

in among other goods

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Documentation

Main types of documentation: • End user and export licence documentation• Arms transport and transfer documentation

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End User and Export Licence Documentation

A lack of sufficient end user verification is the greatest expediting factor for illicit delivery.

Lack of a standardised format. Simplicity of certain EUCs lend themselves to

forgery.

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Arms Transport and Transfer Documentation

Examples:• Bill of Lading• Airway Bill• Cargo manifest• Flight Permission Request

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Checks of Documentation

Matching end user weapon and ammunition requests with end user inventories.

Cross-referencing import and transportation documentation.

Foreign third party brokering licence control checks.

Examining extra-territoriality claims and actual brokering locations.

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Case Studies

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Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

08 March 1995. Ukrainian Airline applies for Flight Plans from Bratislava in the Slovak Republic to Ecuador.

12 March 1995. Flight ADB801 makes a technical stop at Lajes in the Azores, declaring the cargo as ‘Hospital Truck and Special Equipment’.

12 March 1995. Customs officials at Lajes discover cargo is, in fact, rocket launchers.

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Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

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The Explanation

Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

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Request for further landing permission in Dominican Republic

Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

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The Answer: Denial of flight permission

Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

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The explanation again

Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

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Request to continue flight with declaration of true cargo

Flight ADB801 - Ecuador 1995

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Sudan, 2006

Near Juba, November 2006.

An 28 – Short-Haul Flights only. STOL Capability.

ER-AKO (Previously Moldovan registered and now registered in Sao Tome).

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Sudan, 2006

S9-PSV owned by DALLEX Trade, registered in London, but a known shell company.

Leased to GOLIAF Air. New clandestine delivery company? Delivery took 20 minutes!

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Chad

Chad Army mainly equipped with FN weapons – why do they need AK variants?

Known diversion point to Sudan (Dhafur). EUC again very easy to ‘obtain’. Financial

inducements allegedly been accepted since April 1994:• Chad EUC used to supply weapons to Liberia and

Sierra Leonne.• Chad EUC used for export from Bulgaria to Yemen.

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Questions

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