tactique -...

general military review

## 2020

2011

DOCTRINEDOCTRINETAcTIQUE

COMMAND COMMAND IN OPERATIONSIN OPERATIONS

Directeur de la publication : Général (2S) Claude Koessler

Rédactrice en chef : Capitaine Gwenaëlle Denonin : 01 44 42 35 91 - PNIA : 821.753.35.91

Traductions :Lieutenant-colonel (R) Bruno Guyotde Saint-MichelColonel (R) Gérald Joncheray Lieutenant-colonel (R) Jean-François PalardCommandant (R) Rémy Revenant

Révision des Traductions : Lieutenant-colonel (R) Donatien LebastardM. William SettersCommandant Aleksandar Stefanovic : 01 44 42 44 30 - PNIA : 821.753.44 30

Maquette : Christine Villey : 01 44 42 59 86 - PNIA : 821.753.59.86

Crédits photos : 1re et 4e de couvertures : SIRPA Terre

Editorial : ADC Isabelle HELIES/SIRPA TerreImages Centre de MONTIGNY les METZ

Schémas & montage 4e de couverture :Nanci Fauquet : 01 44 42 81 74 - PNIA : 821.753.81.74

Diffusion & relations avec les abonnés :Major Catherine Bréjeon : 01 44 42 43 18 - PNIA : 821.753.43.18

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Revue trimestrielle Conformément à la loi «informatique et libertés»n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, le fichier des abonnésà DOCTRINE TACTIQUE a fait l’objet d’unedéclaration auprès de la CNIL, enregistrée sousle n° 732939. Le droit d’accès et de rectifications’effectue auprès du CDEF. Centre de Doctrined’Emploi des Forces - 1, place Joffre - Case 53 - 75700 PARIS - SP 07

Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr Mel : [email protected]

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Editorial The Art and Science of preparing to Command in Operations 3/4

DoctrineThe Foundations of Command: Trends and Invariants 5/7Doctrine Support fort Battlefield Digitization 8/10Principles of the Officer Training Continuum 11/12Operational Training of Company Commanders at CENTAC and CENZUB 13/14Combat-Seasoning in Training Centers a Requirement for Leaders’ Development 15/16In-Battalion Training of Tactical leaders 17/22

AccountsThe Commander in Operations 23/24Bringing Meaninf tio Action and Orders: the Tactical Leader in Operations 25/28Commanding a Combined Arms Company Team in Afghanistan 29/32Values: A Critical Assessment 33/35Food for Thought: Command in Operations 36/37

InternationalThe changing face of command in war 38/42Führen mit Auftrag - Mission Command 43/47

HistoryMarshal FOCH and the Interallied Command 48/49Two Hundred Years of Command «À LA FRANÇAISE» 50/52

ReflectionThe Importance of Army Aviation in Support of Urban Operations 53/54Legal Advice Supporting Command 55/56Hyperinfluence - A war of Perception and Will - The «Afghan Laboratory» 57/61

Table of contents Table of contents

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In a short book published in 20091, Lieutenant-General

Dominique de la Motte, in his brisk and straightforwardmanner, related his daily life as the leader of a commandoof partisans committed in the “war of combat posts”in Cochin China from 1951 to 1952. It was the life of alieutenant acting successively or simultaneously ascommander of a fighting unit, village chief, justice ofthe peace, military judge and a moneylender “without”collateral. I would strongly advise our young officers toread it, as an illustration of more theoretical texts andofficial doctrine regulations which they absolutely mustknow. This testimony of the way to understand men,terrain and situations, founded on unwaveringly uprightconvictions, is emblematic of the frame of mind that aleader in operation should be endowed with. The aim ofthe action pursued by Lieutenant de la Motte 60 yearsago is indeed still relevant today: to win the heart ofthe populace and keep them on our side, as they arethe main players and the key issue in conflicts.

Of course, 21st century engagements occur in differentcontexts. Even if the necessity for conducting a

comprehensive maneuver is not fundamentally new, sincemilitary action can no longer be the only factor in achievingthe end-state, command in operations is today performedwithin an extremely complex environment: many moreparties involved in crisis resolution, the joint nature ofoperations, action within a coalition with ROEs specificto each theater and even to each contributing nation,prevalence of permanent and instant communications,eagerness to achieve results, growing judicial pressure—going as far as intrusion of judges into the tactical conductof operations—and pressure from the media, society andpoliticians.

These numerous and relatively recent factors should notdistract the leader in operation from certain constants

of war, which may be masked by these factors. Firstly,he should never doubt that the opponent’s intellect andwill are at least as good as his own and are servingthe opponent’s own purposes. The second unchanging,

unchallengeable principle is that the mission always comesfirst, even if its governing spirit increasingly prevails overthe letter shaping its formal aspect. The letter ofthe mission should be balanced constantly with the desiredend-state, which may allow remarkably little room formaneuver, as I found as commander of the Licorne forcefrom June 2005 to June 2006. Lastly, any operationalcommander should always assume absolute responsibilityfor the success of his mission. After taking all necessarymeasures, he must be certain that he has carefullyassessed the amount of uncertainty inherent to any militaryaction and that he has reduced exposure of his troops todanger. This last aspect remains an unvarying feature ofarmed engagement, which must be reduced to a levelbeyond reproach.

With these constants and in consideration ofthe context, correct awareness of the oncoming

mission requires thorough early preparation fromcommanders and their staff, from a technical, tactical,mental, moral and physical perspective, ensuringendurance while preserving necessary objectivity. It entailsmanaging the whole gamut of military skills and learningspecific situation of any theater of operations.Understanding based solely on such principles asimprovised genius or mechanical implementation ofa simplistic balance of power is insufficient forthe complexity of current situations. In order to be fullyefficient, understanding requires steady work and open-minded curiosity. It should operate on the basis of well-oiled decision-making processes, knowledge—so thoroughas to be instinctive—of operating methods and lessonslearned from experience.

Conduct of operations should be thoroughly thought outand cannot be subjected to random or approximate

logic or operate through sheer intuition. To avoid this,particularly in cases of emergency, any decision should bemade strictly in keeping with the fundamental tried andtested principles of war and consideration of currentissues.

The Art and Science of Preparing to Command in Operations

editorial of Army chief of staffeditorial of Army chief of staff

Retaining freedom of action should of course still meanbeing able to choose between courses of action. A

range of options should be available, for whichthe implementation processes are easily managed. Butthat freedom of action should come with an ethicaldimension; it is also the ability to choose between the rightand the wrong solution, between the acceptable andthe unacceptable. When the military leader and hissubordinates very much like goldfish in a bowl, it ismore crucial than ever to preserve all the legitimacy ofthe action. Freedom in the sense of right and wrong isto be acquired with time, through attainment of strongpersonal and professional references and convictions.Today, legitimacy affects the outcome of ongoing actionand initiates the actions to come. We have been inAfghanistan and Lebanon for years now; and each optionmust be examined in accordance with expected or possibleeffects in the long term, and with the consequences thatfuture commanders will have to assume.

Economy of force is a well-established principle, both inits original meaning of a wise attribution and use of

assets according to objectives and desired effects and inits gradually widening scope which has come to includethe crucial duty of a commander to undertake any missionat the lowest cost in soldiers’ lives. But today this shouldalso include according critical importance to materialassets, which are always limited, particularly whenmissions are performed outside national territory. Lastly, itshould also be a principle for the protection and respect ofthe populace, their means of subsistence, their heritageand their customs. It is therefore the—extremely difficult—task of the military commander to decide the attributionof assets most appropriate to the tasks to be performed,as well as to estimating the risk to be taken by his soldiersand the potential damage to the populace andinfrastructure. All this shall obviously comply with hismission and the goal to be achieved. In short, he mustfocus his attention on the human factor in the broadersense of the term.

Lastly, although if concentration of efforts always relieson the ability to transfer assets at the appropriate

juncture to overcome the opponent, obtain a concreteor insubstantial effect, or tip the balance of any type ofdecision, it is now more than ever included within ahierarchical range of effects and streamlined use of force.To limit the use of force in order to grant the opponentan honorable way out may prove more efficient thandestruction. Conversely, displaying power anddetermination—and using it unflinchingly if necessary—enables us to impose our will on the opponent, preferablyin order to discourage him from taking action or toencourage him to relent. This varying scale of effectsrequires an ability to change direction, in other words tomake radical changes in the course of action depending onthe attitude of the opponent. This can, within a short time,lead to shifting from a combat operation with the use of allassets to organizing a conciliation meeting, or vice versa.

As I emphasized in the seventh issue of “Doctrine,”published in December 2005, I would like to point out

that we are not alone in implementing these principles andwe should remember that the opponent can do the same.In many respects, the art of commanding in operations liesin the military commander’s ability to understand, to facethe unexpected, to dominate the opponent’s will andeventually to acquire a sense of decision-making, which isthe very essence of the ability to command. In the contextof current engagements, the complexity and multitude offactors to be taken into account make the task extremelydifficult. The commander has unique responsibilities,requiring that he give clear, unambiguous orders whilegranting subordinates the degree of initiative that theyneed. In return, the latter are expected to show flawlessintellectual discipline and implement operating modesaccording to standard rules, in compliance with what theylearned—painstakingly—in training.

Thus preparing for command in operations is truly ascience which does not allow for approximation or

precipitation. It is learnt gradually, initiated in trainingschools where the future commander learns, as they sayat the Saint-Cyr Military Academy, to “discern in the midstof complexity, decide in the midst of uncertainty and actin the midst of adversity.” This science should beconsolidated and enhanced through patient work andexperience. Not only can instinct and patience thus bedeveloped, but also humanity and serenity, which arecrucial features of a good commander in operations.When the moment of ordeal comes, when confronted withuncertainty and danger, the commander will find that hiscredibility—and the confidence he will have to inspire—will rely heavily on it.

General Elrick IRASTORZA,Army chief of staff

1 «De l’autre côté de l’eau, Indochine 1950-1952», (Across the water, Indochina1950-1952), éd. Tallandier.

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A changing environment

TThe scope of operations requiresthe tactical commander to align

his action with the continuum ofoperations. The second of the threephases of any operation, stabilization,is considered crucial in the environmentof current commitments, and thereforecrystallizes all the difficulties forthe military commander who is thenonly one player among others. Inaddition, the nature of conflicts requiresan assimilation of ways of thinking andcivilizations which are different fromours. Success in this phase also relieson the continuity and permanence ofthe action, barely compatible withthe perpetual cycle of rotation of bothcommanders and units. During thisphase, peaks of violence and periods ofrelative calm alternate, which increasesdifficulties. Finally, it calls forcontinuous monitoring of the physicaland human environment, requiringsignificant manpower, which is barelyfeasible with our instant deploymentcapabilities. This forces the commanderto find and approve the most cost-effective courses of action andprocesses.

On top of “environmental factors”,new constraints have emerged.

Today’s pressure from legal liabilityleads not only to increased monitoringof intervention conditions, but alsoto a growing risk of “penalization” atthe national or international levels.The commander must therefore complywith both the spirit and the letterof the Law of Armed Conflicts,the Defense Code and the rules ofengagement that have beenprescribed.

The second constraint relates to mediaexposure. Advancing technology playsa part in reducing the time betweenthe events and the dissemination ofinformation, whilst information needsare growing at the same time, often ledby the primacy of broadcast audienceratings. Therefore, the commander inoperations can (and must)—whenauthorized—communicate at his levelof command and about his mission,with the exception of any higher-levelconsideration. However, although froma certain level the commander has apress officer or a press/informationcell, he must find and maintain a

difficult balance between excessivemedia exposure—which wouldweaken him—and the temptation toavoid all contact with the media—anequally counterproductive attitude—by leaving that role to the PublicAffairs officer alone.

Finally, the tactical commander mustoptimize and master new technology.Battlespace digitization and accessto new media and means of communi-cation necessarily permeate theexercise of command. They imply amajor change in attitudes and newmethods to be acquired and mastered.If positive contributions are obvious asregards command dialogue anddecision-making aid, it is neverthelessimperative that the militarycommander not be tempted tointervene to the lowest level. It musttherefore take advantage of digitaltools without suffering their diktat.His training and experience—as wellas his intuition and awareness ofthe situation—must enable him tobest determine when and where to bepresent, as digitization can neverreplace the voice of the commanderat critical moments.

DDoctrineoctrineDOCTRIN

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THE FOUNDATIONS OF COMMAND: TRENDS AND INVARIANTS

(Summary of FT 05, available soon)

COLONEL PASCAL ZIEGLER, SECTION COMMANDER, CDEF/DOCTRINE DIVISION

Conditions of employment of the armed forces may have changed and, incurrent commitments, military action may now represent no more than a lineof operations among others, but the fact remains that command is timeless.Separating the foundations of command in operations from those in peacetimewould be paradoxical, since both are inextricably linked to one another.

The command style of French tactical commanders1 in operations highlightsboth its unity and its adaptability, which both remain compatible with the stylesadopted by other forces and our allies. Principles of organization or processesrelated to Army command positions are not, however, addressed in thisdocument.

The commander must adapt his style of command to the conditions of commitment and the strategic objectives setby the political authorities. Whatever the scope of operations, “command by objectives” will generally be favored. Accordingly, six principles can be applied and combined to highlight the use of this intent and its main effect.The tactical commander must therefore acquire, maintain, and develop a number of qualities—cardinal virtues—which will allow him to exercise his command calmly in an increasingly complex operational environment.

The concept of operations,the keystone of drafting orders

Focusing on the Anglo-Saxonunderstanding of the term command,two complementary concepts appear:“command” and “control”. The firstand perhaps most important coversthe prerogatives and powers of thecommander: the unique and personalside of command. The second reliesmore on structures and methods.Consequently, command is bothan art, because it is focused onthe commander’s personality, hisintelligence and intuition, and ascience, because it relies on tools,systems and organizationsimplemented by the staff forthe benefit of the commander.

Military history shows that allcommanders have mainly referred totwo styles of command: that by order2,more direct, and that by objectives,which is more decentralized and seemsto correspond more closely tothe demands of modern conflicts,for which the indirect approach is oftenpreferred.

The first carries with it the idea thatvictory is primarily the result of the solewill of the commander. It relies on ahighly centralized decision-makingprocess and implies a high degree offormal discipline. This style of commandcan/must be applied in particularlydifficult engagements, requiring fastreactions. Similarly, it would seem tobe necessary when the success of anoperation relies on secrecy.

Command by objectives, meanwhile,is based on the margin of initiativegranted to subordinates, on theirintellectual discipline in the executionof orders, and their responsiveness inmeeting assigned objectives. In short,subordinates rely on the commander’sconcept of operations. Using this typeof command most often leads to a moreflexible maneuver because it favorsthe initiative of the subordinate andpre-positions him to seize anyopportunities that arise. These twocommand styles are never mutuallyexclusive but complement one other.Ultimately, it is always the commander’spersonality which will make him favorone form of command over the other.

Finally, although information systemsare now capable of reducing the “fogof war,” the processing of informationnever eradicates uncertainty completely.There is, for any commander inoperations, a major risk of constantlydelaying decision making pendingadditional information which is moreaccurate and comprehensive.To reduce this uncertainty,the commander must anticipate andfocus on the action and effects toobtain, and therefore understandthat uncertainty is a factor inherentto the conduct of war. This approachgives priority to the delegation ofexecution to the levels prepared tocollect, process and exploitinformation from their level in anappropriate and effective way.Clear, well defined intent on the partof the commander thus reducesthe degree of uncertainty in hissubordinates’ decisions.

In the context of the comprehensivemaneuver, stability operations favorthe indirect approach. In this contextcommand by objectives grantsthe spirit supremacy over the letter,without any pretence of exclusivity.

The principles of command

The principles of commandhighlighted below rely on the intentof the commander, as expressed inhis main effect. They contribute togreater consistency in the concept,conduct and control of the executionof the assigned mission whilststrengthening each subordinate levelin its role. Finally, they contribute toprotecting the commander’s freedomof action.

The principle of simplicity appliesnot only to the drafting anddissemination of orders but also totheir development process. It thusreduces the time needed withthe aim of achieving greaterefficiency. It must not only determinethe right balance in the organizationof command between verticalstructures, more formal and binding,and other, more flexible, rake-shapedstructures, but also serve as a guidefor the manning of the headquarters.

The principle of unity embodies, inturn, two main aspects: for each levelof responsibility there is only a singlelevel of command; for each space-time part of a defined maneuver,there is, except in special cases, asingle level of command. The intentensures consistency of command bya single reference: the higher level’sintent, and ultimately the desiredend state.

Finally, the principle of continuity andcommand permanence does not needany adjustment. On the one hand anycommander must have a deputy.On the other, keeping a commanderwith important responsibilities in hisassignment over time is still a faircompromise between the need formission success and the constraintassociated with being worn down bythe position.

These principles, however, are onlyfully implemented if each level ofcommand enjoys the freedom of actionnecessary to successfully completethe assigned mission by emphasizingsubsidiarity and decentralization.The purpose is thus to seek maximumefficiency in using the initiative ofsubordinate levels, which must thenbe modulated by a report-basedcontrol, while the commander mustavoid the pitfall of interfering inthe conduct of subordinate levels.

Command dialogue, both internal andexternal, is therefore essential, but anycollective decision is excluded becauseultimately the commander alonedecides and takes responsibility forthe decision. This principle underliesall dimensions of command, includingin a multinational context, in orderto look for and ensure necessaryinteroperability while ensuringthe preservation of national interests.

Finally, the principle of proximityemphasizes the location of thecommander, who must have the mostobjective view possible of the realsituation at all times. In doing so, heshould not hesitate to gain this visionfrom his tactical operations center or, ifnecessary, by being physically presenton the ground as the deployment of atactical command post will enable himto command a particular action.

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The qualities of the commander

The complexity of the currentenvironment of operations thereforerequires special qualities. The basicqualities of the man, of course;personal ethics, certainly; but in aposition of command he must alsopossess qualities which are essentialbecause they are inherent inthe ability to command.

Some—but not all—of these qualitiesmay be highlighted.

In addition to physical courage,foresight and strength of convictionsought to be included. This strength ofcharacter may cause the commanderto decide against the advice of hisstaff, thus enhancing the spirit ofthe mission rather than its letter.It is alone that the commander’sintellectual courage is oftenexpressed and he systematicallycommits himself whenever he givesorders; he must therefore be anexample to his subordinates.

If the methods of reasoning andthe decision making processes are“toolkits” necessary to the work ofthe staff, the commander must retainhis freedom of judgment andforesight to make his decision.

Finally, there is intuition. Intuitionalone is related to chance;it is a component necessary for asuccessful engagement, but it isdangerous because it is volatile andunstable. To become a recognizedfactor of legitimacy, intuition isinseparable from expertise; it cangrow and be maintained only bycontinuous personal reflection, whichhelps limit the risk of error whenassessing a situation. Training,reflection and intuition are no doubtsome of the essential componentsof experience.

Every commander must also developthe fundamental capability to createa climate of trust. It is essential thatthe commander-subordinaterelationships, and vice versa, grow

and allow a great trust between hewho gives orders and those whoexecute them. This is all the morenecessary under command byobjective, despite the widespreaduse of “backbrief,” which must beconsidered as a coherent tool tofulfill the mission. This capability togain confidence also applies towardsthe higher commanders, but evenmore so with allies or non-militaryplayers, as operations, in the contextof the comprehensive maneuver,become essentially allied or eveninteragency.

It is also important to highlightthe capacity of discernment,fundamental for any commander inoperations since he has to analyzethe relevance of a proposal or assess asituation. Clear-headed, he strives tokeep an overview of the situation, witha capacity to think independently,which must not be confused withintellectual isolation or a superioritycomplex.

Finally, in all circumstances, he musttry to “absorb” stress so that hissubordinates can work in genuineserenity. Not only does he protecthimself and retain his capacity fordiscernment, but he also makeshimself credible towards hisinterlocutors and lends strength tohis decisions.

1 French-style command is primarily characterizedby the definition of goals through the intent ofthe commander.

2 Although the term may be misleading, it was keptbecause it was adopted when drafting TTA 901, thenthe FT 02 and 05 manuals.

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OOver the centuries, it has become clear that trends set the style and forms of command and warrior culturesside by side. However, in contact with the realities on the ground, opponents, enemies or belligerents, the

level of tactical decision remains the prerogative of the commander who has been appointed and theninvested, recognized by his peers and his subordinates; he alone directs, decides and takes responsibility:command is therefore timeless.

The current environment of land operations, which makes stabilization the phase of effort, tends to focus oncommand by objectives, without excluding command by orders of which the qualities may be complementary.However, the former allows the commander to implement the principle of subsidiarity, giving his subordinatesan increased margin of initiative while they are still under his control.

Intellectual discipline, as highlighted throughout this article, shall not, however, overshadow the formalaspects of discipline. The limits of intellectual discipline are reached whenever formal discipline, which is stillthe main strength of the armed forces, begins.

DDoctrineoctrine

BBattlefield digitization is definedas “use of the latesttechnology to dominate

the enemy, and specifically to know,understand and act more quicklythan him thanks to optimal use ofinformation sources.”

By allowing, in particular, betterinformation-sharing, digitizationimproves the C2 process andthe employment of forces, whichare, of course, linked.

Two key digitization processes—ofdifferent natures—enable us to meetthis objective tangibly. Theyillustrate the force behind digitizationtoday and its practical instructionsfor use. They are:- The build-up of a digitized force- The use and the management ofthe tactical situation of reference.

What is generally called the build-up of a digitized force is notthe generation of the force as such,

which is in itself similar to aconventional (traditional) force, but aparallel and vital process whichenables us to feed—or “stuff,” to takeup the wording used for the DDI1 ofthe PR4G—the SIOC2 systems whichconstitute the tools of digitization.

Without this process, the aforemen-tioned SIOC systems are useless as

they do not understand what is goingon in the field. The process consists offour steps:

- The establishment of the order ofbattle (ODB): in a sense the highlydetailed “task organization” ofthe force. A partition of the work is tobe kept between an initial ODBnamed as the stabilized ODB (ODB-S,

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DOCTRINE SUPPORTFORBATTLEFIELD DIGITIZATION

The growing importance of battlefield digitization and the changes it involves require that a large partof the doctrinal corpus be rewritten, in particular the HQ handbooks related to the various C2

levels—the primary users of digitization. A year ago, the Forces Employment Doctrine Center publisheda document called “Principles for command, task organization and employment of a digitized force/Useof digitization” as part of this overhaul.

As a living document, it is, for the time being, more a presentation of digitization and the rationalebehind it than the usual handbook of guidelines that doctrine documents tend to be. However, from timeto time, some guidelines appear for digitization users. In any case, the manual clearly laysthe foundations for the changes required by—and awaited from—the development of battlefielddigitization.

This article aims to present the major themes of the document, in order to refresh the memory of thosewho have already flicked through it and particularly to make other readers want to grab it off the shelf.The latest progress in digitization is also discussed, paving the way for future updates to the document.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PIERRE CLOCHARD - CDEF/DOCTRINE DIVISION

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used as a basis for the followingsteps. We know that this is notthe final document but it enables usto progress with? of the technicalwork) and the final ODB, known asdeployment ODB (ODB-P).

- The writing of near-permanent data(DQP): it deals with the details ofpersonnel, equipment and otherresources of the units listed inthe ODB, in the form of astandardized description. The forceis thus “encoded” to be fed into theinformation systems, each of whichhas its own specific characteristics.

- The writing of communicationtechnical data (DTCom): it is more orless the directory of the messagingand the networks. It is listed in annexof the OPSIC3.

- The creation of a technical platform:rehearsal of the digitization actorsprior to action. Systems andnetworks are tested, preferablyon a single site (MCP4, ZRA5, for adeployment) and further trainingis provided for those who need it.

The final ODB entails the same work,but it isn’t undertaken from scratchas data from the initial ODB areadjusted.

The following schema depicts these4 steps, making it clear that they haveto be centralized and successive.The annex contains recommendationsto be followed to facilitate goodsequencing of the operation, which isvital for what happens next.

The reference tactical situation(STR or SITACREF) is the visualrepresentation common to all playerson the ground, covering a significantnumber of battlefield parametersincluding positions, logisticalcapabilities, posture, coordinationlines, observation sectors and firingareas of friendly entities combinedwith data relating to terrain, (“mapused as a base”) and the environmentin general, accompanied byintelligence about enemy entities.

The issue of STR “management” iscentral and complex. There are manyquestions to be settled concerningthe needs of tomorrow’s systems,including the nature (automatic ormanual) of information output, thefrequency and processes of updatingand the manner of accounting forvisualized entities (integral,barycentric-, etc.). One of the mostdifficult questions is the managementof enemy entities on the screen. For allthat things might seem quite simplefor the friendly entities, it is moredifficult to choose how to presentthe adversary on-screen when he isidentified or even in contact, as helacks the courtesy to provide eitherhis ODB or GPS position.

Familiarization with the STR mustlead us to be both confident inthe capabilities of automatic processesand aware of their limits. Now that the mechanisms ofdigitization are understood, it ispossible to study its uses moreclosely. Its primary role is tostrengthen:

Foresight and preparation onthe ground. Information isforwarded more quickly and clearly,as well as being more precise(friendly geo location, logisticscapabilities, etc.). Tactical thinkingis therefore easier (in particularthe confrontation of the friendlycourses of action with the enemy’sprobable courses of action), as wellas drafting orders, which aredelivered quickly. The HQ benefitsfrom digitization for a reinforceduse of warning orders (WARNO),which authorize backbrief,rehearsal, reconnaissance andpreparation on the ground.Complex actions (rearward passageof lines, disengagement, counter-attack, etc.) are conducted better.

The greater use of “fire” (withoutexcess). The fluidity of the infor-mation stream combined with otherparameters (range, accuracy ofthe effect makers) enable morestrikes in the depth of the battlefieldthan before. Fire might prevail overshock and participate significantlyin the economy of resources.

Boldness, surprise: uncertainty,the “fog of the war” and navigationerrors are minimized. “Mobileforces” in particular go elsewheremore easily, further, faster and withgreater coordination between them.The freedom of action (varyingcapabilities) increases, as doconfidence and boldness.

The swiftness and responsivenessof all functions: all actions areaccelerated, and the force is lessrigid, more flexible and more in aposition to focus its efforts on someareas at the expense of others.

Digitization will not mean—at least inthe short term—a break in our currenttypes of operation, and it is notexpected to change our courses ofaction deeply. But if it lives up toexpectations, it will enable us toelaborate them more quickly and carrythem out better and more efficiently,thanks to the aforementionedadvantages. These guarantee a highcost-effectiveness of the actionscarried out as well as other aspectswhich are linked but not discussed



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Now that the mechanisms of digitization are unders-tood, it is possible to study its uses more closely.

here (reduced friendly fire,commander mobility, clearing of voicecommunication networks, etc.).

What does “ live up to its promises”mean? It is important to recognizethe limitations of the digitizationalready in place. These limitationsdelay the delivery of all advantages.

These limits are inherent tothe process itself, current technologyand its implementation in our troops. They include:

- Information is not always reliable(up to date) or complete: what aboutthe morale of the troops, or potentialhuman tensions? What aboutthe weather? What about the currentenemy situation? The screen doesnot tell all.

- Time runs short: it may be temptingto carry out one action after anothertoo quickly without a break(reorganization, tiredness, logisticalconstraints). At the same time, spacewidens and logistics must alwaysfollow. Remote elements becomemore vulnerable.

- Digitization is fragile: informationsystems are inherently fragile,as are—to a lesser extent—communications, their securityand the commander’s dependencevis-à-vis a few technical specialistswith particular expertise.

- Digitization does not suffer non-digitization: the interoperabilitybetween two units digitized todiffering extents will be difficult aslegacy procedures may beforgotten.

- Lastly, the principle of subsidiaritymay be threatened. This is a latentissue, which resurfaces occasionally,linked to such considerations asthe “strategic corporal”. Debatescan be heated and numerous.The debate would seem to bepremature because current tools donot reasonably enable—owing tothe lack of general reliability ofthe reference tactical situation—alevel N to directly command levelsbelow N-2. It is also accepted that acommander can barely manage morethan 5 subordinate units, particularlyin a coercive context. The fact

remains that the principle ofsubsidiarity is not—and never hasbeen—a sacred cow and whenthe time comes—when digitizationcomes out its teething stages—it willbe time to review its applicationcalmly.

1 DDI: Initial data dispenser. The DDI is one ofthe 3 peripherals for the management ofthe initialization elements of the PR4G.The 2 others are the secret elementsmanagement center (CGES) and the secretelements duplication center (CDES).

2 SIOC: Operational Information and CommandSystems.

3 OPSIC: Order for Information andCommunication Systems.

4 MCP: Operational Preparation beforeDeployment.

5 ZRA: staging area.6 NCi: initial capability level.NC1: capability 1 level.

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TThe outcome of the implementation of digitization in the employment of forces will becomplemented by rationalizations of the SIOC. This shift is clearly highlighted in works aboutdigitization (NCi and then NC1)6. It will more or less eliminate the aforementioned limitations,

along with one further pitfall: as defined by its current tools, digitization requires a degree of investmentto meet expectations. Beneficial it may be, but it would be useless—or even harmful—if, on the ground,it were time- and energy- consuming or simply took up space in vehicles. That is why, being kept only,despite the announced priorities, in parallel of the fundamental themes of tactical education andtraining, it will be endured if not hindered. This could mean slowing temporarily the organization orimplementation of some operational rendezvous, maybe postponing the deployment of units which donot yet master their usual skills with heavy influence from digitization. A first step would be to increasetraining in digitization for personnel tasked with conducting After Action Reviews (AAR) of exercises.

The simplification of the implementation of the future SIOC leaves room for optimism regarding thereduction of those difficulties. In a few years, we should expect to see real fluidity in operations and anincreased cost-effectiveness of battlefield actions.

Beyond that, the thought will really take off if, rather than simply facilitating better work on the ground,digitization becomes the center of a major change in the operational modes of our units.

WWithin the training continuum,making coherent tactical and

academic programs for officers is along-term process which began in 2002with the reform of the Saint-Cyr MilitaryAcademy. This process is nearingcompletion in the EMIA1 program (forcandidates with prior army service),which will soon award a bachelor’sdegree.The purpose of this continuum is toensure a good progression through thevarious officers’ courses from initialentry training in Coëtquidan throughHigher Professional Military Educationvia specialty training delivered bybranch schools or specialized centers.Far from being restricted to theacademic side of things, the continuumof the courses is related to tactics,which is at the heart of an officer’s role.It may be viewed as a recurrent themewhich links the various trainingprograms together.

Overall consistency, the essentialrequirement of officer training

Officer training, despite random eventsand strain on human, financial andmaterial resources, is now more vitalthan ever. It is crucial for the operationalcapacity of ground forces through itscontribution to the homogeneity andconsistency of the whole army. The aimis to provide forces with officers capableof conducting collective instruction andpreparation of their units beforedeployment. While preservingthe essence of what constitutesthe competence of a militarycommander, it is also important thattraining be adjusted constantly forcurrent engagements by running coursesefficiently and at the appropriatejuncture.

Our current conditions of engagement,characterized by the increasing difficulty

of operations which are becoming moreand more complex, make it necessary totake into account the lessons learned inthe different theaters of operations.This does not mean, however, thatpreparation for the operational contractis neglected regarding its most importantaspect. Although the increasingsophistication of systems generates anincrease in the number of necessarytechnical skills, the reinforcement ofthe “sense of tactics” and the acquisitionof mental strength remain essential inthe training of commanders, particularlythe youngest among them. It meansfinding the balance between initiative,independence, the culture of themission, intellectual discipline andcourage in all its forms, as we rightlyexpect from a military commander. Training policy, while preserving thepermanent characteristics of the militaryart, should adjust constantly to meetthese ever-changing needs and base itsapproach on regular communication withthe units and organizations which hostour trainees.

Principles of the officer training continuum

The reinforcement of the continuum oftactical and academic instruction allowsa better organization in time of trainingactions while providing a commonstructure for all officers, whatever theirorigin of recruitment. In addition tothe key subjects that make up militarybehavior training and PT (EPMS)2,courses are structured around threemajor fields, complementary inthe acquisition of expertise.



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Principles of the OfficerTraining Continuum

LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHILIPPE BONNET, ARMY HUMAN RESOURCES DEPUTY DIRECTORCOMMANDING MILITARY SCHOOLS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND HIGH SCHOOLS

The general principles expressed in this article—continuity, consistency, permanent adjustment—arethose expected for all Army commanders, officers and NCOs. However, only officer training will bediscussed here.

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Academic education, deeply orientedaround the profession of arms as thevocation of our training institutions is toproduce commanders, ie. leaders, whomust hold all the necessary tools tounderstand the contemporary world;

Military culture, at the meeting pointof academic education and tacticaltraining which it feeds, enablesthe officer to found his action inthought. It subsequently helpsthe future commander to think atthe right level, in combined arms orvery often joint or even internationalenvironments, which can sometimesbe complex.

The third and key field is about tacticaltraining. Absolutely combined-armsoriented, it is developed as a recurrenttheme throughout the various stages oftraining.

Tackled from initial entry training atCoëtquidan (French military facilitylocated in Brittany) onwards, combinedarms maneuver lies beyond the scopeof PROTERRE mission training. Whilecombining in a consistent andcomplementary manner the effectsof combat, CS and CSS capabilities,combined arms maneuver representsone of the strong points of the branchcourses. Summary sequences arenotably included in a combined armsprogram closing camp organized incamps in Champagne and their twotraining centers3.

This comprehensive approach isimplemented during the captains’course for future company (or troop orbattery) commanders, during the JuniorStaff College course and finally duringthe Senior Staff course. Problemsrelated to combat in urban areas and tobattlefield digitization are taken intoaccount within the framework ofcoercion and stabilization actions.

To this gradual multi-level of combinedarms instruction, is added a noticeableincrease in the number of simulationexercises for trainees and systematictraining for the responsibility leveldirectly above that required.The training programs for futurecompany commanders, provided bybranch schools, have been extended inorder to allow all captains to acquire agood knowledge of GTIA4 and to startlearning staff techniques which thenwill become the necessary tacticalprerequisites to be prepared for thetraining delivered in Compiègne (JuniorStaff College).

Junior Staff College trainees start withlevel-3 exercises (Maneuver Brigade)with the aim, at the end of the commonpart of the course, of gaining fullmastery of GTIA in terms of stabilizationand counter-insurgency. At the end ofthe course, the lessons taught through

decentralized education help developfield-specific knowledge5 while tacklingthe issue at a level above combinedarms forces.Finally, the Senior Staff College, almostentirely dedicated to the teaching oftactics, devotes 75% of teaching timeto this field. The effort is put on 3rd and2nd (division) levels, split between twomodules: “intervention” and“stabilization.”

1 Ecole Militaire Interarmes.2 Military and Athletic Physical Education andTraining.

3 CENTAC and CENZUB.4 Combined-Arms Battalion Task Force.5 Logistics, information systems, communication,intelligence and administration.DOCTRIN


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MMilitary schools accept the significant responsibility of producing the commanders needed by land forces, inall kinds of engagements described in the operational contract.

To that end, they put a substantial stress on the acquisition of basic—particularly tactical—skills enablingofficers to lead in ever-more complex conditions. They honor this mission while being involved in thetransformation process which affects the whole army.But, it is in the frame of collective instruction carried out within units and in the course of preparation beforedeployment that the commander’s ability to play his operational role is strengthened. There should thereforebe another kind of continuum between training actions in schools and operational preparation activities withinthe land forces.

Reccurrent theme in combined tactics

DA (Division d’Application): Officers’ Basic Course (Branch Schools)CFCU (Cours de Formation des Commandants d’Unité): Captains’ CourseDEM (Diplôme d’Etat-Major): Junior Staff CollegeCSEM (Cours Supérieur d’Etat-Major): Senior Staff CollegeCID/T* (College Interarmées de Défense/Terre): Joint War CollegeSGTIA (Sous-Groupement Tactique Interarmes): Company TeamGTIA (Groupement Tactique Interarmes): Combined Arms Battalion Task ForceBIA (Brigade Interarmes): Maneuver Brigade

* Ecole de guerre depuis le 1er/01/2011

DDedicated to combined armscompany teams (SGTIA),

the centers aim to preparethe captain, who is the unitcommander, to take into account allthe maneuver components and toinvolve all reinforcements regardingcombat support or combat service

support such as medical support. This complexity of the combinedenvironment allows for coherenttactical thinking while adding acertain degree of complexity due tothe number of the additional playersto command and their diversity.

At CENZUB, the combined armscompany team commander mustmaster the particular verticalenvironment of the urban areaand adapt his disposition to thisenvironment which is less thanfavorable for the maneuver.

At CENTAC, he is faced with a variedterrain which has been developedover several years and which placeshim in diverse terrain configurations(woods, open fields, villages, etc.).He will also have to face a widerange of players either to manage—journalists, NGOs, refugees—or tofight: militias, terrorists and, ofcourse, the main enemy who knowsthe ground perfectly and who alwayschooses the time and place ofthe attack.

The management of uncertainty andof the fog of the war enables themto handle this contingency of waraction as highlighted by BrigadierGeneral de Gaulle.



13

Operational Training of CompanyCommanders at CENTACand CENZUB

CPF1 S3 WITH THE COOPERATION OF CENTAC2 AND CENZUB3

WWhether at CENTAC or at CENZUB, during rotations for operational preparation before deployment orduring generic rotations, company team commanders and their C2 teams are the main “targets” ofthe training delivered.

The centers place commanders in real situations and make them confront the theory of leadership withthe reality on the ground. This training highlights the commander’s character at difficult moments and the realeffects that his decisions will have on the ground. The final exercise in particular enables companycommanders to put into practice the qualities of firmness and intellect which were considered the vitalleadership qualities by Clausewitz.

To put people in situation is credible only if all conditions of realism are present, making a full-scale exercisepossible, including real weapons effects and once again making the unit commander face his responsibilitiesand the difficulty of choices, which is at the very heart of his job and the purpose of the training.

1. At CENTAC and CENZUB, company commanders have access to a realistic environment through the assetsthey operate, the terrain and the enemy they face.

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TThe way exercises are playedout in the centers enables unit

commanders to use full tacticalreasoning and, above all, to ensurethe implementation of their fullchain of command and control.They can subsequently testtheir methods as well as theirprocedures.

At CENZUB, the captain benefitsfrom the expertise of the center toprepare his maneuver, taking intoaccount the courses of action specificto an urban environment.

At CENTAC, during the week priorto the 96-hour exercise, simulationtools are provided for training. During

the exercise, there is always time forpreparation and this time is devotedto the preparation of the mission.It enables, among other things,the dissemination of orders andthe implementation of the backbriefand the rehearsal which are requiredsteps by which the center can checkthe dissemination of orders andverify their implementation onthe ground.

But during the exercise itself,the unit commander is in charge,conducting the maneuver and givingorders. At CENTAC in particular,the exercise is a force-on-force typeand it is not unusual that the OPFOR(Opposing Force) causes the failureof the maneuver.

The unit commander, helped bythe center controllers, can analyzewith hindsight his concept ofmaneuver and the execution of hisaction in concrete terms. He can alsoreceive concise, precise feedbackabout his subordinates’ behaviorand their ability to implement ordersor to take initiative when required.

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2. Full implementation of the command and control process and playing out the real tactical solutioncomplete with real consequences brings the commander face to face with his responsibilities.

3. The clash between theory and reality and above all unexpected events will lead the unit commander tomanage in the long term some tense situations and test his abilities and resistance.

TTo take into account suchcomplexity in a limited time-space

enables the unit commander tohandle all the issues related toleadership. Even if some incidentsare not properly solved,the confrontation with realityprovides awareness of the problemand allows the commander to lookback with hindsight beyond the endof the rotation.

The dilemma that confronts the unitcommander concerns his physicallocation on the battlefield withthe continuing question of beingwhere the effort takes place butwithout losing sight of the widerdisposition and without uselessly

exposing himself. These constraintsweigh on his job while fatigueaccumulates, forcing him tocompromise constantly.

The notion of moral andpsychological influence, as proponedby Ardant du Picq, takes on all itsimportance here. It can be revealingto see a unit commander, shut in hisVAB and unable to properly assessthe situation, let a tacticalopportunity pass while one of hisplatoons is not getting anywhere forlack of energetic reorientation.

The length of the exercises, theuncertainty, the tension and thefatigue are an arduous test for unit

commanders. In these difficultconditions, they have the opportunityto train themselves to manage theirtime, their energy and their stress,and to make progress whiledeveloping the cohesion of their unitby reinforcing the confidence thateach person gradually gains from theothers—confidence which is vital incombat.

1 CPF: Centre de préparation des forces/Army ForceReadiness Center.

2 CENTAC: Centre d’entraînement aucombat/French Force-on-Force Training Center.

3 CENZUB: Centre d’entraînement aux actions enzone urbaine/Military Operations in Urban Terrain(MOUT) training center.

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MMainly focused on the sub-unit(company) commander and his

close command team, trainingprovided by Forces Readiness CentersHQs prepares all commanders ofCombined-Arms Company Task Forces(SGTIA), or even of Combined-ArmsBattalion Task Forces (GTIA), for themost probable operations, throughrealistic exercises.

These exercises recreate currentengagement conditions as accuratelyas possible, in the circumstances of

worst-case scenarios. They then putthese commanders under conditions ofstress and fatigue which require greatphysical and mental endurance.This realism allows seasoning ofcommand teams, developing theirstamina, their strength of mind andtheir technical and tactical expertise,essential for victory under toughconditions.

In all centers, there is a unanimousunderstanding of the importance ofdemanding and exhausting training

exposing units to the closest thingpossible to the reality of combat.Observation of these training sessionsdemonstrates that tough commandersstay physically strong and mentallystable. They draw on their capacity forjudgment and for decision-making inorder to best use their expertise andexploit all opportunities that present.This is why the conditions of stressand fatigue to which command teamsare exposed in training are at the sametime the end and the means ofseasoning commanders.

1 – Training, as elaborated in Forces Readiness Centers, contributes greatly to the combat seasoningof commanders.



15

CCOMBATOMBAT-S-SEASONINGEASONING ININ TTRAININGRAINING

CCENTERSENTERS

AA REQUIREMENTREQUIREMENT FORFORLEADERSLEADERS’ ’ DEVELOPMENTDEVELOPMENT

CPF1 S3 WITH THE COOPERATION

OF THE MOUNTAIN COMBAT SEASONING GROUP

AAs defined in the Army Combat Seasoning Manual: “Combat-seasoning is a set of processes and individualand collective training in realistic conditions contributing to the enhancement of the operational capability of

men and their assignment cells, confronting them, under the leadership of their commanders, with physical andpsychological difficulties, induced by mission execution in hostile and unusual conditions and environment”.

The expression “under the leadership of their commanders” shows the vital importance of combat seasoningin the training of commanders.

And yet, if seasoning must be found in all training activities such as morale training, physical training,technical and tactical instruction, it is also present during training sessions in Forces Readiness Centers,whether they are dedicated to it or not.

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TThe GAM (Mountain CombatSeasoning Group) was created

in Modane in the summer of 2009,following the creation of two largerspecialized centers. The aim is toretain a minimal capacity for combatseasoning in mountain conditions ofcold and altitude, centered on thestrict operational needs of the Army.It is primarily dedicated to infantryunits (not including the mountainbrigade).

The GAM fulfills two missions whichboth contribute to reinforcingoperational capacity:

- Collective and individual seasoning inmountainous areas thanks tophysical and psychological trainingfor leaders and soldiers.

- Command training in situations ofstress and fatigue under unusual anddisorientating conditions.

The training involves a series of fieldsequences, with significantdifferences in height and dry gapcrossings. Units come to GAM tolearn from instructors the basics ofthis tough and demanding life thatmountains bring. The aim of thistraining is to make them discoverthe—often underlying—ability ofevery individual to surpass himself.

The aim is to put personnel intosituations similar to an operationalcontext in which they must no longersimply follow orders but alsounderstand situations reactindependently sometimes.Units must then not only havethe knowledge but also understandand adapt.

For the preparation and training ofcommanders, mountains areparticularly demanding in terms ofgeographical and weather conditions.

They are good for physical andpsychological training because they:

- Demand efforts that develop greatertoughness, endurance andresistance to fatigue.

- Force trainees to give their all anddevelop their will.

- Reinforce team spirit while inspiringcare for subordinates or comrades.

- Are a unique school of commandwhere, as in operations, thedecision of the commander mayengage the lives of the unit.

- Are an ideal school for managingrisk.

1 CPF: Centre de préparation des forces/Army ForceReadiness Center.

2 – Mountains: a difficult environment useful for combat seasoning men and commanders.

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DDoctrineoctrine

IN-BATTALIONTRAINING OF TACTICAL LEADERSBRIGADIER GENERAL MICHEL YAKOVLEFF, COMMANDING THE 7TH ARMORED BRIGADE

Tactical training of Officers and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) is unanimously recognized as a basicrequirement. This article offers a thorough and realistic pattern as much as it has been implemented both

fully—in a battalion of conscripts—and partially—in a battalion engaged in overseas operations (OPEX). Thispattern may be applied as soon as a reasonable quorum is reached: about a third of the theoretical audience.It relies on simply organized exercises not requiring heavy files but forming a coherent whole.

Before going ahead, the commanding officer (CO) must set objectives and in particular the missions to be usedas teaching aids (unless decided by a higher authority). Next, he should determine an educational structure;an example is described in this article. Above all, he should set out a training roadmap and stick to it fiercely,if necessary showing the greatest obstinacy in the face of subordinates (functional leaders and companycommanders) who may cede to the pressure of impending deadlines and succumb to the temptation ofadjournment or abandon. If he shows unrelenting obstinacy in keeping to the schedule, if he is deeply and personally involved in everyactivity from the beginning to the end of the program and if he systematically disciplines absentees, then hewill succeed in meeting his objectives.

But which tactics to teach?

TThings were simple back inthe day (before the fall ofthe Berlin Wall). We trained for

conventional warfare under a nuclearthreat. We learned tactics for relativelyhomogeneous and equal large

masses (symmetric war), with unitsnested one inside the other likeRussian dolls: battalion in brigade,in division, in army corps. Both campswere operating and aiming to winthrough battle.There a brief “interposition” phasewhere the key expertise seemed to bethe checkpoint and escortinghumanitarian convoys. It was ratherdifficult to apply tactical decision-making process to situations notrequiring use of force.

For some years—and it would seem tohave been the case for some while—the prevailing paradigm is that ofcounter-insurrection warfare.

So on which model should tacticaltraining be based? The model “ofthe moment,” useful immediately but

vulnerable to changing trends;or the “conventional” model, whichbetter characterizes classical thinkingbut may prove to be obsolete? The question is not anodyne. We haveto take into account the effort ofthe battalion with long careers inmind. The tactical spirit of officers andNCOs develops over two decades,by which time war as we know it mayhave changed fundamentally.Things may not be as black and whiteas they seem.

Firstly, regardless of whether weconsider mass warfare or COINwarfare, the battalion would seem tobe the key unit. In the masses,it is the basic element of the big unitmaneuver. In COIN warfare, it isthe level of tactical cohesion. Evenin Afghanistan, there is no brigademaneuver. Battalions maneuver andthe upper levels are there tocoordinate resources.Then, tautologically, we are in a timeof combined arms conflict, if not jointoperations. Today’s operations aredecentralized down to the lowestlevels. If this model of war remainsvalid, any choice which consolidatesthe combined arms culture of ourofficers and NCOs will be vindicated.Of course, were it to change—should“the Great War” paradigm becomerelevant again—we would no doubtsee the various functions refocusingat higher levels, reducingthe combined arms aspect of combatat low levels. In this case,the combined arms expertise taught

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Things may not be as black and white as they seem.

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to young officers and NCOs wouldbe truly useful to them as they risethrough the ranks.

So, in—partial—conclusion,the tactical training provided in-battalion must be focused on the BnTFand the company TF level with, asmuch as possible, a combined armsview.

However, the commanding officer(or even the Army Chief of Staff if hechooses to be directive) must makechoices, as there are significantdifferences between the two models.In “conventional” war, with its bigmasses, the maneuver is wider thanin counter-insurrectional war.For instance, in the past we studiedmobile defense, in which a divisioncovered over a hundred kilometerswithin 36 hours. Today, our Bn TFspatrol fixed sectors for the duration oftheir stay.

However, the human density offighters is far lower today. Combatsupport, until recently massive andcentralized to this end, is nowscattered. We no longer fire shells inclusters (96 rounds), but in ones andtwos. On the other hand, although fireis used more sparingly, it is much

more discriminating. The conceptof tactical decision has become muchmore blurred and it is almostimpossible to pick a winner atthe end of a three-day search.Some “conventional” missions mayseem obsolete—for examplescreening, mobile defense, positionaldefense and denial action—but someof their processes are easilytransferrable to the present context.The missions that are clearly stillrelevant have been listed inthe inventory for quite some time—forexample: control an area, set anambush, react to an incident, reducean isolated resistance and cover—anda more recent list could be compiled:cordon off a zone, search, etc.

Perhaps it is possible to study tacticswithout studying specific missionsper se. It is not, however, possible toimplement tactics without choosing aground, an opponent and a mission.The choice of a mission as a basis fortactical exercises is therefore a crucialone, unless it is possible to studythe full range of missions.

In any case, however operationsdevelop, anything which stimulatesthe minds of our commanders isbeneficial, if not the optimum solution.

The tactical training of leaders doesnot aim to cover the full range ofmissions, even if it is based on this.It aims to prepare the most safe,quick and clear tactical decision-making possible. It aims to developinitiative, aggression (literallyspeaking: to have a biting wit),a penchant for risk andperceptiveness—particularly in the management of combatsupport—without ever forgettingthe ethical judgment that mustunderpin every tactical choice.

Fundamentally, any tacticalexercise—be it related to proceduresor direct implementation—has agoal that is both internal (to developthe skills of the cell) and external (todevelop the ability to operatebetween two tactical levels).When possible, the proposedframework includes two—or eventhree—tactical levels by principle.In addition, it recommends upper-level and out-of-specialty training. Upper-level training entails involvingthe subordinate level with the levelabove, so as to give a betterunderstanding of the workingenvironment. For instance,the lieutenant is involved with hiscaptain’s thinking. Experience showsthat this practice is very popularwith subordinates.

The out-of-specialty concept isbased on the notion that everyonemust be open-minded and not focussolely on his own needs. To achievethis, the exercises aim at crossingspecialties. Tactical leaders must getused to the rationale of their logisticcounterparts, and vice-versa. Whilenot giving them all the requiredexpertise, a minimum of knowledgeregarding the other field of actionis worth having in its own right.It is not guaranteed that this willinfluence overall performance.But it can’t do any harm. Once again,experience has shown it to be apowerful incentive factor onceeveryone has grasped the generalidea.

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And how should we organizeourselves?

I have used this pattern twice atbattalion level, first as a S3 in abattalion of conscripts and then ascommanding officer of a professionalbattalion. This pattern is an ambitiousone, but it has already been applied,both fully (with the 3rd DragonsRegiment) and partially (with the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment).In the current context, it may beseen as “ideal,” but, like every ideal,impossible to each yet usefulto aim at.

It is very structured, both inthe definition of the audiences andthe typology of the exercises. Thisformal aspect facilitates both planningand implementation, whichconstitutes a considerable advantagein current times. In particular, oncean iteration has been run for a givenexercise, there is no longer any needto start the session with anexplanation of each participant’s role,saving time for all.

The framework includes many andvaried types of exercises suited tospecific audiences, split into “Levels”which are well-known in battalions.

LEVEL A = battalion headquarters, inthe widest sense: this encompassesall officers, non commissionedofficers and other personnel likelyto work in the Bn TF CP.In addition to the battalionheadquarters proper, it is importantto remember the Signals platoon,the HQ platoon and the battalionprotection platoon.To come back to the battalionheadquarters, it is important toconsider that not only all S3 sectionofficers but also the quartermasterand his assistant, the surgeon andliaison officers participate.

LEVEL B = company commanders,once again, to be taken in a widesense: current and future companycommanders (including theirexecutive officers), and also theirown environment (logistics officer,company sergeant major, Signalstroops, etc.).

LEVEL C = Platoon/troop leaders ofany kind (therefore the leader ofthe maintenance shop, the nursingofficer, the soldiers’ catering platoon,etc.) and future leaders (in practice,all BSTAT1 candidates).Exercises involving both levels Aand B are named ASTERIX2

Those intended more specificallyforlevels B and C are named OBELIX(the bulk of the force). Level A isinvolved with them to provideguidance.

A specific OBELIX—logistics—isdescribed under a particularframework, “the logistics yoyo.”From it stems a Forward CombatTrains (TC1) drill exercise calledLOGISTIX.

The derivative exercises forcommanding captains (Level B) arenamed CENTURION.

They can in turn form the basis ofplatoon leader level exercises:IDEFIX.

A specific training structure intendedfor level C (troop/platoon leaders)but supervised by level B(the company commanders), dealswith major contemporary issues(PANORAMIX) and military history(CLAUSEWIX).

ASTERIX exercises

ASTERIX exercises form a series,based on a central theme whichevolves from one exercise tothe next. It is recommended to selectan area close to the barracks,enabling reconnaissance onthe ground if necessary. The single,evolving theme offers the advantageof not requiring a new and completeexercise file for each session, asthe former rehearsal level is used asa starting point for the on-going

iteration. This continuity is popularand avoids the artificial aspect of acomplete file to be learned prior toevery exercise. In this situation,the experience of those who havetaken part in the previous exerciseis directly used in the on-goingexercise, which is actually quiteclose to the operational reality.

The following series was appliedwith the 3rd RD (Stetten) in 1995-1996, at the rate of one D+N+Dapproximately every six weeks.The context was “conventional.”

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ASTERIX 1• CP presentation: deployment,

organization.

• Battalion Task Force MDMP:theoretical presentation.

• Implementation in a simple practicalscenario: the Bn TF is moving alonethrough an unsafe area.

• Outcomes: warning order, initialorder, annexes (movements?),briefings.

• Level B: Taking part as CP staff (up-level), then downgrading to theirlevel (cascaded orders) and backbriefing.

• Environment: HQ support platoon,signal platoon drill (SCDG, SITREP).

ASTERIX 2• Starting from the previous situation:

procedural reminders (puttingnewcomers are up to speed).

• Concrete scenario: change tothe previous situation.The movement studied in theprevious exercise is interrupted toface an unexpected threat (hencenew task organization, change indirection, etc.).

• Outcomes: warning orders,fragmentary orders.

• Level B and environment: same asprevious scenario.

ASTERIX 3• Specific complex scenario regarding

coordination (relief on a position).

• Outcomes: same orders.

ASTERIX 4• Fragmentary orders (in this case,

position defense on a gap).

• Analysis of variants(counterattacks).

OBELIX exercisesThe following series was applied withthe 3rd RD (Stetten) in 1995-1996, atthe rate of one Friday approximatelyevery 6 weeks. The context was“conventional.” The S3 organizedthe first two iterations directly, givingthe company commanders time toprepare their missions. Themes weredistributed in cooperation withthe company commanders.

OBELIX 1• Battalion Task Force presentation

• Brigade presentation

• Theme of the afternoon:Group 1: Movement of the brigadeGroup 2: Stationing of the brigade

OBELIX 2• The exercise enemy

• Theme of the afternoonGroup 1: The defending MRR Group 2: The attacking TR

OBELIX 3• The Bn TF logisticsHHC commander the chains:• Medical, supply, maintenance, troop

support

• Deployment and change of locationof Rear Combat Trains (TC 2)

• Afternoon “ The logistic yoyo”(see details below)

OBELIX 4• The Bn TF action in MOUTCo commander• Theme of the afternoonGroup 1: The Bn TF in a protractedstationingGroup 2: The attacking Bn TF

OBELIX 5• Tactical deceptionCo commander• Afternoon themeGroup 1: How to simulate a stationingBn TFGroup 2: How to fake an attack

OBELIX 6• Counter-reconnaissance

Co commander• Afternoon themeGroup 1: Bn TF carries out counter-reconnaissance actionsGroup 2: Eny recce tries to gaincontact with the Bn TF

OBELIX 7• The enemy levels 2 and 3 CS &

CSS Co

Commander• Afternoon themeGroup 1: The Bn TF moving face to aLevel 2 enyGroup 2: The Bn TF stationing face to aLevel 2 eny

OBELIX 8• Lessons learned from a company

commander returning from anoverseas operation (IFOR)

Specific scenario: OBELIX LOGISTICS

It is necessary to be very directiveregarding this exercise, andexperience shows it to be the mostappreciated of all, particularly amongjunior officers and NCOs as it isthe closest to the field.It must take place in September orOctober, as it is directly useful for allplayers, particularly those preparingfor exams such as the Army NCOsspecialized course (BSTAT).

The HHC company commander andthe S4 as well as the quartermasterand surgeon are closely involved.

The morning briefings are distributedbetween the admin and technicalofficer and the HQ and logisticscompany commander. The issues tobe addressed are as follows:- the general principles of logistics;- the Bn TF under the logistic

perspective (personnel strength,vehicles fleet, replenishmentrequirements, etc.);

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- the various chains: Medical, supply,maintenance, troop support fromthe logistics support group down tothe consumer;

- the deployment of the battalion andcompany combat trains;

- the change of location ofthe battalion combat train.

The afternoon is devoted to a kind of“logistic yoyo.”Attendees must circulate through allthe chains, from the logistics supportgroup down to the company combattrain.

A Forward Combat Train (TC1) isdeployed somewhere in the facilities,with at least one of each type ofvehicle likely to be fielded:maintenance-type P4, lightintervention element, medical VAB,support truck.

On the parade ground (or elsewhere)the battalion combat train (TC2) isdeployed in clearly differentiatedpoints: - medical point with a battalion aid

station, - maintenance point with hoisting and

supply means, - forward arming and refueling point

with all possible versions (fuel,

ammunition) with required hoistingmeans,

- command point with the battalioncombat train VAB,

- prisoner point.

Taking advantage of local resources,a logistics support group is set up,or a functional equivalent relying onthe existing infrastructure: - infirmary for triage,- workshops for the maintenance area,- gas station for the fuel area,- ad hoc location for the ammunition

area,- same thing for soldier support

(handling the dead and monitoringof treated people).

The different briefers prepare a 5-minute talk about what happensin their zones.To leave lasting memories, allattendees back and forth betweenchains, from the rear to the front andvice versa. They carry devices whichpromote “awareness.”

LOGISTIX exerciseThis exercise is as a supplement tothe OBELIX logistics exercise andproposes a centralized companycombat train drill. It is the only wayto provide company logistic deputies

with practical experience of realcommand, particularly in the currentcontext of the inventory maintenanceand management policy (PEGP).A complete company combat train isset up, gathered for the day. The daybefore, the company first sergeantsand/or the company logistic officersare gathered for a theory refresherand a briefing on the exercise(simplified theme).

The exercise consists of a circuit loop,possibly repeated, where each playerwill have to command the ForwardCombat Train for a leap. Each playermust: - take into account the mission (to

move with the Forward Combat Trainfrom one place to another)

- plan the movement- give orders- execute the movement- deploy the Forward Combat Train at

its new position, in an unsafe areaand taking into account the tacticalsituation of the company

- give orders for a mission (send themedical VAB or the armoredrecovery tank to a company)

- respond to an unexpected incident(artillery shelling with injuredpeople, appearance of lost enemypersonnel, to be captured thenmanaged).

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CENTURION exercises

One CENTURION exercise for eachtype of mission: ATTACK (COUNTER-ATTACK), BLOCK, DELAY, RAID, etc.

The S3 issues an operations orderwith three or four very differenttasks for subordinates. The thememust be local so the captains cancarry out reconnaissance in thefield.The captains play each role in turn.This saves on themes.For example: the Bn TF is preparingan attack. A company team carriesout a reconnaissance and a counter-reconnaissance in the zone ofapproach. A second company is inreserve, facing two enemy forcesengagement scenarios. A third isgaining ground to cover the mainaction in the enemy depth. Thefourth covers a secondary direction.

Each captain has two hours to planhis mission and must express it asan operation order to the S3 and hisclassmates (who play the companyleaders).

After the exercise, each participantwrites his complete operation orderwith an overlay.

This exercise, which is similar to aCommand and General Staff Collegeoral test, improves performance butalso gives the habit of a commanddialogue. It may be complicated atevery possible opportunity, forexample playing it against the clockwithin the VAB or at night.

The IDEFIX exercises

One IDEFIX exercise for each type ofmission: ATTACK (COUNTER-ATTACK),BLOCK, DELAY, RAID, etc.

The company commander startsfrom one of his orders fromCENTURION.

Each platoon leader has two hoursto plan his maneuver and explain itthrough an operational order to thecompany commander and hisclassmates (who play the role ofplatoon leader). After the exercise, each participant

writes his complete operation orderwith an overlay.Writing a complete operation orderenables us to turn this into a tacticalexercise on the ground for leaders atplatoon level.

The two following exercises,PANORAMIX and CLAUSEWIX, aremore didactic briefings than tacticalexercises. However, they helpdevelop the tactical and generalknowledge of officers and NCOsand thus have their place in thisinventory.They are combined in a half-day ofleader training. They could form partof the information day during whichthe commanding officer or functionalleaders will use to develop organicpoints. It may be advisable to share theworld regions among companies,thus encouraging them to specialize.

1 Translator’s note: BSTAT Brevet SupérieurTechnique de l’armée de Terre (Army HigherTechnical Certificate).

2 Translator’s note: Astérix the Gaul is acharacter from a popular French comic.

While a player plays his phase, his successor prepares the next. On order, he takes into account the Forward CombatTrains, gives it orders and executes the movement. This continues until all players have commanded “their” companyfor two or three hours while performing a leap.

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Logistics support group Rear Combat Train Forward Combat Train

“I am a shell” (a box is carried by twosoldiers)

Ammunition point: explanations about theallotment (homogeneous, heterogeneous),handling equipment, war accounting

Delivery

Upper level repair means Maintenance point: evacuation and repairassets, turnaround time, priorities

“I am a broken-down vehicle”

“I am a spare part”

Maintenance point: supply management,maintenance inventory

Vehicle repaired and delivered

Triage: principles (emergencies),evacuation

Battalion aid station: means, medical treatment

”I am wounded”: preparation for relief,boarding in a medical VAB

“I am dead”: administrative action (quartermaster)

“I am fuel” (jerrycan carried in pair)

Forward refueling point: stripping,management, delivery principles(centralization or round system)

Delivery

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Having been asked tocontribute to reflectiononthe role of thecommander

in operations, I relied, in additionto the experience I gained a fewyears ago, on that of some of mysubordinate commanders, whowere recently assigned to forcecommander positions on nationalas well as internationaloperations in the varioustheaters where France iscurrently committed. I would liketo mention and thank them here,having quoted them abundantlyinthis article, as theirexperiences correlateremarkably with the convictionsI acquired over the 35 years ofmy military career.1

Without being too specific aboutthe responsibilities and roles ofForce Commanders (very welldescribed in the excellent“Exercise of Command inOperations by TacticalCommanders” text recentlypublished by the CDEF (ForcesEmployment Doctrine Center)and if I had to select one singletruth, it would be that the ForceCommander is a warfightingcommander wielding the fullscope of command and bearingall the responsibility pertainingto it. In my opinion, this includes threeessential focus points.The particular situation ofcommand specific to eachtheaterdoes not impair the relevanceor permanence of these points,which apply to all ForceCommanders in operations.

The human side of command

Combat and death at the heart ofdecision-making

This goes without saying, but it isimportant to hammer the messagehome. This crucial aspect of ourvocation as commanders takes onparticular significance for ForceCommanders. The level of respon-sibility, the vast number of decisionsto be made, the strength of forcesunder command, the “distance”between staffs located in theiroperation centers and units in contactwith the enemy are all factors whichmake the decision more critical. It isimportant that all decisions be wellinformed, and it is essential that allsubordinates be fully aware of itssignificance.

The responsibility of the Commanderin the field with his troops

The Force commander must be readyto go into the field, among the troops,and provide linkage between forcecommand and units. He thuscontributes to maintaining the moraleof deployed units and the Force’scohesion of action. The ForceCommander is first and foremostsomebody who may be found in thefield, close to his troops and officerscommanding units or detachments,within an area of responsibility, whichhe should know perfectly.

The Commander’s responsibilityto the populace

The Force Commander is perceivedas a significant authority bythe populace. In this capacity, heis a privileged and credible contact.His commitment when dealing withthe populace, either directly or withadministrative or traditionalauthorities as intermediaries is

therefore a key element forsuccessfully achieving the desiredeffect on the environment. He must,therefore, quickly obtain knowledgeof the country’s culture andthe sensibilities of the people he hasto deal with, as well as striking abalance between his position ascommander and his situation as aforeigner. He should also leave animpression through regular presenceand an open attitude, which entailsappropriate dress to matchthe message he wishes to convey.

The Commander’s responsibility toallies (in multinational missions)

With allies, credibility is once againthe key word. As the subordinateof a lead nation or internationalorganization, the Force Commandermust both comply with the frameworkdefined by higher level and preservehis “soul.” Transparency is the bestway to ensure that we can work in aclimate of trust. In this area too,personal relationships betweencommanders prove to be the bestchance for success. The ForceCommander should devote timeto them, at least in the early stages,so as to build healthy relationships.

The holistic dimensionof command

Conception and implementationof the civil-military maneuver

In charge of the civil-militarymaneuver, at least within his area ofresponsibility, the Force Commanderexercises command with political anddiplomatic dimensions. Besides thenecessary preparation that is involved,he should also include that aspect inhis research process and conceptionof maneuver. Here again, relationships

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The Commander in Operations

LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) ANTOINE LECERF, FORMER COMMANDER OF FRENCH LAND FORCES

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with the civilian component—includingthe ambassador—are crucial forthe efficiency of the disposition andthe coherence of the desired effects.In the midst of instability, the ForceCommander is the main player of thecivil-military maneuver (developmentand governance).

Conception and implementationof the influence maneuver

The force Commander holds the key tothe influence maneuver. All current andfuture operations, whatever theirnature, are and will be wars ofperception, because we deal withconflicts in the midst of a populace ina world of extreme media coverage,in which information is everywhere.

Influence remains the only trueweapon to act on perception.The Force Commander should be fullyaware of its relevance, and mustconvince his subordinates of this. Heshould also consider and understandthat maneuver holistically, as thekeystone of all his lines of operation.

Inventiveness and adaptationBeyond the “maneuver,” the ForceCommander should keep consideringthings objectively, which is necessaryfor continuous progress in the forceand so as to not rest on the laurels ofprevious achievements. His privilegedposition, as well as his ability to seethe bigger picture, enables him toconceive adaptations and innovationsin structures or organizations. TheForce Commander should permanentlyask himself questions, and thisquestioning should also concern hisstaff. This capability is all the morenecessary as the situation on a giventheater moves towards stability.

Keeping the spirit of the mission

The Armed Forces Chief of Staff:the sole operational commander

The Force Commander reports directlyto the Armed Forces Chief of Staff,who assigns his mission. In additionto the Armed Forces Chief of Staff’sguidance—which is often issued afterthe beginning of the mission—the Force Commander should havea perfect knowledge of hiscommander’s conception of

operations, and permanently keep inmind the fact that the latter is his soleoperational superior, beyond hisfunctional links with the CPCO (JointOperations Planning and Command& Control Center).

Keeping alive the spirit of the missionThe Force Commander must ensure thatthe spirit of the mission assigned by theArmed Forces Chief of Staff is preserved.He is its guardian, it keeper, its defenderand its promoter. He must ensure thatorders reflect this spirit perfectly,develop means to explain it and to makesure that it is understandable—andeven convincing—for all. He mustmaintain these means so that the spiritmay endure whatever the circumstancesarise.

Giving a meaning to the spiritof the mission

The commander in operations is oftenthe only person who can give meaningto the action performed by the Force.That meaning, partly comprised withinthe spirit of the mission, shouldconstantly be explained and relayeddown to the lowest levels of execution,so that the “strategic corporal” may beaware—with the specifics of his ownlevel—of what he is fighting for.

To conclude, I shall provide someadvice which, although relevant todifferent issues, has, in my opinion,particular significance for anycommander in operation.

The fundamentals of tactics:Our METT-TC analyses are efficient andstill relevant today, in spite of changein operational environments. In allcircumstances, in particular the mosttense, the commander shouldremember and remind hissubordinates of the fact that:

Implementation of the threeprinciples of war is still crucial.

There is always an enemy (underwhatever name), ie. he whoprevents me from achieving mymission. There is the enemyof the captain and the enemy ofthe general.

The concept of control:More so than on national territory,the commander should on apermanent basis be extremelyconcerned with control. Not the type ofcontrol which annihilates the freedomof action of his subordinates, but thatwhich allows ensuring that employmentof forces complies with the ROEs, inparticular through the orders anddirectives drafted by his staff. The livesof his soldiers depend on it.

The advisors:The commander should not let hisadvisors (if he has any assigned tohim) take up too much of his time, orassume an exaggerated position. Theyshould by no means become a secondstaff; they are only his experts inspecific areas, and not DCOSs orsecond-in-commands. It is generallyadvisable to limit their number asmuch as possible.

The military assistant:His role and additional expertise arecrucial in operation. His efficiencylies in the close relationships thecommander creates and maintainswith him. It also depends on thedegree of information-sharing. Apartfrom providing the Force Commanderwith capability for research, analysisand drafting, the military assistant canenrich and feed his research withunbiased enlightenment. Lastly, heplays the crucial part of a mirror forthe commander, which helps to breakthe “ivory tower” effect inherent tohis position.

Endurance:The mission may be long and trying,especially if it lasts a year or more.The commander should thereforearrive in the field in shape,psychologically as well as physically,and keep to a disciplined lifestyletogether with a tempo of activities thatenable him to endure. This aspect iscrucial, concerning not just himself butalso his subordinates.

1 They are: Major General Stollsteiner (Afghanistan –RCC Kabul – 2008-2009), Brigadier GeneralLafontaine (Lebanon – Repfrance Daman – 2009-2010), Brigadier General Druart (Afghanistan – TFLafayette – 2009-2010) and Brigadier GeneralHogard (Côte d’Ivoire – Licorne Force Commander –2010).

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During operations,the commander of a

Combined Arms BattalionTask Force (GTIA) is theman who brings meaningto action and orders,particularly with regards tothe nature and the settingup of the commitment. Hereadies the unit duringthe preparation phase,and then, duringimplementation, balancesmultidimensionaloperational and organicfactors. He constantlyreconsiders his action,available data and currentperceptions. As acommanding element oftenisolated within unusual andad hoc structures, he is achoice target for potentialor known irregularenemies and the firstresort for subordinatesin difficult situations.

TThe political and militaryenvironment and the objectivesof operations are sometimes

unclear. Objectives, which are at oncemilitary, political, economic andhuman, are intermingled. The lines

between strategic, operational andtactical levels fade away. Potentialand confirmed enemies, in particularirregular ones, act with completeimpunity in the physical andimmaterial fields. Although theydo not hesitate to widen the theaterof confrontation, particularly usingcommunication means, their mentalenvironment (motivation, objectivesand guiding force) is difficult toapprehend. Planning an operationtherefore requires a comprehensiveapproach and finely tuned on-groundexecution.

This is exacerbated by the mostoften urban nature of commitments,requiring action within the populace,under permanent media pressure andwithin strict ethical and sociological1

limits. The concentration of players ina restricted space leads to a reducedtime-frame. Events

occur one after the other at a veryhigh rate and without any obvioustransition, giving a constantlychanging—and often unpredictable—situation. There is a glut ofinformation which must be processedbut is often difficult to interpret.The intent of the potential orconfirmed enemy is diluted inthe events, which are so numerousand varied that they bring confusionto the sequencing of actions. Lastly,our troops are of a generation whichis quick to question and are task-organized in contingency units withdiffering traditions, courses of actionand concepts.

In these circumstances,the commander must see himselfin an overarching multidimensionalframe of reference, above simplecombat and facilitating managementof interactions. He must also outlineintegration in a comprehensivevision of the military actions to becarried out. In short, he must bringmeaning to action and to orders.

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Bringing Meaning to Action and Orders:The Tactical Leader in Operations

COLONEL FRANCK NICOL, COMMANDING THE 16TH BATAILLON DE CHASSEURSCOMMANDING BN TASK FORCE DAMAN X, LEBANON (SEPT. 2009/FEB. 2010)

( )In short, he must bring meaningto action and to orders.

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Federate units andindividuals arounda strong idea

Except in cases of unexpectedcommitment, the commander hastime to conduct the preparation ofhis units. This is vital for the successof the mission, but not sufficientin itself. In practical terms, thecommander plans preparation fordeployment (MCP), relying on abenchmarking with units whichhave already participated inthe operation, completed bycollection of reference documentsand by reconnaissance ofthe theater. Boosted by the lessonslearned, the preparation is basedaround three main themes:- Cultural knowledge of the theaterof operation. The first appraisal ofthe situation is key. Players mustbe identified and distinguished,and their interests and attitudesmust be understood as much as ispossible. This analysis must beconsidered in terms of the role ofthe Force, the spirit of the mission,the intents of the higher level, theterrain and the disposition. Thecommander therefore makes hisBattalion Task Force (GTIA) workon the basic skills and behaviorsto be mastered before deploymentand organizes training exerciseswith particular focus on maneuverrehearsal. The operations center

builds a good command ofprocedures so as to be able tofocus quickly on main issues onceon the theater. Lastly, the culturalfoundations of the host countryare taught to all personnel to avoidany faux pas.

- The frame of mind of subordinates.Their critical ability must besharpened to avoid being tied intotime-consuming procedures andactions, especially during stabilityoperations. They must be awareof the risks of manipulation,exploitation and intimidationwhich are barely touched uponin military training.

- The “mind interoperability” andcohesion of the contingent. Asmany service members as possibleshould live a common experience(cohesion camp during pre-deployment preparation) in whichthe commander sets rules foroperations and—crucially—dailylife. The aim is to create asustained disciplined and rigorousoperational unit, reinforcing itscredibility. This relies onoperational capability andexemplary behavior.

By creating a cohesive, federated C2team2 and setting rules for daily life,the commander shapes hissubordinates. On the theater he

continues this “shaping” by givingtime to people “outsidethe structure”. Although difficult,this action is vital, in particular whenthe Battalion Task Force is composedof various units, as it is currentlythe case in Lebanon, under a singleorganic command but underdifferent operational commands.

Balance operational andorganic factors in conduct

Reconcile the mission (spiritand letter), the sensitivity ofthe (expected) higher echelonsand the local situation. Althoughthe commander can never controleverything, he must assessthe impact of his action beforeconducting it. Is it necessary?Is the action in accordance withthe spirit of the mission? Mightit cause a change in direction oradditional tension?Have the conditions for successof the following phrases beenidentified and included in the plan?

Distinguish the military decisiveactions from those which relateto the resolution of problems andchoose the right ways and meansaccording to the spatiotemporalcontext, events analysis andthe issues of the moment. Certainchoices are within the commander’s

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competence: influenceoperations/use of power, display ofour actions to reassure or convinceplayers and opacity in order tosurprise or to avoid being surprised(Force protection).

Ensure a coherent comprehensiveapproach in the area. The multipleplayers involved in a militaryoperation (units, CIMIC,communication, support, intelligenceand authorities) and their differencesin culture, methods and perceptionsmay cause incoherence and lack ofcontinuity, which affect the credibilityof the action, at least in the eyesof the population. This can lead localactors, aware of the weaknesses ofthe Force, to manipulate theseparticipants or even to set themagainst one other. The commandermust therefore, while ensuring, at hislevel and with the support ofsuperiors, that the cohesion of hisunit remains intact, promote thecomplementarity of effects (militaryand civilian) in his area of action.In particular, the commander mustparticipate in the plan for handlingthe authorities, or Key LeadersEngagement (KLE).

Collaborate and cooperate withouttaking over. It is advisable tocooperate on the ground withcivilian participants and localplayers. Showing respect and givingthem a sense of responsibilityshould be favored, but they shouldnot become instrumental.

Maintain a link with the populacebut keeping its potential to generateconflict in mind. It is difficult todistinguish military personnel fromcivilians, combatants from non-combatants. And yet the populaceis a center of gravity of extremesensitivity. Its sufferings orrecriminations arouse the attentionof the media and the humanitarianworkers. Paradoxically, these groups,in highlighting the enemy todenounce them, give them powerwhich a potential or knownadversary can use. The commanderensures that the legitimacy andthe credibility of his actions arepreserved within the populace.He has to maintain a link with them

and at best make them attached tohim, and in every case protect itsintegrity. He has to send a clearmessage about the role and style ofthe contingent. Without being naïve,the commander’s action should favoropenness, to understand and beaccepted without drifting intoindifference or sentimentalism.

Aim for reversibility, thanks tometiculous preparation of missions.It is important not to be perceived asan occupation force (do not treatthe area as conquered ground;control without humiliating andshow discernment), but it is vital tobe capable of responding to asudden change of the situation.The commander must neither loseface nor show up his protagonists.

Adapt the rhythm of the unit.The commander has to reconcilethe readiness of subordinate units—presence or effective action—andpreservation of expertise immediatelyrequired for the operation.

Protect elements without thisbecoming an end in itself. Althoughnot a final goal, the protection ofthe contingent is a key element ofthe freedom of action andpreservation of capabilities and thusa permanent concern of command.However, it is advisable to avoidgoing to excess either by refrainingfrom necessary actions or divertingtoo many assets to the detrimentof primary objectives.

Everyone has his place. The commanderrelies on the unchanging chain ofcommand (Commanding Officer(CO)/Company commander), althoughfunctional chains exist.

Question oneself and the current situationendlesslyIt is vital not to take what has beenpresented as a given (reconnaissance,orders, dispositions, courses ofaction). The choice of a disposition, arule, or a method must be consideredwith humility and clarity. Reflecting onthe mission (the spirit and the letter)and its execution is a constant

process in which it is advisable toinvolve the higher level to respectthe spirit and meet expectations, tounderstand them well and even todevelop them. It is a reflex to identifywhat can change perceptions andthus the decision making process. In peace interposition missions, wherethe desired effect is often to providetime for political crisis resolution,the quality of the reaction in case ofincidents or major aggravations ofthe situation depends on the analysisof unexpected situations (what if?scenarios).

During an intense commitment,repeated surprise is to be favoredas it causes doubt in the mind ofthe opponent, if not psychologicalweakening. It requires capability forconstant intervention and accuratesituational awareness, but also forthe generation of opportunities whichcan be facilitated by dynamiccompartmentalization of physical andimmaterial spaces.

Exercise unsharedresponsibilities

The operational center is a “hub”which coordinates, anticipates,maintains coherence and ensuresthat actions focus on the same goal. The commander stands back andexercises his duty.

Employment of force. The commanderensures that the employment of forceis unambiguous for subordinates.In preserving the legitimacy of hisaction, he must avoid being in aposition where the only options wouldbe disproportionate use of force ordishonorable withdrawal. He mustidentify and define local sources ofopposition, support or inertia towardshis action. Taking into accountthe rules of engagement and behaviorstemming from the political andmilitary context, the attitude ofthe Force towards potential or existingsources of opposition must beexpressed and announced so as toleave no doubt in the mind ofsubordinates or the populace. It ishis role to define the procedures andmeans of avoiding collateral damageand any degeneration of incidents.



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Combat capability. Maintainingoperational capabilities falls underthe responsibility of the commander.Not knowing either the day or the hourof the commitment, the commandersteeps the spirit of his men inthe following trinity: “soldiers andequipment ready—vigilant soldiers—team spirit.” Potential inactivity isthe subject of intelligent centralizedmanagement.

All the while beingthe subject of everyattention and requestGenerally, the potential or knownopponent has a relationship withtime which enables him to weardown and deprive the Force of itslegitimacy. This adversary canimplement a local strategy of

bypassing the action and wearingdown the power of the Force byexploiting its weaknesses andvulnerabilities. He acts first andforemost on psychology. Instrumentalizing the—sometimesinduced—demands of the populaceallows the enemy to lead a campaignagainst the way the commanderoperates and limit his freedom ofaction. At worst, the adversary willfavor the provocation-retaliation-revenge cycle, pushingthe commander to respond militarilyin an inappropriate way giventhe circumstances.

As a potential victim of “Stockholmsyndrome3,” the commanderensures that rhetoric and actionsare impartial at all levels. Fightingagainst routine and/or inhibition, hemakes sure that everyone assesses

the situation objectively. He restorestruth to the battle of perceptions,particularly when it concernsanalysis of incidents, theirconsequences and their exploitationby the opponent.

The commander must inspire the trustof his subordinates, particularly ifthe situation is critical. He shapes histroops and shares his calm,particularly in difficult situations(casualties, for example). He spendstime on the ground, showing humilityas this is where the concept of orderscollides with the reality of theirimplementation. In case of emergency,he checks collected information,demands direct contact, assesseswhat he can do for the moment andthen, in the short and medium term,identifies potential hindrances to hisaction and identifies available assets.

1 Minimization of casualties.2 The conception team, ie.the operations center;the execution team, ie.the companies.

2 A unit is affected by Stockholmsyndrome when it can no longeridentify potential enemies in itsenvironment. The enemy, whichis part of its daily environment,ends up being considered as a“friend” along with the rest ofthe populace.

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As C2 organization becomes more complicated and requires denser staffs, the commander’s role is even

more fundamental but has changed in some ways. He exercises true leadership, heavily influenced by local

sensibilities and military and political issues. He ponders the relevance and the impact of the carried actions

and develops a culture of the unforeseen for his subordinates. But weighing the criticality of the mission,

necessary moderation and susceptibility of personnel to popular opinion, it is more necessary than ever to

ensure that the coherence of action exists by giving it meaning, distinguishing Good from Evil and sometimes

applying micro management.

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Writing aboutAfghanistan is quitea challenge, as

Western mentalities are oftennot prepared to understandthe complexity of the country.Testifying about theoperations of a company team(SGTIA1) might therefore beperceived—rightly—as evenmore sensitive, as theparameters linked to the warsituation of the country meanthat certainties sometimesevolve at a disconcerting rate.

There are three contingencieswhich have been influencedand put pressure on theconduct of operations inKapisa ever since thebeginning of the commitmentof French troops. The firstrelates to the fluctuation oflocal policies which havemuddled along for centuriesthrough a tangle of tribal andclan alliances.

The second is due to our ownpolicies. Objectives evolve,leading to variation intactical courses of action.Therefore, from the end of2008 until June 2009, ouroperations were firmlyoriented towards the seizureor recapture of refuge areasgained by our enemies,while the contingents whichfollowed were given asomewhat differently-worded brief.

The third contingency islinked to the inevitableevolution of tactical methodsduring the war, the warringparties constantly adaptingtheir courses of action tothose of their adversaries byintegrating past experienceinto future action.

IIn order to comprehend properlythe content of this article, we mustanchor it in space and time by

always linking it to the period andthe location of the mission we havecarried out: the Kapisa province,the Tagab district, from November2008 until June 2009.

The company team which has beenassigned this district wasencompassed in the Battalion TaskForce (GTIA), named Task Force Tiger.This Bn TF was included in a USbrigade from the 101st Division, the HQof which was located 15 kilometersupstream of the Kapisa valley towardsthe Panshir region. Manned fromthe 2nd company of the 27th BCA2,the company team was reinforced bycombat support and combat servicesupport elements (engineer, artillery,armor, quartermaster corps, etc.).Most of the time, the infantryplatoons were reinforced by anengineer squad, (an engineer squadfor 3 infantry squads) sharingthe engineering skills betweenthe infantry platoons.

The organization of company team Bis given at the end of this article.

1. The political environment

The TAGAB district is located atthe crossroads of 4 valleys with theirown geological, economic and culturalcharacteristics: TAGAB, ALASAY,BEDRAOU and DIRAM-DIRAM.This gives it a local importance—botheconomically and politically—resulting in a complex administrativeorganization: no less than 4 Shuras3

organize the dialog betweenthe 140 Maleks4. At the beginning of

Commanding a Combined ArmsCompany Team In Afghanistan

CAPTAIN (P) VINCENT MINGUET - CPCO

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May 2009, these Shuras were unifiedaround a political nucleus close to theHIG5, a dissident political party whichjoined the ranks of the non-violentopposition but which keeps an activenetwork able to return quickly toarmed combat.

In this imbroglio, the captaincommanding the company team isseen as the “garrison commander.”Although he has to attend certainShuras dealing with security,the mission of following the saga ofthe political life falls to the HUMANDET, the S2 and the CIMIC (each inits area of responsibility). Althoughpainstaking, this work enablesthe team to build a climate ofconfidence which can lead toacquisition of key intelligence (IEDlocation6, reports about insurgentactivities).

2. The wording of the mission andits potential evolution duringthe mandate

The operation order (OPO) given bythe Bn TF was cascaded to the levelof the company team. Because the USchain of command requests CONceptsof OPerations (CONOP), companyteam B produced more than 40 ofthem for operations (in English).

The wording of the mission givenby the SGIA B did not change duringthe mandate even if the tacticalobjectives changed according to ouractions. It was worded as follows:“in close coordination withthe ANSF7 and the PRT8, increasesecurity and restore confidencein the AOR in order to improvethe credibility of the force andstrengthen economic development”.

The company team B conducteddaily patrols over 6 months.The whole set of operations can besplit into 6 major types of mission:

- Support of Afghan police forces inoperations seeking weaponscaches or seizure of insurgentleaders. The aim is to seize stocksof weapons or explosives usingintelligence and enabling ANPofficers to work safely. We may

support these police when theyarrest people suspected of havingcarried out a terrorist action againstthe Afghan government or coalitionforces, this terrorist action havingbeen claimed by a Taliban orinsurgent movement.

- Intelligence collection patrol(HUMAN-C). These operations,sometimes called “shapingoperations,” are designed toconfirm a piece of intelligence inorder to finalize a future operationby bringing tactical answers to itsdesigners.

- Engineer reconnaissance (C-IED).Although this type of operation isunfortunately the most time- andhuman resource-hungry, it ensuresthe protection of human lives. It isindispensable for returning fromoperations, as the enemy knowswe are driving back to our baseand will have time to prepare.The chevron-shaped infantry squadsscout the approaches of the axis totry to intercept a potential “trigger”while the engineers, in secondechelon, screen the axis using metaldetectors.

- QRF (Quick Reaction Force).A platoon might be committed atany time to support another unitin contact, dealing with an IED orsimply stuck in a wadi.

- Area control (ANSF support andCOP build up). Three COPs havebeen built during our mandate inthe Alassay Valley to enablethe Afghan Army “to monitorspaces and go through unassignedareas.”

- CIMIC operations (MEDCAP, HAdrops). In addition to theconventional support operationsto the populace (delivery of goodsand food as well as medical care),we must include the big Shuraswith the local authorities. They areintelligence sources and helpintegrate our force intothe population. These meetingsenable the military leader to placehis action in the framework ofthe strategy consisting ofthe support of the populace forthe Afghan government. It is reallythis population which will decidethe outcome of the conflict byhelping or not the insurgents totake over the power.

All these operations are thereforepart of our primary mission, whichis to control the area of responsibilityand improve security. This willingnessto carry out daily patrols means asustained rhythm. Unless there isa Bn TF operation, the platoonswork permanently on a rosterof 4 days guarding, 4 days QRFand 4 days patrol.

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3. Operations

Whatever the operation may be, itmust be focused and play its part inachieving the mission while savingour assets and forces. The necessityof a tangible success is therefore acrucial condition which can beensured thanks only to reliableintelligence.

31/Intelligence

As both the trigger and the exploitationof an operation, intelligence must bean “obsessive” concern of the SGTIAcommander. He must have a goodknowledge of his enemy, his politicalenvironment and his allies in orderto set up his tactical process. Allthe teams under his command(HUMINT, SIGINT, and CIMIC) enablehim to identify objectives so as tosuggest to the chain of command arelevant operation which falls withinthe scope of the company team action.

32/The conception of the operation

With precise intelligence,the operation can be set up. It is vitalthat the action of the company teamfall within the concept ofthe “intervention force” and notthe “occupation force,” bysystematically involving the ANAat the heart of the mission.For confidentiality reasons, onlycommanders are involved inthe conception of a maneuver.

The Military Decision Making Process(in French MEDO) can therefore beingprocessed according to the standardoperating procedures, by matchingthe enemy’s positions (given byHUMINT and SIGINT), the power of hisweapons, the possibilities offered bythe terrain and the shelter it canprovide. We must of course take intoaccount distances which, in thismountainous area, very often requiressetting up radio relays and defininghelicopter landing zone in advancein case of medical evacuation by air.

The lessons learned after a fewoperations in Kapisa have enabledthe company team, in respect of CS,

to develop a particularly relevantmaneuver9 that the ANA soldiersmaster quite well providedthe commander has a minimumof experience.

33/The process of issuing orders andrehearsals

Once the concept of operation hasbeen established by the company teamcommander, each commander receiveshis mission and its coordinationmeasures during a “mission brief.”The disclosure of this mission is vitaland must encourage tactical thinkingby all participants in order toharmonize the different points of view.Everyone must give his view ofthe mission at his own level to identifypotential conflicts on the ground.Once the remarks have been takeninto account, the company teamcommander can write his OPO andforward it to the maneuver and supportelements.It is then possible to performthe “rehearsal10.” This process isparticularly useful when allied units(ANA, US) are taking part in theoperation and it enables the companyteam to take the preparation of themission far beyond simply draftingorders.

34/The conduct of the operation

Most operations are carried out withat least two platoon-sized maneuverelements supported by a number ofCSS units. It is therefore vital for thecompany team commander as thetactical lead to have clear situationalawareness and enough detachment tomake the right decision calmly. Inthe mountainous eastern provincesof Afghanistan, it is often possible toseize small “heights” to carry outline-of-sight operations. This enablesthe tactical leader to “feel” the terrainwhile being sure of good radiocommunications. The quality of thoselinks is indeed vital as it is oftennecessary to manage a network ofmore than 12 contacts, some of themspeaking only English. It is thereforewise to delegate part of your authorityto your tactical deputy11 who thenshows his worth and efficiency.

Similarly, for each operationconducted within a coalition, it is vitalto embed liaison officers12 with ourallies while providing them with closeprotection and self-sufficiency incommunications and medical support.One major lesson emerges from allour operations in Kapisa: after twohours spent in the same area ofoperations, the enemy is likely toattack. Two hours is indeed the timeneeded to become aware of ourpresence, to man a combat cell and tomove to our position while concealedby the population. The best momentfor him will be during our withdrawal.More than ever, his action can besummed up in those 3 principles:if we attack, disappear; if we defendourselves, harass; if we withdraw,attack.

4 / Lessons learned

Spending 6 months at the FOB13

of TAGAB is probably the mostenriching experience there is for aFrench soldier today. In addition tothe commitment pertaining tooperation, to progress within acoalition enables us to conceive andaccomplish missions which wouldhave been almost impossible forFrench forces alone.

The quality and the number ofdeployed assets make tactically boldoperations possible. The companyteam commander—a captain—maycommand more than 300 troopsdirectly and coordinate operationswith the ANA and US Special Forces(sometimes nearly 600 coalitionsoldiers).

Some basic principles arenevertheless to be kept in mind,both for the preparation andthe conduct of the operations:

- Decentralization: we must promotethe freedom of decision down tothe squad leader level in order toface any decision which does notcomply with the operation plan,even if a large variety of “noncompliant” cases have beenconsidered during the rehearsal.



31

- Interchangeability: any soldier mustbe technically and tactically capableof replacing his immediate superior.

- Systematic use of precise mappingand GPS from the start of training. Inthe labyrinthine Kapisa valley floors,no map can match the ability of GPSto provide an immediate geographiclocation. Digitization on the groundis the universal language whichenables dialog with our allies andallows coordination.

- The mastery of combat first-aid skills.Saving the life of a brother-in-armsis as crucial as neutralizingthe adversary.

- A good command of English forofficers and NCOs. Learning thislanguage, far from denying

the exceptional richness of French, isessential to work in an internationalenvironment where non-Englishspeaking people will be excludedfrom the heart of the operation.

Lastly, in a conflict which isphysically and mentally exhausting,it is vital for commanders to givemeaning to action. We must findthe right words to stimulate mindsand therefore avoid soldiers beingworn out. More than ever, we mustawake souls excited by anuncommon adventure, lulled bythe romanticism of action andguided by poetic duty.

1 SGTIA: Sous-Groupement Tactique Interarmes. 2 BCA: Bataillon de Chasseurs Alpins

(Mountain Infantry).3 “Shura”: council (of wise men).4 “Malek” (or “Malik”): tribal chief/clan chief.5 HIG: insurgent party of radical allegiance

which relies on the personality of its ex-Mujahidine leader Gulbudin Hekmatyar.

6 IED: Improvised Explosive Device.7 ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces.8 PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team.9 A terraced disposition composed of three

levels. On the ridge line, a small platooncontrols high points (once on the ridge line,seldom is the encountered enemy strongerthan a squad, and air superiority will ensuretactical superiority). Quick deployment(physical fitness vital) often supported by aUAV or a fighter, this platoon will ensure thatno enemy harasses the company team orprovides information about its maneuver.At the intermediate level, a second elementequipped with direct support weaponsoverlooks the forces which maneuver inthe lower terrain, providing them with anefficient fire support. This element is coveredby that on the ridge line. Lastly, at thebottom of the valleys, generally in villages,the bulk of the force maneuvers to close inon the objective, sure of being effectivelysupported and to have coherent cover onthe heights.

10 “Mock” operation, which entails playingout the plan on a map or on a mock-up ofthe ground.

11 I often entrusted the task of coordinatingaction between an Afghan Army and Frenchinfantry platoons to my deputy in order toclarify a part of the committed area.

12 Very often, the Mountain commando team,meeting the conditions, has been embeddedwith the American mentors of the AfghanArmy in front line.

13 FOB: Forward Operation Base.

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Company team B: Task organization

- 3 infantry rifle platoons/ 2nd Company / 27th Infantry Mountain Battalion (27ème BCA).- 1 engineer platoon /2nd Foreign Legion Engineer Battalion (REG).- 1 mortar support platoon / 93rd Mountain Artillery Battalion (RAM).- 1 81 mm mortar squad/ 27th Infantry Mountain Battalion (27ème BCA).- 1 team/Mountain Commando Group (GCM) 27th Infantry Mountain Battalion (27ème BCA) (10 service members).

- 1 team/ 13rd Paratrooper Dragoon Battalion (13ème RDP).- 1 squad / 4th Chasseurs Battalion (RCH) (1 VBL/ 1AMX10RC).- 1 sniper team/ 27th Mountain Infantry Battalion (27ème BCA).- 1 JTAC team / 93rd Mountain Artillery Battalion (93ème RAM).- 1 VAB equipped with a 20 mm gun.- 1 electronic warfare team.- 1 service member from the Weapon Intelligence Team (WITT).- 1 Quartermaster Corps team.

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VALUES: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRUNO DARY, PARIS GARRISON COMMANDER

TThis article first appeared in French in the July 2010 issue of “Casoar1,” and is reproducedhere with the kind permission of the author and the editor in chief of “Casoar.”

IIt is with great pleasure that I read these articles2, particularly those writtenby the youngest among us. I am very glad to see that the gray matter is stillturning over among the younger generations of officers. While reading,

I remembered an anecdote about Surcouf, a corsair in the service of France.One day a naval officer said to him: “I fight for my honor, whereas you, sir, fightfor money!” Surcouf answered: “This is true; we all fight for that which we do notpossess!”

More seriously, and while reading the various articles, I wondered whatwere the values specific to the military, whose vocation is to “workin the shadow of death.” I had the feeling that some people wereappropriating these values of which we are the—perhaps sole—holders and that these values sufficed to magnify the specificity ofthe military. Now, allow me to make a critical—even iconoclastic—assessment of some of these assertions. Let us consider them oneby one.

Fraternity

Cohesion is indeed crucial,so crucial in fact that within aformation it is known as the espritde corps. However, cohesion alsoexists in sports teams, in the crewsof sailing ships and in businesses.But it is undeniable that there isalso a strong feeling of cohesionin some criminal organizations,taking for example the Mafia whichspilt blood across Italy. But nobodywould dream of comparing ourarmed forces to the Mafia.The conclusion is therefore that,while this value is necessary toour armed forces, it is also afeature of many others and istherefore neither specific norsufficient.

Courage

This is a necessary—if not vital—quality. Let us imagine for one seconda company whose commander andsoldiers are unable to control theirfear, and flee in the face of danger.That would be disgraceful! Yet somesportsmen do not lack courage, bethey mountaineers, Formula Onedrivers or skiers. And here again,some notorious gangsters did notlack courage either. Jacques Mesrine,for example, infamous French banditand “public enemy number one,” didnot lack courage in his own way. Butwhat officer would want to be likenedto him? The conclusion is thereforethat, while this value is necessary toour armed forces, it is also a featureof many others and is thereforeneither specific nor sufficient.

Availability

This is obviously one of our mainvalues, since the general regulationsof military personnel specify as earlyas Article 1 that “military statusrequires availability from personnelin any circumstances.” For armedforces not to be available round-the-clock is inconceivable. But otheroccupations also require availability:doctors, business leaders, senior civilservants and religious leaders. And,to go even further, criminals of alldescriptions also have to be available!Drug dealers are happy to work dayand night to sell their poisons. Onceagain, the conclusion is that, whilethis value is necessary to our armedforces, it is also a feature of manyothers and is therefore neitherspecific nor sufficient.

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And loyalty!

It is dependent on the same logic.It is inconceivable that a fightingforce not be loyal to its commander;it would be nothing but a packof traitors! However, we are notthe sole possessors of it, sincespouses are pledged to each other,the duty of citizens is to be loyal totheir country, and any person is alsoduty-bound to the company whichemploys them. But it can also beadded that any mercenary is loyalto the country which pays him, sincehe is bound to it by contract.However, does any officer servinghis country feel he is a mercenary?The conclusion is therefore that,while this value is necessary to ourarmed forces, it is also a feature ofmany others and is therefore neitherspecific nor sufficient.

So, what sets us apart?

What distinguishes a soldier fromsportsmen, business leaders andcraftsmen? And what is even moreimportant, what distinguishes usfrom criminals, gangsters, banditsor mercenaries, since they, too,

without claiming them as we do,respect and apply these values, ifonly for practical reasons? Onething is crucial: it is to serve a causewhich is above us and makes usgreater. This service distinguishesus from other public servantsbecause we defend our countrywith arms. This is our guiding light!First, this value is noted inthe military status regulationswith the word “ loyalty,” which isperhaps a not strong enough.Loyalty to our country is actuallythe first among the values whichwe alone may call our own. It setsus apart from all gangsters, dealersand “gentlemen thieves,” sincewe strive for our country and notfor personal gain. This is whatmakes an occupation a noble one!And this loyalty is also exclusive tous because it concerns the defenseof our country with the arms givento us by the country, implicitly with

the possibility to dispense death,or to die! This is what makes usdifferent from the “other servantsof the country,” be they contractors,civil servants, research workers orteachers.

Can we go further?However, when our soldiers arecommitted in a theater of operations,you may sometimes hear a politicianor leader say that we are committed“to fight for our values.” What isparadoxical is that they are hardlyever specific about the meaningof the word, or what it includes.As we would not launch anoperation abroad in order to defendthe values which we mentionedabove, we may then wonder whichvalues justify France’s commitment,or the French President’s decisionto use force.

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ONE THING IS CRUCIAL: IT IS TO SERVE A CAUSE WHICH IS ABOVE US

AND MAKES US GREATER. THIS SERVICE DISTINGUISHES US FROM

OTHER PUBLIC SERVANTS BECAUSE WE DEFEND OUR COUNTRY WITH

ARMS. THIS IS OUR GUIDING LIGHT!



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Individual and collectivevalues

Concerning the legal area, SaintThomas was the first to distinguishbetween jus in bello (law in war)and jus in bello (law of war).Just as with law, are there not valueswhich might be called virtus a bello(values in war) and virtus a bello(values of war)? The former standfor the values of the soldier, as theyhave already been defined, andwhich should guide our thoughts,behavior, decisions and commitmentduring operations, while the latterare values that a country mustdefend in order to preserve itsidentity, ensure its future existence,or take part in peacekeeping overan area or in the world. But whatare they?

A first obvious answer lies in ourmotto: “Liberty, Equality,Fraternity.” It stands to reasonthat whenever these values arethreatened, this legitimizesresorting to force: in particular,it is in the name of freedom thatour forces are currently committedin Afghanistan. It may be added thatcommitment must be proportionalto the degree of threat. We can evengo a little further into theseconsiderations. France was not bornin 1789, and thousands ofFrenchmen fought before the FrenchRevolution in order to defend ourcountry and its values. We should

dig as deep as the roots of ourculture, which have amplified thedignity of man: Greek philosophy,Roman law, the Hebrew Decalogue,Christian revelation; it would beinteresting to study how each ofthese cultures has influenced andshaped ours to define our currentset of values.

Another approach, which is just asinteresting, may be initiated fromthe French strategy which definesour vital interests. Any attack onthem would be deemed“unacceptable,” and would leadto the commitment of our armedforces. If part of our nationalterritory was seized, or Frenchnationals were attacked, or our linesof communications and supply cut,that would be consideredunacceptable. Not so much becauseit would threaten the nation’s

survival, but because it would affectwhat we consider most valuable.

The example of the Falklands war isparticularly revealing in this regard:invasion of the Islands byArgentinean troops did not reallythreaten the United Kingdom’sstability or economy, but this movewas judged unacceptable by theBritish government, for onefundamental and undisputablereason: the honor of the UnitedKingdom was at stake. This was amatter of honor.

Honor!

There it is, I have said it. It is atthe heart of our considerations,because not only does it stand atthe very crossroads of individualand collective values, but also itconstitutes their peak. Usually it isdefined as “the feeling one has ofone’s moral dignity.” It thereforerelates to dignity and morality, inother words what we regard as mostsensitive and precious. This is why itstands at the top of our individualvalues. It also concerns the country,for each nation has its own pride,and will not balk at resorting toforce when its dignity is threatened,in other words when somethingbecomes “unacceptable.” Honorreally is the center and culminationof our values, both individual andcollective. Everybody is concerned,the individual as well as the nation,or rather no-one can claim to beexcluded, be they young or old, richor poor, mighty or weak, victors orvanquished. As King François I oncesaid, “All is lost, save honor!”

1 Alumni and student magazine of the Saint-CyrMilitary Academy. The Casoar is also the nameof the plume of cockerel feathers which adornsthe caps of Saint-Cyr cadets.

2 Translator’s note: articles from the “Values ofthe Officer” dossier in “Casoar,” compiled byLieutenant General Dary.

As King François I once said,

“All is lost, save honor!”

WWhat wisdom can I share with the officers oftoday? I had the good chance to command, inoperation, three rifle platoons, two companiesand finally a taskforce organized around myown battalion, 3rd RPIMa1.

My first point is that the training delivered atthe Coëtquidan Military Academy—as in branchschools—and the prevailing regulations of mytime were very well suited to the problemsfaced by junior officers:

• Fire kills;

• You cannot win without intelligence andtrying to understand how the adversarythinks and maneuvers;

• You cannot advance under enemy fire withoutsupport;

• You have to pin down and outflank the enemyin order to exhaust his resistance;

• A good combat unit is able and willing to fightat night;

• All commanders should preserve theirsubordinates’ lives.

Obviously, a comprehensive operations ordersuch as the one issued by Joffre on September6, 1914: “…troops which can no longer advancemust at any cost hold the ground which has beenseized and be prepared to be killed rather thanretreat” was—and must—be the exception.There are two maxims in particular that I stillremember from my years of training. The firstis from Ardant du Picq: “A soldier goes to fightin order to vanquish, not to die.” The second isfrom Frederic the Great: “I have made you asenior officer because I believe you to be capableof judicious disobedience.”

Where should we start when taking an operationalcommand?

First, make an assessment.When I took command of 2nd Company of 8th RIMa2 inthe fall of 1960, I discovered that my draftees had had nomilitary training. On December 2, 1959, the dam atMalpasset, near Fréjus, southeast France, had ruptured,causing a disaster: my draftees had been tasked to freecorpses from rubble, search through mud and helpsurvivors, before being conveyed to Algeria. Consequentlyan intensive training session was undertaken, based onrifle marksmanship, live fire combat exercises, sports andsinging; all excellent means to produce discipline andcohesion. However, my constant concern, in operationalcircumstances, was to resume and continue the training:shortcomings emerge during every skirmish, and werealize that some aspects can be improved.

Next, be modest. You should not believe yourself to beomniscient or almighty. You should know how to bringabout good ideas and suggestions among subordinates. In late April 1958, 2nd RPIMa was tasked with destroyingthe terrorist networks proliferating in Constantine.All officers attended a briefing before action, at whichthe commanding officer gave his orders. I realized thatnothing had been planned to block the city exits whilethe companies were supposed to perform raids againstsuspicious individuals the following night. I cautiouslydiscussed the issue with my captain. The answer wasquite clear: “Drop it; it’s not our problem.” The colonelconcluded his orders with a peremptory “No questionasked!” By daybreak, all those who had not been caughtduring the night had escaped. I have never forgiven myselffor my diffidence on April 27, 1958. Back then,the commander was still a mythical figure, a demigod tobe followed blindly; “perinde ac cadaver3.”

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Food For Thought: Command In Operations

LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETIRED) J.G. SALVAN

ECPA

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“Where does discipline start and where does it stop?”This is a question which worried my generation—and myfather’s—immensely.With 8th RIMa, on January 12, 1961, after several daysof rather exhausting operations to the south of Oran,we were bivouacking in the Tameda, in middle-altitude(2,000 meters) mountains. We no longer had any rationswhen we received the order to stay in position. Snow beganto fall. The gear of our soldiers was light and there wereno deep-cold clothes or sleeping-bags. At dawn, there wasalmost 50 centimeters of snow on the ground, and mostof my soldiers had not slept a wink. I was ordered to gotowards a 2,200-meter high mountain pass, then go downin order to search a valley riddled with caves. After half anhour, we were caught in a blizzard and could not seeanything 10 meters ahead. Some draftees felt faint, andmost of us were slipping over extremely dangerous crags.I decided to stop progress towards the pass, and to walkdown into the valley as soon as possible. I reported to mycompany commander, who obviously was not awareof the risks he had caused us to take. As soon as we hadreached 1,600 meters, we came out of the clouds of snowand had 500-meter visibility, with only a mild drizzle.I achieved the part of the mission which I had beenassigned. Later, when I met my company commander,I explained him that three years before to the day,in similar circumstances, in Blidean Atlas, threeparatroopers of 2nd RPIMa had died of cold, and morethan thirty were left disabled, with frozen feet andcongestion of the lungs. On January 8, 1961, areferendum had decided on the future of Algeria,so why jeopardize lives?

On March 23, 1978, I landed at Beirut airport, leadingthe first French detachment assigned to the UN in Lebanon(UNIFIL). It did not take me long to realize that the local UNofficials had little military and operational experience,and many had been given fictitious commissions and ranksbefore taking up their posts in the UN organization.I received the order to “take up position on the Qasmiyebridge, to the south of the Litani river, on the road fromBeirut to Tyr and get the agreement of all parties positionedaround the bridge. Act with diplomacy and courtesy,and above all without fighting!”

Only the military attaché, Colonel Le Peillet, and Espinassy,my military academy classmate, then head of the UNIsraeli-Lebanese Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC),could give me accurate information about the area where Iwas to take up position, and about the armed groups of alldescriptions which proliferated there. Both confirmed thatthe order was ridiculous and that we should settle in Tyr.The morning of March 24, on arriving in sight of the LitaniBridge, I observed that:• To the north there was a crest, from which you could geta view over the bridge, where about a hundred“Mohabitoun”—Sunni militiamen armed and equippedby Nasser and Kadhafi—had taken position. And yet Iwas not to take up position to the north of the Litani!

• Four different militias guarded the bridge.

I decided to continue towards Tyr, where bold actionallowed us to settle in barracks abandoned bythe Lebanese armored task force. I spent the next weektrying to convince UNIFIL officials and staff that the onlysensible move was to stand between Israeli forces and“Lebanese” militias, among which mercenaries fromArabic-speaking countries including Tunisia, Syria and Iraqcould already be found.

In Frederic the Great’s time, junior officers were in the lineor square, under direct orders of senior officers, but todaythe commander of any isolated detachment shouldconsider the consistency of orders, sometimes receivedfrom Paris or New York, with the situation that he canobserve in the field, and he should draw the obviousconclusions from an operational point of view. As Jomini4

said, “A general whose genius and hands are tied byan aulic council5 five hundred miles distant cannot be amatch for one who has liberty of action.” But who readsJomini today?

One last issue to deal with is the press.In April 1978, out of the seven hundred troops in my taskforce, a journalist found four paratroopers who said theydid not know what they were doing in Lebanon. I thenreceived an “extreme urgency” message requesting that Iinform my soldiers about their missions in the Middle-East.My reports about incidents with opening of fire were sentin “operational immediate” mode. Obviously, the author ofthe “extreme urgency” message had never read Stendhaland did not know that Fabrice del Dongo took part inNapoleonic battles without understanding their strategyor tactics. Unfortunately, some political and military leadersare driven frantic by press articles which convey a less-than-rosy image of our troops. The presence of journalistsin the field is a godsend for certain militiamen, who cannotresist play-acting or brandishing weapons. In situationsin which negotiation just between leaders might justhave solved a crisis, journalists only make things worse.You should avoid developing a besieged mentality,in particular at the top of the hierarchy. At all levels, keepcool when facing the media…

1 3e Régiment de Parachutistes d’Infanterie de Marine: a French ParachuteMarine Infantry battalion.

2 8e Régiment d’Infanterie de Marine: a French Marine Infantry battalion.3 A Latin phrase whose literal translation means “in the manner of acorpse.” It is attributed to Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuit society,who advocated absolute obedience to the Pope, perinde ac cadaver.

4 Antoine-Henri de Jomini (born 1779 in Switzerland, died 1869 in Paris),banker, military man, historian, member of the staffs of Marshal Ney andNapoleon.

5 Or council of the court. A private council chaired by the German Emperor,tasked with exerting imperial rights in his name.



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Brigadier Hankinson was commissioned into the 17th/21st Lancers

in April 1984. His military experience includes some nine

operational tours of duty in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo,

Cyprus and Iraq. He commanded the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment during

the warfighting phase in Iraq. In a subsequent tour of Iraq he was

awarded the Legion of Merit by General Petraeus.

In September 2008 he assumed command of the Land Warfare

Development Group; responsible for tactical lessons process, tactical

doctrine and development for Land Forces. He is the British Army’s

Permanent Military Expert for FINABEL.

UK

MO

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AGES

IIn his treatise ‘On War’ Clausewitz identifies the 2 greatest skills required by aCommander, one who should possess what he describes as a genius for war,as resolution and the coup d’oeil. The first of these concerns the ability to arrive

at and then stick to a course of action, based upon a decision-making process thatweighs up complex and often competing factors and swiftly arrives at a seriesof options; the final decision being which of these courses to select. Through thisprocess the Commander is briefed upon what could be a bewildering array of factsassembled by his Staff. Their duty is to make this ‘setting out of their stall’ –the tactical estimate - as logical and simple as possible. Their ability to do this wellis likely to be determined by how well they were educated then trained as staffofficers; and how effectively their leader trained them to anticipate his wishes andunderstand his thought processes – literally to be 'in his mind'. Of all his staff, it isthe chief of staff who most needs this talent for 'reading' his principal and thusbecoming, in effect, the embodiment of his intent. In return, the Commander almostresembles a judge. He uses his experience and deep knowledge together to weighup the conflicting evidence and then to arrive at the right decision – which may beone that simply minimises the extant risks - and then see it through to its conclusion.This decision he communicates as his command intent, which becomes the guidinglight for all his subordinates then do...

The Changing Face of Commandin War

MAJOR GENERAL (GB) PIERS HANKINSON (LWDG)

InternationalInternationalDOCTRIN


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IIf resolution is a moral characteristic, but one based on technical and procedural calculation, the second

faculty - coup d’oeil - is perhaps more ephemeral, fleeting and truly indicative of a genius for command.

Coup d’œil represents the ability of the great commanders instantly, in an instant flash of insight, to determine

or discern truths about the nature of a battle that are denied to those with less perception. Coup d’œil is the gift

of intuition, the prickling of hair on the nape of the neck that alerts someone with rare insight to danger.

The ability to fuse knowledge and instinct to achieve insight is based upon information – what Clausewitz defines

as ‘all we know of the enemy and his country…in fact the foundation of all our ideas and actions’. If the modernterm ‘ground’ is substituted for ‘country’ we see that the two core factors of the estimate remain the same as

ever – enemy and ground. It is the role of a Staff to collect and deploy information swiftly, using discrimination

as to priorities, and to present it in a manner that allows it to be assimilated. But Clausewitz saw that much

information in war is actually false, much is contradictory and yet more is ‘of doubtful character’ e.g. it creates

rather than resolves a dilemma.

We might today call the talent for gathering, sorting and deploying facts ' Information Management’ (and its

reverse would be mismanagement). To the 18th century leader information was collected directly by human eye

and ear, recorded by pen or brush and it was relayed to the Commander by word of mouth or longhand.

The only 'real time' activity was based on personal oversight and the ability to relate assimilated knowledge to

the current situation. On the field of Waterloo, the delivery of orders or dispatches were restricted by the speed

at which the opposing commanders’ staffs could write down and duplicate the written word then convey this

despatch by galloper to its intended recipient (of which normally 3 set out by different routes to ensure a degree

of redundancy). Little had changed since Pheippides epic run from Marathon to Athens.

The upshot of this human factor in the transmission of information had been that armies were tied to their

commanders unless a subordinate general simply applied his overall intent. The first armies to properly apply

such mission command were the cavalry hordes of the Mongol Khanate. When armies took to the field for major

set-piece battles, all the manoeuvre and subterfuge consisted of bringing the adversary to battle at a time, place

and condition that best suited either protagonist. The actual geographical area was confined. Most of the great

battles prior to the electronic age took place in an area of the order of 10 spare kilometres or less. This was as

true for Cannae as it was for Hastings, Agincourt, Blenheim, Waterloo, Inkerman and First Bull Run; and this

reality had not changed markedly by First Ypres or the Marne albeit the industrial nature of weight of shot, shell

and industrial machine production altered the extent of the field of potential destruction. Admittedly in some

aspects of war, conflict became formalized and almost ritualistic, as suggested by the heraldic conventions of

the late Middle Ages and the incontrovertible rules concerning the conduct of sieges and the giving of parole in

the Age of Enlightenment. But despite these constraints – no different in their own way from the Law of Armed

Conflict today – layers of unorthodoxy and dissymmetry co-existed with conventions and regulation. This meant

that the skill for a commander lay in interpreting the underlying nuances and subtleties inherent in what might

almost have appeared to be a stage-managed scenario, and then conveying this detail to subordinates.

The invention of the telegraph was the first stage in automating this process, albeit fixed landlines were not

immediately suitable for tactical

command during a war of manœuvre.

It was the invention of radio

communications that hastened the ability

of troops to operate in concert with other

force elements, and for commanders to

orchestrate better the overall disposition

of the various parts of their forces. This

could be said to have permitted a change

from combined arms operating in

immediate or intimate support to a more

dispersed and remotely synchronized

manner of operations.

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And it could be argued that even with the introduction of

the internal combustion engine, strategic deployment via

railway and radio telegraphy in the Second World War, that

operations still obeyed similar demands. Logistic convoys

supporting Operation BARBAROSSA were largely horse-

drawn. Wehrmacht Landsers in Russia still largely marched to

contact in column in their high boots, as had their Prussian,

Hessian and Hanoverian great grandfathers to Quatre Bras

and after, Waterloo. Whilst Kursk might be identified as a truly

modern battle, with radio control and all-informed nets (at

least on the German side), the Germans nevertheless did not

win. And the Army that defeated them continued to rely on

flags and semaphore for command and control well into last

decade of the second millennium. And at Alam el Halfa and

the battles at El Alamein, the sheer scale of the conflict and destruction took place in a curiously bounded

battlespace, limited largely by the Mediterranean sea to the North and the impassable sand sea of the Qattara

Depression to the South.

There have been many revolutions in military affairs throughout the history of warfare. Amongst these physical

inventions such as the invention of the wheel, the effective employment of gunpowder, various advances in

metallurgy, radio telecommunications and nuclear fission could all be argued to be innovations that have

changed the face of warfare forever. Equally conceptual basis for battle could be said to be more about

constants than about change – same ends, similar ways and slightly differing means. As the previous example of

Clausewitz suggests, plus ça change; very much the same conclusions can be drawn from Micah, Pliny, Sun Tzu,Mellenthin, de Guingand, William Manchester, Moshe Dayan and even James Webb’s tales of Vietnam. War and

its command have consisted throughout of precisely the same three components identified by Jomini: the attack,

the defence and freedom of action. In most of these, the protagonists resemble wrestlers as they manœuvre for

advantage, feinting, grappling, seeking in the martial arts to absorb, destabilize and turn the aggressor’s

momentum against. Advance implies a drive forwards, thus most physical protection lies in the frontal arc,

whether that is armour on a vehicle or combat power; and attack has been said to be the best form of defence.

The danger thus lies to the flanks and rear and in the ability to 'turn the flanks' of an adversary lies the seeds

of victory. Flanks are not necessarily physical; they may be a vulnerability such as an unwillingness to back down

or withdraw when such accession is needed.

If the digitized and space age have brought any differences, and if they are to apply and to be developed in

the future, then the vital differences perhaps largely reside in those capabilities that enable freedom of action

to one commander and constrain that available to his adversary. The first aspect of freedom of action is that

the commander of the future is not tied as were historical commanders either to the same location as his staffs

or to his fighting echelon. He is able to remote himself from either of them at will, because he will be networked

to them and able to evolve his decisions as soon as the Staff collates inputs and create a picture. This could be

expressed in the phrase ‘non-line of sight’ – intercourse and insight can now be generated and can happen

remotely. He can make decisions that alter the picture dynamically, almost in the same way that an artist

changes the way that he depicts a work in progress. He can truly separate his personal exercise of command

from control because he can be linked in near real time to his Chief of Staff who is directing the control function

on his commander’s behalf in the unit or formation’s principal or Main Headquarters. And the facility that links

them is not an image built upon painstaking collation of verbal statements but an accurate pictorial

representation of ‘what is happening’.

Thus the net links him to his subordinate commanders all of whom can take orders and receive direction based

upon common knowledge and understanding of a series of updated pictures. There is thus no need to reiterate

or recapitulate orders and direction. The commander is able to ‘direct by exception’ in exactly the same way as

his subordinates and Staff can ‘report by exception’. Coup d’œil is conferred automatically by the process of

developing the operating picture, which becomes less mechanistic and more intuitive in its nature as it evolves.

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Commanders solely intervene to add insight to the picture by transmitting changes that happen outside

the evolving passage of situational information. As this is automated in near-real time, they are free to think

ahead and ponder the underlying reality of what appears to be unfolding, thus helping them to move inside

the enemy’s decision cycle.

The Commander’s location is possibly irrelevant however it remains hard to see how soldiers in combat will

continue to follow a leader who is not in any way exposed to risk. Risk and mutual acceptance of a degree of

threat form the vital bond that convinces subordinates that a commander is qualified to lead ‘by example’ and

from the front. This personal aspect of command is largely illogical but still deeply human, tied as it is to the idea

that if a commander expects others to expose themselves to threats he too must be prepared to share a part of

the risk that arises from his decisions. This will be true as long as combat retains the risk of mortal danger and

is human in its nature.

Robotic command may in time be exercised remotely from a distance outside the battlespace; and if it is trulyrobotic it will cease to be a command function and become more a refined graduation of control. The highly

fragmented and dispersed nature of battlespace is both a function and a creation of the likely future operating

environment. The commander cannot be everywhere and the search for the centre of gravity of his enemy is best

exercised by standing back, not by close involvement. Thus his presence will be largely ritualised and formal –

a visible and tangible expression of his faith in his own decisions and his trust in his subordinates. At time he

may wish to meet physically with his subordinates but this will become less and less necessary and the rule will

be physical dispersion and electronic fusion. Too close proximity may almost indicate bad faith and a lack of

empowerment; it could certainly indicate bad judgement if it involves mal-location from communications

bearers. In this way Mission Command, borne of freedom of action, and underpinned by an up to date and

accurate common operating picture, will become even more vital to the future 'way of command'.

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The commander will choose either to reside in

the midst of his major staff component in a position

selected for communications, force protection and

operational balance. This is likely to be the optimum

location where he can link to his own superiors and,

at the higher levels, be best placed to sense the political

realities that will continue to direct his endeavours.

He will have to exercise the emotional and

demonstrative part of his role by deploying out to

the ‘field’ in a small, agile and fast moving tactical HQ.

This is liable to consist of a very small protection detail,

one or two vehicles or aircraft (to bear the complete

range of communications bearers and situational feeds)

and perhaps one or two personal staff. These are likely to be relatively junior – a staff captain G2/G3 and G1/G4

accompanying a Task force commander at any relatively junior – a staff captain G2/G3 and G1/G4 accompanying

a task force commander at any level.

More experienced and senior arms advisers including his chief of staff are likely to reside back where

communications, control measures and refining the picture are more vital than pure battle command. So long as

he can be contacted, briefed on Staff decision support products and alerted to ‘what’s different’ he can make

timely, precise, relevant command decisions. His COS will in effect be his deputy and his alternate should be

the senior of his subordinate manœuvre commanders. It may be necessary to move the key battle staff forward

to a 'Forward HQ' which is located within the tactical battlespace, if the nature of the conflict demands personal

and firsthand exercise of command or an intimate grasp of ground reality. This group are likely to be his 'key 7'

advisers – offensive support, aviation, engineer, logistics, ops, plans and his G6. POLAD, CIMIC, IO, OPLAW

and others may be included. Each of these staff branches will be contained in one or two vehicles; the whole

may need a troop/platoon sized protection detachment including CBRN and AD.

TThus, so long as people are involved in warlike activities, command will be personal and exercised as such

by a commander who for reasons of immediacy and example only will judge it necessary to move into

the forward battlespace. This will assist him in making firsthand judgments to support the decisions and to

evaluate the options suggested by his staff. They in turn will fuse the widest range of stimuli and source materiel

to refine the overall picture and its sub-components. These will be passed forward as a multimedia mixture of

visual, pictorial, audio and textual means. This picture will be continually referenced and updated by passage

of information back and forth – networked

communications ‘reach out’.

Command will stay personal, and it will be

possible for it to be physically separated from

control but nevertheless to remain intimately

linked to it. The medium for this is the real

time awareness facilitated by the broadband

tactical internet. It will be permitted by

continual symbiotic fusion of information

feeds from human and robotic ISTAR, EW

collection and the frequently refreshed

automatic updates furnished by forward

elements in contact with the adversary.

Command in itself may become more about deciding how best to preserve freedom of action and thus decision

superiority, than where and how to attack or defend. This will increasingly be dictated by the near-autonomous

fusion of sensory experiences derived from strategic sensors through to forward combat elements, continuously

updated, and operating within the overall envelope of matched layers of command intent.

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Führen mit AuftragMission Command

CAPT. DR. GUIDO GRAVENKÖTTER, ARMY OFFICE I 1 (3), COLOGNE/GERMANY

PERSONAL DATA born in Emsdetten (Westphalia) on 18 April 1975, single

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCEsince January 2009 Project Manager

Army Office, CologneConceptual development and international standardization of command and control principles, especially for stability operations; Member of the writing team for Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) – 3.2.1.1 “Stability Activities”

October 2005 – December 2008 Scientific AssistantChair of Machine Elements and Technical LogisticsHelmut Schmidt University (Bundeswehr University), HamburgPhD in engineering (research area: adhesive and flow forces on microparts during conveyance with a vibration conveyor)

March 2004 – September 2005 Platoon Leader182 Armoured Infantry Battalion, Bad SegebergAssignment as leader and instructor in the armoured infantry corps

EDUCATION AND TRAININGOctober 2010 – December 2010 Emerging Leaders Programme

London Business School, London, UKGeneral Management and Leadership Programme

October 2000 – March 2004 Graduate Studies in Industrial EngineeringHelmut Schmidt University (Bundeswehr University), HamburgThayer School of Engineering at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, USAGraduate thesis: “Development of a Cool Robot for the Antarctic”(the project was sponsored by the National Science Foundation)

July 1997 – September 2000 Officer Training in the BundeswehrArmour School, Munster - Army Officer School, Dresden

October 1995 – June 1997 Undergraduate Studies in Industrial EngineeringDarmstadt Technical University

July 1985 – June 1994 High SchoolMunicipal High School, Ochtrup

SCHOLARSHIPSJune 2007 – September 2007 PhD Scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service

Research at the University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

September 2003 – March 2004 Foreign Country Scholarship from the German Academic Exchange ServiceWriting of the graduation thesis at Dartmouth College, NH, USA

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Mission command is the supreme command principle in the German land forces. It affordssubordinate commanders freedom of action when performing missions, directing only what to dobut not how to do it. Mission command, formerly known as “Auftragstaktik” (mission tactics), canbe traced back to the historical and social patterns prevalent in 19th-century Germany. In 1806, afterPrussia had lost the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt against the French, the need to reformthe Army and with it infantry training, became apparent. Even before 1806, progressive officershad criticised the antiquated Prussian military structure. After the Prussians had been defeatedby Napoleon’s troops and the country was on the brink of collapse, the pressure was high enoughto implement reforms.

The development of “Auftragstaktik”

Under the command of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Head of the General War Department (Ministryof War) and Chief of the General Staff, the process of adapting the conduct of battle to the newconditions of war got under way. Adopting the “tirailleur” (shooter) tactics successfully appliedby the French Army, and the mobile employment of light infantry forces led to the dispersal oftraditionally closed formations. The advent of breech-loading rifles from the mid-19th century soonrevealed a growing need to make better use of the terrain and thus to evade the weapons’ increasedeffect. This called for a so far unheard-of degree of independence at almost all levels of command.The Supreme Cabinet Order of 16 December 1858, known as the “Magna Charta of Independence”,emphasised this. The promulgation of the “Exerzierreglement für die Infanterie” (Drill Regulationsfor the Infantry), the Prussian Army’s most important military training regulation at the time, finallylaid down the new tactical foundations and thus the “Auftragstaktik”.

After the First World War, the “Auftragstaktik” was further developed under the pressure of the 1920Treaty of Versailles. According to the Treaty, the number of “Reichswehr” soldiers was not to exceed100,000. As a result, military leaders were trained one level above that necessary for the intendedmilitary assignment. The aim was to draw on sufficiently qualified officers, allowing the Reichswehr tobe augmented expeditiously at a later stage. This enabled military leaders particularly to carry out theirmissions in accordance with the higher commander’s intent. The ability to command forces flexibly and independently as well as to quickly adapt to changes inthe situation even at lower tactical levels proved a considerable advantage for the “Wehrmacht”during World War II’s rapid courses of action brought about by mechanisation.



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Mission Command as the Bundeswehr’s Supreme Command Principle

While “Auftragstaktik” was still considered a solely tactical means to coordinate by space and timeassets and fire during battle, the Bundeswehr, established in 1955, adopted it as a “Führungsprinzip”(command principle). “Auftragstaktik” was consequently called “Führen mit Auftrag” (missioncommand) because the concept exceeds the mere tactical dimension. As the supreme leadershipprinciple of the German land forces, it aims to generally transfer the scope for decision-making tothe best suited level. Only with the necessary freedom of action is it possible to immediately react tosituation developments in the complex and dynamic operational environment, and to seize a favourablemoment instead of waiting for orders.

The development described above illustrates that the principle of mission command cannot beimplemented by orders. It is rather the result of a long process during which all military leaders aretaught common core values. Mission command is based on the willingness to accept responsibilityand to cooperate as well as the ability to act independently and resourcefully.Mutual trust is the most essential tie between the person giving a task and the one taking it over.The military leader will only gain that trust by convincing the soldiers of the rationale and legitimacyof the mission, and by leading from the heart and the mind. For that purpose he must consider threekey demands when tasking somebody: (1) striking a balance between clear and achievable objectives and the capability of the person

taking on the task as well as the nature thereof, (2) providing the necessary assets, and (3) unambiguously spelling out one’s own intent. This is the only way to achieve cohesion of action

of everyone involved.

Against the Backdrop of Current Operations, is Mission Command still in Line with the Times?

In operations under an asymmetric threat the situation is in particular characterised by insecurity,friction, and confusion. The consequences of one’s own actions are hardly predictable becausethe activities of various actors influence each other. The option that stands to reason may well bereplaced by a less obvious alternative. It is particularly in situations like this – when Rules ofEngagement set a rigid legal framework and where the often strategic effects of one’s own actionsleaves little tolerance for mistakes – that soldiers are required to take on responsibility and makeexpedient decisions. Mission command is not in conflict with this, quite the contrary: it has always beennecessary to consider the constraints restricting one’s freedom of action when analysing the mission.In addition, decisions particularly at platoon and company level must be made under such timepressure that there is no alternative for mission command.

This command principle has by now become a permanent fixture as mission command in the relevantNATO regulations. The Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations (AJP-3.2), for instance, devotes aseparate subchapter to it.

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References

AG JACOP/S.H.A.T: Grundsätze der Truppenführung im Lichte derOperationsgeschichte von vier Jahrhunderten. Hamburg/Paris, 1999

Brodersen, Dirk, O i.G.: Was kommt statt „Führen mit Auftrag“? In:Der Panzerspähtrupp, Nr. 46, Freundeskreis Heeresaufklärer, 2009

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Heeresdienstvorschrift 100/100– Truppenführung von Landstreitkräften(VS-NfD). Bonn, 11/2007

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Heeresdienstvorschrift 100/200– Führungssystem der Landstreitkräfte(VS-NfD). Bonn, 03/2010

Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 10/1 –Innere Führung(VS-NfD). Bonn, 01/2008

Frieser, Karl-Heinz: Blitzkrieg-Legende – Der Westfeldzug 1940.Oldenbourg-Verlag, München, 2005

Keller, Jörg: Mythos Auftragstaktik. In: Armee in der Demokratie,Wiesbaden, 2006

Leistenschneider, Stephan: Auftragstaktik im preußisch-deutschenHeer 1871 bis 1914. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Mittler& Sohn Verlag, Hamburg, 2002

Millotat, Christian: Das preußisch-deutsche Generalstabssystem.vdf Hochschulverlag AG, Zürich, 2000

NATO Standardization Agency: Allied Joint Doctrine for LandOperations (AJP-3.2, NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED). Brüssel, 10/2009

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veryone remembers the decisiontaken in Doullens1 by the Britishand French governments to entrust

to Foch the “coordination” of the Alliedforces, in full retreat in front ofthe German offensive. This “coordination”soon became a real interallied command.Less well known, however, are the trueconditions in which Foch exercisedcommand.

The organization of the staff

Foch’s interallied staff was organized ex nihilo, as it didnot exist previously. It was based on that of the ArmyChief of Staff, a position that he had occupied previously.It was an exclusively French organization under GeneralWeygand, operating in accordance with the French

procedures then in effect. The allied forces, essentiallyBritish and American, assigned junior liaison officers to it.It was by no means a “combined” staff in today’smultinational sense.

Foch was directly and personally in contact with subordinatecommanders-in-chief. This was usually on an individualbasis, taking place very occasionally during summitmeetings. During the eight months of high-intensityoperations under his command, Foch held only twointerallied conferences:

- in July, to comment his directive to resume offensiveoperations and provide planning guidance;

- very early in November, to finalize the draft terms ofarmistice to be imposed on defeated Germany.

Regarding contacts with his allied counterparts, Fochshowed unswerving courtesy, always respecting nationalinterests. It was only with Pétain that he was particularlydirective. Each commander-in-chief could appeal to hisgovernment’s arbitration if he felt “disadvantaged” by adecision of the Supreme Allied Commander. Foch had notrouble convincing Clemenceau to take this “right ofappeal” away from Pétain in June, when their views differedcompletely. Pétain wanted to shorten his front andreconstitute his reserves whereas Foch—much less alarmedabout the magnitude of the German advance—planned acounterattack2.

Knowing he would get nowhere by exercising too directivea command, Foch always showed flexibility. He was alsocredited with the aphorism—in reality made by Sarrail3 inSalonika—that “he admired Napoleon a great deal lesssince he had commanded a coalition.” Thus Foch, asSupreme Commander of Allied Forces in 1918, alwaysadvocated persuasion as the sole method of command,which is rather surprising given his renowned bad temper.

�Unity of command, particularly when it must beexerted on commanders of another nation, ofanother race, cannot be imposed by decree. The onlyone who imposes it is the man entrusted with itsconduct, acting through his influence over those with

CDES

Marshal FOCH and the interallied command

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RESERVE) CLAUDE FRANC, PROJECT MANAGER, CDEF/DOCTRINE DIVISION

whom he must cooperate [...]. Basically my ideacomes to this: when command is exerted over Alliedforces, categorical orders will produce no results.Let the commander gain the full acceptance ofthe person to whom he is talking. He must gain hisconfidence and support. There is no other way tocommand [...]. When forces fight alongside oneanother, unity of command is possible only throughmoral influence. In other words, it is not force thatbrings results, but persuasion alone.

Why give orders when, for all kinds of practicaland moral reasons, they cannot be executed?Men, especially foreigners, must be taken as theyare and not as we wish they were4.�

Foch’s relationships with Pershing and Pétain are indicativeof his “interallied” command style. With the first—a foreigncommander—Foch was “tactful,” while with Pétain—aFrench general—his attitude was that of a commandertowards a subordinate.

During the buildup of America’s major units, Pershing—legitimately—wanted them to be combined into a nationalarmy under his command. Pétain, however, facing a severeshortage of French troops, considered that America’s majorunits should be distributed among French forces, which alsohad the advantage of “breaking in” their—stillinexperienced—staffs. Foch sided with Pershing in the nameof interallied solidarity.

In the fall, as the American offensive in the Argonne Forestfailed to advance, demonstrating the inexperience ofthe young American forces, Clemenceau acknowledged itsfailure and urged Foch to have them relieved, which wouldcertainly have caused a serious interallied crisis.Foch vigorously opposed this measure and even stoppedGouraud’s offensive on his left flank, an offensive which wasonly resumed once American forces had been reorganized.Foch’s leniency towards Pershing particularly antagonizedClemenceau and strained relations between the two Frenchleaders.

Conversely, with Pétain, the relationship was that of acommander towards a subordinate. In June, realizing that the French commander-in-chief wasnot inclined to prepare the counterattacks he had planned,but even considered shortening his front5, Foch brought hisCP closer to Provins, where Pétain’s CP was deployed. Everymorning for three weeks, Weygand went to the French GHQand verified that his counterpart, the French Forces’ DeputyCommander, was following Foch’s orders to the letter.Considering that Deputy Commander General Anthoinewould sell his soul for Pétain, who allowed him to continueto labor in his pessimistic approach, Foch had him relievedand replaced by Buat, more attuned to his way of thinking.This friction and “tight leash” command of the French GHQby Foch would become the source of strained relations afterthe war between the Foch and Pétain schools.

On July 18, Pétain cancelled a new offensive by Manginin order to use his forces to plug the gap created byLudendorff south of the Marne River. Within the hour,Foch countermanded French GHQ, confirmed Mangin’saction and gave direct orders to Fayolle, commander ofthe Group of Reserve Armies (GAR)6.

Lessons to be learnt from this first experience of interallied command

The major lesson lies in the respect of Allies and theirnational interests. Although Foch did not have amultinational staff, he alwaysviewed the “management” of their interests as his primary concern, even againstimmediate operational requirements. This observation andapproach were to be found in exactly the same terms lessthan twenty years later, when Eisenhower commandedthe Allied Forces in Europe. For similar reasons, Bradleyalways considered himself at a disadvantage compared withMontgomery, especially when the logistical priorities ofthe allied coalition were allocated to the latter for the high-risk Operation Market Garden, which ended in bitter failureat Arnhem.

It is open to question whether this style of command, afactor of cohesion and hence of greater efficiency, is nowforgotten or has become obsolete. In “modern”multinational coalitions, national interests no longer prevailand tend to fade against the leadership of the “lead nation”which imposes its goals, organization and operatingprocedures.

1 Translator’s note: on March 26, 1918.2 Successfully conducted by Mangin on June 11th.3 (Army) General Maurice Sarrail (1856-1929): French general who becamefamous during the First World War as Commander of the Third Army, thenas Commander-in-Chief of Allied Armies in the Orient (first battle of theMarne, Salonika expedition). Called back to active duty in 1924, he wasappointed French High Commissioner to Syria and Commander-in-Chiefof the Army of the Levant to restore order after the Druze uprising.

4 Recouly, Le mémorial de Foch, Paris – Les éditions de France, 1929,pages 15-24.

5 On June 4, Pétain handed Foch a personal memorandum advocatingshortening of the front through withdrawal along the Somme Riverin the north and moving away from the Lorraine area in the east.Foch ignored it, reported the maneuver to the French government andordered Mangin to counterattack.

6 Group of Reserve Armies, Mangin’s higher headquarters.

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If what Catosaid is true,it was not untilthe eve ofthe twentiethcentury thattwo factors he identified as characteristicsof Gaul came closer, namely warfare andthe art of rhetoric.

Without going back to the origins ofthe French Army, ie. to Charles VII, thispiece will simply show that in terms ofthe tactical problem solving processand the drafting of orders, French-stylecommand has always tried - sinceNapoleon - to define the desired end state,Foch’s “ What is it all about?,” inheritedfrom Verdy du Vernois. It was not untilthe twentieth century that it was codified,both as the Military Decision MakingProcess2 and in the drafting of orders,later becoming the “main effect” wecurrently use.

AAs is commonin France, itwas defeat

that stimulatedtactical thinking3.The defeatSoubise suffered

at Rossbach was no exception. At a time when tacticswere discussed at high society soirées, the intellectualelite sought to unravel the secrets of the victory ofFrederick the Great, who made no bones about repeating“Warfare is a science for greater men, an art forthe mediocre and a trade for the ignorant.”

This intellectual ferment gave birth to the masterpiecesof Bourcet and Guibert4. Despite the creation of the ÉcoleMilitaire by Louis XV, this institution failed to devise adecision-making method for military problems before itwas disbanded in 1788. It is worth mentioning that it wasalso a time of reflection, because since Hugues Capetand the foundation of France, it was the first time thatthe country had experienced a period of peace of morethan thirty years (between the Treaty of Paris endingthe Seven Years’ War in 1763 and the declaration of waron the “King of Bohemia” by the Legislature in 17925):an entire generation.

As regards the most illustrious period of our history froma military point of view, the Napoleonic era, it was thanksonly to the empiricism of a single man, the Emperor, whodied leaving neither precepts nor method. Although hehimself said of his marshals that they knew nothing abouttactics at the highest level, it must be admitted that, byleaving them intentionally in a role of strictly executingorders, he did nothing to educate them. After the crushingdefeat of Waterloo, intellectual lethargy engulfed Franceand it was not until the brutal call to order at Sedan in

Two hundred years of command«à la française»

� Gallia duas res industriosissime persequitur, rem militarem et argute loqui1�

Cato the Censor

LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RESERVE) CLAUDE FRANC, PROJECT MANAGER, CDEF/DOCTRINE DIVISION

«Warfare is a science for greater men, an artfor the mediocre and a trade for the ignorant ».

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1870 that military thought awoke. This time, it led toa method and constant expression of orders so as tohighlight the desired end state.

The founding act of the revival of French military thoughtwas the creation of the War College in 1876 and the actionof two men, Brigadier General Lewal, who was the firstCommandant, and Colonel Maillard, who taught generaltactics. They both defined—although the term did notofficially appear until 1936—an analytical process, ie.guidelines for studying a tactical problem, which aimed atleading to a concept of operations. In parallel, they triedto build a doctrinal corpus based on the lessons learnedin the imperial campaigns and those of 1870. Thesecampaigns, especially those of 1870, were not outlinedfrom above, rather they were used to study actual caseswhich formed the basis of the principles of the desiredend state sought by one or the other of the protagonists.A doctrinal corpus, an analytical process and stafftechniques for expressing orders were implementedempirically at the same time. All referred to the end stateto be achieved by the player:

- applying doctrine by studying concrete examples, bothon the map and on the ground,

- the desired goal is not to make the students learn byheart and reproduce patterns, but to educate theirjudgment.

Maillard liked to repeat “Get used to thinkingmethodically.” In his 1886 lectures, he wrote “You musthave a purpose, you must have a plan. Having a purposeis to want something and knowing what you want ishaving military thinking governing your actions. Havinga plan is determining how to conduct it, that is to saymaking the necessary arrangements.”6

Foch improved upon this teaching by openly focusing onthe desired end state with his famous “What is it all about?”Today, one would say looking for the main effect. For Foch, it was always a question of keeping in mind“the mission” which resulted either from the order receivedor from the location one had in relation to the maneuverforce. The mission might change during the action or bemodified as a result of the enemy’s conduct.

In 1902, the course preparing the tactics examination wasapproved by Lanrezac, Deputy Commandant of the School.It offered an analytical process dealing with the studyof the desired end state and the means to be allocated.Finally, in 1913, an Army regulation codified “the factors thatmust be used as a foundation for command decisions.”The Military Decision Making Process was born.

Since that time, on the eve of the Great War, its essencehas - despite changes in the form of the method andin terminology - remained the same: define a practicalsolution in order to reach the desired end state.

In 1936, the expression “commander’s intent” inthe drafting of orders was codified through a regulationannexed to the IGU7. Trained at the War College justbefore the war88, Leclerc represented a fine example ofhow well the students had mastered this method andunderstood the importance of identifying an end state andhow to express it as an intent: As a division commander,he himself explained his intent to his G3. Two examplesare famous for their concise wording:

- the order from August 25, 1944: Seize Paris. It wassuccessful;

- the order from November 23, 1944: Seize the bridge ofKehl. It failed.

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Similarly, during an inspection in French North Africatowards the end of his career, he told the players atthe end of an exercise that had been presented to himthat “Whenever the end state is not clearly determined,the mission fails. To tell a detachment or battalion taskforce commander to make an effort on such and such anaxis in order to seize such and such terrain feature, andthen resume the advance on such and such direction, isto give orders badly. We need commanders at all levelsto know the desired end state: the one for which westrive by all possible means, by any route; and for that,they must know the intent of their commander andthe end state he plans to achieve. This is why simplicityis key when stating your mission: your intent isthe desired end state by any means9.”

This manner of drafting orders is based on the conceptof the main effect which is implemented in France, evenif allied forces are coming to adopt it to some extent(commander’s intent)10. The concept of operations setsthe common goal as an effect to be obtained within adefinite time-space constraint, the related sequencingand the role assigned to each, while imposing as limitsto the subordinates’ initiative the coordination measureswhich are deemed essential.

It would be a shame if, on the pretext of excessiveinteroperability with our Allies within the framework of NATO,France were to give up the capital of military thought it tooktwo centuries to develop and formalize. In this case, one canreally talk here of “command à la française.”

1 “There are two things that Gaul cultivates with the utmost attention,making war and talking in a refined way”: Cato the Censor, around 168AD, in Origins, while talking about the Gauls.

2 Previously called MRT (Tactical decision-making method), it is now calledMEDO (Operational Decision-Making Process), but it remains unchanged.

3 The French Army is not alone in its kind. It was the final defeat sufferedby Prussia at Jena which aroused the Prussian military establishment atthat time and allowed them to develop an army model whose formidablefoundations were used by Germany until 1945.

4 After whom two lecture halls at the École Militaire are named.5 The French contribution to the American War of Independence can becompared to a current overseas operation.

6 Maillard in Cours de tactique générale 1886 – page 22 – To be found inthe library of the former War School.

7 Instruction on the employment of major units.8 Accepted at the competitive exam in 1938, his education was interruptedand reduced to one year because of his mobilization.

9 Quoted by General Compagnon, Ce que je crois (What I believe), Page 138.10 Translator’s note: in English in the French original text.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMYAVIATION IN SUPPORTOF URBAN OPERATIONS

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OOn June 5, 2010 I attended the tactical display designed for the lieutenantsof the Army Branch Schools (within the framework of CIADA1) atthe Sissonne camp. This experience has prompted me to underline

the vital place of Army Aviation in combined arms combat in urban areas.

BRIGADIER GENERAL YANN PERTUISEL COMMANDING FRENCH ARMY AVIATION

ReflectionReflection

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AAt CIADA on June 5 I had the opportunity to attendan outstanding dynamic display, the aim of whichwas to highlight the expertise that is specific to

each operational function and demonstrate how theymust complement each other.This is how our young officers came to watch an SGTIA(combined arms company task force) maneuver display,first on open field and then on urban terrain.

Although the full range of operational functions wasdisplayed during the first phase, the air combatcomponent was totally absent fromthe scenario, the visualization andthe discourse of the second.

The aim of such a display is to leave alasting impression on our future combatleaders, with vivid images thatsynthesize and illustrate the trainingthey receive. But what are they likely toretain from these two display sequences,the first one bringing helicopters intoplay but the second not using them?I fear they may be left with the ideathat helicopters have no place in urbancombat.Imagine my surprise, when speakingwith some of them, to discover that thisis exactly what they understood fromtheir time on the Army Aviation BasicOfficer Course.It is very unfortunate (for the efficiency of a maneuver)that TTA 9802 (2007 addenda) and ALAT 30.0113

manuals are not yet widely enough known or are evenignored.

Without wanting to go into the detail of thesedocuments, I would like to insist once again onthe fact that the helicopter has intrinsic features4 andcapabilities which make it very beneficial for SGTIAmaneuvers. I will cite only observation5, commandand control6, fire7 or “simply” its deterrent effect.Of course, it should not be used anywhere anyhow,especially in areas where it could be vulnerable.It does, however, have interesting potential, in astand-off action led from secured areas.

Despite common perceptions, it is not difficult to usehelicopters. The combined arms commander need onlyexpress his desired effect on the enemy within a well-defined space-time continuum and the air combatexpert will translate his requests into recommendationsfor use.

“Blackhawk Down,” the famous movie inspired byOperation “Gothic Serpent” (which took place inDecember 1993 in Somalia), had, without a doubt, atraumatic effect and conveyed the idea that the use ofhelicopters is inappropriate in built-up areas. In reality,

the losses suffered in this case8 resulted from grossmistakes regarding the use of helicopters withoutgiving a single thought to the basic rules ofengagement of that kind of asset in a non-controlledarea.Just like every operational function, air mobility hasclearly defined and precisely described requirementsregarding the employment doctrine that should beunderstood and utilized for the success of themaneuver.

TThe adage “not a single step without support”can be applied easily to Army Aviation as “nota single step without helicopters,” including

in built-up areas.

As the Army Chief of Staff said on July 10, 2008,at the French Army Aviation School at � Le Cannetdes Maures � , “ to fight an enemy entrenched in urbanareas or taking shelter in compartmented zones,only a maneuver that combines ground forces andhelicopters may allow (the commander) to winthe day.”

1 CIADA: Army Branch Basic Officer Courses military camp.2 Land forces Field operations manual in Urban terrain.3 Army Aviation Field operations manual in Urban terrain. 4 Capability to gain altitude, hover, etc.5 During night flight (and of course day flight as well) with VIVIANEthermal camera (magnification 38).

6 From time to time, SGTIA (combined arms company task force)commanders may even be taken on board so as to get a bettersituation assessment and to lead his troops through the urban maze.

7 For example, firing a HOT missile into an artillery piece (plunging fire)or 30 mm-gun.

8 2 Blackhawk destroyed and 2 others severely damaged.

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OOur Western society is becoming more and morejudicial, as is increasingly noticeable in France.This judicialization reinforces mistrust—and even

fear—of national and international judicial institutionsamong armed forces personnel. These personnel fearprosecution for use of force under orders from theircountry’s authorities. However, prosecutions of Frenchmilitary personnel for acts which they have ordered orexecuted are still extremely rare, or even non-existent,except for those pertaining to criminal offences.

It is true that overlapping of national and internationallaws does not make things easy for those tasked withabiding by and enforcing these laws in operations outsideFrance. These operations are defined not as “war orpeace situations,” but more conveniently as counter-insurgency or stability operations.

While it is essential to have a specific mandate for anyoperation, together with applicable regulations, politicaldirectives and operational rules of engagement (ROEs)which are consistent with what actually happens inthe theater, the military commander should be awarethat his legal advisor is at hand to assist in the exerciseof command.Whilst conscious of the importance of hiscommunications advisor for what concerns ongoing andshort-term events, the military commander should bemore aware still of the fact that his legal advisor can—and should—be an aid to decision-making.The legal advisor must, however, be equally aware of hisresponsibilities and limits3.

Knowledge is freedom

The conditions in which legal factors are taken intoaccount in the planning and conduct of operationsoutside France can worry some commanders. All toooften, it is claimed that laws, and more particularlyinternational law regarding armed conflicts, are a bind forcommanders who have to make decisions and employ thenecessary means to fight against an opponent who doesnot abide by these rules, thereby tying regular armedforces into an asymmetric conflict which is unfavorable tothem and placing them on the losing side.

These fears of some military personnel are morethe result of their limited understanding of the textsguiding their actions, including even basic rules,regulations and forces employment doctrine documents.Doctrine manuals, which are not legal documents even ifthey do consider legal factors, describe clearly how anaction should be performed, with courses of action andcommand organizations. These documents are of courseno replacement for legal reference texts or orders, whichmust be drafted and issued by each commander at hisown level and which allow supervision of the action. This is when the LEGAD should play his full role as legalcounsel.The job of the legal advisor to the general commandingthe force in operation is to enable the militarycommander to deliver orders in full awareness of hisresponsibilities concerning the legal environment.Embedded within the staff, the legal advisor contributesall his professional skill during planning, as well as hisconsiderations during the briefs dealing with the conductof operations.

Knowledge for prediction

Legal factors are one of the elements of the commander’senvironment which enable him to make his actioncompliant with national and international law and moreimportantly to maintain its legitimacy. It is easy toobserve that armed forces which do not comply with jusin bello rules very quickly lose the legitimacy of theiraction.

Although the LEGAD (legal advisor) is an expert, “hecannot but take operational realities into account”. Histask is to contribute his expertise to the development ofan operation order or fragmentary order (FRAGO). Inorder to be useful to the military commander, the legaladvisor should not be a mere clerk rubber-stampingauthorizations and prohibitions according to the terms oflegal texts. He should, rather, be in a position to providethe commanding general with solutions which meet ortake into account regulations, but also capabilities andassets employed to carry out the mission. The legaladvisor, an officer who has acquired experience anddrawn lessons from it, should be a facilitator in support of

Legal Advice Supporting Command

“From knowledge comes prediction; from prediction comes action1”

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JÉRÔME CARIO2, LEGAL ADVISOR/CDEF, FORMER LEGAD OF REGIONAL COMMAND CENTER

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the commander. A good advisor should simplifyinterpretation of legal regulations in order to helpthe commander to plan his action.The LEGAD should be a practicing lawyer.

Knowledge for action

During the planning stage of an operation, the LEGADworks in close cooperation with G5 and G3, and isinvolved in the development of the legal annex to anoperation order or fragmentary order. While the legalaspect is important, it should by no means be an essay,and still less a law manual. This annex specifiesapplicable legal rules. In addition to providing a reminderof R.O.E.s, it is important to specify certain proceduresfor implementation described by the Standing operatingprocedures (S.O.P.), as well as the restrictions prescribedby the theater tactical guidance. Lastly, in the annex, itis necessary to mention a number of behavior rules,which are as crucial as the rules of employment of forcethemselves.

Like all staff officers, the LEGAD takes part in briefingsduring the operation. He should be in a position to acton his own initiative if some aspects require precisionsconcerning the principles of proportionality anddiscrimination in the employment of force. He shouldalso be in a position to respond to specific questions orrequests from the commanding general and the highercommand. This constitutes a critical moment forthe LEGAD, for it is on this occasion that operational legaladvice should play its part. The point then is no longer tosimply expound regulations but to analyze specific andpractical situations in the light of the law. Thus it isadvisable to use the phrase “operational law,” becausethe aim here is to contrast two points of view, which maybe illustrated by the saying: “do not do more harm thanrequired by war.”

It is therefore important for a legal advisor to work in aclimate of trust with the whole staff. While withthe commander this trust may be taken for granted, itrequires from the LEGAD humility in providing advice, butalso straightforwardness and honesty, and therefore, ina manner of speaking, courage. It would be disastrous tosuggest only what the commander wants or would liketo hear, or to fail to express things with frankness. The legal advisor should enable the military commanderto achieve his mission in compliance with regulations.

TThe role of the LEGAD in an operation is notto prevent the commander from fulfilling hismission, but rather to act as a counsel enabling

the commander to act without anxiety.Knowledge, and above all compliance with laws,liberate and facilitate decision making. Thereforelegal advisors should provide military commanderswith simple advice in response to the problems whichthe latter meet on the ground.Thanks to his ability to stand back and his knowledgeof regulations, he must ensure that common senseprevails, that reason prevails over passion andthat situational awareness is the light that guidesthe commander’s action!

1 This quotation from the work of Auguste Comte, in the heading of thisarticle is a perfect illustration of the rationale of legal advice tocommand. The LEGAD is there to convey his expertise to the militarycommander so that the latter may foresee during planning and becapable in action.

2 Legal advisor to the General commanding Regional Command Centerin Afghanistan from March to November 2009.

3 This entails a full-blown policy and organization of legal support withinthe armed forces.



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TThe increasing complexity of warfare is moresignificant in current counterinsurgency conflicts:nameless wars without enemies, far away from

national territory. Their relevance is at odds with theskepticism of public opinion swaddled in the prevailingillusion of permanent peace in Western societies,which are reluctant, through loss of resilience, tocommit to these uncertain, murderous conflicts, whiletheir own nations do not seem directly threatened.

These new asymmetric wars are won on an abstractbattlefield, in a struggle of will and perception.Operations remain necessary but of secondaryimportance, intended to stimulate and thus supportthe main action in the influence area.

Victory in such an environment requires completemastery of the military instrument, coupled with closecoordination with other players, be they civilian ormilitary, local or members of an international coalition,in an integrated approach ensuring unity of action,coherent employment of (obviously limited) resources,and convergence of effects.

A conception of maneuver developed with influence inmind and in support of a strategy of virtuous presencebased on the welfare of the populace is one ofthe most appropriate holistic approaches to respondto the challenge of this singular type of conflict.It provides two advantages: first, it is attractive to bothsets of public opinion, that behind us as well as thatof the host nation, and second to put the flaws ofthe rebellion under the spotlight.

The Lafayette brigade, with its innovativeorganizational structure and campaign plan focusedon information operations, turned out to be a usefullaboratory in this regard, for experiments providingnumerous lessons, if we consider its results andthe new opportunities it has brought. It carries with itthe seed of a more holistic and pivotal conception ofinfluence, or hyperinfluence, no doubt more complexfor implementation, but which certainly facilitates,even under constraints, the resolution of these “smallmodern wars.”

HyperinfluenceA war of perception and willThe «Afghan Laboratory»

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRÉDÉRIC BONINI, FORMER MILITARY ASSISTANT TO BRIGADIER GENERAL DRUART IN TASK FORCE LA FAYETTE

Editor’s note: the following article is a full version of the two articles written by LTC Boninidealing with this fully current topic, published in Héraclès newsletter no. 40.

TToday’s military engagements are characterized by media coverage of conflicts as well asglobalized processing of collected information. This media coverage takes the shape of a flow

of brief news items, fact-oriented, scattered here and there with peaks depending on the emotionalor controversial potential of an event or of political affairs. These ephemeral peaks, the results ofinformation processing which is most often of a narrow focus, magnify and distort reality throughtheir resonance. However, in the long run, they mould the perception of public opinion on relatedconflicts. Any fact can turn out to be powerful information, exploitable simultaneously worldwide andsubject to interpretation or misrepresentation according to the interests of those who disseminate it.This shrinking of time and space, in which perception of reality prevails over reality itself, generateshypervisibility of military activities, insofar as an insignificant act by one individual may, dependingon its exploitation by the media, have consequences on the conduct of an operation.

This concept does not, however, pretend to be the beall and end all of counterinsurgency. It suggests aframework of action in which influence operates as akeystone and basic success factor. Then within thisgeneral framework several appropriate and oftenspecific procedures should be identified. Theseprocedures should be subjected to permanent analysisin order to fit into an ever-changing context and withinwhich the opponent and third parties develop theirown strategies. As Brigadier General Druart onceforcefully said, “ the will to understand is a virtue, butto believe that you understand is a flaw.” This servesas a reminder that any conviction is a potentialweakness, and that continuous questioning allows forimprovement of awareness of the environment andadaptation to inevitable developments.

The Afghan conflict, a specificcounterinsurgency contextThe asymmetric war waged by coalition forces inAfghanistan, in spite of obvious similarities, cannotreally be likened to the situations used as the basisof study by the various counterinsurgency theoristswhose doctrine underlies the chosen strategy.Their writings either bear the stamp of colonizationand pacification of territories as regards Gallieni orLyautey, or as regards Trinquier’s or Galula’s theories,associated with decolonization and in line withthe broader environment of an indirect clash betweentwo ideological blocs. In the case of more recenttheoreticians such as Kilcullen and Petraeus, analysisis most often performed with reference to nationalliberation groups, or to minority independence claims,or based solely on the Iraqi conflict, characterizedby a centralized dictatorship and its throes.

The Afghan theater shows different characteristicsfrom these previous or current situations.Afghanistan is a sovereign but fragile country withinsufficient state authority locally, made up of apatchwork of ethnic groups and tribes and surroundedby neighbors with regional ambitions and antagonisticstrategies.

The enemy is characterized by a division into severalentities and the lack of a major hegemonic groupstructured around a political or religious ideology. Lastly, the international coalition operates alongsidewith inexperienced local armed forces, totally relianton support. The coalition’s failing is a lack ofcoherence in its objectives, torn between thesometimes antagonistic interests of its membernations.

The example of Task Force La Fayette and its“snooker” strategyTask Force La Fayette developed its campaign planbased on the conviction that it had to focus its effortson the populace and on the improvement of livingconditions and security, rather than on attrition ofrebels.The situation in the KAPISA province and SUROBIdistrict, which make up its area of responsibility, ismore the result of stabilization work than of truecounterinsurgency. The adversary is scattered, withsometimes diverging interests, made up of assorteddelinquents, politically oriented armed movements,unemployed youths, and a few religious fanatics, allprey to internal struggles and without any coordinatedwill or capability to overthrow the incumbentgovernment. This opponent is for the most partreactive and is somewhat legitimized by the ineptitude

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of state authorities weakened by corruption andnepotism. The rebels also capitalize on naïveté, lack ofeducation and fear to maintain control. In rural areas,they strengthen that legitimacy through the capabilityto settle local disputes thanks to an efficient system ofinformal justice.In this context, responding to the enemy “coercively”would have been a mistake. Violence makes him acredible opponent to foreign forces and provides anoutlet for idle young men, impressed by their elders’stories of their fight against the Soviets, giving theillusion of a proud struggle of the weak against thestrong. On the contrary, action has been focused onthe breaking of voluntary or forced links with thepopulace by emphasizing the criminal activities andviolent acts committed by these armed bands.

In order to debunk the myth of the insurgent and freethe populace from the rebel yoke, the chosen strategyof the brigade has entailed identifying active elements,whether positive or negative, so as to highlight orsupport the most capable among the former andmarginalize the most resolute and harmful amongthe latter. As in the game of snooker, in which one ballis used as a tool to move the others, this policy shouldin the long run lead to gaining adherence of themajority through attrition of the circle of negativeplayers and the bulk of the unresolved turning intopartisans of positive players. Once fanatics andforeigners have been neutralized or removed, it will benecessary to limit violence in order to dispossessthe residual groups of any legitimacy, and to cut offtheir source of manpower. Refusing direct clashes or,more usually, deciding not to take part in escalationof violence deprives rebellious groups of propaganda-matter and of the ability to cloak their criminalactivities in a guise of ideology.

This policy of influence has represented that“immaterial” task force responsible for implementingthis strategy as a priority, reinforced bycomplementary courses of action with encouragingresults. One of the most emblematic is the prolongedstationing of coalition and Afghan security forces ininhabited areas with full security dispositions, whichgave conditions favorable to fruitful contact withthe populace within a gradual process of comingmutually to friendly terms. These security havens putAfghan forces and authorities in the limelight as theyperform their duties which are to play their part andgain legitimacy in these areas which are often devoidof any state authority. This course of action was testedin the south of TAGAB valley, and the results werebeyond all initial expectations. Afghan and Frenchtroops gained a foothold smoothly and permanentlyin less than one month, despite the area’s reputedhostility.

Control of the level of violence is central to this policy.Activities conducted previously within the brigade’sarea brought to light the attrition paradox: losses

suffered by the enemy, rather than resulting in adecrease in strength, had the opposite result, throughfamily ties and vengeance duty.

All the same, this strategy does not preclude the useof force. This, however, should be confined to attritionof active hostile elements, according to the ongoingobjectives of influence, and with no risk of collateraldamage to the populace. Targeted operations intendedto capture notable insurgents are supplementary andperformed to show the determination and capacity ofthe force to strike when necessary. These aggressiveactivities play a part in maintaining the initiative and apsychological advantage over the opponent, as well asgiving the force credibility with the populace. Theyenable forces to use the military tool as a deterrenceforce in unassigned areas to sustain influence, curbingthe level of visible violence while displaying power.In order to be fully efficient in this area, employmentof Special Forces dedicated to this type of activities isan obvious asset, thanks to their proficiency inperforming those complex operations.

The innovative structure of the La Fayette brigadestaff, the way it operates and the originality of itscampaign plan served as a foundation for trialing astrategy based on a holistic approach and prioritygiven to information operations. The experiencegained by the brigade and their first effects openedup new opportunities by outlining a broader conceptin which influence is both the source and the pillar ofthe strategy.

Hyperinfluence as a mode of resolution ofmodern asymmetric conflictsIn Afghanistan, the major staffs of ISAF havedeveloped “stability” divisions manned by civilianexperts. This new duality in the conduct of operationsreflects an effort to produce a holistic answer to theproblem, with the positive result of shifting the focusonto the populace and away from fighting rebels.However, this does generate significant negativeeffects through the multiplication of players tocoordinate and the scattering of resources. A strategyfocused on information operations cannot encompassthis new aspect, particularly as it is not formallysubordinated to military command. Nevertheless,to coordinate that “stability” pillar with militaryoperations is crucial so as to magnify their effectsand ensure their convergence.

To make up for that deficiency, information operationsshould be designed not in the doctrinal framework ofthe environment function, but as full-blown influenceoperations to be performed alongside the currentstrategy. These operations fulfill several functions,including proactive and reactive action to be preparedfor or face any event, and particularly the overridingfunction of balance, above the three operational lines



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of security, development and governance so as toprovide a basis for the whole maneuver. They can beusefully supplemented by indirect influence operationswhich will not be explicitly explained here. This overall influence strategy seems to be the bestadapted to respond to the dual challenge oflegitimacy, which any force has to face in a counterinsurgency conflict in a sovereign country:on the one hand,the legitimacy ithas to gain withthe populace inorder to make upfor the basicdeficiency of anyexternal body,magnified byamalgamation withnative authoritieswhich sometimeslack legitimacythemselves, and on the other the legitimacy ofthe opponent that must be fought against, whichgenerally means rebels taking advantage of non-existent or decaying incumbent authorities.

The principles of hyperinfluence

The hyperinfluence concept is based on the idea thata pro-active policy of improvement of the populace’sliving conditions, alongside a relentless will todecrease the intensity of violence suffered by civilians,is the best course to resolve most modern asymmetricconflicts. Its purpose is the emancipation of thepopulace through the breaking of links with rebels.The objective is no longer to win hearts and minds,but to open hearts and unfetter minds so as to set freepositive energies existing among the populace.That result is to be obtained by working acrossthe spectrum of influence. Through a refusal of anydirect clash with rebel groups, it also includessystematic exploitation of their mistakes and targetingactivities, assimilation of retrievable rebels andneutralization of irretrievable elements.

This strategy requires substantial empathy fromdeployed units to understand the fears, beliefs andhopes of the populace. This empathy, strengthenedby enlightened respect of local customs, will ensureawareness of the environment with influence activitiesin mind. It is also vital to apprehend fully the impact of ourpresence on the environment. Either action or lackthereof is bound to be interpreted by the populace,and may even reveal fertile ground for adversepropaganda. Any choice about posture, operations orrespite should be analyzed with in terms of thepotential influence risks. Appropriate measures shouldbe taken as a result of this analysis to affectthe populace’s perception favorably as well as counter

the opponent’s possible exploitation preemptively.Accounting for and predicting influence effects is aprerequisite to obtaining the results desired inthe long term.

What does hyperinfluence comprise?

The concept ofhyperinfluencemakes influencethe structuringfunction of strategyand what itcomprises inthe campaign plan.Every operationorder, organized intolines of operations,is designed

according to a specific influence effect to achieve onthe populace and—less importantly—on theopponent.The comprehensive strategy also relies on informationoperations in order to meet that same goal, or modifyit, taking into account unexpected incidents anddevelopments of the operational environment.In terms of communication policy, it relies on thevirtuous principle of its presence as well as on takingadvantage of symbolic events. Those events areinitially instigated by the force, in the form ofstructuring or symbolic projects. They can also includenegative events, ie. flagrant mistakes made bythe enemy.

They are the fabric which has to be renewedconstantly, and which constitutes the backgroundnoise of influence-oriented communication. They arenecessary to maintain the initiative and deaden enemyattempts at propaganda or misinformation.Within this framework, information operations,because of the spectrum they cover, fulfillthe aforementioned crucial functions of reactiveexploitation and balance between operational lines.The meaning of “reactive exploitation” is the force’scapability to exploit immediately any unexpectedevent, either to assuage or reverse its effects if noimmediate advantage can be drawn or if it highlightsan error by the opponent, respectively.

The balance function is part of an iterative processand subject to modifications. It comes down todefining a new balance, in space or minds, betweenthe undertaking of military operations, developmentactivities and support of governance. The objective isthen to consolidate what has been gained whileachieving the overall objectives which have beendefined, without causing detrimental distortions. In terms of organization, in order to achievethe required level of coherence and steering efficiency,

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«The objective is no longer towin hearts and minds, but toopen hearts and unfetterminds ...

the setting up of a structure specific to the forcecommander’s level is crucial. Organized so as to covermonitoring of the overall strategy, of reactiveexploitation and operational balance enhancement,its purpose is to provide the commander withrecommendations intended to be turned intodirectives later for assistant chiefs of staff,subordinate units and various players operating withinthe zone of action.

A partial conclusion

Should a force attempt to implement its own societal,doctrinal or simply military paradigm onto a moderncounterinsurgency conflict, the result may be a falseperception of reality. While it is necessary to rely on agenuine military culture and a sound ethical basis tomaintain, in all circumstances, a behavior in keepingwith our principles, it is also necessary not to betrapped by particular thought patterns or doctrines.Only personal reflection, fed by knowledge and facedwith ongoing reality, can give birth to appropriate,efficient solutions, which are bound to evolve.

The information operations-based strategy used bythe La Fayette brigade is in compliance with that logic,through a reading of counterinsurgency theories whichit suggests. It is intended, by focusing on andinfluencing the populace so as to free the people fromthe rebels’ grasp, to give Afghan people of good willthe opportunity to take over the initiative within amore peaceful context, without however making themtoo dependent on our presence. Nevertheless, thismethod calls for prudence as the complexity ofthe environment and its constraints require handlinginfluence with humility and caution.

Yet it constitutes the basis of a more holistic approachbased on influence or hyperinfluence in order to tacklecounterinsurgency in a sovereign country today.This concept, in which force deployment is performedwithin the scope of a holistic influence maneuver,may prove complex to organize into operating modes.It assumes the existence, and even development of alocal state structure which operates beyondantagonisms—the national army if possible—on whichto rely. It takes time for practical results to appear andresilience from the force to bear blows inthe meantime. It also requires deep knowledgeof the native local environment, fed on a permanent

basis by cultural advisors, as well asby intelligence collection of which the scopeshould be as wide as possible, every playerassuming the part of a potential sensorto be used in this view. Lastly it must beimplemented in the operational area, forthe benefit of a desired final effect whichhas been clearly defined by political power.

Lack of understanding or adhesion oftroops no doubt constitutes the majorpitfall to be avoided. A real preliminaryeffort of persuasion is necessary so asto convey the spirit of such a method andconvince everyone—down to the lowestlevel—of its relevance. However, through its cardinal virtues(control of violence, concentration of effortsfor the benefit of the populace only and thepromotion of good governance),hyperinfluence provides two advantages:satisfying Western public opinion, which isalways skeptical about such engagementsand more importantly depriving theopponent of his primary source of strength.

It undoubtedly constitutes the overallframework of a strategy that can providepositive resolution of these particularlycomplex conflicts.



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Operational Training of Company Commandersat CENTAC and CENZUB - p. 13Credit photos : Propriété CENZUB

Bringing Meaning to action and orders : The tactical Leader in Operations- p. 25Credit photos : SIRPA TERRE

The Changing Face of Command in War - p. 39Credit photos : UK MOD IMAGES

The Marshal FOCH and the Interallied Command - p. 48Credit photos : CDES

HYPERINFLUENCEA war of perception and will - The «Afghan laboratory » - p. 58Credit photos : SIRPA TERRE

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