TAPPAN ZEE BRIDGE REPLACEMENT

DARA ADIB AND VALENTINA FUNG

Background

The Tappan Zee Bridge (“TZB”) is a three-mile bridge across a wide estuary of the Hudson

River, approximately 13 miles north of New York City. It is part of the 570-mile tolled

NYS Thruway (I-287/87 corridor) between Rockland County (“Rockland”) and Westchester

County (“Westchester”). TZB is the principal Hudson River crossing for the 48-mile stretch

between the George Washington Bridge (“GWB”) and the Newburgh-Beacon Bridge (NYSTA

2009). See Figure 1 for a map.

Locally, TZB serves the northern suburbs of the New York metropolitan area (“Greater

NY”), via the Palisades Interstate Parkway and Cross-Westchester Expressway. Regionally,

it allows passenger and truck traffic between New England and New Jersey to bypass New

York City and GWB, the world’s busiest bridge (PANYNJ 2012), via a beltway connecting

the New England Expressway and the New Jersey Turnpike.

The NYS Thruway Authority (“NYSTA”) operates TZB, and charges a $5 cash toll east-

bound. In contrast, GWB is operated by the competing Port Authority of NY&NJ (“PA-

NYNJ”), which charges a $12 cash toll eastbound.

Existing Problems

Governor Andrew Cuomo: They’ve been talking about replacing the Tappan

Zee Bridge since I think I was [in] diapers (CBS New York 2012).

The most significant problems are congestion and maintenance. The original bridge had six

lanes, three in each direction, and was designed for a maximum capacity of 100,000 vehicles

Date: April 29, 2012.1

Figure 1. Highway map of Hudson River Crossings (NYSDOT 2012a, Fig1-1). The Bear Mountain Bridge is not considered a major crossing.

per day. TZB was also built with a relatively short 50-year projected lifespan during Korean

War-era material shortages.

Congestion. Several solutions have been suggested and implemented to relieve severe con-

gestion. In 1982, NYSTA expanded toll plazas and lanes in the surrounding segments of

I-287 (NYSDOT 1987, 1), and five years later, NYSTA converted the median divider into2

Figure 2. Movable barrier system (CalTrans 2003, 2).

a southbound lane to ease morning congestion (CalTrans 2003, 2). Drawing from research

in California on movable barriers (NYSTA 1982), NYSTA implemented a movable barrier

system with 3+1 lanes in the peak direction in 1992 (CalTrans 2003, 2). See Figure 2.

While effective, these improvements did not provide enough additional capacity to off-

set increased traffic. NYSDOT recommended transportation systems management through

discounted tolls and exclusive lanes for carpools and express bus service “pursued without

further delay” (NYSDOT 1987, 2, 4-6), but noted that these measures would be inadequate

by 2010 without constructing an adjacent “TZB II” before then to complement the existing

bridge (NYSDOT 1987, 7). According to NYSDOT, an adjacent “TZB II” would minimize

change to land use patterns, connect to existing highways, utilize existing rights-of-way , and

provide the greatest congestion relief compared to constructing a bridge at other locations

(NYSDOT 1987, 7-10). See Figure 3.

The recommendation to build a supplementary bridge was based on underestimated traffic

growth. While growth between 1985 and 2010 was projected to be 29% (NYSDOT 1987, 1),

traffic actually grew 70% (NYSTA 2009). Additionally, NYSDOT recommendations assumed

that TSM and HOV lanes would result in a 18% and 2% traffic reduction, respectively, during

the same period (NYSDOT 1987, 5-6), but by 2000, TSM had only reduced the number of

trips by 4% (Vollmer 2000, Ch2-8).

Governor Pataki terminated the HOV proposal in 2000 (Hintersteiner 2001, 6). The task

force study at the time claimed that “because all lanes in the critical sections will be at or

near capacity in 2020, any proposed alternative that takes away a lane from its current use

will result in increased traffic congestion in the remaining lanes (and the associated negative3

Figure 3. Cost of alternative measures to reduce congestion (NYSDOT 1987, 9).

environmental impacts) even after factoring in the benefits of increased transit [or HOV lane]

usage” (Vollmer 2000, Ch2-16).

The addition of a lane and movable barrier system in 1987 and 1992, respectively, which

increased the number of peak lanes from three to four, was not considered in the 1987 NYS-

DOT report. The severe underestimation of traffic growth in that report suggests that the

effects of induced demand may diminish the benefits of increasing lane capacity. Considering

that the alternative route for most traffic, GWB, is already the world’s busiest (PANYNJ

2012) and possibly one of the most expensive ($12 toll), it is possible that the current level

of congestion prevents further congestion. Perhaps congestion is the “principal means of

allocating scare road space” (Downs 2004, 5).

Meanwhile, freight traffic in Greater NY is projected to increase by 70% between 2000

and 2025, and 79% of this increase is projected to be carried by trucks (NYCEDC 2004).

Many trucks currently use TZB to bypass NYC and will likely continue to do so given the

lack of alternative routes. Traffic during peak hours consists largely of cars, but firsthand

experience suggests that even then trucks slow traffic in adjacent lanes.4

During the current weekday peak hours (6 AM to 9 AM, 4 PM to 7 PM) the level-of-service

in peak direction is “F” (NYSTA 2009), meaning traffic backs up frequently (Hintersteiner

2001, 23). The peak hour period also continues to spread out (Vollmer 2000).

Maintenance. Since 1990, the monetary and opportunity costs associated with mainte-

nance have continued to escalate. Parts of TZB are nearing or are at the end of their useful

life (NYSTA 2009). This state of deterioration can be explained by the bridge’s short-term

lifespan, the buoyant caisson foundation design (Franco 1978), harsh water environment, and

greater passenger and especially freight traffic.

Despite intense repair work in the 1990s, including an overnight redecking project (Sha-

hawy 2003) worthy of CalTrans attention (CalTrans 2003), 2008 inspections rated the

bridge’s overall structural condition at 3.71 on a 1-to-10 scale (NYSTA 2009). Some struc-

tural components were rated “3”, indicating that deterioration was affecting structural in-

tegrity. The 2007 collapse of Minnesota’s I-35W Mississippi River bridge has increased

concern among politicians and the public.

NYSTA warned that “as the deck continues to deteriorate, failures in the original deck

will continue to increase and the maintenance regimen and its impact on traffic will escalate

accordingly” (NYSTA 2009, 5). In 2000-2004, the bridge deck experienced on average 56

punch-throughs per year, leading to lane closures: in 2009, a single punch-through resulted

in a ten mile backup (NYSTA 2009, 16). Note the closed lane in Figure 4, a fairly common

sighting.

Replacement is necessary because incremental upgrades are not feasible (Vollmer 2000,

Ch2-9). Maintaining the existing bridge will cost $1.3 billion over the next decade and still

risks emergency repair closing the entire bridge (NYSDOT 2012a, Ch2-10). The value of

time commuters and businesses lose from bridge delays and closures is far greater.

Narrow span. The bridge’s narrow span and addition of an extra lane results in narrow

lanes, which are irritating from firsthand experience. See Figure 5. The lack of shoulders

delays clearing stalled and crashed vehicles (Vollmer 2000).5

Figure 4. Cantilever span, taken during off-peak hours.

Modal alternatives. TZB lacks pedestrian walkways, bicycle access, dedicated bus lanes,

and commuter rail on the current structure. Both Rockland and Westchester were in nonat-

tainment of tropospheric ozone standards until 2010 and are currently in nonattainment of

PM-2.5 standards (EPA 2012).

Aesthetics. TZB crosses one of the widest and most beautiful parts of the Hudson River:

see Figure 6. The cantilever-truss bridge with its long approaches has been a visual blight on

the local harbor, park, and Hudson River landscape, even pre-construction (Journal News

1980). See Figure 7 and 8. Building the bridge demolished the local business district (to the

west of Figure 8, not visible), and the replacement may do the same again (Hintersteiner

2000).

Moreover, alternatives are unclear: a prettier bridge, such as a suspension bridge, or a

different location, may not be feasible. The natural widening of the Hudson River allows for6

Figure 5. Narrow lanes with turns and movable barrier.

less steep approaches to and from the Palisades cliffs in Rockland but also makes construction

of a suspension bridge disproportionately expensive.

NYSTA has an agreement with PANYNJ that prevents construction of competitive toll

crossings within 16 miles of GWB (Franco 1978). Hence, if NYSTA built the bridge further

south, NYSTA would be unable to collect toll revenue, which is used to pay for maintenance

of the rest of the 570-mile Thruway.

Replacement project

The Tappan Zee Hudson River Crossing Project (TZHRCP) is projected to break ground

in 2012 or 2013 and be completed in 2017. Directly north of the existing bridge, two cable-

stayed spans with four lanes each will be built for each direction (NYSDOT 2012a, ES-7).

Total expenses, including acquiring the necessary rights-of-way, are budgeted at $6 billion

(NYSDOT 2012b) or $5.2 billion (NY Times 2011).7

Figure 6. Facing away from the north side of the bridge.

Some rejected alternatives. Rehabilitating the existing bridge was rejected because orig-

inal components of the bridge remain structurally deficient and more expensive to maintain.

Rehabilitation would require expensive work on the underwater caissons and would still re-

sult in “many of the same environmental impacts of a replacement bridge” (NYSDOT 2012a,

ES-11).

Another rejected alternative was to build one or several underwater tunnels, but construc-

tion and rights-of-way would cost $8 billion. A tunnel would not provide pedestrian and

bicycle access, and would disrupt surrounding residents more (NYSDOT 2012a, ES-12).

Financing.

. . . the bridge’s excessively high cost could create a perverse incentive for state

officials to subsidize or otherwise facilitate driving, and to under-invest in

public transit. . . [in order to] restrain the rate of toll hikes (Komanoff 2012, 1).8

Figure 7. Facing towards the south of the bridge from Nyack.

Unlike the toll-free Interstate Highway System, TZB and the rest of the Thruway are state-

financed through toll revenue collected by NYSTA. $3 billion in bond revenue and a $2

billion direct loan from the federal Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation

Act (TIFIA) (NY Times 2011) are planned to cover TZHRCP.

Despite being named as one of 14 projects nationwide that would receive expedited federal

review and approval, the TIFIA loan has not materialized—travel advocates argue this is

indicative of Governor Cuomo’s failure to include transit (Journal News 2012). Still, with

no plans to use tax revenue, all loans and bonds will have to paid back with tolls that are

2-4 times greater than the current amount (Komanoff 2012, 1).

Toll hikes spread burden to out-of-state commuters, who otherwise benefit with costs.

Unfortunately, they would still impact local residents, both commuters and local businesses,

who already bear the impact of construction, increased traffic, and visual blight. Higher tolls

might also displace some traffic to the already-congested GWB.9

Figure 8. Facing towards the south of the bridge from a state park.

Public Involvement. NYSTA and NYSDOT are managing TZHRCP with input from

FHWA. Public discussion has been constrained to a few meetings and comment periods.

Possible alternatives that had appeared in earlier documents were abridged or eliminated in

the draft EIS without justification. The draft EIS barely addresses environmental justice

and neglects negative externalities from construction and increased traffic. For example,

a twin-span bridge’s wider landings impact more neighboring residences and may induce

additional unwanted traffic, but these effects were not considered.

The plan for expedited environmental review and design-build construction, dubbed “Cuomo’s

Way”, attracts skepticism, especially from politicians in Rockland and Westchester. The

mayor of the nearby Village of Nyack expressed concern that “financial development and

consideration of a single alternative, and the lack of a funding structure for that alternative,

precludes the State from providing sufficient analysis of the economic impact of this and the

discarded alternatives on the communities” (Nyack 2012).10

Figure 9. Gap for future transit between spans (NYSDOT 2012a, Fig2-1).

Effectiveness

TZHRCP intends to “ensure the long-term vitality of this Hudson River crossing, maximize

the public investment in a new Hudson River crossing, and improve transportation operations

and safety on the crossing” (NYSDOT 2012a, Ch1-7).

Although Governor Cuomo touts TZHRCP as a job creation mechanism, which is a short-

term expenditure effect, his framing of the project is misleading; instead, large transportation

projects should be judged by their long-term transportation effects (Taylor 2004, 297). As

a mega-project, TZB is the “technological sublime”, making it potentially controversial and

more costly than expected (Frick 2008, 239-241).

TZHRCP targets congestion and maintenance costs, the most significant problems of the

existing bridge. The twin-span replacement that will have “a life span in excess of 100 years

before major maintenance is required” (NYSDOT 2012a, Ch1-7).Congestion is not addressed

as well. TZHRCP adds an additional lane and includes a gap between the spans for later

construction of bus lanes or rail tracks to handle transit, but does not implement transit

alternatives: see Figure 9.

Maintenance. A new bridge will substantially decrease monetary and opportunity costs as-

sociated with maintenance. Repair work would “take longer, cost more, and be more limited”

with a single span (NYSDOT 2012a), hence the preference for the twin-span replacement,

which will add service redundancy and be more reliable, since traffic can be diverted during

extensive maintenance and repairs.

Congestion.11

Lane capacity. TZHRCP plans to increase the total number of lanes from seven to eight.

However, the number of lanes in the peak direction will still be four, and it is unclear how

this handles congestion problems. To prevent force-flow traffic that builds up for miles and

an extension of the rush hour period from four to six hours, at least ten lanes are needed by

2020 (Hintersteiner 2001, 49) and twelve lanes are needed by 2040 (Hintersteiner 2001, 103).

Even with an effective public transit system, resisting highway expansion will not prevent

traffic growth (Hintersteiner 2001, 238).

On the other hand, increased accessibility induces more travel (Johnston 2004, 119), which

might offset accessibility benefits (Giuliano 2004, 256). Government responses to “build [our]

way out of congestion” may be socially sub-optimal (Downs 2004, 8-9).

User fees. The problematic toll increases may be effective traffic management strategies, if

combined with congestion pricing as is done on GWB. Unfortunately, commuter and freight

traffic have few choices since there are no transit options and GWB, the world’s busiest

bridge, is the only alternative route.

Transit.

“We’re going to raise your toll and by the way we’re not going to improve

public transit,” Mr. Zupan said. “And we’re not going to give you an option

other than driving.” (NY Times 2011)

NYSTA and NYSDOT documents, originally in favor of adding bus, light rail, and commuter

rail to the existing bridge (NYSDOT 1987), now defer transit until later (NYSDOT 2012a).

Transit advocates, in particular the Tri-State Transportation Campaign, argue that this is

unsustainable and unjust, especially towards low-income and minority groups. The state

agencies view it as a necessary cost-saving compromise, as ever-increasing cost estimates are

typical in transportation projects (Flyvjberg 2007).

Implenting public transit will be an expensive capital investment as federal funds are only

available in the form of loans for TZHRCP. Transit costs are typically underestimated and

ridership overestimated (Flyvjberg 2007, 41-55), especially rail (Giuliano 2004, 264). Transit12

counts for 1.6% of trips in the US (Pucher 2004, 207), of which suburban rail only accounts

for 5% (Pucher 2004, 200-201). Thus, it is “extremely unlikely that a rail project would have

prevailed in the presence of more reliable forecasts” (Pickrell 1992, 168).

As the exception to transit-use patterns in the US, transit in Greater NY holds a 25%

share of all work trips (Pucher 2004, 209), but transit in Rockland follows national trends

more closely with only a 3% share for all commuter trips (Vollmer 2000). Commuter rail

service in Rockland is limited by lack of access to the Metro-North Railroad, which is across

the Hudson River; express bus service in Rockland is limited by lack of access to the Palisades

Interstate Parkway, which has low overpasses that prevent commercial traffic.

A more realistic alternative to rail might be bus rapid transit: with exclusive rights-of-

way, traffic signal priority, prepaid fares, and more attractive vehicles (Pucher 2004, 230). A

single bus lane on I-495 off the NJ Turnpike carries five times the combined volume of three

car lanes during peak hours (Pucher 2004, 209). State agency reports have recommended

bus/HOV lanes for the existing bridge since 1982 (NYSDOT 1987), until Governor Pataki

terminated the HOV proposal in 2000 (Hintersteiner 2001, 6).

But transit might not be as just or environmentally-friendly as expected. Transit does not

mean geographic equity (Johnston 2004, 122-123), as higher-income suburbs disproportion-

ately receive subsidies on lower ridership (Wachs 2004, 151), and commuter rail riders have

higher incomes. Off-peak urban buses pollute more than any other mode per-passenger-mile

(Chester and Horvath 2009, 6).

Overall, the effectiveness of transit depends on its success at diverting car traffic. For

this to happen, “supportive zoning and development policies must be in place. . . [and] im-

pacts depend on complementary zoning, parking, and traffic policy” (Giuliano 2004, 266,

268). Local governments may feel that transit options could facilitate unwanted further

development. Neither state agencies nor transit advocates have considered whether a com-

prehensive transit/land-use strategy is possible in Rockland, which is 30% parkland, the

highest percentage of any county in Greater NY.

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Narrow span and modal alternatives. TZHRCP includes dedicated lanes for bicycle

and pedestrian access, wide car lanes and shoulders. The inclusion of bike and pedestrian

lanes fails to completely address modal alternatives, however.

Aesthetics. Similar to CalTrans’ experience with the Bay Bridge (Frick 2008, 249-250),

the state agency’s objective is mostly utilitarian, while locals see the new bridge as a mega-

landmark (Frick 2008, 248). Although a new bridge will “look better”, the twin spans may

exacerbate visual blight and environmental impact during construction.

Somewhat surprisingly, Governor Cuomo endorsed studying an alternative plan to turn

the existing bridge into a green walkway over the Hudson River rather than demolish it,

as suggested by local politicians and the newly-formed Tappan Bridge Park Alliance (NY

Times 2012). Although the Walkway over the Hudson to the north and High Line in New

York City have converted bridges into parks, the idea has not been mentioned in agency

documents, so it is unclear if it is practical.

Conclusions

The existing problems with TZB have made it clear that a new bridge is necessary, but

a rushed TZHRCP might be inadequate. Long-term questions remain: congestion, transit,

and land use development in Rockland.

14

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