table turners | constitutional law 1 reviewer

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TABLE TURNERS

PREPARED BY: JOEL ARZAGA

KAYE BALDONADO AILEEN CRUZ

IJ CHAN-‐GONZAGA, S.J. PHILIP EVARDONE

GELO GENER RACHELLE GUTIERREZ

PONCE LOPEZ ALYSSA MICLAT

IJJI PARAS RAIZA RADOC ADRIAN TAN ERIKA VALDEZ

Reminders: • Use at your own risk. Although it is made with

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• We’d appreciate it if you could please keep this within the block J

Constitutional Law 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.

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POINTS

I. Early Organic Acts

What is a constitution?

o Justice Miller: “A constitution. In the American sense of

the word, is a written instrument by which the

fundamental powers of government are established,

limited, and defined, and by which these powers are

distributed among several departments, for their safe

and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic.”

Philippine concept of constitutionalism came

from the American concept

o Purpose of a constitution: grant and limitation of

government authority

o The written instrument agreed upon by the people… as

the absolute rule of action for all departments and

offices of government

o Government owes it being to the constitution

o The supreme written law of the land.

Classifications of constitution

o Generally, the constitution is classified under: written

and unwritten.

Written constitution – a book of documents

(example: Philippine Constitution)

Unwritten constitution – supported by different

court rulings, documents, etc. (example: UK

Constitution)

o Alternative classification: as norms of government

action

Normative – direct government action and

government follows and adjust itself to the

norms

Nominal – cannot be fully operative because of

socio‐political problems; principal value is

educational

Semantic – tool for the perpetuation of power

in the hands of power holders

o Constitutional document: 3 parts

Constitution of government – set up

government structure

Constitution of liberty – guarantee individual

fundamental liberties

Constitution of sovereignty – outline process

whereby the sovereign people may change the

constitution

Is the Constitution and constitutional law the same?

o NO. Constitutional law is not just the text of the

constitution itself.

o It is “a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by

a high court of cases in which the validity, in relation to

the constitutional instrument, of some act of

government power, … has been challenged.”

o Function of Judicial Review – power and duty of the

Court of pronouncing void any such act which does not

square with its own reading of the constitutional

instrument; in other words, the constitution is what the

judges say it is (Chief Justice Hughes)

When did constitutionalism in the Philippines start?

o Ratification of the Treaty of Paris – transfer of

sovereignty from Spain to US

o US: released different organic acts

President McKinley’s Instruction to the Second

Philippine Commission

Philippine Bill of 1902 – US Congress made this

Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 – paved the

way for the 1935 Constitution

Introduction: Philippine Constitutionalism, Birth Pangs and

Traumatic Growth


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o By 1934, US Congress passed the Tydings‐McDuffie Law

– provided for the establishment of a Commonwealth

Government under a constitution

II. The 1935 Constitution

Important dates:

o July 30, 1934 Constitutional Convention (CC) met

o February 8, 1935 CC ended

o March 3, 1935 US President approved the draft

o May 14, 1935 ratified by the Filipino electorate

o November 15, 1935 Commonwealth Government

became operative

o July 4, 1946 Philippine Independence

After independence, many felt unease that Philippines is still

following a constitution that is fashioned under colonial

auspices, hence a call for amendment of the said constitution.

III. The 1973 Constitution

Important dates:

o March 16, 1967 Philippine Congress passed

Resolution No. 2: a call for an amendment of the

Constitution

o June 1, 1971 1971 Constitutional Convention

o September 21, 1972 Martial Law was imposed

o November 29, 1972 Convention approved proposed

Constitution

o November 30, 1972 Presidential Decree 73 –

“submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or

rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines proposed by the CC”

o January 7, 1973 General Order No. 20:

postponement of plebiscite which was originally

scheduled on January 15, 1973

o January 17, 1973 Proclamation No. 1102: proposed

Constitution was ratified by Citizens Assemblies; 1973

Constitution officially took effect

o March 31, 1973 divided Supreme Court ruled: no

further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being

considered in force and effect

Javellana v. Executive Secretary

o Supreme Court ruled there is no further judicial obstacle

to the new Constitution being considered in force and

effect

o Executive Department, with vigor and with all the

resources at its command, proceeded to implement it

o Legislative Department was nowhere found to object it

o Ordinary mortals lived under the new Constitution

1976 Constitution was amended to give birth to interim

Batasang Pambansa – legislative body that affirms the wills and

whims of President Marcos under Amendment 6 of the 1976

amendments

1981 Departure from parliamentary to presidential

Interim Batasang Pambansa to a regular one

IV. Freedom Constitution

Important dates:

o November 1985 special presidential elections

(Ferdinand Marcos vs. Cory Aquino)

o February 15, 1985 Marcos declared as winner by

Batasang Pambansa

o February 22, 1985 Revolt against President Marcos

led by Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos, followed by

support of unarmed civilians (Edsa Revolution)

o February 25, 1985 Marcos regime ended

o February 25, 1985 Cory Aquino proclaimed first

woman President in defiance of 1973 Constitution and

Batasang Pambansa ‐ sworn in by Claudio Teehankee;

Marcos was also sworn in by CJ Ramon Aquino then

went to exile after


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Article 1: The National Territory

Section 1: The national territory comprises the Philippine

Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and

all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or

Jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,

including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular

shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,

and connecting the islands of the Archipelago, regardless of their

breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the

Philippines.

• Barred by the processes of the 1973 Constitution, Cory Aquino

chose to govern under a Provisional Constitution designed to

enable her to meet the people’s challenge.

• Proclamation No. 3 – Freedom Constitution

V. The 1987 Constitution

• Article 6 of Proclamation No. 3 – Adopting a New Constitution

o Section 1: Appointment of Commission within 60 days

of Proclamation. Commission shall consist of 30‐60

natural‐born citizens of the Philippines

o Section 2: Accomplish as fast as possible to hasten

normal constitutional circumstances and draft a

document

o Section 3: Conduct public hearings

o Section 4: Plenary session shall be public and fully

recorded

o Section 5: Ratification by a majority of votes will make

Constitution valid; date is within 60 days following

submission to President

• Important dates:

o June 1, 1986 CC convened

o October 15, 1986 CC ended

o February 2, 1987 new Constitution is ratified

• 2010 – Constitution has already lasted 23 years

• Who wrote the Constitution? Ans: The sovereign Filipino people

POINTS

Baseline Law – RA 9522: G.R. No. 187167: Magallona vs. Ermita

Petitioner: PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY‐LIST REP.

RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., and University of the

Philippines College of Law Students, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE

ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT,

RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO,

VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN

DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO,

RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA

REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY

ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI,

MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,

MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON,

JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA,

NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE

TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and

MARCELINO VELOSO III

Respondents: HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity of Executive

Secretary, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of


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Department of Foreign Affairs, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, in his capacity

of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. DIONY VENTURA,

in his capacity as administrator of the National Mapping & Research

Information Authority, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., in his capacity as

representative of the permanent mission of the Republic of the

Philippines to the United Nations.

Ponente: Justice Carpio

Case: Original action of writs of certiorari and prohibition that assails the

constitutionality of RA 9522.

Background:

1961 Congress passed RA No. 3046 demarcating the

maritime baselines of the Philippines. This followed the framing

of UNCLOS I in 1958, which codified the extent of sovereign

rights over territorial seas. RA No. 3046 remain unchanged for 5

decades.

Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522 because of the

need to comply to UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III prescribes the water‐

land ration, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic

States and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the

extended continental shelf.

RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of

some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago, and named

KIG and Scarborough Shoal as “regimes of islands”.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two

principal grounds:

o (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory in

violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, and

o (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the

baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and

aircrafts in violation of relevant constitutional

provisions.

Petitioners also content the RA’s treatment of KIG as “regime of

islands” results in loss of large maritime area and prejudices the

livelihood of subsistence fishermen; RA 9522 excluded to

reference the Treaty of Paris and included the UNCLOS III’s

framework.

Respondents raised the ff:

o (1) Petitioners’ lack of locus standi and,

o (2) Propriety of writs of certiorari and prohibition.

Respondents defended RA 9522 as country’s compliance with

terms of UNCLOS III, preserving territory over KIG, and RA 9522

does not undermine country’s security, environment and

economic interests, and country’s claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force under

international law of petitioners’ assertion regarding the Treaty

of Paris.

Issues:

Preliminary Issues:

o Whether petitioners possess locus standi.

o Whether writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper

remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

Merits: whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Ruling/Ratio Court holds that:

1. Petitioners possess locus standi to bring suit as citizens.

Ratio: They are citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in

the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises

issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution; it is

understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing “a more

direct and specific interest” to bring the suit.

2. Writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test

constitutionality of RA 9522.


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Ratio: Court, by tradition, viewed writs of certiorari and prohibition

as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes;

statute involved in the case has relevance in the life of Philippine

nation so Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance

of the case.

3. RA 9522 is constitutional.

Ratio: RA 9522is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s

maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS III, not to

delineate Philippine territory. UNCLOS III is a multilateral treaty

regulating, among others, sea‐use rights over maritime zones,

territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelves

that UNCLOS III delimits. It was the culmination of decades‐long

negotiations among UN members to codify norms regulating the

conduct of states in the world’s ocean ands and submarine areas.

Baseline laws are enacted to mark‐out specific basepoints along

States coasts to serve as geographic starting points to measure the

breadth of maritime zones and continental shelf. (Article 48 of

UNCLOS III) Baselines are nothing but statutory mechanisms to

delimit with precision the extent of maritime zones and continental

shelves and this gives notice to the international community within

which the State can exercise treaty‐based rights.

Regarding Treaty of Paris: baselines of Philippines would still have to

be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 to conform to UNCLOS III.

UNCLOS III plays no role in the diminution of territory.

States acquire or lose territory through occupation,

accretion, cession and prescription. Territorial claims to land

features are outside of UNCLOS III; it is governed by general

international law.

RA 9522’s use of the framework of regime of islands to

determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal, is not inconsistent with the Philippines’

claim of sovereignty over these areas. Petitioner’s assertion

of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial

waters is unfounded both in fact and law as RA 9522

optimized the location of basepoints and therefore,

increased the Philippines’ total maritime space by 146, 216

square nautical miles as there is an extension of the reach of

exclusive economic zones. Also, Section 2 of RA 9522 shows

Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction

over the KIG and Scarborough Shoal (…over which the

Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction…).

Had Congress enclosed KIG and SS in RA 9522, they would

have committed the following breaches:

o (1) Article 47.3 of UNCLOS III (baselines shall not

depart to any appreciable extent from the general

configuration of the archipelago).

o (2) Article 47.2 of UNCLOS III (length of baselines

shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for 3% of

the total number of baselines, which can reach up

to 125 nautical miles). Classification of KIG and SS as

“regimes of islands” is responsible observance of its

pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept)

obligation under UNCLOS III.

Statutory claim over Sabah under RA 5446 is retained.

Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps

open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah.

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 is not incompatible with Constitution’s

delineation of internal waters.

The Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of

water lying landward of the baselines, including the air

space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS

III affirms this. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not

preclude the operation of municipal and international law

norms subjecting territorial sea or archipelagic waters to


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necessary, if not marginal burdens in the interest of

international navigation (international law principle of

freedom to navigate), thus, domestically the political

branches of the Philippine government may pass legislation

designating routes within the archipelagic waters to

regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. The right of

innocent passage is a customary international law, thus

automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.

The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic

waters was a concession of participating States in exchange

for their right to claim all the waters landward of their

baselines. Moreover, the recognition of waters enclosed by

State’s baselines prevents the treatment of their islands as

separate islands under UNCLOS III.

Regarding the petitioners’ claim of non‐executory constitutional

provisions in Article II: It must fail.

Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions

in Article II as mere legislative guides, which absent enabling

legislation, “do not embody judicially enforceable

constitutional rights.”

RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones – Passage of RA 9522

is in the discretion of Congress. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant

baselines law, Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally

acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones

and continental shelf is measured. It sends an open invitation to

seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the

waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and weakens

country’s case in any international dispute

Wherefore, we DISMISS the petition.

Justice J.R. Velasco, Concurring

Philippines, when it signed the UNCLOS III made the

following Declaration: “The signing of the Convention by the

GRP shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the

sovereign rights of the RP under and arising from the

Constitution of the Philippines.” “Such signing shall not in

any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the RP

over any territory over which it exercises soverign authority,

such as the KIG and waters appurtenant thereto;”

Article 46 of UNCLOS III in fact recognizes that an

archipelagic state, such as the Philippines, is a state

“constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may

include other islands.

UNCLOS III pertains to a law on the seas, not territory

Philippines maintains the sui generis character of our

archipelagic waters as equivalent to the internal waters of

continental coastal states.

o Article I of the Constitution: “the waters around,

between, and connecting the islands of the

archipelago, regardless of their breadth and

dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the

Philippines. – ratification of people of 1987

Constitution veritably rejected the quid pro quo

petitioners take as being subsumed in that treaty.

CLASS DISCUSSION

24 nautical miles – 200 nautical miles: already considered as

high seas and not anymore part of Philippine territorial waters

o We don’t own the seas but we have rights

o Lands outside of our territorial waters such as KIG and

Scarborough Shoal – part of our exclusive economic

zone

UNCLOS – not about drawing territorial rights but about usage

of seas


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Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Section 2. The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority

emanates from them.

POINTS

I. Sovereignty: People vs. Gozo

Ponente: Justice Fernando

Background:

Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First

Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an

ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the

municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building,

as well as any modification, alternation, repair or demolition

thereof. She questions the validity and applicability of provisions

to her by invoking due process. Her house was constructed

within the naval base leased to the American armed forces and

thus seeks emasculation of sovereignty’s rights by asserting

administrative jurisdiction is not present. She was given 30 days

from the finality of judgment to obtain a permit, failing which,

she is required to demolish the same.

Ruling/Rationale

No support in law for the stand taken by appellant.

o “By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine

Government merely consents that the United States

exercise jurisdiction in certain cases.” (Justice Tuason)

o Under the terms of the treaty, the US government has

prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of

such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not

only jurisdiction rights not granted, but also all

authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use

of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of

Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from

the express provisions of the treaty.

o Reagan: The Philippines’ authority may be exercised

over its entire domain. Within its limits, its decrees are

supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern

therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit

to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both

territorial and personal.

o Principle of auto‐limitation: a state, then, if it chooses

to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is

illimitable competence. Even if there is diminution of

jurisdictional rights, there is no disappearance of said

rights.

o It is not precluded from allowing another power to

participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over

certain portions of its territory. They are still subject to

its authority.

o Jurisdiction does not disappear. From the military bases

agreement, bases under the lease of American armed

forces are not and cannot be foreign territory.

II. GOVERNMENTS DE JURE AND DE FACTO: Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez

Tan Keh

Issue: The question to be determined is whether or not the

governments established in the Phil. Islands under the names of Phil.

Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the

Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments.

Ruling/Rationale:

Kinds of de facto governments:


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(1) Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by

force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal

government and maintains itself against the will of the latter.

(2) Government that is established and maintained by military

forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the

course of war and denominated a government of paramount

force.

(3) Government that is established by the inhabitants of a country

who rise in insurrection against the parent state.

Government of the 2nd kind: Thorington v Smith

(1) Its existence is maintained by active military power within the

territories, and against the rightful authority of an established

and lawful government.

(2) While it exists, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by

private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in

submission to such force, do not become responsible, as

wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws

of the rightful government.

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are

regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907.

Article 43 provides that “the authority of the legitimate power

having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter

shall take all steps in his power to reestablish, and insure, as far

as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless

absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

Belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty

to insure public order and safety – he can suspend old laws and

promulgate new ones but he is enjoined to respect the

municipal laws that promote public order and safety

Laws of political complexions are suspended or in abeyance

during military occupation

Halleck, International Law (Vol. 2 p. 444) – the right of one

belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy

while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war,

and flows directly from the right to conquer

o Such authority and rules are delivered directly from the

laws of war, as established by the usage of the world

and confirmed by the writings of publicists and

decisions of courts – in fine, from the law of nations

The municipal laws of the conquered territory are considered

continuing in force, as far as they are compatible with the new

order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the

occupying belligerent, and in practice they are allowed to

remain and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,

substantially as they were before the occupation

Government of the 3rd kind:

Thorington vs. Smith

US recognized the government set up by the Confederate States

as a de facto government

Williams vs. Bruffy

SC of the US discussing the validity of the acts of the

Confederate States said: "The same general form of

government, the same general laws for the administration of

justice and protection of private rights, which had existed in the

States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance

and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or

tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the

just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in

general, to be treated as valid and binding.”

Horn vs. Lockhart

The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen

the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the

regular administration of the laws.

“No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity

of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States

touching these and kindred subjects, where they were not


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hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the

authority of the National Government, and did not impair the

rights of citizens under the Constitution.”

Baldy vs. Hunter

De facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be

invalid merely because those governments were organized in

hostility.

Existence of war between the United States and the

Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the

insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor

destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government

or the regular administration of the laws.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive

Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23,

1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government

established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto

government of the second kind.

The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil

and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not

by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence.

The so‐called Republic of the Philippines was the same

character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the

ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese

military authority and government.

However, as a belligerent occupation, being essentially

provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the

territory. Thus, Japan had no legal power to grant independence

to the Philippines.

Virtue of Postliminy (Potliminium) in international law

Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it

necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the

courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a

political complexion, were good and valid after the liberation

and reoccupation of the Philippines by US and Filipino forces

under the leadership of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto

governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and

remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a

belligerent occupant

III. In re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno

Revolution – the complete overthrow of the established

government in any country or state by those who are previously

subject to it

It was through the February 1986 revolution that Filipino people

tore themselves away from the state

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has

been defined as “an inherent right of a people to cast our their

rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their

systems of government or institutions by force or a general

uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making

change have proved inadequate or are obstructed as to be

unavailable.

Locus of positive law‐making power lies with the people and so

they can also abolish, alter, and reform the existing constitution

3 clauses that precede the Freedom Constitution:

o (1) New government under President Cory Aquino was

installed through direct exercise of the power of the

Filipino people.

o (2) Action was done in defiance of the provisions of the

1973 Constitution.

o (3) Cory Aquino promulgate the ff. Provisional

Constitution

Aquino government was “revolutionary” in the sense that it

came into existence in defiance of existing legal processes and it

was instituted by the direct action of the people in opposition to


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the authoritarian values and practices of the overthrown

government.

Was the existing legal order overthrown by the Aquino

government? YES. It is assumed that the legal order remains as

a “culture system” of the polity as long as the latter endures and

that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system

ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by

the population nor enforced by the officials.

Aquino government was a violation of the 1973 Constitution yet

it signaled the point where the legal system then in effect had

ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino people.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Ponente: Justice Carpio

Background:

President Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the PCGG, which is tasked to

investigate former President Marcos, his family, friends, subordinates,

and close associates and recover ill‐gotten wealth. PCGG created an AFP

Anti‐Graft Board to investigate officials. AFP Board investigated the

respondent Major General Josephus Ramas.

THIRD ISSUE: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the

properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally seized

and therefore adminissible in evidence.

Raiding team seized ff. items: one baby armalite rifle with two

magazines, 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition, one pistol, caliber

.45, communications equipment, cash amounting to Php

2,870,000 and US $50,000, jewelry, and land title. Not all items

are included in the search warrant.

Search and seizure was during the revolutionary government.

Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively

withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution, which

guaranteed private exclusionary rights.

Correct issues:

(1) Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the

Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum.

(2) Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(“Covenant”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(“Declaration”) remained in effect during interregnum.

Ruling/Rationale

Court: We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973

Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.

However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals

under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect

during the interregnum.

o During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any

exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights because there

was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the

interregnum.

o To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973

Constitution remained operative during the

interregnum would render void all sequestration orders

issued by the PCGG before the adoption of the Freedom

Constitution.

Freedom Constitution, as well as the 1987 Constitution

recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus: … it should

be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the

authority of the PCGG to issue them have received

constitutional approbation and sanction.

Father Bernas was against the amendment excepting the

sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights in drafting the 1987

Constitution because it is against the Bill of Rights.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

o Excepting sequestration orders are like vices and these

are hard to shed.

o What matters are the results and not the legal niceties

are very disturbing. The argument makes the PCGG an

auctioneer and the BOR on an auction.

o Nation will only survive and grow only if it would

become convinced of the values enshrined in the

Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary

estimation.

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino people

continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,

almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights in the 1987

Constitution.

Revolutionary government installed itself as a de jure

government so assumed good faith compliance of Covenant and

Declaration.

o Covenant:

Article 2(1) requires every signatory “to respect

and to ensure to all individuals within its

territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights

recognized in the present Covenant.”

Article 17(1): “no one shall be subjected to

arbitrary or unlawful interference with his

privacy, family, home or correspondence.”

o Declaration: Article 17(2): “no one shall be arbitrarily

deprived of his property.”

The Court has interpreted the Declaration as

part of the generally accepted principles of

international law and binding on the State.

The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the

Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the

1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary

government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good

faith compliance with it treaty obligations under international

law.

The Provisional Constitution served as a self‐limitation by the

revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute

power entrusted to it by the people.

And so, the search warrant is thus valid with respect to the

items specifically described in the warrant but those that are

not included in the warrant are considered illegal searches and

seizures. There was no legal basis to seize these objects without

showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless

search and seizures.

Therefore, petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J.

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ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

PRINCIPLES

Section 1.

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

Section 2.

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of

the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Section 3.

Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal

is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

Section 4.

The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the

fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Section 5.

The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the

enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 6.

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

STATE POLICIES

Section 7.

The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty,

territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self‐determination.

Section 8.

The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Section 9.


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The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from

poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life

for all.

Section 10.

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Section 11.

The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

Section 12.

Case Facts Issues Held Ratio/Ruling

Tondo Medical Center

Employees v. Court of

Appeals

Ponente: Chico‐Nazaro, J.

A petition for review of certiorari on

the CA’s decision of denying a

petition for nullification of the Health

Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA)

Philippines (1999‐2004 DOH). HSRA

was issued by former Pres. Erap

through Executive Order No. 102

“Redirecting the Functions and

Operations of the DOH”

Petitioner alleges that the reform

resulted in the inaccessibility of free

medicine and medical services to the

poor and thus counters the

aspirations and ideals of the Filipino

peoples. Reforms violated Sec.

5,9,10,11,13,15 and 18 of Art. 2; Sec

1 of Art. 3, Sec. 11 and 14 of Art. 8,

and Sec. 1 and 3 of Art. 15 of the

1987 Constitution

(i) Whether or not the

HSRA can be nullified

based solely on

petitioner’s allegation

that it violates the

general principles

expressed in Sec.

5,9,10,11,13,15 and 18

of Art. 2.

(i) HSRA cannot

be nullified

based solely on

the

aforementioned

allegation.

(i) In Tanada v. Angara the Court has

already ruled the sections found on

Article 2 of the Constitution as not self‐

executing and need legislative

enactments before they can be

implemented. Sections of Article 2 are

used by the judiciary as aids or as

guides in the exercise of its power of

judicial review and by legislature in its

enactment of laws.

In Basco v. Phil. Amusement and

Gaming Corporation, Sections 11,12,

and 13 of Art. 2 are not self‐executing

provisions as they merely lay down a

general principle and cannot give rise to

a cause of action in the courts.

Other non self‐executing provisions:

Sec. 1 of Article 8, Section 2 of Article

XIV


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The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally

protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the

youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Section 13.

The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation‐building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and

social well‐being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Section 14.

The State recognizes the role of women in nation‐building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Section 15.

The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

Section 16.

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.


Oposa v. Factoran Jr. Ponente: Davide, Jr. J.

Controvery started in Civil Case No.

90‐777 which was filed before Branch

66 of the RTC NCR. Petitioners are

minors duly represented and

enjoined by parents while

respondent is former DENR Secretary

Factoran, Jr. substituted by current

Sec. Honorable Angel C. Alcala. Addt’l

plaintiff is Phil. Ecological Network,

Inc. (PENI) a domestic, non‐stock,

non‐profit corp. engaging in

concerted action geared for the

protection of the environment and

national resources. Complaint is

(i) Whether or not

Filipinos have a right to

a balanced and

healthful ecology

(ii) Whether or not said

petitioners have a cause

of action to “prevent

(i) Filipinos have

a right to a

balanced and

healthful ecology

as defined in

Section 16, Art.

2

(ii) Petitioners

have a cause of

action adequate

(i) Even though right is found in Art. 2

and not in the Bill of Rights, it does not

follow that it is less important than any

of the civil and political rights. Such a

right belongs to a different category for

it concerns self‐preservation and self‐

perpetuation. These different

categories of rights are assumed to be

in existence from the inception of

humankind and when it was written in

the Constitution, it is to highlight their

importance.

(ii) Their personality to sue in behalf of

the succeeding generations can only be

based on the concept of


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

instituted as a taxpayer’s class suit

and that petitioners are citizens of

the Phils. entitled to the full benefit

and enjoyment of the country’s

resources. Petitioners also assert that

they represent their generation and

the generation yet unborn. They

prayed that defendant and his agents

and representatives (1) cancel all

existing timbler license agreements

(TLA) in the country and (2) cease and

desist fron receiving, accepting,

processing, renewing or approving

new TLAs.

Phil. is a rich country with many

resources and scientific evidence

reveals that in order to maintain a

balanced and healthful ecology, the

country’s land area should be utilized

on a ratio of 54% for forests,

environment, etc. 46% on

agricultural, residential, industrial,

commercial, etc. Disturbances in the

balances resulted in the ff:

(a) Water shortages,

(b) Salinization of the water table,

(c) Massive erosion,

(d) Endangered and extinction of

flora and fauna,

(e) Disturbance of cultural

communities,

(f) Siltation of rivers and waterbeds

the misappropriation of

impairment” of

Philippine rainforests

and “arrest the

unabated hemorrhage

of the country’s vital

life‐support systems

and continued rape of

Mother Earth.”

enough to show,

prima facie, the

claimed violation

of their rights.

intergenerational responsibility insofar

as the right to a balanced and healthful

ecology is concerned. Every generation

has a responsibility to the next to

preserve the rhythm and harmony for

the full enjoyment of a balanced and

healthful ecology. Right to a balanced

and healthful environment carries a

correlative duty of not impairing the

environment. Right of petitioners is as

clear as the right of DENR with its

functions as provided in EO. No 192. A

denial or violation of that right by the

other who has the correlative duty or

obligation to respect or protect the

same gives rise to a cause of action.

Granting of TLAs violated petitioners’

right hence the full protection thereof

requires that no further TLAs should be

renewed or granted.


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(g) Recurrent spells of drought

(h) Increasing velocity of typhoon

winds

(i) Flooding of lowlands

(j) Shortening of lifespan of dams

(k) Reduction of capacity to process

CO2.

Laguna Lake

Development

Authority vs. Court of

Appeals

Ponente: Romero, J.

Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of our

Lady of Lourdes filed a letter‐

complaint with the Laguna Lake

Development Authority to stop the

operation of the 8.6 hectare

dumpsite because of the harmful

health effects it causes and

possibilities of pollution. LLDA found

out City of Caloocan maintains

dumpsite without ECC and leachate

seeping through the waters can

cause pollution and so they ordered a

cease and desist order to Caloocan

City. Dumping operation closed for a

while then opened again when

settlements failed to happen. LLDA

issued another order and stopped

trucks from entering Camarin. City of

Caloocan filed a petition in the RTC

declaring a nullity of the orders given

by LLDA, claiming that it is the sole

authority empowered to promote the

health and safety and enhace the

right of people of Caloocan to a


LLDA has authority and

power to issue an order

(ii) Whether or not LLDA

have the authority to

entertain complaint

against the dumping of

garbage in the open

dumpsite in Camarin

(i) LLDA has

authority and

power to issue

an order through

Republic Act No.

4850.

(ii) LLDA has

authority to

entertain

complaint.

(i) Section 4 of RA explicitly authorizes

LLDA to make whatever order may be

necessary in the exercise of its

jurisdiction; it is likewise a settled rule

that an administrative agency has also

such powers as are necessarily implied

in the exercise of its express powers.

(ii) The immediate response to the

demands of “the necessities of

protecting vital public interests” gives

vitality to the statement on ecology

embodied in Art II of the Constitution.

Section 16 – as a constitutionally

guaranteed right of every person, it

carries the correlative duty of non‐

impairment. Health is a fundamental

human right (Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and Alma Conference

Declaration of 1978)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

balanced ecology. RTC issued a TRO

to LLDA, LLDA filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground of Pollution

Control Law. CA upheld RTC’s

decision.

Section 17.

The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social

progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

Section 18.

The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Section 19.

The State shall develop a self‐reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.


Garcia v. Board of

Investments

Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. J.

Petition to annul and set aside the

decision of the BOI/DTI approving the

transfer of the proposed

petrochemical plant site from Bataan

to Batangas and shift of feedstock to

naptha and/or LPG

Background: 576 hectares in Limay

Bataan was for the Petrochemical

Industrial Zone. Taiwanese investors

formed BPC with terms specifying

Bataan as the place and using naptha.

It was supposed to be a joint venture

with PNOC. BPC was accorded several

benefits in relation to the industry.

(i) Whether or not BOI

was correct in

approving the transfer

of BPC in Batangas and

the shift of feedstock to

naptha and/or LPG?

(i) The Court

holds and finds

that the BOI

committed a

grave abuse of

discretion in

approving the

transfer of the

petrochemical

plant from

Bataan to

Batangas and

authorizing the

change of

feedstock from

naptha only to

naphtha and/or

(i)

(1) Bataan was the original choice

hence the name of BPC

(2) BRC in Bataan produces 60% naptha

(3) Naptha was exempted from tax

because of petrochemical industry and

so neither BOI or foreign investors

should disregard or contravene

expressed policy

(4) Duty of the State to exercise

authority over foreign investments

within national jurisdiction.

Development of a self‐reliant and

independent national economy

effectively controlled by Filipinos

(Section 19, Art, 2)

(5) capital requirements will be


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

But in Feb 1989 AT Chong the major

investor of BPC gave BOI a letter

stating BPC’s desire to relocate in

Batangas

LPG for the main

reason that the

final say is in the

investor all other

circumstances to

the contrary

notwithstanding.

minimized if changes won’t happen

(6) PNOC can be involved to the benefit

and advantage of gov’t

> Every provision of the Constitution on

the national economy and patrimony is

infused with the spirit of national

interest.

> Petrochemical industry is not an

ordinary industry and essential to

national interest.

Section 20.

The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Section 21.

The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

Section 22.

The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Section 23.

The State shall encourage non‐governmental, community‐based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

Section 24.

The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation‐building.

Section 25.

The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Section 26.

The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻


Pamatong v. Comelec Ponente: Tinga, J.

Petitioner filed a certificate for

candidacy last Dec. 27, 2003 but

respondent refused to give due

course to petitioners certificate of

candidacy (dated: Jan. 17,2004).

Petitioner seeks a petition for a

review of certiorari because the

decision was violative of his right to

“equal access to opportunities for

public service” under Sec. 26 of Art.

II. Petitioner argues that Comelec

indirectly amended the consti

provisions on the electoral process

and limited the power of the

sovereign people to choose their

leaders. Petitioner alleges that he is

the most qualified among

presidential candidates and also

attacks the validity of the form for

the certificate of candidacy of

Comelec.

(I) Whether or not

COMELEC violated

petitioner’s right to

“equal access to

opportunities for public

service.”

(i) The clause

“equal access to

opportunities for

public service” is

not a

constitutional

right but a

privilege subject

to limitations

imposed by law.

(i) Sec. 26 of Art. 2 neither bestows

such a right nor elevates the privilege to

the level of an enforceable right.

Provisions in Art. 2 are generally

considered non self‐executing and

merely specifies a guideline for

legislative or executive action.

Commissioner (now Chief Justice)

Hilario Davide, Jr. changed some words

of Sec. 26 (from “broad” to “equal

protection” and “office” to “service”) –

The provision is not intended to compel

the State to enact positive measures

that would accommodate as many

people as possible into public office.

Words such as “equal access”

“opportunities” “public service” are

susceptible to countless interpretations

and so it is difficult to regard this as

operative as positive rights.

The clause is subject to limitations

(provisions of the Omnibus Election

Code on “Nuisance Candidates” and

Comelec Resolution No. 6452) and the

limitations, as long as it applies to

everyone, is presumed valid. Petitioner

did not challenge the validity of the

limitations so they have to be accorded

due weight.

Section 27.

The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 28.

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving

public interest.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

ARTICLE VI: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1.

The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the

extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.


Garcia v. Commission

on Elections

G.R. No. 111230

September 30, 1994

Ponente: Puno, J.

In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

Serye 1993, Sangguniang Bayang ng

Morong (SBM) agreed to the

inclusion of the municipality of

Morong as part of the Subic Special

Economic Zone as accorded in R.A.

7227. Petition filed a petition with

SBM saying Morong didn’t acted on

the petition and petitioners resorted

to power of initiative under Local

Government Code 1991 and solicited

signatures for the repeal. COMELEC

denied the petition on the ground

that its subject is merely a resolution

and not an ordinance

(i) Whether or not

Pambayang

Kapasyahan Blg. 10

serye 1993 of SMB

Bataan is the proper

subject of an initiative.

(i) Pambayang

Kapasyahan Blg.

10 of

Sangguniang

Bayan ng

Morong is a

proper subject of

an initiative.

(i) Constitution clearly includes

resolutions as subject of a local

initiative. Resolutions as subject of

initiative was implemented by Congress

– R.A. No. 6735 Initiative – power of

the people to make amendments to the

Constitution or propose legislation

(rooted from original legislative power);

they can enact or reject any act or law

by Congress or local legislative body.

Eastern Shipping Lines

v. Philippine Overseas

Employment

Administration

166 SCR.A. 533 (1988)

Ponente: Cruz, J.

POEA awarded private respondent

P192,000 for the death of husband

(Vitaliano Saco). Petitioner challenges

POEA’s jurisdiction over the case as

Saco is not an overseas worker and

that POEA has no authority to

promulgate the regulation. Petitioner

argues that POEA’s Memorandum

(i) Whether or not POEA

violated the non‐

delegation of legislative

power.

(i) POEA did not

violate the non‐

delegation of

legislative power.

(i) Delegation of legislative power has

become frequent if not necessary and

has established itself to be a rule and

the non‐delegability an exception.

Modernizing society gave way to more

problems and thus, legislative’s

competence and capacity has become

limited. Delegation or legislative

powers are particularly applicable to

administrative bodies (power of


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

No. 2 is violative of the principle of

non‐delegation of legislative power.

subordinate legislation). Memorandum

No. 2 falls into administrative

regulation and has passed one of the

tests of valid delegation of power which

is sufficient standard test (limitations

and boundaries of delegate’s authority

are mapped out)

Tablarin v Gutierrez

152 SCR.A. 730 (1987)

Ponente: Feliciano, J.

Petitioners have made an argument

that Section 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 2382

offend against the constitutional

principle which forbids the undue

delegation of legislative power by

failing to establish the necessary

standard to be followed by delegate,

the Board of Medical Education.

(i) Whether or not

Section 5(a) and (f) of

R.A. 2382 failed to

establish the necessary

standards and thus,

offend the principle of

forbidding undue


power

(i) Necessary

standards set

forth in Sec. 1 of

the 1959 Medical

Act and in

Sections 5(a) and

7 of the Same Act

and that these

considered

together are

sufficient

compliance with

the requirements

of the non‐

delegation

principle

(i) The general principle of non‐

delegation of legislative power, which

both flows from and reinforces the

more fundamental rule of the

separation and allocation of powers

among the three depts. Of govt must

be applied with circumspection in

respect of statutes

> Justice Laurel: complexities of modern

government – adapt to subordinate

legislation; there is a constantly

growing tendency toward the

delegation of greater power by the

legislature, and toward the approved of

the practice by the courts

Standards set for subordinate

legislation in the exercise of rule‐

making authority may be either

expressed or implied.

Free Telephone

Workers Union v.

Minister of Labor

108 SCR.A. 757 (1981)

Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 empowers

Minister of Labor to assume

jurisdiction over labor disputes

causing or likely to cause strikes or

lockouts adversely affecting the

national interest and deciding and

certifying the same to the National

Labor Relations Commission

(i) Whether or not Batas

Pambansa Blg. 130 is

unconstitutional for

violating the non‐


powers

(i) Batas

Pambansa Blg.

130 is not

unconstitutional

for being violate

of the non‐

delegation of

legislative

(i) Non‐delegation of powers appears to

be too strict and rigid for modern

governments encounter different

complexities and thus subordinate

legislation comes into the picture. The

difficulty with subordinate legislation

comes in the fixing of the limit and

extent of authority. Safest way to


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

powers decide each case is according to its

peculiar environment, having into mind

the wholesome legislative purpose

intended to achieve.

Closer relationship of the departments

in our Constitution there is more

promptitude in framing our policies and

unity in its execution. Non‐delegation

would be an obstacle in our national

development. “Power should be

delegated where there is agreement

that a task must be performed and it

cannot be effectively performed by the

legislature without the assistance of a

delegate or without an expenditure of

time so great as to lead the neglect of

equally important business”

Cebu Oxygen and

Acetylene Co., Inc. v.

Secretary Drilon

176 SCR.A. 24 (1989)

Ponente: Gancayco, J.

R.A. No. 6640 was passed increasing

minimum wage by 10 pesos. The

Secretary of Labor issued pertinent

rules in implementing the R.A.,

prohibiting the employer from

crediting anniversary wages increases

negotiated under a CBA against such

wage increases in R.A. No. 6640

(i) Whether or not an

Implementing Order of

the Secretary of Labor

and Employment

(DOLE) can provide for a

prohibition not

contemplated by the

law it seeks to

implement

(i) An

implementing

Order of the

Secretary of

Labor and

Employment

cannot provide

for a prohibition

not

contemplated by

the law it seeks

to implement as

R.A. No. 6640

does not prohibit

the crediting of

CBA anniversary

wages increases

(i) It is fundamental that in a case

where only pure questions of law are

raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of

the administrative remedies cannot

apply because issues of law cannot be

resolved with finality by the

administrative officer. The question

raised here is a question of law. It is a

fundamental rule that implementing

rules cannot add or detract from the

provisions of the law it is designed to

implement. Administrative regulations

adopted under legislative authority by a

particular department must be in

harmony with the provisions of the law,

and should be for the sole purpose of

carrying into effect its general


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

for purposes of

compliance

provisions.

Tatad v. Secretary of

Energy

G.R. No. 124360

November 5, 1997

Ponente: Puno, J.

Petitions challenge the

constitutionality of Sec. 15 R.A. No.

8180, which ends the 26 years of

gov’t regulation of downstream oil

industry. Full deregulation will start

after March 1997 and when the

prices of crude oil and petroleum

products in the world market are

declining and when the exchange

rate of the peso in relation to the US

dollar is stable and upon approval of

the President. EO No. 372 issued by

President Ramos approved the

deregulation of the downstream oil

industry considering the two factors

stated above plus including the OPSF

fund depletion as a factor.

Petitioners assail that no specific

time frame was set in the R.A. and

does not provide a determinate

standard to guide Executive Branch in

implementing the deregulation

(i) Whether or not

Section 15 of R.A. No.

8180 violates the

constitutional

prohibition on undue

delegation of power

and whether or not EO

No. 392 is a

misapplication of R.A.

No. 8180

(i) Section 15 of

R.A. 8180 does

not violate the

constitutional

prohibition on

undue delegation

of power but EO

No. 392 is a

misapplication of

R.A. No. 8180

(i) Section 15 can hurdle both the

completeness test and sufficient

standard test of due delegation. The

law is complete on the question of the

final date of full deregulation. There

were also determinate standards set

forth in Sec. 15. The inclusion of EO No.

392 with the depletion of the OPSF

fund is extraneous and rewrote the

standards included in R.A. No. 8180.

The Executive is bereft of any right to

alter the standards in the R.A.. The

exercise of delegated power is given a

strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate

is a mere agent whose actions cannot

infringe the agency.

People v. Dacuycuy

173 SCR.A. 90 (1989)

Ponente: Regalado, J.

Sec 32 of R.A. No. 4670 expressed 2

alternative and distinct penalties:

fine ranging from 100 to 1000 or

imprisonment. No specified period

was indicated for imprisonment.

Respondents contend that having no


penalty of

imprisonment provided

in Sec. 32 of R.A. No.

4670 is declared

unconstitutional

(i) The penalty of

imprisonment

provided in Sec.

32 of R.A. No.

4670 is declared

unconstitutional

(i) It is not for the courts to fix the term

of imprisonment where no points of

reference have been provided by the

legislature. What valid delegation

presupposes and sanctions is an

exercise of discretion to fix the length

of service of a term of imprisonment

which must be encompassed within


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Section 2.

The Senate shall be composed of twenty‐four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by

law.

Section 3.

No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty‐five years of age,

able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

People v. Dacuycuy

173 SCR.A. 90 (1989)


Sec 32 of R.A. No. 4670 expressed 2

alternative and distinct penalties:

fine ranging from 100 to 1000 or

imprisonment. No specified period

was indicated for imprisonment.

Respondents contend that having no

specific period for the penalty is

violative of the constitutional

prohibition against undue delegation

of legislative power as it is left in the

discretion of the court.


penalty of

imprisonment provided

in Sec. 32 of R.A. No.

4670 is declared

unconstitutional

(i) The penalty of

imprisonment

provided in Sec.

32 of R.A. No.

4670 is declared

unconstitutional

(i) It is not for the courts to fix the term

of imprisonment where no points of

reference have been provided by the

legislature. What valid delegation

presupposes and sanctions is an

exercise of discretion to fix the length

of service of a term of imprisonment

which must be encompassed within

specific or designated limits will

constitute such exercise as an undue

delegation if not an outright intrusion

into or assumption of legislative power

Employees

Confederation v.

National Wages

Commission

G.R. No. 96169

September 24, 1991

Ponente: Sarmiento, J.

Petitioners are questioning the

validity of R.A. No. 6727 Wage

Rationalization Act which provides

new wage rates, provides, among

other things, for various Regional

Tripartite Wages and productivity

Boards in charge of prescription of

minimum wage rates for all workers

in the various regions, and for a

National Wages and Productivity

Commission to review among other

functions wage levels determined by

the boards.

(i) Whether or not R.A.

No. 6727 is valid

(i) R.A. No. 6727

is valid

(i) The Commission noted that the

determination of wages generally

involves two methods: the floor‐wage

method and the salary‐ceiling method.

It is true that wage‐fixing, like rate‐

fixing, constitutes an act of Congress, it

is also true, however, that Congress

may delegate the power to fix rates

provided that it leaves standards and

the Commission has fulfilled this with

Art. 124.


Social Justice Society v.

Dangerous Drugs

Board

G.R. No. 161658

Dec. 23, 2003 COMELEC issued

Resolution No. 6486 prescribing rules

and regulations for mandatory drug

testing of candidates for public office


9165’s mandatory drug

testing is constitutional

(i) Section 36(g)

og R.A. 9165 is

unconstitutional

Pimental argued that qualifications

under Sec. 3, Article 6 are the only

qualifications needed to be a candidate

in the elections. Constitution prevails


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Section 4.

The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next

following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall

not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.

Section 5.

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be

elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their

respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party‐list

system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party‐list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For

three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one‐half of the seats allocated to party‐list representatives shall be filled, as

provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other

sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least

two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards

provided in this section.

November 3, 2008 in connection with the May 10, 2004

elections

over administrative acts or laws

contrary to it.

> It can be argued that drug testing can

be optional but the provision in the R.A.

specified it to be mandatory hence,

suggesting that the obstinate ones shall

have to suffer to the adverse

consequences for not adhering to the

statutory demand


Veterans Federation

Party v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 136781

October 6, 2000

COMELEC violated the legal

parameters of R.A. No. 7941 which

are: (1) 20% allocation (2) 2%

threshold (3) three seat limit (4)

(i) Is the 20% allocation

for party‐list

representatives

mandatory or merely a

(i) The 20%

allocation is not

mandatory and

merely a ceiling.

(i) First Issue: The Constitution simply

states “the party‐list representatives

shall constitute 20 % of the total

number of representatives including


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proportional representation ceiling?

(ii) Are the 2% threshold

requirement and 3 seat

limit constitutional?

How should the

additional seats of a

qualified party be

determined?

2% allocation

(ii) 3 seat limit is

constitutional

Method was

indicated in the

case

those under the party‐list” Section 5(2)

of Article VI is only a ceiling. A statute

remains a valid command of

sovereignty unless declared

unconstitutional.

(ii) Second Issue: All gov’t authority

emanates from the people, but is

exercised by representatives chosen by

them. But to have meaningful

representation, the elected persons

must have the mandate of a sufficient

no. of people. When the law is clear,

the function of courts is simple

application, not interpretation or

circumvention. Three seat limit ensures

the entry of various interest‐

representations into the legislature.

Third Issue: How to determine the

allocation:

(1) Rank and determine first party

(2) (No. of seats available to

legislative districts/.80) * .20 =

no. of seats available to party‐

list representatives.

Bagong Bayani v.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

Ponente: Panganiban, J.

Petitioners seek the disqualification

of private respondents, arguing

mainly that the party‐list system was

intended to benefit the marginalized

and underrepresented, not the

mainstream political parties, the non‐

marginalized or overrepresented

(i) Whether or not

political parties may

participate in party‐list

elections

(i) Political

parties may

participate in

party‐list

elections.

(i) First Issue: Under Sec. 5 Art. 6 of

Consti “members of the House of

Representatives may be elected

through a party‐list system of

registered national, regional, and

sectoral parties or organizations.”

Commissioner Monsod and Sections 2

and 11 of R.A. 7941 further reiterated

this.


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(ii) Whether or not

party‐list system is

exclusive to

marginalized and

underrepresented

Whether or not

COMELEC committed

grave abuse of

discretion in

promulgating Omnibus

Resolution No. 3785

(ii) The spirit of

the party‐list

system is geared

towards

marginalized and

underrepresente

d

(ii) Second Issue: purpose of the party‐

list system was to give genuine power

to our people. Sec. 2 of R.A. 7941

mandates a proportional

representation by means of Filipino

style party‐list system. The emphasis is

on the “marginalized and

underrepresented” “lack of well‐

defined constituencies” and

“proportional representation.” It is not

enough for the candidate to claim

representation of the marginalized and

underrepresented; they must belong in

these specific sectors and and factually

and truly represent the marginalized

and underrepresented. The party‐list

system is a tool for the benefit of the

underprivileged. The intent is clear and

thus must be followed thoughout.

Ang Bagong Bayani‐

OFW Labor Party et

al., v. COMELEC, et al.

G.R. No. 147589

June 25, 2003


The instant Motions for

proclaimation contend that the

disqualification of many party‐list

orgs has reduced the “total number

of votes cast for the party‐list

elections.” Because of this, 2%

threshold has now been attained by

movants and thus pray for their

proclamation as winners.

(i) Should votes tallied

for the disqualified

candidates be

deducted?

(ii) Does the clause

“total number of votes

cast for the party‐list

elections” include only

ballots from qualified

parties.

(i) Votes tallied

for the

disqualified

candidates

should be

deducted.

Clause only

includes ballots

from qualified

parties.

(i) Subtracting the votes of disqualified

party‐list groups will make 2%

threshold attainable for marginalized

and underrepresented (proportional

representation)

(ii) Perceived “instability” can be

alleviated because COMELEC now has

the herein qualified and disqualified

participants’ list and COMELEC can now

be guided accordingly when accrediting

new candidates for the next party‐list

elections and will be able to set the

period for accreditation in such time


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and manner as to enable it to

determine their qualifications long

before the elections were held. There is

a need for patience and perseverance

in order to uphold the spirit of the law

of opening opportunities to the

marginalized and underrepresented.

Banat v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 179295

April 21, 2009

Ponente: Carpio, J.

A petition for certiorari and

mandamus assails the Resolution

promulgated on 3 August 2007.

(i) Is the 20% allocation

for party‐list

representatives

mandatory or merely a

ceiling?

(ii) Is the 3 limit seat

unconstitutional?

(iii) 2% threshold and

qualified voters

constitutional?

(iv) How shall the party‐

list representatives be

allocated?

(v) Does the

Constitution prohibit

the major political

(i) The 20%

allocation is

mandatory.

(ii) 3‐seat limit is

constitutional.

(iii) 2% threshold

is

unconstitutional

in the allocation

of additional

seats.

(v) Major political

parties are

disallowed and

(i) The Constitution left the manner of

allocating the seats available to party‐

list representatives to the wisdom of

the legislature.

(ii) New method is shown in the book.

(Table 3 pp.99‐100)

(iii) The Court finds that the 2%

threshold makes it mathematically

impossible to achieve the maximum

number of available party list seats

when the number of available party‐list

seats exceeds 50. It frustrates the

attainment of the permissive ceiling

that 20% of the members of the House

of Representative shall consist of party‐

list representatives.

(iv) Follow Table 3 of pp. 99‐100 for the

method of allocating the additional

seats to the party‐list winners.


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parties from

participating in the

party‐list elections? If

not, can the major

political parties be

barred from

participating in the

party‐list elections?

are only allowed

on sectoral lines.

Tobias v. Abalos

G.R. No. L‐114783

December 8, 1994

Ponente: Bitin, J.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality

of R.A. 7675 “An Act Converting the

Municipality of Mandaluyong into a

Highly Urbanized City to be known as

the City of Mandaluyong”

Prior to enactment Mandaluyong and

San Juan belonged to one district.

Petitioners argue that act breaks the

one subject‐one bill rule since it also

tackles the separation of

Mandaluyong to San Juan. Separation

has resulted in the increase in the

composition of the House of

Representative and is also

preempting the rights of Congress to

reapportion the legislative districts.

(i) Whether or not

contentions have merit

(i) Contentions

do not have

merit

(i) Conversion of Mandaluyong to a

highly urbanized city is in compliance

with the “one city‐one representative”

proviso in the Constitution. Separation

from San Juan is a natural and logical

consequence of conversion to a highly

urbanized city. “One title‐one subject”

rule should be given practical rather

than technical construction. The said

act enjoys the presumption of being

passed through the regular

congressional processes, including due

consideration by the members of the

Congress of the minimum requirements

for the establishment of separate

legislative districts.

> Present limit of 250 members in

Congress not absolute because of the

“otherwise provided by law” proviso.

Congress itself drafted, deliberated,

enacted assailed law therefore it

cannot preempt itself on a right, which

pertains itself.

> No “gerrymandering” is present as

incumbent representative of San

Juan/Mandaluyong district’s powers is


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diminished and not favorable to him.

Mariano, Jr. v.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577

March 7, 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

Petitioners assailing the

constitutionality of R.A. 7854 under

the ff. grounds: Sec. 2 did not

properly identify the proper land area

or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by

metes and bounds, Sec. 51 attempts

to alter or restart the “three‐

consecutive term” limit for local

elective officials, and Sec 52 is

unconstitutional for it increased the

legislative district of Makati only be

special law, increase was not stated

in the title of bill, and addition of

another legislation is not in accord

with Section 5(3).

(i) Whether or not there

is merit in

aforementioned

petitions

(i) The Court

finds no merit in

aforementioned

petitions

(i) Petitions failed to establish the

supposed confusion of not delineating

the territory of Makati. Section 2 did

not add or subtract and expressly

stated that area “shall comprise the

present territory of the municipality.”

Land area was not defined because an

ongoing dispute with Taguig was under

court litigation. So long as the territorial

jurisdiction is ascertained it may be

concluded that the legislative intent

behind the law has been sufficiently

served.

> Reapportionment of legislative

districts may be made through a special

law. Makati has met the minimum

requirements of 250,000 population

and thus legislative district can be

increased. Policy of Court favoring a

liberal construction of the “one title‐

one subject rule”

Montejo v. COMELEC

G.R. No.118702

March 16, 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

Petitioner pleads for the annulment

of Sec. 1 of Resolution No. 1736 of

COMELEC, redistricting certain

municipalities in Leyte on the ground

that it violates the principle of

equality of representation. Petitioner

seeks to transfer the municipality of

Tolosa from his district to the 2nd

district of the province.

Whether or not Section

1 of Resolution No. 2736

is void.

Section 1 of

Resolution No.

2736 is void.

Section 2 of the Ordinance (source of

power of COMELEC) only empowers

COMELEC to make minor adjustments

of the reapportionment herein made.

Minor adjustments do not include

transferring one municipality from one

district to another. The power granted

to COMELEC is to adjust the no. of

members “apportioned to the province

out of which such new province was

created.”

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 Art 6 Sec. 5 and Art. 10 Sec. 10, the


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Section 6.

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is

at least twenty‐five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party‐list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall

be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.


Gallego v. Verra

G.R. No. L‐48641

November 24, 1941

Ponente: Ozaeta, J.

A petition of certiorari to review the

decision of CA affirming CFI in

declaring petitioner’s win as mayor is

illegal.

Petitioner was a native of Abuyog,

Leyte. He studied in Samar. He found

Whether or not

petitioner is a resident

of Abuyog for at least 1

year prior to Dec. 10,

1940.

Petitioner has

maintained his

domicile of birth

in Leyte.

Despite working in several areas in the

country, specifically staying for 2 years

of in Malaybalay, petitioner always

returns to homeland. He ran for the

same office in Leyte and bought

property in Leyte. He kept close ties

with the people in the area and won

by a majority of 800 votes. There was

no clear intention of abandoning

G.R. No. 176970

December 8, 2008

converts and divides the City of

Cagayan de Oro as a local gov’t unit

and does not merely provide for the

city’s legislative apportionment.

authority to act of apportionment and

reapportionment is within the

Legislature. Art 6, Sec. 5 is a political

representation and the means to make

a legislative district sufficiently

represented so that the people can be

effectively heard. Sec. 5(4) specifically

mandates reapportionment as soon as

the given standards are met. In

contrast, Art. 10 Sec 10 talks of the

commencement, termination, and

modification of local gov’t units

corporate existence and territorial

coverage. Distinction between the two

articles is on the requirement of

plebiscite. No plebiscite requirement

exists under the apportionment or

reapportionment provision.


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work in Samar and in municipalities of

Leyte. He ran for mayor in his

hometown but lost and thus, he went

to Mindanao to search for a job. He

worked in Malaybalay but still

returned to his hometown whether to

deliberate on a job offer or to visit his

wife and kids who resided there. He

did not take the parcel of land offered

by the gov’t in Malaybalay and instead

kept real property in Leyte. He

registered himself as an elector in

Malaybalay and has stated that he had

resided there for a year and a half.

Respondent contends that petitioner

has already abandoned his domicile of

origin and transferred to a new

domicile. Petitioner states that CA

erred in holding him as aresident of

Bukidnon and that his election as

mayor of Leyte is null and void

domicile.

Romualdez‐Marcos v.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976

September 18, 1995

Ponente: Kapunan, J.

On March 8, 1995, petitioner provided

that she was residing for 7 months in

the First District of Leyte. Private

respondent contested that and said

petitioner did not meet the 1‐year

residency requirement. On March 29,

1995, petitioner changed the entry to

“since childhood” but the provincial

Election adviser in Leyte informed her

that it was too late already. Petitioner

Whether or not

petitioner was a

resident, for election

purposes, of the First

District of Leyte for a

period of one year at

the time of the May 9,

1995 elections.

Petitioner

possesses the

necessary

residence

qualifications for

election

purposes

The residence qualification in the 1987

Consti actually refers to domicile.

Domicile is one’s permanent home

with two elements: physical presence

in the area or having the intention to

go back.

It would be plainly ridiculous for a

candidate to deliberately and

knowingly make a statement in a

certificate of candidacy which would

lead to his/her disqualification hence

upholding petitioner’s contention that


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contends that her first entry is an

honest misinterpretation and she has

always maintained Tacloban as her

domicile. Petitioner filed for motion

for reconsideration but was denied.

Hence, the case.

it was an honest misinterpretation.

Tacloban is petitioner’s domicile as

she was born and raised there, and

even when she moved to other cities

to find work and resided because of

her married life, she still visited the

place and kept close ties in the

community hence showing the

intention to return. Domicile of origin

is not easily lost unless there is an

actual removal or an actual change of

domicile, a bona fide intention of

abandoning domicile, and acts

corresponding to the purpose. Also,

there is nothing in the Civil Code that

presupposes wife takes on the

domicile of her husband.

Aquino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120265

September 18, 1995


Court agrees with COMELEC’s

contention that in order for petitioner

to qualify as candidate for

representation of the 2nd district of

Makati city, he must prove that he has

established not just residence but also

domicile.”

As found by COMELEC, petitioner

resided in Tarlac for 52 years. He was

born and raised there. Petitioner has

an agreement of lease of a condo unit

in Makati City and has admitted of

owning other properties in QC.

Whether or not

petitioner was able to

establish domicile in

Makati City

Petitiner was not

able to establish

domicile in

Makati City

The fact that petitioner himself claims

of other residences in Metro Manila

coupled with the short amount of time

he claimed to be a resident of Makati

indicates that the sole purpose of

transferring to a new residence is not

to establish domicile but to qualify for

elections. There is an absence of clear

and positive proof showing successful

abandonment of domicile.

Domino v. COMELEC Ponente: Davide, Jr., J. Whether or not the The judgment of First Issue: COMELEC has jurisdiction


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

G.R. No. 134015

July 19, 1999

A case of certiorari with a prayer for

preliminary injunction challenging the

disqualification of Juan Domino as

candidate for representative of the

Lone Legislative District of the

Province of Sarangani. Domino

maintains that he has complied with

the one‐year residency requirement

and has been residing there since Jan.

1997. He was disqualified because of

voter’s registration record and address

in QC. He also lacks the no. of days

from registration (June 22, 1997 –May

8, 1998)

Domino filed a motion for

reconsideration, which was denied by

COMELEC. Hence, this petition.

judgment of the MTC of

QC declaring petitioner

resident of Sarangani is

final, conclusive and

binding;

Whether or not

petitioner herein

resided in the subject

congressional district for

at least 1 year;

Whether or not

respondent COMELEC

has jurisdiction in the

disqualification of

candidate

the MTC of QC

declaring

petitioner

resident of

Sarangani is final,

conclusive and

binding cannot

be sustained.

Petitioner did not

reside in the

subject

congressional

district for at

least 1 year

over a petition to deny due course to

or cancel certificate of candidacy.

MTC’s determination does not

preclude COMELEC’s determination.

Second Issue: petitioner lacks

intention in changing domiciles. Proofs

are lease of home in Sarangani,

registering for elections in the QC

area. Both intent and actual presence

in the district one intends to represent

must satisfy the length of time

prescribed by fundamental law.

Co v. House Electoral

Tribunal

G.R. Nos. 92191‐92

July 30, 1991

Petitioners asking for a reversal of the

decision of the HRET.

Background:

Private respondent’s grandfather, Ong

Te, came from China and acquired

land and certification in Samar. His

son, Jose Ong Chuan was born in

China, but Ong Te brought him here.

Jose Ong Chuan met a Filipino girl, got

married, and bore their son in 1948.

On May 15, 1957, Ong Chuan took an

oath of allegiance to the Philippines

and around that time, the respondent

was only 9 years old.

When respondent became older, he

Whether or not HRET

acted with grave abuse

of discretion in declaring

Jose Ong, Jr. a natural‐

born citizen of the Phils.

HRET did not act

with grave abuse

of discretion

when it declared

Jose Ong, jr. a

natural‐born

citizen of the

Phils.

“Those born before January 17, 1973,

of Filipino mothers, who elect

Philippine citizenship upon reaching

the age of majority.” – amended and

made to be retroactive as spirit and

intendment of the law must prevail

over the letter especially when the

latter results in absurdity and

injustice. Filipino father, alien mother

= natural born and alien father,

Filipino mother = natural born is on

equal footing.

Respondent is natural‐born. His

mother is a Filipina and his father is a

naturalized citizen when he was 9

years old. Because of his age, it would


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

ran for public office and hence the

contention for his citizenship status.

be unusual if he undergone election

through a statement but since he

already exercised his right of suffrage

and established his life here in the

Phils and thus, he is a Filipino citizen.

“It was the law itself that had already

elected Philippine citizenship for

protestee by declaring him as such”

Bengzon v. Cruz

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

Cruz was a natural‐born citizen born

to Filipino parents in April 27, 1960.

(1935 Consti was in effect). Nov 5

1985 – Cruz swore allegiance to the US

without the consent of the Philippines

when he joined the marine corps. He

reacquired his citizenship through

repatriation under R.A. No. 2630.

Petitioner argues that respondent is

not anymore a natural‐born citizen of

the Phils because he got his status

from reacquisition but respondents

says that the phrase “from birth”

refers to the inherent and inborn

characteristic of being a natural‐born

citizen.

Whether or not Cruz, a

natural‐born Filipino

who became an

American citizen, can

still be considered a

natural‐born Filipino

through reacquisition.

Cruz can still be

considered a

natural‐born

citizen of the

Phils

There are 2 ways of getting Phil.

Citizenship: (1) by birth (2)

naturalization. Those natural‐born are

citizens who don’t need to go through

a process to perfect citizenship while

those naturalized went to a process to

prove that they possess all the

qualities and have no disqualifications

under Phil. Law. For Phil. Citizens who

lost their citizenship they can acquire

it through (1) naturalization (2)

repatriation (3) direct act from

Congress. Repatriation consists of

taking an oath of allegiance to the

Phils. and registering it to the Local

Civil Registry of the place of residence.

Repatriation results in the recovery of

original nationality. Cruz went through

repatriation and hence reacquired his

original natural‐born citizen status. He

is also not required by law to go

through the naturalization process

and hence, he is perforce to be a

natural‐born citizen.

Sandoval‐Gutierrez, J. dissenting:

respondent had to take certain acts to


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

be a Filipino citizen again. The

provision on “natural‐born citizens” is

clear, precise, and definite. Citizen

cannot be considered natural‐born if

he went into acts of naturalization,

repatriation, legislation. Even if he

didn’t go through the tedious process

of naturalization, he still did

repatriation.

Valles v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 137000

August 9, 2000

The case is about the citizenship of

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. She was born

with a Filipino father and an Australian

mother in Napier Terrace, Broome,

Western Australia. She was born a

year before the signing of the 1935

Constitution (May 16, 1934) and laws

governing before were the Philippine

bill and Jones law. Both laws stated

that all inhabitants of the Phils who

were Spanish subjects and their

children are deemed as Filipino

citizens.

Petitioner contends that private

respondent is not qualified since she is

a dual citizen, has renounced her

Filipino citizenship because of her

application of ACR and ICR.

Whether or not Rosalind

Ybasco Lopez is qualified

to run for governor of

Davao Oriental even if

she is a dual citizen

Rosalind Ybasco

Lopez is qualified

to run for

governor even

with her dual

citizen

Philippines follow the jus sanguinis

principle – child follows the citizenship

of parents regardless of birth

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez did not

expressly renounce her citizenship in

her documents. Renunciation must be

express to be effective.

For dual citizenship to be counted as a

disqualification, it must refer to dual

allegiance. For candidates with dual

citizenship, it is enough that they elect

Philippine citizenship upon filing of

candidacy (this already terminates

their dual citizenship as this declares

the person is a Filipino citizen and is

willing to uphold and defend the

Philippine Constitution and ideals)

Section 7.

The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon

on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive

terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full

term for which he was elected.


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Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.

G.R. No. 96859

October 15, 1991

Petitioner seems to confuse “term”

with “tenure.”

“The term of office prescribed by the

Constitution may not be extended or

shortened by the legislature but the

period during which an officer actually

holds the office (tenure), may be

affected by circumstances within or

beyond the power of said officer.

Tenure may be shorter than the term

or it may not exist at all. These

situations will not change the duration

of the term of office.” (Topacio Nueno

v. Angeles 76 Phil. 12)

When an elected official covered

thereby files a certificate of candidacy

for another office, he is deemed to

have voluntarily cut short his tenure,

not his term. The term remains and his

successor, if any, is allowed to serve its

unexpired portion.

Fariñas, et al. v.

Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 147387

December 10, 2003

Ponente: Callejo, Sr. J

Petitioners seek to declare the

unconstitutionality of Section 14 of

the Republic Act 9006 (Fair Election

Act) based on the ff grounds:

1) It repeals Sec. 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

thus violating the one subject‐

one title policy. Sec 14 is a

proscribed rider because of

the differences between Sec.

67 of the OEC: Representative

Act 9006 primarily deals with

Whether or not

petitions have valid

points and have merit

Petitions do not

have valid points

and lacks merit.

Petitions are

DISMISSED.

1) Sec 14 is not a proscribed

rider. The provision in Sec

26(1) Art. 6 merely calls for all

parts of an act relating to its

subject finding expression in

the title. Court is convinced

that the title and the

objectives of Rep Act 9006 are

comprehensive enough to

include the repeal of Sec 67 of

the Omnibus Election Code.

Over time, Congress may find

it imperative to repeal the law

on its belief that the election


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the lifting of the ban on the

use of media for election

propaganda and the

elimination of unfair election

practices while Sec 67 imposes

a limitation on election

officials who run for an office

other than the one they are

holding in a permanent

capacity by considering them

as ipso facto resigned

therefrom upon filing of the

certificate of candidacy.

2) Rep Act 9006 violates the

equal protection clause of the

Constitution because it

repeals Sec 67 only of the

Omnibus Election Code and it

discriminates appointive

officials since they are still

considered ipso facto

3) Rep Act 9006 is null in its

entirety since it didn’t follow

due process (publication of

law before being effective)

4) Sec. 67 of the Omnibus

Election Code is a good law

and is based on the

constitutional mandate of the

“Accountability of Public

Offices”

process is thereby enhanced

and the paramount objective

of election laws (fair, honest

and orderly) is achieved. It

cannot be claimed the

legislators were not apprised

of the repeal since it was

deliberated upon and even the

petitioners admit that they

have already expressed their

reservations beforehand.

2) Rep Act 9006 does not violate

the equal protection clause.

Equal protection clause is not

absolute but it is subject to

reasonable classification. It

does not demand absolute

equality among residents, it

merely requires that all

persons shall be treated alike,

under like circumstances and

conditions both as to

privileges conferred and

liabilities enforced. Substantial

distinctions clearly exist

between elective officials and

appointive officials. Elective

officials got their office

through mandate, has a

definite term, can be removed

upon stringent conditions, and

allowed to take part in

electoral and political

activities. Appointive officials


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got their office through

appointing authority, holding

office may be in a permanent

capacity or at the pleasure of

the appointing authority, and

they are prohibited from

taking part in partisan political

activity.

3) The Enrolled Bill Doctrine is

applicable in this case. Under

the enrolled bill, the signing of

a bill by the Speaker of the

House and the Senate

President and the certification

of the Secretaries of both

Houses of Congress that it was

passed are conclusive of its

due enactment. The Court

finds no reason to deviate

from the salutary rule since

the irregularities petitioners

raised involves the internal

rules of Congress. “At any rate,

courts have declared that the

rules adopted by deliberative

bodies are subject to

revocation, modification or

waiver at the pleasure of the

body adopting them.”

“Parliamentary rules are

merely procedural and with

their observance, the courts

have no concern.”

4) Effectivity Clause is defective.


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But it does not render the

entire law invalid. Publication

is indispensable in every case,

but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the

usual 15‐period shall be

shortened or extended.

Main principle: courts do not

involve themselves with nor delve

into the policy or wisdom of a

statute. That is the exclusive

concern of the legislative branch

of gov’t. Sole function of the court

is to determine whether it

transcends constitutional

limitations or the limits of the

legislative power.

Section 8.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second

Monday of May.


Codilla v. De Venecia

G.R. No. 150605

December 10, 2002

Ponente: Puno, J.

A petition for mandamus and quo

warranto assailing the holding of

office of respondent Victoria L. Locsin

despite losing to petitioner Codilla by

17,903 votes last May 14 2001

elections. Petitioner garnered 71,350

votes while respondent Locsin only

got 53,447 votes. COMELEC 2nd

Whether or not

Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr.

should be declared as

the duly‐elected

representative of the

4th district of Leyte.

Eufrocino M.

Codilla, Sr. should

be declared as

the duly‐elected

representative of

the 4th district of

Leyte.

The facts are settled and beyond

dispute. Respondent Locsin has not

challenged the Decision of the

COMELEC en banc before Supreme

Court and said decision has become

final and executor. Issue of who is the

rightful representative has been

settled by the COMELEC en banc, the

constitutional body with jurisdiction

over the matter. The rule of law


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division initially proclaimed

respondent as winner but on motion

of reconsideration COMELEC en banc

reversed and proclaimed petitioner as

the rightful winner.

Petitioner gave a letter‐appeal to the

House of representatives but no

answer came. He sought the help of

party LAKAS NUCD‐UMDP to give a

letter to the House Speaker De

Venecia to which he replied that they

recognize the ruling of COMELEC but

Representative Locsin expressed that

she shall openly defy and disobey the

ruling of COMELEC and thus advised

the petitioner to take the matters into

Supreme Court.

demands that its Decision be obeyed

by all officials of the land.

Section 9.

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by

law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.


Tolentino v. COMELEC Ponente: Carpio, J.

In Feb 2001, a Senate seat for a term

expiring on June 30 2004 was vacated

w/ the appointment of then Sen.

Guingona as VP of the PH. The Senate

then adopted Resolutions which

certified the existence of a vacancy in

the Senate, called the COMELEC to fill

up the said vacancy through a special

election to be held simultaneously

(i) Procedural

a. Whether the petition

is in fact a petition for

quo warranto which the

Senate Electoral

Tribunal is the sole

judge,

(i) Procedural

a. Yes

The petition has no merit.

(i) Procedural Issues

a. YES, the Court can properly exercise

jurisdiction because what the

petitioners are questioning is the

validity of the special election in wc

Honasan was elected, NOT his right in

the exercise of his office as Senator. His

election is merely incidental to the

petitioner’s case of action.


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with the regular elections on May 14

2001, and declared that the

senatorial candidate garnering the

13th

highest number of votes shall serve

only for the

unexpired term of former

Sen. Guingona.

This is a petition for prohibition to set

aside the COMELEC’s Resolutions,

which the petitioners believe assail

the manner by which the special

election was conducted, violating the

precedents set by the 1951 & 1955

special elections, both of which were

held simultaneously & yet

DISTINCTLY w/ the regular general

elections. Thus, they pray that the

Court declare that NO special

elections were held & that the

COMELEC’s Resolutions that proclaim

the senatorial candidates who

obtained the 13th highest # of votes

be declared NULL & VOID.

…………………………………

Supplementary information

Petitioners contend that such

resolutions were issued w/o

jurisdiction because:

1. They failed to notify the

electorate of the position to

b. Whether the petition

is moot, and

c. Whether petitioners

have standing to

litigate.

(ii) On the merits,

whether a special

election to fill a vacant

3‐yr term Senate seat

was validly held on May

14, 2001.

b. Yes, but..

• Yes

c. Yes

b. Although the petition may be moot,

it is no bar for the Court to decide on its

resolution because the question of the

validity of a special election is likely to

be repeated

c. YES, the Court shall be liberal in

applying its rule of locus standi because

the issues raised are of transcendental

significance & paramount importance

to the people, for it involves the

people’s freedom of suffrage

(ii) On the merits, YES. A special

election to fill a vacant 3‐yr term Senate

seat was validly held on May 14 2001.

Although COMELEC DID NOT COMPLY

w/ the requirements of R.A. 6645,

either strictly or substantially, it does

NOT invalidate the special election

BECAUSE (given that the special

election was held simultaneously with a

general election) the law already

imposes on the voters knowledge of

this statutory notice & the COMELEC’s

deficiency in allowing more notice

about it doesn’t negate having a special

election, and moreover, invalidating it.

> Had the election been exclusively a

special election for the House of

Representatives (as special elections for

Senate seats are ALWAYS with general

elections), the COMELEC’s deficiency of


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be filled in the special

election (required under R.A.

6645 Sec. 2),

2. It failed to require the

candidates to indicate in

their certificates of candidacy

if they wanted to be elected

under special or regular

elections (required under

Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,

Sec.73), and

3. It failed to specify in the

Voters Info Sheet if the

candidates were seeking

election under special or

regular elections (required

under R.A. 6646, Sec. 4,

paragraph 4)

failing to inform the public about said

special election will make electoral

process void as it will be well‐nigh

impossible for the voters in the

congressional district involved to know

the time and place of the special

election and the office to be filled

unless the COMELEC so notifies them.

> The test in determining the validity of

a special election in relation to the

failure to give notice of the special

election is whether the want of notice

has resulted in misleading a sufficient

number of voters as would change the

result of the special election. In this

case, petitioners have neither claimed

nor proved that COMELEC’s failure to

give this required notice misled a

sufficient number of voters as would

change the result of the special

senatorial election or led them to

believe there was not such special

election.

> The May 14, 2001 special senatorial

elections cannot be declared null simply

because COMELEC failed to document

separately the candidates and to

canvass the votes separately. NO SUCH

REQUIREMENT EXISTS IN OUR

ELECTION LAWS. R.A. No. 6645 mere

requires that COMELEC fix the date of

the election if necessary and “state

among others the office or offices to be


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Section 10.

The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect

until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.

Section 11.

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from

arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress

or in any committee thereof.

voted for.” Furthermore, in the conduct

of the special elections, COMELECT

merely implemented the procedure

specified by Senate in Resolution No.

84 that “the senatorial candidate

garnering the 13th highest number of

votes shall serve only for the unexpired

term.”


People v. Jalosjos Ponente: Ynares‐Santiago, J.

Congressman Jalosjos (first district

ZamboNorte) was confined at the

national penitentiary while his case

for statutory rape and acts of

lasciviousness was pending appeal.

He filed a MOTION THAT HE BE

ALLOWED TO FULLY DISCHARGE THE

DUTIES of a Congressman, including

ATTENDANCE AT SESSIONS AND

(i) Whether or not

Jalosjos may attend

sessions despite his

imprisonment for a

non‐bailable offense,

which he committed

prior to his present

term?

(i) No Under the Constitution, privilege to be

free from arrest applies only if the

offense is punishable by less than 6

years of imprisonment. The accused has

not shown any reason why he should

be exempted from this.

The members of Congress cannot

compel absent members to attend

sessions if the reason for the ABSENCE

IS A LEGITIMATE ONE. The

confinement of a Congressman charged


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

COMMITTEE HEARINGS, despite his

conviction for a non‐bailable offense.

He claims that his re‐election as

congressman proves as an

EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL,

and cannot be rendered inutile. (He

claims he has the MANDATE OF THE

SOVEREIGN WILL).

He further argues that under Sec

16(2), a Congressman’s function is to

attend sessions. He also relies on the

case of AGUINALDO involving the

administrative removal of a public

officer for acts done prior to his

present term of office where the

court said that a public officer should

not be removed from office for acts

done prior to his present term of

office. To do otherwise would be

depriving the right of the people to

elect their officers.

with a non‐bailable offense (more than

6 years) is certainly authorized by law,

and has constitutional foundations.

The R.A.TIONALE behind confinement is

PUBLIC SELF‐DEFENSE. Society must

protect itself, and serves as an example

and warning to others. A person is

taken into custody for purpose of the

administration of justice. It is the injury

to the public, which the State seeks to

redress in criminal cases.

The Aguinaldo case also does not apply.

It refers only to administrative removals

and NOT TO IMPRISONMENT ARISING

FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF

CRIMINAL LAW.

ELECTION TO HIGH GOVERNMENT

OFFICE DOES NOT FREE THE ACCUSED

FROM THE COMMON RESTR.A.INTS OF

GENER.A.L LAW.

What he is seeking is not mere

emergency or temporary leaves from

imprisonment. He is seeking to attend

congressional session and meetings for

5 days or more in a week. THIS WOULD

VIRTUALLY MAKE HIM A FREE MAN.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang

(Additional plaintiffs:

Albert & Lukban)

Ponente: Concepcion, C.J: Case was

issued at the Court of First Instance

of Rizal.

(i) Whether

Cabangbang’s letter is

privileged

communication: Does it

(i) No (i) It is obvious that in causing the

communication to be so published,

Cabangbang was NOT PERFORMING HIS

OFFICIAL DUTY, EITHER AS A MEMBER


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Jimenez (plaintiff) brought a suit for

the recovery of money as damages

for PUBLICATION OF A LIBELOUS

LETTER made by Cabangbang

(defendant). The former claims that

the Cabangbang letter is false and

intended to impeach his reputation,

expose him to public hatred,

contempt, dishonor and ridicule.

Cabangbang’s DEFENSE: (1) that the

letter was not libelous, and (2) it was

privileged communication.

According to Cabangbang, at the time

the letter was written, he was a

member of the House and the

Chairman of the House Committee

on National Defense.

The letter involved was an OPEN

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE

PHILIPPINES dated November 14,

1959, when CONGRESS WAS NOT IN

SESSION. This was published in

several newspapers of general

circulation.

…………………………………


The letter describes 3 OPLANS.

That there was an insidious plan or a

massive political buildup where DND

fall under “privileged

speech or debate”? Will

Cabangbang be held

liable?

OF CONGRESS OR A MEMBER OF ANY

COMMITTEE THEREOF.

Hence, the communication is not

absolutely privileged.

…………………………………


Supreme Court: The Constitution

protects utterances made by

Congressmen in the performance of:

1. Their official functions, such as

speeches delivered, statements made,

or votes cast in the halls of Congress,

and while the same is in session.

2. Bills introduced in Congress, whether

the same is in session or not.

3. The acts performed by Congressmen

either in Congress or outside its

premises in the official discharge of

their duties as members of Congress

and of Congressional Committees.


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Secretary Vargas was plotting to

become the new President, that

P4‐million of intelligence funds are

allegedly being used to finance the

political campaign.

The letter mentions JIMENEZ AS ONE

OF THE PLANNERS of a COUP D’ETAT.

Cabangbang’s open letter also

recommended that Vargas resign and

that the AFP should stay away from

politics, and that all other intelligence

officials of the AFP should be

reassigned.

Antonino v. Valencia Ponente: Teehankee, J.

Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal

Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the

Nacionalista Party in the election for

governor in Davao.

Subsequently, Senator Antonino

issued a statement that the loss was

caused by the support given by

Valencia, the Secretary of Public

Works, to the independent LP

candidate Maglana which caused a

division in LP votes. Antonino was

quoted in various newspapers that

had Valencia not “Sabotaged” and

“double‐crossed” them, the LP would

have won.

Antonino then proceeded to file


Press Release was

issued by Valencia

(i) Yes

(i) Yes, the fact that Valencia caused the

release and publication of the press

release is seen when the newspapers

reproduced the specific charges filed by

Antonino; the press release there was

marked “For release” under the date;

the press release indicated Valencia’s

answers to Antonino’s charges in the

same numerical order; the press

release said it came from Valencia; it

quoted Valencia and he admitted

making the statement in his office in

the presence of the press; the first page

of the press release consisted of quoted

statements by Valencia and reports and

information he received about

Antonino; it mentioned specific figures

which only Valencia could know given

the time constraint; and Valencia did


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

requests to have Valencia

investigated by the Senate Blue

Ribbon Committee on alleged

anomalous acquisitions of public

works supplies and equipment.

Valencia retaliated by issuing a press

release that he will also file charges

with the Blue Ribbon Committee

regarding anomalous acts of the

Senator. This release was published

in newspapers.

Antonino filed this case of damages.

Valencia filed a counter‐claim. Lower

court ruled in favor of Antonino.

Valencia appealed. Antonino died

and was substituted by Senator

Antonino (Wife).

(ii) Whether or not the

Press Release was

libelous

(ii) Yes

not make any correction or denial of

the published statement!

(ii) Yes, because the statements issued

were defamatory and libelous in nature

as they imputed upon him certain

corrupt practices. Also, because the

statement was not issued privately or

officially, malice is presumed and such

presumption was not overcome as

Valencia did not prove the truth of his

statements or that they were published

with good intentions and with a

justifiable motive or that they were

made in the exercise of the right of fair

comment on the character, good faith,

ability and sincerity of public officials.

The court said that had Valencia not

been motivated with malice, he would

have filed charges against Antonino

with the Senate seeing as Antonino was

not a candidate for election and that his

term as senator was no yet to expire.

Also, Valencia cannot claim that his

actions were justified in that Antonino

was first in making libelous statements.

The anomalous transactions charge was

duly filed with the Blue Ribbon. Also,

the statement on sabotage and double

crossing cannot be considered libelous

as contemporary politics shows that no

stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls

one who changes political parties.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 12.

All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business

interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which

they are authors.

Section 13.

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof, including government‐owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.

Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was

elected.


Liban v. Gordon

G.R. No. 175352

July 15, 2009

Ponente: Carpio, J.:

This is a petition to declare Senator

Gordon (respondent) as having

forfeited his seat in the Senate.

Procedural:

1. Whether the Phil Natl

Red Cross (PNRC) is a

government‐owned or

controlled corporation,

2. Whether Sec.13

applies to the

respondent who is

Chairman of PNRC while

at the same time, is a

member of the Senate,

3. Whether respondent

should be automatically

removed as Senator

because accdg to the

relevant portions in said

article, no member of

the Congress may hold

any office (whether gov

No, the

petitioners have

no standing to

file this petition

THE GOVERNEMNT DOESN’T CONTROL

PNRC. THE PNRC IS NOT GOV‐OWNED,

BUT PRIVATELY OWNED.

…………………………………


Sec. 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court:

Action of the Government against

individuals relating to their usurpation

of a public office, position, or

franchised, may be commenced by

ONLY A VERIFIED PETITION brought in

the NAME OF THE RP against:

1. A person who usurps, intrudes into,

or unlawfully holds or exercises a public

office, position, or franchise,

2. A public officer who does or suffers

an act which by provision of law,


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 14.

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral

Tribunals, or quasi‐judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in

any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government‐

owned or controlled)

during his term w/o

forfeiting his seat.

Substantive:

Whether the office of

the PNRC Chairman is a

gov office or an office in

a gov‐owned or

controlled corporation

for the purposes of the

prohibition mentioned

above relating to Art.

13.

constitutes a ground for the forfeiture

of his office, or

3. An association, which acts as a

corporation w/in the PH w/o being

legally incorporated or w/o lawful

authority to act.

Accdg to R.A. 95, or the PNRC Charter,

the PNRC is a private organization

performing public functions. It is a non‐

profit, donor‐funded, voluntary,

humanitarian organization.

THE GOVERNEMNT DOESN’T CONTROL

PNRC. (accdg to the R.A., only 6 of the

36 members of the PNRC Board of

Governors are appointed by the chief

executive. Thus, 24 members of the

board are not appointed by the Pres.)

THE PNRC IS NOT GOV‐OWNED, BUT

PRIVATELY OWNED. Vast majority are

private indivs and students. Under the

charter, if you contribute a certain

amount, you can become a member.

Thus, anyone from 6‐65 years old CAN

become a member, even foreigners.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government

for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.


Puyat v. De Guzman,

Jr.

113 SCR.A. 31 (1982)

Ponente: Melencio‐Herrera, J:

This is a case questioning the Order

of SEC granting Congressman

Estanislao Fernandez leave to

intervene in a SEC case.

Prior to this, there was an election

for the directors of Int’l Pipe

Industries (IPI). There were 2

factions: the Puyat Group and the

Acero Group.

The Acero Group instituted a QUO

WARR.A.NTO proceeding before the

SEC claiming that the votes were not

properly counted.

The Puyat Group claims that

Congressman Fernandez orally

entered his appearance as counsel

for the Acero Group. Naturally, the

Puyat Group opposed Fernandez’

appearance as counsel citing that a

Congressman cannot appear as

counsel in any administrative

proceeding like SEC. So Assemblyman

Fernandez no longer appeared as

counsel.

Whether intervention in

the SEC case is in effect

an appearance as

counsel (indirectly)

before an

administrative body.

Yes Ordinarily, it seems that Fernandez was

not appearing as counsel as he was

theoretically appearing for the

protection of his ownership of 10

shares.

HOWEVER, certain salient

circumstances militate against this. The

FACT OF ACQUIRING A MERE P200

worth of stock of only 10 shares (out of

262,000) shows an OBVIOUS

CIRCUMVENTION OF THE RULE. He

acquired them AFTER THE FACT, after

the Quo Warranto proceedings had

been filed and one day before the

schedule SEC hearing. What’s more,

before he moved to intervene, he

already signified his intention to appear

as counsel for the Acero group, which

was earlier objected to.

Under those facts and circumstances,

there has been an INDIRECT

APPEAR.A.NCE AS COUNSEL BEFORE AN

ADMINISTR.A.TIVE BODY. The

“intervention” was an afterthought to

enable him to appear actively in the

proceedings in SOME OTHER CAPACITY.

If we were to uphold the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 15.

The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall

continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of

Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Section 16.

(1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House

shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the

attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two‐thirds of all

its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect

national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one‐fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each

House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other

place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

However, he later purchased 10

SHARES OF STOCK in IPI to qualify

him to run as Director. After the

purchase, Fernandez filed a Motion

for Intervention in the SEC case,

because now, Fernandez is owner of

10 shares.

SEC granted the motion.

“intervention”, then it would make the

constitutional prohibition ineffective.

All an Assemblyman has to do if he

wants to influence an administrative

body is to acquire minimal participation

in the “interest” of the client and then

“intervene” in the proceedings. That

which the Constitution directly

prohibits may not be done by

indirection.

SEC’s grant of Motion to Intervene is

reversed and set aside.


Avelino v. Cuenco Feb 18 – Senator Tanada requested 1) Does the court have 1) No 1) COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION. In


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

G.R. No. L‐ 2821

March 4, 1949

his right to speak on the floor to

formulate charges against Senate

President Avelino be reserved.

Request approved.

Feb 21 1949 – hours before the

opening of session, Senator Tanada

filed a

resolution enumerating the charges

against the Senate President and

ordering an investigation.

Senate President Avelino refused to

open the session at 10am. He

delayed

appearance at session hall until

11:35am. He read the charges against

him in

public.

At around 12pm, due to the insistent

demands of Senators Sanidad and

Cuenco, the session was finally called

to order. Sanidad however, moved

that the roll call be dispensed with.

Avelino’s allies, Senators Francisco

and Tirona, insisted that the roll be

called in an obvious conspiracy to

prevent Senator Tanada from

delivering his speech. The roll was

called.

Senator Tanada repeatedly stood up

jurisdiction?

2) Was the resolution

making Cuenco acting

president validly

approved? WAS THERE

MAJORITY TO

TR.A.NSACT BUSINESS

IN THE SENATE?

3) Can Avelino reclaim

his position?

2) Yes, if you

assume that SC

has jurisdiction

3) No

view of the separation of powers, and

the political nature of the controversy,

the Constitution grants the Senate the

power to elect its own president. It

cannot be interfered with, nor taken

over, by the Judiciary. The selection of

the senate president affects only the

senators themselves who are at liberty

to choose at any time their officers. The

remedy thus lies in the Senate Session

Hall, not in the Supreme Court.

2) ASSUMING THAT SC HAD

JURISDICTION, the session under

Senate President Pro‐Tempore Arranz

was VALID. It was merely a continuation

of the morning session and that a

MINORITY OF 10 SENATORS may not,

by leaving theSession hall, prevent the

MAJORITY OF 12 OTHER SENATORS

from passing a resolution with their

unanimous consent.

When the Constitution says that a

majority shall constitute a quorum,

“THE HOUSE DOES NOT MEAN ALL THE

MEMBERS.” Even a majority of all the

members constitute the House. There is

a difference between a majority of “ALL

THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE”, and a

majority of “THE HOUSE”.

Therefore, an absolute majority, that is

12, of all the members of the senate


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so that he could deliver his speech

but was continuously ignored by

Avelino. Avelino even threatened to

arrest any talking senator. Disorder

broke out in the gallery of the

Senate.

Senator David, moved for the

adjournment of session but Sanidad

still opposed.

Suddenly Avelino banged the gavel

and walked out of the session hall

(along with

David, Tirona and Francisco). The

pro‐Tanada senators remained.

Senate President Pro‐Tempore

Arranz, suggested that Cuenco take

over and

preside over the session. Cuenco did

and took the Chair.

Senator Tanada was able to deliver

his speech.

The position of Senate President was

declared vacant by a unanimous

resolution (#68), by those who were

still there.

Cuenco became Acting Senate

President, he took an oath and was

recognized by the President of the

Philippines the day after.

(23 only), constitutes constitutional

majority for the purpose of a quorum

to do business.

The office of the Senate President is

one that essentially depends on the will

of the majority of the senators.

Hence, Cuenco is the new Senate

President.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Avelino now filed a QUO

WARR.A.NTO proceeding to declare

him as the rightful

Senate President.

Santiago v. Guingona

G.R. No. 134577

November 18, 1998

There was an election for Senate

President. There were 2 contenders,

Senator Fernan and Senator Tatad.

By a vote of 20 to 2, Fernan won as

Senate President. (The 2 who voted

for Tatad were Miriam and Tatad,

himself!)

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested

that he was assuming the post as

minority leader since according to

him, only those who had voted for

him, belonged to the “minority.”

This was opposed by Senator Johnny

Flavier. He manifested that 7 LAKAS

NUCD Senators are also part of the

minority and they chose Senator

Guingona as minority leader.

Senator Guingona was recognized by

the Senate President as Minority

Leader.

Senators Santiago and Tatad

instituted QUO WARR.A.NTO

proceedings to oust

Senator Guingona as Minority

Leader, and to declare Tatad as the

(i) Does the court have

jurisdiction?


Senate and its officials,

particularly Senate

President Fernan

committed a violation

of the constitution in

recognizing Respondent

Guingona as the Senate

minority leader? What

constitutes minority?

Was Section 16 (1) not

followed in the

selection of Senate

minority leader?

(i) Yes

(ii) No

(i) COURT HAS JURISDICTION.

MAJORITY IS DEFINED AS THE NUMBER

GREATER THAN HALF OR MORE THAN

HALF OF ANY TOTAL. Sec 16(1) simply

states that the Senate President must

obtain the votes of more than 1⁄2 of

ALL THE SENATORS. The Constitution

does not delineate who shall comprise

the majority, much less the minority.

While the Constitution mandates that

the senate president must be elected

by a number constituting MORE THAN

1⁄2 OF ALL THE MEMBERS THEREOF, it

does NOT provide that the members

who will not vote for him shall IPSO

FACT CONSTITUTE THE MINORITY. No

law or regulation states that the

defeated candidate shall automatically

become the minority leader.

HISTORY ALL SHOWS that “majority”

refers to the political party to which the

most number of lawmakers belonged,

while the “minority” normally referred

to a party with a lesser number of

members. MAJORITY = may also refer

to the group or party with the larger

number of votes, not necessarily more


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

rightful

minority leader.

Tatad argues that the term

“majority” refers to the group of

senators who voted

for the winning senate president and

accepted committee chairmanships.

Accordingly, they say that those who

voted for the losing nominee and

accepted no committee

chairmanships comprise the

“minority.”

than 1⁄2. è PLUR.A.LITY.

MINORITY = a group or party with a

small number of votes than the

majority.

Between 2 unequal parts or numbers

comprising a whole, the greater

number would obviously be the

majority, while the lesser would be the

minority. But where there are more

than 2 unequal groupings, it is not as

easy to say which is the minority

entitled to select the leader, which will

represent all minorities. Because we

have a multi‐party system, there could

be several minority parties, one of

which has to be identified as the

dominant minority.

AS TO THE ELECTION OF OFFICERS IN

CONGRESS: While the Constitution is

explicit on the manner of electing the

Senate President and the House

Speaker, it is however, dead silent on

the manner of selecting the other

officers of Congress. The constitution

merely says that “each House shall

choose such other officers as it may

deem necessary.” Hence, the method

of choosing who will be such other

officers is merely a derivative of the

exercise of prerogative conferred by

the Constitution.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

(iii) Whether or not

there has been an

usurpation of office

thus calling for a quo

warranto proceeding

(iii) No

Such METHOD MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY

THE SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY THE

COURTS.

The RULES OF SENATE DO NOT

PROVIDE FOR THE POSITIONS OF

MAJORITY/ MINORITY LEADERS. In the

absence of and specific rules, THIS

COURT HAS NO BASIS UPON WHICH TO

DETERMINE THE LEGALITY OF THE ACTS

OF THE SENATE. The Courts cannot

intervene in the internal affairs of the

legislature.

(iii) If we were to uphold the contention

of Tatad and Santiago, that would

amount to judicial legislation. Since no

provision of the Constitution or any

other rule or law has been violated, NO

ABUSE OF POWER CAN BE SHOWN.

(Meaning Guingona acted correctly,

and Fernan also acted correctly in

recognizing Guingona as Minority

Leader).

Arroyo, et. Al. v. De

Venecia

G.R. No. 127255

August 14, 1997

Ponente: Mendoza, J:

Joker Arroyo brought a suit against

Speaker JDV, etc for the violation of

the Rules of House. They are

challenging also the passage of R.A.

8240 (which amended the NIRC by

imposing sin‐taxes on beer and

cigarettes,

(i) Was there grave

abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction

when Congress enacted

R.A. 8240?

(i) No. Law

Remains Valid.

(i) What is alleged to have been

violated in the enactment of R.A. No.

8240 are MERELY INTERNAL RULES OF

PROCEDURE of the House rather than

the Constitutional requirements for the

enactment of law. Joker does not claim

that there was no quorum, but only

that, by some maneuver allegedly in

violation of the House rules, he was

prevented from questioning the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

The bill originated from the House, it

was approved on 3rd reading and

was transmitted to the Senate.

The Bicameral Conference

Committee submitted its report to

the House; Congressman Javier, Chair

of the ways and means committee,

delivered his sponsorship speech.

During interpellation, JOKER

ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING

TO QUESTION THE QUORUM,

ALTHOUGH UNTIL THE END OF HIS

INTERPELLATION, HE NEVER DID.

Joker challenged R.A. 8240 arguing

that is was passed in violation of the

rules of the House, which rules

embody the Constitutional mandate

in Sec 16(3). He argues that a

violation of the House rules is a

violation of the Consti itself.

Specifically, he alleges that:

1. The yeas or nays were not

asked, but was simply

approved only to prevent

him from questioning the

presence of a quorum.

2. The Chairman deliberately

ignored his questioning.

3. The Chairman refused to

recognize him and instead

presence of quorum.

Joker claims that the violation of house

rules is a violation of the constitution

itself. NO.

The rules adopted by deliberative

bodies (such as the House) are subject

to revocation, modification, or waiver

by the body adopting them.

PARLIAMENTARY RULES ARE MERELY

PROCEDUR.A.L, AND WITH THEIR

OBSERVANCE, THE COURT HAS NO

CONCERN. They may be waived or

disregarded by the legislative body.

Mere failure to conform to

parliamentary usage will NOT invalidate

the action, when the requisite number

of members has agreed to a particular

measure.

The constitution empowers each house

to determine its rules of proceedings.

The power to make rules is not one

which once exercised is exhausted. It is

a continuous power, always subject to

be exercised by the House, and within

the limitations suggested, and

ABSOLUTELY BEYOND THE CHALLENGE

OF ANY OTHER BODY.

The failure to regard the rule is NOT a

subject matter of judicial inquiry. A

legislative act will not be declared


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

proceeded to act on

4. Albano’s motion to declare the

report approved.

5. The Chairman suspended the

session without first ruling on

his questioning

6. That the session was hastily

adjourned to prevent him

from formally challenging the

existing of a quorum

invalid for non compliance with internal

rules. No court has ever declared an act

of the legislature void just because of

non‐compliance with rules of

procedure made by itself.

In this case, there is NO RULE IN THE

HOUSE which specifically requires that

in approving the Bicameral Conference

Committee Report, the Chair must

restate motion and conduct nominal

voting. The manner by which the report

was approved has a BASIS IN

LEGISLATIVE PR.A.CTICE.

The Constitution does NOT require that

the yeas and nays of the Members be

taken every time the House has to vote.

Only in the following instances were

yeas and nays are mandatory:

1) Last and 3rd reading of a bill

2) Request of 1/5 of the members

present

3) Repassing of a bill over the veto of

the President.

Also, while it is true that Albano moved

for adjournment, Joker could have at

least objected if there was anything he

wanted to say. THE FACT HOWEVER IS

THAT HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING!! The

question he raised was not a point of

order nor a question of privilege


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

entitled to precedence.

As to the QUORUM, the roll call

established the existence of a quorum.

The question of a quorum cannot be

raised repeatedly, especially when the

quorum is obviously present.

LAW VALID.

Osmeña v. Pendatun

109 Phil. 863 (1960)

Osmeña (in his privileged speech)

charged President Garcia for

extending pardon for a price.

This prompted the creation of a

special committee to investigate the

accusations against Garcia. A House

Resolution No. 59 was passed,

requiring Osmeña to substantiate his

charges against President Garcia).

Osmeña submitted a petition for

injunction against Pendatun, etc who

are member of the Special

Committee created by the House

through Resolution No. 59.

Osmeña wants to annul that

Resolution on the ground that it

INFRINGES HIS PARLIAMENTARY

IMMUNITY

He also claims that the statements he

made were no actionable.

(i) Can Osmeña be held

liable for his speech?

(i) Yes (i) The Constitution provides that the

speech or debates in Congress shall not

be questioned in any other place. They

are privileged speech. However, the

provision has always been understood

to mean that although EXEMPT FROM

PROSECUTION OR CIVIL ACTIONS for

the words uttered in Congress, THE

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MAY

NEVERTHELESS BE QUESTIONED IN

CONGRESS ITSELF.

Parliamentary immunity guarantees the

legislator complete freedom of

expression before the courts or any

other forum. BUT this is only OUTSIDE

THE CONGRESSIONAL HALLS. It does

not protect him from responsibility

before the legislative body itself

whenever his words and conduct are

considered disorderly or unbecoming a

member thereof.

On the question of whether the speech

constitutes disorderly conduct, the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Nevertheless, Osmeña was FOUND

GUILTY OF SERIOUS DISORDERLY

BEHAVIOR. He was suspended for 15

months. The Special Committee

invoked the Power of Congress to

Discipline Its Members.

Osmeña argues further: that the

House can no longer take action

against him because before

Resolution No. 59 had been

approved, the House had taken up

other business.

House is the sole judge of what

constitutes disorderly behavior. These

are matters dependent on factual

circumstances which the House knows

best and cannot be presented in black

and white before the Courts. If the

court would review the act of the

House, then it is tantamount to giving

appellate jurisdiction to a co‐equal

branch of the government.

House Resolution No. 59 remains

VALID. The House has exclusive power

to discipline, the courts have no

jurisdiction to interfere. It is inherent

legislative prerogative to suspend.

Paredes, Jr. v.

Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 118364

August 10, 1996

(i) While Congressman Paredes was

still provincial governor, he was

charged before the Sandiganbayan

for violating the Anti‐Graft Law. On

his second term of congress, the

Sandiganbayan imposed a preventive

suspension on him pursuant to the

Anti‐Graft Law, prompting Paredes to

challenge the authority of the

Sandiganbayan to suspend a district

representative)

(i) Does the

Sandiganbayan have

authority to suspend a

district representative?

(i) No (i) Petitioner’s invocation of Section

16(3) does not apply. This is the power

of each House of Congress, inter alia, to

“punish its Members for disorderly

behavior,” and “suspend/expel a

Member” by a vote of 2/3 of all its

Members subject to the penalty of

suspension, which, when imposed,

should not exceed 60 days.

Such invocation mentioned does not

apply, as it appears to be distinct from

the suspension mentioned in Sec.13 of

Republic Act No. 3019, which is not a

penalty but a preliminary, preventive

measure, not considering the fact that

the latter is not being imposed on the

petitioner for misbehavior as a Member


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

of the HoR of the Congress.

United States v. Pons

31 Phil. 729 (1916)

Ponente: Trent, J:

Information was filed against Pons

for illegal importation of opium (in

violation of ACT 2381). He was found

guilty and was sentenced to 2 years

in Bilibid Prison.

Pons appealed on the last day of the

special session of the Philippine

Legislature was on February 28,

contending that ACT 2381 was

passed only on MARCH 1, NOT

February 28. Hence, he cannot be

prosecuted.

According to the PUBLISHED

JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY, (which

records all the proceedings), the

Assembly adjourned on February 28,

1914 at midnight. The journal shows

with absolute certainty that the

Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight

on February 28.

Pons wanted the admission of

extraneous evidence to prove that it

was really on March 1 when the

Assembly adjourned. Pons insists that

it is of public knowledge that the

Assembly’s clock was stopped on

February 28, 1914, and was left until

the determination of all other

(i) What is the real date

of adjournment of the

assembly?

(ii) Can Courts take

judicial notice thereof,

or is extraneous

evidence allowed to

prove otherwise?

(i) 12‐midnight,

February 28,

1914

(ii) Yes

TO INQUIRE INTO THE VER.A.CITY OF

THE JOURNALS OF LEGISLATURE, WHEN

THEY ARE ALREADY CLEAR AND

EXPLICIT, WOULD BE TO VIOLATE THE

ORGANIC LAWS OF THE GOVERNMENT,

TO INVADE A COORDINATE AND CO‐

EQUAL BR.A.NCH OF GOVERNMENT,

and TO INTERFERE WITH THE

LEGITIMATE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS

OF THE LEGISLATURE.

Since the journals clearly stated the

actual time of adjournment (12‐

midnight February 28, 1914), this

settles the question and the court

cannot go behind these journals.

Courts CAN take judicial notice of

Legislative Journals Courts are

bound to take judicial notice of what

the law is and to enable them to

determine whether the legal requisites

to the validity of a statute have been

complied with. It is their RIGHT AND

DUTY.

COURTS cannot go behind the journals

(cannot accept testimonial evidence) as

a matter of public policy and to ensure

stability. THEY ARE CONCLUSIVE

EVIDENCE AS TO THE DATE OF

ADJOURNMENT. Extraneous evidence

(such as the stopping of the clock)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

pending matters. The HANDS OF THE

CLOCK WERE KEPT IN THEIR LAST

POSITION, in order to enable the

Assembly to effect an adjournment

within the time fixed for a special

session.

Pons argues that by stopping the

clock, a resultant evil might result

because it alters the probative force

and character of legislative records.

On the other hand, the government

asserts that the contents of

legislative journals are conclusive

evidence as to the date of

adjournment.

cannot be admitted.

Casco Philippine

Chemical Co. v.

Gimenez

7 SCR.A. 347 (1963)

This is a review of the decision of the

Auditor General denying the claim for

refund by Casco.

Pursuant to the FOREX Margin Fee

Law, the Central Bank issued a

circular fixing a uniform MARGIN FEE

OF 25% on FOREX TRNSX.

Casco, in order to import Urea and

Formaldehyde for its business,

bought FOREX and paid MARGIN

FEES.

However, it later claimed that Urea

and Formaldehyde are exempt from

the Margin Fees, hence they now

(i) Are the raw materials

UREA and

FORMALDEHYD exempt

based on the bill passed

in Congress?

(i) No (i) It is well settled that the ENROLLED

BILL – which uses the term “UREA

FORMALDEHYDE” instead of “UREA”

AND “FORMALDEHDYE” – is

CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS as

regards the TENOR OF THE MEASURE

passed by Congress, and approved by

the President.

If there has been any mistake in the

printing of the bill, before it was

certified by the officers of Congress and

approved by the President (which we

cannot speculate now), the remedy is

by amendment or curative legislation,

not by judicial legislation.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

seek a refund of the margin fees

paid.

This was denied by the AG because it

says that only UREA FORMALDEHYDE

(the finished product) is exempt and

that UREA “AND” FORMALDEHEDY

(as raw materials) are not.

Casco claims however, that the bill

approved in Congress contained the

conjunction “AND” between “UREA”

and “FORMALDEHYD”, and that

Congress intended these raw

materials to be exempt.

Astorga v. Villegas

56 SCR.A. 714 (1974)

A bill of local application was filed in

the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

passed 3rd reading without

amendments, referred to the

Committee on local governments,

which was approved with minor

amendment.

This minor amendment was that

“instead of the City Engineer, it will

be the President Pro Tempore of the

Municipal Board who will succeed

the Vice Mayor, in case the latter is

unable to act as Mayor”. (This is the

ROXAS AMENDMENT)

AT THE SENATE: Substantial

amendments were introduced by

Senator Tolentino (approved by the

(i) Whether R.A. 4065

actually became law

since it was not the bill

actually passed by

Congress and that it

lacked the approved

Tolentino Amendment.

(i) No. (i) IT NEVER BECAME LAW. ASTORGA

LOSES. Congress has devised a system

for authenticating bills duly approved,

by the signatures of their respective

presiding officers and secretaries

printed on the copy of the approved

bill. The function of this attestation

therefore is not of approval.

The enrolled bill doctrine is based

mainly on the respect due to the co‐

equal and independent departments,

which requires the judicial department

to accept as having passed Congress, all

bills AUTHENTICATED IN THE MANNER

STATED. If the attestation is absent and

the same is not required for the validity

of a statute, the courts may resort to

the journals and other records of the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Senate). The Roxas Amendment does

not appear in the journal of the

Senate as having been acted upon.

Later, the Secretary of the Senate

sent a letter to the House, that the

House Bill has been passed by the

Senate with amendments. Attached

was a certification of amendment,

which was the Roxas Amendment,

and NOT the Tolentino Amendment

which were duly approved by the

Senate.

Naturally, Senator Tolentino made a

press statement saying that the

enrolled copy signed into law was a

wrong version!

Tolentino argues that the law signed

did not embody the Tolentino

Amendments which were introduced

and approved by the Senate.

The President of the Philippines

therefore was compelled to

withdraw his signature on the Bill.

As a result, VILLEGAS, THE MAYOR OF

MANILA, issued circulars to disregard

the R.A. 4065. He also ordered the

Chief of Police to recall the 5 officers

assigned to the Vice Mayor. Mayor

says that R.A. 4065 never became

Congress for proof of its due

enactment.

As far as the Congress itself is

concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct

in the certification made by the

presiding officers. It is merely a mode

of authentication. The law making

process ends when the bill is approved

by both Houses, and the certification

does not add to the validity of the bill

or cure any defect already present

upon its passage. IN OTHER WORDS,

THE APPROVAL BY CONGRESS AND NOT

THE SIGNATURES OF THE PRESIDING

OFFICERS which is essential.

Astorga’s claim that the attestation of

the presiding officers of Congress is

conclusive proof of the bill’s due

enactment HAS BEEN NEUTR.A.LIZED by

the fact that the Senate President

declared his signature on the bill to be

invalid, and issued a subsequent

certification that the invalidation of his

signature meant that the bill he had

earlier signed had never been approved

by the Senate. Obviously, this

declaration has more weight that the

attestation which it invalidated.

Absent such attestation as a result of

the DISCLAIMER, and consequently

there being NO ENROLLED BILL to speak


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 17.

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be

Astorga v. Villegas

56 SCR.A. 714 (1974)

A bill of local application was filed in

the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

passed 3rd reading without

amendments, referred to the

Committee on local governments,

which was approved with minor

amendment.

This minor amendment was that

“instead of the City Engineer, it will

be the President Pro Tempore of the

Municipal Board who will succeed

the Vice Mayor, in case the latter is

unable to act as Mayor”. (This is the

ROXAS AMENDMENT)

AT THE SENATE: Substantial

amendments were introduced by

Senator Tolentino (approved by the

Senate). The Roxas Amendment does

not appear in the journal of the

Senate as having been acted upon.

Later, the Secretary of the Senate

sent a letter to the House, that the

House Bill has been passed by the

Senate with amendments. Attached

was a certification of amendment,

which was the Roxas Amendment,

and NOT the Tolentino Amendment

which were duly approved by the

Senate.

Naturally, Senator Tolentino made a

press statement saying that the

enrolled copy signed into law was a

wrong version!

Tolentino argues that the law signed

did not embody the Tolentino

Amendments which were introduced

(i) Whether R.A. 4065

actually became law

since it was not the bill

actually passed by

Congress and that it

lacked the approved

Tolentino Amendment.

(i) No. (i) IT NEVER BECAME LAW. ASTORGA

LOSES. Congress has devised a system

for authenticating bills duly approved,

by the signatures of their respective

presiding officers and secretaries

printed on the copy of the approved

bill. The function of this attestation

therefore is not of approval.

The enrolled bill doctrine is based

mainly on the respect due to the co‐

equal and independent departments,

which requires the judicial department

to accept as having passed Congress, all

bills AUTHENTICATED IN THE MANNER

STATED. If the attestation is absent and

the same is not required for the validity

of a statute, the courts may resort to

the journals and other records of the

Congress for proof of its due

enactment.

As far as the Congress itself is

concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct

in the certification made by the

presiding officers. It is merely a mode

of authentication. The law making

process ends when the bill is approved

by both Houses, and the certification

does not add to the validity of the bill

or cure any defect already present

upon its passage. IN OTHER WORDS,

THE APPROVAL BY CONGRESS AND NOT

THE SIGNATURES OF THE PRESIDING

OFFICERS which is essential.

Astorga’s claim that the attestation of

the presiding officers of Congress is

conclusive proof of the bill’s due

enactment HAS BEEN NEUTR.A.LIZED by

the fact that the Senate President


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of

Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or

organizations registered under the party‐list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.


Angara v. Electoral

Commission

63 Phil. 134 (1936)

In the elections of September 17,

1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and

the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel

Castillo, and Dionisio Mayo were

candidates for the position of

members of the National Assembly

for the first district of Tayabas.

On October 7, 1935, the provincial

board of canvassers proclaimed

Angara as member‐elect of the

National Assembly and on Nov. 15,

1935, he took his oath of office.

On December 3, 1935, the National

Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,

which in effect, fixed the last date to

file election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before

the Electoral Commission a "Motion

of Protest" against Angara and

praying, among other things, that

Ynsua be named/declared elected

Member of the National Assembly or

that the election of said position be

nullified.

On December 9, 1935, the Electoral


Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over the

Electoral Commission

and the subject matter

of the controversy upon

the foregoing related

facts, and in the

affirmative,


said Electoral

Commission acted

without or in excess of

its jurisdiction in

assuming to take

cognizance of the

protest filed against the

election of the herein

petitioner

notwithstanding the

previous confirmation

of such election by

resolution of the

National Assembly

(i) Yes

(ii) No

The Electoral Commission was acting

within the legitimate exercise of its

constitutional prerogative in assuming

to take cognizance of the protest filed

by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against

the election of the herein petitioner,

Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution

of the National Assembly on Dec. 3,

1935, cannot in any manner toll the

time for filing protest against the

election, returns, and qualifications of

the members of the National Assembly,

nor prevent the filing of protests within

such time as the rules of the Electoral

Commission might prescribe. The

petition for a writ of prohibition against

the electoral commission is hereby

denied, with cost against the petitioner.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Commission adopted a resolution

(No. 6) Angara contended that the

Constitution confers exclusive

jurisdiction upon the Electoral

Commission solely as regards the

merits of contested elections to the

National Assembly and the Supreme

Court therefore has no jurisdiction to

hear the case

Abbas, et al. v. Senate

166 SCR.A. 651 (1988)

Abbas filed an election contest

before the SET, against 22 candidates

of LABAN who were earlier

proclaimed as senators.

Abbas moved for the disqualification

/ INHIBITION of some senators (who

are part of the SET) on the ground

that they are all interested parties to

the case. He wanted MASS

DISQUALIFICATION of the 6 senators

who comprised the SET. (JPE,

Gonzales, Tito Guingona, Joey Lina,

Tamano, Ziga) He argues that such is

required by public policy, fair play

and due process.

Senator JPE in the meantime

voluntarily inhibited himself.

In effect, Abbas was also proposing

to amend the SET’s rules so as to

permit the

contest being decided by only 3

(i) May the senators be

disqualified from the

SET? Is the Abbas

proposal valid?

(i) No It seems quite clear that in providing for

the SET to be staffed by both SC

Justices and Senators, the Constitution

intended that both those judicial and

legislative components COMMONLY

SHARE the duty and authority of

deciding all contests relating to the ERQ

of senators.

In fact, the prescribed ratio of Senators

to Justices is 2 to 1 – an unmistakable

indication that the legislative

component cannot be totally excluded

from participation in the resolution of

the contests. The proposed mass

disqualification would leave the SET no

alternative but to abandon a duty that

no other court or body can perform,

but which it cannot lawfully discharge is

shorn of the participation of its entire

membership of Senators.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying

that no Senator‐Member may inhibit or


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

members (the 3 justices – Yap,

Narvasa, Gutz) Abbas proposes that

when more than 4 members are

disqualified, the remaining shall

constitute a quorum, and that if not

less than 3, it may adopt resolutions

by majority vote without abstention.

disqualify himself from sitting in the

SET. Every Senator‐Member of the SET

may, as his conscience dictates, refrain

from participating in the resolution of

the case when he sincerely feels that

his personal interests or biases would

stand in the way of objective and

impartial judgment.

BUT, what we are merely saying is that,

the SET cannot legally function as such,

absent its ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP OF

SENATORS, and that no amendment of

its rules can confer on the 3 remaining

Justice‐Members alone the power of

valid adjudication of senatorial election

contest.

Bondoc v. Pineda

G.R. No. 97710

September 26, 1991

Pineda (LDP) vs. Bondoc

(Nationalista). They are rival

candidates in the 4th district of

Pampanga. Pineda won by 3,300

votes and was proclaimed winner.

Bondoc filed a protest before the

HRET. The HRET ruled that Bondoc

won by a margin of 23 votes.

Moved by honesty, Congressman

CAMASURA of the LDP, told his LDP

party‐

mates that because Bondoc really

won, he was compelled to vote

against Pineda, consistent with truth

and justice.

(i) Whether Camasura

may be taken out of the

HRET, when he was

expelled from the LDP?

(i) No, because

expulsion from

the LDP party

due to “party

disloyalty” is not

valid ground for

expulsion from

HRET.

The ET was created to function as a

NONPARTISAN court even if 2/3 of its

members are politicians. It is a non‐

political body in the sea of politicians. It

was to be an independent and impartial

tribunal for the determination of

election contests. To be able to exercise

this exclusive jurisdiction, the ET must

be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear

and decide congressional election

contests is not to be share with the

Legislature nor the Courts.

The ET is a body separate and

independent of the legislature. While

composed of a majority of the

members of the legislature, it is an


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

On the eve of the promulgation of

the Bondoc decision, LDP Chief Jose

Cojuangco

EXPELLED CAMASURA from the LDP,

stating that his act was inimical,

unethical, and immoral, and was a

complete betrayal to the cause and

loyalty to LDP.

The following day, a letter was sent

to the HRET Chair Justice Melencio‐

Herrera informing them that

Camasura’s nomination for the HRET

has been withdrawn by LDP, hence

they are rescinding Camasura’s

election for the HRET.

Because of this “distressing

development” the 3 Justices‐

Members (Herrera,

Cruz, Feliciano) of the HRET asked

that they be relieved from their

assignments at the HRET because

they felt that the unseating of an

incumbent member of Congress is

being prevented at all costs. They cite

political factors are blocking the

accomplishment of the task of the

HRET. The 3 justices are proposing

amendments to the composition of

the HRET that is: 3‐3‐3 (3 members

from party with largest vote, 3 for

second largest vote, 3 from the SC).

(ii) May the house

request the dominant

party to change the

party’s representation

in the HRET?

(iii) Can the house

reorganize

representation in the

HRET of the majority

party?

(ii) No.

(iii) No.

independent body.

The House Resolution removing

Camasura from the HRET because he

cast a vote against his party‐mate is a

clear IMPAIRMENT OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PREPRROGATIVE OF

THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUGE OF THE

ELECTION CONTEST between Pineda

and Bondoc.

(ii‐iii) The House INTERFERED in the

work of the HRET, and in doing so

reduced the HRET into a mere tool for

the AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY

IN POWER (LDP), which the 3 justices

and the lone Nationalista member

would be powerless to stop.

As judges, the members of the tribunal

must be non‐partisan. They must

discharge their duties in complete

detachment and impartiality, even

independence from the political party

to which they belong. DISLOYALTY TO

THE PARTY, is not a valid ground for the

expulsion of a member of the HRET.

The purpose of his expulsion was to

nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so

that the HRET’s decision may not be

promulgated, and would clear the way

for LDP to nominate a replacement at

the HRET.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

The SC directed 3 justices to return to

the HRET.

The HRET resolved to cancel the

promulgation of the Bondoc ruling.

This is because without Camasura’s

vote, the decision lacks the

concurrence of 5 members as

required by the rules and therefore

cannot be validly promulgated.

Bondoc not being proclaimed, filed a

case to annul the decision of the

House to withdraw Camasura from

the HRET. Bondoc is seeking the

reinstatement of Camasura to the

HRET.

Pineda, on the other hand, prays for

the dismissal of the petition. He

argues that Congress is the sole

authority to nominate and elect from

its members, and that the House has

the sole power to remove any

member of the HRET whenever the

ration in representation of political

parties has materially changed. He

contends that Camasura’s expulsion

was purely a party affair, a political

question in the hands of the House,

and beyond the reach of courts.

Furthermore, Camasura has a RIGHT TO

SECURITY OF TENURE. Members of the

HRET, are like members of the judiciary,

who enjoy security of tenure.

Membership may not be terminated

except for just cause, such as:

expiration of term of office, death,

disability, resignation from the political

party he represents, etc.

Camasura’s expulsion is therefore null

and void. The expulsion of Camasura by

the House from the HRET was unjust

interference with the HRET’s

disposition in the Bondoc case, and to

deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the

HRET’s decision.

The HRET’s decision in favor of Bondoc

is thereby PROMULGATED. Camasura

reinstated to HRET – House decision is

annulled.

Guerrero v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 137004

Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify

respondent Fariñas as a candidate for


COMELEC has

(i) No (i) There is no grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the COMELEC when it


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

July 26, 2000 the position of Congressman in the

First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz

alleged that Fariñas had been

campaigning as a candidate for

Congressman in the May 11, 1998

polls, despite his failure to file a

certificate of candidacy for said

office. On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed

his certificate of candidacy

substituting candidate Chevylle

Fariñas who withdrew on April 3,

1998. On May 10, 1998, the

COMELEC dismissed the petition of

Ruiz for lack of merit.

After the election, Fariñas was duly

proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz

filed a motion for reconsideration,

contending that Fariñas could not

validly substitute for Chevylle Fariñas,

since the latter was not the official

candidate of LAMMP, but was an

independent candidate. Another

person cannot substitute for an

independent candidate. Ruiz claimed

that Fariñas’ certificate of candidacy

was fatally defective. On June 3,

1988, Fariñas took his oath of office

as a member of the House of

Representatives. The COMELEC

dismissed the case for lack of

jurisdiction.

CLASS DISCUSSION:

committed grave abuse

of discretion in holding

that the determination

of the validity of the

certificate of candidacy

of respondent Fariñas is

already within the

exclusive jurisdiction of

the House of

Representatives

Electoral Tribunal

(HRET).

held that its jurisdiction over the case

had ceased with the assumption of

office of respondent Fariñas as

Representative for the first district of

Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested

with the power to declare valid or

invalid a certificate of candidacy, its

refusal to exercise that power following

the proclamation and assumption of

the position by Fariñas is a recognition

of the jurisdictional boundaries

separating the COMELEC and the HRET.

Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the

Constitution, the HRET has sole and

exclusive jurisdiction over all contests

relative to the election, returns and

qualifications of members of the House

of Representatives. Thus, once a

winning candidate has been

proclaimed, taken his oath, and

assumed office as a member of the

House of Representatives, COMELEC’s

jurisdiction over election contests

relating to his election, returns and

qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own

jurisdiction begins. Thus, the

COMELEC’s decision to discontinue

exercising jurisdiction over the case is

justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s

own jurisdiction and functions.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

SC looked at "qualifications" rather

than election process which

concerned the manner in which

Fariñas took office.

Garcia et. al. v. HRET

G.R. No. 134792

August 12, 1999

Ponente: Ynares‐Santiago, J:

All duly registered voters in the

district (petitioners) filed for quo

warranto before the HRET against

Congressman Angping

(Representative for the 3rd District of

Manila). They questioned the

eligibility of the Congressman to hold

office in the House of

Representatives because the latter

was not a natural‐born citizen of the

PH, which was a constitutional

requirement. They pray that

Congressman Angping be declared

ineligible to assume or hold office as

a member of the lower house and for

the candidate who received the

highest number of votes from among

the qualified candidates to be

proclaimed the winner.

Petitioners filed the required P5k

filing fee, but the HRET later issued a

Resolution dismissing it for lack of

the P5k cash deposit. Petitioners

then paid said deposit and filed a

Motion for Reconsideration on the

same day, which was consequently

denied in view of HRET’s Rule 32

(i) Did HRET commit

grave abuse of

discretion in applying its

Rules strictly and in

dismissing the petition

for quo warranto?

(ii) Can the instant

petition for certiorari

prosper?

(i) No

(ii) No

(i) It was a judgment call of the HRET as

to whether or not it would apply its

rules strictly, which is clearly authorized

under its Rules. As long as the exercise

of discretion is based on well‐founded

factual and legal basis, as in this case,

no abuse of discretion can be imputed

to the Tribunal.

(ii) The function of the Court is merely

to check whether grave abuse of

discretion has been committed in the

dismissal of the petition for quo

warranto before it. A petition for

certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court will prosper only if there is a

showing of grave abuse of discretion or

an act without or in excess of

jurisdiction on the part of respondent

tribunal. There was an absence of such.

There is therefore no reason for the

Court to annul the decision of the

respondent or substitute it for its own

judgment. The instant petition must be

dismissed.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

saying that the P5k cash deposit

should have been paid at the same

time they submitted the P5k filing

fee.

Pimentel, et. al. v.

HRET

G.R. No. 141489

November 29, 2002

Ponente: Carpio, J:

Before this Court are two original

petitions for prohibition and

mandamus with prayer for writ of

preliminary injunction. Petitioners

assail the composition of the HRET

and the Commission on

Appointments (CA). Petitioners pray

that respondents be ordered to

“alter, reorganize, reconstitute, and

reconfigure” the composition of the

HRET and the CA to include party‐list

representatives in accordance with

Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of our

Consti, and R.A. 7941 (“Party‐List

System Act”), praying that the HRET

and the CA be enjoined from

exercising their fictions until they

have been reorganized.

(i) Whether the present

composition of the

HRET violates the

constitutional req of

proportional

representation because

there are no party‐list

reps in the HRET

(ii) Whether the present

membership of the

House in the CA violates

the same constitutional

req of proportional

representation because

there are no party‐list

reps in the CA

(iii) Whether the refusal

of the HRET and the CA

to reconstitute

themselves to include

party‐list reps

constitutes grave abuse

of discrection

(i) No

(ii) No

(iii) No

The direction of the House to choose its

members to the HRET and the CA is not

absolute, being subject to the

mandatory constitutional rule on

proportional representation, BUT under

the doctrine of the separation of

powers, the Court may not interfere

with the exercise by the House of this

constitutionally mandated duty.

The instant petitions are bereft of any

allegation that respondents prevented

the party‐list groups in the House from

participating in the election of

members of the HRET and the CA. It

also doesn’t appear that after the May

11, 1998 elections, the House barred

the party‐list reps from seeking

membership in the HRET or CA. As the

primary recourse of the party‐list reps

lies with the lower house, the Court

cannot resolve the issues presented by

the petitioners this time.

It is a well‐settled rule that a

constitutional question will not be

heard and resolved by the courts unless

the following requirements of judicial

inquiry concur:

1) There must be an actual


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

controversy

2) The person or part raising the

constitutional issue must have

a personal and substantial

interest in the resolution of the

controversy

3) The controversy must be raised

at the earliest reasonable

opportunity

4) The resolution of the

constitutional issue must be

indispensable to the final

determination of the

controversy

The petitioners also do not possess the

locus standi necessary to raise the

constitutional issue because in the first

place, they must have “such personal

stake in the outcome of the controversy

as to assure that concrete adverseness

which sharpens the presentation of

issues upon which the court depends

for illumination of difficult

constitutional questions.” Such

petitioners have not alleged that they

are entitled to, or have even been

unlawfully deprived of seats in the

HRET and the CA. They have not even

claimed that they have been nominated

by the party‐list groups in the House to

the HRET and the CA.

Vinzons‐Chato v.

COMELEC

Unico has already been proclaimed

and taken his oath of office as a

(i) Should the Court

take cognizance of

(i) No

The court should not take cognizance of

Chato’ selection protest for it would


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

G.R. No. 172131

April 2, 2007

Member of the HOR, hence,

COMELEC ruled that it had already

lost jurisdiction over petitioner

Chato’s election protest against

Unico regarding canvassing of returns

and alleged invalidityof Unico’s

proclamation. He then filed a special

civil action for certiorari in the SC.

Chato’s election

protest? If not, to who

is this issue best

addressed to?

(ii) Will his civil action

for certiorari prosper?

(ii) No

amount to usurpation of the

constitutionally mandated functions of

the HRET. Civil action for certiorari will

not prosper.

In an electoral contest where the

validity of the proclamation of a

winning candidate who has taken his

oath of office and assumed his post as

Congressman is raised, that issue is best

addressed to the HRET.

It avoids duplicity of proceedings and a

clash of jurisdiction between

constitutional bodies with due regard

to the people’s mandate.

Limkaichong v.

COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 178831‐32

April 1, 2009

Limkaichong ran as a representative

in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.

Paras, her rival, and some other

concerned citizens filed

disqualification cases against

Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly

not a natural born citizen of the

Philippines because when she was

born her father was still a Chinese

and that her mom, though Filipino

lost her citizenship by virtue of her

marriage to Limkaichong’s dad.

During the pendency of the case

against Limkaichong before the

COMELEC, Election day came and

votes were cast. Results came in and

Limkaichong won over her rival


proclamation done by

the COMELEC is valid

(ii) Whether or not

COMELEC should still

exercise jurisdiction

over the matter

(i) Yes

(ii) No, the HRET

must instead

The proclamation of Limkaichong was

valid. The COMELEC Second Division

rendered its Joint Resolution dated May

17, 2007. On May 20, 2007,

Limkaichong timely filed with the

COMELEC En Banc her motion for

reconsideration as well as for the lifting

of the incorporated directive

suspending her proclamation. The

filing of the motion for reconsideration

effectively suspended the execution of

the May 17, 2007 Joint

Resolution. Since the execution of the

May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was

suspended, there was no impediment

to the valid proclamation of

Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2,


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Paras. COMELEC after due hearing

declared Limkaichong as disqualified.

About 2 days after the counting of

votes, COMELEC declared

Limkaichong as a disqualified

candidate. On the following days

however, notwithstanding their

proclamation disqualifying

Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a

proclamation announcing

Limkaichong as the winner of the

recently conducted elections. This is

in compliance with Resolution No.

8062 adopting the policy‐guidelines

of not suspending the proclamation

of winning candidates with pending

disqualification cases which shall be

without prejudice to the continuation

of the hearing and resolution of the

involved cases.

Paras countered the proclamation

and she filed a petition before the

COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’

petitioned arguing that since she is

now the proclaimed winner, the

COMELEC can no longer exercise

jurisdiction over the matter. It should

be the HRET which should exercise

jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC

agreed with Limkaichong.

Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure applies.

The HRET must exercise jurisdiction

after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The

SC has invariably held that once a

winning candidate has been

proclaimed, taken his oath,

and assumed office as a Member of the

HOR, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction

over election contests relating to

his election, returns, and qualifications

ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction

begins. It follows then that the

proclamation of a winning candidate

divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction

over matters pending before it at the

time of the proclamation. The party

questioning his qualification should

now present his case in a proper

proceeding before the HRET, the

constitutionally mandated tribunal to

hear and decide a case involving a

Member of the House of

Representatives with respect to the

latter’s election, returns and

qualifications. The use of the

word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of

the Constitution and in Section 250 of

the OEC underscores the exclusivity of

the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction

over election contests relating to its

members.


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Section 18.

There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve

Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or

organizations registered under the party‐list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The

Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule

by a majority vote of all the Members.


Daza v. Singson

180 SCR.A. 496 (1989)

Raul Daza was a member of the

Comission of Appointments (CA),

representing LP.

LDP reorganized itself and 24

members of the LP resigned to join

LDP.

Because of this political re‐alignment,

the House revised the representation

in the

CA. The House withdrew the seat

occupied by Daza and gave this to the

newly‐ formed LDP. (Chavit Singson).

Daza filed a petition to challenge his

removal from the CA. He contends

that his election to the CA is

permanent and that reorganization in

the House is NOT based on a

permanent political re‐alignment

because the LDP is still not a duly

registered political party and that it

has not attained political stability. He

argues that a party must stand the

(i) Does the SC have

jurisdiction?

(ii) May LDP still be

represented at the CA

despite its being

unregistered?

(i) Yes

(ii) Yes

(i) The Court has jurisdiction. What is

involved here is the legality, not the

wisdom, of the act of the House in

removing Daza from the CA. It is not a

political question. It is a legal question

on the manner of filling the CA, as

prescribed in the Constitution. Even

assuming that it were a political

question, the Courts still have the

expanded power to check whether

grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction has been

committed.

(ii) DAZA loses. The COMELEC has

subsequently recognized LDP for

registration as a political party. This has

taken the wind out of the sails of Daza,

and he must now limp to shore as best

as he can.

> The LDP has been existence for more

than one year now. Its titular head is no

less than the President of the

Philippines ad its President is Senator

Gonzales. While there are still some


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test of time to prove permanence.

Singson countered by saying that

what is involved is a political

question. He argues that nowhere in

the Constitution is it required that

the political party be registered to be

entitled to proportional

representation at the CA.

internal disagreements, these are to be

expected in any political organization.

In fact, even the monolithic Communist

Party has undergone similar dissension,

but surely it cannot be considered

temporary because of such discord. The

LDP now commands the biggest

following in the House, the party has

thus not only survived but in fact

prevailed.

> Hence, the House has the authority to

change its representation in the CA to

reflect AT ANY TIME, the changes that

may transpire in the political

alignments of its membership. It is

understood that SUCH CHANGES MUST

BE PERMANENT and do not include the

temporary alliances or factional

divisions not involving severance of

political loyalties or formal

disaffiliation.

> Further, when the Liberal Party (Daza)

was allotted 2 seats in the CA, it did not

express any objection.

Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr.

187 SCR.A. 377 (1990)

On the Congressional Elections of

1987, Anna Dominique Coseteng was

the only candidate under KAIBA.

The members of the CA were also

elected, 11 coming from the

majority, and 1 from the coalesced

Majority.

A year later. LDP organized, which led

(i) Dose the court have

jurisdiction?

(i) Yes

Court has jurisdiction. Not a political

question. As held in Daza vs. Singson,

the issue in this case is the manner of

filling the CA and not the wisdom. Even

if the question were political, the court

still has the power to review grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction committed by

any branch or instrumentality of the

government by virtue of Article VII,


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to the reorganization of the

representation in the CA.

Coseteng wrote to Speaker Mitra

that as representative of KAIBA, she

should be appointed to the CA. This

was supported by 9 other

congressmen.

She later filed a petition for quo

warranto praying that the election of

some LDP congressmen in the CA be

nullified on the theory that it violated

the constitutional mandate of

proportional representation because

the new majority – LDP (158 out of

202), would now be entitled to 9 seat

only. She claims that she has the

support of the 9 other congressmen

as well.

She further claims that CA members

should have been nominated and

elected by their respective political

parties.

The LDP congressmen opposed and

argued that KAIBA is part of the

coalesced majority which supports

the administration of Cory, and not

of the minority, hence she is bound

by the choice of the Coalesced

majority as to who shall sit in the CA.

(ii) Whether the

congressmen in the CA

were chosen on the

basis of proportional

representation from the

political parties?

(ii) Yes

Section 1 of the Constitution.

(ii) Coseteng loses. The composition of

the house membership in the CA was

BASED ON A PROPORTIONAL

REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL

PARTIES. There are 160 members of the

LDP in the house. They represent 80%

of the house. 80% of the 12 members in

the CA = 9.6 or 10. Hence the LDP is

entitled to 10 members in the CA. the

remaining 2 were apportioned to the

Liberal Party as the next largest party in

the Coalesced Majority, and the last

one to the KBL as the principal

opposition party. There is no doubt that

the apportionment in the CA was done

on the basis of proportional

representation of political parties in the

House.

> Even if KAIBA were to be considered

as an opposition party, its lone member

(Coseteng) represents only 0.4% of the

House membership, hence SHE IS NOT

ENTITLED TO ONE OF THE 12 SEATS IN

THE CA. To be able to claim

proportional representation, a political

party should represent at least 8.4% of

the house membership, that is at least

17 congressmen.

> The endorsement of 9 other

congressmen in favor of Coseteng is

inconsequential because they are not

members of her party. The claim that


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the members in the CA should be

nominated and elected by their

respective political parties is untenable.

The members have been nominated

and elective by the House (not by their

party) as provided for in the

Constitution.

Guingona, Jr. v.

Gonzales

G.R. No. 106971

October 20, 1992

Based on the rule of proportional

representation from political parties,

a compromise was reached for the

election of members of the CA.

However, Lakas was given only 1 (and

not 2) because the 1.5 was not

rounded off.

The 8 senators from LDP chosen for

CA were: Angara, Herrera, Alvarez,

Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and

Romulo.

Guingona (LAKAS) opposed the

nomination of Romulo. Guingona

also questioned the appointment of

Tanada as lone representative of LP.

Based on the mathematical

computation of proportional

representation, each of the political

parties are entitled to additional 0.5

seat, Guingona claims that by the

election of Romulo and Tanada, it

unduly increased the membership of

LDP and the LP, and reduced the

(i) Court’s jurisdiction?

(ii) What should be

done to the 0.5 seat to

which each of them is

entitled?

(i) Yes

(ii) There is

nothing to stop

political parties

from forming a

coalition with

another political

party in order to

fill up the two

vacancies

resulting from

the fractional

seat each party is

entitled to.

(i) Court has jurisdiction. The legality of

the filling up of membership of the CA

is a justiciable issue, not a political

question.

(ii) The LDP majority converted its

fractional half into a whole number, for

an additional of one senator, enabling it

to elect its 8th member, Romulo. In

doing so, the other party’s fractional

representation was correspondingly

reduced leaving that party’s

representation in CA to less than their

representation in the Senate. This is

CLEARLY A VIOLATION OF THE SECTION

18, because it is no longer in

compliance with the mandate that

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CA SHOULD BE

BASED ON THE PROPORTIONAL

REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL

PARTIES. The election of Romulo gave

more representation to the LDP, and

reduced the representation of either

the Lakas or NPC.

> By adding together 2 halves to make a

whole is a breach of the rule on

proportional representation because it


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membership of Lakas, and NPC.

(iii) Must the 12

members in the CA be

always filled?

(iii) No. So long

as the necessary

number for

quorum is met,

the CA may

exercise its

functions.

will give LDP an added member in the

CA, by utilizing the fractional

membership of the minority political

party, who is deprived of half a

representation. Section 18 is

mandatory in character and does not

leave any discretion to the majority

party in the Senate.

> GUIDELINES:

1) In the senate, a political party must

have at least 2 duly elected senators to

be entitled to a seat in the CA.

2) Where there are more than 2

political parties represented, a political

party with a single senator in the

Senate cannot claim a seat in the CA.

(Differs from the case of Senator

Lorenzo Tañada where he was lone

minority, and the 23 came from the

same party)

(iii) The constitution does NOT

contemplate that the CA must always

include 12 senators and 12

congressmen. What the constitution

requires is that there be at least a

majority of the entire membership. The

constitution does NOT require the

election and presence of 12 senators

and 12 congressmen in order that the

CA may function properly. THEY NEED

NOT BE FULLY CONSTITUTED (even if

the constitution provides for their

composition) to perform their


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Section 19.

The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of

Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only

while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein

conferred upon it.

Section 20.

The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be

audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.

Section 21.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly

published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.

functions.

> The election of ROMULO (LDP) and

TANADA (LP) was clearly a violation of

Section 18. Their nomination was done

by sheer force of superiority in

numbers and was done in grave abuse

of discretion.

> IN SHORT, fractional seats should

never be rounded off. The seats should

be vacant.


Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate

Blue Ribbon

Committee

G.R. No. L‐89914

November 20, 1991

This is a petition for prohibition to

enjoin SBR from requiring Bengzon to

testify regarding the sale of equity of

Kokoy Romualdez to Cory Aquino’s

relative Ricardo Lopa.

Case was about the control over the

biggest business enterprises in the

(i) Does the court have

jurisdiction over this

case? Can senate

conduct inquiry?

(i) Yes COURT HAS JURISDICTION to

determine the scope and extent of the

power of the SBRC to conduct inquiries

into the private affairs in purported aid

of legislation.

BUT there are limits on Congress’

power. The power of both houses to


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Philippines through massive infusion

of government funds thru Kokoy

Romualdez, and with the aid of

BENGZON LAW OFFICE who allegedly

maneuvered funds using dummy

corporations.

Senate minority floor leader JPE

delivered a speech before the Senate

on the alleged take over of one

company by Ricardo Lopa (Cory’s

brother‐in‐law), but contained

nothing about it being in aid of

legislation. They merely wanted an

investigatn.

The matter was referred to the

Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

(SBRC). Bengzon and Lopa were

subpoenaed but declined to testify.

EARLIER, civil cases were filed by

PCGG before the Sandiganbayan to

recover ill‐ gotten wealth of

Romualdez. The cases impleaded

Bengzon.

NOW, Bengzon claims that testifying

before the Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee might unduly prejudice

them in the cases before the

Sandiganbayan.

They claim that

conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is

NOT ABSOLUTE. The investigation must

be:

1) in aid of legislation,

2) in accordance with duly published

rules of procedure

3) the rights of persons appearing or

affected by such inquiries shall be

respected.

The Rules of SBRC provide that the

senate may refer to any committee any

speech filed by a senator which in its

judgment requires legislation. TO

ASCERTAIN THE CHARACTER OR

NATURE OF INQUIRY, resort to the

SPEECH under which such inquiry is

proposed to be made.

Here, THE SPEECH OF ENRILE

CONTAINED NO SUGGESTION OF

CONTEMPLATED LEGISLATION. He is

merely calling upon the senate to look

into the possible violation by the

President on prohibition of certain

relatives in gov’t dealings. NO

INTENDED LEGISLATION IS INVOLVED

HERE. Thus it is NOT IN AID OF

LEGISLATION.

Also, since there is a pending case

before the Sandiganbayan. There is a

possibility of conflicting judgments

between legislative and judicial bodies,


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1) The Blue Ribbon has no valid

legislative purpose (not in aid of legis)

2) The sale of the Romualdez corp is

purely a private affair.

3) The inquiry would violate their

right to due process

and influence of Committee judgment

on court judgment. (Separation of

powers).

Sabio v. Gordon

G.R. No. 174177

October 17, 2006

Former President Cory issued EO No.

1 creating the PCGG. She entrusted

upon this body the task of recovering

the ill‐gotten wealth accumulated by

the deposed President Marcos and

his close associates. To ensure the

PCGG’s unhampered performance of

its tasks, Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1

provides that: “No member or staff of

the Commission shall be required to

testify or produce evidence in any

judicial, legislative or administrative

proceeding concerning matters

within its official cognizance.”

20 years later, the Senate invited

PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio to be

one of the resource persons in a

Senate investigation. However,

Chairman Sabio declined the

invitation invoking Section 4 (b) of

E.O. No. 1.

(i) May Section 4 (b) of

E.O. No. 1 be invoked by

Chairman Sabio to

justify non‐appearance

on legislative

investigations?

(i) No Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared

REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution.

The Congress’ power of inquiry, being

broad, encompasses everything that

concerns the administration of existing

laws as well as proposed or possibly

needed statutes. It even extends “to

government agencies created by

Congress and officers whose positions

are within the power of Congress to

regulate or even abolish.”

Note: Article VI, Section 21 grants the

power of inquiry not only to the Senate

and the House of Representatives, but

also to any of their respective

committees.

Standard Chartered

Bank v. Senate

Committee

G.R. No. 167173

December 27, 2007

Ponente: Nachura, J:

This is a Petition for Prohibition (with

Prayer for Issuance of Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Injunction)


respondent can conduct

investigation against the

petitioner despite

criminal and civil cases

(i) No, petition is

denied

Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue

Ribbon committee, the petitioners

claim that since the issue of whether or

not SCB‐Philippines illegally sold

unregistered foreign securities is


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dated and filed on March 11, 2005,

by petitioners against respondent,

wherein Financial Institutions and

Currencies is represented by the

respondent’s Chairperson, Edgardo

Angara.

On Feb 1, 2005, Senator Enrile, Vice

Chair of respondent, delivered a

speech entitled, “Arrogance of

Wealth” before the Senate,

denouncing the petitioners for seling

unregistered foreign securities in

violation of the Securities Regulation

Code, and urging the Senate to

conduct an inquiry immediately, in

aid of legislation, to prevent the same

occurrence from happening in the

future. Through Senator Pangilinan,

the speech was referred to the

respondent. Prior to the privileged

speech, Enrile ha introduced PS

Resolution 166, “DIRECTING THE

COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, TO

CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF

LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE

OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH‐RISK

SECURITIES BY STANDARD

CHARTERED BANK, WHICH RESULTED

IN BILIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO

THE INVESTIGATING PUBLIC.”

CLASS DISCUSSION:

against the latter

pending in courts

already preempted by the courts that

took cognizance of the foregoing cases,

the Senate Committee, by this

investigation, would encroach upon the

judicial powers vested solely in these

courts. Petitioner’s argument does not

apply squarely to this case.

Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon,

that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

was without any constitutional mooring

to conduct the legislative investigation,

was the Court’s determination that the

intended inquiry was not in aid of

legislation. The Court found that

Enrile’s speech merely called upon the

Senate to look into the possible

violations in R.A. 3019. The

unmistakable objective of the

investigation, as set forth in the

resolution, exposes the petitioners’’

allegation that the inquiry, as initiated

in a privilege speech by the very same

Enrile, was simply “to denounce the

illegal practice committed by a foreign

bank in selling unregistered foreign

securities”. This fallacy made more

glaring when we consider that, at the

conclusion of the privilege speech,

Enrile urged the Senate to immediately

conduct an inquiry with the help of

legislation, to prevent such acts in the

future.


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‐ very clear that it was in aid of

legislation

Indeed, the mere filing or an

administrative complaint before a court

of quasi‐judicial body should not

automatically bar the conduct of

legislative investigation. Otherwise, it

would be extremely easy to subvert any

intended inquiry by Congress through

the convenient ploy of instituting a

criminal or an administrative complaint.

Surely, the exercise of sovereign

legislative authority, of which the power

of legislative inquiry is an essential

component, cannot be made

subordinate to a criminal or an

administrative investigation.

Senate Blue Ribbon v.

Judge Majaducon

Ponente: Ynares‐Santiago, J:

This case involves consolidated petitions:

1) For certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus and preliminary

injunction, assailing the resolution

dated Nov. 11, 1998 of Judge

Madajucon (defendant) of the RTC

of GenSan City, Branch 23, which

denied the petitioner motion to

dismiss the petition for

prohibition, injunction with writ of

preliminary injunction filed by

private respondent Atty. Flaviano;

2) For review of the resolution dated

April 15, 1999 of respondent

Judge Majaducon declaring

petitioner Senator Pimentel guilty

of contempt of court.

Was the TRO issued by

Judge Majaducon ordering

the Senate to cease and

desist from proceeding with

its hearing valid?

No

The principle of separation of powers

essentially means that legislation belongs to

Congress, execution to the Executive, and

settlement of legal controversies to the

Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the

domain of the others. The RTC of GenSan City

or any court, for that matter, had no authority

to prohibit the Senate committee from

requiring the respondent (Atty. Flaviano) to

appear and testify before it.

The Bill of Rights grants respect to the rights

to a person appearing in or affected by such

inquiries mentioned above. However, this

must be exercised subject to constitutional

limitations, particularly adhering to

governmental action. In the case at bar, such

legislative action taken by the Senate to

secure the testimony of Flaviano.

There also exists the implicit limitation that

the legislature’s power to commit a witness


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Section 22.

The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each

House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted

to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations

shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and

the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

only the heads of departments need consent of President.

Basically…

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

conducted an inquiry on the alleged

irregularities in the funds used by the

Armed Forces Retirement and Separation

Benefits system (AFP‐RSBS). This was

becase Senator Blas Ople filed a resolution

to the Committee on National Defense and

Security to investigate charges concerning a

group of active and retired military officials

planning a coup d’état to prevent then

President Estrada’s admin from probing

into such alleged irregularities. The said

Committee subpoenaed Atty. Flaviano to

appear before it and testify to such

charges, but the counsel refused to appear

at the hearing. Instead, he secured a TRO

against the Senate issued by Judge

Majaducon of RTC Branch 23 of GenSan

City.

for contempt terminates when the legislative

body ceases to exist upon its final

adjournment. “This must be so, inasmuch as

the basis of the power to impose such a

penalty is the right which the legislature has

to self‐preservation, and which right is

enforceable during the existence of the

legislative body.”


Senate v. Ermita

G.R. No. 169777

April 20, 2006

Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.

September 21‐23, 2005 The

Committee of the Senate as a whole

(i) Whether E.O. 464

contravenes the power

of inquiry vested in

Congress.

(i) Section 2(b)

and 3 are invalid,

while Sections 1

and 2(a) are

(i) Validity of Section 1

> The coverage of department heads

under Section 1 is not made to depend

on the department heads possession of


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issued various invitations to various

officials of the Executive Department

for them to appear on Sept.29 as

resource speakers in a public hearing

on the North Rail Project. The

hearing was sparked by alleged

overpricing and other unlawful

provisions of the contract.

September 28, 2005

Senate President Franklin Drilon

received from Executive Secretary

Eduardo Ermita a letter(s) requesting

for postponement of the hearing.

The president issued E.O. No. 464

which required “all heads of

departments of the Executive Branch

of the government shall secure the

consent of the President prior to

appearing before either House of

Congress.”

Sen. Drilon received another letter

from Sec. Ermita informing him that

the invited executive branch officials

will not be able to attend as they

have not secured the consent of the

president.

AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Generoso

Senga sent a letter to Sen. Biazon

informing “that per instruction of

[Pres. Arroyo], thru Secretary of

National Defense no officer of the

AFP is authorized to appear before

any Senate or Congressional hearings

valid.

any information which might be

covered by executive privilege.

> “Question Hour” (where attendance

is discretionary) under Section 22,

Article VI needs to be differentiated

from Section 21 which provides for the

power of either Houses of Congress to

“conduct inquiries in aid of legislation”

(where attendance is compulsory).

> The requirement then to secure

presidential consent under Section 1,

limited as it is only to appearances in

the question hour, is valid. It cannot be

applied to appearances of department

heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

> Section 2(b) virtually states that

executive privilege actually covers

persons. The doctrine is misused

because it is properly invoked in

relation to specific categories of

information and not to categories of

persons.

> While Section 2(a) enumerates the

types of information that are covered

by the privilege under the challenged

order, Congress is left to speculate as to

which among them is being referred to

by the executive, or on how the

requested information could be

classified as privileged. It does not

suffice to merely declare that President

has determined that a piece of

information is so privileged.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

without seeking a written approval

from the President.”

October 3, 2005 3 petitions (G.R.

169659, 169660, 169667) for

certiorari and prohibition were filed

challenging the constitutionality of

E.O. No. 464.

(ii) Whether E.O. 464

violates the right of the

people to information

on matters of public

concern.

(iii) Whether

respondents have


of discretion when they

implemented E.O. 464

prior to its publication

in a newspaper of

general circulation.

(ii) The right of

the people to

information

cannot be called

to surface

because not all

exercises of the

legislative of its

power of inquiry

finds its root in

the people’s right

to information.

(iii) While E.O.

464 applies only

to officials of the

executive

branch, it does

not follow that

the same is

exempt from the

> An improperly asserted claim of

privilege is no claim of privilege.

> The need to ensure respect for

officials does not change the infirm

nature of the authorization of the

executive order.

(ii) The right to information does not

grant a citizen power to exact

testimony from government officials.

This power belongs only to Congress

and not to an individual citizen. The

right to information follows the

Congress’ power of inquiry only in a

highly qualified sense.

> To the extent that investigations in

aid of legislation are generally

conducted in public, any executive

issuance tending to unduly limit

disclosures of information in such

investigations necessarily deprives the

people of information which, being

presumed to be in aid of legislation, is

presumed to be a matter of public

concern.

(iii) E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the

right of the people to information on

matters of public concern. It is,

therefore a matter of public interest

which members of the body politic may

question before this court. Due process

thus requires that the people should

have been apprised of this issuance


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need for

publication.

before it was implemented.

Neri v. Senate

Committee

G.R. No. 180643

September 4, 2008

Motion for reconsideration for the SC

decision granting the petition for

certiorari filed by Petitioner Romulo

Neri against respondent Senate

Committees on Accountability of

Public Officers and Investigations,

Trade and Commerce, and National

Defense and Security (“respondent

Committees”).

In the investigation regarding the

NBN‐ZTE deal, the respondent

committees required the petitioner

to answer the following questions:

(a) Whether or not President Arroyo

followed up the NBN‐ZTE Project, (b)

Whether or not she directed him to

prioritize it, and (c) whether or not

she directed him to approve it.

November 20, 2007 petitioner did

not appear before respondent

committees upon orders of the

President invoking executive

privilege.

Petitioner was issued with a

contempt order, but he insisted that

he had not shown any contemptible

conduct worthy of contempt and

arrest. He emphasized his willingness

to testify on new matters, but

(i) Whether or not there

is a recognized

presumptive

presidential

communications

privilege in our legal

system.

(ii) Whether or not

there is factual or legal

basis to hold that the

communications

elicited by the 3

questions are covered

by executive privilege.

(i) While

executive

privilege is a

constitutional

concept, a claim

thereof may be

valid or not

depending on

the ground

invoked to justify

it and the

context in which

it is made.

(ii) FIRST The

power to enter

into an executive

agreement is a

“quintessential

and non‐

delegable

presidential

power”.

SECOND, the

doctrine of

operational

proximity was

laid down

precisely to limit

the scope of the

presidential

communications

(i) In this case, it was the President

herself, through Executive Secretary

Ermita, who invoked executive privilege

on a specific matter involving an

executive agreement between the

Philippines and China, which was the

subject of the 3 questions propounded

to petitioner Neri in the course of the

Senate Committees investigation.

(ii)

> The fact that a power (i.e. to secure a

foreign loan) is subject to the

concurrence of another entity (i.e. the

Monetary Board) does not make such

power less executive. The fact that the

president has to secure the prior

concurrence of the Monetary Board,

which shall submit to Congress a

complete report of its decision before

contracting or guaranteeing foreign

loans, does not diminish the executive

nature of the power.

> The danger of expanding the privilege

“to a large swath of the executive

branch” is absent because the official

involved here is a member of the

Cabinet i.e. her official family.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

respondent committees did not

respond to his request for advance

notice fo questions.

(iii) Whether or not

respondent committees

have shown that the

communications

elicited by the 3

questions are critical to

the exercise of their

functions.

(iv) Whether or not

respondent committees


of discretion in issuing

the contempt order.

privilege, but in

any case, it is not

conclusive.

THIRD, the

president’s claim

of executive

privilege is not

merely based on

a generalized

interest.

(iii) The

respondent

committees have

failed to show

adequate

compelling need

that would justify

limitation of the

privilege.

(iv) Respondent

committees

committed grave

abuse of

discretion in

issuing the

contempt order

as the demands

of the petitioner

to be furnished a

copy of the

> The letter of Executive Secretary

Ermita specified presidential

communications privilege in relation to

diplomatic and economic relations with

another sovereign nation as the bases

for the claim.

(iii) The presumption in favor of the

Presidential communications puts the

burden on the respondent Senate

Committees to overturn the

presumption by demonstrating their

specific need for the information. Here,

there is simply a generalized assertion

that the information is pertinent to the

exercise of the power to legislate and a

broad and non‐specific reference to

pending Senate bills.

(iv) Witnesses have their constitutional

right to due process. They should be

adequately informed what matters are

to be covered by the inquiry, It will also

allow them to prepare the pertinent

information and documents, To our

mind, these requirements concede too

little political costs or burdens on the

part of the Congress when viewed vis‐à‐

vis the immensity of its power of

inquiry.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 23.

(1) The Congress, by a vote of two‐thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the

existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such

restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by

resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Section 24.

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Section 25.

(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.

The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation

therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments

and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the

National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House

of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any

item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and

subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general

appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re‐enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is

passed by the Congress.

questions in

advance is

reasonable.



┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 26.

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form

have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment

to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken

immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

Garcia v. Mata

65 SCR.A. 517 (1975)

Ponente: Castro, J.

A petition for certiorari to review the

decision of the Court of First Instance

of Q.C., Branch XI in Civil Case 1‐

13466 declaring paragraph 11 of the

“Special Provisions for the Armed

Forces of the Philippines” of R.A. No.

1600 unconstitutional and there

invalid and inoperative.


provision in question is

a rider with no

relevance to any

appropriation item

contained in the act.

(i) Judgment of

the lower court

affirmed.

(i) The incongruity and irrelevancy are

already evident. While R.A. No. 1600

appropraited money for the operation

of the Government for the fiscal year

1956‐1957, the said paragraph 11

refers to the fundamental

governmental policy matters of the

calling to active duty and the reversion

to inactive status of reserve officers in

the AFP.

Demetria v. Alba

148 SCR.A. 208 (1987)

Ponente: Fernan, J.

Petition for prohibition with paryer

for writ of preliminary injunction.


of the first paragraph of Section 44 of

P.D. No.1177 otherwise known as

the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977”.

(i) Whether or not

assailed section is in

conflict with Section

16(5) of Article VIII of

the 1973 Constitution.

(i) Conflict is

readily

perceivable as

the decree

unduly

overextends

presidential

powers.

(i) Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177

empowers the president to

indiscriminately transfer funds from on

department, bureau, office or agency of

the Executive Department to any

program, project or activity of any

department bureau or office included

in the General Appropriations Act,

without regard as to whether or not the

fund to be transferred are actually

savings in the item from which the

same are to be taken. It does not only

completely disregard the standards set

in the fundamental law, thereby

amounting to an undue delegation of

legislative powers, but likewise goes

beyond the tenor thereof.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻


Tio v. Videogram

Regulatory Board

151 SCR.A. 208 (1987)

Ponente: Melencio‐Herrera, J.

P.D. No. 1987 (An Act Creating the

Videogram Regulatory Board)

November 5, 1985 P.D. No. 1994

amended the National Internal

Revenue Code.

(i) Whether or not

Section 10 thereof,

which imposes a tax of

30% on the gross

receipts payable to the

local government is a

RIDER and the same is

not germane to the

subject matter thereof,

thus making the decree

unconstitutional.

(i) The petition is

without merit

because the

constitutional

requirement as

to the title of the

bill should not be

so narrowly

construed as to

cripple or

impede the

power of

legislation.

(i) The foregoing provision is allied and

germane to, and is reasonably

necessary for the accomplishment of,

the general objects of the decree which

is the regulation of the video industry

through the Videogram Regulatory

Board. The tax provision is not

inconsistent with, nor foreign to that

general subject and title. The express

purpose of the decree to include

taxation of the video industry in order

to regulate and rationalize the

heretofore uncontrolled distribution of

videograms is evident from Preambles

2 and 5 (see p.254 for complete

preamble of decree).

Phil. Judges

Association v. Prado

G.R. No. 105371

November 11, 1993

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as

implemented by the Philippine Postal

Corporation through its Circular No.

9228. These measures withdraw the

franking privilege from the Supreme

Court, the Court of Appeals, the

Regional Trial Courts, the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, the

Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land

Registration Commission and its

Register of Deeds, along with certain

other government offices.


law is unconstitutional

because its title

embraces more than

one subject and does

not express its purpose.

(ii) Whether or not it

violate the constitution

as it did not pass the

(i) The title of the

act does not

violate the

constitution

because its

sections are

germane to the

title.

(ii) While it is

true that a

conference

(i) The title of the bill is not required to

be an index to the body of the act, or to

be as comprehensive as to cover every

single detail of the measure. It has been

held that if the title fairly indicates the

general subject, and reasonably covers

all the provisions of the act, and is not

calculated to mislead the legislature of

the people, there is sufficient

compliance with the constitutional

requirement.

(ii) A conference committee may deal

generally with the subject matter or it

may be limited to resolving the precise


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

required readings in

both houses of

Congress and printed

copies of the bill in its

final form were not

distributed among the

members before its

passage.

(iii) Whether or not it is

discriminatory and

encroaches on the

independence of the

Judiciary.

committee is the

mechanism for

compromising

differences

between the

Senate and the

House, it is not

limited in its

jurisdiction to

this question.

(iii) It is violative

of Article3, Sec.1

of the

Constitution on

account of the

repealing clause.

differences between the two houses.

Even where the conference committee

is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,

legislative custom severely limits the

freedom with which new subject

matter can be inserted into the

conference bill. But occasionally a

conference committee produced

unexpected results, results beyond its

mandate. These excursions occur even

where the rules impose strict

limitations on conference committee

jurisdiction.

(iii) The repealing clause is a

discriminatory provision that denies the

Judiciary the equal protection of the

laws guaranteed for all persons or

things similarly situated.

Fariñas, et al. v.

Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 147387

December 10, 2003

See Supra under Article VI, Section 7

Tan v. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 109289

October 3, 1994

Ponente: Vitug, J.

In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that

the enactment of R.A. No. 7496

(Simplified Net Income Taxation

Scheme for the Self‐Employed and

Professionals Engaged in the practice

of their Profession) violates the

following provisions of the

Constitution:


continued

implementation of said

law violates the

constitutional

requirements that

taxation shall be

uniform and equitable.

(i) The plea to

have the law

declared

unconstitutional

fails because the

concept of equal

protection

merely requires

that all subjects

or objects of

(i) Uniformity does not forfend

classification as long as:

(1) The standards that are used

therefore are substantial and not

arbitrary.

(2) The categorization is germane to

achieve the legislative purpose.

(3) The law applies, all things being

equal, to both present and future

conditions.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

(1) Art.VI, Sec.26(1)

(2) Art.VI, Sec.28(1)

(3) Art.III, Sec.1

taxation be

treated alike

both in privileges

and limitations.

(4) The classification applies equally

well to all those belonging to the same

class. (Pepsi Cola v. City of Butuan)

Tolentino v. Secretary

of Finance

G.R. No. 115455

August 25, 1994

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

R.A. No. 7716 seeks to widen the

existing tax base of the existing VAT

system and enhance its

administration by amending the

National Internal Revenue Code.

R.A. No. 7716 is the results of

Conference Committee Bill entitled

“AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE

VALUE‐ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,

WIDENING IT TAX BASE AND

ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTR.A.TION

AND FOR THESE PURPOSES

AMENDING AND REPEALING THE

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE

NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE

CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES”. This results from

the consolidation of Senate Bill No.

1630 (submitted in substitution of

S.B. 1129 taking into consideration

P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No.1197)

and House Bill no. 1197.

Procedural Issues:

(i) Does R.A. No. 7716

violate Art.VI, Sec.4 of

the Constitution?

(ii) Does S. No.1630

violate Art.VI, Sec.26(2)

of the Constitution

because it did not pass

three readings on

separate days?

Procedural Issues

(i) It does not

unconstitutional

because the

Constitution

simply means

that the initiative

for filing

revenue, tariff, or

tax bills, bills

authorizing an

increase of the

public debt must

come from the

HOR.

(ii) The fact that

2nd and 3

rd

readings were

done on the

same day is valid

because it was

certified by the

President as

urgent, and the

Senate accepted

Procedural Issues

(i) It is not the law itself, but the

revenue bill which is required by the

Constitution to originate exclusively

from the House of Representatives. To

insist that a revenue statute and not

only the bill which initiated the

legislative process culminating in the

enactment of the law must

substantially be the same as the H.B.

would be to deny the Senate’s power

not only to concur with amendments

but also propose amendments. Nor

does the Constitution prohibit the filing

in the Senate of a substitute bill in

anticipation of its receipt from the

House, so long as the action by the

Senate as a body is withheld pending

receipt of the House bill.

(ii) Upon certification of the bill by the

President, the requirement of three

readings on separate days and of

printing and distribution can be

dispensed with is supported by the

weight of legislative practice.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Tolentino v. Secretary

of Finance

G.R. No. 115455

August 25, 1994

Ponente: Mendoza, J.



system and enhance its

administration by amending the

National Internal Revenue Code.


Conference Committee Bill entitled

“AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE

VALUE‐ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,

WIDENING IT TAX BASE AND

ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTR.A.TION

AND FOR THESE PURPOSES

AMENDING AND REPEALING THE

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE

NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE

CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES”. This results from

the consolidation of Senate Bill No.

1630 (submitted in substitution of

S.B. 1129 taking into consideration

P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No.1197)

and House Bill no. 1197.

Procedural Issues:

(i) Does R.A. No. 7716

violate Art.VI, Sec.4 of

the Constitution?

(ii) Does S. No.1630

violate Art.VI, Sec.26(2)

of the Constitution

because it did not pass

three readings on

separate days?

(iii) What is the extent

of the power of the

Bicameral Conference

Committee?

Procedural Issues

(i) It does not

unconstitutional

because the

Constitution

simply means

that the initiative

for filing

revenue, tariff, or

tax bills, bills

authorizing an

increase of the

public debt must

come from the

HOR.

(ii) The fact that

2nd and 3

rd

readings were

done on the

same day is valid

because it was

certified by the

President as

urgent, and the

Senate accepted

the President’s

certification.

(iii) The

allegation that

the included

provisions not

found in either

the House or

Senate bill were

surreptitiously

Procedural Issues

(i) It is not the law itself, but the

revenue bill which is required by the

Constitution to originate exclusively

from the House of Representatives. To

insist that a revenue statute and not

only the bill which initiated the

legislative process culminating in the

enactment of the law must

substantially be the same as the H.B.

would be to deny the Senate’s power

not only to concur with amendments

but also propose amendments. Nor

does the Constitution prohibit the filing

in the Senate of a substitute bill in

anticipation of its receipt from the

House, so long as the action by the

Senate as a body is withheld pending

receipt of the House bill.

(ii) Upon certification of the bill by the

President, the requirement of three

readings on separate days and of

printing and distribution can be

dispensed with is supported by the

weight of legislative practice.

(iii) It is within the power of a

conference committee to include it its

report an entirely new provision that is

not found either in the house bill or in

the Senate bill. If the committee can

propose an amendment consisting of

one or two provisions, there is no

reason why it cannot propose several


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 27.

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise,

he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and

proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two‐thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,

together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two‐thirds of all the Members of that

House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting

for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days

after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the

item or items to which he does not object.


Commissioner of

Internal Revenue v.

Court of Tax Appeals

185 SCR.A. 329 (1990)

Ponente: Medialdea, J.

Commissioner of internal Revenue v.

Manila Hotel Corporation, et al. (G.R.

No. 83250), the Supreme Court

overruled a decision of the Court of

Tax Appeals which declared the

collection of caterer’s tax under

Section 191‐A of R.A. No. 6110 illegal

because Section 42 of H.B. No. 17839

which carries that proviso was

vetoed by then President Marcos,

and the congress did not take steps

to override the veto.

CTA argues that the President has no

power to veto part of an item in a

bill; either he vetoes an entire

section or approves it but not a

fraction thereof.

(i) Whether the

presidential veto

referred to the entire

section or merely to the

imposition of 20% tax

on gross receipts of

operators or proprietors

of restaurants,

refreshments, parlors,

bars and other eating

places which are

maintained within the

premises or compound

of a hotel, motel or

resthouses.

(i) The

presidential veto

only referred to

“hotels, motels,

and resthouses”

in the 20%

caterer’s tax

bracket, but not

to the whole

section.

(i) To construe the word “item” as

referring to the whole section would tie

the President’s hand in choosing either

to approve the whole section at the

expense of also approving a provision

therein which he deems unacceptable

or veto the entire section at the espsen

of foregoing the collection of the kind

of tax altogether.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Manila Golf and Country Club Inc.,

claims it should have been exempt

from payment of privilege taxes were

it not for the last paragraph of

Section 191‐A of R.A. No. 6110.

Petitioner denied the club’s protest

maintaining that Section 42 was not

entirely vetoed but merely the words

“hotels, motels, resthouses” on the

ground that it might restrain

development of hotels which is

essential to the tourism industry.

Gonzales v. Macaraig

G.R. No. 87636

November 19, 1990


December 16, 1988 Congress

passed House Bill No. 19186 or the

General Approprations Bill for the

Fiscal Year of 1989.

December 29, 1988 President

signed the bill into law (R.A. No.

6688). Seven (7) Special Provisions

and Section 55 a “General Provision”

were vetoed.

A substantially similar provision as

the vetoed Section 55 appears in the

Appropriations Act of 1990,

particularly Section 16.


veto by the President of

Section 55 of the 1989

Appropriations Bill

(Section 55 FY’89) and

subsequently of its

counterpart Section 16

of the 1990

Appropriations Bill

(Section 16 FY’90) is

unconstitutional and

without effect

(i) The veto is

upheld because

the sections are

considered as

items and not

some general

provision of law,

which is within

the veto power

of the President

under Article VI,

Section 27 of the

1987

Constitution.

(i) “Item” in a bill refers to the

particulars the details, the distinct and

severable parts of the bill.

> The restrictive interpretation urged

by petitioners that the President may

not veto a provision without vetoing

the entire bill not only disregards the

basic principle that a distinct and

severable part of a bill may be subject

of a separate veto but also overlooks

the Constitutional mandate that any

provision in the general appropriations

bill shall relate specifically to some

particular appropriation therein.

> Section 55 FY’89 and Section 16 FY’90

are not provisions in the budgetary

sense of the term, as inferred from

Section 25(2) of 1987 Constitution: The

provision should relate specifically to

some particular appropriation therein.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻


exercise of the veto

power by the President

partakes of the nature

of legislative powers

(ii) The exercise

of veto power by

the President

was not in the

nature of

legislative

powers as there

are constitutional

laws that allow

for the

augmentation

from savings.

(1) The vetoed provisions do not relate

to any particular or distinctive

appropriation, they apply to generally

all the items.

(2) The disapproved or reduced items

are nowhere to be found on the fact of

the Bill.

(3) The vetoed Sections are more of an

expression of the Congressional policy

in respect of augmentation from

savings rather than a budgetary

appropriation.

(ii) There is a rule that the Executive is

not allowed to veto a condition or

proviso of an appropriation while

allowing the appropriation itself to

stand. However, for the rule to apply,

restrictions should be such in the real

sense of the term, not some matters

which are more properly dealt with in a

separate legislation. Section 55 FY’89

and Section 16 FY’90 partake more of a

curtailment on the power to augment

from savings.

> The power to augment from savings

lies dormant until authorized by law

(Article VI Section 25(5)), and it has

been so authorized by law through

Section 12 of the General

Appropriations Act of 1989.

> The doctrine of separation of powers

is not way endangered because the

transfer is made within a department


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 28.

(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,

tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development

program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non‐profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and

improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Gonzales v. Macaraig

G.R. No. 87636

November 19, 1990


December 16, 1988 Congress

passed House Bill No. 19186 or the

General Approprations Bill for the

Fiscal Year of 1989.

December 29, 1988 President

signed the bill into law (R.A. No.

6688). Seven (7) Special Provisions

and Section 55 a “General Provision”

were vetoed.

A substantially similar provision as

the vetoed Section 55 appears in the

Appropriations Act of 1990,

particularly Section 16.


veto by the President of

Section 55 of the 1989

Appropriations Bill

(Section 55 FY’89) and

subsequently of its

counterpart Section 16

of the 1990

Appropriations Bill

(Section 16 FY’90) is

unconstitutional and

without effect


exercise of the veto

power by the President

partakes of the nature

of legislative powers

(i) The veto is

upheld because

the sections are

considered as

items and not

some general

provision of law,

which is within

the veto power

of the President

under Article VI,

Section 27 of the

1987

Constitution.

(ii) The exercise

of veto power by

the President

was not in the

nature of

legislative

powers as there

are constitutional

(i) “Item” in a bill refers to the

particulars the details, the distinct and

severable parts of the bill.

> The restrictive interpretation urged

by petitioners that the President may

not veto a provision without vetoing

the entire bill not only disregards the

basic principle that a distinct and

severable part of a bill may be subject

of a separate veto but also overlooks

the Constitutional mandate that any

provision in the general appropriations

bill shall relate specifically to some

particular appropriation therein.

> Section 55 FY’89 and Section 16 FY’90

are not provisions in the budgetary

sense of the term, as inferred from

Section 25(2) of 1987 Constitution: The

provision should relate specifically to

some particular appropriation therein.

(1) The vetoed provisions do not relate

to any particular or distinctive

appropriation, they apply to generally

all the items.

(2) The disapproved or reduced items

are nowhere to be found on the fact of

the Bill.

(3) The vetoed Sections are more of an

expression of the Congressional policy

in respect of augmentation from

savings rather than a budgetary

appropriation.

(ii) There is a rule that the Executive is

not allowed to veto a condition or

proviso of an appropriation while

allowing the appropriation itself to

stand. However, for the rule to apply,

restrictions should be such in the real

sense of the term, not some matters

which are more properly dealt with in a


Gerochi v. Department

of Energy

G.R. No. 159796

July 17, 2007

Ponente: Nachura, J.

Petitioners come before court to

praying for Section 34 of R.A. 9136

otherwise known as the “Electric

Power Industry Reform Act of 2001”

(EPIR.A.) imposing the Universal

Charge (UC) and Rule 18 of the Rules

and Regulations (IRR) to be declared

unconstitutional.

It is assailed to be unconstitutional

on the following grounds:

1. The UC is a tax. The power to

tax is strictly a legislative

function. The assailed

provision clearly provides

that the UC is to be


UC imposed under

Section 34 of the

EPIR.A. is a tax.

(i) No, because

the tax is merely

incidental of the

state’s exercise

of police power

in regulating

electricity to

ensure the

viability of the

country’s electric

power industry.

(i) Taxation Power v. Police Power

> The theory behind taxation power

emanates from the necessity to help

the government fulfill its mandate of

promoting the general welfare and

well‐being of the people.

> Police Power is the power of the state

to promote public welfare by

restraining and regulating the use of

liberty and property. The power to

regulate means the power to protect,

foster, promote, preserve and control

with due regard for the interests, first

and foremost of the public, then of the

utility and of its patrons.

> If the generation of revenue is the

primary purpose and regulation is

merely incidental, it is a tax. BUT if


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

determined, fixed and

approved by the Energy

Regulatory Board (ERC),

hence leaving to the latter

complete discretionary

legislative authority.

2. The ERC is also empowered

to approve and determine

where the funds collected

should be used.

3. The imposition of the UC on

all end‐users is oppressive

and confiscatory and

amounts to taxation without

representation as the

consumers were not given a

chance to be heard and

represented.

regulation if the primary purposes, the

fact that revenue is incidentally raised

does not make the imposition a tax.

Garcia v. Executive

Secretary

G.R. No. 101273

July 3, 1992

Ponente: Feliciano, J.

November 27, 1990 E.O. No. 438

which imposed an additional duty of

5% on all imported articles (e.g.

crude oil and other oil products).

January 3, 1991 E.O. No. 443

increased duty from 5% to 9%.

August 15, 1991 E.O. No. 475

reduced rate of additional duty from

9% to 5% except in cases of crude oil

and other oil products which

continued to be subject to additional

duty of 9%.

(i) Whether or not E.O.

Nos. 475 and 478 are

violative of Section 24,

Article VI of the 1987

Constitution.

(i) The

enactment of

bills

appropriation,

revenue and

tariff bills are

Legislative

functions, but it

doesn’t mean

that the EOs in

question are

unconstitutional

and prohibited.

(i) Section 28(2) of the 1987

Constitution provides constitutional

permission to Congress to authorize the

President “subject to such limitations

and restrictions as [Congress] may

impose” to fix “within specific limits

tariff rates…and other duties or

imposts…”

> President invoked Sections 104 and

401 of the Tariff and Customs Code of

the Philippines in promulgating the EO

in question.

> There is nothing in the Code that

suggests that the President is limited to

act under the Code only when

protecting local industries. The levying


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

August 16, 1991 Upon completion

of public hearings, The Tariff

Commission submitted to the

President a “Report on special duty

on Crude Oil and Oil Products”.

August 23, 1991 E.O. No. 478

added (besides the 9% duty) a duty

of P0.95/liter or P151.05/barrel of

imported crude oil and P1.00/liter of

imported oil products.

Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition

and Mandamus were made

of customs duties on imported goods

may have in some measure the effect

of protecting local industries.

> Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs

Code establishes general standards

with which the exercise of authority

delegated by that provision to the

President must be consistent: it must

be exercised in the interest of national

economy, general welfare and/or

national security. The protection of

consumers is part of the provision.

Systems Plus Computer

College v. Caloocan

City

G.R. No. 146382

August 7, 2003

SPCC is a non‐stock and non‐profit

educational institution organized,

and as such enjoys property tax

exemption from LGU on its buildings,

but not the parcel of land which it

rents for P5,000/month from its

sister companies Consolidated

Assembly Inc. (CAI) and Pair

Management and Development

Corporation (PMDC).

January 8, 1998 SPCC requested

the City of Caloocan, through

Mamerto Manahan (City Assessor

and Administrator) to extend tax

exemption since it was actually,

directly and exclusively used for

educational purposes pursuant to

Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987

(i) Petition for certiorari

imputing grave abuse of

discretion on the party

of the trial court when

it ruled:

(1) Mandamus does not

lie against the public

respondents.

(2) That petitioner

failed to exhaust

available administrative

remedies

(i) Petition for

certiorari

DISMISSED as

petitioner is

taking an

unwarranted

shortcut.

(i) Mandamus is defined as a writ

commanding a tribunal, corporation,

board or person to do the act required

to be done when it or he unlawfully

neglects the performance of an act

which the law specifically enjoins as a

duty resulting from an office, trust or

station, or unlawfully excludes another

from the use and enjoyment of a right

or office or which such other is entitled,

there being no other plain, speedy, and

adequate remedy in the ordinary

course of law. Where administrative

remedies are available, a petition for

mandamus does not lie.

> Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, the

remedy of appeal to the local Board of

Assessment appeals is available from an

adverse ruling or action of the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Constitution.

February 5, 1998 SPCC’s request

was denied on the ground that the

land was owned by CAI and PMDC

which derived income through the

rents paid by SPCC.

February 15, 1999 CAI and PMDC

entered into separate agreements

with SPCC which converted the land

into donations.

February 19, 1999 SPCC seeks

reconsideration informing the City

Assessor of the new agreements.

July 21, 1999 Application for tax

exemption denied because:

(1) SPCC is an agency for CAI and

PMDC to evade payment of Real

Property Tax.

(2) Grant of exemption rests on the

theory that the exemption will

benefit the body of people, not just

one individual or corporate entity.

(3) There is not showing that land are

actually, directly, and exclusively

used either for religious, charitable,

or educational purposes.

Petitioner filed a petition for

mandamus with the RTC of Caloocan

City, but it was dismissed for being

provincial, city or municipal assessor in

the assessment of property.

> Mandamus does not lie against the

respondent City Assessor in the

exercise of his function of assessing

properties for taxation purposes.

Mandamus may not be availed of to

direct the exercise of judgment or

discretion in a particular way, or to

retract or reverse an action already

taken in the exercise of either.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

premature.

Central Mindanao

University (CMU) v.

Department of

Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 100091

October 22, 1992

Note: This case is added simply

because of its interpretation of the

meaning of “directly, actually, and

exclusively”

Ponente: Campos, Jr., J.

This is a petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court to nullify the proceedings

and decisions of the Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(DAR.A.B), and to set aside the

decision of the Court of Appeals

[affirming DAR.A.B’s decision] which

ordered the segragation of 400

hectares of suitable, compact and

contiguous portions of CMU land for

distribution to qualified beneficiaries

of the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Porgram (CARP) on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The questioned decision is hinged on

the alleged fact that CMU land is “not

directly, actually and exclusively used

for school sites, because the same

was leased to Philippine Packing

Corporation (no Del Monte

Philippines)”. In addition, there is not

definite and concrete showing that

said lands are essentially

indispensable for educational

(i) Whether or not CMU

land is exclusively used

and indispensable to

educational purposes

and thus covered by

CARP.

(i) No, because

CMU is a school

established to

promote

agriculture and

industry. The

need for a vast

tract of

agricultural land

for future

programs of

expansion is

obvious.

(i) President Garcia issued Proclamation

No. 476, withdrawing from sale or

settlement and reserving for Mindanao

Agricultural College (forerunner of the

CMU) a land reservation of 3,080

hectares as its future campus. It was set

up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of

Mindanao in order that it can have

enough resources and wide open

spaces to grow as an agricultural

educational institution, to develop and

train future farmers of Mindanao and

help attract settlers to that part of the

country.

> As to determination of when and

what lands are found to be necessary

for use by the CMU, the school is in the

best position to resolve and answer the

question. Neither the DARB nor the

Court of Appeals has the right to

substitute its judgment or discretion on

this matter, unless the evidentiary facts

are so manifest as to show that the

CMU has no real need for the land.

> It is exempt from coverage under

Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 because

the lands are actually, directly and

exclusively used and found to be

necessary for school site and campus,

including experimental farm stations

for educational purposes, and for

establishing seed and seedling research

and pilot production centers.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Central Mindanao

University (CMU) v.

Department of

Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 100091

October 22, 1992

Note: This case is added simply

because of its interpretation of the

meaning of “directly, actually, and

exclusively”

Ponente: Campos, Jr., J.

This is a petition for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court to nullify the proceedings

and decisions of the Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(DAR.A.B), and to set aside the

decision of the Court of Appeals

[affirming DAR.A.B’s decision] which

ordered the segragation of 400

hectares of suitable, compact and

contiguous portions of CMU land for

distribution to qualified beneficiaries

of the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Porgram (CARP) on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The questioned decision is hinged on

the alleged fact that CMU land is “not

directly, actually and exclusively used

for school sites, because the same

was leased to Philippine Packing

Corporation (no Del Monte

Philippines)”. In addition, there is not

definite and concrete showing that

said lands are essentially

indispensable for educational

purposes.

(i) Whether or not CMU

land is exclusively used

and indispensable to

educational purposes

and thus covered by

CARP.

(i) No, because

CMU is a school

established to

promote

agriculture and

industry. The

need for a vast

tract of

agricultural land

for future

programs of

expansion is

obvious.

(i) President Garcia issued Proclamation

No. 476, withdrawing from sale or

settlement and reserving for Mindanao

Agricultural College (forerunner of the

CMU) a land reservation of 3,080

hectares as its future campus. It was set

up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of

Mindanao in order that it can have

enough resources and wide open

spaces to grow as an agricultural

educational institution, to develop and

train future farmers of Mindanao and

help attract settlers to that part of the

country.

> As to determination of when and

what lands are found to be necessary

for use by the CMU, the school is in the

best position to resolve and answer the

question. Neither the DARB nor the

Court of Appeals has the right to

substitute its judgment or discretion on

this matter, unless the evidentiary facts

are so manifest as to show that the

CMU has no real need for the land.

> It is exempt from coverage under

Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 because

the lands are actually, directly and

exclusively used and found to be

necessary for school site and campus,

including experimental farm stations

for educational purposes, and for

establishing seed and seedling research

and pilot production centers.

Commissioner of BIR v.

Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124043

October 14, 1998


Young Men’s Christian Association of

the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) is a non‐

stock, non‐profit institution which

conducts various programs in

pursuant to its religious, educational

(i) Is the income derived

from rentals of real

property owned by the

YMCA subject to

income tax under the

National Internal

Revenue Code (NIRC)

(i) Yes, because

the said

exemption only

refers to

property taxes

real estate such

as lands,

(i) Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the

1987 Constitution exempts charitable

institutions from the payment not only

of property taxes but also of income tax

from any source. According to Justice

Hilario Davide, Jr., “... what is exempted

is not the institution itself.” Fr. Bernas


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Commissioner of

Internal Revenue v.

Santos

G.R. No. 119252

August 18, 1997

Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.

The trial judge declared a law

inoperative and without force on

account of it’s allegedly oppressive

and confiscatory nature of the

jewelry sector.

(i) Whether or not

Regional Trial Courts’

can declare a law

inoperative and without

force and effect or

otherwise

unconstitutional. If it

can, under what

circumstances?

(i) No. (i) The trial judge declared the laws to

be inoperative and without force and

effect insofar as the private

respondents are concerned. But,

respondent judge, in the body of his

decision, unequivocally but wrongly

declared the said provisions of law to

be violative of Section 1, Article III of

the Constitution.

> In advocating the abolition of local tax

and duty on jewelry simply because

other countries have adopted such

policies, the respondent judge

overlooked the fact that such matters

are not for him to decide.

John Hay Peoples

Alternative Coalition v.

Victor Lim

G.R. No. 119775

October 24, 2003

Ponente: Carpio‐Morales, J.

Petition for prohibition and

mandamus and declaratory relief

with prayer for a temporary

retraining order (TRO) and/or writ of

preliminary injuction, petitioners

assail, in the main, the

constitutionality of Presidential

Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994

“CREATING AND DESIGNATING A

PORTION OF THE AREA COVERD BY

THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS

THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC

ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT

NO. 7227.”

March 13, 1992 R.A. 7227

otherwise known as the Bases

(i) Whether or not

Proclamation No. 420 is

constitutional by

providing for national

and local tax exemption

within and granting

other economic

incentives to the John

Hay Special Economic

Zone; and

(i) The grant of

tax exemption is

void and violative

of the

Constitution.

(i) It is clear that under Section 12 of

R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ

which was granted by Congress with tax

exemption, investment incentives and

the like. There is no express extension

of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs

still to be created at the time via

presidential proclamation.

> The incentives under R.A. No. 7227

are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ,

hence, the extension of the same to the

John Hay SEZ finds no support therein.

Neither does the same grant of

privileges to the John Hay SEZ find

support in the other laws specified

under Section 3 of Proclamation No.

420, which laws were already extant

before the issuance of the proclamation

or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 29.

(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Conversion and Development Act of

1992 set out the policity to

accelerate the sound and balanced

conversions into alternative

productive uses of the former

military bases. It created the Bases

Conversion and Development

Authority (BCDA), vesting it with

powers pertaining to the multifarious

aspects of carrying out the ultimate

objective of utilizing the base areas in

accordance with the declared

government policy.

(ii) Whether or not

Proclamation No. 420 is

constitutional for

limiting or interfering

with the local autonomy

of Baguio City.

(ii) No, because

under R.A. 7227,

the BCDA is given

the power and

purposes to fulfill

its mandate.

> The challenged grant of tax

exemption would circumvent the

Constitution’s imposition that a law

granting any tax exemption must have

the concurrence of a majority of all the

members of Congress. In the same vein,

the other kinds of privileges extended

to the John Jay SEZ are by tradition and

usage for Congress to legislate upon.

(ii) With such broad rights of ownership

and administration vested in BCDA over

Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has

control over it, subject to certain

limitations provided for by the law. By

designating BCDA as the governing

agency of the John Hay SEZ, the law

merely emphasizes or reiterates the

statutory role or functions it has been

granted.

> The delineation and declaration of a

portion of the area covered by Camp

John Hay as a SEZ was well within the

powers of the President to do so by

means of a proclamation. The requisite

prior concurrence by the Baguio City

government to such proclamation

appears to have been given in the form

of a duly enacted resolution by the

sanggunian.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,

church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,

except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or

leprosarium.

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for

which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.


Guingona, Jr. v.

Carague

G.R. No. 94571

April 22, 1991

Presidential Decree No. 81 entitled

“Amending Certain Provisions of R.A.

4860 as amended (Re: Foreign

Borwwoing Act)” authorized the

automatic appropriation for debt

service.

P.D. No. 1177 entitled “Revising the

Budget Process in Order to

Institutionalize the Budgetary

Innovations of the New Society”

P.D. No. 1967 entitled “An Act

Strengthening the Guarantee and

Payment Positions of the Republic of

the Philippines and Its Contingent

Liabilities Arising out of Relent and

Guaranteed Loancs by Approprating

Funds For The Purposes.”

(i) IS THE

APPROPRIATION OF P86

BILLION IN THE P233

BILLION 1990 BUDGET

VIOLATIVE OF SECTION

5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE

CONSTITUTION?

(i) No.

(i) Mr. Ople pointed out that the

recognition by the Constitution of the

highest priority for public

schoolteachers, and by implication, for

all teachers, would ensure that the

President and Congress would be

strongly urged by a constitutional

mandate to grant to them such a level

of remuneration and other incentives

that would take teaching competitive

again and attractive to the best

available talents in the nation.

> It does not thereby follow that the

hands of the Congress are so

hamstrung as to deprive it the power to

respond to the imperatives of the

national interest and for the attainment

of other state policies or objectives.

> Congress is certainly not without any

power, guided only by its good

judgment, to provide an appropriation,

that can reasonably service our

enormous debt, the greater portion of

which was inherited from the previous

administration. It is not only a matter of

honor and to protect the credit


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

(ii) ARE PD NO. 81, PD

NO. 1177 AND PD NO.

1967 STILL OPER.A.TIVE

UNDER THE

CONSTITUTION?

(iii) III. ARE THEY

VIOLATIVE OF SECTION

29(1), ARTICLE VI OF

THE CONSTITUTION?

(ii) Yes.

(iii) No.

standing of the country. More

especially, the very survival of our

economy is at stake. Thus, if in the

process Congress appropriated an

amount for debt service bigger than the

share allocated to education, the Court

finds and so holds that said

appropriation cannot be thereby

assailed as unconstitutional.

(ii) Section 3, Article XVII of the

Constitution regcognizes that “All

existing laws, decrees, executive

orders…shall remain operative until

amended, repealed or revoked” to

preserve the social order so that

legislation by the then President

Marcos may be recognized. Such laws

are to remain in force and effect unless

they are inconsistent with the

Constitution or are otherwise amended,

repealed or revoked.

(iii) The Court finds that in this case the

questioned laws are complete in all

their essential terms and conditions

and sufficient standards are indicated

therein.

> Although the subject presidential

decrees do not state specific amounts

to be paid, necessitated by the very

nature of the problem being addressed,

the amounts nevertheless are made

certain by the legislative parameters


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

provided in the decrees.

> Debt service is not included in the

General Appropriation Act, since

authorization therefore already exists

under R.A. No. 4860 and 245, as

amended and P.D. No. 1967. Precisely

in the light of this subsisting

authorization as embodied in said

Republic Acts and PD for debt services,

Congress does not concern itself with

details for implementation by the

Executive, but largely with annual levels

and approval thereof upon due

deliberation as part of the whole

obligation program for the year.

Osmeña v. Orbos

G.R. No. 99886

March 31, 1993

Ponente: Navasa, C.J.

October 10, 1984 Pres. Ferdinand

Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a

Special Account in the General Fund

designated as the Oil Price

Stabilization fund (OPSF) – designed

to reimburse oil companies for costs

increases in crude oil and imported

petroleum producst resulting from

exchange rate adjustments and from

increases in the world market prices

of crude oil.

E.O. 1024 reclassified the OPSF into a

“trust liability account”

February 27, 1987 Pres. Corazon

Aquino amended P.D. 1956 through

(i) The invalidity of the

“TRUST ACCOUNT” in

the books of account of

the Ministry of Energy

(now the Office of

Energy Affairs) created

pursuant to § 8,

paragraph 1, of P.D. No

1956, as amended,

“said creation of a trust

fund being contrary to

Section 29 (3) Article VI

of the Constitution.”

(i) It is not

contrary to the

constitution.

(i) The OPSF was established precisely

to protect local consumers from the

adverse consequences that such

frequent oil price adjustments may

have upon the economy. Thus, the

OPSF serves as a pocket, as it were, into

which a portion of the purchases price

of oil and petroleum products paid by

consumers as well as some tax

revenues are inputted and from which

amounts are drawn from time to time

to reimburse oil companies, when

appropriate situations arise, for

increases in, as well as under recovery

of, costs of crude importation.

> It appears to the Court that the

establishment and maintenance of the

OPSF is well within that pervasive and

non‐waivable power and responsibility


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

E.O. No. 137 expanding the grounds

for reimbursement to oil companies

for possible cost under recovery

incurred as a result of the reduction

of domestic prices of petroleum

products.

(ii) The

unconstitutionality of §

8, paragraph 1(c) of

P.D. No. 1956 as

amended by Executive

Order No. 137 for

“being an undue and

invalid delegation of

legislative power to the

Energy Regulatory

Board;”

(ii) It is not an

undue delegation

of legislative

authority/power.

of the government to secure, the

physical and economic survival and

well‐being of the community.

> Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank

The tax collected is not in a

pure exercise of the taxing

power. It is levied with a

regulatory purpose, to provide

a means for the stabilization of

the sugar industry. The levy is

primarily in the exercise of the

police power of the State.

> Moreover, that the OPSF is a special

fund is plain from the special treatment

given it by E.O. No. 137. It is segregated

from the general fund; and while it is

placed in what the law refers to as a

“trust liability account,” the fund

nonetheless remains subject to the

scrutiny and review of the COA.

(ii) With regard to the alleged undue

delegation of legislative power, the

Court finds that § 8 P.D. 1956

conferring the authority upon the ERB

to impose additional amounts on

petroleum products provides a

sufficient standard by which the

authority must be exercised. In addition

to the general policy of the law to

protect the local consumer by

stabilizing and subsidizing domestic

pump rates, § 8(c) of P.D. 1956

expressly authorizes the ERB to impose


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 30.

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

additional amounts to augment the

resources of the Fund.


Fabian v. Desierto

G.R. No. 129742

September 16, 1998


PROMOST Construction Development

Corporation president, Teresita

Fabian participated in the bidding for

government construction including

those under the First Metro Manila

Engineering District (FMED) whose

incumbend District Engineer was

Nestor Desierto. Making use of his

official position, he began an affair

with Fabian and gifted PROMAT with

public works contracts.

When Fabian wanted to end the

relationship, Desierto refused and

went as far as employing harassment,

intimidation and threats.

January 31, 1996 Graft investigator

Eduardo Benitez – acting on the

complaint of Fabian regarding

Desierto’s violation of Section 19, R.A.

6770 and Section 36 of P.D. 807 –

issued a resolution finding Nestor

Desierto guilty of grave misconduct


8770 is violative of

Section 20, Article VI of

the Constitution which

states that “no law shall

be passed increasing the

appellate jurisdiction of

the Supreme Court as

provided in this

Constitution without its

advice and consent.”

(i) No. (i) Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of

the Constitution authorizes this Court to

review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm

on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid

final judgment or orders “as the law of

the Rules of Court may provide,” said

Section 27 does not increase this Court’s

appellate jurisdiction since, by providing

that the mode of appeal shall be by

petition for certiorari under Rule 45,

then what may be raised therein are

only questions of law of which this Court

already has jurisdiction.

> Also, the very provision cited by

petitioner specifies that the appellate

jurisdiction of this Court contemplated

therein is to be exercised over “final

judgments and orders of lower courts,”

that is, the courts composing the

integrated judicial system. It does not

include the quasi‐judicial bodies or

agencies, hence whenever the

legislature intends that the decisions or

resolutions of the quasi‐judicial agency

shall be reviewable by the Supreme

Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 31.

No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

Section 32.

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can

directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the

registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must

be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

and ordering his dismissal from

service with forfeiture of all benefits

under the law.

Pursuant to the amendment of

Section 9, Batasang Pambansa Blg.

129 by R.A. 7902, all adjudications by

the Civil Service Commission in

administrative disciplinary cases were

made appealable to the Court of

Appeals, while those of the Office of

the Ombudsman are appealable to

the Supreme Court.

provision to that effect is included in the

law creating that quasi‐judiciary agency

and, for that matter, any special

statutory court.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

ARTICLE VII: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.


Marcos v. Manglapus Ponente: Cortes, J.

This is a petition of mandamus and

prohibition asking the court to order

respondents to issue travel

documents to Mr. Marcos and the

immediate members of his family

and to enjoin the implementation of

the President’s decision to bar their

return in the Philippines

Background: Marcos was deposed

from presidency through people

power revolution, and Cory Aquino

replaced him. During Cory’s

presidency, the government

encountered a lot of threats from the

military (ex: Col. Gregory Honasan’s

failed coup), communist and

secessionist movement in Mindanao

(they set up a parallel gov’t), as well

as economic woes (rise in foreign

debt, poverty, and ill‐gotten wealth

of the Marcoses). In short, the gov’t

was in shambles and unstable hence,

the decision of not allowing Marcos

back in the country.

(i) Whether or not, in

the exercise of the

powers granted by the

Constitution, the

President may prohibit

the Marcoses from

returning to the

Philippines

(i) YES. The

President, in the

exercise of the

powers granted

by the

Constitution,

may prohibit the

Marcoses from

returning to the

Philippines

(i) The 1987 Constitution has fully

restored the separation of powers of

the 3 great branches of gov’t. For the

executive department, it didn’t really

define what executive power means

but Art. 7 touches on the exercise of

certain powers of the President found

in Art 7 Secs. 14‐23. Petitioners

advance the view that the President’s

powers are limited to those specifically

enumerated powers, and what is not

enumerated is impliedly denied of her.

Although the 1987 Constitution gave

limitations to the power of the

President, it remains intact what is

traditionally considered as within the

scope of executive power. The powers

of the President cannot be said to be

limited only to the specific powers

enumerated in the Constitution. Also, it

has been advanced that whatever

power inherent in the gov’t that is

neither legislative nor judicial has to be

executive.

Looking at the case in hand, in making

any decisions as President of the

Philippines, the President has to

consider the ff principles: serve and


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

protect the people, maintenance of

peace and order, protection of life,

liberty and property, promotion of

general welfare. It must be borne in

mind that the Constitution, aside from

being an allocation of power is also a

social contract whereby the people

have surrendered their sovereign

powers to the State for the common

good. The case calls for the exercise of

the President’s powers as protector of

the peace, which is also a task that

tackles the day‐to‐day problems of

maintaining peace and order and

ensuring domestic tranquility. Lastly,

members of the Legislature also

recognizes the power of the President

to bar the Marcoses as they made a

resolution to appeal to her compassion.

Estrada v. Desierto President Estrada makes two

submissions: cases filed against him

before the Ombudsman should be

prohibited since he was not yet

convicted in the impeachment

proceedings and that he enjoys

immunity in civil and criminal suits.


petitioner enjoys

immunity from suit and

assuming he enjoys

immunity, up to what

extent is the immunity?

(i) NO. The

President does

not enjoy

immunity from

suit, even if there

is still no

conviction in the

impeachment

proceedings. The

extent of

immunity does

not cover liability

from unlawful

acts and

omissions.

(i) The Impeachment Court is now

functus officio, and if his plea is

granted, it would put a perpetual bar

against his prosecution. Such a

submission has nothing to commend

itself for it will place him in a better

situation than a non‐sitting president

who has not been subjected to

impeachment proceedings and yet can

be the object of a criminal prosecution.

Since his impeachment case has been

aborted and he lost the elections,

petitioner cannot demand as a

condition sine qua non to his criminal

prosecution before the Ombudsman


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that he be convicted in the

impeachment proceedings based on

the ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez

– incumbent Presidents are immune

from suit or from being brought to

court during the period of their

incumbency and tenure.

Scope of immunity – the rule is that

unlawful acts of public officials are not

acts of the State and the officer who

acts illegally is not acting as such but

stands in the same footing as any other

trespasser.

One of the great themes of the

Constitution is that public office is a

public trust. Different constitutional

policies were made to adhere to this

theme (creation of Ombudsman,

Sandiganbayan, etc.) and asserting

petitioner’s claims will devaluate these

policies.

Soliven v. Makasiar President Aquino sued Beltran for

libel for having written that the

President hid under the bed during

the attempted coup.

Petitioner Beltran argues that “the

reasons which necessitate

presidential immunity from suit

impose a correlative disability to file

a suit.” This would be an indirect way

defeat her privilege of immunity from

suit, as by testifying on the witness

stand, she would be exposing herself


President of the

Philippines, under the

Constitution, may

initiate criminal

proceedings against the

petitioners through the

filing of a complaint‐

affidavit

(i) YES. The

President of the

Philippines,

under the

Constitution,

may initiate

criminal

proceedings

against the

petitioners

through the filing

of a complaint‐

affidavit

(i) Privilege of immunity may only be

invoked by the holder of the office (The

President in this case). Thus, the

accused in a criminal case of which the

President is a complainant cannot raise

the presidential privilege as a defense

to prevent the case from proceeding

against such accused.

There is nothing in our laws that can

stop the President from waiving her

presidential privilege. The choice of

whether to exercise the privilege or to


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least

forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

to possible contempt of court or

perjury

waive it is solely the President’s

prerogative. No other person can

assume and waive it for him/her.


Tecson vs. COMELEC Three consolidated cases, all of which

raise the issue of whether

presidential candidate, Fernando

Poe, Jr. (FPJ) is a natural‐born Filipino

citizen.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R.

No. 161824, in his petition for FPJ’s

disqualification alleged that he (FPJ)

made material misrepresentation in

his certificate of candidacy by

claiming to be a natural‐born Filipino

citizen when his parents were

foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley

Poe, was an American, and his father,

Allan F. Poe, was a Spanish national.

Granting that Allan F. Poe was a

Filipino citizen, he could not have

transmitted his Filipino citizenship to

FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate

child of an alien mother – first, Allan

F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to

a certain Paulita Gomez and second,

if no such prior marriage existed,

Allan F. Poe married Bessie Kelley


Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over the

Cases.


COMELEC erred in

dismissing the case filed

(i) The Court

dismissed the

separate

petitions filed by

Pet. Tecson and

Pet. Velez for

want of

jurisdiction.

(ii) The Court

may take

cognizance of the

(i) The petitioners invoked Article VII,

Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987

Constitution in challenging the

jurisdiction of the COMELEC. The

provision states: “The Supreme Court,

sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge

of all contests relating to the election,

returns, and qualifications of the

President or Vice‐President, and may

promulgate its rules for the purpose.”

The provision refers to contests in

reference to a post‐election scenario

where there is already a winner; the

petitions are not contemplative of such

scenario.

The provision speaks of the jurisdiction

of the Court over the election, returns,

and qualifications of the President or

Vice‐President and not of candidates

for the respective positions.

(ii) The Court recognized Rule 64 in

connection to Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 7,


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

only a year after the birth of

respondent.

Petition was dismissed by the

COMELEC for lack of merit. Upon

filing of motion for reconsideration,

such was also dismissed. Thus, the

instant petition to the Court.

Two other petitions were filed to the

Court: Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and

Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. vs. COMELEC

and Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, and Zoilo

Antonio G. Velez vs. Ronald Allan

Kelley Poe. Both challenged the

jurisdiction of the COMELEC and

asserting that under Article VII,

Section 4, paragraph 7 of the

Constitution, only the Supreme Court

had original jurisdiction to resolve

the basic issue.

by Victorino X. Fornier

for lack of merit and

ruling in favor of the

citizenship of FPJ.

petition for

(iii) The Court

Article IX of the Constitution, which

both state that in an action for

certiorari, the decisions of the

COMELEC may be reviewed by the

Court.

Section 1, Article VIII, of the

Constitution provides that judicial

power is vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be

established by law which power

“includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies

involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to

determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.”

The Court further stated that the

petition brought up by Fornier was

aptly elevated to, and could well be

taken cognizance of, by the Court, and,

that a contrary view would be a gross

denial to the people of their

fundamental right to be fully informed,

and to make a proper choice, on who

could or should be elected to occupy

the highest government post in the

land.

(iii) The Court in resolving whether


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

affirmed the

ruling of the

COMELEC.

COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion, found it necessary to look

into the issue on the citizenship of FPJ.

Considering the evidences presented by

both parties and their reservations as

to the veracity of some of the

documents presented. The ff. facts

were established:

a. The parents of FPJ were Allan F.

Poe and Bessie Kelley;

b. FPJ was born to them on August

20, 1939;

c. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley

were married to each other on 16

September, 1940;

d. The father of Allan F. Poe was

Lorenzo Poe, and;

e. At the time of his death on 11

September, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was

84 years old.

The Court in resolving whether FPJ was

a natural‐born citizen deemed it fit to

determine whether or not the father

of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would

have himself been a Filipino citizen

and, in the affirmative, whether or not

the alleged illegitimacy of respondent

prevents him from taking after the

Filipino citizenship of his putative

father.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Any conclusion on the Filipino

citizenship of FPJ’s grandfather,

Lorenzo Poe could only be drawn from

the presumption that having died in

1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would

have been born sometime in the year

1870, when the Philippines was under

Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,

Pangasinan, his place of residence upon

his death in 1954, in the absence of any

other evidence, could have well been

his place of residence before his death,

such that Lorenzo Poe would have

benefitted from the “en masse

Filipinization” that the Philippine bill

had effected in 1902.

That citizenship (of Lorenzo Poe) if

acquired, would thereby extend to his

son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent

FPJ.

However, since FPJ’s parents were

married only a year after he was born,

he was considered illegitimate and

thus, it was necessary to establish his

father’s acknowledgment of paternal

relation with him. Because Allan F. Poe

was already deceased, the recognition

by him (Allan F. Poe) of his paternal

relationship with FPJ was attested to

through a declaration made by Ruby

Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley

Poe.


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Section 13. The President, Vice‐President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other

profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the

Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government‐owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as

Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or

offices, including government‐owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

The 1935 Constitution, during which

regime respondent FPJ was born,

confers citizenship to all persons

whose fathers are Filipino citizens

regardless of whether such children

are legitimate or illegitimate.

The totality of the evidence may not

establish conclusively that respondent

FPJ is a natural‐born citizen of the

Philippines, the evidence on hand still

would preponderate in his favor

enough to hold that he cannot be held

guilty of having made a material

misrepresentation in his certificate of

candidacy in violation of Section 78, in

relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus

Election Code. Petitioner has utterly

failed to substantiate his case before

the Court.

The Court resolved to DISMISS petition.

Case Keywords Facts Applicable/Violated

Provision/s Issue & Ratio


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Doromal v.

Sandiganbayan

(1989)

177 SCRA 354

pp. 398‐399

Participation

to Doromal

International

Trading

Corporation

P61‐M

equipment

supply to

DECS &NMYC

Ponente:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former

Commissioner of the Presidential

Commission on Good Government

(PCGG), for violation of the Anti‐Graft

and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019),

Section 3(h), in connection with his

shareholdings and position as president

and director of the Doromal

International Trading Corporation

(DITC) which submitted bids to supply

P61 million worth of electronic,

electrical, automotive, mechanical and

airconditioning equipment to the

Department of Education, Culture and

Sports (or DECS) and the National

Manpower and Youth Council (or

NMYC).

Section 13. xxx

Members of the

Cabinet, and their

deputies or

assistants shall not

xxx They shall not,

during said tenure,

directly or

indirectly, practice

any other

profession,

participate in any

business, xxx

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Doromal violated Article 7,

Section 13 of the Constitution.

The presence of a signed document bearing the

signature of Doromal as part of the application to

bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with

having participated in a business which act is

absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of

the Constitution because the DITC remained a

family corporation in which Doromal has at least an

indirect interest.

Civil Liberties

Union v. The

Executive

Secretary

GR 83896

FEB 22,1991

pp. 399‐407

EO 284

“unless

otherwise

provided in

this

Constitution”

Ponente:

July 25, 1987 Cory issued EO 284

allows members of the Cabinet, their

undersecretaries and assistant

secretaries to hold NOT MORE THAN 2

other government offices or positions in

addition to their primary positions

subject to limitations set therein.

In sum, the constitutionality of

Executive Order No. 284 is being

challenged by petitioners on the

principal submission that it adds

Section 13. The

President, Vice‐

President, the

Members of the

Cabinet, and their

deputies or

assistants shall not,

unless otherwise

provided in this

Constitution, hold

any other office or

employment during

their tenure. xxx

ISSUE 1: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional.

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation

to refer only to those particular instances cited in

the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice‐President

being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under

Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President

in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.

(2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice

being ex‐officio member of the Judicial and Bar

Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be

constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

exceptions to Section 13, Article VII

other than those provided in the

Constitution. According to petitioners,

by virtue of the phrase "unless

otherwise provided in this

Constitution," the only exceptions

against holding any other office or

employment in Government are those

provided in the Constitution, namely:

(1) The Vice‐President may be

appointed as a Member of the Cabinet

under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII

thereof; and

(2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex‐

officio member of the Judicial and Bar

Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),

Article VIII.

respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural

Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local

Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National

Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo

R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo

Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices

or employment, as herein defined, in the

government, including government‐owned or

controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

WHEREFORE, xxx the petitions are GRANTED.

Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and

void xxx

Bitonio Jr. v.

COA

GR 147392

March 12,

2004

pp. 407‐ 412

DOLE

PEZA

Disallowance

Per diem

Ponente:

In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R.

Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of

the Bureau of Labor Relations in the

Department of Labor and Employment.

In a Letter dated May 11,

1995 addressed to Honorable Rizalino S.

Navarro, then Secretary of the

Department of Trade and Industry,

Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of

the Department of Labor and

Employment designated the petitioner

to be the DOLE representative to the

Board of Directors of PEZA.

Article VII

Prohibition

Section 13. The

President, Vice‐

President, the

Members of the

Cabinet, and their

deputies or


unless otherwise

provided in this

Constitution, hold

any other office or

employment during

their tenure. Xxx

Art IX‐B Civil

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the COA correctly

disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner

for his attendance in the PEZA Board Director’s

meetings as representative of the Secretary of

Labor.

It must be noted that the petitioner’s presence in

the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his

capacity as representative of the Secretary of

Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was

no separate or special appointment for such

position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited

from receiving compensation for his additional office

or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to

the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of

the Secretary of Labor.

Citing also the Civil Liberties Union case, the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Such designation was in pursuance to

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916,

otherwise known as the Special

Economic Zone Act of 1995, which

provides:

Section 11. The Philippine Economic

Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. – There is

hereby created a body corporate to

be known as the Philippine Economic

Zone Authority (PEZA)…

As representative of the Secretary of

Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was

receiving a per diem for every board

meeting he attended during the years

1995 to 1997.

After a post audit of the PEZA’s

disbursement transactions, the COA

disallowed the payment of per diems to

the petitioner and thus issued 3 Notices

of Disallowance.

The COA issued Memorandum No. 97‐

038 which authorized the issuance of

the Notices of Disallowances for

the per diems received by the

petitioner. It states:

The Commission received a copy of

Senate Committee Report No. 509

urging “the Commission on Audit to

immediately cause the disallowance of

any payment of any form of additional

Service Commission

Section 7. No

elective official shall

be eligible for

appointment or

designation in any

capacity to any

public office or

position during his

tenure.

Unless otherwise

allowed by law or

by the primary

functions of his

position, no

appointive official

shall hold any other

office or

employment in the

Government or any

subdivision, agency

or instrumentality

thereof, including

Government‐owned

or controlled

corporations or

their subsidiaries.

Court explained thus:

“The ex‐officio position being actually and in legal

contemplation part of the principal office, it follows

that the official concerned has no right to receive

additional compensation for his services in the said

position. The reason is that these services are

already paid for and covered by the compensation

attached to his principal office. It should be obvious

that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a

meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex‐

officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal

contemplation performing the primary function of

his principal office in defining policy in monetary

banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction

of his department. For such attendance, therefore,

he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation,

whether it be in the form of a per diem or

an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such

euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,

such additional compensation is prohibited by the

Constitution.”

xxx the petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to

receive a per diem for his attendance at board

meetings during his tenure as member of the Board

of Director of the PEZA.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

compensation or remuneration to

cabinet secretaries, their deputies and

assistants, or their representatives in

violation of the rule on multiple

positions and to effect the refund of any

and all such additional compensation

given to and received by the officials

concerned, or their representatives,

from the time of the finality of the

Supreme Court ruling in Civil Liberties

Union vs. Executive Secretary to the

present.” In the Civil Liberties Union

case, the Supreme Court ruled that

Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and

assistants may not hold any other office

or employment. It declared Executive

Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar

as it allows Cabinet members, their

deputies and assistants to hold other

offices in addition to their primary

office and to receive compensation

therefore. The said decision became

final and executory on August 19, 1991.

Public Interest

Center v. Elma

GR 138965

June 30, 2006

March 5, 2007

pp. 412‐413

Incompatible

offices

PCGG & CPLC

Respondent Elma was appointed as

Chairman of the Presidential

Commission on Good Government

(PCGG) on 30 October 1998.

Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG

Chairman, he was appointed as Chief

Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He

accepted the second appointment, but

waived any renumeration that he may

Article VII

Prohibition

Section 13. The

President, Vice‐

President, the

Members of the

Cabinet, and their

deputies or


unless otherwise

provided in this

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the position of the PCGG

Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the

prohibition against multiple offices.

The general rule contained in Article IX‐B is that a

government official occupying two government

offices is permitted as long as there is no

incompatibility between both.

The concurrent appointments of the respondent

as PCGG Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional.

It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

receive as CPLC.

Constitution, hold

any other office or

employment during

their tenure. xxx

Art IX‐B Civil Service

Commission

Section 7. No

elective official shall

be eligible for

appointment or

designation in any

capacity to any

public office or

position during his

tenure.

Unless otherwise

allowed by law or

by the primary

functions of his

position, no

appointive official

shall hold any other

office or

employment in the

Government or any

subdivision, agency

or instrumentality

thereof, including

Government‐owned

or controlled

corporations or

their subsidiaries.

offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX‐B

of the 1987 Constitution, since these are

incompatible offices. The duties of the CPLC include

giving independent and impartial legal advice on the

actions of the heads of various executive

departments and agencies and reviewing

investigations involving heads of executive

departments. Since the actions of the PCGG

Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are

subject to the review of the CPLC, such

appointments would be incompatible.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from

his assumption or reassumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not

make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or

endanger public safety.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

In Re

Appointments

of Valenzuela

and Vallarta

AM No 98‐5‐

01‐SC

Nov 9, 1998

pp. 413‐416

Void

RTC

Judge

Appointments

Referred to the Court En Banc by the

Chief Justice are the appointments

signed by His Excellency the President

under the date of March 30, 1998 of

Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.

Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the

Regional Trial Court of Branch 62,

Bago City and of Branch 24,

Cabanatuan City, respectively.

May 7, 1998 The President through

a letter expressed the view that "the

election‐ban provision (Article VII,

Section 15) *** applies only

to executive appointments or

appointments in the executive branch

of government," the whole article

being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENT.'" He also observed

that further proof of his theory "is the

fact that appointments to the

judiciary have special, specific

provisions applicable to them" (citing

Article VIII, Section 4 [1] and Article

SEC 15. Two months

immediately before

the next presidential

elections and up to

the end of his term,

a President or Acting

President shall not

make appointments,

xxx will prejudice

public service or

endanger public

safety”

ISSUE: 1 Whether or not during the period of the

ban on appointments imposed by Section 15,

Article VII of the Constitution, the President is

nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the

judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article

VIII.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not he can make

appointments to the judiciary during the period of

the ban in the interest of public service.

Surely, the prevention of vote‐buying and similar

evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in

filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of

some cases.

It is this Court's view that, as a general

proposition, in case of conflict, the former (Sec

15) should yield to the latter (Sec 4).

To the contention that may perhaps be asserted,

that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII should

prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, because they

may be considered later expressions of the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

VIII, Section 9. In view thereof, he

"firmly and respectfully reiterate(d)

*** (his) request for the Judicial and

Bar Council to transmit *** the final

list of nominees for the lone Supreme

Court vacancy."

The Chief Justice replied to the letter

the following day, May 8, 1998. Since

the Chief Justice's letter explains the

issue quite plainly, xxx

As you can see, Your Excellency,

Section 15 of Article VII imposes a

direct prohibition on the

President: he "shall not make

appointments" within the period

mentioned, and since there is no

specification of which appointments

are proscribed, the same may be

considered as applying to all

appointments of any kind and

nature. xxx As the exception makes

reference only to "executive"

positions, it would seem that

"judicial" positions are covered by the

general rule.

xxx Section 4 (1) of Article VIII,

requires that any vacancy in the

Supreme Court "shall be filled within

ninety days from the occurrence

thereof." Unlike Section 15, Article

VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is

Article 8‐Judicial

Dept.

"SEC 4 (1) The

Supreme Court shall

be composed of a

Chief Justice and

fourteen Associate

Justices. ***. Any

vacancy shall be

filled within ninety

days from the

occurrence thereof."

Article 8‐ Judicial

Dept

"SEC 9 The Members

of the Supreme

Court and judges in

lower courts shall be

appointed by the

President from the

list of at least three

nominees prepared

by the Judicial and

Bar Council for every

vacancy. xxx

people when they adopted the Constitution, it

suffices to point out that the Constitution must be

construed in its entirety as one, single,

instrument.

The exception allows only the making

of temporary appointments to executive positions

when continued vacancies will prejudice public

service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the

article greatly restricts the appointing power of

the President during the period of the ban.

The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and

Vallarta xxx were unquestionably made during the

period of the ban. Consequently, they come

within the operation of the first prohibition

relating to appointments which are considered to

be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing

the election (under Omnibus Election Code)…

xxx the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the

appointments signed by His Excellency the

President under date of March 30, 1998 xxx


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

not specifically imposed on the

President; hence, it may be inferred

that it is a duty shared by the Judicial

and Bar council and the President.

The reason for said prohibition,

according to Fr. J. Bernas, S.J., an

authority on Constitutional Law and

himself a member of the

Constitutional Commission, is "(I)n

order not to tie the hands of the

incoming President through midnight

appointments."

Should the Court rule that the

President is indeed prohibited to

make appointments in a presidential

election year, then any appointment

attempted within the proscribed

period would be void anyway. If the

Court should adjudge that the ban has

no application to appointments to the

Supreme Court, the JBC may submit

nominations and the President may

make the appointment forthwith

upon such adjudgment.

DE LA RAMA V.

Court of

Appeals

GR 131136

FEB 28, 2001

Misinterpretation

of section 15 by

De La Rama

14 appointed

Municipal

employees

Upon his assumption to the position

of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,

petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote

a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil

Service Commission (CSC), seeking the

recall of the appointments of fourteen

(14) municipal employees…

Section 15. Two

months immediately

before the next

presidential

elections and up to

the end of his term,

a President or Acting

President shall not

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the so‐called “midnight”

appointments by former Mayor Abeja were

unconstitutional. NO

It has been held that upon the issuance of an

appointment and the appointee’s assumption of

the position in the civil service, “he acquires a

legal right which cannot be taken away either by


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

pp. 417‐418 Misinterpretation

of section 15 by

De La Rama

14 appointed

Municipal

employees

Petitioner de Rama justified his recall

request on the allegation that the

appointments of the said employees

were “midnight” appointments of the

former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja,

done in violation of Article VII, Section

15 of the 1987 Constitution…

The CSC upheld the validity of the

appointments on the ground that

they had already been approved by

the Head of the CSC Field Office in

Lucena City, and for petitioner’s

failure to present evidence that would

warrant the revocation or recall of the

said appointments.

On November 21, 1996, the CSC

denied petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration. The CSC reiterated

its ruling that:

In the absence of any showing that

these alleged midnight appointments

were defective in form and in

substance, nor is there evidence

presented to show that subject

appointments were issued in

contravention of law or rules, these

appointments are deemed valid and

in effect.

xxx, the Court of Appeals denied for

lack of merit the petition for review.

make appointments

xxx

revocation of the appointment or by removal

except for cause and with previous notice and

hearing.” Moreover, it is well‐settled that the

person assuming a position in the civil service

under a completed appointment acquires a legal,

not just an equitable, right to the position. This

right is protected not only by statute, but by the

Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken

away by either revocation of the appointment, or

by removal, unless there is valid cause to do so,

provided that there is previous notice and

hearing.

The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the

constitutional prohibition on so‐called “midnight

appointments,” specifically those made within

two (2) months immediately prior to the next

presidential elections, applies only to the

President or Acting President.

In truth and in fact, there is no law that

prohibits local elective officials from making

appointments during the last days of his or her

tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue

of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who

made the appointments.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration arguing that the

appellate court erred in upholding the

CSC’s resolutions despite the

following defects:

I. No screening process and no

criteria were adopted by the

Personnel Selection Board in

nominating the respondents;

II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous

public places of notice of vacancy as

required by the rules and the law;

III. Merit and fitness requirements

were not observed by the selection

board and by the appointing authority

as required by the Civil Service rules;

IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to

recall the appointments of

respondents.

In a Resolution dated October 20,

1997, the Court of Appeals denied the

motion for reconsideration.

Mendoza, J., dissents: What the majority overlooks is that Article VII Section15 is simply an application of a

broader principle xxx This rule binds all, including mayors, who are vested with the power of appointment, and it

flows from the principle that a public office is a public trust. xxx

It is clear, however, that the Civil Service Commission did not find anything wrong or irregular in the appointments

of respondents because it failed to appreciate the fact that “Midnight appointments” – whether made by the

President or by a mayor – are bad, because they are made hurriedly, without due deliberation and careful

consideration of the needs of the office and the qualifications of the appointees, and by an appointing authority on

the eve of his departure from office. “Midnight appointments” are bad because, as the Aytona v. Castillo decision

puts it, they offend principles of “fairness, justice and righteousness.” They cannot be less bad because they are

made at the local level, by mayors and other local executives.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive

departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other

officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments

are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of

other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such

appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

Gov’t v. Milton

Springer

50 Phil. 259

(1927)

pp. 418‐419

ISSUE 1: Is the power of appointment

executive? YES.

In Concepcion v. Paredes, supra, xxx

Following the lead of Kentucky, it was

announced that “Appointment to office is

intrinsically an executive act involving the

exercise of discretion”

OSCAR BERMUDEZ

V. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY

GR 131429

AUG 4, 1999

pp. 419‐421

Revised

Administrative

Code of 1987

Provincial

Prosecutor

appointment

Missing

recommendation

The occurrence of a vacancy in the

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

of Tarlac impelled the main

contestants in this case, petitioner

Oscar Bermudez and respondent

Conrado Quiaoit, to take

contrasting views on the proper

interpretation of a provision in the

1987 Revised Administrative Code.

Bermudez, the First Assistant

Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and

Officer‐In‐Charge of the Office of

Revised Administrative

Code of 1987 (Book IV,

Title III, Chapter II,

Section 9)—

All provincial and

city prosecutors and

their assistants shall be

appointed by the

President upon the

recommendation of the

Secretary.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the absence of a

recommendation of the Secretary of Justice

to the President Fidel Ramos can be held fatal

to the appointment of respondent Conrado

Quiaoit to the post of Provincial Prosecutor of

Tarlac. NO.

The recommendation is here nothing

really more than advisory in nature.

xxx the President has the power to assume

directly the functions of an executive

department, bureau and office. It can


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

the Provincial Prosecutor, was a

recommendee of then Justice

Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for

the position of Provincial

Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other

hand, would appear to have had

the support of then Representative

Jose Yap of the Second Legislative

District of Tarlac.

On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit emerged

the victor when he was appointed

by President Ramos to the coveted

office.

Petitioners contend that an

appointment of a provincial

prosecutor mandatorily requires a

prior recommendation of the

Secretary of Justice endorsing the

intended appointment citing, by

analogy, the case of San Juan

vs. CSC where the Court held:

. . . The DBM may appoint only from

the list of qualified recommendees

nominated by the Governor. If none

is qualified, he must return the list

of nominees to the Governor

explaining why no one meets the

legal requirements and ask for new

recommendees who have the

necessary eligibilities and

qualifications.

Executive Order No.

112 —

Section 1. All budget

officers of provinces,

cities and municipalities

shall be appointed

henceforth by the

Minister of Budget and

Management upon

recommendation of the

local chief executive

concerned. . . .

Note: EO 112 is just

tangential but not

necessarily apt to this

issue. The appointment

in the case of San Juan

has distinctively given

stress in obeying the

constitutional mandate

of the local autonomy.

accordingly be inferred therefrom that the

President can interfere in the exercise of

discretion of officials under him or altogether

ignore their recommendations.

In the instant case, the recommendation

of the Secretary of Justice and the

appointment of the President are acts of the

Executive Department itself, and there is no

sharing of power to speak of, the latter being

deemed for all intents and purposes as being

merely an extension of the personality of the

President.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

FLORES V. DRILON

& GORDON

GR 104732

JUNE 22, 1993

pp. 421‐423

Gordon’s

prohibited

appointment to

SBMA

Invalid proviso of

RA 7227

Violation of S16

Article IX‐B

The constitutionality of Section 13,

par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise

known as the "Bases Conversion

and Development Act of 1992,"

under which respondent Mayor

Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City

was appointed Chairman and Chief

Executive Officer of the Subic Bay

Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is

challenged in this original petition

with prayer for prohibition,

preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order "to

prevent useless and unnecessary

expenditures of public funds by way

of salaries and other operational

expenses attached to the office…”

Petitioners, xxx maintain that

the proviso in par. (d) of Section 13

infringes section 16 of Article VII

because the City Mayor of

Olongapo City is an elective official

and the subject posts are public

offices, section 7 of Article IX‐B

since it was Congress through the

questioned proviso and not the

President who appointed the Mayor

to the subject posts, and, (c)

Section 261, par. (g), of the

Omnibus Election Code for the

reason that the appointment of

respondent Gordon to the subject

RA 7227, Par.(d) ‐‐

Chairman

administrator — The

President shall appoint

a professional manager

as administrator of the

Subic Authority with a

compensation to be

determined by the

Board subject to the

approval of the

Secretary of Budget,

who shall be the ex

oficio chairman of the

Board and who shall

serve as the chief

executive officer of the

Subic

Authority: Provided,

however, That for the

first year of its

operations from the

effectivity of this Act,

the mayor of the City of

Olongapo shall be

appointed as the

chairman and chief

executive officer of the

Subic

Authority (emphasis

supplied).

Section 16 of Article VII

"[t]he President shall . .

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the proviso in

Section 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violates the

constitutional proscription against

appointment or designation of elective

officials to other government posts. YES.

Section 7 of Art IX‐B expresses the policy

against the concentration of several public

positions in one person, so that a public

officer or employee may serve full‐time with

dedication and thus be efficient in the

delivery of public services. It is an affirmation

that a public office is a full‐time job. ALSO, its

basic idea really is to prevent a situation

where a local elective official will work for his

appointment in an executive position in

government, and thus neglect his

constituents.

The proviso is precisely what the

constitutional proscription seeks to prevent,

it needs no stretching of the imagination to

conclude that the proviso contravenes

Section 7, first par., Article IX‐B, of the

Constitution. Futhermore, no legislative act

can prevail over the fundamental law of the

land.

The exemption allowed to appointive

officials in the second paragraph of Section 7

cannot be extended to elective officials who

are governed by the first paragraph.

While it may be viewed that


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

posts made by respondent

Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992

was within the prohibited 45‐day

period prior to the 11 May 1992

Elections.

. . appoint all other

officers of the

Government whose

appointments are not

otherwise provided for

by law, and those

whom he may be

authorized by law to

appoint"

Note: the appointment

is invalid and therefore,

not authorized by the

fundamental law of the

land.

Section 7, first par., of

Article IX‐B "[n]o

elective official shall be

eligible for appointment

or designation in any

capacity to any public

officer or position

during his tenure,"

the proviso merely sets the qualifications of

the officer during the first year of operations

of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of

Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of

congressional authority to prescribe

qualifications where only one, and no other,

can qualify. Accordingly, while the

conferment of the appointing power on the

President is a perfectly valid legislative act,

the proviso limiting his choice to one is

certainly an encroachment on his

prerogative.

The proviso in par. (d), Section 13, of R.A.

7227,xxx is declared unconstitutional;

Consequently, the appointment pursuant

thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,

respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID,

hence NULL and VOID. However, all per

diems, allowances and other emoluments

received by respondent Gordon, xxx are

hereby UPHELD.

ULPIANO

SARMIENTO

(lawyer, taxpayer,

IBP member) V.

MISON (Customs

Commissioner)

156 SCRA 549

1987

pp. 423‐433

Appointment to

bureau heads

w/o CA’s

consent

2nd, 3rd, 4th

group

Petitioners assailed that Mison's

appointment as Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs is

unconstitutional by reason of its not

having been confirmed by the

Commission on Appointments.

The respondents, on the other

hand, maintain the constitutionality

of respondent Mison's appointment

Section 16, Article VII of

the 1987 Constitution

says:

The President shall

nominate and, with the

consent of the

Commission on

Appointments, appoint

the heads of the

ISSUE 1: The second, third and fourth groups

of officers are the present bone of

contention. Whether or not they may be

appointed by the President without the

consent (confirmation) of the Commission on

Appointments? YES.

xxx the framers of the 1987 Constitution

and the people adopting it, struck a "middle

ground" by requiring the consent


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

without the confirmation of the


This case assumes added

significance because, at bottom

line, it involves a conflict between

two (2) great departments of

government, the Executive and

Legislative Departments. It also

occurs early in the life of the 1987

Constitution.

It is readily apparent that under the

provisions of the 1987 Constitution,

just quoted, there are four (4)

groups of officers whom the

President shall appoint. These four

(4) groups, to which we will

hereafter refer from time to time,

are:

First, the heads of the executive

departments, ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls,

officers of the armed forces from

the rank of colonel or naval captain,

and other officers whose

appointments are vested in him in

this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the

Government whose appointments

are not otherwise provided for by

law;

executive departments,

ambassadors, other

public ministers and

consuls, or officers of

the armed forces from

the rank of colonel or

naval captain, and other

officers whose

appointments are

vested in him in this

Constitution. He shall

also appoint all other

officers of the

Government whose



by law, and those

whom he may be


appoint. The Congress

may, by law, vest the

appointment of other

officers lower in rank in

the President alone, in

the courts, or in the

heads of the

departments, agencies,

commissions or boards.

The President shall have

the power to make

appointments during

the recess of the

Congress, whether

(confirmation) of the Commission on

Appointments for the first group of

appointments and leaving to the President,

without such confirmation, the appointment

of other officers, i.e., those in the second and

third groups as well as those in the fourth

group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

Mr. Monsod: On Section 16, I would like to

suggest that the power of the Commission on

Appointments be limited to the department

heads, ambassadors, generals and so on but

not to the levels of bureau heads and

colonels.

MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed

amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26

which is to delete the words "and

bureaus,"xxx

MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is

actually quite low in the executive

department, and to require further

confirmation of presidential appointment of

heads of bureaus would subject them to

political influence.

MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's

proposed amendment by deletion also

includes regional directors xxx

It is evident that the position of

Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a

bureau head) is not one of those within the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Third, those whom the President

may be authorized by law to

appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose

appointments the Congress may by

law vest in the President alone.

voluntary or

compulsory, but such

appointments shall be

effective only until

disapproval by the

Commission on

Appointments or until

the next adjournment

of the Congress.

first group of appointments where the

consent of the Commission on Appointments

is required. Thus, the appointment of

Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Bureau of

Customs is upheld.

Cruz, J., dissents: xxx

There is no question that bureau directors are not required to be confirmed under the first sentence of Section

16, but that is not the provision we ought to interpret. It is the second sentence we must understand for a

proper resolution of the issues now before us.

xxx

One may also ask why, if the officers mentioned in the second sentence do not need confirmation, it was still

felt necessary to provide in the third sentence that the appointment of the other officers lower in rank will also

not need confirmation as long as their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. The third sentence

would appear to be superfluous, too, again in view of the first sentence.

xxx

It must be borne in mind that one of the purposes of the Constitutional Commission was to restrict the powers

of the Presidency and so prevent the recurrence of another dictatorship.

xxx

My own reading is that the second sentence is but a continuation of the Idea expressed in the first sentence

and simply mentions the other officers appointed by the President who are also subject to confirmation. The

second sentence is the later expression of the will of the framers and so must be interpreted as complementing

the rule embodied in the first sentence or, if necessary, reversing the original intention to exempt bureau

directors from confirmation. Xxx At any rate, this view is more consistent with the general purpose of Article

VII, which, to repeat, was to reduce the powers of the Presidency.

xxx

The rule re‐ established by the new Constitution is that the power requires confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments as a restraint on presidential excesses, in line with the system of checks and balances. I submit it

is the exception to this rule, and not the rule, that should be strictly construed.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

In my view, the only officers appointed by the President who are not subject to confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments are (1) the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman and his deputies, who

are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council; (2) the Vice‐President when he is appointed to the Cabinet; and

(3) "other officers lower in rank," but only when their appointment is vested by law in the President alone. It is

clear that this enumeration does not include the respondent Commissioner of Customs who, while not covered

by the first sentence of Section 16, comes under the second sentence thereof as I would interpret it and so is

also subject to confirmation.

I vote to grant the petition

QUINTOS‐DELES et

al v. CA

177 SCRA 259

(1989)

pp. 433‐438

Sectoral Reps

requires CA

confirmation

This is a special civil action xxx

seeking to compel respondent

Commission on Appointments to

allow petitioner Teresita Quintos‐

Deles to perform and discharge her

duties as a member of the House of

Representatives representing the

Women's Sector and to restrain

respondents from subjecting peti‐

tioner's appointment to the

confirmation process.

On April 18, 1988, the petitioner

and 3 other sectoral repre‐

sentatives appointed by Pres.

Corazon Aquino were scheduled to

take their oaths before Speaker

Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session

Hall of Congress after the Order of

Business. However, they were not

able to take their oaths and

discharge their duties as members

of Congress due to the opposition

of some congressmen‐members of

Under Section 7, Article

18 of the Constitution:

"SEC. 7. Until a law is

passed, the President

may fill by appointment

from a list of nominees

by the respective

sectors the seats

reserved for

sectoral representation

in paragraph (1),

Section 5 of Article VI of

this Constitution."


the Constitution:

"SEC. 16. x x x

The President shall have

the power to make

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Constitution

requires the appointment of sectoral

representatives to the House of

Representatives to be confirmed by the

Commission on Appointments. YES

Since the seats reserved

for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,

Section 5, Article VI may be filled by

appointment by the President by express

provision of Section 7, Article XVIII of the

Constitution, it is indubitable

that sectoral representatives to the House of

Representatives are among the "other

officers whose appointments are vested in

the President in this Constitution," referred to

in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII

whose appointments are subject to

confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

o Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2,

Section 16, Article VII as authority for the

appointment of petitioner is, the

recognition by the President as


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

the Commission on Appointments,

who insisted

that sectoral representatives must

first be confirmed by the

respondent Commission before

they could take their oaths and/or

assume office as members of the

House of Representatives.

In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the

Committee of the Constitutional

Commissions and Offices of the

Commission on Appointments,

chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara,

the Committee ruled against the

position of petitioner Deles.

Petitioner Teresita Quintos‐Deles

contends that her appointment

as Sectoral Representative for

Women by the President pursuant

to Section 7, Article XVIII of the

Constitution, does not require


Appointments to qualify her to take

her seat in the House of

Representatives.

appointments during

the recess of the

Congress, whether

voluntary or


appointments shall be

effective only until

disapproval by the

Commission on



of the Congress."

appointing authority that petitioner's

appointment requires confirmation by

the Commission on Appointments.

Thus, appointments by the President of

sectoral representatives require the consent

of the Commission on Appointments in

accordance with the first sentence of Section

16, Article VII of the Constitution. More to

the point, petitioner Deles’ appointment was

issued not by virtue of Executive Order No.

198 but pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,

paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of

the Constitution which require submission to

the confirmation process.

Calderon v. Carale

as Chairman of

the National Labor

Relations

Commission

GR 91636

RA 6715

amending art.

215 of Labor

Code

NLRC Chair

under 3rd

Pursuant to said law (RA 6715),

President Aquino appointed the

Chairman and Commissioners of

the NLRC representing the public,

workers and employers sectors. The

appointments stated that the

appointees may qualify and enter

The second sentence of

Section 16, Article VII

refers to all other

officers of the

government whose



ISSUE 1: Whether or not Congress may, by

law, require confirmation by the Commission

on Appointments of appointments extended

by the president to government officers

additional to those expressly mentioned in

the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII of

the Constitution whose appointments


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Apr 23, 1992

pp. 438‐444

groups upon the performance of the duties

of the office. After said

appointments, then Labor Secretary

Franklin Drilon issued

Administrative Order No. 161,

series of 1989, designating the

places of assignment of the newly

appointed commissioners.

Petitioner insists on a mandatory

compliance with RA 6715 which has

in its favor the presumption of

validity. RA 6715 is not, according

to petitioner, an encroachment on

the appointing power of the

executive contained in Section 16,

Article VII, of the Constitution, as

Congress may, by law, require


Appointments of other officers

appointed by the President

additional to those mentioned in

the first sentence of Section 16 of

Article VII of the Constitution.

Petitioner claims that

the Mison and Bautista rulings are

not decisive of the issue in this case

for in the case at bar, the President

issued permanent appointments to

the respondents without submitting

them to the CA for

confirmation despite passage of a

by law and those whom

the President may be


appoint.

require confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments. NO.

Ulpiano v. Mison In the course of the

debates on the text of Section 16, there were

two (2) major changes proposed and

approved by the Commission:

(1) the exclusion of the appointments of

heads of bureaus from the requirement of


Appointments.

(2) the exclusion of appointments made

under the second sentence of the section

from the same requirement.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and

Commissioners fall within the second

sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the

Constitution, more specifically under the

"third groups" of appointees referred to

in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may

be authorized by law to appoint. xxx not

among the officers mentioned xxx whose

appointments requires confirmation by the


To the extent that RA 6715 requires


Appointments of the appointments of

respondents Chairman and Members of the

National Labor Relations Commission, it is

unconstitutional because:

1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence

of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

law (RA 6715) which requires the


Appointments of such

appointments.

by adding thereto appointments requiring


Appointments; and

2) It amends by legislation the second

sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the

Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of

the Commission on Appointments on

appointments, which are otherwise entrusted

only with the President.

The deliberate limitation on the power of

confirmation of the Commission on

Appointments over presidential

appointments, embodied in Section 16,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution has

undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and

disapproval of members of Congress. The

solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a

problem, is not judicial or legislative but

constitutional. A future constitutional

convention or Congress sitting as a

constituent (constitutional) assembly may

then consider either a return to the 1935

Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a

hybrid system between the 1935 or 1987

constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the

duty of the Court to apply the 1987

Constitution in accordance with what it says

and not in accordance with how the

legislature or the executive would want it

interpreted.

Cruz, J., dissents:

I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison, which I believe should be re‐examined instead of

being automatically re‐affirmed simply because of its original adoption. I do not believe we should persist in


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

error on the ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent, however unsound.

Ma. Aangelina

Matibag v. Alfredo

Benipayo

GR 149036

April 2, 2002

pp. 444‐456

Comelec ad

interim

appointments

Article IX‐C

Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G.

Matibag questions the

constitutionality of the

appointment and the right to hold

office of the following: (1) Alfredo L.

Benipayo as Chairman of the

Commission on Elections; and (2)

Resurreccion Z. Borra and

Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as

COMELEC Commissioners.

Petitioner also questions the

legality of the appointment of

Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the

COMELEC’s Education and

Information Department.

In the meantime, on September 6,

2001, President Macapagal Arroyo

renewed once again the ad interim

appointments of Benipayo as

COMELEC Chairman and Borra and

Tuason as Commissioners,

respectively, for a term of seven

years expiring on February 2,

2008.They all took their oaths of

office anew.

Petitioner posits the view that

an ad interim appointment can be

withdrawn or revoked by the

President at her pleasure, and can

even be disapproved or simply by‐

passed by the Commission on

Section 1 (2), Article IX‐

C of the Constitution,

which provides as

follows:

"The Chairman and the

Commissioners shall be

appointed by the

President with the

consent of the

Commission on

Appointments for a

term of seven years

without reappointment.

Of those first

appointed, three

Members shall hold

office for seven years,

two Members for five

years, and the last

Members for three

years, without

reappointment.

Appointment to any

vacancy shall be only

for the unexpired term

of the predecessor. In

no case shall any

Member be appointed

or designated in a

temporary or acting

capacity."

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the assumption of

office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the

basis of the ad interim appointments issued

by the President amounts to a temporary

appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),

Article IX‐C of the Constitution. NO

An ad interim appointment is a permanent

appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn

by the President once the appointee has

qualified into office. The fact that it is subject

to confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments does not alter its permanent

character.xxx

Thus, as provided by Section 16, the ad

interim appointment remains effective

until such disapproval or next adjournment,

signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn

or revoked by the President. The fear that the

President can withdraw or revoke at any time

and for any reason an ad interim

appointment is utterly without basis.

An ad interim appointment can be

terminated for two causes specified in the

Constitution. The first cause is the

disapproval of his ad interim appointment by

the Commission on Appointments. The

second cause is the adjournment of Congress

without the Commission on Appointments

acting on his appointment. These two causes


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Appointments. For this reason,

petitioner claims that an ad

interim appointment is temporary

in character and consequently

prohibited by the last sentence of

Section 1 (2), Article IX‐C of the

Constitution.

Based on petitioner’s theory, there

can be no ad interim appointment

to the COMELEC or to the other two

constitutional commissions, namely

the Civil Service Commission and

the Commission on Audit. The last

sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX‐

C of the Constitution is also found

in Article IX‐B and Article IX‐D

providing for the creation of the

Civil Service Commission and the

Commission on Audit, respectively.

Petitioner interprets the last

sentence of Section 1 (2) of Article

IX‐C to mean that the ad interim

appointee cannot assume office

until his appointment is confirmed

by the Commission on

Appointments for only then does

his appointment become

permanent and no longer

temporary in character.

The second paragraph

of Section 16, Article VII

of the Constitution

provides as follows:

"The President shall

have the power to

make appointments

during the recess of the

Congress, whether

voluntary or


appointments shall

be effective only

until disapproval by the

Commission on



of the Congress."

are resolutory conditions expressly imposed

by the Constitution on all ad

interim appointments. Xxx

In the instant case, the President did in

fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill

the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to


Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason

were extended permanent appointments

during the recess of Congress. They were not

appointed or designated in a temporary or

acting capacity xxx

xxx The original intention of the framers of

the Constitution was to do away with ad

interim appointments because the plan was

for Congress to remain in session throughout

the year except for a brief 30‐day compulsory

recess. xxx

Clearly, the reinstatement in the present

Constitution of the ad interim appointing

power of the President (stated in the last

sentence of Section 16) was for the purpose

of avoiding interruptions in vital government

services that otherwise would result from

prolonged vacancies in government offices,

including the three constitutional

commissions. .

In the instant case, the Commission on

Appointments had long confirmed four of the

incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a


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majority, who could now be removed from

office only by impeachment. The special

constitutional safeguards that insure the

independence of the COMELEC remain in

place. The COMELEC enjoys fiscal autonomy,

appoints its own officials and employees, and

promulgates its own rules on pleadings and

practice. Moreover, the salaries of COMELEC

members cannot be decreased during their

tenure.

In fine, we rule that the ad interim

appointments extended by the President to

Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC

Chairman and Commissioners, respectively,

do not constitute temporary or acting

appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2),

Article IX‐C of the Constitution.

Rufino V. Endriga

GR 139565

JULY 21, 2006

pp. 456‐461

CCP Board of

Trustees

Section 6b

PD 15

Rufino Group vs

Endriga Group

June 25, 1966 then President

Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30)

creating the Cultural Center of the

Philippines as a trust governed by a

Board of Trustees of seven

members to preserve and promote

Philippine culture. The original

founding trustees, who were all

appointed by President Marcos,

were Imelda Romualdez‐Marcos,

Juan Ponce‐Enrile, Andres Soriano,

Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father

Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P.

Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.

Section 6(b) of PD 15,

as amended, which

reads:

Board of Trustees. —

The governing powers

and authority of the

corporation shall be

vested in, and exercised

by, a Board of eleven

(11) Trustees who shall

serve without

compensation.

x x x x

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court of

Appeals committed reversible error in

not holding that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is

unconstitutional considering that:

x x x [it] is an invalid delegation of

the President’s appointing power under the

Constitution;

x x x [it] effectively deprives the President

of his constitutional power of control and

supervision over the CCP

YES.

As Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found

unconstitutional, the President shall appoint

the trustees of the CCP Board because the

trustees fall under the third group of officers.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

October 5 1972 or soon after the

declaration of Martial

Law, President Marcos issued PD

15, the CCP’s charter, which

converted the CCP under EO 30 into

a non‐municipal public corporation

free from the “pressure or influence

of politics.”

Eventually, during the term of

President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP

Board included Endriga, Lagdameo,

Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez,

Lenora A. Cabili (“Cabili”),

and Manuel T. Mañosa (“Mañosa”).

December 22, 1998 then

President Joseph E. Estrada

appointed seven new trustees

(Rufino group) to the CCP Board for

a term of four years to replace the

Endriga group as well as two other

incumbent trustees.

January 6 1999 the Endriga

group filed a petition for quo

warranto before this Court

questioning President Estrada’s

appointment of seven new

members to the CCP Board.

May 14, 1999 the Court of

Appeals rendered the Decision

under review granting the quo

(b) Vacancies in the

Board of Trustees due

to termination of term,

resignation, incapacity,

death or other cause as

may be provided in the

By‐laws, shall be filled

by election by a vote of

a majority of the

trustees held at the

next regular meeting

following occurrence of

such

vacancy. xxx Should for

any reason the Board

be left entirely vacant,

the same shall be filled

by the President of

the Philippines acting in

consultation with the

aforementioned ranking

officers of the

Center. (Emphasis

supplied)


the

1987 Constitution which

provides:

xxx He shall also

appoint all other

officers of the

The express language of the Constitution

and the clear intent of its framers point to

only one conclusion — the officers whom the

heads of departments, agencies,

commissions, or boards may appoint must be

of lower rank than those vested by law with

the power to appoint.

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers

the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill

vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to

elect their fellow trustees. On the other

hand, Section 16, Article VII of the

1987 Constitution allows heads of

departments, agencies, commissions, or

boards to appoint only “officers lower in

rank” than such “heads of departments,

agencies, commissions, or boards.”

Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which

authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to

fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the

President’s power of control under Section

17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Xxx

it makes the CCP a self‐perpetuating entity,

virtually outside the control of the

President. Such a public office or board

cannot legally exist under the 1987

Constitution.

Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states

that the CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy

and operation x x x. This provision does not


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

warranto petition. The Court of

Appeals declared the Endriga group

lawfully entitled to hold office as

CCP trustees. On the other hand,

the appellate court’s Decision

ousted the Rufino group from

the CCP Board.

Rufino group, seek to set aside the

Decision dated 14 May 1999 of the

Court of Appeals in CA‐G.R. SP No.

50272 as well as the Resolution

dated 3 August 1999 denying the

motion for reconsideration. The

dispositive portion of the appellate

court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

rendered

1) Declaring petitioners [the

Endriga group] to have a clear right

to their respective offices to which

they were elected by the CCP Board

up to the expiration of their 4‐year

term,

2) Ousting respondents [the Rufino

group], except respondent Zenaida

R. Tantoco, from their respective

offices and excluding them

therefrom, and

3) Dismissing the case against

respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco. SO

ORDERED

Government whose



by law, and those

whom he may

be authorized by law to

appoint. The Congress

may, by law, vest the

appointment of other

officers lower in rank in

the President alone, in

the courts, or in the

heads of departments,

agencies, commissions,

or boards.

xxx

free the CCP from the President’s control, for

if it does, then it would be unconstitutional.

The CCP is part of the Executive branch.

xxx By stating that the “President shall have

control of all the executive x x x offices,” the

1987 Constitution empowers the

President not only to influence but even to

control all offices in the Executive branch,

including the CCP. Control is far greater than,

and subsumes, influence.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in

G.R. No. 139554. We

declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 6(b) and

(c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as

amended, insofar as it authorizes the

remaining trustees to fill by election

vacancies in the Board of Trustees of the

Cultural Center of the Philippines.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully

executed.



Lacson‐

Magallanes

Co., Inc v. Pano

L‐27811

1967

pp. 461‐465

Executive

Secretary

Secretary of

Agriculture

and Natural

Resources

Director of

Lands

An order issued by the Director of

Lands, affirmed by the Secretary of

Agriculture and Natural Resources, was

reversed by the Executive Secretary

(ES).

Petitioner prays that: (1) the decision of

the Secretary of Agriculture has full

force, (2) The decision of the ES is

contrary to law and has no legal force,

(3) The decision of the ES constituted

undue delegation of power and (4) The

ES is on equal rank as any other

Secretary and thus is not authorized to

reverse decisions by department heads.

Lower courts ruled that ES did not act in

excess of jurisdiction. Thus, this petition

for review.

Sec 17, Art 7

constitution

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Executive Secretary has

the power to reverse decisions by other department

heads. YES.

It is not correct to say that the President may not

delegate to his Executive Secretary acts, which the

Constitution does not command that he perform in

person.

The president is not expected to perform in

person all the multifarious executive and

administrative functions.

The ES who acts for and in behalf and by

authority of the President has an undisputed duty to

affirm, modify or even reverse any order. Only the

president may rightfully say that the ES is not

authorized to do so.

Ang‐Angco v.

Castill

9 SCRA 619

(1963)

pp. 465‐466

Civil Service

Executive

Secretary

Power of

control

tenure

A civil service officer bypassed the

procedure prescribed by the Civil

Service Law.

Executive Secretary Castillo imposed

disciplinary actions against the said

officer.

Art IX‐B, Sec 4

No officer or

employee of the

civil service shall be

removed or

suspended except

for cause provided

by law.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the President, acting

through the Executive Secretary, may take

disciplinary action against a Civil Service officer.

NO.

Despite the power of control given to the

President, Section 4, Article 12 of the Constitution

clearly provides that “No officer or employee in the

civil service shall be removed or suspended except

for cause as provided by law”. The constitution gives

stability to the tenure of office of those who belong


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

to classified service.

To hold that civil service officials hold their office

at the will of the appointing power would

demoralize and undermine the whole civil service

system and structure.

Congress has provided, by law, for a procedure

for the removal of civil service officers. i.e. Civil

Service Act 1959

Namarco v.

Arca

29 SCRA 418

(1969)

pp. 466‐467

NAMARCO

GOCC’s

Presidential

power of

control

The NAMARCO Board of Directors

dismissed Juan T. Arive from service.

President ordered the reinstatement of

Mr. Arive.

Petitioners contend that the

Presidential power of control does not

include government‐owned and

controlled corporations such as

NAMARCO. They assert that president

cannot order reinstatement.

Section 17, Article 7 ISSUE 1: Whether or not the President had authority

to reverse the decision of the Board of Directors.

YES.

Under our government set‐up, corporations

owned or controlled by the government, such as

NAMARCO, partake the nature of government

offices, which are under the power of the President.

The reinstatement order, therefore, falls within the

constitutional power of the president over all

executive departments, bureaus and offices.

De Leon v.

Carpio

178 SCRA 457

(1989)

pp. 467‐468

DOJ

CSC

NBI

Orders of reinstatement of Estavillo and

De Leon to their respective posts was

issued by the Civil Service Commission,

as referred by the Department of

Justice.

Director of National bureau of

Investigation refused to reinstate the

petitioners. Respondent argues that the

Commission does not have authority to

review dismissals made under the

Freedom Constitution

Section 17, Article 7 ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Director of NBI can

disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by

Secretary of Justice. NO.

The President’s power of control is directly

exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet

who, in turn and by his authority, control the

bureaus and other offices under their respective

jurisdictions in the executive department. In the

case at bar, there is no question that when he

directed the respondent to reinstate petitioners,

Secretary Ordonez was acting in the regular

discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

President. His acts should therefore have been

respected by the respondent Director of NBI.

E. Blaquera, et

al v. Alcasid

G.R. No.

109406 Sep 11,

1998

pp. 468

AO 29

Power of

Control

President issued Administrative order

29 limiting the amount of incentive

benefits, enjoining heads of

government agencies from granting

incentive benefits without prior

approval from the President and

directing the refund of the excess over

the prescribed amount.

Section 17, Article 7 ISSUE 1: Whether or not the issuance of AO 29 is

within the scope of the President’s power of control

over executive departments. YES

The President is the head of the government. His

power includes control over executive departments.

He can exercise this power motu propio without

need of any appeal from any party.

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander‐in‐Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out

such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,

he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under

martial law. Within forty‐eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the

President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members

in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the

initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the

Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty‐four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules

without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial

law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,

nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically

suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected

with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he

shall be released.




┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

IBP vs. Zamora Law and

Order,

President

Estrada

A special civil action for certiorariand

prohibition with prayer for issuance of a

temporary restraining order seeking to

nullify on constitutional grounds the

order of President Joseph Ejercito

Estrada commanding deployment of the

Philippine Marines to join the Philippin

National Police in visibility patrols

around the metropolis.

In view of the alarming increase in

violent crimes in Metro Manila, like

robberies, kidnappings and carnappings,

the President, in a verbal directive,

ordered the PNP and the Marines to

conduct joint visibility patrols for the

purpose of crime prevention and

suppression. The Secretary of National

Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of

the PNP and the Secretary of the

Interior and Local Government were

tasked to execute and implement said

order.

Subsequently, the President confirmed

his previous directive on the

deployment of the Marines in a

Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000,

addressed to the Chief of Staff of the

AFP and the PNP Chief.

The selected areas for deployment

under the Memo are: Monumento

Circle, North EDSA (SM City), Araneta

Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM

Megamall, Makati Commercial Center,

Section 18, Article

VII of the

Constitution

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the President committed

grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed

Memo. NO.

What the IBP questions is the basis for calling of

the Marines under the aforestated provision.

According to them, o emergency exists that would

justify the need for calling of the military to assist

the police force.

The Court ruled in the negative saying that the

power of the President involved may be no more

than the maintenance of peace and order and

promotion of the general welfare.

When the President calls the armed forces to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion, he necessarily exercises discretionary

power solely vested in his wisdom.

The present petition fails to discharge such heavy

burden as there is no evidence to support the

assertion that there exists no justification for calling

out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence

to support that the President acted with grave abuse

of discretion.

The Court cannot review the factual bases of the

calling of the armed forces.

o In so claiming, the Court found it prudent to

note the differences of calling out the armed

forces from the suspension of the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus and the proclamation

of martial law, the latter two being subject to


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and

Domestic Airport.

On 17 January 2000, the IBP filed the

instant petition to annul the Memo and

to declare the deployment of the

Philippine Marines, null and void.

revocation by Congress and review by the court

while no such provision was provided for the

former. The Court elaborated on this by quoting

from the proceedings of the Constitutional

Commission, to wit:

o Fr. Bernas: …There is a graduated power of the

President as Commander‐in‐Chief. First, he can

call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary

to suppress lawless violence; then he can

suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a

graduated sequence. When he judges that it is

necessary to impose martial law or suspend the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his

judgment is subject to review. We are making it

subject to review by the Supreme Court and

subject to concurrence by the National

Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser

power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he

says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his

judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

The reason for the difference in the treatment

of the aforementioned powers highlights the

intent to grant the President the widest leeway

and broadest discretion in using the power to call

out because it is considered as the lesser and

more benign power compared to the power to


corpus and the power to impose martial law.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the

Constitution, in the exercise of the power to


corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion

or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it.

These conditions are not required in the case of

the power to call out the armed forces. The only

criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,

the President may call the armed forces to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

rebellion.”

Further, the Court may not verify the factual

bases of such calling. Whereas, in contrast, the

President as Commander‐in‐Chief has a vast

intelligence network to gather information to

base his decision upon.

The determination of the necessity for the

calling out power subjected to unfettered judicial

scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for

disaster, as such power may be unduly

straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary

restraining order every time it is exercised.

The President has already determined the

necessity and factual basis for calling the armed

forces. In his Memorandum, he identified them

as the following: violent crimes like bank/store

robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings,

continue to occur in Metro Manila.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the deployment of

Marines violates the civilian supremacy clause.

NO.

The IBP asserts that by the deployment of the

Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is


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“militarized” in violation of Section 3, Article II of

the Constitution.

The calling of the Marines in this case

constitutes permissible use of military assets for

civilian law enforcement.

It is noteworthy that the local police forces are

the one sin charge of the visibility patrols at all

times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In

fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall

leader of the PNP‐Philippine Marines joint

visibility patrols.

ISSUE 3: Whether or not the deployment of the

Marines to assist the PNP unmakes the civilian

character of the police force and amounts to an

“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law

enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI

of the Constitution. NO.

The real authority in these operations, as stated

in the Memo, is lodged with the head of a civilian

institution, the PNP, and not with the military.

Further, since none of the Marines was

incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,

there can be no appointment to a civilian position to

speak of.

The Marines render nothing more than assistance

required in conducting the patrols. As such, there

can be no “insidious incursion” of the military in

civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the

civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.


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Lastly, since the institution of the joint visibility

patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has

complained that his political or civil rights have been

violated as a result of the deployment of the

Marines.

The court dismissed the petitions.

Lacson vs.

Perez

State of

rebellion

May 1, 2001 President Macapagal‐

Arroyo, faced by an “angry and violent

mob armed with explosives, firearms,

bladed weapons, clubs, stones and

other deadly weapons” assaulting and

attempting to break into Malacañang,

issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring

that there was a state of rebellion in the

NCR. She likewise issued General Order

No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to

suppress rebellion in the NCR.

Warrantless arrests of several alleged

leaders and promoters of the

“rebellion” were thereafter effected.

The Petitions assail the declaration of a

state of rebellion by PGMA and the

warrantless arrests ellegedly effected

by virtue thereof, as having no basis in

fact and in law. Significantly, on May 6,

2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the

declaration in Metro Manila.

Accordingly, the instant petitions have

been rendered moot and academic.

Petitioners claim that the proclamation

of a “state of rebellion” is being used by

the authorities to justify warrantless

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the proclamation of a

“state of rebellion” is being used by the authorities

to justify warrantless arrests, as alleged by

Petitioner. NO.

In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the

authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of

persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the

circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest

feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the

declaration of a “state of rebellion.”

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the declaration is an

encroachment on the domain of the judiciary and

therefore violative of the doctrine of separation of

powers. NO

The Court disagrees with the allegation of

Petitioner. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution

expressly provides that “the President shall be the

Commander‐in‐Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he

may call out such armed forces to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”


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arrests.

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the

People’s Movement Against Poverty

(PMAP), for his part, argues that the

declaration of a “state of rebellion” is

violative of the doctrine of separation of

powers, being an encroachment on the

domain of the judiciary which has the

constitutional prerogative to

“determine and interpret” what took

place on May 1, 2001, and that the

declaration of a state of rebellion

cannot be an exception to the general

rule on the allocation of the

governmental powers.

Substantiated by the ruling in IBP vs. Zamora:

…The factual necessity of calling out the

armed forces is not easily quantifiable and

cannot be objectively established since

matters considered for satisfying the same is a

combination of several factors which are not

always accessible to the courts. Besides the

absence of textual standards that the court

may use to judge necessity, information

necessary to arrive at such judgment might

also prove unmanageable for the courts.

Certain pertinent information might be

difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the

courts. In many instances, the evidence upon

which the President might decide that there is

a need to call out the armed forces may be of

a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as

Commander‐in‐Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which

may be classified as highly confidential or

affecting the security of the state. In the

exercise of the power to call, on‐the‐spot

decisions may be imperatively necessary in

emergency situations to avert great loss of

human lives and mass destruction of poverty…

The Court dismissed the petitions.

Sanlakas vs.

Executive

Secretary

Oakwood

Mutiny, State

of rebellion

They came in the middle of the night.

Armed with high‐powered ammunitions

and explosives, some three hundred

junior officers and enlisted men of the

AFP stormed into the Oakwood

Premiere apartments in Makati City in

Section 18, Article

VII of the

Constitution,

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and

General Order No. 4, declaring a “state of rebellion”

is unconstitutional. NO.

It is true that for the purpose of exercising the

calling out power the Constitution (Section 18,


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the wee hours of July 27, 2003.

Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the

soldiers demanded, among other

things, the resignation of the President,

the Secretary of Defense and the Chief

of the PNP.

In the wake of the Oakwood

occupation, the President issued later in

the day Proclamation No. 427 and

General Order No. 4, both declaring “a

state of rebellion” and calling out the

Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

By the evening of July 27, 2003, the

Oakwood occupation had ended. After

hours‐long negotiations, the soldiers

agrred to return to barracks.

The President, however, did not

immediately lift the declaration of a

state of rebellion and did so only on

August 1, 2003, through Proclamation

No. 435.

In the interim, several petitions were

filed before this Court challenging the

validity of Proclamation No. 427 and

General Order No. 4.

Since the declaration was lifted,

petitions have become moot and

academic. However, in light of the fact

that once before, ruled on a like matter,

the Court treated the instant petitions

as exceptions in that they are capable of

repetition yet evading review.

Article VII) does not require the President to make a

declaration of a state of rebellion. In this regard, a

declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter

superfluity. At most it only gives notice to the nation

that such a state exists and that the armed forces

may be called to prevent or suppress it. The Court

finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal

significance.

The declaration of a state of rebellion cannot

diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.

For the same reason, apprehensions that the

military and police authorities may resort to

warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In

Lacson vs. Perez, the authorities may only resort to

warrantless arrests of persons suspected of

rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of

the Rules of Court. The warrantless arrest feared is

not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion.

In other words, a person may be subjected to a

warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether

or not the President has declared a state of

rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid

warrantless arrest are present.

While the Court may examine whether the power

to call out the armed forces was exercised within

constitutional limits or in a manner constituting

grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners

have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that

the President acted without factual basis.

The argument that the declaration of a state of

rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law

and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

requirement is a leap of logic. There is no indication

that the military tribunals have replaced civil courts

in the “theater of war” or that military authorities

have taken over the functions of civil government.

There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or

political rights. There is no indication that the

President has exercised judicial and legislative

powers.

The Petitions were dismissed.

Randolf David

et al. vs. Ermita

pp. 1017 These seven consolidated petitions for

certiorari and prohibition allege that in

issuing Proclamation No. 1017 (pp.

1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O.

No. 5), PGMA committed grave abuse

of discretion.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of

the said issuances.

On February 24, 2006, as the nation

celebrated the 20th anniversary of the

EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo

issued pp. 1017 declaring a state of

national emergency.

On the same day, pursuant to pp. 1017,

PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 which calls

upon the AFP and PNP to immediately

carry out the necessary and appropriate

actions and measures to suppress and

prevent acts of terrorism and lawless

violence.

Section 18, Article

VII of the

Constitution

Chapter 2, Book III

of EO 292

ISSUE 1: Whether the Court can review the factual

bases of pp. 1017.

As a rule, judicial inquiry can go no further than

to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision

is correct, but that the President did not act

arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not

correctness, but arbitrariness. In IBP vs. Zamora, the

Court further ruled that it is incumbent upon the

petitioner to show that the President’s decision is

totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by

way of proof, to support his assertion, then this

Court cannot undertake an independent

investigation beyond the pleadings.

Petitioners failed to show that PGMA exercising

of the call‐out power, by issuing pp.1017, is totally

bereft of factual basis.

Solicitor General, on behalf of respondents, filed

a Consolidated Comment and Memorandum that

shows a detailed narration of the events leading to

the issuance of pp. 1017, with supporting reports

forming part of the records. Mentioned are the


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On March 3, 2006, exactly one week

after the declaration of a state of

national emergency and after all these

petitions had been filed, the President

lifted pp. 1017 through the issuance of

pp. 1021.

In their presentation of the factual

bases of pp. 1017 and G.O. No. 5,

respondents stated the proximate cause

behind the executive issuances was the

conspiracy among some military

officers, leftist insurgents of the NPA,

and some members of the political

opposition in a plot to unseat or

assassinate President Arroyo. They

considered the aim to oust or

assassinate the President and take‐over

the reigns of government as a clear and

present danger. It is noteworthy that

respondents fully substantiate these

claims with actual incidents and actual

reports from the military and various

sources.

Petitioners allege several violations

against constitutional rights including

arrests, suppression of freedom of

speech, etc.

17, Article XII of the

escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious

threat of the Magdalo D‐Day, the defections in the

military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and

the reproving statements from the communist

leaders. There was also the Minutes of the

Intelligence Report and Security Group of the

Philippine Army showing the growing alliance

between the NPA and the military.

Petitioners presented nothing to refute such

events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the

Court is convinced that the President was justified in

issuing pp. 1017 calling for military aid.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not pp. 1017 and G.O. No. 5

are constitutional. No

2.1. Facial Challenge. Petitioners contend that pp.

1017 is void on its face because of overbreadth.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an

analytical tool developed for testing “on their faces”

statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of pp.

1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to

speech or even speech‐related conduct.

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not

intended for testing the validity of a law that

“reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining

comprehensive control over harmful,

constitutionally unprotected conduct.”

A facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine

will require the Court to examine pp. 1017 and


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Constitution

Section 17 reads: In

times of national

emergency, when

public interest so

requires, the State

may, during the

emergency and

under reasonable

terms prescribed by

it, temporarily take

over or direct

operation of any

privately‐owned

public utility or

business affected

with public interest.

pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its

actual operation to petitioners, but on the

assumption or prediction that its very existence may

cause others not before the Court to refrain from

constitutionally protected speech or expression.

Lastly, a facial challenge on the ground of

overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount

successfully, since the challenger must establish that

there can be no instance when the assailed law may

be valid. The petitioners did not even attempt to

show whether this situation exists.

2.2. Constitutional Basis of pp. 1017

First Provision: Calling‐out Power

Some petitioners vehemently maintain that pp. 1017

is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is not so,

What defines the character of pp. 1017 are its

wordings. It is plain therein that what the President

invoked was her calling‐out power.

pp. 1017, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the

Constitution, is a valid exercise of the President’s

call‐out power.

Second Provision: Take Care Power

pp. 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon

President Arroyo the power to enact laws and

decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the

Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in

Congress. They assail the clause “to enforce

obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders

and regulations promulgated by me personally or

upon my direction.”


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The President, under Chapter 2, Book III of EO 292

(Administrative Code of 1987), may issue any of the

following: Executive Orders, Administrative Orders,

Proclamations, Memorandum Orders,

Memorandum Circulars, General and Special Orders.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the

foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees

similar to those issued by Former President Marcos.

Presidential Decrees are of the same category and

binding force as statutes because they were issued

by the President in the exercise of his legislative

power during the period of Martial Law under the

1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that pp. 1017 is unconstitutional

insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to

promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is

peculiarly within the province of the legislature.

Third Provision: Power to take Over

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House

of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s

inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in pp. 1017 is an

encroachment on the legislature’s emergency

powers.

President only has authority to declare a state of

national emergency. However, to exercise

emergency powers would need a delegation from

Congress. pp. 1017 does not authorize the President

during the emergency to temporarily take over or

direct privately‐owned public utility or business

affected with public interest without authority from

Congress.

2.3. As Applied Challenge


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Petitioners aver that pp. 1017 should be struck

down for violating constitutional rights in that it

allowed the police to conduct illegal arrest and

searches, and other such violations.

Petitioners David and Llamas alleged arrests without

warrants.

Petitioners Cacho‐Olivares and Tribune Publishing

Co., Inc. claimed that CIDG operatives “raided and

ransacked without warrant” their office.

Petitioners KMU and NAFLU‐KMU et al. alleged that

their members were “turned away and dispersed”

when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue

to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the EDSA People

Power I.

The Court was guided by the question: “May this

Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional

on the ground that its implementor committed

illegal acts?” The answer is no. The criterion by

which validity of the statute or ordinance is to be

measured is the essential basis for the exercise of

power and not a mere incidental result arising from

its exertion…

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

In re: Torres v.

Director of

Prison

Conditional

pardon

Wilfredo Sumulong Torres was

convicted of two counts of estafa by the

court of First Instance of Manila before

1979. These convictions were affirmed

by the court of appeals. He was granted

Section 64(i) of the

Revised

Administrative

Code:

the Chief Executive

ISSUE 1: Did the exercise of the President’s

prerogative under Section 64(i) of the Revised

Administrative Code to determine, if any, any

breach of a condition of pardon in violation of the

pardonee’s act to due process and the constitutional


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

conditional pardon by the president of

the Philippines on April 18, 1979, the

condition being that he would not again

violate any penal laws of the

Philippines. He accepted and was

released from confinement.

May 21, 1986 the Board of Pardons

and Parole resolved to recommend to

the president to cancel Torres’ pardon

because Torres had been charged with

twenty counts of estafa and convicted

of sedition by the QC RTC. His

conditional pardon was canceled and

was arrested and confined in

Muntinlupa.

Torres’ wife and children pray for his

immediate release. This is an original

petition for habeas corpus.

is authorized to

order "the arrest

and re‐incarceration

of any such person

who, in his

judgment, shall fail

to comply with the

condition, or

conditions of his

pardon, parole, or

suspension of

sentence."

presumption of innocence constitute a grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lace or excess of

jurisdiction? NO.

Courts have no authority to interfere with the

grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted

criminal. Also, a conditional pardon is in nature a

contract between the Chief Executive and the

convicted criminal. The determination of the

violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively

in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive.

Therefore, no final judicial pronouncement as to the

guilt of a pardonee is required in determining

whether there was a breach of the terms of the

conditional pardon.

Garcia v.

Commission on

Audit

Executive

clemency

Petitioner Vicente Garcia was a

Supervising Lineman in the Region IV

Station of the Bureau of

Telecommunications in Lucena City. He

was summarily dismissed from servce

on the ground of dishonest for the loss

of several telegraph poles. A criminal

case for qualified theft was filed against

him with the Court of First Instance of

Quezon. Petitioner was acquitted on

the fact that petitioner was found

innocent and never having committed

the offense. Garcia sought

reinstatement to his former position

ISSUE 1: Is Garcia entitled to his back wages

pursuant to his reinstatement by grant of executive

clemency? YES.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to

government service entitles him to back wages. This

is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is

innocent from the start and to make reparation for

what he has suffered as a result of his unjust

dismissal from the service.


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but was denied by the Bureau of

Telecommunications. Hence petitioner

pleaded to the president for executive

clemency.

Petitioner was granted executive

clemency and was reinstated to his

former employment. He then claimed

payment for back wages but was denied

by the Commission on Audit saying that

since petitioner did not render any

service during the period before his

reinstatement, he is not entitled to back

wages. (No service, no pay)

Llamas v.

Orbos

Petitioner Rodolfo Llamas is the

incumbent Vice‐Governor of the

province of Tarlac.

March 1, 1991 he assumed, by

virtue of a decision of the Office of the

President, the governorship. Private

respondent Mariano Un Ocampo III is

the incumbent Governor of the

Province of Tarlac and was suspended

from office for 90 days in violation of

the Anti‐Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act. Public respondent Oscar Orbos

(Executive Secretary) is being impleaded

herein in that official capacity for having

issued, by authority of the President,

executive clemency to Ocampo.

March 1, 1991 Petitioner took his

oath of office as acting governor. He

Sec 19, Art 7 ISSUE 1: Can the president grant executive clemency

in administrative cases? YES.

The president can grant executive clemency

based on Art 7, Sec 19 of the constitution. The

constitution does not distinguish between cases that

executive clemency may be applied to. If the law

does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.

ISSUE 2: Were petitioner’s constitutional rights to

due process violated? NO.

The petitioner’s constitutional rights to due

process were not violated because his being not

notified of the subject of pardon is because a pardon

is private, delivered to the individual for whose

benefit it is intended. Therefore, petitioner need not

be notified.


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had until May 31, 1991 as acting

governor under the administrative

suspension order. However, Ocampo

was granted executive clemency and

the reassumption ceremony was held

on May 21, 1991.

Petitioner contends that the president

has the power to grant executive

clemency in criminal cases and not in

administrative cases.

Drilon v. Court

of Appeals

Presidential

pardon

The DOJ has brought this suit to annul

the decision of the Court of Appeals

prohibiting the government from

pursuing criminal actions against the

private respondents for the death of

Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez

during early martial law.

Private respondents Raul Paredes and

Rodolfo Ganzon were charged with

double murder. Paredes was acquitted

while Ganzon was sentenced to life

imprisonment with hard labor. Ganzon

was made to serve sentence (for 6

years) until he was released and placed

under house arrest (but was apparently

free to move in and out of his

residence). Ganzon claims he was

extended absolute pardon by the

president (Marcos).

Petitioners allege that the Court of

Appeals committed grave abuse of

ISSUE 1: Did the Court of Appeals commit grave

abuse of discretion in granting the prohibition?

NO.

Former deputy presidential executive assistant

Joaquin Venus, Jr. declared that Ganzon’s absolute

pardon was indeed signed by former president

Marcos. Also, former presidential executive assistant

Juan Tuvera testified that he was given by Venus the

Xerox copy of the presidential pardon.

If Ganzon was not actually extended absolute

pardon, then he should have remained incarcerated

or under house arrest until present time, which is

not the case. Also, it would seem that the president

commuted Ganzon’s imprisonment to 6 years, and

the house arrest being a condition. Therefore, he

has already served his full sentence and can no

longer be reinvestigated.

It is sufficient that Ganzon was voluntarily

released with terms or conditions. Commutation of

sentence need not be in a specific form.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

discretion in granting the prohibition

since Ganzon has not adequately

proved the fact of presidential pardon.

People v. Salle,

Jr.

Amnesty

(compare to

pardon)

Under Jones Law: pardon could be

granted any time after the commission

of the offense, either before or after

conviction

Under the 1973 constitution: pardon

could be granted only after final

conviction.

1981 amendments: removed limitation

of final conviction thereby bringing back

provision of Jones Law.

1987 constitution: pardon may be

granted only after conviction by final

judgment.

Judgment of conviction becomes final

when:

(1) no appeal is seasonably perfected

(2) accused commences to serve the

sentence

(3) right to appeal is expressly waived in

writing, except where the death penalty

was imposed by the trial court

(4) when accused applies for probation

Sec 19, Art 7 ISSUE 1: Is pardon granted to an accused during the

pendency of his appeal from a judgment of

conviction enforceable? NO.

Before an appellant may be validly granted

pardon, he must first ask for the withdrawal of his

appeal. The ‘conviction by final judgment’ limitation

of the present constitution prohibits the grant of

pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused

during the pendency of his appeal from his

conviction by the trial court.

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the

Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every

quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Government or government‐owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other

matters as may be provided by law.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two‐thirds of all the Members of the

Senate.



LIM VS.

EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY

G.R. NO.

151445

P. 540

Visiting

Forces

Agreement

Ponente: De Leon, Jr., J.

Petition for certiorari praying that

respondents be restrained from

proceeding with the so‐called

“Balikatan 02‐1” and the deployment of

U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for

being illegal and in violation of the

Constitution.

January 2002 personnel from the

armed forces of the USA started arriving

in Mindanao to take part in the

Balikatan 02‐1

February 1, 2002 petitioners Arthur

D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this

petition for certiorari and prohibition.

February 7, 2002 the Senate

conducted a hearing on the “Balikatan”

exercise wherein Vice‐President

TeofistoGuingona, Jr., concurrently

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented

the draft Terms of reference (TOR). Five

days later, he approved the TOR.

Sec. 25 Article XVIII

of the Constitution.

After the expiration

in 1991 of the

Agreement

between the

Republic of the

Philippines and the

United States of

America concerning

the Military Bases,

foreign military

bases, troops or

facilities shall not

be allowed in the

Philippines…

Section 5 (2) Article

VIII of the

Constitution.

Review, revise,

reverse, modify, or

affirm on appeal or

certiorari, as the

law or the Rules of

Court may provide,

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Balikatan 02‐1 is

covered by the VFA YES. The TOR of the Balikatan

fall within the context of the VFA.

Ratio 1:

o The ambiguity on whether the Balikatan falls

within the context of the VFA is couched on the

interpretation of the word “activities” by the

VFA.

o A review of pertinent sections of the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties provides

that the cardinal rule of interpretation of

treaties must involve an examination of the

text, which is presumed to verbalize the

parties’ intentions.

o The Court ruled that the ambiguity stemming

from the word “activities” arose by accident. It

held that it was deliberately made that way to

give the parties ample leeway in negotiation.

o Under this interpretation, the VFA gives

legitimacy to the Balikatan 02‐1. It falls under

the allowable or sanctioned activities in the

context of the agreement.

ISSUE 2: May American troops actually engage in

combat in Philippine territory? NO. US forces are


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final judgments and

order of lower

courts in:

(A) All cases in

which the

constitutionality or

validity of any

treaty, international

agreement, law…

prohibited from engaging in an offensive war on

Philippine territory.

Ratio 2:

o Neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign

troops to engage in an offensive war on


o Further, Article 2 (4) of the United Nations

Charter enjoins its countries party to it from the

use of force against the territorial integrity of

any state.

o The VFA and the MTD, as in all other treaties

and international agreements to which the

Philippines is a party must be read in the

context of the 1987 Constitution. Sections 2, 7,

and 8 of Article II of which are key provisions

useful in determining the extent to which

foreign military troops are allowed in Philippine

territory. It is notable that such provisions

prohibit offensive war by foreign countries on


Sec. 25 of Article XVIII seems to be in conflict with

our treaty obligations?

o Sec. 25 provides that foreign military bases,

troops or facilities after the expiration in 1991

of the agreement between the RP and the US

shall not be allowed in the Philippines except

under a treaty duly concurred in by the

senate…

o From the perspective of public international

law, a treaty is favored over municipal law. This

is not, however, the case in the Philippines. This

is evidenced by Section 5, Article VII of the

Constitution – the power of the Supreme Court

to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

judgments in all cases in which the

constitutionality of any treaty, law, decree, and

international agreement is in question, a notion

supported by the decision in Ichong vs.

Hernandez.

ISSUE 3: Are American troops actively engaged in

combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of

an alleged training and assistance exercise? The

Court may not rule on this matter.

Ratio 3:

o Such is a question of fact and is not a fit topic

for a special civil action for certiorari. The

Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

WHEREFORE, the petition and petition‐in‐

intervention are hereby DISMISSED without

prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in

form and substance in the proper Regional Trial

Court.

BAYAN V.

EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY

G.R. No.

159618

PP 547

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly

registered party‐list group established

to represent the marginalized sectors of

society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now

deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign

Affairs during the period material to this

case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was

impleaded in his capacity as then

Executive Secretary.

On December 28, 2000, the RP,

through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A.

Manalo, signed the Rome Statute of the

International Criminal Court which, by

its terms, is “subject to ratification,

Section 21 states:

No treaty or

international

agreement shall be

valid and effective

unless concurred in

by at least two‐

thirds of all the

Members of the

Senate.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the agreement was

contracted validly, which resolves itself into the

question of whether or not respondents gravely

abused their discretion in concluding it. YES it is

valid and there’s no grave abuse of discretion.

The Constitution vests in the President the power

to enter into international agreements, subject, in

appropriate cases, to the required concurrence

votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated,

executive agreements may be validly entered into

without such concurrence.

In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru

E/N BFO‐028‐03, then President Gloria Macapagal‐


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

acceptance or approval” by the

signatory states. Only 92 out of the 139

signatory countries appear to have

completed the ratification, approval and

concurrence process. The Philippines is

not among the 92.

The RP, represented by then DFA

Secretary Ople, agreed with and

accepted the US proposals embodied

under the US Embassy Note adverted to

and put in effect the Agreement with

the US government. In esse,

the Agreement aims to protect what it

refers to and defines as “persons” of

the RP and US from frivolous and

harassment suits that might be brought

against them in international tribunals.

In response to a query of then Solicitor

General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the

status of the non‐surrender agreement,

Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his

letter of October 28, 2003 that the

exchange of diplomatic notes

constituted a legally binding agreement

under international law; and that, under

US law, the said agreement did not

require the advice and consent of the

US Senate.

Section 25, Article

18:

After the expiration

in 1991 of the

Agreement

between the

Republic of the

Philippines and the

United States of

America concerning

military bases,

foreign military

bases, troops, or

facilities shall not be

Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign

Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and

discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the

end of the day, the President––by ratifying, thru her

deputies, the non‐surrender agreement––did

nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty

and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her

office.

The rationale behind this principle is the

inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among

the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the

government.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not x x x AGREEMENT IS VALID,

BINDING AND EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE

CONCURRENCE BY AT LEAST TWO‐THIRDS (2/3) OF

ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE x x x. YES.

One type of executive agreement is a treaty or a

treaty‐implementing executive agreement, which

necessarily would cover the same matters subject of

the underlying treaty.

In the instant case, it bears stressing that

the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome

Statute and not a State‐Party for lack of ratification

by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from

acts which would defeat the object and purpose of

the Rome Statute.

But over and above the foregoing considerations

is the fact that––save for the situation and matters

contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

allowed in the

Philippines except

under a treaty duly

concurred in by the

Senate and, when

the Congress so

requires, ratified by

a majority of the

votes cast by the

people in a national

referendum held for

that purpose, and

recognized as a

treaty by the other

contracting State.

Constitution]––when a treaty is required, the

Constitution does not classify any subject, like that

involving political issues, to be in the form of, and

ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely

prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of

the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete

the ratification process.

The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as

reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the

obligatory effect of executive agreements without

the concurrence of the Senate:

o x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into

binding agreements without the necessity of

subsequent Congressional approval has been

confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days

of our history, we have entered executive

agreements covering such subjects as

commercial and consular relations, most

favored‐nation rights, patent rights, trademark

and copyright protection, postal and navigation

arrangements and the settlement of claims. The

validity of these has never been seriously

questioned by our courts.

SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE VS.

JUDGE

LANTION

GR 139465

P. 564

Extradition Ponente: Puno, J.

On January 13, 1977 then President

Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the

Procedure for the Extradition of Persons

Who Have Committed Crimes in a

Foreign Country".

On November 13, 1994 then

Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,

P.D. 1069

Section 6. Issuance

of Summons;

Temporary Arrest;

Hearing; Service of

Notices.

(1) Immediately

upon receipt of the

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the private respondent is

entitled to the due process right to notice and

hearing during the evaluation stage of the

extradition process? NO. Respondent is bereft of

the right to notice and hearing during the

evaluation stage of the extradition process.

Ratio 1:

o A review of Section 6(1)(2) of P.D. 1069 and the

RP‐US Extradition Treaty reveals that there is


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

representing the Government of the

Republic of the Philippines, signed in

Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between

the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines and the Government of the

United States of America" (hereinafter

referred to as the RP‐US Extradition

Treaty). The Senate, by way of

Resolution No. 11, expressed its

concurrence in the ratification of said

treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of

Justice received from the Department

of Foreign Affairs a request for the

extradition of private respondent Mark

Jimenez to the United States for crimes

committed in the US.

On the same day, petitioner issued

Department Order No. 249 designating

and authorizing a panel of attorneys to

take charge of and to handle the case

pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential

Decree No. 1069. Upon technical

evaluation and assessment of the

extradition request, the panel found

irregularities must first be addressed.

Pending evaluation of the said

documents, respondent Jimenez wrote

to petitioner requesting a copy of the

extradition request from the US

government and that he be given ample

time to respond to the same. However,

request was denied by petitioner.

A petition was brought to the Regional

petition, the

presiding judge of

the court shall, as

soon as practicable,

summon the

accused to appear

and to answer the

petition on the day

and hour fixed in

the order…

(2) The order and

notice as well as a

copy of the warrant

of arrest, if issued,

shall be promptly

served each upon

the accused and the

attorney having

charge of the case.

no provision in both which gives an extraditee

the right to demand from the Secretary of

Justice copies of the extradition request from

the US Government and its supporting

documents and to comment thereon while the

request is still undergoing evaluation. Thus, the

right of the subject to have access to the

evidence in the hands of the executive

department is only during the judicial phase

and not during the evaluation phase.

o The Court also ruled that treaties should be

interpreted only in the light of their intent.

Extradition treaties provide the assurance that

the punishment of these crimes will not be

frustrated by the frontiers of territorial

sovereignty. The intent of the treaty is to ensure

that the perpetrators of such crimes will not be

overprotected by any of the signatory states.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25

wherein respondent Hon. Judge

Lantion, granted the petition of now

respondent Jimenez.

Petitioner Secretary of Justice appealed

to the Supreme Court, such appeal was

granted on a vote of 9‐6.

Respondent timely filed motion for

reconsideration. Hence, the instant

case.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

ARTICLE VIII: JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,

and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

SANTIAGO

V. BAUTISTA

32 SCRA 188

(1970)

p. 568

Honor

ranking

disputes

In Sero Elementary School in Cotabato

City, the Committee on the Rating of

Students for Honor deliberated and

adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia

Lingat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as

first, second and third honors

respectively for the school year 1964‐

1965.

The mother represented him while his

father served as their counsel. Reasons

alleged:

• The second placer Patricia had

never been a close rival except in

grade V

• The closest rival Socorro had been

so much benefited for being

coached and tutored by Mrs. Alpas,

their Grade VI English teacher and a

member of the selection committee

(honors)

• Some teachers giving Teodoro a

starting grade of 75% in Grade VI

with the intention to pull him to a

Section 1

xxx

Judicial power

includes the duty of

the courts of justice

to settle actual

controversies

involving rights

which are legally

demandable and

enforceable xxx

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the case at bar present a

justiciable controversy NO.

Actions questioned exercised neither judicial nor

quasi judicial functions in the performance of its

assigned task.

It is necessary that there be a law that gives rise

to some specific rights of persons under which

adverse claims to such rights are made. The tribunal

board itself has the power to determine what law is

in the exercise of its functions.

In Felipe v. Leuterio, it was basically declared that

the judiciary would not interfere with the verdicts of

judges/referees in contests/tournaments/

competitions. Also, no rights to prizes may be

asserted by the contestants because theirs was

merely a privilege to compete for the prize. That

privilege did not ripen into a demandable right

unless and until they were proclaimed winners.

“damnum absque injuria.” If malice or fraud had

been proven, it would be a different proposition. But

then the action, if there was error, should be


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

much lower rank

• Collusion among the teachers, etc.

The petitioner asked the court to set

aside the final list of honor students in

Grade VI and to enjoin the respondent

teachers from officially publishing and

proclaiming the said honor pupils in the

scheduled graduation exercises on May

21, 1965.

The injunction was denied by the lower

court the day before graduation for

restraining the exercises would shock

everybody. The graduation was held

with the same protested list of honor

students.

Appellant here assails the holding of the

lower court that his petition has no

cause of action.

directed to the guilty judge or judges but not against

other innocent judges. Besides, error is not

tantamount to a violation of a right.

MARCOS V.

MANGLAPUS

p. 570

The Extent of

Judicial

Review on

the forbidden

return of

Marcos

Feb 1986 Ferdinand Marcos was

deposed from the presidency via the

non‐violent “people power” revolution

and forced into exile. In his stead,

Corazon Aquino was declared President

of the Republic under a Revolutionary

government.

The accumulated foreign debt and the

plunder of the nation of the nation

attributed to Marcos and his cronies left

the economy devastated.

Section 1

xxx

Judicial power



xxx to determine

whether or not

there has been a

grave abuse of

discretion

amounting to lack

or excess of

jurisdiction on the

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to

review the case? NO.

General Rule: No, the issue constitutes a political

question. As such, the Court may not rule on it.

Exception: The Court's decision in this case would

undeniably have a profound effect on the political,

economic and other aspects of national life.

When political questions are involved, the

Constitution limits the determination to whether or

not there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of the official whose action is being questioned.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Now, Mr. Marcos, at his deathbed, has

signified his wish to return to the

Philippines to die.

However, Mrs. Aquino, considering the

dire consequences to the nation of his

return at a time when the stability of

the government is threatened from

various directions and the economy is

just beginning to rise and move

forward, has stod firmly on the decision

to bar the return of Marcos and his

family.

part of any branch

or instrumentality

of the Government

If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not

substitute its judgment for that of the official

concerned and decide a matter, which by its nature

or by law is for the latter alone to decide.

Accordingly, the question for the Court to

determine is whether or not there exist factual

bases for the President to conclude that it was in the

national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses

to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it

cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily

or that she has gravely abused her discretion in

deciding to bar their return.

We find that xxx there exist factual bases for the

President's decision…

LEO

ECHEGARAY V.

THE

SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE

G.R. 132601

January 19,

1999

pp. 571‐572

Finality of a

judgment in

relation to

jurisdiction of

the court

The instant motions concern matters

that are not incidents in G.R. No.

117472, where the death penalty was

imposed on petitioner on automatic

review of his conviction by this Court.

The instant motions were filed in this

case, G.R. No. 132601, where the

constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177

(Lethal Injection Law) and its

implementing rules and regulations was

assailed by petitioner.

Petitioner contends:

(1) the stay order. . . is within the scope

of judicial power and duty and does not

trench on executive powers nor on

congressional prerogatives;

(2) the exercise by this Court of its

power to stay execution was

Section 1

xxx

Judicial power



xxx to determine

whether or not

there has been a

grave abuse of

discretion

amounting to lack

or excess of

jurisdiction on the

part of any branch

or instrumentality

of the Government

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the court lost jurisdiction

over the case after it had rendered final judgment.

NO.

The Court did NOT lost its jurisdiction over the

case at bar and thus can restrain the execution of

the petitioner.

The Decision was not altered a whit by this Court.

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General,

the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this

Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the

same judgment.

Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the

well established jurisprudence on this issue as

follows: xxxxxxxxxx

the finality of a judgment does not mean that the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

reasonable;

(3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to

address incidental matters involved or

arising from the petition;

(4) public respondents are estopped

from challenging the Court's

jurisdiction; and

(5) there is no certainty that the law on

capital punishment will not be repealed

or modified until Congress convenes

and considers all the various resolutions

and bills filed before it.

Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the

finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its

jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. xxx

There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the

court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to

amend, modify or alter the same. xxx

The power to control the execution of its decision

is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the

subject of substantial subtraction for our

Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in

one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may

be established by law. xxx. It is because of these

unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts

have been conceded the inherent and necessary

power of control of its processes and orders to make

them conformable to law and justice.

UNITED STATES

V. NIXON

p. 573

Judicial

review on

executive

privilege

Following indictment alleging violation

of federal statutes xxx the Special

Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed.

Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c) for a subpoena

duces tecum for the production before

trial of certain tapes and documents

relating to precisely identified

conversations and meetings between

the President and others.

In support of his claim of absolute

privilege, the President's counsel urges

two grounds:

• the valid need for protection of

communications between high

Government officials and those who

advise and assist them in the

performance of their manifold

US CONSTI

ARTICLE 3, SECTION

1.

The judicial power

of the United

States, shall be

vested in one

Supreme Court, and

in such inferior

courts as the

Congress may from

time to time ordain

and establish. The

judges, both of the

supreme and

inferior courts, shall

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Judiciary was without

authority to review an assertion of executive

privilege by the President. NO.

Powell v. McCormack, supra, at 549. And in Baker

v. Carr, the Court stated:

"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure

been committed by the Constitution to another

branch of government, or whether the action of that

branch exceeds whatever authority has been

committed, is itself a delicate exercise in

constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility

of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the

Constitution."

Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor

the generalized need for confidentiality of high‐level


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

duties; the importance of this

confidentiality is too plain to

require further discussion

• the claim of absolute privilege rests

on the doctrine of separation of

powers

The court thereafter issued an order

for an in camera examination of the

subpoenaed material, having rejected

the President's contentions xxx that the

judiciary lacked authority to review the

President's assertion of executive

privilege.

hold their offices

during good

behaviour, and

shall, at stated

times, receive for

their services, a

compensation,

which shall not be

diminished during

their continuance in

office.

communications, without more, can sustain an

absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of

immunity from judicial process under all

circumstances. xxx and any absolute executive

privilege under Article II of the Constitution would

plainly conflict with the function of the courts under

the Constitution.

The impediment that an absolute, unqualified

privilege would place in the way of the primary

constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do

justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict

with the function of the courts under Article 3 xxx

but the separate powers were not intended to

operate with absolute independence.

[Because] the legitimate needs of the judicial

process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is

necessary to resolve those competing interests in a

manner that preserves the essential functions of

each branch.

INFOTECH

FOUNDATION,

ET AL V.

COMELEC

GR 159139

January 13,

2004

Pg 575

Invalid

automation

contract

Bidding

For the automation of the counting and

canvassing of the ballots in the 2004

elections, Comelec awarded the

Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium"

an entity that had not participated in

the bidding. Despite this grant, the poll

body signed the actual automation

Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions,

Inc.," a company that joined the bidding

but had not met the eligibility

requirements.

Comelec awarded this billion‐peso

Section 1

xxx

Judicial power



xxx to determine

whether or not

there has been a

grave abuse of

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the instant petition is

premature. NO.

There is grave abuse of discretion:

(1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution,

the law or jurisprudence or

(2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or

arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

In the present case, the Commission on Elections

approved the assailed Resolution and awarded the

subject Contract not only in clear violation of law

and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

undertaking with inexplicable haste,

without adequately checking and

observing mandatory financial,

technical and legal requirements. It also

accepted the preferred computer

hardware and software even if, at the

time of the award, they had undeniably

failed to pass eight critical requirements

designed to safeguard the integrity of

elections.

Respondents claim that petitioners

acted prematurely, since they had not

first utilized the protest mechanism

available to them under RA 9184, the

Government Procurement Reform Act,

for the settlement of disputes

pertaining to procurement contracts.

discretion

amounting to lack

or excess of

jurisdiction on the

part of any branch

or instrumentality

of the Government

its own bidding rules and procedure.

In any event, the peculiar circumstances

surrounding the unconventional rendition of the

BAC Report and the precipitate awarding of the

Contract by the Comelec en banc ‐‐ plus the fact that

it was racing to have its Contract with MPC

implemented in time for the elections in May 2004

(barely four months away) ‐‐ have combined to bring

about the urgent need for judicial intervention, thus

prompting this Court to dispense with the

procedural exhaustion of administrative remedies in

this case.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the

Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.



MALAGA V.

PENACHOS, JR.

Ponente: CRUZ, J

This controversy involves the extent and

applicability of P.D. No. 1818, which

prohibits any court from issuing

injunctions in cases involving

infrastructure projects of the

government.

Section 1, P.D.

1818: No court

shall have

jurisdiction to issue

any restraining

order, preliminary

injunction, or

preliminary

infrastructure

ISSUE 1: Is ISCOF covered by P.D. 1818? NO.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial

scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative

agencies. Hence, the challenged restraining order

WAS NOT IMPROPERLY ISSUED by the respondent

judge and the writ of preliminary injunction SHOULD

NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

The Iloilo State College of Fisheries

(ISCOF) through its Pre‐qualification,

Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)

published an invitation to bid for the

construction of a micro laboratory

building.

Petitioners submitted their

prequalification documents (PRE‐C1)

but were not allowed to participate

since the said documents were

submitted late. Petitioners filed a

complaint with the Iloilo RTC against

PBAC members and chairman, claiming

that they submitted their PRE‐C1 on

time.

Judge Lodrigio Lebaquin issued a

restraining order prohibiting PBAC from

conducting the bidding and awarding

project. Defendants filed a motion to lift

the restraining order on the ground that

the court was prohibited from issuing

restraining orders, preliminary

injunctions, and preliminary mandatory

injunctions by P.D. 1818.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion saying

that ISCOF was a state college BUT it

had its own charter and separate

existence and was not part of the

national government or of any local

political subdivision.

The trial court lifted the restraining

project or a mining,

fishery, forest or

other natural

resource

development

project of the

government, or any

public utility

operated by the

government,

including among

others public

utilities for the

transport of the

goods and

commodities,

stevedoring and

arrastre contracts,

to prohibit any

person or persons,

entity or

government official

from proceeding

with, or continuing

the execution or

implementation of

any such project, or

the operation of

such public utility,

or pursuing any

lawful activity

necessary for such

execution,

implementation or


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

order and denied the petition for

preliminary injunction.

operation.

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount

appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.



RADIOWEALTH

, INC. V.

AGREGADO

(AUDITOR

GENERAL)

In 1949, Radiowealth installed speaker

phones in the office of the Chief Justice

and the total expenditure amounted to

P585.

The clerk of the SC issued a certification

that the purchase of the gadgets were

valid and due to an emergency.

However, the chairman of the Property

Requisition Committee (PRC) refused to

issue disbursement therefore.

Auditor General Agregado affirmed

PRC’s ruling that the purchase of the

speaker phones are against E.O. 302

which states that the government

adopts a policy discontinuing open

market purchases.

ISSUE 1: Can the auditor general disallow such

expenditure by the SC? NO.

No one denies the auditor general the power to

audit, in accordance with law and administrative

regulations, expenditures of funds or property by

government. However, the auditor general’s

authority to audit and disapprove the court’s

expenditures has to be limited to the conditions

prescribed by the constitution which is TO NOT

INVADE THE COURT’S INDEPENDENCE. The auditor

general may not question the court’s expenditures

except when they are ‘irregular, unnecessary,

excessive and extravagant.’

BENGZON V.

DRILON

The petitioners are retired justices of

the SC and Court of Appeals who are

currently receiving monthly pensions

under R.A. 910 as amended by R.A.

1797. Section 3A which authorizes the

said pensions was repealed by President

Marcos. The legislature then re‐enacted

the said RAs to restore the privileges to

ISSUE 1: Does the questioned veto impair the Fiscal

Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary? YES.

Section 3, Article 8 of the Constitution provides

for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary. The veto of

the specific provisions by the president is

tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its

funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

the retired justices. However, President

Aquino vetoed certain portions of it.

to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice

to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds

appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary,

including the use of any savings from any particular

item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of

the judiciary is withheld. The Judiciary must enjoy

freedom and must be given a free hand on how to

augment appropriations where it is needed.

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division

of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en

banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application,

or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of

a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the

deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the

required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision

rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

FORTICH

(Provincial

Governor Of

Bukidnon) V.

CORONA

(Deputy Exec.

Sec.)

In their respective motions for

reconsideration, both respondents and

intervenors pray that this case be

referred to this court en banc.

The contend that the required number

of votes (three) was not met as the

motions for reconsideration were

ISSUE 1: Did the court’s resolution, wherein they

voted two‐two on the separate motions for

reconsideration, as a result of which the decision

was deemed affirmed, effectively resolve the said

motions? YES.

A careful reading of the above constitutional

provision, however, reveals that cases are decided,


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

resolved by a vote of two‐two.

and matters (including motions) are resolved. With

that said, only cases are referred to the Court en

banc for decision whenever the required number of

votes is not obtained. If there is a tie in the voting,

there is no decision. On the other hand, if a case has

already been decided by the division and the losing

party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure

of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie

in the voting does not leave the case undecided.

There is still a decision which must stand in view of

the failure of the members of the division to muster

the necessary vote for its reconsideration.

Therefore, if there is a tie, the motion for

reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is

therefore deemed affirmed.

PEOPLE V. DY Accused‐appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy

and Giovan Bernardino filed separate

motions for reconsideration xxx finding

them guilty of rape and acts of

lasciviousness.

In his motion, accused‐appellant Dy

submits that our decision should have

been merely recommendatory, in view

of the provision of Article VIII, Section 5

(2) (d) of the Constitution which

provides that the Supreme Court

sitting en banc has jurisdiction over

“[a]ll criminal cases in which the penalty

imposed is reclusion perpetua or

higher.” He contends that Supreme

Court Circular No. 2‐89 which provides

that death penalty cases shall be within

the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is

Section 4. (1) The

Supreme Court xxx

It may sit en banc or

in its discretion, in

division of three,

five, or seven

Members.xxx

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the SC Circular is

incongruous to Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (d) of the

Constitution? No.

The contention is misleading because this one is

actually covered by Article 8 Section 4 (1).

At present, it is made up of three

divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme

Court are not to be considered as separate and

distinct courts. Actions considered in any of these

divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in

effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not

to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but

as divisions of one and the same court

Only the Court sitting en banc can reverse the

decision of the Court in division.


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incongruous and incompatible with the

aforementioned constitutional

provision.

PEOPLE V. EBIO

Court en

banc re‐

deliberation

on rape case

of 11‐year

old daughter

Decision affirmed the judgment of the

Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,

Sorsogon finding the accused guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of raping his

eleven‐year old daughter, and

sentencing him to death.

In his motion for reconsideration, the

accused calls the attention of the Court

to the fact that only seven out of the

fourteen Justices sitting in the Court

signed the Decision. The other seven

Justices were on official leave at the

time.

(2) All cases

involving the

constitutionality of

a treaty,

international or

executive

agreement, or law,

which shall be

heard by the

Supreme Court en

banc, and all other

cases which under

the Rules of Court

are required to be

heard en banc,

including those

involving the

constitutionality,

application, or

operation of

presidential

decrees,

proclamations,

orders, instructions,

ordinances, and

other regulations,

shall be decided

with the

concurrence of a

majority of the

Members who

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the votes of only seven

Justices of the Court sitting en banc can validly

impose the death penalty and whether there is a

need for a quorum when it sits en banc? No

The term "quorum"' has been defined as "that

number of members of the body which, when legally

assembled in their proper places, will enable the

body to transact its proper business, or, in other

words, that number that makes a lawful body and

gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any

other valid corporate act."

The second paragraph of Article VIII Section 4 of

the 1987 Constitution does not expressly state the

number of Justices required to be present to

constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The

deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent

on what constitutes a quorum when the Court is

composed of only fourteen members. In case of

doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death

penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in

favor of the accused. Thus, in this case, considering

that the life of the accused is at stake, we deem it

wise to resubmit the case to the Court en banc for

re‐deliberation.


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Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of

lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,

proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

actually took part

in the deliberations

on the issues in the

case and voted

thereon.

(3) Cases or matters

heard by a division

shall be decided or

resolved with the

concurrence of a

majority of the

Members who

actually took part in

the deliberations on

the issues in the

case and voted

thereon, and in no

case, without the

concurrence of at

least three of such

Members. xxx


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months

without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the

admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under‐privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive

procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi‐judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

MARBURY VS

MADISON

p. 587

Judicial Power Ponente: Marshall, C.J.

On his last day in office, President John

Adams named forty‐two justices of the

peace and sixteen new circuit court

justices for the District of Columbia

under the Organic Act. The Organic Act

was an attempt by the Federalists to

take control of the federal judiciary

before Thomas Jefferson took office.

The commissions were signed by

President Adams and sealed by acting

Secretary of State John Marshall (who

later became Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court and author of this

opinion), but they were not delivered

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the

authority to review acts of Congress and determine

its constitutionality and being voidYES. The

Supreme Court has authority to review acts of

Congress.

Ratio 1:

o The powers of the Legislature are defined and

limited; and that those limits may not be

mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is

written.

o An act of the legislature, repugnant to the

Constitution, is void.

o It is the province and duty of the judicial

department to say what the law is. If a law be

in opposition to the Constitution, if both the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

before the expiration of Adams’s term

as president. Thomas Jefferson refused

to honor the commissions, claiming

that they were invalid because they had

not been delivered by the end of

Adams’s term.

Petitioner William Marbury was an

intended recipient of an appointment

as justice of the peace. Marbury applied

directly to the Supreme Court of the

United States for a writ of mandamus

to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of

State, Defendant James Madison, to

deliver the commissions. The Judiciary

Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme

Court original jurisdiction to issue writs

of mandamus “…to any courts

appointed, or persons holding office,

under the authority of the United

States.”

law and the Constitution apply to a particular

case, the court must determine which of these

conflicting rules govern the case. This is the

very essence of judicial duty.

o Those who controvert the principle that the

Constitution is the paramount law are reduced

to the necessity of maintaining that courts

must close their eyes on the Constitution, and

see only the law.

This doctrine would subvert the very

foundation of all written Constitutions. To say

that an act, which is entirely void for being

contrary to the Constitution, is yet, in practice,

completely obligatory. It would declare that,

however forbidden, any act of the legislature,

shall be effectual. It would be giving the

legislature practical and real omnipotence. It is

prescribing limits, and declaring that those

may be passed at pleasure.

ANGARA VS

ELECTORAL

COMMISSION

63 Phil. 139

(1936)

p. 589

Electoral

Commission

Ponente: Laurel, J.

December 3, 1935 National Assembly

by Resolution No. 8 confirmed the

election of petitioner to the said body.

December 9, 1935 Electoral

Commission fixed said date as the last

day for filing of protests against the

election, returns and qualifications of

members of the National Assembly.

It is contended by the petitioner that

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court has

jurisdiction over the caseYES. The Supreme Court

has jurisdiction.

Ratio 1:

o Upon principle, reason, and authority, the

Court clearly is of the opinion that it has

jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and

the subject matter of the present controversy

for the purpose of determining the character,

scope and extent of the commission’s power

as the sole judge of contests relating to the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

the resolution of the National Assembly

has the effect of cutting of the power of

the Electoral Commission to entertain

protests against the election, returns

and qualifications of members of the

National Assembly submitted after

December 3, 1935.

election, returns, and qualifications of the

members of the National Assembly.

o The constitution itself granted the duty to

determine the nature, scope and extent of the

powers of government to the judiciary. When

it mediates to allocate constitutional

boundaries, it does not assert superiority over

the other departments.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW:

o The power of judicial review is limited to actual

cases and controversies and limited further to

the constitutional question raised or the very

lismota presented.

o The judiciary does not pass upon questions of

wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.

o The courts accord the presumption of

constitutionality to legislative enactments.

TOLENTINO VS

SECRETARY OF

FINANCE

G.R. No.

115455,

August 25,

1994

p. 590

VAT Ponente: Mendoza, J.



system and enhance its administration

by amending the National Internal

Revenue Code.


Conference Committee Bill entitled “AN

ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE‐

ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING

IT TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS

ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE

Article VIII, Sec. 1

(2). Judicial power



to settle actual

controversies

involving rights

which are legally

demandable and

enforceable, and to

determine whether

or not there has

been a grave abuse

of discretion…

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court may

take cognizance of the caseYES. The Supreme

Court may take cognizance of the case.

Ratio 1:

o Although the case at bar is not ripe for

adjudication, the constitutionally vested duty

of judicial review mandates the Court to look

behind the barriers set by the principle of

separation of powers.

o The Court may invoke this duty (judicial

review) to justify its intervention in what is

essentially a case that at best is not ripe for

adjudication.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING

THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE

NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE,

AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER

PURPOSES”. This results from the

consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1630

(submitted in substitution of S.B. 1129

taking into consideration P.S. Res. No.

734 and H.B. No.1197) and House Bill

no. 1197.

Article VIII, Sec. 5

(2). Review, revise,

reverse, modify, or

affirm on appeal…

TAN VS

MACAPAGAL

43 SCRA 678

(1972)

p. 591

Constitutional

Convention

Ponente: Fernando, J.

Petitioner filed petition in the court

seeking declaratory relief and declaring

the authority of the 1971 Constitutional

Convention (CC) void.

Petitioner contends that the CC is

without authority to discuss and adopt

proposals which seek to revise the

present Constitution through the

adoption of a form of government

other than the form outlined in the

present Constitution.

The Court dismissed the petition for

lack of merit. A motion for

reconsideration was filed.

Petitioner Gonzales however, waited

until R.A. 4913, act submitting to the

electorate of certain proposed

amendments to the Constitution, was

enacted. It was only then that the

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court should

take cognizance of the caseNO.

Ratio 1:

o It is a prerequisite that something had been

accomplished or performed by either branch

before a court may invoke its power of judicial

review.

o The autonomy of the CC must be respected. It

is a coordinate agency and its powers are

transcendent, since it may radically alter the

organization and functions of all three

departments including the courts.

o The rule of non‐interference should be

adhered to until there is an actual case or

controversy. As long as any proposal to amend

the Constitution is not acted upon yet, there is

no room for interposition of judicial oversight.

Until then, the courts are devoid of

jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is

denied.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

matter was ripe for adjudication.

PACU VS

SECRETARY OF

EDUCATION

97 Phil. 806

(1955)

p. 592

Private

Schools,

Secretary of

Education

Ponente: Bengzon, J.

Petitioning colleges and universities

question the constitutionality of Act

No. 2706.

The law provides that before anyone

may operate a school, a permit from

the Secretary of Education must first be

obtained.

Petitioners claim that this constitutes a

deprivation of their liberty and property

without due process of law.

Respondent contends that the matter

constitutes no justiciable controversy

exhibiting unavoidable necessity of

deciding the constitutional questions

and that petitioners suffered no wrong

from the enactment of the questioned

Act.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Supreme Court should

take cognizance of the caseNO.

Ratio 1:

o The Act has been in existence for 37 years. The

Secretary of Education has supervised and

regulated the private schools in this country

without audible protest and with the approval

of the general public. The law has long been

treated as constitutional and important rights

have been dependent on it. Hence, the Court

may refuse to consider an attack on its validity.

o The petitioners suffered no wrong from the

Act. The petitioners even have permits to

operate and are actually operating by virtue of

their permits. This Court will not pass upon

validity where the assailant is one who availed

of its benefits.

o There is not even a threat by the Secretary that

he will revoke the permits of petitioners.

o The Court does not adjudicate mere scholarly

questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however

intellectually solid the problem may be.

JOYA V. PCGG

GR 96541

August 24,

1993

pp 593‐596

The 35 petitioners in this special civil

action for prohibition and mandamus

with prayer for preliminary injunction

and/or restraining order seek to enjoin

the PCGG from proceeding with the

auction sale scheduled Jan. 11, 1991 by

Christie’s of New York and of the Old

Masters Paintings and 18th and 19

th

century silverware seized from

ISSUE 1: Do the petitioners have legal standing to

file the instant petition? NO

“Legal standing” means a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party

has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result

of the governmental act that is being challenged.

Petitioners themselves allege that the paintings

were donated by private persons from different


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Malacañang and the Metropolitan

Museum of Manila and placed in the

custody of the Central Bank.

parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of

Manila Foundation. On this basis, the ownership of

these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or

corporation or the members thereof, and not to the

petitioners or to the public. Therefore, they do not

possess any clear legal right in this case.

ISSUE 1: Has this case become moot and academic?

YES

Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition

is to enjoin the respondent public officials from

holding the auction sale of the artworks on a

particular date which is long past, the issues raised

in the petition have become moot and academic.

However, there is a need to emphasize that the

court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit

which does not satisfy the requirements of an

actual case or legal standing when paramount

public interest in involved. In this case though,

there is no such justification.

Macasiano v.

National

Housing

Authority

Petitioner seeks to have sections 28 and

44 of RA # 7279 (Urban Development

and Housing Act of 1992) declared

unconstitutional. He claims locus standi

on his being a consultant of the DPWH

and as being a taxpayer. He alleges that

sections 28 and 44 ‘contain the seeds of

a ripening controversy that serve as

drawback’ to his ‘tasks and duties

regarding demolition of illegal

structures’ and that because of the said

sections, he ‘is unable to continue the

ISSUE 1: Does the petitioner have locus standi?

NO.

As a consultant of the DPWH, he is not vested

with any authority to demolish obstructions and

encroachments on properties of the public domain,

much less on private lands. His consultancy is

limited to certain duties which do not include the

above mentioned.

Nor is the petitioner an owner of an urban

property whose enjoyment and use would be


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

demolition of illegal structures which

he assiduously and faithfully carried out

in the past.’ As a taxpayer, he alleges

that ‘he has direct interest in seeing

that the public funds are properly and

lawfully disbursed.’

affected by the challenged provisions.

Although petitioner likewise anchors his locus

standi on the fact that he is a taxpayer, it does not

mean, however, that in each and every instance

where such a ground is invoked, this court is left

with no alternative except to hear the parties.

Mariano Jr. v.

COMELEC


of Section 51, Article X or RA # 7854

saying that it collides with Section 8,

Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the

constitution. They stress that under

these provisions, elective officials,

including members of the House of

Representatives, have a term of 3 years

and are prohibited from serving for

more than 3 consecutive terms. They

argue that by providing that the new

city shall acquire a new corporate

existence, section 51 of RA 7854

restarts the term of the present

municipal elective officials of Makati

and disregards the terms previously

served by them. They argue that

respondent Mayor Jejomar Binay can

still run for the same position and seek

another 3‐year consecutive term since

his previous 3‐year consecutive term as

municipal mayor would not be counted.

Sec 51. The present

elective officials of

the Municipality of

Makati shall

continue as the

officials of Makati

and shall exercise

their powers and

functions until such

time that a new

election is held and

the duly elected

officials shall have

already qualified

and assume their

offices: Provided,

The new city will

acquire a new

corporate

existence. The

appointive officials

and employees of

the city shall

likewise continue

exercising functions

and duties and they

ISSUE 1: Do petitioners have locus standi? NO.

Petitioners are residents of Taguig (except for

Mariano) and therefore are not the proper parties

to raise this abstract issue. Also, petition is

premised on the occurrence of many contingent

events like Mayor Binay will run again in the coming

mayoralty elections, and that he would seek re‐

election for the same post in the 1998 elections.

These are merely hypothetical issues which have

yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

shall be

automatically

absorbed by the city

government of the

City of Makati.

Sec. 8 The term of

the office of

elective local

officials, except

barangay officials,

which shall be

determined by law,

shall be three years

and no such official

shall serve for more

that three

consecutive terms.

Xxx

Sec. 7 the members

of the House of

Representatives

shall be elected for

a term of three

years which shall

begin, unless

otherwise stated by

law, at noon on the

thirtieth day of June

next following their

election. Xxx

Oposa v.

Factoran Jr.

Petitioners are minors represented by

their respective parents. They allege

that they are all citizens of the

Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to

ISSUE 1: Do the petitioners have locus standi?

YES

Petitioners assert that they represent their


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

the full benefit, use and enjoyment of

the natural resource treasure that is the

country’s virgin tropical rainforests.

They further asseverate that they

represent their generation as well as

generations yet unborn. Consequently,

it is prayed for that judgment be

rendered to (a) cancel all existing

timber license agreements in the

country (b) cease and desist from

receiving, accepting, processing,

renewing or approving new timber

license agreements.

generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their

personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding

generations can only be based on the concept of

intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right

to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Needless to say, every generation has a

responsibility to the next to preserve nature.

Kilosbayan v.

Guingona Jr.

This is a special civil action for

prohibition and injunction, with a

prayer for a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction which

seeks to prohibit and restrain the

implementation of the ‘Contract of

Lease’ executed by the PCSO and the

Philippine Gaming Management

Corporation in connection with the

online ‘lotto’ system.

Petitioners oppose the setting up of the

online lotto system on the bases of

serious moral and ethical

considerations.

ISSUE 1: Do petitioners have locus standi? YES

The court resolved to set aside the procedural

technicality in view of the importance of the issues

raised. The court adopted the liberal policy on locus

standi to allow taxpayers, members of the congress,

and non‐profit civic organizations to initiate and

prosecute actions to question the validity or

constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings

of various government agencies or

instrumentalities.

Tatad v.

Secretary of the

Department of

Energy

G.R. Nos.

124360 and

Oil

Deregulation

Law

Non‐

delegability of

legislative

Ponente: Puno, J.

The petitioners at bar challenge the

constitutionality of RA 8180: “An Act

Deregulating the Downstream Oil

Industry and For Other Purposes,”

which ends 26 years of government

Art VI, Sec. 1. The

legislative power

shall be vested in

the Congress xxx

except to the extent

reserved to the

people by the

CONNECTION TO ARTICLE VIII:

Although this case was placed in Art. VI (Legislative

Department), this case may be connected to the

Judicial Department because it speaks of locus

standi. The petitioners have locus standi, meaning

that they qualify to challenge the legality of official

acts done by the government. In this case, it was to


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

127867

November 5,

1997

pp. 65‐68

power

Locus Standi

regulation of the downstream oil

industry.

The deregulation phase has 2 phases:

1. The transition and

2. The full deregulation phase.

The first phase was commenced on

August 12, 1996. The second phase

implemented the full deregulation of

the Downstream Oil Industry through

EO 372 on February 8, 1997.

EO 372, on the other hand, speaks how

President Ramos implemented the full

deregulation phase. Petitioners

basically target Section 15 of RA 8180

for it assigns legislative power to the

president and the Department of

Energy.

(EO 372 is about how RA 7638

(“Department of Energy Act of 1992”)

provides that at the end of 4 years from

its December 1992 approval, the

president will institute programs and

timetable the deregulation of

appropriate energy projects and

activities of the energy sector, as sworn

to by President Fidel Ramos with the

powers vested in him by law to declare

the full deregulation of the downstream

oil industry.)

provision on

initiative and

referendum.

Art VIII, Sec. 5 (1).

Exercise original

jurisdiction over

cases affecting xxx

and over petitions

for certiorari

prohibition,

mandamus, quo

warranto, and

habeas corpus.

assail the constitutionality of RA 8180 due to the

depletion of the OPSF fund, a condition that wasn’t

found in such RA that would justify the President’s

act of fully deregulating the oil industry.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Section 15 of the RA 8180

is constitutional. NO. Section 15 of R.A. 8180 is

unconstitutional.

RATIO:

Administrative agencies may not issue

regulations that contravene law. The Court

invalidated EO 392 because in effecting the full

deregulation of the oil industry, President Ramos

added a standard, which did not appear in the

delegating law, RA 8180.

The standards set by the law were:

1. The time when the price of crude oil and

petroleum products in the world market

were declining, and

2. When the exchange rate of the Peso to the

US Dollar was stable.

EO 392 considered the depletion of the OPSF as

the 3rd factor for ordering the early implementation

of full oil deregulation. The Court holds that the

Executive Department failed to follow faithfully the

standards set by RA 8180 when it considered the

extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund.

Such consideration amounts to a rewriting of the

standards set forth in the RA 8180.

On the basis of the text of EO 392, it is


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In another case (GR 127867),

petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo,

Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tañada, the

Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., the

Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and

Sanlakas, also contest the

constitutionality of Section 15 of RA

8180 and EO 392, the latter because

implementing the full deregulation of

downstream oil industry is

unreasonable because it was made due

to the depletion of the OPSF (Oil Price

Stabilization Fund), a condition that

wasn’t found in RA 8180.

impossible to determine the weight given by the

Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF

fund. It could well be the principal consideration

for the early deregulation. The Court rules that the

early deregulation under EO 392 constitutes a

misapplication of RA 8180.

Kilosbayan v.

Morato

GR 118910

July 17, 1995

pp 605‐613

Petition to

invalidate ELA

dismissed

Rule on locus

standi vs. Rule

on real parties

in interest

The Kilosbayan, Inc. is an organization

described in its petition as "composed

of civic‐spirited citizens, pastors,

priests, nuns and lay leaders who are

committed to the cause of truth,

justice, and national renewal."

On January 25, 1995, the parties signed

an Equipment Lease Agreement

(hereafter called ELA) whereby the

PGMC leased on‐line lottery equipment

and accessories to the PCSO in

consideration of a rental equivalent to

4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sales

derived by the PCSO from the operation

of the lottery which in no case shall be

less than an annual rental computed at

P35,000.00 per terminal in commercial

operation.

On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed

seeking to declare the ELA invalid on

Rule 3, §2 of the

Rules of Court:

"Every action must

be prosecuted and

defended in the

name of the real

party in interest."

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners have claim

on the case? NO.

Petitioners have neither standing to bring this

suit nor substantial interest to make them real

parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3 §2.

Petitioners do not have such present substantial

interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring

this suit. Denying to them the right to intervene will

not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in

the execution of government contracts. Questions

as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the

necessity for a public bidding before they may be

made can be raised in an appropriate case before

the Commission on Audit or before the

Ombudsman.

A determination of the petitioners' right to bring

this suit is not precluded or barred by the decision

in the prior case between the parties.


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the ground that it is substantially the

same as the Contract of Lease nullified

in the first case.

Respondents question the right of

petitioners to bring this suit on the

ground that, not being parties to the

contract of lease which they seek to

nullify, they have no personal and

substantial interest likely to be injured

by the enforcement of the contract.

Petitioners on the other hand contend

that the ruling in the previous case

sustaining their standing to challenge

the validity of the first contract for the

operation of lottery is now the "law of

the case" and therefore the question of

their standing can no longer be

reopened.

The ELA, which petitioners seek to declare

invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different

from the 1993 Contract of Lease entered into by the

PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in

the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that petitioners

had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993

Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude

determination of their standing in the present suit.

SEE also RATIO in Gonzales v. Narvasa…

J. REGALADO DISSENTING:

It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority urges the

adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have failed to

perceive, but nonetheless refuses to concede, that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not be

straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations.

Indeed, if the majority would have its way in this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against irregularities or

excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue.

The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present case petitioners are not the real parties, hence they

cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that the Commission on Audit

would deign to deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain the

assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman?

I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the merits and on substantive considerations, not on dubious

technicalities intended to prevent an inquiry into the validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to

the benefit of a duly clarified and translucent transaction, just as respondents deserve the opportunity xxx

To pay unqualified obeisance to the beguiling locus standi or right of action doctrines posited by the majority in this case would

not only be an abdication of a clear judicial duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the people of recourse to us from dubious


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

government contracts through constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such stultification. This is a

contingency which is not only possible, but probable under our oligarchic society in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant

within a just regime of law still in posse.

Telebap v.

COMELEC

GR 132922

April 21, 1998

Pp 614‐615

B.P. BLG. 881

GMA

Petitioner Telecommunications and

Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,

Inc. is an organization of lawyers of

radio and television broadcasting

companies. They are suing as citizens,

taxpayers, and registered voters.

The other petitioner, GMA Network,

Inc., operates radio and television

broadcasting stations throughout the

Philippines under a franchise granted

by Congress.

Petitioners challenge the validity of §92

on the ground (1) that it takes property

without due process of law and without

just compensation; (2) that it denies

radio and television broadcast

companies the equal protection of the

laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the

power given to the COMELEC to

supervise or regulate the operation of

media of communication or

information during the period of

election.

Doctrine:

A citizen will be

allowed to raise

a constitutional

question only

when he can

show that he

has personally

suffered some

actual or

threatened

injury as a

result of the

allegedly illegal

conduct of the

government;

the injury fairly

is fairly

traceable to the

challenged

action; and the

injury is likely to

be redressed by

a favorable

action.

ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT TELEBAP has a legal

standing? NO.

Members of petitioner have not shown that they

have suffered harm as a result of the operation of

§92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an

interest as registered voters since this case does not

concern their right of suffrage. A party suing as a

taxpayer must specifically show that he has a

sufficient interest in preventing the illegal

expenditure of money raised by taxation and that

he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the

enforcement of the questioned statute.

TELEBAP have NO standing to assert the rights of

radio and television broadcasting companies. The

mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in

the broadcast industry does not entitle them to

bring this suit in their name as representatives of

the affected companies.

ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT GMA has a legal

standing? YES

GMA operates radio and television broadcast

stations in the Philippines affected by the

enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio

and television broadcast companies to provide free

air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates


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for campaign and other political purposes.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to

several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in

connection with the 1992 presidential election and

the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to

suffer even more should it be required to do so

again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will

suffer losses again because it is required to provide

free air time is sufficient to give it standing to

question the validity of §92.

Gonzalez v.

Narvasa

EO 43‐ PCCR Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a

citizen and taxpayer, assails the

constitutionality of the creation of the

Preparatory Commission on

Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of

the positions of presidential

consultants, advisers and assistants.

Respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa,

impleaded in his capacity as Chairman

of the PCCR.

The Preparatory Commission on

Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was

created by President Estrada on

November 26, 1998 by virtue of

Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in

order “to study and recommend

proposed amendments and/or revisions

to the 1987 Constitution, and the

manner of implementing the same.

Petitioner disputes the constitutionality

of the PCCR on two grounds:

it is a public office which only the

legislature can create by way of a

Doctrine/s:

An action is

considered

“moot” when it

no longer

presents a

justiciable

controversy

because the

issues involved

have become

academic or

dead.

A citizen

acquires

standing only if

he can establish

that he has

suffered some

actual or

threatened

injury as a

result of the

ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT the petitioner has a

standing as a citizen and taxpayer? NO.

In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, we denied

standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease

agreement between the Philippine Charity

Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming

Management Corporation, stating that,

… in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes

Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was

denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form

of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid

because, as the Court held,

Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer,

taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But

nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that

his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have

been directly and personally injured by the

operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. xxx He must

be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but

also that he has sustained or in immediate danger

of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its

enforcement, and not merely that he suffers


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

law

creating such a body the President

is intervening in a process from

which he is totally excluded by the

Constitution – the amendment of

the fundamental charter

It is alleged by respondents that, with

respect to the PCCR, this case has

become moot and academic.

In addition to the mootness of the

issue, petitioner’s lack of standing

constitutes another obstacle to the

successful invocation of judicial power

insofar as the PCCR is concerned.

allegedly illegal

conduct of the

government;

the injury is

fairly traceable

to the

challenged

action; and the

injury is likely to

be redressed by

a favorable

action.

A taxpayer is

deemed to have

the standing to

raise a

constitutional

issue when it is

established that

public funds

have been

disbursed in

alleged

contravention

of the law or

the

Constitution.

thereby in some indefinite way xxx

We apprehend no difference between the

petitioner in Valmonte and the present

petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what

particularized interest they have for bringing this

suit. xxx

Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained

or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury

attributable to the creation of the PCCR.

DEL MAR, ET.

AL. V. PAGCOR

GR 138298

Nov. 29, 2000

PP 616‐619

PAGCOR’s Jai

Alai

These two consolidated petitions

concern the issue of whether the

franchise granted to the Philippine

Amusement and Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR) includes the right to manage

and operate jai‐alai.

The Philippine Amusement and Gaming

Doctrine:

Taxpayers are

allowed to sue

where there is a

claim of illegal

disbursement of

public funds, that

ISSUE 1: Do petitioners have locus standi? YES.

Petitioners complain that the operation of jai‐

alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the

legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise. To

the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so

is the power of each member thereof, since his


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Corporation is a government‐owned

and controlled corporation organized

and existing under Presidential Decree

No. 1869 which was enacted on July 11,

1983.

PAGCOR entered into

an Agreement with private respondents

Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and

Filipinas Gaming Entertainment

Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME)

wherein it was agreed that BELLE will

make available to PAGCOR the required

infrastructure facilities including the

main fronton, as well as provide the

needed funding for jai‐alai operations

with no financial outlay from PAGCOR,

while PAGCOR handles the actual

management and operation of jai‐alai.

Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S.

Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and

intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing

as taxpayers and in their capacity as

members of the House of

Representatives representing the First

District of Cebu City, the Lone

Congressional District of Malabon‐

Navotas, the Third Congressional

District of Quezon City, and the Third

Congressional District of Bukidnon,

respectively.

Respondents allege that petitioners

have no legal standing to file a

taxpayer’s suit because the operation

of jai‐alai does not involve the

public money is

being deflected to

any improper

purpose,or where

petitioners seek to

restrain respondent

from wasting public

funds through the

enforcement of an

invalid or

unconstitutional

law.

A member of the

House of

Representatives has

standing to

maintain inviolate

the prerogatives,

powers and

privileges vested by

the Constitution in

his office.

office confers a right to participate in the exercise

of the powers of that institution, so petitioners

contend.

As presciently stressed in the case of Kilosbayan,

Inc., viz:

“We find the instant petition to be of

transcendental importance to the public. The

issues it raised are of paramount public interest and

of a category even higher than those involved in

many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of

such issues immeasurably affect the social,

economic, and moral well‐being of the people even

in the remotest barangays of the country and the

counter‐productive and retrogressive effects of the

envisioned on‐line lottery system are as staggering

as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The

legal standing then of the petitioners deserves

recognition x x x.”


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

disbursement of public funds.

MATIBAG V.

BENIPAYO

GR 149036

April 2, 2002

COMELEC Ad‐

interim

appointments

Reassignment

of Matibag to

law

department

Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag

questions the constitutionality of the

appointment and the right to hold

office of Alfredo L. Benipayo as

Chairman of the Commission on

Elections et al

On March 22, 2001, President Gloria

Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad

interim, Benipayo as COMELEC

Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as

COMELEC Commissioners, each for a

term of seven years and all expiring on

February 2, 2008.

Further renewals of appointments for

same term of seven years were made

on June 1, 2001, June 8, 2001, and

September 6, 2008 because of the

failure of CA to act on it before

Congress adjourns.

Petitioner was removed as Director IV

of the EID and her reassignment to the

Law Department by Benipayo.

Doctrine:

COMELEC

Resolution No. 3300

does not require

that every transfer

or reassignment of

COMELEC personnel

should carry the

concurrence of the

COMELEC as a

collegial body.

The COMELEC

Chairman is the

official expressly

authorized by law

to transfer or

reassign COMELEC

personnel.

ISSUE 1: WHETHER OR NOT the petitioner has a

locus standi? YES.

Petitioner has a personal and substantial stake in

the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s

assumption of office.

If Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman

because he assumed office not in accordance with

the Constitution, then petitioner’s reassignment is

illegal and she has a cause to complain provided the

reassignment is not in accordance with the Civil

Service Law.

In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of

paramount importance to the public. The legality of

the directives and decisions made by the COMELEC

in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national

elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional

issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved.

Petition dismissed. Reassignment authorized.

Tatad v.

Secretary of the

Department of

Energy

G.R. Nos.

124360 and

127867

November 5,

1997

Oil

Deregulation

Law

Non‐

delegability of

legislative

power

Locus Standi

Ponente: Puno, J.

The petitioners at bar challenge the

constitutionality of RA 8180: “An Act

Deregulating the Downstream Oil

Industry and For Other Purposes,”

which ends 26 years of government

regulation of the downstream oil

industry.

The deregulation phase has 2 phases:

Art VI, Sec. 1. The

legislative power

shall be vested in

the Congress xxx

except to the extent

reserved to the

people by the

provision on

initiative and

referendum.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners have Locus

Standi YES.

The petitioners have locus standi, meaning that

they qualify to challenge the legality of official acts

done by the government. In this case, it was to

assail the constitutionality of RA 8180 due to the

depletion of the OPSF fund, a condition that wasn’t

found in such RA that would justify the President’s

act of fully deregulating the oil industry.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

pp. 65‐68

3. The transition and

4. The full deregulation phase.

The first phase was commenced on

August 12, 1996. The second phase

implemented the full deregulation of

the Downstream Oil Industry through

EO 372 on February 8, 1997.

EO 372, on the other hand, speaks how

President Ramos implemented the full

deregulation phase. Petitioners

basically target Section 15 of RA 8180

for it assigns legislative power to the

president and the Department of

Energy.

(EO 372 is about how RA 7638

(“Department of Energy Act of 1992”)

provides that at the end of 4 years from

its December 1992 approval, the

president will institute programs and

timetable the deregulation of

appropriate energy projects and

activities of the energy sector, as sworn

to by President Fidel Ramos with the

powers vested in him by law to declare

the full deregulation of the downstream

oil industry.)

In another case (GR 127867),

petitioners Edcel Lagman, Joker Arroyo,

Enrique Garcia, Wigberto Tañada, the

Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., the


Exercise original

jurisdiction over

cases affecting xxx

and over petitions

for certiorari

prohibition,

mandamus, quo

warranto, and

habeas corpus.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and

Sanlakas, also contest the

constitutionality of Section 15 of RA

8180 and EO 392, the latter because

implementing the full deregulation of

downstream oil industry is

unreasonable because it was made due

to the depletion of the OPSF (Oil Price

Stabilization Fund), a condition that

wasn’t found in RA 8180.

Bayan v.

Executive

Secretary

GR 138570

October 10,

2000

pp. 547‐564

Ponente: Buena, J.

March 14, 1947 PH and the US

forged a Military Bases Agreement

which formalized, among others, the

use of installations in the Philippine

territory by US military personnel.

August 30, 1951 To further

strengthen their defense and security

relationship, both countries entered

into a Mutual Defense Treaty.

In view of the expiration of the RP‐US

Military Bases Agreement both

countries negotiated for its possible

extension.

September 16, 1991 The PH Senate

rejected the extension of the US

military bases, which was now called

the RP‐US Treaty of Friendship,

Cooperation and Security.


Judicial power

includes the power

xxx to determine

whether or not

there has been a

grave abuse of

discretion

amounting to lack

or excess of

jurisdiction on the

part of any branch

or instrumentality

of the government.


Although this case was placed in Art. VII (Executive


Judicial Department because it speaks of alleged

grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch

or instrumentality of the government, pursuant to

Section 1 of Article VIII.

In the case at bar, the petitioners allege that the

President committed grave abuse of discretion by

entering into international agreements without the

required concurrence votes of the Senate. However,

the Court ruled that the Constitution vests in the

President the power to enter into executive

agreements without such concurrence from the

Senate. The President was merely exercising a given

right. Furthermore, there is no occasion for the

Court to exercise its corrective power. It has no

power to look into what it thinks is an apparent

error.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the VFA is governed by the

provisions of Art. 7, Sec. 21, or Art. 18, Sec. 25, of

the 1987 Constitution. Article 18, Section 25


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

During the term of Pres. Ramos, he

approved the Visiting Forces

Agreement, which was the result of a

negotiation on “the complementing

strategic interests of the US and the

Philippines in the Asia‐Pacific region”.

It provides for the mechanism for

regulating the circumstances and

conditions under which the US Armed

Forces and defense personnel may be

present in the PH.

October 5, 1998 Pres. Joseph

Estrada, through respondent Secretary

of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon,

ratified the VFA.

The Instrument of Ratification, the

letter of the President and the VFA

were then transmitted to the Philippine

Senate for concurrence pursuant to Sec

21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

The necessary 2/3 votes of the

members of the Senate were gathered

thus concurring with the ratification of

the VFA under Resolution No. 18.

June 1, 1999 VFA officially entered

into force after the Exchange of Notes

between Siazon and the Us

Ambassador, Hubbard.

Petitioners argue that the VFA is

(Art VII, Sec. 21:

No treaty or

international

agreement shall be

valid and effective

unless concurred in

by at least two‐

thirds of all the

Members of the

Senate.)

(Relevant: Article

XVIII, Sec. 25. After

the expiration in

1991 of the

Agreement

between the RP and

the US concerning

military bases,

foreign military

bases, troops, or

facilities shall not be

allowed in the PH

should apply.

RATIO 1:

Art. 18, Sec. 25, should apply to this case

because it is a special provision that specifically

deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,

troops, or facilities.

This section disallows for foreign military bases,

troops, or facilities in the country, unless the ff: had

been sufficiently met:

1. It must be under a treaty

2. The treaty must be duly concurred in by the

Senate, and when so required by Congress,

ratified by a majority of the votes cast by

the people in a national referendum

3. Recognized as a treaty by the other

contracting State.

The VFA possesses the first two requisites with

regards to the proscription of the VFA.

Although the Court ruled that Art. 18, Sec. 25

would prevail in this case, Art. 7, Sec. 21, may also

be applied, but it will be in a limited sense, for it will

address only the sole purpose of determining the

number of votes required to obtain the valid

concurrence of the Senate. In effect, even though

Art. 18, Sec. 25 was the law applicable to the case

at bar, its “concurrence requirement” was subject to

the provisions of Art. 7, Sec. 21.

o It was held that the Agreement was still valid,

binding, and effective, without the concurrence

by at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate,

pursuant to Art. 7, Sec. 21.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

governed by the provision of Article 18,

Sec. 25 of the 1987 Constitution,

considering that the VFA has for its

subject the presence of foreign military

troops in the Philippines.

Respondents maintain that Article 7,

Sec. 21, should apply because the VFA

is not a basing arrangement but an

agreement which involves merely the

temporary visits of US personnel

engaged in joint military exercises.

except under a

treaty duly

concurred in by the

Senate and, when

the Congress so

requires, ratified by

a majority of the

votes cast by the

people in a national

referendum held for

that purpose, and

recognized as a

treaty by the other

contracting State.)

o One type of executive agreement is a treaty or a

treaty‐implementing executive

agreement, which necessarily would cover the

same matters subject of the underlying treaty.

o What the Constitution merely prescribes is that

treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a

vote defined therein to complete the ratification

process. The Court has in Eastern Sea Trading,

as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the

obligatory effect of executive agreements

without the concurrence of the Senate.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the agreement was

contracted validly, meaning Whether or not the

respondents gravely abused their discretion in

concluding it, pursuant to Art. 7, Sec. 21. YES.

RATIO 2:

Yes, it is valid. There was no grave abuse of

discretion.

The Constitution vests in the President the

power to enter into international agreements,

subject, in appropriate cases, to the required

concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier

indicated, executive agreements may be validly

entered into without such concurrence.

It is the Court’s considered view that the

President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the

same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within

he confines and limits of the powers vested in him

by the Constitution. He honestly believed that the

VFA fell within the ambit of Art. 7, Sec. 21, referring


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

the VFA for the concurrence of the Senate, when he

should have been adhering to Art. 18, Sec. 25

instead. Certainly, no abuse of discretion was made

because there was no act that was committed that

showed an abuse of patent, gross, and capricious

manner.

The rationale behind this principle is the

inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among

the legislative, executive and judicial branches of

the government.

IBP v. Zamora

GR 141284

August 15,

2000

pp. 474‐482

President

Estrada

TRO

Marines

PNP

Locus standi

Judicial

Review


At bar is a special civil action for

certionari and prohibition with prayer

for issuance of a TRO seeking to nullify

on constitutional grounds the order of

President Estrada commanding the

deployment of the Philippine Marines

to join the Philippine National Police in

visibility patrols around the metropolis.

Art. VII, Sec. 18.

The President shall

be Commander‐in‐

Chief of all the AFT

and whenever it

becomes necessary,

he may call out such

armed forces to

prevent or suppress

lawless violence,

invasion, or

rebellion. xxx

Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (2).

Judicial power



to settle actual

controversies

involving rights

which are legally

demandable and


Although this case was placed in Art. VII (Executive


Judicial Department because it speaks of locus

standi and the power of judicial review. The

petitioners did not have locus standi, meaning that

they did not qualify to challenge the legality of

official acts done by the government, but in this

case, the Court relaxed its ruling because the issue

was of transcendental importance. This case also

speaks about political questions and justiciable

issues.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners have locus

standi. NO.

RATIO: No. The power of judicial review imposes

the following requisites:

1. Existence of an actual and appropriate case

2. A personal and substantial interest of the

party (locus standi) raising the

constitutional question


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

enforceable, and to

determine whether

or not there has

been a grave abuse

of discretion

amounting to lack

or excess of

jurisdiction on the

part of any branch

or instrumentality

of the government.

Art VIII, Sec. 5 (1)

Exercise original

jurisdiction over

cases affecting xxx

and over petitions

for certiorari

prohibition,

mandamus, quo

warranto, and

habeas corpus.

3. Case must be filed at the earliest

opportunity

4. The constitutional question is unavoidable

or is the very lis mota of the case.

The petitioners (The Integrated Bar of the

Philippines) had no legal standing, but the Court,

through its discretion, relaxed its ruling in order to

arrive at a resolution, since the issue was of

transcendental importance.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not President Estrada was

justified in invoking his “calling out power” YES.

RATIO 2: Yes. The issue was a political question

that involved the wisdom, and not the legality of

the act. If the Court exercised its power of judicial

review over the case, it would be violating the

principle of the separation of powers. The Court

has no jurisdiction over the President’s use of his

discretionary power to decide to use his “calling out

power.”

ISSUE 3: Whether or not the act of deploying the

Marines to join the PNP is a violation of the

supremacy of civilian authority in the country NO

RATIO 3: No. The deployment of the Marines in

joining the PNP does not violation civilian

supremacy since it is only a joint and mutual

cooperation between the two. There has been

multifarious activities wherein military aid has

rendered exemplifying activities that bring both

civilian and military together in a relationship of


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

communication. Such activities include elections,

administration of the Philippine National Red Cross,

conservation of natural resources, enforcement of

customs laws, sanitary inspections, anti‐drug

enforcement activities, etc.

Macalintal v.

Comelec

GR 157013

July 10, 2003

pp. 618‐619

Locus standi

(taxpayer’s

suit)

Overseas

Absentee

Voting Act

Justiciable

controversies

Ponente: Austria‐Martinez, J.

Before the Court is a petition for

certiorari and prohibition filed by

Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the

PH Bar, assailing the constitutionality of

certain provisions of RA 9189 (“The

Overseas Absentee Voting Act of

2003”).

This is a taxpayer’s suit, for the

petitioner claims that he has actual and

material legal interest in the subject

matter in seeing to it that public funds

are properly and lawfully used and

appropriated.

The petitioner claims that the assailed

RA misappropriates funds under its

Section 29, in that it provides a

supplemental budget in the General

Appropriates Act of the year.


Exercise original

jurisdiction over

cases affecting xxx

and over petitions

for certiorari

prohibition,

mandamus, quo

warranto, and

habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal possesses locus

standi NO.

RATIO: No, BUT the Court relaxed its ruling through

its own discretion.

The rule on suing as a taxpayer involves that

there must first be an alleged disbursement of

public funds, bringing forth such taxpayer’s right to

restrain officials from what he would deem an

unconstitutional act, which would result in the

misapplication of public funds.

When an action of the legislative branch is

seriously alleged to have infringed on the

Constitution, it becomes not only the right, but in

fact, the duty of the judiciary to settle the

justiciable controversy.

Considering the transcendental importance to

the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with

the Court’s duty of seeing to it that other branches

of the government stay within the limits of the

discretionary powers granted them under the 1987

Constitution, the Court has brushed aside

technicalities of procedure and has taken

cognizance of this petition. The question of


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

propriety of the instant petition was also filed when

there were no other ongoing proceedings.

The Court decided to disregard the constitutional

issues raised before it, reasoning that it has been

more than 15 years since the ratification of 1987

Constitution, which required Congress to provide a

system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos

abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy made

the Court decide to resolve the instant petition to

determine whether or not the Congress acted

within the limits of the Constitution or if it had

gravely abused the discretion granted to it.

White Light

Corporation v.

City of Manila

GR 122846

January 20,

2009

pp. 619‐620

Admission

Rates in

Hotels,

Motels, etc.

Manila City

Ordinance

Equal

protection

rights

Ponente: Tinga, J.

This petition seeks to reverse the

Decision of the Court of Appeals,

challenging the validity of Manila City

Ordinance No. 7774: “An Ordinance

Prohibiting Short‐Time Admission,

Short‐Time Admission Rates, and

Wash‐Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,

Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension

Houses, and Similar Establishments in

the City of Manila.”

(December 15, 1992 The Malate

Tourist and Development Corpotation

(MTDC) filed a complaint for

declaratory relief with prayer for a writ

of preliminary injunction and/or TRO

with the RTC of Manila‐Branch 9,

impleading as defendant, the City of

Manila, represented by Mayor Lim.)


Exercise original

jurisdiction over

cases affecting xxx

and over petitions

for certiorari

prohibition,

mandamus, quo

warranto, and

habeas corpus.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners can

represent 3rd parties as intervenors.

(Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments

offering “wash up’ rates, their business is being

unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance.

Moreover, the equal protection rights of their

clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the

issue is Whether or not these establishments have

the requisite standing to plead for protection of

their clients’ equal protection rights.) YES.

RATIO 1: Yes. The petitioners have the right to

assert the constitutional rights of their clients to

patronize their establishments for a “wash‐rate”

time frame.

The doctrine of locus standi is built on the

principle of the separation of powers. The judicial

branch may not interfere with the actions rendered

by its co‐equal branches of government. A “direct

and personal interest” presents the most obvious


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

The MTDC basically prayed that the

Ordinance (mentioned above), insofar

as it includes motels and inns as among

its prohibited establishments, be

declared invalid and unconstitutional.

(December 21, 1992 The petitioners,

along with Titanium Corporation (TC)

and Sta. Mesa Tourist and

Development Corporation (STDC), filed

a motion to intervene and to admit

attached complaint‐in‐intervention.)

The petitioners basically filed an

intervention based on the ground that

the Ordinance directly affects their

business interests as operators of drive‐

in hotels and motels in Manila.

December 23, 1992 RTC granted the

petitioner’s motion to intervene.

cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner’

standing.

The three constitutional standing requirements

are:

1. Injury

2. Causation

3. Redressability.

However, these general rules have exceptions,

too, namely:

1. Overbreadth doctrine

2. Taxpayer suits

3. Third party standing (especially in the PH)

4. The doctrine of transcendental importance.

The case at bar applies the overbreadth doctrine

and third party standing as exceptions to

constitutional standing. The petitioners (WLC) here

have a close relation to the third parties (TC and

STDC), and that there is also a hindrance to the

third party’s ability to protect his/her own interests.

In overbreadth doctrine analysis, the challengers

to government action are permitted to raise the

rights of third parties when a statute needlessly

restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Here, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance

interferes with the right to liberty of their clients.

Based on the allegations, the Ordinance suffers

from overbreadth. The petitioners may represent

3rd parties as intervenors.

MARCOS V.

MANGLAPUS

SEE SECTION 1 CASE B

DAZA V. The manner Raul Daza was a member of the Article VIII, Section ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction?


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

SINGSON

180 SCR.A. 496

(1989)

of removing

Daza is not a

political

question

Comission of Appointments (CA),

representing LP. LDP reorganized itself

and 24 members of the LP resigned to

join LDP. The House withdrew the seat

occupied by Daza and gave this to the

newly‐ formed LDP. (Chavit Singson).

Daza filed a petition to challenge his

removal from the CA. Singson

countered by saying that what is

involved is a political question. He

argues that nowhere in the Constitution

is it required that the political party be

registered to be entitled to

proportional representation at the CA.

1, of the

Constitution, which

includes the

authority to

determine whether

grave abuse of

discretion

amounting to

excess or lack of

jurisdiction has

been committed by

any branch or

instrumentality of

the government

YES.

What is involved here is the legality, not the

wisdom, of the act of the House in removing Daza

from the CA. It is not a political question. It is a

legal question on the manner of filling the CA, as

prescribed in the Constitution. Even assuming that

it were a political question, the Courts still have the

expanded power to check whether grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction has been committed.

SANTIAGO V.

GUINGONA

Minority

leadership

dispute

between

Tatad &

Guingona

There was an election for Senate

President. There were 2 contenders,

Senator Fernan and Senator Tatad. By a

vote of 20 to 2, Fernan won as Senate

President. (The 2 who voted for Tatad

were Miriam and Tatad, himself!)

The majority leader informed the body

chat he was in receipt of a letter signed

by the seven Lakas‐NUCD‐UMDP

senators stating that they had elected

Senator Guingona as the minority

leader and formally recognized it.

Senators Santiago and Tatad filed

before this Court the subject petition

for quo warranto, alleging in the main

that Senator Guingona had been

usurping, unlawfully holding and

The present

Constitution now

fortifies the

authority of the

courts to determine

in an appropriate

action the validity

of the acts of the

political

departments.

Judicial power



xxx to determine

whether or not

there has been a

grave abuse of

discretion

ISSUE 1: Does the court have jurisdiction over the

case? YES.

It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the

Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its

officials committed a violation of the Constitution

or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of

their functions and prerogatives.

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection

of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the

senators was not a political question. The choice of

these members did not depend on the Senate's "full

discretionary authority," but was subject to

mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the

Court held that not only was it clearly within its

jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection

proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

exercising the position of Senate

minority leader, a position that,

according to them, rightfully belonged

to Senator Tatad.

amounting to lack

or excess of

jurisdiction on the

part of any branch

or instrumentality

of the Government.

determine the issue.

Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring

Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this

Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . .

so as to establish in this country the judicial

supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final

arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the

government transcends the Constitution, not only

in justiceable but political questions as well."

DAVIDE

IMPEACHMENT

(Francisco v.

House of

Representatives

(HOR))

GR 160261

On Nov. 28, 2001, the 12th congress of

the HOR adopted and approved the

Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings, which superseded the

previous one approved by the 11th

congress.

On July 22, 2002, the HOR adopted a

resolution which directed the

Committee on Justice to ‘conduct an

investigation, in aid of legislation, on

the manner of disbursements and

expenditures by the Chief Justice of the

SC of the Judiciary Development Fund

(JDF).

On June 2, 2003, then President Erap

filed an impeachment complaint against

CJ Hilario Davide and seven associate

justices of the SC for ‘culpable violation

of the Constitution, betrayal of public

trust, and other high crimes.’ The

House Committee on Justice ruled that

the said complaint was sufficient in

Sec 5, Art XI: ‘no

impeachment

proceedings shall be

initiated against the

same official more

than once within a

period of one year.’

Doctrine:

“Political question

xxx, under the

Constitution, are to

be decided by the

people in their

sovereign capacity,

or in regard to

which full

discretionary

authority has been

delegated to the

Legislature or

ISSUE 1: Is the filing of the second impeachment

complaint against Davide constitutional? NO.

The filing of the second impeachment complaint

clearly violates Sec 5, Art XI of the constitution.

ISSUE 2: Is the resolution thereof a political

question? NO.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not

eliminate the fact that truly political questions are

beyond the pale of judicial power. (ConComm)

It is clear that judicial power is not only a power;

it is a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere

specter of this creature called the political question

doctrine.

By virtue of Sec. 1, Art. 8, courts can review

questions which are not truly political in nature.

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define

what are justiciable political questions and non‐

justiciable political questions, however.

Identification of these two species of political


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

form, but insufficient in substance and

so voted to dismiss it.

A day after the dismissal (4 months, 3

weeks after filing of complaint), a

second complaint was filed by HOR

(Gibo Teodoro et al) against CJ Davide,

which was signed by at least 1/3 of all

the HOR members.

Various petitions contend that the

filing of the second impeachment

complaint is unconstitutional as it

violates Sec 5 of Art XI of the

constitution.

executive branch of

the Government.”

(CJ Roberto

Concepcion in

Tanada v. Cuenco)

Lis mota

The cause of

the suit or action.

Lis mota of the

case:

(1) whether

Sections 15 and 16

of Rule V of the

House

Impeachment Rules

adopted by the

12th Congress are

unconstitutional for

violating the

provisions of

Section 3, Article XI

of the Constitution;

and

(2) whether, as a

result thereof, the

second

impeachment

questions may be problematic.

From the cases decided by the Supreme Court,

parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court

in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the

exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have

"standing" to challenge; he must have a

personal and substantial interest in the case

such that he has sustained, or will sustain,

direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be

raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the

very lis mota of the case.

The Court found the existence in full of all the

requisite conditions for its exercise of its

constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial

review over an issue whose resolution precisely

called for the construction or interpretation of a

provision of the fundamental law of the land.

This issue is of a genuine constitutional material

which only this Court can properly and competently

address and adjudicate…

This Court in the present petitions subjected to

judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

complaint is barred

under Section 3(5)

of Article XI of the

Constitution.

main issue of whether the impeachment

proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice

transgressed the constitutionally imposed one‐year

time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about

assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor

indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of

decidedly political questions. xxx

BUSTOS V.

LUCERO

Substantive

law

Substantive

rights

Procedural

law

In this decision to be reconsidered, it

was cited that ‘the constitutional rights

of an accused to be confronted by the

witnesses against him does not apply to

preliminary hearings; nor will the

absence of a preliminary examination

be an infringement of his right to

confront witness. As a matter of fact,

preliminary investigation may be done

away with entirely without infringing

the constitutional right of an accused

under the due process clause to a fair

trial.’

Section 11, Rule 108

of the Rules of

Court:

After the arrest of

the defendant and

his delivery to

court, he shall be

informed of the

complaint or

information filed

against him. He

shall also be

informed of the

substance of the

testimony and

evidence presented

against him, and if

he desires to testify

or to present

witnesses or

evidence in his

favor, he may be

allowed to do so.

Doctrine/s:

Substantive law –

creates substantive

rights; in criminal

ISSUE 1: Does Sec 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

infringe section 5(5) of article VIII of the

constitution and does it deal with substantive

matters and impair substantive rights? NO

Section 11, Rule 108 is an adjective law and not

a substantive law or a substantive right. As a rule of

evidence, it is also procedural.

The curtailment of the right of an accused in a

preliminary investigation to cross‐examine the

witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is

of such importance as to offend against the

constitutional inhibition. Preliminary investigation is

not an essential part of due process of law and may

be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done,

mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed

thereunder cannot be held to fall within the

constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies defendant the

right to cross examine witnesses in a preliminary

investigation, his right to present his witnesses

remains unaffected, and his constitutional right to

be informed of the charges against him both at such

investigation and at the trial is unchanged.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

law, it declares

what acts are

crimes and

prescribes

punishment for

them.

Substantive rights –

rights which one

enjoys under the

legal system prior to

the disturbance of

normal relations.

Procedural law –

provides or

regulates the steps

by which one who

commits a crime is

to be punished.

IN RE

CUNANAN

Bar Flunkers

Act

Believing themselves to be fully

qualified to practice law as those

reconsidered and passed by the SC, and

feeling that they have been

discriminated against, unsuccessful

candidates who obtained averages of a

few percentages lower than those

admitted to the bar went to congress

and secured Senate Bill # 12. The bill

substantially became law.

RA 972 has for its object to admit to the

Bar those candidates who suffered

from insufficiency of reading materials

and inadequate preparations. It is

contrary to public interest since it

qualifies law graduates who had

RA 972 (Bar

Flunkers Act):

‘An Act to Fix the

Passing Marks for

Bar Examinations

from 1946 up to

and including 1955’

Section 1 provided

the following

passing marks: 70%

for 1946 to 1951

71% for 1952, 72%

for 1953, 73% for

1954 and 74% for

1955. Provided that

the examinee shall

ISSUE 1: Is RA 972 constitutional? NO

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to

the fatal defects of it not being embraced in the

title. As per its title, the Act should affect only the

bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. It

was also struck down for allowing partial passing.

As to section 1, the portion for 1946 to 1951 was

declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to

1955 was declared in force and in effect. This was

because the law itself admits that the candidates

for 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due

World War II. The law is in effect revoking the

resolution of the court on the petitions of the said

candidates. It is an encroachment on the court’s


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

inadequate preparation for the practice

of law profession, as evidenced in their

failed exams.

have no grade

lower than 50%.

Section 2 provided

that a bar candidate

who obtained a

grade of 75% in any

subject shall be

deemed to have

already passed that

subject and the

grade/grades shall

be included in the

computation of the

general average in

subsequent bar

examinations.

primary prerogative to determine who may be

admitted to practice law and, therefore, in excess of

legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement

the Rules of Court.

As to the portion in force and in effect, it may

rationally fall within the power of congress to alter,

supplement or modify rules of admission to the

practice of law.

JAVELLANA V.

DILG

GR 102549

August 10,

1992

pp. 625‐626

Rule‐making

power

City Councilor

was also a

practicing

lawyer

Local

Government

Code

Ponente: Griño,‐Aquino, J.

This petition for review on certiorari

involves the right of a public official to

engage in the practice of his profession

while employed in the Government.

Petitioner is Atty. Erwin Javellana, an

elected City Councilor of Bago City,

Negros Occidental.

October 5, 1989 City Engineer

Ernesto Divinagracia filed Admin Case

C‐10‐90 against Javellana, basically

alleging that said Javellana (an

incumbent City Councilor and a lawyer

Article 8, Sec. 5(5).

Promulgate rules

concerning the

protection and

enforcement of

constitutional

rights, pleading,

practice, and

procedure in all

courts, the

admission to the

practice of law, the

integrated bar, and

legal assistance to

the under‐

privileged. Such

rules shall provide a

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the DLG Memorandum

Circular violate Article 8, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987

Constitution? NO

The petitioner’s contention was COMPLETELY off

tangent, meaning it had no relation to the said

provision whatsoever. Neither the statute nor the

circular trenches upon the SC’s power and authority

to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The LGC

and DLG Memorandum Circular 90‐81 simply

prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to

avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of

their public duties and private practice of their

professions when the laws allow it.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Note: Amendment of rules by Statute.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

DLG

Memorandum

Circular

by profession) has continuously been

working as a lawyer without securing

the required permit from the Regional

Director, Dept. of Local Government, as

required by DLG Memorandum Circular

No. 80‐38.

Javellana responded through this

petition, praying that such DLG

Memorandum Circular (80‐38, with the

addition of 90‐91 and Section 90 of the

new Local Government Code (LGC)

/RA7160) be declared unconstitutional

and null and void because they violate

Article 8, Sec. 5(5) of the 1987

Constitution.

simplified and

inexpensive

procedure for the

speedy disposition

of cases, shall be

uniform for all

courts of the same

grade, and shall not

diminish, increase,

or modify

substantive rights.

Rules of procedure

of special courts

and quasi‐judicial

bodies shall remain

effective unless

disapproved by the

Supreme Court.

Republic v. Judge Guinguyon

(GR 166429, February 1, 2006)

Sec. 4 of RA 8974 on expropriation (the

dispossession of someone’s property by the State)

for public infrastructure basically says that

whenever it is necessary to acquire resal property

for any government infrastructure project through

expropriation, the appropriate agency shall conduct

the proceedings before the proper court with the

following guidelines:

Upon filing of the complaint and notice to the

defendant, the implementing agency shall

immediately pay the owner of the property 100% of

the value of the property based on the BIR’s current

relevant zonal valuation

The value of the improvements/structues as

determined under Section 7 of this RA hereof.

This runs counter of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court

which requires only partial deport before entry.

May a statute amend a Rule of Court?

Substantive matters may be embodied in a rule of

procedure, and in this case, Rule 67 contains

matters of substance, BUT the absorption of the

substantive point into a procedural rule does not

prevent the substantive right from being

superseded or amended by a statute.

This is because the creation of property rights is a

matter that is acted upon by the legislature, and not

for the courts to decide upon. Otherwise, it can


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

lead to the absurd situation of the judiciary

shielding laws by making them irrepealable,

absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of

procedure.

The judiciary has the sole prerogative/right to

promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and

procedure, and it should be understood that such

rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and

not points of substantive law. This privilege was

restored to the judicial department by the 1987

Constitution.

PEOPLE V.

MATEO

GR 147678‐87

July 7, 2004

pp. 626‐627

Review of

death penalty

Life

imprisonment

and afflictive

penalties

Fundamental

Law

Mandatory v.

Intermediate

review

Court of

Appeals

Procedural

matters

(There was no mention of the case here.

This was merely a discussion on the

review of the death penalty, which cited

relevant laws, procedures, and

provisions.)

The SC has assumed direct appellate

review over all criminal cases in which

the penalty imposed is death, reclusion

perpetua, or life imprisonment (or

lower penalties but involving offenses

committed on the same occasion,

which gave rise such afflictive penalties

including life imprisonment). This

practice is justified in Article 8, Sec.

5(2)(d).

While the Fundamental Law (FL)

requires a mandatory review of such

cases involving those penalties

mentioned above, such FL does not

require an intermediate review.

Art. 8, Sec. 5(2)(d):

(2) Review, revise,

reverse, modify, or

affirm on appeal

or certiorari, as the

law or the Rules of

Court may provide,

final judgments and

orders of lower

courts in:

(d) All criminal cases

in which the penalty

imposed is reclusión

perpetua or higher.

Note: Reclusión perpetua.

Garcia v. People

(GR 106531, November 18, 1999)

It is only in cases where the death penalty is

actually imposed that the trial court must forward

the records of the case to the SC (now CA) for

automatic review of the conviction. This right

cannot be waived.

However, in cases imposing reclusión perpetua, the

right to appeal may be waived by the petitioner:

Filing a notice of appeal, or

Indicating a desire to appeal from the decision.

In the absence of these, the decision becomes final

and unappealable.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Remember:

Death penalty – Death itself by lethal injection


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

The SC requires that the Court of

Appeals (CA) review these cases before

they are sent to the SC because where

life and liberty are at stake, all possible

avenues to determine the guilt or

innocence of the accused must be

determined. The SC overemphasizes

the evaluation of facts, and a prior

determination by the CA (particularly

on the factual issues) is paramount to

minimizing the possibility of an error in

judgment.

Statistics show that since the

reimposition of the death penalty law in

1993 until June 2004, the cases where

the judgment of death penalty had

either been modified or vacated was

71.77%, the total number of death

penalty cases directly elevated before

the Court on automatic review. With

the final disposition resting on the SC,

651 out of 907 appellants were saved

from lethal injection.

Under Article 8, Sec. 5, the SC has the

power to amend rules of procedure,

since procedural matters fall within the

law‐making privilege of the SC, instead

of the law‐making power of the

Congress.

Procedural matter The additional

Life imprisonment – This applies to Special Laws.

Life imprisonment has no specific extent of

punishment, but one may have parole any time.

Reclusion perpetua – (20‐40 years, applying to

crimes in the RPC). This is translated from Spanish

as “life imprisonment,” too, but here, one has the

possibility of pardon/exec clemency after serving

one’s sentence for 30 years.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

rule allowing immediate review by the

CA (an appellate court) before the case

is elevated to the SC on automatic

review.

IN RE: PETITION

TO DISQUALIFY

ATTY. DE VERA

AC 6052

December 11,

2003

pp. 628‐629

Bar

integration

IBP

IBP By‐Laws

Bar

Ponente: Tinga, J.

Petitioners:

Atty. Oliver Garcia VP of the

Bukidnon IBP Chapter

Atty. Emmanuel Ravanera Past

president of the Misamis Oriental IBP

Chapter

Atty. Tony Velez Incumbent

president of the Misamis Oriental IBP

Chapter

These petitioners mainly seek the

disqualification of respondent Atty.

Leonard De Vera “from being elected

Governor of Eastern Mindanao” in the

16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) Regional Governors’ elections.

June 9, 2003 respondent filed a

Respectful Comment on the petition

after seeking a leave of court.

Respondent argues that this Court has

no jurisdiction over the controversy,

saying that the election of the Officers

of the IBP, including the determination

of the qualification of those who want

to serve the organization, is purely an

internal matter, governed by the IBP

Art. 8, Sec. 5(5) of

the 1987

Constitution.

Promulgate rules

concerning the

protection and

enforcement of

constitutional

rights, pleading,

practice, and

procedure in all

courts, the

admission to the

practice of law, the

integrated bar xxx

and shall not

diminish, increase,

or modify

substantive rights.

Rules of procedure

of special courts

and quasi‐judicial

bodies shall remain

effective unless

disapproved by the

Supreme Court.

Art. 8, Sec. 13 of

the 1935

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over

the internal matters of the IBP? YES

Yes, pursuant to Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the 1987

Constitution, which confers on the SC the power to

promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Implicit in this

constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the

activities of the IBP, including the election of its

officers. This authority over the IBP originates from

the 1935 Constitution, particularly in Art. 8, Sec. 13.

Ironically, the IBP By‐Laws document invoked by

the respondent in asserting IBP independence from

the SC, recognizes the full range of the power of

supervision of the SC over the IBP.

Section 77 of the IBP By‐Laws gives the SC power

to amend, modify, or repeal the IBP By‐Laws

through:

Motu proprio (“On his own impulse”)

Upon recommendation of the Board of

Governors of the IBP.

Section 15 of the IBP By‐Laws also authorizes the

SC to send observes in the IBP elections, whether

local or national.

Section 44 of the IBP By‐Laws empowers the SC


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

By‐Laws exclusive regulated and

administered by the IBP.

Constitution.

The Supreme Court

shall have the

power to

promulgate rules

concerning

pleading, practice,

and procedure in all

courts, and the

admission to the

practice of law. Said

rules shall be

uniform for all

courts of the same

grade and shall not

diminish, increase,

or modify

substantive rights.

The existing laws on

pleading, practice,

and procedure are

hereby repealed as

statutes, and are

declared Rules of

Courts, subject to

the power of the

Supreme Court to

alter and modify the

same. The Congress

of the Philippines

shall have the

power to repeal,

alter, or

to have the final decision on the removal of the

members of the Board of Governors.

Thus, the SC has jurisdiction over this issue.

xxx xxx xxx xxx


The term, “Bar” refers to the “collectivity of all

persons whose names appear in the Roll of

Attorneys”.

October 5, 1970 The Court initiated the

integration of the PH Bar by creating the

Commission on Bar Integration whose task was to

ascertain the advisability of unifying the PH Bar.

RA 6397 was enacted, confirming the power of the

SC to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.

January 1, 1973 “In the Matter of the Integration

of the Bar to the Philippines” was a per curiam

Resolution of the Court which ordained the

Integration of the PH Bar in accordance with Rule

139‐A of the Rules of Court, pursuant to the Court’s

rule‐making power under the 1935 Constitution.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

supplement the

rules concerning

pleading, practice,

and procedure, and

the admission to

the practice of law

in the Philippines.

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

MACEDA VS.

VASQUEZ

G.R. No.

102781,

April 22, 1993

p. 629

Ombudsman

FALSIFIED

CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

Ponente: Nocon, J.

Petition for certiorari with prayer for

preliminary mandatory injunction.

Respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the

Public Attorney’s Office, in his affidavit‐

complaint to the Office of the

Ombudsman, alleged that petitioner

Maceda had falsified his Certificate of

Service by certifying that all civil and

criminal cases submitted for decision

have been determined and decided

when in fact some were still pending.

Petitioner Maceda counters the

allegation by saying that he had been

granted by the Court an extension of 90

days to decide the aforementioned

cases.

Petitioner also contends that the

Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over

Article VIII, Section

6 of the 1987

Constitution. The

Supreme Court shall

have Administrative

supervision over all

courts and

personnel thereof.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Office of the

Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint

for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification

submitted to the Supreme Court. NO. The Office

of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction.

RATIO:

o Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively

vests in the Supreme Court administrative

supervision over all courts and court personnel.

No other branch of government may intrude into

this power, without running afoul the doctrine of

separation of powers.

o The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation

of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the

Constitution, for such a justification runs counter

the Constitution and the independence of the

judiciary.

o Thus the Ombudsman should first refer the

matter of petitioner’s certificates of service to


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

the complaint since the offenses

charged arose from the judge’s

performance of his official duties which

is under the supervision and control of

the Supreme Court.

this Court for determination of whether said

certificates reflected the true status of his

pending case load.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED.

PEOPLE VS

GACOTT, JR.

G.R. No.

116049,

July 13, 1995

p. 630

Reprimand Ponente: Regalado, J.

Rebuffed by the Court through the

annulment of his order dismissing

Criminal Case No. 11529 of the court a

quo, complemented with a reprimand

and a fine of P10,000.oo for gross

ignorance of the law, respondent Judge

Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. has filed a

motion for reconsideration and a

supplemental motion for

reconsideration.

Respondent judge questions the

competence of the Second Division of

the Supreme Court to administratively

discipline him. Respondent judge

anchors his argument on the wording of

Article VIII, Section 11 of the 1987

Constitution where he alleged that only

the en banc/full court may decide on his

administrative liability.

(1) Article VIII,

Section 11 of the

1987 Constitution.

The Supreme Court

en banc shall have

the power to

discipline judges of

lower courts, or

order their

dismissal by a vote

of a majority of the

Members who


the deliberations…

(2) Court En Banc

Resolution “Bar

Matter No. 209. In

the Matter of the

Amendment and/or

Clarification of

various Supreme

Courts Rules and

Regulations”. Cases

where the penalty

to be imposed is the

dismissal of a judge,

officer or employee

of the Judiciary,

disbarment…

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the decision of the en banc

and not just of the Second Division of the Court is

needed for the decision to hold respondent

administratively liable. NO. The decision of the

Second Division of the Court is the decision of the

Court. Petitioner misconstrued Article VIII, Sec. 11

of the 1987 Constitution.

Ratio 1:

o On the misconstrual of Article VIII, Sec. 11:

Fortuitously, the writer of this resolution, as a

member of the committee on the Judiciary of the

1986 Constitutional Commission, had the

opportunity to take up the precise matter with

the committee chairman, retired Chief Justice

Roberto Concepcion. Both were in concurrence

that the qualification (en banc) was not intended

to make a difference, as a reference to the Court

by itself necessarily means the Court en banc and

that where the reference is to the Court acting

through its divisions, it would necessarily be so

specified.

o Per the Court En Banc Resolution, entitled “Bar

Matter No. 209. In the Matter of the Amendment

and/or Clarifications of various Supreme Court

Rules and Resolutions”, cases involving

reprimand and a fine of P10, 000.00 are not

decided en banc.

o To require the entire Court to deliberate upon


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

(3) Circular No. 2‐

89. 2. A decision or

resolution of a

Division of the

Court, when

concurred in by a

majority of its

members who


the deliberations on

the issues… is a

decision or

resolution of the

Supreme Court.

and participate in all administrative matters or

cases would result in a congested docket.

o Per Circular No. 2‐89 pursuant to Section 4(3),

Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, a decision or

resolution of a Division, when concurred in by a

majority, and in no case without concurrence of

at least 3 members, is a decision or resolution of

the Supreme Court.

JUDGE

CAOIBES, JR.

VS.

OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No.

132177,

July 19, 2001

p. 632

OFFICE

FURNITURE

The present case involves two members

of the judiciary who were entangled in a

fight within court premises over a piece

of office furniture.


6 of the 1987

Constitution. The

Supreme Court shall

have Administrative

supervision over all

courts and

personnel thereof.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Office of the

Ombudsman has jurisdiction over administrative

cases involving members of the judiciary.NO. The

Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction.

RATIO:

o Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution, it is the

Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive

administrative supervision over all courts and its

personnel. In view of this, the Ombudsman

cannot determine for itself and by itself whether

a criminal complaint against a judge, or court

employee, involves an administrative matter.

o Ombudsman must give due recognition of the

administrative authority of the Court. It cannot

dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that

a case before it does or does not have

administrative implications. To do so would be to

deprive the Court of the exercise of its

administrative prerogatives and to arrogate


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

under itself a power not constitutionally

sanctioned. This impinges on judicial

independence.

o The ruling in Maceda prevails, to allow the

Ombudsman to oversee judges’ and court

personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take

administrative action against them is to violate

the doctrine of separation of powers.

Section 7.

(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural‐born citizen of the Philippines. A

Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged

in the practice of law in the Philippines.cralaw

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of

the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.cralaw

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

IN RE JBC V.

JUDGE QUITAIN

JBC NO. 013

August 22, 2007

p. 633

RTC JUDGE

Failure to

disclose past

Administrative

Order of

dismissal is a

grave

misconduct

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was

appointed Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch

10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.

Subsequent thereto, xxx

administrative and criminal charges

were filed against Judge Quitain in his

capacity as then Assistant Regional

Director, National Police Commission

(NAPOLCOM), xxx Davao City, as a

result of which he was dismissed from

the service xxx

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to

(3) A Member of

the Judiciary must

be a person of

proven

competence,

integrity, probity,

and independence.

W/N Judge Quitain failed to meet the

qualifications required of appointees to the

Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the

Constitution? YES

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE

JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct

which would have warranted his dismissal from

the service had he not resigned during the

pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the

penalty of a fine of P40,000.00.

It appearing that he has yet to apply for his

retirement benefits and other privileges, if any,

the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

disclose that he was administratively

charged and dismissed from the

service for grave misconduct per A.O.

No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no

less than the former President of

the Philippines.

xxx it can not be denied that at the

time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC

judge, he had full knowledge of A.O.

No. 183 dismissing him from

government service. xxx the OCA

(Office of the Court Administrator)

maintained its recommendation that

Judge Quitain be dismissed from the

service with prejudice to his

reappointment to any position in the

government xxx

benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge

Quitain may be entitled to, and he

is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from

reinstatement and appointment to any branch,

instrumentality or agency of the government,

including government‐owned and/or controlled

corporations.

KILOSBAYAN V.

ERMITA & ONG

GR 177721

July 3, 2007

Ong’s

citizenship

Petitioners are people and/or non‐

governmental organizations engaged

in public and civic causes aimed at

protecting the people’s rights to self‐

governance and justice.

Respondent Executive Secretary is

the head of the Office of the President

and is in charge of releasing

presidential appointments including

those of Supreme Court Justices.

Respondent Gregory S. Ong is

allegedly the party whose

appointment would fill up the vacancy

Section 7 (1) of

Article VIII provides

that “No person

shall be appointed

Member of the

Supreme Court or

any lower collegiate

court unless he is a

natural‐born citizen

ISSUE 1: Whether or not Gregory S. Ong is a

natural‐born Filipino Citizen? YES

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of

this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized

Filipino citizen.

The series of events and long string of alleged

changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong’s

ancestors, by various births, marriages and

deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to

be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so

as to correct the existing records on his birth and

citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to

show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s

mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

in this Court.

Petitioners claim that respondent

Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact

is plain and incontestable, and that his

own birth certificate indicates his

Chinese citizenship. The birth

certificate, petitioners add, reveals

that at the time of respondent Ong’s

birth on May 25, 1953, his father was

Chinese and his mother was also

Chinese.

Respondent Executive Secretary

added that the President appointed

respondent Ong from among the list

of nominees who were duly screened

by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC

created under Article VIII, Section 8 of

the Constitution. Said respondent

further stated: “The appointment,

however, was not released, but

instead, referred to the JBC for

validation of respondent Ong’s

citizenship.”

of the Philippines.”

Sec. 2 of Art. IV

defines “natural‐

born citizens as

those who are

citizens of

the Philippines from

birth without having

to perform any act

to acquire or

perfect their

Philippine

Citizenship.”

still appears in the records of this Court.

Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in

court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his

citizenship under the time‐line of three

Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong

cannot accept an appointment to this Court as

that would be a violation of the Constitution.

History:

o As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces

his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of

Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25,

1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen who

married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that

these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in

1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of

which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino

citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was

a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also

became a Filipino citizen; that respondent

Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the

daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy

Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were

married in 1927; that, therefore,

respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at

birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a

Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng,

thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that

when respondent Ong was eleven years old

his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was

naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers

and sisters, and his mother were included in

the naturalization.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 8.

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the

Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired

Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three

years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide

in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the

Supreme Court may assign to it.

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three

nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.

Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law.

During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

NITAFAN V.

COMMISSION

Withholding

tax deduction

Petitioners are RTC Judges in Manila. Section 10. xxx

During their

ISSUE 1: Whether or not withholding taxes should

be deducted to the salaries of all judiciary


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

OF INTERNAL

REVENUE

152 SCRA 284

(1987)

pp. 635‐639

of Judiciary

members

They seek to prohibit CIR and Financial

Officer of the SC from making any

deduction of withholding taxes from

their salaries.

They submit that any tax withheld from

their emoluments or compensation as

judicial officers constitutes a decrease

of their salaries, contrary to section 10,

Art. 8.

June 4, 1987 Court en banc released

a decision RE: QUESTION OF

EXEMPTION FROM INCOME TAXATION

that the Finance Office of the Court to

continue the deduction of the

withholding taxes from salaries of all

the members of the Judiciary.

continuance in

office, their salary

shall not be

decreased.

It also means that

Congress may pass

a law fixing another

rate of

compensation but

such rate must be

higher than that

which they are

receiving, or if

lower, it would be

applicable only to

those appointed

after its approval.

members? YES.

The payment of such income tax by Justices and

Judges does not fall within the constitutional

protection against decrease of their salaries during

the continuance of their office.

The true intent of the framers of the 1987

Constitution was to make the salaries of the

members of the Judiciary taxable.

Commissioner Rigos: to give substance to

equality among the three branches of government

Fr. Bernas: So, we put a period (.) after

‘DECREASED’ on the understanding that the salary of

justices is subject to tax

Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy

years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower

courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted

thereon.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

Vargas v.

Rilloraza

80 Phil. 297

(1948)

Security of

tenure

Section 14 of

the People’s

Court Act

Disqualification

Ponente: Hidalgo, J.

Such question of unconstitutionality or

repugnancy to the Constitution arises

in relation to the disqualification of

certain members of the Supreme Court

provided for in Section 14 of the

People’s Court Act.

People’s Court Act,

Sec. 14. Any justice

of the SC who held

any office or

position under the

Philippine Executive

Commission (PEC)

or under the

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Congress had the

power to add to the pre‐existing grounds of

disqualification of a Justice of the SC, provided for

in Section 14. No.

RATIO 1:

The ground for disqualification added by Section

14 of Commonwealth Act 682 to those already


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

of justices government of the

RP may not sit and

vote in any case

brought to that

Court under section

13 hereof in which

the accused is a

person who held

any office or

position under

either or both the

PEC and the RP or

any branch,

instrumentality, or

agency thereof.

If, on account of

such

disqualification, or

because of any of

the grounds or

disqualification of

judges, in Rule 126,

section 1 of the

Rules of Court, or

on account of

illness, absence of

temporary disability

the requisite

number of Justices

necessary to

constitute a

quorum or to

render judgment in

existing at the time of the adoption of the

Constitution and continued by it is not only

arbitrary and irrational but also positively violative

of Organic Law.

A law repugnant to the Constitution is void. For

repugnancy to result, there is no requirement of

actual removal of the disqualified judges.

Nonetheless, the jurisdiction of the SC in cases can

only be exercised by those justices who are

appointed by the President. The deprivation of

his/her judicial power is equivalent to the

deprivation of the judicial power of this court. It is

also repugnant that the justices in the lower courts

do not have the same qualifications as those with

the justices of the SC.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not a person may act as a

Justice of the SC who has not been duly appointed

by the President and confirmed by the CA pursuant

to the Constitution, even only as a “designee”.

No

RATIO 2:

Such designation authorized in Section 14 of the

People’s Court Act cannot possibly be a compliance

with the provision requiring that appointment.

Additional disqualifying circumstances of the

“designee” are the lack of confirmation by or

consent of the Commission on Appointments. This

is another point of repugnancy between the

challenged section and the Constitution. It is in fact

saying that the composition of the Court is

temporary, when it is not. This Tribunal,

established under the Organic Law, is one of the


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

any case is not

present, the

President may

designate such

number of Judges of

First Instance,

Judges‐at‐large of

First Instance, or

Cadastral Judges,

having none of the

disqualifications set

forth in said section

one hereof, as may

be necessary to sit

temporarily as

Justice of said

Court, in order to

form a quorum or

until a judgment in

said case is reached.

Article 8, Sec. 4.

(1) The Supreme

Court shall be

composed of a Chief

Justice and fourteen

Associate Justices.

xxx

Article 8, Sec. 5.

Discusses the

powers of the SC

and where they

have original

permanent institutions of the government.

ISSUE 3: Whether or not by the method of

“designation” created by the aforecited Section 14

of a Judge of First Instance, Judge‐at‐Large of First

Instance, or Cadastral Judge, designated by the

President under the same section can

constitutionally “sit temporarily as Justice” of the

SC by virtue thereof. No.

RATIO 3:

A temporary member of the Court would be

misnomer, implying a position not contemplated by

the constitution. Pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of

Article 8, the framers intended the SC to function

through the members who are therein defined, and

by section 6, they determined who may be

appointed by such members. Hence, we do not see

why “designees” in such a case can constitutionally

“sit temporarily as Justices” of the SC.

Therefore, Section 14 of the People’s Court Act is

unconstitutional.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

jurisdiction.

Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi‐

judicial or administrative functions.

Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation

before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be

issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Members who took no part, or dissented, or abstained

from a decision or resolution, must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis

therefor.


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

AIR FRANCE V.

CARRASCOSO

18 SCRA 155

(1956)

First class

seat

White man

Ponente: Sanchez, J.

The case is now before us for review on

certiorari.

Essential facts

Carrascoso was one of the 28 Filipino

pilgrims who left Manila for Lourdes,

France. Air France, through the

Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued a “first

class” round trip ticket to Carrascoso

from Manila to Rome. However, during

the Manila to Bangkok flight, Carrascoso

was forced by the Air France Manager

to vacate his “first class” seat.

Now, the relief petitioner (Air France)

seeks that the Court review “all the

findings of the Court of Appeals (CA),”

saying that respondent court failed to

Article 8, Sec. 12 of

the 1935

Constitution. No

decision shall be

rendered by any

court of record

without expressing

therein clearly and

distinctly the facts

and the law on

which it is based.

Section 1, Rule 36,

Rules of Court,

which basically

states, “a judgment

determining the

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the CA failed to make

findings of fact on all issues laid before it by

Carrasco. NO.

The law solely insists that a decision state that

the “essential ultimate facts” upon which the court’s

conclusion is drawn. So long as the decision of the

CA contains the necessary facts to warrant its

conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold

“any specific finding of facts with respect to the

evidence for the defense. The legal presumptions

are that official duty has been regularly performed

and that all the matters within an issue in a case

were laid down before the court and passed upon by

it.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

make complete finds of fact on all the

issues properly laid before it.

Additional facts

In the words of witness Ernesto Cuento,

there was a “white man,” who the Air

France Manager alleged had a “better

right” to the seat. When Carrascoso

was asked to vacate his seat, he

naturally refused, telling the Manager

that his seat would be taken over his

dead body.

A commotion ensued between

Carrascoso and the white man,

thereupon they all came across to

Carrasoco and pacified him to give his

seat to the white man. Plaintiff

reluctantly gave away his “first class”

seat in the plane.)

Note: The claim of W/N the ticket was

“first class” or not is immaterial because

the issue at hand is different.

merits of a case

shall state ‘clearly

and distinctly the

facts and the law on

which it is based.’”

Section 4, Rule 51,

Sec. 33(2), Judiciary

Act of 1948, as

amended, which

states, “Every

decision of the

Court of Appeals

shall contain

complete findings

of fact on all issues

properly raised

before it.”

VALDEZ V.

COURT OF

APPEALS

A three‐page decision of the trial court

contained in the first two pages a

statement of the allegations of the

pleadings of the parties and

enumerates the witnesses presented

and the exhibits marked during the trial.

The court statement in the decision that

a party has proven his case while the

other has not, is not the findings of facts

contemplated by the Constitution and

the rules to be clearly and distinctly

ISSUE 1: Did the decision of the Court of Appeals

state the finding of facts? NO

The said 3‐page decision which contained a

statement of allegations, pleadings of parties, and

enumeration of witnesses was not a clear and

distinct statement of facts in the basis of which the

decision is rendered. A mere conclusion of facts and

the law based on without stating the facts which

serve the basis is not sufficient.

This Court is not the trier of facts and it relies on

the facts found by the lower courts and appellate


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

stated.

Unfortunately, the appellate court

overlooked this and adopted the

alleged findings of facts of the trial

court. Facts are stated by they are

hardly a substantial compliance with

the mandate.

courts. However, the Court had to wade through

records and make its own findings to avoid further

delay.

PEOPLE V.

LIZADA

The accused is alleged of committing 4

counts of rape and was convicted by the

trial court of the said crimes. However,

it merely summarized the testimonies

of the witnesses and failed to state in

the said decision the factual and legal

basis for the imposition of death

penalty on him.

ISSUE 1: Did the trial court comply with the

constitutional requirements? NO

Trial courts should not merely provide

testimonies of witnesses of both parties and just

come out with a conclusion based on those. The trial

court failed to specifically state the facts proven by

the prosecution based on their evidence, the issues

raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual

and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual

bases for convicting the accused‐appellant for the

crimes charged.

VELARDE

(Founder, El

Shaddai) V.

SOCIAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM (SJS)

This petition for review assails the

decision of the lower courts. The main

question is whether or not the act of a

religious leader like any of herein

respondents, in endorsing the

candidacy of a candidate for elective

office or in urging or requiring the

members of his flock to vote for a

specified candidate, is violative of the

letter or spirit of the constitutional

provisions.

The trial court decided that said acts

were unconstitutional, however it failed

ISSUE 1: Did the decision of the court fail to comply

with the requirements of the constitution in its

written decision? YES

The essential parts of a case are (1) statement of

the case (2) statement of facts (3) issues or

assignment of errors (4) court ruling (5) dispositive

portion. This case did not include (2) and (5). It

cannot simply say a judgment had been rendered

without any justification. Failure to comply with this

constitutional provision is a grave abuse of

discretion. It must be a nullity and must be struck

down as void.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

to provide a clear and complete

decision. It is alleged that the

questioned decision did not contain a

statement of facts and a dispositive

portion.

ISSUE 2: Are the acts of a religious leader in

endorsing a candidate violative of the constitution?

NO

The court deems this constitutional issue to be of

‐paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry for it

concerns the governance of our country and its

people. Therefore, despite the obvious procedural

transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this

court still called for oral argument, so as not to leave

any doubt that there might be room to entertain

and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.

Counsel for SJS however failed to convince the

Court that there are enough factual and legal bases

to resolve this paramount issue. The office of the

Sol. Gen. has sided with the petitioner insofar as

there are no facts supporting the SJS petition and

the assailed decision.

Section 15.

(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty‐four months from date of submission

for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower

courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the

Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be

issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or

resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in

consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻


Provision/s

Issue & Ratio

RE: PROBLEM OF

DELAYS IN CASES

BEFORE THE

SANDIGANBAYAN

A.M. No. 00‐8‐

05‐SC

November 28,

2001

p. 657

Sandiganbayan A question is raised on whether or not

the Sandiganbayan functions as a

regular court and is therefore covered

by the reglementary period prescribed

in Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution.


15(1) of the 1987

Constitution. All

cases or matters

filed after the

effectivity of this

Constitution must

be decided or

resolved within

twenty‐four months

from date of

submission to the

Supreme Court…


15(2) of the 1987

Constitution. A case

or matter shall be

deemed submitted

for decision or

resolution upon the

filing of the last

pleading, brief…

P.D. No. 1606,

Section 6.

Maximum period

for termination of

cases – As far as

practicable, the trial

of cases before the

Sandiganbayan

once commenced

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the reglementary period

for the resolution of cases prescribed in Section 15

of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution applies to

the Sandiganbayan. NO. The prescribed

reglementary period does not apply to the

Sandiganbayan.

RATIO:

o The provision does not apply to the

Sandiganbayan, it refers to regular courts of

lower collegiate level that in present hierarchy

applies only to the Court of Appeals.

o The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the

same level as the Court of Appeals and

possessing all the inherent powers of a court of

justice, with functions of a trial court.

o Court Administrator contradicted this view and

distinguished between cases which the

Sandiganbayan has cognizance of in its original

jurisdiction, and cases which fall within the

appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. He

posited that since in the first class of cases, the

Sandiganbayan acts more as a trial court, then

for that classification of caes, the 3 month

reglementary period applies. For the second

class of cases, the Sandiganbayan has the 12

month reglementary period for collegiate

courts. However, the Court disagreed with such

contention.

o Further, Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 1606, the law that

created the Sandiganbayan, provided that


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

shall be continuous

until terminated

and the judgment

shall be rendered

within three (3)

months…

cases, as far as practicable, must be resolved.

o Also, on September 18, 1984, the

Sandiganbayan promulgated its own rule

affirming the 3‐month period prescribed in P.D.

No. 1606.

B. COURT

ADMINISTRATOR

VS. QUIÑANOLA

A.M. No. MTJ‐

9901216,

October 20, 1999

p. 658

Administrative

sanctions


Respondent judge was charged with

violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct for allegedly not deciding

matters pending before him within the

period fixed by law.

Cases must be

attended to within

the prescribed

period.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the respondent judge

violated the Code of Judicial ConductYES.

RATIO:

o The Code of judicial Conduct requires judges to

decide cases and matters pending before them

within the period fixed by law. A heavy case

load and a poor health may partially excuse

such lapses, only if the judges concerned

request reasonable extensions.

o Respondent judge made no effort to inform the

Court of his reasons for the delay, much less to

request any extension. Respondent even signed

certifications that all cases and motions

pending before him had been attended to

within the prescribed period.

o This court has always emphasized the need and

the imperative for judges to decide cases

promptly and expeditiously within the

constitutionally prescribed 90‐day period.

Failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency

and warrants administrative sanctions.

Note: Taking into account the failing health and

the respondent’s having already compulsorily

retired, he should be fined in the amount of forty

thousand pesos (P40,000).


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻

Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the

Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary.

CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**

┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

ARTICLE(IX:(CONSTITUTIONAL(COMMISSIONS(

(

A.(COMMON(PROVISIONS(

(

SECTION(1.((((The(Constitutional(Commissions,(which(shall(be(independent,(are(the(Civil(Service(Commission,(the(Commission(on(Elections,(and(the(

Commission(on(Audit.(

(

Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(

Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

A. MACALINTAL((

V.(COMELEC(

G.R.$No.$157013$$

July$10,$2003$

Pp(659O660(

Joint(

Congressional(

Oversight(

Committee(

(

$

R.A.(No.(9189$

"An$Act$

Providing$for$

A$System$of$

Overseas$

Absentee$

Voting$by$

Qualified$

Citizens$of$the$

Philippines$

Abroad,$

Appropriating$

Funds$

Therefor,$and$

for$Other$

Purposes”$

Respondents’$profile:$COMMISSION$

ON$ELECTIONS,$HON.$ALBERTO$

ROMULO,$in$his$official$capacity$as$

Executive$Secretary,$and$HON.$

EMILIA$T.$BONCODIN,$Secretary$of$

the$Department$of$Budget$and$

Management.$

$

ROMULO$MACALINTAL,$IBP$member,$

submits(that(the(creation(of(the(Joint(

Congressional(Oversight(Committee$

with$the$power$to$review,$revise,$

amend$and$approve$the$

Implementing$Rules$and$Regulations$

promulgated$by$the$COMELEC,$R.A.$

No.$9189$intrudes(into(the(

independence(of(the(COMELEC$

which,$as$a$constitutional$body,$is$not$

under$the$control$of$either$the$

executive$or$legislative$departments$

of$government;$that$only$the$

COMELEC$itself$can$promulgate$rules$

and$regulations$which$may$be$

changed$or$revised$only$by$the$

majority$of$its$members.$

R.A.$No.$9189$created$

the$JCOC,$as$follows:$

$

SEC.$25.$Joint&Congressional&Oversight&Committee.$–$xxx$Provided,$That,$of$the$seven$(7)$members$

to$be$designated$by$

each$House$of$

Congress,$four$(4)$

should$come$from$the$

majority$and$the$

remaining$three$(3)$

from$the$minority.$

(

The(Joint(

Congressional(

Oversight(Committee(

shall(have(the(power(

to(monitor(and(

evaluate(the(

implementation(of(this(

Act.(It(shall(review,(

revise,(amend(and(

I:$W/N$Sections$19$and$25$of$R.A.$No.$9189$

violate$Article$IXeA$(Common$Provisions)$$Section$

1$of$the$Constitution$

Held:$$YES$

• The$second$sentence$of$the$first$paragraph$of$

Section$19,$to$wit:$"The$Implementing$Rules$and$Regulations$shall$be$submitted$to$the$Joint$Congressional$Oversight$Committee$created$by$virtue$of$this$Act$for$prior$approval;"$and$

• The$second$sentence$in$the$second$

paragraph$of$Section$25,$to$wit:$"It$shall$review,$revise,$amend$and$approve$the$Implementing$Rules$and$Regulations$promulgated$by$the$Commission"$of$the$same$law;$

are$declared$UNCONSTITUTIONAL$&$VOID$for$

being$repugnant$to$Section$1,$Article$IXeA$of$the$

Constitution$mandating$the$independence$of$

constitutional$commission,$such$as$COMELEC.$

$

Ratio:$The$legislative$function$of$Congress$is$not$

to$approve,$review,$revise$and$amend$the$IRR$of$

the$COMELEC.$$

$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

$

COMELEC$joins$the$petitioner$in$

asserting$that$as$an$independent$

constitutional$body,$it$may$not$be$

subject$to$interference$by$any$

government$instrumentality$and$that$

only$this$Court$may$review$COMELEC$

rules$and$only$in$cases$of$grave$abuse$

of$discretion.$

approve(the(

Implementing(Rules(

and(Regulations(

promulgated(by(the(

Commission.$(Emphasis$

supplied)$

$

$

SEC.$19.$Authority$of$

the$Commission$to$

Promulgate$Rules.$–$

The$Commission$shall$

issue$the$necessary$

rules$and$regulations$to$

effectively$implement$

the$provisions$of$this$

Act$within$sixty$(60)$

days$from$the$

effectivity$of$this$

Act.$The(Implementing(

Rules(and(Regulations(

shall(be(submitted(to(

the(Joint(Congressional(

Oversight(Committee(

created(by(virtue(of(

this(Act(for(prior(

approval.$

The$framers$of$the$Constitution$wanted$

COMELEC$to$be$independent$from$the$other$

departments$of$the$Government.$

$$

Congress,$in$both$provisions,$arrogates$unto$itself$

a$function$not$specifically$vested$by$the$

Constitution,$should$be$stricken$out$of$the$

subject$statute$for$constitutional$infirmity.$Both$

provisions$brazenly$violate$the$mandate$on$the$

independence$of$the$COMELEC.$

(

Section(2.(No(member(of(a(Constitutional(Commission(shall,(during(his(tenure,(hold(any(other(office(or(employment.(Neither(shall(he(engage(in(the(

practice(of(any(profession(or(in(the(active(management(or(control(of(any(business(which,(in(any(way,(may(be(affected(by(the(functions(of(his(office,(

nor(shall(he(be(financially(interested,(directly(or(indirectly,(in(any(contract(with,(or(in(any(franchise(or(privilege(granted(by(the(Government,(any(of(its(

subdivisions,(agencies,(or(instrumentalities,(including(governmentOowned(or(controlled(corporations(or(their(subsidiaries.(

(

Section.(3.(The(salary(of(the(Chairman(and(the(Commissioners(shall(be(fixed(by(law(and(shall(not(be(decreased(during(their(tenure.(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

(

Section(4.(The(Constitutional(Commissions(shall(appoint(their(officials(and(employees(in(accordance(with(law.(

(

Section(5.(The(Commission(shall(enjoy(fiscal(autonomy.(Their(approved(annual(appropriations(shall(be(automatically(and(regularly(released.(

(

Section(6.(Each(Commission(en(banc(may(promulgate(its(own(rules(concerning(pleadings(and(practice(before(it(or(before(any(of(its(offices.(Such(rules,(

however,(shall(not(diminish,(increase,(or(modify(substantive(rights.(

(


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

(

A. ARUELO,(

JR.(V.(CA(&(

Gatchalian(

$

G.R.$No.$

107852$

October$20,$

1993$

(

Pg(661(

COMELEC(

Rules(of(

Procedure(vs.(

Rules(of(

Court(

Aruelo$and$Gatchalian$were$rival$

candidates$in$the$May$11,$1992$

elections.$Gatchalian$won$over$Aruelo$

by$a$margin$of$four$votes,$such$that$on$

May$13,$1992,$the$Municipal$Board$of$

Canvassers$proclaimed$him$as$the$duly$

elected$ViceeMayor$of$Balagtas,$

Bulacan.$$

$

June$6,$1992!$COMELEC$denied$

Aruelo’s$petition$to$annul$Gatchalian’s$

proclamation$due$to$nonesubmission$of$

evidence$&$other$supporting$

documents.$

$

November$24,$1992!$the$Court$of$

Appeals$rendered$a$decision$denying$

Gatchalian's$petition,$but$declared,$at$

the$same$time,$that$Gatchalian's$

Answer$With$CountereProtest$and$

Counterclaim$was$timely$filed.$$

$

Hence,$This$petition$for$certiorari$and$

prohibition$to$set$aside$the$Decision$of$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

Section$2,$Rule$1,$

Part$I$provides:$

$

Sec.$2.$

Applicability$—$

These(rules,$except$

Part$VI,(shall(apply(

to(all(actions(and(

proceedings(

brought(before(the(

Commission.$Part$VI$

shall$apply$to$

election$contests$

$

I:$W/N$Aruelo$is$correct$in$asserting$the$COMELEC$

Rules$of$Procedure$in$the$filing$of$motions$to$

dismiss$and$bill$of$particulars$

$

Held:$NO,$petition$is$hereby$DISMISSED$

$

Ratio:$

Petitioner$filed$the$election$protest$(Civil$Case$No.$e

343eMe92)$with$the$Regional$Trial$Court,$whose$

proceedings$are$GOVERNED$by$the$REVISED$RULES$

OF$COURT$and$not$of$the$COMELEC$Rules$of$

Procedure.$$

$

"$See$also$the$applicability$of$COMELEC$Rules$of$

Procedure$according$to$rule$1$of$section$2.$

$

The$COMELEC$cannot$adopt$a$rule$prohibiting$the$

filing$of$certain$pleadings$in$the$regular$courts.$$

$

The$power$to$promulgate$rules$concerning$

pleadings,$practice$and$procedure$in$all$courts$is$

vested$on$the$Supreme$Court$(Constitution,$Art$VIII,$

Sec.$5$[5]).$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

the$Court$of$which$ruled$that$the$

answer$and$countereprotest$of$

respondent$Danilo$F.$Gatchalian$was$

filed$timely$and$ordered$the$Regional$

Trial$Court,$Branch$17,$Malolos,$Bulacan$

to$continue$with$the$protest$case$

proceedings$filed$by$petitioner$Gregorio$

N.$Aruelo,$Jr.$

$

Aruelo$asserts$“Rule$35,$Sec.$7”$and$

“Rule$13,$Sec.1”$of$the$COMELEC$Rules$

of$Procedure.$

and$quo&warranto$cases$cognizable$by$courts$

of$general$or$limited$

jurisdiction.$

(

B. ANTONIO(

V.(

COMELEC(

(

G.R.$135869$

September$22,$

1999$

(

Pg(661(

Filing(of(Brgy.(

Election(

Appeal(

COMELEC(5O

dayOperiod(

vs.(RA(

6697/OEC(10O

day(period(

This$is$a$petition$for$certiorari$seeking$to$annul$the$order$of$the$Second$

Division$of$the$COMELEC,$dismissing$the$

appeal$of$petitioner$Rustico$Antonio$for$

having$been$filed$out$of$time$pursuant$

to$COMELEC$Rules$of$Procedure,$and$

the$order$of$the$COMELEC$en$banc,$

denying$petitioner’s$motion$for$

reconsideration.$$

$

Antonio$filed$a$Notice$of$Appeal$with$

the$trial$court$nine$(9)$days$after$receipt$

thereof.$$

$

COMELEC$relied$on$Section$21,$Rule$35$

of$the$COMELEC$Rules$of$Procedure$in$

dismissing$the$appeal.$

$

Petitioner$contends$that$the$period$of$

appeal$from$decisions$of$the$Municipal$

Trial$Courts$or$Metropolitan$Trial$Courts$

involving$barangay$officials$is$governed$

COMELEC$“SEC.$

21.$$Appeal$–$xxx$the$aggrieved$party$

may$appeal$to$the$

Commission$on$

Elections$within(five(

(5)(days$after$the$

promulgation$of$the$

decision.”$

$

RA$6679$“SEC.$9.$$A$

sworn$petition$

contesting$the$

election$of$a$

barangay$official$

may$be$filed$with$

the$proper$

municipal$or$

metropolitan$trial$

court$by$any$

candidate$xxx$for$a$

barangay$office$

I:$W/N$the$10edayeperiod$as$provided$in$the$$

Republic$Act$6679$and$the$Omnibus$Election$Code$

should$be$followed$in$filing$an$appeal$involving$an$

election$protest$for$a$barangay$position$

$

Held:$NO,$the$COMELEC$is$the$proper$appellate$

court$clothed$with$jurisdiction$to$hear$the$appeal,$

which$appeal$must$be$filed$within$five$days$after$the$

promulgation$of$the$MTC’s$decision.$

$

Ratio:$Section$6,$Article$IXeA$grants$and$authorizes$

the$COMELEC$to$promulgate$its$own$rules$of$

procedure.$$The$1993$COMELEC$Rules$of$Procedure$

have$provided$a$uniform$five$(5)$day$period$for$

taking$an$appeal$consistent$with$the$expeditious$

resolution$of$electionerelated$cases.$$

$

To$adopt$a$contrary$view$would$defeat$the$laudable$

objective$of$providing$a$uniform$period$of$appeal$

and$defy$the$COMELEC’s$constitutional$mandate$to$

enact$rules$of$procedure$to$expedite$disposition$of$

election$cases.$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

by$Section$9$of$Republic$Act$6679$and$

Section$252$of$the$Omnibus$Election$

Code.(

within(ten((10)(days$

after$the$

proclamation$of$the$

results$of$the$

election.$$xxx$

$“SEC.$252.$$Election&contest&for&barangay&offices.$–$A$sworn$petition$

contesting$the$

election$of$a$

barangay$officer$

shall$be$filed$xxx$by$

any$candidate$who$

has$duly$filed$a$

certificate$of$

candidacy$and$has$

been$voted$for$the$

same$office$within(

ten(days$xxx$

(

Section(7.(Each(Commission(shall(decide(by(a(majority(vote(of(all(its(Members,(any(case(or(matter(brought(before(it(within(sixty(days(from(the(date(of(

its(submission(for(decision(or(resolution.(A(case(or(matter(is(deemed(submitted(for(decision(or(resolution(upon(the(filing(of(the(last(pleading,(brief,(or(

memorandum(required(by(the(rules(of(the(Commission(or(by(the(Commission(itself.(Unless(otherwise(provided(by(this(Constitution(or(by(law,(any(

decision,(order,(or(ruling(of(each(Commission(may(be(brought(to(the(Supreme(Court(on(certiorari(by(the(aggrieved(party(within(thirty(days(from(

receipt(of(a(copy(thereof.(

(


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

A. CUA((V.(

COMELEC(

G.R.$No.$80519e

21$December$

2O1(

COMELEC(

decision(

QUORUM(

The$First$Division$of$the$COMELEC$

rendered$a$2e1$decision$favoring$the$

herein$petitioner$Cua$but$

nevertheless$suspended$his$

proclamation$as$winner$in$the$lone$

Section$5$of$COMELEC$

Resolution$No.$1669$reads$as$

follows:$

$

SEC.$5.$Quorum:$votes$

I:$W/N$the$2e1$decision$of$the$First$Division$of$

the$COMELEC$is$valid$

H:$YES,$it$was$a$valid$decision$under$Article$IXe

A,$Section$7$of$the$Constitution.$

$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

17,1987$

Pg(662$

congressional$district$of$Quirino$due$

to$the$lack$of$the$unanimous$vote$

required$by$the$procedural$rules$in$

COMELEC$$

$

The$respondents$insist$that$no$

decision$was$reached$by$the$First$

Division$because$only$three$votes$

were$cast$in$favor$of$the$petitioner$

and$these$did$not$constitute$a$

majority$of$the$body.$

required;$substitution.$—$Two$

members$shall$constitute$a$

quorum$for$the$transaction$of$

the$official$business$of$the$

Division.$

R:$The$three$members$who$voted$constitute$a$

quorum$of$the$five$members$who$deliberated$

and$voted$thereon$en$banc$and$their$decision$

is$also$valid$under$the$aforecited$

constitutional$provision.$

B. MISON(

(Customs$

Commissio

ner)((V.(

COA(

G.R.$No.$91429$$

July$13,$1990$

Pg(662$

Japanese(

Vessel(

Acting(COA(

Chairman(

$

M/V$‘HyojinMaru’,$a$vessel$of$

Japanese$registry,$sank$while$in$the$

custody$of$the$Bureau$of$Customs,$

and$could$not$be$salvaged$due$to$

lack$of$funds.$

$

The$claimants$(Chan$Chiu$On$and$

Cheung$I)$then$filed$a$claim$against$

the$COA$for$the$payment$of$the$value$

of$the$vessel$amounting$to$US$

$50,000.00,$plus$the$amount$

corresponding$to$legal$interest.$$

$

Mr.$Espiritu$(Manager,$Technical$

Service$Office$of$the$COA),$‘by$

authority$of$the$Acting$Chairman’,$

denied$such$claim$of$the$claimants.$

SECTION$7.$$$$Each$

Commission$shall$decide$xxx$

within$sixty$days$from$the$

date$of$its$submission$for$

decision$or$resolution.$xxx$

(

I:$W/N$Mr.$Espiritu’s$denial$of$the$claim$valid?$$

H:$NO,$Mr.$Espiritu$had$no$power$whatsoever$

to$render$and$promulgate$a$decision$for$the$

COA,$him$being$‘manager$of$the$COA$

technical$service$office’.$$

R:$The(power(is(lodged(in(the(COA(composed(

of(a(Chairman(and(two(Commissioners.(In$

fact,$even$the$Chairman$alone$does$not$have$

that$power.$Jurisdiction$belongs$to$the$

Commission,$as(a(collegial(body.$$

(

Also,$any$adoption$or$ratification$of$the$

‘Espiritu$decision’$by$the$Acting$COA$

Chairman$was$inconsequential$as$the$decision$

was$void$ab&initio&it$being$made$without$

authority.&$

C. MATEO(V.(

CA(

G.R.$No.$

113219$August$

14,$1995$

MOWAD(

CSC(

A$dismissal$of$an$employee$of$

MOWAD$(Morong$Water$District),$

which$is$a$quasiepublic$corporation,$

was$filed$under$the$RTC$of$Rizal.$

Sec.$7.$Unless$otherwise$

provided$by$this$Constitution$

or$by$law,$any$decision,$order,$

or$ruling$of$each$Commission$

may$be$brought$to$the$

Supreme$Court$

I:$W/N$$RTC$had$jurisdiction$over$disciplinary$

actions$of$government$employees$which$is$

vested$exclusively$in$the$Civil$Service$

Commission$

$

Held:$NO,$hiring$and$firing$of$employees$in$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Pg(663( on$certiorari&by$the$party$within$thirty$days$from$

receipt$of$a$copy$thereof.(

the$GOCCs$are$governed$by$the$provisions$of$

the$Civil$Service$Law$and$Rules$and$

Regulations.$

$

R:$MOWAD$is$a$quasiepublic$corporation$

created$pursuant$to$PD$198$(Provincial$Water$

Utilities$Act$of$1973.$

(In$Davao&City&Water&District&v.&Civil&Service&Commissions,$the$Court$enbanc$ruled$that$employees$of$GOCCs$with$original$charter$fall$

under$the$jurisdiction$of$the$Civil$Service$

Commission.$

D. AMBIL(V.(

COMELEC$

$

G.R.$No.$

143398,$

October$25,$

2000$

$

$

Pg$664$

Guiani(

Resolution(

The$case$to$nullify$the$order$of$the$

Commission$on$Elections$(Comelec),$

First$Division,$giving$notice$to$the$

parties$of$the$promulgation$of$

the$resolution$on$the$case(entitled$

Jose$T.$Ramirez,$Protestee,$versus$

Ruperto$A.$Ambil,$Jr.,$and$to$prohibit$

the$respondent$Commission$on$

Election$from$promulgating$the$so$

called$“Guiani$ponencia.”&$

Petitioner$Ruperto$A.$Ambil,$Jr.$and$

respondent$Jose$T.$Ramirez$were$

candidates$for$the$position$of$

Governor,$Eastern$Samar,$during$the$

May$11,$1998$elections.$On$May$16,$

1998,$the$Provincial$Board$of$

Canvassers$proclaimed$Ruperto$A.$

Ambil,$Jr.$as$the$duly$elected$

Governor,$Eastern$Samar.$

$

June$4,$1998!$respondent$Ramirez$

“Section$7.$Each$commission$

shall$xxx$$

Unless$otherwise$provided$

by$this$constitution(or(by(law,$

any$decision,$order,$or$ruling$

of$each$commission(may$be$

brought$to$the$Supreme$

Court$on$certiorari$by$the$

aggrieved$party$within$thirty$

days$from$receipt$of$a$copy$

thereof.”$

$

ISSUE(1:(Whether$or$not$the$Guiani$resolution$

is$valid$and$may$be$promulgated$

$

Held:$NO.$The$resolution$is$void.$$Ratio:$

A$final$decision$or$resolution$becomes$

binding$only$after$it$is$promulgated$and$not$

before.$Accordingly,$one$who$is$no$longer$a$

member$of$the$Commission$at$the$time$the$

final$decision$or$resolution$is$promulgated$

cannot$validly$take$part$in$the$resolution$or$

decision.$Much$more$could$he$be$the$

ponente$of$the$resolution$or$decision.$The$

resolution$or$decision$of$the$Division$must$be$

signed$by$a$majority$of$its$members$and$duly$

promulgated.$

$

Commissioner$Guiani$might$have$signed$a$

draft$ponencia$prior$to$his$retirement$from$

office,$but$when$he$vacated$his$office$without$

the$final$decision$or$resolution$having$been$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

who$obtained$the$second$highest$

number$of$votes,$filed$with$the$

Comelec,$an$election$

protest$challenging$the$results.$

$

January$27,$2000!Commissioner$

Japal$M.$Guiani$prepared$and$signed$

a$proposed$resolution$in$the$case.$

$

February$15,$2000!$Commissioner$

Guiani$retired$from$the$service.$On$

March$3,$2000,$the$President$of$the$

Philippines$appointed$Commissioner$

Rufino$S.$Javier$to$the$seat$vacated$

by$Commissioner$Guiani.$

Commissioner$Javier$assumed$office$

on$April$4,$2000.$

$

February$24,$2000!$petitioner$Ambil$

and$respondent$Ramirez$received$a$

purported$resolution$promulgated$

on$February$14,$2000,$signed$by$

Commissioner$Guiani$and$Tancangco,$

with$Commissioner$Desamito$

dissenting$(Guiani$Resolution).$

promulgated,$his$vote$was$automatically$

invalidated.$

$

E. DUMAYAS,(

JR.(V.(

COMELEC(

&(BERNAL(

G.R.$Nos.$

141952e53$

April$20,$2001$

(

Pg(664(

(

(

Effect(of(

Retirement(

of(Gorospe(

and(Guiani(

$

$

$

History:$$Petitioner$Dumayas,$Jr.$and$

respondent$Bernal,$Jr.$were$rival$

candidates$for$the$position$of$mayor$

in$Carles,$Iloilo$last$11$May$1998$

synchronized$elections.$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

Section$7$

I:(W/N$the$resolution$is$valid$

Held:$YES.$The$resolution$remains$valid.$(

Ratio:$

In$Jamil&v.&COMELEC,$the$Court$held$that$a$decision$becomes$binding$only$after$its$

promulgation.$If$at$the$time$it$is$promulgated,$

a$judge$or$member$of$the$collegiate$court$

who$had$earlier$signed$or$registered$his$vote$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

( March$13,$2000!$Bernal,$Jr.$was$

proclaimed$by$the$newlyeconstituted$

Municipal$Board$of$Canvassers$as$the$

dulyeelected$Mayor$of$the$

Municipality$of$Carles,$thereby$

unseating$Dumayas.$

$

*$*$*$*$*$

In$view$of$the$retirement$of$

Commissioners$Gorospe$and$Guiani$

before$the$date$of$the$promulgation$

of$the$assailed$resolution$on$March$

2,$2000.$

$

$There$arose$the$question$on$

whether$the$said$resolution$should$

be$deemed$null$and$void$for$being$

violative$of$Article$IXeA,$Section$7$of$

the$1987$Constitution.$

$

has$vacated$office,$his$vote$on$the$decision$

must$automatically$be$withdrawn$or$

cancelled.$Accordingly,$the$votes$of$

Commissioners$Gorospe$and$Guiani$should$

merely$be$considered$as$withdrawn$for$the$

reason$that$their$retirement$preceded$the$

resolution’s$promulgation.$The$effect$of$their$

withdrawal$would$be$as$if$they$had$not$signed$

the$resolution$at$all$and$only$the$votes$would$

be$properly$considered$for$the$purpose$of$

deciding$the$controversy.$

However,$unless$the$withdrawal$of$the$votes$

would$materially$affect$the$result$insofar$as$

votes$for$or$against$a$party$is$concerned,$we$

find$no$reason$for$declaring$the$decision$a$

nullity.$$

The$defect$cited$by$petitioner$does$not$affect$

the$substance$or$validity$of$respondent$

Commission’s$disposition$of$the$controversy.$

The$nullification$of$the$challenged$resolution$

would$merely$prolong$the$proceedings$

unnecessarily.(

(

Section(8.(Each(Commission(shall(perform(such(other(functions(as(may(be(provided(by(law.(

(

(

$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*


(

A.(CIVIL(SERVICE(COMMISSION(

(

Section(1.((

(1)(The(civil(service(shall(be(administered(by(the(Civil(Service(Commission(composed(of(a(Chairman(and(two(Commissioners(who(shall(be(naturalIborn(

citizens(of(the(Philippines(and,(at(the(time(of(their(appointment,(at(least(thirtyIfive(years(of(age,(with(proven(capacity(for(public(administration,(and(

must(not(have(been(candidates(for(any(elective(position(in(the(elections(immediately(preceding(their(appointment.(

(2)(The(Chairman(and(the(Commissioners(shall(be(appointed(by(the(President(with(the(consent(of(the(Commission(on(Appointments(for(a(term(of(

seven(years(without(reappointment.(Of(those(first(appointed,(the(Chairman(shall(hold(office(for(seven(years,(a(Commissioner(for(five(years,(and(

another(Commissioner(for(three(years,(without(reappointment.(Appointment(to(any(vacancy(shall(be(only(for(the(unexpired(term(of(the(predecessor.(

In(no(case(shall(any(Member(be(appointed(or(designated(in(a(temporary(or(acting(capacity.(

(


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

A. GAMINDE(V.(

COA(

GR.$No.$140335$

December$13,$

2000$

$

$

Pg(665I669(

5IYEAR(TERM(

OF(GAMINDE(

AS(CSC(

COMMISSIONER(

June$11,$1993!$the$President$

appointed$Atty.$Thelma$P.$Gaminde$

Commissioner,$Civil$Service$

Commission,$for$a$term$

expiring$February$02,$1999.$This$

terminal$date$is$specified$in$her$

appointment$paper.$$$

$

September$07,$1993!$the$

Commission$on$Appointments$

confirmed$the$appointment.$$She$

accepted$the$appointment$and$

assumed$office$on$June$22,$1993$for$

a$term$expiring$on$February$02,$

1999.$$

$

February$24,$1998!$The$Chief$

Presidential$Legal$Counsel,$in$a$letter$

dated$April$07,$1998$opined$that$

The$term$of$office$of$

the$Chairman$and$

members$of$the$CSC:$

$

“Section$1$(2).$$xxx$$Of$

those$first$appointed,$

the$Chairman$shall$hold$

office$for$seven$years,$

a$Commissioner$for$

five(years,$and$another$

Commissioner$for$

three$years,(without(

reappointment.$$xxx$

ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$5TyearTterm$of$office$

of$Atty.$Thelma$P.$Gaminde,$as$Commissioner,$

Civil$Service$Commission,$expired$on$February$

02,$1999,$as$stated$in$the$appointment$paper,$

or$on$February$02,$2000,$as$claimed$by$her.$

$

HELD:$Her$term$expired$on$February(2,(1999$

but$still$entitled$to$receive$her$salary$and$other$

emoluments$for$actual$service$rendered$until$

February$2,$2000.$

$

RATIO:$$The$letter$dated$April$07,$1998,$of$

Deputy$Executive$Secretary$Renato$C.$

Corona$clarifying$that$her$term$would$expire$on$

February$02,$2000,$was$in$ERROR.$$What$was$

submitted$to$the$Commission$on$Appointments$

was$a$nomination$for$a$term$expiring$on$

February$02,$1999.$$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Gaminde’s$term$of$office$would$

expire$on$February$02,$2000,$not$on$

February$02,$1999.$

$

March$24,$1999!$CSC$Resident$

Auditor$Flovitas$U.$Felipe$issued$

notice$of$disallowance,$disallowing$in$

audit$the$salaries$and$emoluments$

of$Gaminde$effective$February$02,$

1999.$

(

Section(2.((

(1)(The(civil(service(embraces(all(branches,(subdivisions,(instrumentalities,(and(agencies(of(the(Government,(including(governmentIowned(or(

controlled(corporations(with(original(charters.(

(2)(Appointments(in(the(civil(service(shall(be(made(only(according(to(merit(and(fitness(to(be(determined,(as(far(as(practicable,(and,(except(to(positions(

which(are(policyIdetermining,(primarily(confidential,(or(highly(technical,(by(competitive(examination.(

(3)(No(officer(or(employee(of(the(civil(service(shall(be(removed(or(suspended(except(for(cause(provided(by(law.(

(4)(No(officer(or(employee(in(the(civil(service(shall(engage,(directly(or(indirectly,(in(any(electioneering(or(partisan(political(campaign.(

(5)(The(right(to(selfIorganization(shall(not(be(denied(to(government(employees.(

(6)(Temporary(employees(of(the(Government(shall(be(given(such(protection(as(may(be(provided(by(law.(

(


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

A. EIIB(V.(CA(&(

CSC(

(

G.R.$No.$129133$

November$25,$1998$

(

Pg(670I671$

CSC(covers(

EIIB(

Petitioner$Jose$T.$Almonte,$as$

Commissioner$of$Economic$

Intelligence$and$Investigation$

Bureau$(EIIB),$failed$to$submit$all$

appointments$of$EIIB$as$required$by$

CSC.$

$

He$invoked$PD$No.$1458$and$LOI$No.$

71$exempting$the$EIIB$from$the$

coverage$of$civil$service$rules$and$

regulations$on$appointments$and$

$

SECTION$2.$$$$(1)$The$

civil$service$embraces$

all$branches,$

subdivisions,$

instrumentalities,$and$

agencies(of(the(

Government,$including$

governmentTowned$or$

controlled$corporations$

with$original$charters.$

ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$petitioner,$Economic$

Intelligence$Investigation$Bureau$(EIIB),$is$

embraced$by$the$Civil$Service.$

$

HELD:$Yes,$EIIB$is$a$government$agency$under$

the$Department$of$Finance,$which$is$within$the$

ambit$of$the$Civil$Service$Law$as$pursuant$to$

Sec.$2$(1),$Art.$IXTB$of$the$Constitution.$

$

RATIO:$The$PD$1458$and$LOI$No.$71$being$

invoked$by$the$petitioner$had$no$merit.$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

other$personnel$actions.$$

$

CSC$adjudge$Almonte$guilty$of$

indirect$contempt$with$penalty$of$

fine$P1,000.00$each$day$of$his$failure$

to$comply$with$the$CSC$Order$which$

shall$be$deducted$from$his$salary.$$

$

Dissatisfied$therewith,$petitioner$

went$to$the$Court$of$Appeals$but$his$

Petition$for$Certiorari$was$

dismissed.$$

$

$

$

LOI$No.$71,$$the$

Implementing$Rules$of$

P.D.$No.$1458,$reads:$

$

“10.$$It$is$further$

directed$that$personnel$

of$the$BII$shall$be$

exempt$from$OCPC$

and$Civil$Service$Rules$

and$

Regulations$relative$to$

appointments$and$

other$personnel$

actions;$xxx$"$

"$Such$provision$provide$for$the$exemption$of$

petitioner$EIIB$only$from(Civil(Service(Rules(and(

Regulations(relative(to(appointments(and(

other(personnel(actions,$but$not$from$the$Civil$

Service$Law$or$Civil$Service$Rules$and$

Regulations$relative$to$any$other$matter.$

$

“$...$[R]espondent$CSC’s$act$of$requiring$

petitioner$EIIB$to$submit$to$it$all$appointments$

in$the$Bureau,$for$appropriate$action,$is$part$of$

its$administrative$function$as$the$central$

personnel$agency$of$the$government.”$

B. CSC(&(PAGCOR(

v.(SALAS(

G.R.$No.$123708$

June$19,$1997$

PP(671I675$

(

CONFIDENTIAL(

EMPLOYEE(

$

Respondent$Salas$was$appointed$by$

the$PAGCOR$Chairman$as$Internal$

Security$Staff$(ISS)$member$but$was$

terminated$due$to$loss$of$

confidence$on$him$after$he$engaged$

in$proxy$betting.$Later$on,$

Petitioners$contended$that$

respondent$Salas$was$not$dismissed$

from$the$service$but,$instead,$his$

term$of$office$had$expired.$

$

The$Court$of$Appeals$rendered$its$

decision$that$herein$respondent$

Salas$is$not$a$confidential$employee;$

hence,$he$may$not$be$dismissed$on$

the$ground$of$loss$of$confidence.$It$

likewise$held$that$Section$16$of$

DOCTRINE/S:$

$

Confidential$Position$

Indicator$according$to$

Civil$Service$Act$of$

1959:$

$

1. when$the$

President$has$

declared$the$

position$to$be$

primarily$

confidential;$and,$$

$in$the$absence$of$such$

declaration,$when$by$

the$nature$of$the$

functions$of$the$office$

ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$$respondent$Salas$is$a$

confidential$employee$$

$

HELD:$NO,$taking$into$consideration$the$nature$

of$his$functions,$his$organizational$ranking$and$

his$compensation$level,$it$is$obviously$beyond$

debate$that$private$respondent$cannot$be$

considered$a$confidential$employee.$$

$

RATIO:$$

(1986$Constitutional$Commission$Delibaration)$

MR.$FOZ:$Which$department$of$government$

has$the$power$or$authority$to$determine$

whether$a$position$is$policyTdetermining$or$

primarily$confidential$or$highly$technical?$

$

FR.$BERNAS:$The$initial$decision$is$made$by$the$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Presidential$Decree$No.$1869$has$

been$superseded$and$repealed$by$

Section$2(1),$Article$IXTB$of$the$1987$

Constitution.$

$

Petitioners$seek$to$nullify$the$

decision$of$the$Court$of$Appeals$

ordering$the$reinstatement$of$

herein$private$respondent$Rafael$M.$

Salas$with$full$back$wages$for$having$

been$illegally$dismissed$by$the$

PAGCOR,$but$without$prejudice$to$

the$filing$of$administrative$charges$

against$him$if$warranted.$

there$exists$"close$

intimacy"$between$the$

appointee$and$

appointing$power$

which$insures$xxx$

freedom$from$

misgivings$of$betrayals$

of$personal$trust$$

$

In$other$words:$

FR.$BERNAS.$xxx$It$is$

not$enough$that$the$

law$calls$it$primarily$

confidential$to$make$it$

such;$it$is$the$nature$of$

the$duties$which$makes$

a$position$primarily$

confidential.$

legislative$body$or$by$the$executive$

department,$but$the$final(decision(is(done(by(

the(court.$The$Supreme$Court$has$constantly$

held$that$whether$or$not$a$position$is$policyT

determining,$primarily$confidential$or$highly$

technical,$it$is$determined$not$by$the$title$but$

by$the$nature$of$the$task$that$is$entrusted$to$it.$$

$

Several$factors$lead$to$the$conclusion$that$

private$respondent$does$not$enjoy$such$"close$

intimacy"$with$the$appointing$authority$of$

PAGCOR$such$as$having$routinary$security$staff$

functions,$being$lowest$in$the$chain$of$

command,$and$for$receiving$the$bottom$level$

salary$of$P2,200.00$a$month.$

C. CANONIZADO(

V.(AGUIRRE(

Pg(675I679(

NAPOLCOM(

reorganization(

The$NAPOLCOM$was$originally$

created$under$Republic$Act$No.$

6975.$It$was$later$amended$by$RA$

8551.$$

$

RA$8551$declared$that$the$terms$of$

the$current$Commissioners$were$

deemed$as$expired$upon$its$

effectivity$even$though$the$

petitioners’$terms$had$not$yet$

actually$expired.$$

$

Petitioners$argue$that$their$removal$

from$office$by$virtue$of$section$8$of$

RA$8551$violates$their$security$of$

tenure.$

Section$2$(3)$$$$No$

officer$or$employee$of$

the$civil$service$shall$be$

removed$or$suspended$

except$for$cause$

provided$by$law.$

$

Section$8$of$RA$8551:$

Upon$the$effectivity$of$

this$Act,$the$terms$of$

office$of$the$current$

Commissioners$are$

deemed$expired$which$

shall$constitute$a$bar$to$

their$reappointment$or$

an$extension$of$their$

ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$Republic(Act(No.(8551$

(RA(8551),$otherwise$known$as$the$"Philippine$

National$Police$Reform$and$Reorganization$Act$

of$1998$is$UNCONSTITUTIONAL$

$

HELD:$$YES,$but$only$to$the$extent$of$declaring$

section(8(of(RA(8551$unconstitutional$for$being$

in$violation$of$the$petitioners’$right$to$security$

of$tenure.$

$

RATIO:$It$is$exceedingly$apparent$to$this$Court$

that$RA(8551$effected$a$reorganization$of$the$

PNP,$not$of$the$NAPOLCOM.$They$are$two$

separate$and$distinct$bodies,$with$one$having$

supervision$and$control$over$the$other.$In$fact,$

the$basic$structure$of$the$NAPOLCOM$has$been$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

terms$in$the$

Commission$except$xxx$

$

preserved$by$the$amendatory$law.$$

$

No$bona$fide$reorganization$of$the$NAPOLCOM$

having$been$mandated$by$Congress,$RA$8551,$

insofar$as$it$declares$the$terms$of$office$of$the$

incumbent$Commissioners,$petitioners$herein,$

as$expired$and$resulting$in$their$removal$from$

office,$removes$civil$service$employees$from$

office$without$legal$cause$and$must$therefore$

be$struck$down$for$being$constitutionally$

infirm.$$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

D. SEC.(RICARDO(

GLORIA((DECS)(

V.(CA$

G.R.$No.$119903$

August$15,$2000$

Pg$679T680$

(

(

(

(

(

Prohibited(

indefinite(

Reassignment(

(

(

(

Security(of(

Tenure(

violation(

CA$granted$the$petition$of$Dr.$

Bienvenido$Icasiano$to$prohibit$the$

implementation$of$his$reassignment$

from$Schools$Division$

Superintendent,$Division$of$City$

Schools,$Quezon$City,$to$Vocational$

Schools$Superintendent$of$the$

Marikina$Institute$of$Science$and$

Technology$pursuant$to$the$

Memorandum$of$Secretary$Ricardo$

T.$Gloria$to$the$President$of$the$

Philippines$for$lack$of$indication$that$

it$is$only$temporary$and$thereby,$

violative$of$his$right$to$security$of$

tenure.$

$

Petitioners$contend$that$the$

doctrine$enunciated$in$Bentain$vs.$

Court$of$AppealsTT$that$"a$

reassignment$that$is$indefinite$and$

results$in$a$reduction$in$rank,$status$

and$salary,$is$in$effect,$a$

Bentain(doctrine:$

"Security$of$tenure$is$a$

fundamental$and$

constitutionally$

guaranteed$feature$of$

our$civil$service.$The$

mantle$of$its$

protection$extends$not$

only$to$employees$

removed$without$

cause$but$also$to$cases$

of$unconsented$

transfers$which$are$

tantamount$to$illegal$

removals$$

$

While$a$temporary$

transfer$or$assignment$

of$personnel$is$

permissible$even$

without$the$

employee’s$prior$

ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$reassignment$of$

private$respondent$from$School$Division$

Superintendent$of$Quezon$City$to$Vocational$

School$Superintendent$of$MIST$is$violative$of$

his$security$of$tenure?$YES$

$

RATIO:$

The$Court$upholds$the$finding$of$the$

respondent$court$that$the$reassignment$of$

petitioner$to$MIST$"appears$to$be$indefinite".$$$

$

Besides,$there$is$nothing$in$the$said$

Memorandum$to$show$that$the$reassignment$

of$private$respondent$is$temporary$or$would$

only$last$until$a$permanent$replacement$is$

found$as$no$period$is$specified$or$fixed.$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

constructive$removal$from$the$

service"$TT$does$not$apply$in$the$

present$case$for$the$reassignment$in$

question$was$merely$temporary,$

lasting$only$until$the$appointment$of$

a$new$Vocational$School$

Superintendent$of$MIST.$

consent,$it$cannot$be$

done$when$the$

transfer$is$a$

preliminary$step$

toward$his$removal,$or$

is$a$scheme$to$lure$him$

away$from$his$

permanent$position,$or$

designed$to$indirectly$

terminate$his$service,$

or$force$his$

resignation.$Such$a$

transfer$would$in$effect$

circumvent$the$

provision$which$

safeguards$the$tenure$

of$office$of$those$who$

are$in$the$Civil$Service”$

E. BUKLOD(NG(

KAWANING(

EIIB(V.(

EXECUTIVE(

SECRETARY(

ROLANDO(

ZAMORA(

GR(142801I802(

July(10,(2001(

Pg(680(

Valid(

Abolition(of(

EIIB(

Former$President$Corazon$C.$

Aquino,$issued$EO$No.$

127$establishing$the$Economic$

Intelligence$and$Investigation$

Bureau$(EIIB)$as$part$of$the$

structural$organization$of$the$

Ministry$of$Finance.$

$

11$years$after,$President$Joseph$

Estrada$issued$EO$No.$191$which$

ordered$the$deactivation$of$EIIB$and$

the$transfer$of$its$functions$to$the$

Bureau$of$Customs$and$the$National$

Bureau$of$Investigation.$

$

3$months$later,$$ERAP$issued$EO$No.$

Section$2$(3)$$$$No$

officer$or$employee$of$



except$for$cause$

provided$by$law.$

ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$EO$Nos.$191$and$223$

should$be$annulled$as$they$are$unconstitutional$

for$being$violative$of$Section(2(3),(Article(IXIB$$

$

HELD:$NO,$there$is$no$such$thing$as$absolute$

right$to$hold$office$except$constitutional$offices$

with$special$immunity$

$

RATIO:$Justice$Sarmiento$in$Dario$v.$Mison:$

xxx$As$a$general$rule,$a$reorganization$is$carried$

out$in$“good$faith”$if$it$is$for$the$purpose$of$

economy$or$to$make$bureaucracy$more$

efficient.((In(that(event,(no(dismissal((in(case(of(

dismissal)(or(separation(actually(occurs(

because(the(position(itself(ceases(to(exist.((And$

in$that$case,$security$of$tenure$would$not$be$a$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

223$providing$that$all$EIIB$personnel$

occupying$positions$specified$

therein$shall$be$deemed$separated$

from$the$service$effective$April$30,$

2000,$pursuant$to$a$bona$

fide$reorganization$resulting$to$

abolition,$redundancy,$merger,$

division,$or$consolidation$of$

positions.$

$

Petition$to$nullify$Executive$Order$

No.$191$and$Executive$Order$No.$

223$on$the$ground$that$they$were$

issued$by$the$Office$of$the$President$

with$grave$abuse$of$discretion$and$

in$violation$of$their$constitutional$

right$to$security$of$tenure.$

Chinese$wall.$$Be$that$as$it$may,$if$the$

‘abolition,’$which$is$nothing$else$but$a$

separation$or$removal,$is$done$for$political$

reasons$or$purposely$to$defeat$security$of$

tenure,$otherwise$not$in$good$faith,$no$valid$

‘abolition’$takes$and$whatever$‘abolition’$is$

done,$is$void$ab$initio.$$There$is$an$invalid$

‘abolition’$as$where$there$is$merely$a$change$of$

nomenclature$of$positions,$or$where$claims$of$

economy$are$belied$by$the$existence$of$ample$

funds.$

$

F. DIMAYUGA(V.(

BENEDICTO(II(

(

PP(683I686(

Security(of(

Tenure(

Chona$Dimayuga$was$appointed$(by$

DPWH$Secretary$Jose$de$Jesus)$as$

Executive$Director$II$of$the$Toll$

Regulatory$Board$(TRB).$As$the$

highestTranking$working$official,$she$

had$powers$of$control$and$

supervision$over$3$divisions:$Finance$

and$Administrative,$Technical,$

Engineering.$She$also$oversaw$

projects$and$participated$in$

negotiations.$At$that$time,$however,$

such$position$was$still$not$part$of$

the$career$executive$service$(CES).$

Therefore,$she$occupied$the$position$

although$she$was$not$a$career$

executive$service$officer$(CESO).$

On$May$31,$1994,$the$Civil$Service$

CSC$Memorandum$

Circular$21.$Section$4:$

Incumbents$of$

positions$which$are$

declared$to$be$CES$

positions$for$the$first$

time$pursuant$to$this$

resolution$who$hold$

permanent$

appointment$thereto$

shall$remain$under$

permanent$status$in$

their$respective$

positions.$However,$

upon$promotion$or$

transfer$to$other$CES$

positions,$these$

ISSUE(1:$Can$Dimayuga$claim$security$of$

tenure?$!$NO$

$

RATIO:(Petitioner$was$appointed$in$a$

permanent$capacity$to$the$position$of$Executive$

Director$II$of$TRB$in$1992,$at$which$time$said$

position$was$not$included$in$the$CES.$The$

subsequent$inclusion$of$her$position$under$the$

CES$did$not$automatically$qualify$her$for$that$

position$as$she$lacked$eligibility$as$she$was$not$

a$CESO.$Without$the$required$eligibility$

required,$she$could$not$hold$on$to$her$office$

permanently.$She$could$only$occupy$said$

position$until$the$appointing$authority$replaced$

her$with$someone$eligible.$$

$

ISSUE(2:$Can$petitioner$claim$proprietary$right$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Commission$(CSC)$issued$

Memorandum$Circular$no.$21.$(see$

right$column)$

Petitioner$alleges$that$during$her$

tenure,$she$became$the$subject$of$

several$administrative$and$criminal$

complaints$designed$to$coerce$her$

removal.$Two$consecutive$90Tday$

suspension$orders$were$issued$upon$

petitioner,$first$by$DPWH$sec$Vigilar$

and$then$by$Exec$Sec$Aguirre.$

Petitioner$assumed$duties$after$

expiration$of$the$second$suspension.$

However,$on$the$following$day,$

Vigilar$issued$Department$Order$no$

85$which$put$petitioner$as$

‘temporarily$detailed’$at$the$Office$

of$the$Secretary$of$the$DPWH.$

Dimayuga$filed$a$leave$of$absence$as$

a$gesture$of$protest,$rather$than$

assume$a$position$which$she$

considered$as$a$demotion.$$

While$Dimayuga$was$on$leave,$

President$Estrada$appointed$

respondent$Benedicto$II$in$her$stead$

as$Executive$Director$II$of$the$Board.$

Petitioner$then$filed$a$petition$for$

quo$warranto$before$the$court$of$appeals.$Apellate$court$rendered$the$

assailed$decision$dismissing$the$

petitioner’s$suit.$$

incumbents$shall$be$

under$temporary$

status$in$said$positions$

until$they$qualify.$$

to$her$post$as$Executive$Director$II$of$TRB?$!$

NO.$

$

RATIO:(This$would$encroach$upon$the$executive$

powers$of$the$President$and$run$counter$to$the$

wide$latitude$given$to$the$appointing$authority$

or$to$the$President.$

G. MIRANDA(V.(

CARREON((

PP(686I690(

6Imonth(

period(

Mayor$Jose$Miranda$was$suspended$

from$office.$Vice$Mayor$Amelita$

Navarro$took$over$as$Acting$Mayor.$

( ISSUE:$Can$the$appointees$be$terminated$from$

service$on$the$ground$that$they$are$wanting$in$

their$performance$before$the$6$month$period?$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Acting$Mayor$Amelita$Navarro$then$

appointed$the$respondents$to$

various$city$government$positions$

(City$of$Santiago).$$Such$

appointments$were$with$permanent$

status$and$the$Civil$Service$

Commission$(CSC)$approved$the$

appointments.$Upon$reassumption$

of$office,$Miranda$formed$a$3Tman$

special$performance$audit$team$

(Bayaua,$Martinez,$Santos)$to$

conduct$a$personnel$evaluation$

audit$of$those$appointed$by$

Navarro.$Their$report$stated$that$the$

appointees$were$wanting$in$their$

performance.$Miranda$thereafter$

issued$an$order$for$their$dismissal$

on$the$ground$that$they$performed$

poorly$during$their$probation$

period.$Respondents$allege$that$

they$can$only$be$dismissed$after$the$

expiration$of$the$6Tmonth$period$for$

the$employees$under$probation$and$

that$their$rights$to$due$process$were$

violated$since$they$deny$that$an$

evaluation$on$their$performance$

was$conducted.$

!$NO$

$

RATIO:(The$Revised$Administrative$Code$states$

that$such$appointees$can$be$dismissed$before$

the$6Tmonth$period$on$two$grounds:$(1)$

unsatisfactory$conduct$or$(2)$want$of$capacity$

must$be$present.$BUT(IN(THIS(CASE,(the$mayor$

just$recently$reassumed$office$and$it$was$

improbable$the$he$can$accurately$gauge$the$

performance$of$the$employees$in$such$short$

time$(3$months).$Enough$time$must$be$given$to$

gauge$the$performance$of$an$employee.$

Also,$the$Mayor$has$no$standing$to$file$such$

petition$since$assuming$that$there$was$an$

evaluation$on$the$employees,$such$evaluation$

must$be$done$by$their$immediate$supervisors$

and$not$by$those$appointed$by$Miranda.$

Lastly,$assuming$that$there$was$an$evaluation,$

the$dismissal$of$the$employees$was$still$invalid$

since$they$were$not$informed$of$their$poor$

performance$before$their$termination,$which$

the$law$requires.$Due$notice$is$required$by$law$

not$later$than$the$4th$month$of$the$rating$

period.$Respondents$assert$that$they$did$not$

receive$any$due$notice$prior$to$their$dismissal$

and$so$such$dismissal$is$invalid.$

H. SEÑERES(V.(

COMELEC(&(

ROBLES(

PP(690(

(

Robles$was$elected$chairperson$of$

BUHAY,$a$partyTlist$group$registered$

with$COMELEC.$The$constitution$of$

BUHAY$provides$for$a$3Tyear$term$

for$all$its$party$officers,$without$reT

election.$BUHAY$participated$in$the$

2001$and$2004$elections$with$Robles$

( ISSUE:(Did$Robles$violate$the$constitutional$

prohibition$of$electioneering?$NO$

$

RATIO:(Electioneering$is$defined$as$an$act$

designed$to$promote$the$election$or$defeat$of$a$

particular$candidate/s$to$a$public$office$which$

includes:$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

as$president.$

On$March$2007,$Robles$signed$a$

certificate$of$nomination$for$2007,$

and$Hans$Señeres$(holding$that$he$is$

an$acting$president$and$secretary$

general$of$BUHAY)$also$filed$a$

certificate$of$nomination.$$

Señeres$contends$that$Robles,$being$

BUHAY$president$and$nominating$

officer$as$well$as$Administrator$of$

the$LRTA$(Light$Rail$Transit$

Authority),$was$engaging$in$

electioneering$or$partisan$political$

campaign,$which$the$constitution$

prohibits.$It$is$prohibited$in$the$

constitution$for$any$officer$or$

employee$in$the$CSC$to$directly$or$

indirectly$be$engaged$in$

electioneering$or$partisan$political$

campaign.$

forming$of$organizations$to$solicit$votes$

interviews$for$or$against$election$of$a$candidate$

publishing$to$support$a$candidate$

directly$or$indirectly$soliciting$votes$

If$the$foregoing$are$performed$only$to$enhance$

the$chances$of$aspirants$for$nominations$for$

candidacy$to$public$office$by$a$political$party,$

agreement$or$coalition,$it$is$not$electioneering.$

Also,$public$expression$or$opinions$in$a$

forthcoming$election$or$criticisms$against$

probable$candidates$nominated$shall$not$be$

part$of$electioneering.$

Robles’$act$did$not$fall$under$the$mentioned$

circumstances$and$even$if$it$did,$it$only$served$

to$enhance$the$chances$of$aspirants$for$

nominations$for$candidacy$to$a$public$office$by$

a$political$party.$Therefore,$it$is$not$considered$

electioneering.$

$

COMPETITIVE(AND(NONICOMPETITIVE(POSITIONS(

A. NASECO(V.(

NLRC(

Pg(692(

Original(

Charter(

The$coverage$by$the$civil$service$of$

governmentTowned$or$controlled$

corporations$varies$in$the$1987$

Constitution$and$1973$Constitution.$

1973$Constitution:$$“The$civil$service$

embraces$every$branch,$agency,$

subdivision,$and$instrumentality$of$

the$Government,$including$every$


corporation.”$

1987$Constitution:$“The$civil$service$

embraces$all$branches,$and$agencies$

of$the$government,$including$

( (


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*


corporations$with$original$charter.”$The$purpose$“with$original$charter”$

is$to$indicate$that$government$

corporations$such$as$the$GSIS$and$

SSS,$which$have$original$charters,$

fall$within$the$ambit$of$the$civil$

service.$However,$corporations$

which$are$subsidiaries$of$these$

chartered$agencies$such$as$the$

Philippine$Airlines,$Manila$Hotel$and$

Hyatt$are$excluded$from$the$

coverage$of$the$civil$service.$$

The$term$“original$charters”$means$

they$were$created$by$law,$by$an$act$

of$Congress,$or$by$special$law$and$

NOT$under$the$general$law.$

The$NASECO$is$a$governmentT

owned$or$controlled$corporation$

without$original$charter$since$it$is$

the$1987$Constitution$that$governs$

the$instant$case.$

B. SAMSON(V.(CA(

PP(693(

Non(

competitive(

job$T$$

Then$Mayor$Marcial$Samson$issued$

Administrative$Order$No.$3,$

whereby$said$mayor$summarily$

terminated$the$services$of$the$

private$respondent$Feliciano$Talens$

who$then$held$the$position$of$

Assistant$Secretary$to$the$Mayor,$on$

the$ground$of$‘lack$and$loss$of$

confidence’.$He$then$appointed$

Hermogenes$Liwag,$a$coTpetitioner$

of$this$case,$in$place$of$Talens.$

Samson$cites$section$5$of$RA$2260,$

Section$5(f),$RA$#$2260$

(Civil$Service$Act$of$

1959)$

The$position$of$

secretaries$to$city$

mayors$is$declared$

nonTcompetitive.$

ISSUE:(Is$Administrative$Order$#$3$legal?$NO$

$

RATIO:(The$positions$Secretary$to$the$Mayor$

and$Assistant$Secretary$to$the$Mayor$are$two$

separate$and$distinct$positions.$One$is$of$higher$

category$and$rank.$The$Secretary$must$possess$

the$confidence$of$the$mayor,$however,$the$

Assistant$Secretary,$being$of$lower$rank,$need$

not$carry$such$requisite.$Also,$the$assistant$

secretary$differs$in$function$from$the$secretary.$

The$assistant$merely$‘aids’$with$the$duties$and$

responsibilities$of$the$secretary.$$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

which$he$interpreted$as$including$

assistant$secretaries$to$the$mayor,$

as$support.$Petitioner$argues$that$an$

assistant$secretary$is$also$a$

secretary$and$is$thus$comprised$

within$the$general$term$‘secretaries’$

in$the$mentioned$provision.$

C. HERNANDEZ(V.(

VILLEGAS(

14$SCRA$544$(1965)$

PP(693(

Term(of(office(

(

Law(of(Public(

Officers(

(

Removal(vs.(

Expiration(

The$termination$of$officials$and$

employees$of$their$position$can$be$

justified$on$the$ground$of$loss$of$

confidence.$

$

According$to$the$Law(of(Public(

Officers,$such$cessation$from$office$

involves$no(removal$from$office,$but$

merely$the$expiration$of$the$term$of$

office.$$These$are$two$different$

causes$for$the$termination$of$official$

relations.$

The$point$is$that$as$long$as$

confidence$in$such$officials$endures$

and$is$shown$not$to$have$been$lost,$

the$incumbent$is$entitled$to$

continue$in$office.$

Nothing$mentioned,$but$this$could$be$applicable:$$

Article(IX(B.(Sec.(2.(

(2)$Appointments$in$


made$only$according$to$

merit$and$fitness$to$be$

determined,$as$far$as$

practicable,$and,$

except$as$to$positions$

which$are$policyT

determining,$primarily$

confidential,$or$highly$

technical,$by$

competitive$

examination.$

NOTE:((

$

These$positions$are$primarily$confidential:$

Provincial$attorney$

City$legal$officer$

$

The$positions$of$the$legal$staff$are$NOT$

primarily$confidential.$

D. ACHACOSO(V.(

MACARAIG(

(

G.R.$No.$93023$

March$13,$1991(

Permanent(vs.(

Temporary(

appointments(

$

A$permanent$appointment$can$be$

issued$only$to$a$person$who$is$

eligible$and$has$met$all$the$

requirements$for$such$position.$$

Petitioner$Achacoso$did$not.$$At$

best,$his$appointment$can$only$be$

regarded$as$temporary$and$

according$to$jurisprudence,$can$



(2)$Appointments$in$


made$only$according$to$

merit$and$fitness$to$be$

ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$petitioner$Achacoso$can$

claim$to$have$been$permanently$appointed$and$

can$therefore$enjoy$security$of$tenure$as$a$

career$official.$

$

HELD:$No.$

$

RATIO:$

He$was$not$eligible$and$did$not$meet$all$the$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

therefore$be$withdrawn$at$a$

moment’s$notice.$

$

The$mere$fact$that$a$position$

belongs$to$the$Career$Service$does$

not$automatically$mean$he$can$

enjoy$security$of$tenure$even$if$he$

did$not$possess$the$required$

qualifications.$$$

$

A$person$who$does$not$have$such$

qualifications$for$the$position$

cannot$be$appointed$to$it$in$the$first$

place.$$As$an$exception,$he$could,$

but$only$to$the$extent$to$an$acting$

capacity$in$the$absence$of$those$

truly$qualified.$$Such$appointment$

cannot$be$regarded$as$permanent.$

$

The$purpose$of$an$acting$or$

temporary$appointment$is$to$

prevent$a$hiatus$in$the$discharge$of$

official$functions$by$authorizing$a$

person$to$do$such$while$pending$the$

selection$of$a$permanent$appointee.$$

Such$acting/temporary$appointment$

is$accepted$with$the$understanding$

that$he$may$be$called$to$surrender$

his$office$upon$the$order$of$the$

appointing$authority.$

determined,$as$far$as$

practicable,$and,$

except$as$to$positions$

which$are$policyT

determining,$primarily$

confidential,$or$highly$

technical,$by$

competitive$

examination.$

requirements$for$a$permanent$appointment.$$

At$best,$his$was$only$temporary.$

E. BRIONES(V.(

OSMENA(

104$Phil.$588$

(1988)(

Abolition(of(

positions(

(

(

This$is$an$action$for$mandamus$with$damages$to$declare$the$termination$

of$the$petitioners’$petitions$void$and$

to$order$respondent$City$Mayor$to$


ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$the$petitioners$may$

keep$their$offices$in$the$City$Mayor’s$Office$

and/or$the$Municipal$Board.(

$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

City(Mayor(

(

(

Honorable(

civil(service(

employees(

should(not(be(

sacrificed(due(

to(political(

intrigues(

reinstate$them$to$their$former$

positions.$

$

February$14,$1956$!$The$Municipal(

Board$through$Resolution$No.$187$

approved$Ordinance$No.$192,$which$

abolished(a(total(of(32(positions$(15$

positions$in$the$City$Mayor’s$office$+$

17$positions$in$the$Office$of$the$

Municipal$Board).$$Among$the$

positions$abolished$were$those$

occupied$by$the$petitioners.$

$

February$23,$1956$!$Pursuant$to$

said$Ordiance,$the$City$Major$

notified$the$petitioners$of$such$

changes,$“effective$at$the$close$of$

business$hours$on$March$15,$1956.”$

$

In$reply$thereto,$the$petitioners$filed$

their$letters:$

Acknowledging$the$receipt$of$the$

City$Mayor’s$letters$of$separation$

Protesting$the$abolition$of$their$

offices$

Informing$him$that$they$will$not$

relinquish$their$positions$“unless$

otherwise$determined$by$higher$

competent$authorities$or$courts.”$

$

The$City$Mayor$persisted$in$such$

termination,$adding$that$the$City(

Treasurer(and(City(Auditor(refused$

to$pay$the$petitioners’$salaries.$


(3)$No$officer$or$

employee$of$the$civil$

service$shall$be$


except$for$cause$

provided$by$law.$

HELD:$Yes.$

$

RATIO:(

The$reasons$given$for$such$abolition$(“economy$

and$efficiency”)$are$untrue,$which$are$only$

pretenses$for$the$removal$without$cause$of$the$

said$appellees.$$Such$violated$the$Civil$Service$

tenures.$

$

Since$the$time$of$the$Commonwealth$and$

before$the$war,$the$appellees$have$shown$

efficiency$in$their$services,$attested$by$repeated$

increases$in$salary.$$One$of$the$petitioners$was$

even$recently$proclaimed$“Model$Employee”.$$

Before$this$issue,$the$appellees$had$created$for$

the$same$City$Major$35$new$positions,$calling$for$an$outlay$of$P68k$per$year.$$The$excuse$of$

promoting$efficiency$and$economy$is$

unimpressive.$

$

Respect$must$be$given$to$Civil$Service$

employees,$like$these$petitioners$who$have$

rendered$long$and$honorable$services,$and$

should$not$be$sacrificed$in$favor$of$nonTeligibles$

given$positions$of$recent$creation,$nor$should$

they$be$left$at$the$mercy$of$political$changes.$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

$

Petitioners$filed$petitions$for:$

Reinstatement$

Back$salaries$

Moral$damages$

Attorney’s$fees$

F. MAYOR(V.(

MACARAIG(

(

(

G.R.$No.$87211$

March$5,$1991(

RA(6715(

(

Abolition(of(

offices(

Petitioners$!$They$basically$contest$

the$constitutionality$of$RA(6715,$

which$declares(vacant$“all$such$

positions$under$the$present$National$

Labor$Relations$Commissions:$

Commissioners$

Executive$Labor$Arbiters$

Labor$Arbiters.$

$

Respondents$!$

Such$positions$are$considered$

effectively$separated$from$the$

service,$including$the$Commission’s:$

Executive$Director$and$

Deputy$Executive$Director.$

This$caused$the$appointment$of$

other$persons$to$new$positions$in$

the$National$Labor$Relations$

Commission,$specified$in$RA$6715:$

Chairman$

Commissioners$

Executive$Clerk$

Deputy$Executive$Clerk$

Labor$Arbiters$

The$respondents$justified$that$the$

old$positions$were$declared$vacant$

because$of$the$need$to$

professionalize$the$higher$levels$of$


$

(1)$The$civil$service$

embraces$all$branches,$

subdivisions,$


agencies$of$the$





$

(3)$No$officer$or$

employee$of$the$civil$

service$shall$be$


except$for$cause$

provided$by$law.$

ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$there$was$an$express$or$implied$abolition$in$RA$6715$of$the$petitioners’$petitions.(

$

HELD:$There$was$no$express$abolition.$$

RATIO:(

There$were$no$essential$inconsistencies$

observed$in$the$relevant$provisions$of$RA$6715$

upon$the$changes$effected$on$the$nature,$

compositions,$powers,$duties,$and$functions$of$

the$Commission$and$the$Commissioners,$the$

Executive$Director,$the$Deputy$Executive$

Director,$and$the$Labor$Arbiters$under$the$prior$

legislation.$

$

So,(if(justification(must(be(sought(for(such(

abolition,(it(must(be(an(implied(one(that(attests(to(the(irreconcilable(inconsistency(

between(the(nature,(duties,(and(functions(of(

the(petitioners’(offices(under(the(old(rules(and(

those(corresponding(thereto(under(the(new(

law.(

(

*$$$*$$$*$$$*$$$*$

$

Security$of$tenure$is$a$protected$right$under$the$

Constitution,$pursuant$to$Article(IX(B,(Sec.(2(3).$$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

officialdom$and$to$upgrade$their$

qualifications,$ranks$and$salaries,$or$

emoluments.$

$

Because$the$Constitution$(1)$does$

not$ordain$the$abolition$of$the$

petitioners’$positions,$(2)$their$

removal$from$their$offices,$(3)$and$

that$there$is$no$claim$that$the$

petitioners’$separation$from$the$

service$is$due$to$a$cause$other$than$

RA$6716$!$In(order(that(the(

petitioners’(removal(from(their(

positions(may(be(defended(or(

sustained,(the(issue(should(be(

Whether(or(not(RA(6715(has(

worked(on(such(an(abolition(of(the(

petitioners’(offices,(whether(

express(or(implied.$

$

The$petitioners,$then,$may$avail$of$this,$as$they$

fall$within$the$concept$of$“an$officer$or$

employee$in$the$civil$service,”$pursuant$to$

Article(IX(B,(Sec.((2)1.$$None$of$the$positions$

mentioned$could$be$deemed$to$be$serving$at$

the$pleasure$of$the$President$because$they$had$

a$right$to$remain$in$office$until$the$expiration$of$

the$terms$for$which$they$had$been$appointed.$

$

A$recognized$cause$for$removal$or$termination$

of$employment$of$a$Government$employee$is$

the$abolition(by(law$of$his$office,$which$may$be$

due$to:$

Reorganization$by$reason$of$economy$or$for$

removal$of$redundancy$

A$clear$and$explicit$constitutional$mandate.$

$

Abolition$of$an$office$is$not$the$same$as$the$

declaration$that$the$office$is$vacant.$$Such$

would$constitute$on$its$face,$an$infringement$of$

the$constitutional$guarantee$of$security$of$

tenure$as$provided$for$in$Article(IX(B,(Sec.(2(3).$

G. BINAMIRA(V.(

GARRUCHO(JR.(

$

$

$

G.R.$No.$92008$

July$30,$1990(

Appointment(

vs.(

Designation(

Petitioner$seeks$reinstatement$to$

the$office$of$General$Manager$(GM)$

of$the$Philippine$Tourism$Authority$

(PTA)$from$which$he$claims$to$have$

been$removed$without$just$cause$in$

violation$of$his$security$of$tenure.$

$

April$7,$1986$!$Jose(Gonzales,(the(

Minister(of(Tourism,$designated$

Petitioner$Binamira$as$GM$of$the$

PTA$through$a$Memorandum.$$

Petitioner$then$assumed$office$on$

$

$

$

$

$

$

Presidential$Decree$

564.$Sec.$23TA.$

$

General$Manager$–$Appointment$and$Tenure.$$The$General$

ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$Binamira’s$appointment$

was$valid$and$that$he$could$enjoy$security$of$

tenure$as$General$Manager$of$the$Philippine$

Tourism$Authority.(

$

HELD:$No.$

$

RATIO:(

The$petitioner$was$not$appointed$by$the$President$of$the$Philippines$but$was$only$

designated$by$the$Minister$of$Tourism.$

$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

the$same$date.$

$

Binamira$claims$that$since$assuming$

office,$he$had$discharged$the$duties$

of$PTA$GM$and$Vice$Chair$of$its$

Board$of$Directors,$and$had$been$

acknowledged$as$such$by$various$

government$offices,$including$the$

Office$of$the$President.$

$

January$2,$1990$!$Binamira$

complained$that$his$resignation$was$

demanded$by$respondent$Garrucho$

as$the$new$Secretary(of(Tourism.$

$

January$4,$1990$!$President$

Corazon$Aquino$sent$a$

Memorandum$to$respondent$

Garrucho$saying$that$petitioner$

Binamira$(GM$of$the$PTA)$was$not$

designated$by$the$President$(as$

required$by$PD(564,$which$created$

the$Philippine$Tourism$Authority),$

but$only$by$the$Secretary$of$

Tourism.$$As$such,$Binamira’s$

designation$was$invalid.$$The$

President$then$designated$Garrucho$

as$GM$until$she$could$appoint$a$

person$to$hold$such$office$in$a$

permanent$capacity.$

$

Garrucho$then$took$over$Binamira’s$

postion$as$GM$of$the$PTA.$$Binamira$

then$filed$this$action$against$

Manager$shall$be$

appointed$by$the$

President$of$the$

Philippines$and$shall$

serve$for$a$term$of$six$

(6)$years$unless$sooner$

removed$for$cause;$

Provided,$That$upon$the$expiration$of$his$

term,$he$shall$serve$as$

such$until$his$successor$

shall$have$been$

appointed$and$

qualified.$(As$amended$

by$PD$1400.)$

Appointment$involves$the$exercise$of$

discretion,$and$this$cannot$be$delegated.$$

Legally$speaking,$it$was$impossible$for$Minister$

Gonzales$to$act$as$an$alter$ego$of$the$President,$even$if$Gonzales$happened$to$be$a$member$of$

the$President’s$Cabinet.$$The$power$to$appoint$

the$GM$of$the$PTA$rested$solely$on$the$

President$of$the$Philippines.$$At$best,$Binamira’s$

appointment$was$only$a$temporary$or$acting$

appointment$that$could$be$legally$withdrawn$at$

pleasure,$as$in$fact$it$was.$$Thus,$he$cannot$

claim$security$of$tenure.$

$

Moreover,$In$the$case$of$Villena$v.$Secretary$of$

Interior,$it$was$discussed$that$the$acts$of$the$

Department$Head$were$acts$of$the$President$of$

the$Philippines$when$“performed$and$

promulgated$in$the$regular$course$of$business,”$

which$was$true$of$the$designation$made$by$

Minister$Gonzales$of$Binamira.$$However,$such$

doctrine$also$adds$that$such$act$will$only$

remain$valid$“if$not$disapproved$or$reprobated$

by$the$Chief$Executive,”$as$what$happened$in$

this$case.$

$

*$$$*$$$*$$$*$$$*$

$

Appointment$!$Is$the$selection,$by$the$

authority$vested$with$power,$of$an$individual$

who$is$to$exercise$the$functions$of$a$given$

office.$$Such$completion$of$appointment$results$

in$security$of$tenure.$

$

Designation$!$The$imposition$by$law$of$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Garrucho$to$question$his$title.$$

Binamira$further$impleaded$a$

certain$Jose(Capistrano(as(an(

additional(respondent,$alleging$that$

on$April$6,$1990,$President$Aquino$

appointed$him$as$the$GM$of$the$

PTA.$

additional$duties$on$an$incumbent$official.$$

Such$appointee$serves$only$for$a$temporary$

capacity$and$may$be$replaced$at$will$by$the$

appointing$authority.$$There$is$no$security$of$

tenure.$

$

(Examples$of$designation$!$(1)$The$Secretary$of$Tourism$was$designated$Chairman$of$the$Board$of$Directors$of$the$Philippine$Tourism$Authority,$(2)$Three$justices$of$the$SC$may$be$enjoined$by$the$CJ$to$sit$in$the$Electoral$Tribunals$while$in$office.)$

H. LUEGO(V.(CSC(

(

143(SCRA(327((

(1986)(

(

(

p.(699(

(

Limits(of(CSC(

( Section$9(h)$of$Article$V$

of$the$Civil$Service$

Decree.$Approve$all$

appointments,$

whether$original$or$

promotional,$to$

positions$in$the$civil$

service…$

ISSUE(1:(Whether$or$not$the$CSC$is$authorized$

to$disapprove$a$permanent$appointment$on$the$

ground$that$another$person$is$better$qualified$

than$the$appointee$and$order$his$

replacement!NO.*It*was*not*for*the*CSC*to*reverse*him*and*call*the*appointment*temporary.$(

RATIO:$The$appointment$of$the$petitioner$is$not$

temporary$but$permanent$and$was$therefore$

protected$by$the$Constitution.$$

The$CSC$is$not$empowered$to$determine$the$

kind$or$nature$of$the$appointment$extended$by$

the$appointing$officer,$its$authority$being$

limited$to$approving$or$reviewing$the$

appointment$in$the$light$of$the$requirements$of$

the$Civil$Service$Law.$$

A$full$reading$of$Section$9(h)$of$the$Civil$Service$

Decree$will$make$it$clear$that$all$the$CSC$is$

actually$allowed$to$do$is$check$whether$or$not$

the$appointee$possesses$the$appropriate$civil$

service$eligibility$or$the$required$qualifications.(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

I. SANTIAGO(JR.(

V.(CSC(

178(SCRA(733(

(1989)(

(

p.(700(

Limits(of(CSC(

Petitioner,$Narciso$Y.$Santiago,$Jr.,$

with$the$rank$of$Collector$of$

Customs$I,$was$appointed$by$then$

Customs$Commissioner$

WigbertoTañada$as$Collector$of$

Customs$III.$However,$private$

respondent$Leonardo$A.$Jose,$with$

the$rank$of$Collector$of$Customs$II,$

filed$a$protest$before$the$Merit$

Systems$Promotion$Board$against$

Santiago’s$promotional$

appointment$on$the$ground$that$he$

was$next$in$rank$to$the$position$in$

question.$The$appointment$of$

Santiago$was$revoked$by$the$Merit$

Systems$Board$and$affirmed$by$the$

CSC.$

Hence,$the$instant$petition$for$

certiorari.$

Section$4,$CSC$

Resolution$No.$83T843.$

An$employee$who$

holds$a$nextTinTrank$

position$who$is$

deemed$the$most$

competent$and$

qualified…$However,$

the$appointing$

authority$may$promote$

an$employee$who$is$

not$nextTinTrank$but$

who$possesses$

superior$

qualifications…$

ISSUE(1:($Whether$or$not$the$CSC$is$authorized$

to$disapprove$a$permanent$appointment$on$the$

ground$that$there$is$another$nextTinTrank!NO.*The*CSC*does*not*have*authority.$(

RATIO:$One$who$is$nextTinTrank$is$entitled$to$

preferential$consideration$for$promotion$to$the$

higher$vacancy$but$it$does$not$necessarily$

follow$that$he$and$no$one$else$can$be$

appointed.$The$rule$neither$grants$a$vested$

right$to$the$holder$nor$imposes$a$ministerial$

duty$on$the$appointing$authority$to$promote$

such$person$to$the$next$higher$position.$As$

provided$for$in$Section$4$of$CSC$Resolution$No.$

83T843,$the$appointing$authority$has$the$power$

to$promote$an$employee$not$nextTinTrank.$$

The$power$to$appoint$is$a$matter$of$discretion.$

The$appointing$power$has$a$wide$latitude$of$

choice$as$to$who$is$best$qualified$for$the$

position.$To$apply$the$nextTinTrank$rule$

peremptorily$would$impose$a$rigid$formula$on$

the$appointing$power$contrary$to$the$policy$of$

the$law$that$among$those$qualified$and$eligible,$

the$appointing$authority$is$granted$discretion$

and$prerogative.$

J. ASTRAQUILLO(

ET.(AL.(V.(

MANGLAPUS(

$

G.R.(No.(88183,(

October(3,(1990(

(

(

p.(702(

NonIcareer(

Service(

(

Foreign(

Service(

The$decision$deals$with$five$cases.$

The$cases$have$been$consolidated$

and$jointly$considered$because$they$

all$turn$upon$a$common$legal$issue,$

i.e.,$the$validity$of$the$termination,$

by$authority$of$the$President$of$the$

Philippines,$of$the$petitioners’$

appointments$as$“political”$or$“nonT

career”$members$of$the$country’s$

$ ISSUE:$Whether$or$not$the$petitioners$were$

nonTcareer$officers$and$whose$service$as$

Philippine$diplomats$was$under$the$pleasure$of$

the$president.$

$

HELD:(YES.$Petitioners$were$nonTcareer$officers$

who$serve$at$the$pleasure$of$the$President.$

$

RATIO:$A$perusal$of$the$provisions$of$Section$5,$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Foreign$Service$–$whether$or$not$

their$service$as$Philippine$diplomats$

was$under$the$circumstances,$at$the$

pleasure$of$the$president,$

terminable$without$cause$or$need$of$

investigation.$

Astraquillo$was$appointed$by$the$

President$as$Ambassador$

Extraordinary$and$Plenipotentiary$

and$Chief$of$Mission$(II)$to$the$UAE.$

His$service$was$terminated$“by$

authority$of$the$President”$3$years$

later.$

Giang$was$appointed$as$Ambassador$

Extraodirnary$and$Plenipotentiary$

and$Chief$of$Mission$(Class$I)$to$

Kuwait.$His$service$was$terminated$

“by$authority$of$the$President”$also$

3$years$later.$

Melchor,$Jr.$was$appointed$as$

Ambassador$Extraordinary$and$

Plenipotentiary$and$whose$service$

was$also$terminated$after$3$years.$

$

P.D.$No.$807$shows$that$the$three$petitioners$

pertained$to$the$NonTCareer$Service.$Their$

appointments$to$the$Foreign$Service$were$

made$on”$bases$other$than$those$of$the$usual$

test$of$merit$and$fitness$utilized$for$the$career$

service;”$their$entrance$was$not$“based$on$

merit$and$fitness$determined$by$competitive$

examinations,$or$based$on$highly$technical$

qualifications.”$This$being$so,$their$“tenure$

(was)$coterminous$with$that$of$the$appointing$

authority$or$subject$to$his$pleasures.”$

K. SSS(V.(CA(

175(SCRA(686(

(1989)(

(

p.(704(

Strike(

An$issue$is$raised$on$whether$the$

Regional$Trial$Court$can$enjoin$the$

Social$Security$System$Employees$

Association$(SSSEA)$from$striking$

and$order$the$striking$employees$to$

return$to$work.$Collaterally,$it$is$

whether$or$not$employees$of$the$

SSS$have$the$right$to$strike.$

$ ISSUE(1:($Whether$or$not$the$SSS$employees$

have$the$right$to$strike!NO.*The*SSS,*like*all*government*employees,*are*prohibited*from*staging*strikes.$$

RATIO:$At$present,$in$the$absence$of$any$

legislation$allowing$government$employees$to$

strike,$recognizing$their$right$to$do$so,$or$

regulating$the$exercise$of$the$right,$they$are$

prohibited$from$striking,$by$express$provision$of$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Memorandum$Circular$No.$6$and$as$implied$in$

E.O.$No.$180.$$

Are(employees(of(the(SSS(covered(by(the(

prohibition(against(strikes?(

Considering$that$under$the$1987$Constitution$

the$civil$service$embraces$all$branches,$

subdivisions,$instrumentalities,$and$agencies$of$

the$Government,$including$governmentTowned$

or$controlled$corporations$with$original$

charters”$and$that$the$SSS$is$one$such$

governmentTcontrolled$corporation$with$an$

original$charter,$having$been$created$under$R.A.$

No.$1161,$its$employees$are$part$of$the$civil$

service.$

$

L. AQUINO(V.(CSC(

GR(92403(

April(22,(1992(

PP(706I707(

Security(of(

tenure(

CSC$revoked$the$appointment$of$

petitioner$Victor$A.$Aquino$as$Supply$

Officer$I$in$the$DECS$Division$of$San$

Pablo$City$as$it$found$private$

respondent$Leonarda$de$la$Paz$

better$qualified.$

$

In$assailing$the$revocation$of$his$

appointment,$petitioner$invoked$the$

ruling$of$the$Court$in$the$case$of$

Santiago$v.$Civil$Service$Commission$

and$Galura$v.$Civil$Service$

Commissionthat$the$CSC$has$no$

authority$to$revoke$an$appointment$

on$the$ground$that$another$person$

is$more$qualified$for$a$particular$

position$for$that$would$have$

constituted$an$encroachment$on$the$

discretion$vested$solely$in$the$

$ ISSUE(1:(Whether$or$not$the$CSC$committed$

grave$abuse$of$discretion$in$revoking$the$

appointment$of$petitioner!NO.*It*merely*restored*the*appointment*of*private*respondent*who*was*first*appointed*to*the*contested*position.*$(

RATIO:$Petitioner$reliance$in$the$rulings$in$the$

two$cases$did$not$hold$as$the$situation$is$

different$in$the$instant$case,$where$the$CSC$

revoked$the$appointment$of$petitioner$

principally$because$the$right$to$security$of$

tenure$of$the$prior$appointee,$private$

respondent,$to$the$contested$position$had$

already$attached.$CSC$did$not$direct$the$new$

appointment$of$a$substitute$of$its$choice.$It$

merely$restored$the$appointment$of$private$

respondent.$

It$is$wellTsettled$that$once$an$appointment$is$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

appointing$authority.$ issued$and$the$moment$the$appointee$assumes$

a$position$in$the$civil$service$under$a$completed$

appointment,$he$acquires$a$legal$a$legal$right$to$

the$position$which$is$not$only$protected$by$

statute$but$also$of$the$Constitution.$$

When$the$appointing$power$has$once$acted$and$

the$appointee$has$accepted$the$office$and$done$

what$is$required$of$him$upon$its$acceptance,$his$

title$to$the$office$becomes$complete,$and$he$

can$then$be$removed$only$in$the$regular$way.$(

M. PNOC(V.(NLRC(

GR(100947(

May(31,(1993(

PP(707I708(

Secc.(66(OEC:(

Ipso(Facto(

resignation(

Sept.$17,$1981!$Manuel$S.$Pineda$

was$employed$with$the$Philippine$

National$Oil$Co.TEnergy$

Development$Corp.$(PNOCTEDC)$as$

Geothermal$Construction$Secretary$

$

June$1988!$Pineda$took$his$oath$of$

office$in$as$councilorTelect$of$the$

Municipality$of$Kananga,$Leyte$and$

continued$working$for$PNOCTEDC.$

$

January$26,$1989!$the$PNOCTEDC,$

through$Marcelino$Tongco,$notified$

Manuel$S.$Pineda$in$writing$that$his$

employment$was$being$terminated$

pursuant$to$Section$66$of$the$

Omnibus$Election$Code,$effective$

upon$receipt$of$notice$

$

December$28,$1990!$Labor$Arbiter$

Araceli$H.$Maraya$rendered$a$

declaring$Manuel$S.$Pineda's$

dismissal$from$the$service$illegal,$

and$ordering$his$reinstatement$to$

Sec.$66.$Candidates$

holding$appointive$

office$or$position.$—$

Any$person$holding$a$

public$appointive$office$

or$position,$including$

active$members$of$the$

Armed$Forces$of$the$

Philippines,$and$

officers$and$employees$

in$governmentTowned$

or$controlled$

corporations,$shall$be$

considered$ipso$

facto$resigned$from$his$

office$upon$the$filing$of$

his$certificate$of$

candidacy.$

$

Section$2$(1),$Article$IX$

of$the$1987$

Constitution:$The$civil$

service$embraces$all$

branches,$subdivisions,$

ISSUE:(Whether$or$not(Pineda(should$be$

considered$ipso$facto$resigned$upon$the$filing$of$his$Certificate$of$Candidacy$in$November,$

1987,$in$accordance$with$Section$66$of$the$

Omnibus$Election$Code?$

(

HELD:(YES,(OEC$applies$to$all$employees$of$

GOCCs.(

(

RATIO:$In$the$language$of$Section$2$(1),$Article$

IX$thereof,$is$the$proposition$that$governmentT

owned$or$controlled$corporations$without$

original$charter$do$not$fall$under$the$Civil$

Service$Law$but$under$the$Labor$Code.$

$

However,$Sec.$66$of$the$OEC$has$a$general$

application$to$all$the$employees$even$if$they$do$

not$fall$under$the$Civil$Service$Law.$$

$

In$other$words,$Section$66$constitutes$a$just$

cause$for$termination$of$employment$in$

addition$to$those$set$forth$in$the$Labor$Code.$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

his$former$position$without$loss$of$

seniority$rights$and$payment$of$full$

back$wages$corresponding$to$the$

period$from$his$illegal$dismissal$up$

to$the$time$of$actual$reinstatement.$$


agencies$of$the$





$

N. LAPINID(V.(CSC(

GR(96298(

May(14,1991(

PP(708I709$

Limits(of(CSC(

CSC$appointed$appellants$Juanito$

Junsay$and$Benjamin$Villegas$as$

Terminal$Supervisor$replacing$

Renato$Lapinid$and$Antonio$Dulfo$

because$the$former$acquired$higher$

grade$in$the$comparative$evaluation$

over$the$latter.$

Doctrine:$

CSC$is$actually$allowed$

to$do$is$check$whether$

or$not$the$appointee$

possesses$the$

appropriate$civil$

service$eligibility$or$the$

required$qualifications.$$

And$to$disapprove$only$

when$such$

requirements$are$not$

met.$$

ISSUE:(Whether$or$not$the$Civil$Service$

Commission$is$authorized$to$disapprove$a$

permanent$appointment$on$the$ground$that$

another$person$is$better$qualified$than$the$

appointee$and,$on$the$basis$of$this$finding,$

order$his$replacement$by$the$latter?$

$

Held:$NO,$the$Civil$Service$Commission$cannot$

disallow$an$appointment$because$it$believes$

another$person$is$better$qualified$and$much$

less$can$it$direct$the$appointment$of$its$own$

choice.(

(

Section(3.(The(Civil(Service(Commission,(as(the(central(personnel(agency(of(the(Government,(shall(establish(a(career(service(and(adopt(measures(to(

promote(morale,(efficiency,(integrity,(responsiveness,(progressiveness,(and(courtesy(in(the(civil(service.(It(shall(strengthen(the(merit(and(rewards(

system,(integrate(all(human(resources(development(programs(for(all(levels(and(ranks,(and(institutionalize(a(management(climate(conducive(to(public(

accountability.(It(shall(submit(to(the(President(and(the(Congress(an(annual(report(on(its(personnel(programs.(

(

Section(4.(All(public(officers(and(employees(shall(take(an(oath(or(affirmation(to(uphold(and(defend(this(Constitution.(

(

Section(5.(The(Congress(shall(provide(for(the(standardization(of(compensation(of(government(officials(and(employees,(including(those(in(governmentI

owned(or(controlled(corporations(with(original(charters,(taking(into(account(the(nature(of(the(responsibilities(pertaining(to,(and(the(qualifications(

required(for,(their(positions.(

(

Section(6.(No(candidate(who(has(lost(in(any(election(shall,(within(one(year(after(such(election,(be(appointed(to(any(office(in(the(Government(or(any(

GovernmentIowned(or(controlled(corporations(or(in(any(of(their(subsidiaries.(

(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Section(7.(No(elective(official(shall(be(eligible(for(appointment(or(designation(in(any(capacity(to(any(public(office(or(position(during(his(tenure.(

(

Unless(otherwise(allowed(by(law(or(by(the(primary(functions(of(his(position,(no(appointive(official(shall(hold(any(other(office(or(employment(in(the(

Government(or(any(subdivision,(agency(or(instrumentality(thereof,(including(GovernmentIowned(or(controlled(corporations(or(their(subsidiaries.(

(

Section(8.(No(elective(or(appointive(public(officer(or(employee(shall(receive(additional,(double,(or(indirect(compensation,(unless(specifically(

authorized(by(law,(nor(accept(without(the(consent(of(the(Congress,(any(present,(emolument,(office,(or(title(of(any(kind(from(any(foreign(government.(

(

Pensions(or(gratuities(shall(not(be(considered(as(additional,(double,(or(indirect(compensation.(

(


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

( $ $ $ $

(

(

(

$


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*


(

D.(THE(COMMISSION(ON(AUDIT(

(

Section(2.((

(1)( The(Commission(on(Audit( shall( have( the(power,( authority,( and(duty( to( examine,( audit,( and( settle( all( accounts( pertaining( to( the( revenue( and(

receipts(of,(and(expenditures(or(uses(of(funds(and(property,(owned(or(held(in(trust(by,(or(pertaining(to,(the(Government,(or(any(of(its(subdivisions,(

agencies,( or( instrumentalities,( including( governmentOowned( or( controlled( corporations( with( original( charters,( and( on( a( postO( audit( basis:( (a)(

constitutional(bodies,(commissions(and(offices(that(have(been(granted(fiscal(autonomy(under(this(Constitution;((b)(autonomous(state(colleges(and(

universities;((c)(other(governmentOowned(or(controlled(corporations(and(their(subsidiaries;(and((d)(such(nonOgovernmental(entities(receiving(subsidy(

or(equity,(directly(or(indirectly,(from(or(through(the(Government,(which(are(required(by(law(or(the(granting(institution(to(submit(to(such(audit(as(a(

condition(of(subsidy(or(equity.(However,(where(the(internal(control(system(of(the(audited(agencies(is(inadequate,(the(Commission(may(adopt(such(

measures,(including(temporary(or(special(preOaudit,(as(are(necessary(and(appropriate(to(correct(the(deficiencies.(It(shall(keep(the(general(accounts(of(

the(Government(and,(for(such(period(as(may(be(provided(by(law,(preserve(the(vouchers(and(other(supporting(papers(pertaining(thereto.(

(

(2)(The(Commission(shall(have(exclusive(authority,(subject(to(the(limitations(in(this(Article,(to(define(the(scope(of(its(audit(and(examination,(establish(

the(techniques(and(methods(required(therefor,(and(promulgate(accounting(and(auditing(rules(and(regulations,(including(those(for(the(prevention(and(

disallowance(of(irregular,(unnecessary,(excessive,(extravagant,(or(unconscionable(expenditures(or(uses(of(government(funds(and(properties.(

(


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

A.DINGCONG(V.(

GUINGONA(JR.(

162(SCRA(782(

(1988)(

PP(761(

Power(to(

review(&(

evaluate(

contracts(

“pakyao”(

Petitioner,)Atty.)Praxedio)P.)Dingcong,)was)the)former)Acting)Regional)Director)of)Regional)Office)No.)VI)of)the)Bureau)of)Treasury)in)Iloilo)City)while)Guingona)was)the)Chairman)of)COA.)On)three)occasions,)petitioner,)after)public)bidding,)contracted,)admittedly)on)an)"emergency)labor)basis,")the)services)of)one)Rameses)Layson,)a)private)carpenter)and)electrician)on)"pakyao")basis)for)the)renovation)and)improvement)of)his)

Sec.)2.)(1))The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)revenue)and)receipts)of,)and)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)and)property,)owned)or)held)in)trust)by,)or)pertaining)to,)the)

W/N)the)disallowance)is)a)usurpation)of)a)management)function)and)an)impairment)of)contract.)Held:)No,)it)is)a)valid)exercise)of)functions.)Ratio:)Not)only)is)the)Commission)on)Audit)(COA))vested)with)the)power)and)authority,)but)it)is)also)charged)with)the)duty,)to)examine,)audit)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)...)the)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)...)owned)...)by,)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.)In)the)exercise)of)its)jurisdiction,)it)determines)whether)or)not)the)fiscal)responsibility)that)rests)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

office)for)giving)the)lowest)bid.)COA)reduced)the)daily)rate)of)the)carpenter)from)P40)to)P25)for)being)excessive)and)so)Dingcong)was)not)reimbursed.)

Government,)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities,)including)governmentVowned)or)controlled)corporations)with)original)charters(

directly)with)the)head)of)the)government)agency)has)been)properly)and)effectively)discharged,)and)whether)or)not)there)has)been)loss)or)wastage)of)government)resources.)

B.(DANVILLE(

MARITIME,(INC.(

V.(COA(

175(SCRA(701(

(1989)(

PP(763O764(

Bidding(

Public(Auction(

In)the)petition)for)review)in)G.R.)No.)85285,)petitioner)seeks)to)set)aside)the)letterVdirective)of)the)respondent)Commission)on)Audit)(COA)for)brevity))disapproving)the)result)of)the)public)bidding)held)by)the)Philippine)National)Oil)Company)(PNOC)for)brevity))of)the)sale)of)its)tankerVvessel)"T/T)Andres)Bonifacio")on)the)ground)that)only)one)bidder)submitted)a)bid)and)to)direct)COA)to)approve)the)said)sale.)Petitioner's)argues)that)the)COA)was)in)grave)error)in)its)perception)that)when)there)is)only)one)actual)bid)submitted)there)is)consequently)no)competition)and)thus)there)is)a)"failure)of)bidding.")The)fact)that)it)was)only)petitioner)which)submitted)a)bid)does)not)affect)the)validity)of)the)bidding)conducted.))

The)phrase)"public)auction")or)"public)bidding")imports)a)sale)to)the)highest)bidder)with)absolute)freedom)for)competitive)bidding.)(Competitive)bidding)requires)that)there)be)at)least)two)(2))bidders)who)shall)compete)with)each)other)on)an)equal)footing)for)winning)the)award.)If)there)is)only)one)participating)bidder,)the)bidding)is)nonVcompetitive)and,)hence,)falls)short)of)the)requirement.))Jurisdiction:)RTC)court)has)no)jurisdiction)to)review)a)decision)of)the)COA)under)the)Constitution.)This)is)a)matter)within)the)exclusive)jurisdiction)of)

W/N))COA)committed)a)grave)abuse)of)discretion)when)it)ruled)that)there)was)a)failure)of)bidding)Held:)No,)the)agreement)shall)be)null)and)void.)Rather)than)condemn)the)COA)as)petitioner)proposes,)the)COA)should)be)commended)for)its)zeal)and)care)in)insuring)that)the)disposition)of)the)subject)vessel)would)be)in)a)manner)most)advantageous)to)the)government.)A)rebidding)removes)any)suspicion)that)may)arise)out)of)the)sale)of)the)vessel)to)petitioner)under)present)circumstances.)The)Court)holds)that)a)second)public)bidding)is)ordained)so)that)all)government)transactions)would)be)competitive)and)above)board.))


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

the)Supreme)Court.)(

C.(RAMOS(V.(

AQUINO(

39(SCRA(256(

(1971)(

PP(764O766(

Auditor(

General(in(

Criminal(

Prosecution(

Petitioner)filed)an)action)for)certiorari)and)prohibition)assailed)the)jurisdiction)of)Benjamin)Aquino,)then)Provincial)Fiscal)of)Rizal,)to)conduct)the)preliminary)investigation)of)the)alleged)commission)of)malversation)through)falsification)of)commercial)documents,)imputed)by)the)Auditor)General.)Arguments)of)Edilberto)Ramos:)the)ascertainment)of)whether)a)crime)committed)and)by)who)is)a)not)a)constitutional)power)vested)in)the)Auditor)General.))

(

W/N)there)is)an)encroachment)of)the)constitutional)prerogatives)of)Auditor)General)by)the)inquiry)of)the)fiscal)to)determine)w/n)criminal)liability)is)incurred)for)any)anomaly)discovered)in)the)course)of)his)audit?)Held:)YES,)it)is)included)in)the)task)of)the)Auditor)General)“to)bring)the)proper)administrative)officer)expenditures)of)funds)or)property)which,)in)his)opinion,)are)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)or)extravagant”)Ratio:)CJ)Concepcion:)“As)a)matter)of)general)rule,)the)writ)of)prohibition)will)not)issue)to)retrain)criminal)prosecution.”)Besides,)the)Auditor)General)will)not)participate)in)the)investigation)to)determine)w/n)criminal)prosecution)should)be)instituted.)

D.(MAMARIL(V.(

DOMINGO(

PP767(

Accountable(

officer(

Petitioner)contends)that)he)could)not)be)held)liable)on)the)audit)disallowances)because)he)was)not)an)accountable)officer)within)the)meaning)of)Sec.)101)of)PD)1445)since:)))1.)his)work)was)purely)clerical,))2.)he)did)not)come)into)possession)of)any)money)or)property)for)which)he)is)now)asked)to)pay,)and)3.)He)did)not)act)in)bad)faith)or)with)gross)negligence.)

(

W/N)petitioner)is)an)accountable)officer)in)relation)to)Sec.)2,)Art.)9VD)of)the)Constitution)and)thus)is)held)liable)on)the)audit)disallowances.)!)YES)Ratio:)YES.)State)audit)is)not)limited)to)the)auditing)of)the)accountable)officers)and)the)settlement)of)accounts,)but)includes)accounting)functions)and)the)adoption)in)the)audited)agencies)of)internal)controls)to)see)to)it,)among)other)matters,)that)the)correct)fees)and)penalties)due)to)the)government)are)collected.)

E.(SAMBELI(V.(

PROVINCE(OF(

Public)expenditure)of)

The)case)at)bar)speaks)of)the)validity)of)a)COA)ruling)denying)the)

Article)9D,)Sec.)2(1).)The)COA)is)vested)with)

ISSUE:)WON)the)ruling)of)the)COA)was)valid.)HELD:)Yes.)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

ISABELA(

(

GR(No.(92279(

June(18,(1992(

funds) petitioner’s)claim)that)said)Commission)should)authorize)the)payment)between)a)transaction)the)petitioners)made)with)the)Province)of)Isabela)concerning)a)contract)of)sale.))))Petitioners)contend)that)the)contract)of)sale)has)not)been)perfected)between)the)Province)of)Isabela)and)petitioner,)but)delivery)has)been)made)by)it)with)the)corresponding)partial)payment)by)the)Province)of)Isabela.))Thus,)petitioners)allege)that)it)is)the)duty)of)COA)to)authorize)the)payment)of)the)balance)because)to)act)otherwise)will)constitute)an)impairment)of)contract.)

the)power)and)authority,)but)it)is)also)charged)with)the)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)accounts)pertaining)to)xxx)the)expenditure)or)uses)of)funds)xxx)owned)by)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.)Article)9D,)Sec.)2(2).)The)Commission)shall)have)exclusive)authority,)subject)to)the)limitations)in)this)Article,)to)define)the)scope)of)its)audit)and)examination,)establish)the)techniques)and)methods)required)therefor,)and)promulgate)accounting)and)auditing)rules)and)regulations,)including)those)for)the)prevention)and)disallowance)of)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)extravagant,)or)unconscionable)expenditures)or)uses)of)

RATIO:)Pursuant)to)Art.)9D,)Sec.)2(1V2),)the)COA)has)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)expenditure)or)use)of)funds)in)the)government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.))The)COA)is)vested)with)the)right)to)put)a)stop)to)improper)or)wasteful)spending)of)public)funds,)immoral)use)of)government)property)for)being)highly)irregular,)unnecessary,)or)scandalously)excessive)or)extravagant,)it)being)offensive)to)the)will)of)the)sovereign)people.)This)Commission)determines)whether)or)not)the)fiscal)responsibility)that)rests)with)the)head)of)the)government)agency)has)been)properly)and)effective)discharged.))It)is)also)empowered)to)review)and)evaluate)contracts,)and)after)an)audit)has)been)made,)its)auditors)issue)a)certificate)of)settlement)to)each)officer)whose)account)has)been)audited)and)settled)in)whole)or)in)part,)stating)the)balances)found)and)certified,)and)the)charges)or)differences)arising)from)the)settlement)by)reason)of)disallowances,)charges,)or)suspensions.)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

government)funds)and)properties.))

F.(OSMEÑA(V.(

COA(

(

GR(No.(98355(

March(2,(1994)

Abattoir(

Contract(

(

Compromise(

Agreement(

(

Auditing(Code(

of(the(

Philippines((PD(

1445)(

1985)!)The)City)of)Cebu)decided)to)construct)a)modern)abattoir)(slaughterhouse.))April)30,)1985)!)City)Treasurer,)Ricardo)Pestano,)issued)a)certificate)of)availability)of)funds)in)the)amount)of)P5.4M.))After)a)public)bidding,)H.)Franco)Construction)Company,)Inc.)(HFCCI))got)the)deal.))Thus,)the)City)of)Cebu,)through)its)Mayor,)Ronald)Duterte,)entered)intro)a)contract)with)HFCCI.)March)13,)1986)!)Sen.)John)Osmeña,)then)OfficerVInVCharge)of)the)City)of)Cebu,)ordered)the)suspension)of)the)project)and)review)of)the)contract)by)COA.))He)also)asked)that)HFCCI)account)for)the)value)of)their)progress,)for)which)they)said)that)P2.1M)was)the)value)of)they)work)they)had)accomplished)so)far.)May)21,)1987)!)After)HFCCI)was)unable)to)collect)the)amount)after)so)many)demands,)said)company)instituted)a)civil)action)against)the)City)of)Cebu)for)recovery)of)investment)and)damages.)June)5,)1987)!)The)City)of)Cebu)basically)said)that)the)contract)it)entered)with)HFCCI)was)null)and)

Art.)9VA,)Sec.)7.)Unless)otherwise)provided)by)this)Constitution)or)by)law,)any)decision,)order,)or)ruling)of)each)Commission)may)be)brought)to)the)Supreme)Court)on)certiorari)by)the)aggrieved)party)within)thirty)days)from)receipt)of)a)copy)thereof.))Article)9VD,)Sec.)2(1).)The)COA)is)vested)with)the)power)and)authority,)but)it)is)also)charged)with)the)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)accounts)pertaining)to)xxx)the)expenditure)or)uses)of)funds)xxx)owned)by)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities.)))

ISSUE:)WON)the)decision)of)COA)invalidating)the)contract)between)the)City)of)Cebu)and)HFCCI)was)void)because)the)contract)had)already)been)executed)and)fulfilled.)HELD:)No,)such)decision)is)valid.)RATIO:)The)COA)has)the)power)to)do)such)pursuant)to)Art.)9VD,)Sec.)2(1).)Moreover,)the)Auditing)Code)of)the)PH)also)states)that)no)contract)involving)the)expenditure)of)public)funds)shall)be)entered)into)unless:)There)is)an)appropriation,))The)proper)accounting)official)shall)have)certified)to)the)officer)entering)into)the)obligation)that)funds)have)been)duly)appropriated)for)the)purpose,)and)The)amount)necessary)to)cover)the)contract)for)the)current)year)is)available)for)expenditure.)The)contract)entered)into)by)former)City)of)Cebu)Mayor)Duterte)was)void)from)the)very)beginning)since)the)agreed)cost)for)the)project)(P8.37M))was)way)beyond)the)appropriated)amount)of)P5.4M,)as)certified)by)the)City)Treasurer.))Hence,)the)contract)was)properly)declared)void)and)unforceable)in)COA’s)2nd)Indorsement,)dated)September)4,)1986.))


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

void)as)declared)by)COA)in)its)2nd)Indorsement)dated)September)4,)1986.))Therefore,)the)officer/s)who)entered)into)the)contract)are)liable)for)whatever)amount)is)due)the)company.)December)15,)1988)!)The)City)Mayor,)now)Tomas)Osmeña,)entered)into)a)compromise)agreement)approved)by)the)court,)to)the)effect)that)as)a)full)and)final)settlement)for)HFCCI,)it)will)only)pay)the)company)P1.5)M.)March)3,)1989)!)Thus,)the)Provincial)Deputy)Sheriff,)RTC,)Branch)5,)of)Cebu)City,)was)ordered)to)serve)a)writ)of)execution)against)the)City)of)Cebu)through)its)Mayor.))The)amounts)of)P1.5)M)and)P15k,)as)lawul)fees,)were)garnished)from)the)City’s)funds)from)PNB.)May)2,)1989)!)The)COA)ruled)that)the)contract)for)the)construction)of)the)Cebu)City)Abattoir)was)declared)void)in)a)2nd)Indorsement.))Since)there)was)no)appeal,)the)decision)became)final.)Consequently,)if)a)compromise)is)based)upon)an)antecedent)claim,)which)is)illegal,)the)compromise)may)be)considered)invalid)on)the)ground)of)illegality)as)well)as)lack)of)consideration.))Besides,)pursuant)to)Art.)9VA,)Sec)7,)the)contract)is)a)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

circumvention)of)such)provision.))Petitioner’s)(Osmeña))request)for)reconsideration)was)denied)in)COA’s)5th)Indorsement.))Hence,)this)petition)with)the)ff:)grounds:)The)decision)in)the)2nd)Indorsement)is)null)and)void)for)having)been)made)without,)in)excess)of)jurisdiction)or)with)grave)abuse)of)discretion;)That)Public)Respondent’s)decision)has)never)become)final)for)the)abovementioned)reasons,)as)well.)

G.(BUSTAMANTE(

V.(COA(

(

GR(No.(103309(

(

November(27,(

1992(

Transportation)allowance))P1,250)

This)petition)seeks)to)set)aside)the)Decision)of)COA)which)denied)due)course)to)the)appeal)of)petitioner)Bustamante)from)the)disallowance)by)Regional)Auditor)Martha)Caburian)of)petitioner’s)claim)for)transportation)allowance)covering)the)month)of)January)1989)in)the)amount)of)P1,250.)Petitioner)Bustamante)is)the)Regional)Legal)Counsel)of)the)National)Power)Corporation)(NPC))for)the)Northern)Luzon)Region)Center)covering)the)provinces)of)Rizal)up)to)Batanes.))He)was)issued)a)government)vehicle.))Pursuant)to)NPC)Policy,)he)was)given)monthly)transportation)allowances)in)addition)to)the)use)of)the)government)vehicle.)On)May)1990,)the)petitioner)

Article)12VD,)Sec.)2(1),)1973)Constitution.)The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)following)powers)and)functions:))(1))Examine,)audit,)and)settle,)in)accordance)with)law)and)regulations,)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)revenues)and)receipts)of,)and)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)and)property,)owned)or)held)in)trust)by,)or)pertaining)to,)the)Government,)or)any)of)its)subdivisions,)agencies,)or)instrumentalities,)including)governmentV

ISSUE:)WON)the)COA)committed)grave)abuse)of)discretion)amounting)to)lack)of)jurisdiction)when)COA)denied)due)course)to)the)appeal)of)the)petitioner)from)the)disallowance)of)his)transportation)allowance.)HELD:)No,)COA)did)not)commit)such)in)denying)the)appeal.)RATIO:)The)discretion)exercised)in)the)denial)of)the)appeal)is)within)the)power)o)the)COA,)pursuant)to)Art.)12VD,)Sec.)2(1))of)the)1973)Constitution)and)in)Circular)No.)75V6)(Sec.14,)PD)733))which)regulated)the)use)of)government)motor)vehicles,)aircrafts,)and)watercrafts.)The)petitioner)cannot)say)that)NPC)was)not)under)the)corporations/offices)covered)by)PD)733)because)it)is)clear)that)the)circular)is)addressed)to)managing)heads)of)GovernmentVowned)or)Controlled)Corporations,)the)NPC)being)held)under)such)categories.)The)petitioner’s)contention)that)the)COA)usurped)the)statutory)functions)of)the)NPC)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

received)an)Auditor’s)Notice)to)Person)Liable)from)respondent)Caburian)disallowing)the)P1,250)transportation)allowance.)The)petitioner)moved)for)reconsideration)by)way)of)letter)to)Caburian,)but)the)latter)denied)such)motion.))Petitioner)then)appealed)this)denial)to)the)COA)at)Quezon)City,)which)denied)it,)as)well.)Thus,)this)petition.)

owned)and)controlled)corporations;)keep)the)general)accounts)of)the)government)and,)for)such)period)as)may)be)provided)by)law,)preserve)the)vouchers)pertaining)thereto;)and)promulgate)accounting)and)auditing)rules)and)regulations)including)those)for)the)prevention)of)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)or)extravagant)expenditures)or)use)of)funds)and)property.)P.D.)733,)Sec.)14.))VI.)Prohibition)Against)Use)of)Government)Vehicles)by)Officials)provided)with)transportation)allowance.))“No)official)who)has)been)furnished)motor)transportation)allowance)by)any)government)corporations)or)other)office)shall)be)allowed)to)use)motor)vehicle)transportation)operated)and)

Board)of)Directors,)also)cannot)be)sustained)because)that)would)lead)to)the)absurd)conclusion)that)a)mere)Board)of)Directors)of)a)governmentVowned)and)controlled)corporation,)by)issuing)a)resolution,)can)contravene)a)constitutional)provision.))Doing)otherwise)would)be)rendering)useless)this)Constitutional)Body,)which)has)been)tasked)to)be)vigilant)and)conscientious)in)safeguarding)the)proper)use)of)the)government’s,)and)ultimately,)the)people’s)property.)The)use)of)government)motor)vehicle)and)the)claim)for)transportation)allowance)are)mutually)exclusive.))Therefore,)the)P1,250)transportation)allowance)was)disallowed.)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

maintained)from)funds)appropriated)in)the)aboveVcited)Decree.”)

H.(OROCIO(V.(

COA(

(

GR(No.(75959(

August(31,(1992(

Decisions)by)acting)chairmen)have)no)authority)=)void)ab#initio)

Under)the)1973)and)1987)Constitutions,)the)COA)is)a)collegial)body.))It)must)resolve)cases)presented)to)it)as)such.))Its)General)Counsel)cannot)act)for)the)Commission)for)he)is)not)even)a)Commissioner)thereof.))He)can)only)offer)legal)advice)or)render)an)opinion)in)order)to)aid)the)COA)in)the)resolution)of)a)case)or)a)legal)question.)

VV) ISSUE:)WON)Nepomuceno’s)5th)Indorsement)can)be)considered)as)a)decision)of)the)COA.)HELD:)No.)RATIO:)A)soVcalled)decision)by)authority)of)the)acting)chairman)is)“substantially)void)ab#initio,”)because)it)was)rendered)without)jurisdiction.))It)had)an)essential,)inherent)defect,)that)could)not)cured)or)waived.”)(See)Mison#v.#COA))(Instead,#what#Mr.#Nepomuceno#should#have#done#was#to#render#the#opinion#sought#for#in#the#preceding#4th#Indorsement#of#respondent#Ursal,#and#submit#the#same#to#the#Commission#for#the#latter’s#guidance#in#resolving#the#motion#for#reconsideration.))

I.(CALTEX(

PHILIPPINES(VS.(

COA(

G.R.(No.(92585,(

May(8,(1992(

p.(772(

(

Reimbursement(

This)is)a)petition)erroneously)brought)under)Rule)44)of)the)Rules)of)Court)questioning)the)authority)of)the)Commission)on)Audit)(COA))in)disallowing)petitioner’s)claims)for)reimbursement)from)the)Oil)Price)Stabilization)Fund)(OPSF))and)seeking)the)reversal)of)said)Commission’s)decision)denying)its)claims)for)recovery)of)financing)charges)from)the)Fund)and)reimbursement)of)under)recovery)arising)from)sales)to)the)National)Power)Corporation,)Atlas)Consolidated)Mining)and)Development)Corporation)(ATLAS))and)Marcopper)Mining)Corporation)

Par.)1,)Section)2,)Article)IX,)D)of)the)1987)Constitution.)The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts)pertaining)to)the)revenue)and)receipts)of,)and)expenditures)or)uses)of)funds)and)property…)))

ISSUE(1:(Whether)or)not)the)COA)has)the)authority)to)disallow)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)extravagant,)or)unconscionable)expenditures,)or)use)of)government)funds)and)properties)!YES.)!Ratio)1:))o The)audit)power)of)the)Auditor)General)

under)the)1935)Constitution)and)the)Commission)on)Audit)under)the)1973)Constitution)authorized)them)to)disallow)illegal)expenditures)of)funds)or)uses)of)funds)and)property.)Our)present)Constitution,)as)seen)in)Par.)1,)Section)2,)Article)IX,)D,)retained)that)same)power)and)authority)further)strengthened)by)the)definition)of)the)COA’s)general)jurisdiction)in)Section)26)of)the)Government)Auditing)Code)of)the)Philippines)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

(MARCOPPER),)preventing)it)from)exercising)the)right)to)offset)remittances)against)its)reimbursement)visVàVvis)the)OPSF)and)disallowing)its)claims)which)are)still)pending)resolution)before)the)Office)of)Energy)Affairs)(OEA))and)the)Department)of)Finance)(DOF).))Due)to)importance)of)the)issues)raised,)the)error)in)the)designation)of)the)remedy)pursued)was)excused.)

and)Administrative)Code)of)1987.)(o The)same)view)was)expressed)by)one)of)the)

Commissioners)of)the)1986)Constitutional)Commission,)Fr.)Joaquin)G.)Bernas.(

J.(POLLOSO(VS.(

GANGAN(&(COA(

G.R.(No.(140563,(

July(14,(2000(

p.(774(

Payment(of(

legal(services(

The)National)Power)Corporation)(NPC))entered)into)a)service)contract)with)Atty.)Benemerito)A.)Satorre.)Satorre)was)able)to)render)legal)services,)however,)on)12)January)1995,)Unit)Auditor)Alexander)A.)Tan,)NPCVVRC,)Cebu)City,)issued)Notice)of)Disallowance)for)the)payment)of)the)services)rendered)by)Atty.)Satorre)for)the)period)covering)March)to)December)1995)on)the)ground)that)it)violated)COA)Circular)No.)86V255.)Professional)fees)were)then)charged)to)officials)of)the)NPC,)including)herein)petitioner.))Petitioner)initially)filed)motions)for)reconsideration)to)the)Unit)Auditor)and)the)COA)Regional)Director.)However,)both)were)denied)and)the)prior)decision)holding)petitioner)liable)for)said)fees)was)affirmed.)Hence,)before)the)Court)is)a)petition)for)review)from)the)decision)of)the)

) ISSUE(1:(Whether)or)not,)under)COA)Resolution)No.)86V255,)the)phrase)“handling)of)legal)cases”)should)be)construed)to)mean)as)conduct)of)cases)or)handling)of)court)cases)or)litigation)and)not)to)other)legal)matters,)such)as)legal)documentation,)negotiations,)counseling)or)right)of)way)matters)!NO#!Ratio)1:))o Contrary)to)view)espoused)by)petitioner,)the)

prohibition)covers)the)hiring)of)private)lawyers)to)render)and)form)of)legal)service.)It)makes)no)distinction)as)to)whether)or)not)the)legal)services)to)be)performed)involve)actual)legal)controversy)or)court)litigation.(

ISSUE(2:(Whether)or)not)the)petitioner)is)correct)in)saying)that)the)service)contract)in)question)falls)outside)the)ambit)of)the)circular)as)what)is)being)curtailed)is)the)payment)of)retainer)fees)and)not)the)payment)of)fees)for)legal)services)actually)rendered)!NO.#!Ratio)2:))o To)give)such)a)technical)interpretation)to)the)

term)“retainer)fees”)would)go)against)the)


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Commission)on)Audit)(COA),)dated)28)September)1999)of)herein)petitioner)Dante)M.)Polloso,)from)the)disallowance)by)the)COA)Unit)Auditor)of)the)amount)of)P283,763.39)representing)payment)of)legal)services)rendered)by)Atty.)Benemerito)A.)Satorre)to)the)National)Power)Corporation)(NPC).))

purpose)of)the)circular)and)render)the)same)ineffectual.(

ISSUE(3:()Whether)or)not)the)Circular)is)unconstitutional)for)being)an)invalid)restriction)to)the)practice)of)the)law)profession!NO.#!Ratio)3:))o The)questioned)COA)circular)simply)sets)forth)

the)prerequisites)for)a)government)agency)instrumentality)ion)hiring)a)private)lawyer,)which)are)reasonable)safeguards)to)prevent)irregular,)unnecessary,)excessive,)extravagant)or)unconscionable)expenditures)or)uses)of)government)funds)and)properties.(

THE(COURT(DISMISSED(THE(PETITION.(

K.(KBP(VS.(COA(

G.R.(No.(88435,(

January(16,(2002(

p.777(

Disallowance(

This)is)a)petition)for)review)on)certiorari)of)the)letterVdecision)of)the)Chairman)of)the)Commission)on)Audit)(COA))and)the)letterVdecision)of)the)COA)en)banc,)prohibiting)the)Development)Bank)of)the)Philippines)(DBP))from)hiring)a)private)external)auditor.)This)petition)raises)a)question)of)first)impression,)whether)or)not)the)constitutional)power)of)the)COA)to)examine)and)audit)the)DBP)is)exclusive)and)precludes)a)concurrent)audit)of)the)DBP)by)a)private)external)auditor.)

Sec.)2,)Article)IXVD)of)the)1987)Constitution.))(1))The)Commission)on)Audit)shall)have)the)power,)authority,)and)duty)to)examine,)audit,)and)settle)all)accounts…)(2))The)Commission)shall)have)exclusive)authority,)subject)to)the)limitations)in)this)Article,)to)define)the)scope)of)its)audit)and)examination,)establish)techniques…)Sec.)20,)Article)XII)of)the)1987)Constitution.)The)Congress)shall)establish)an)

ISSUE(1:(Whether)or)not)COA)has)the)sole)and)exclusive)power)to)examine)and)audit)government)banks)so)as)to)prohibit)concurrent)audit)by)private)external)auditors)under)any)circumstance!NO.#!Ratio)1:))o A)perusal)of)the)records)of)the)1986)

Constitutional)Commission)would)reveal)that)the)framers)of)the)Constitution)intended)that)COA)be)not)granted)exclusive)jurisdiction)over)the)auditing)of)any)government)department,)agency,)or)instrumentality.)They)were)fully)aware)of)the)need)to)allow)independent)private)audit)of)certain)government)agencies)in)addition)to)the)COA)audit,)as)when)there)is)a)private)investment)in)a)governmentVcontrolled)corporation,)or)when)a)government)corporation)is)privatized)or)publicly)listed,)or(as(in(the(case(at(bar(when(the(government(borrows(money(from(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

independent)central)monetary)authority,)the)members)of)whose)governing)board)must)be)naturalVborn)Filipino)citizens,)of)known)probity,)integrity,)and)patriotism,)the)majority)of)whom)shall)come)from)the)private)sector…)

abroad.(

o There)is)another)constitutional)barrier)to)the)COA’s)insistence)of)exclusive)power)to)examine)and)audit)all)government)agencies.)The)COA’s)claim)clashes)directly)with)the)Central)Bank’s)constitutional)power)of)“supervision”)over)banks)under)Section)20,)Article)XII)of)the)Constitution.)The)COA)and)the)Central)Bank)have)concurrent)jurisdiction,)under)the)Constitution,)to)examine)and)audit)government)banks.)However,)despite)this)concurrent)jurisdiction,)the)COA’s)audit)still)prevails)over)that)of)the)Central)Bank.(

L.(PARREÑO(VS.(

COA(

G.R.(No.(162224,(

June(7,(2007(

p.(781(

Pension(

Salvador)Parreño)(petitioner))served)in)the)Armed)Forces)of)the)Philippines)(AFP))for)32)years.)On)5)January)1982,)petitioner)retired)from)the)Philippine)Constabulary)with)the)rank)of)2nd)Lieutenant.)Petitioner)availed,)and)received)payment,)of)a)lump)sum)pension)equivalent)to)three)years)pay.)In)1985,)petitioner)started)receiving)his)monthly)pension)amounting)to)P13,680.)Petitioner)migrated)to)Hawaii)and)became)a)naturalized)American)citizen.)In)January)2001,)the)AFP)stopped)petitioner’s)monthly)pension)in)accordance)with)Section)27)of)Presidential)Decree)No.)1638,)as)amended)by)Presidential)Decree)No.)1650.))

) ISSUE(1:()Whether)or)not)COA)has)jurisdiction)to)rule)on)the)constitutionality)of)Section)27)of)PD)1638)!NO.#!Ratio)1:))o Petitioner)filed)his)money)claim)before)the)

COA.)A)money)claim)is)“a)demand)for)payment)of)a)sum)of)money,)reimbursement)or)compensation)arising)from)law)or)contract)due)from)or)owing)to)a)government)agency.”)Under)Commonwealth)Act)No.)327,)as)amended)by)Presidential)Decree)No.)1445,)money)claims)against)the)government)shall)be)filed)before)the)COA.(

o The)jurisdiction)of)the)COA)over)money)claims)against)the)government)does)not)include)the)power)to)rule)on)the)constitutionality)or)validity)of)laws.)(

(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

PD)1638,)as)amended,)provides)that)a)retiree)who)loses)his)Filipino)citizenship)shall)be)removed)from)the)retired)list)and)his)retirement)benefits)terminated)upon)loss)of)Filipino)citizenship.)Petitioner)requested)for)reconsideration)but)the)Judge)Advocate)General)of)the)AFP)denied)the)request.)Petitioner)filed)a)claim)before)the)COA)for)the)continuance)of)his)monthly)pension.)COA)denied)petitioner’s)claim)for)lack)of)jurisdiction.)

(

(

!


ARTICLE(X:(LOCAL(GOVERNMENT((Section(8.(The(term(of(office(of(elective(local(officials,(except(barangay(officials,(which(shall(be(determined(by(law,(shall(be(three(years(and(no(such(official(shall(serve(for(more(than(three(consecutive(terms.(Voluntary(renunciation(of(the(office(for(any(length(of(time(shall(not(be(considered(as(an(interruption(in(the(continuity(of(his(service(for(the(full(term(for(which(he(was(elected.((

Cases( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(

A. BORJA(JR.(V.(COMELEC(&(CAPCO(

GR(133495(Sept.(3,(1998(PP((822W826(

Succession(is(not(counted(in(the(3Wterm(limit(of(mayors(

January'18,'1988,June'30,'1992'!'Term'of'''private'respondent'Jose'T.'Capco'as'vice,mayor'of'Pateros''September'2,'1989!'Capco'became'mayor,'by'operation'of'law,'upon'the'death'of'the'incumbent,'Cesar'Borja.'''May'11,'1992,'June'30,'1995'!'Capco'ran'and'was'elected'mayor.''May'8,'1995,'June'30,'1998!'Capco'was'reelected'mayor.''March'27,'1998!'Capco'filed'a'certificate'of'candidacy'for'mayor'of'Pateros'for'May'11,'1998'elections.''''Petitioner'Benjamin'U.'Borja,'Jr.,'who'was'also'a'candidate'for'mayor,'sought'Capco’s'disqualification.''COMELEC'disqualified'Capco'but'reversed'its'decision.''May'11,'1998'elections!'Capco'won'

SEC.'8.''The'term'of'office'of'elective'local'officials,'except'barangay'officials,'which'shall'be'determined'by'law,'shall'be'three'years'and'no'such'official'shall'serve'for'more'than'three'consecutive'terms.(

W/N(Capco’s(succession(to(the(office(of(mayor(by(operation(of(law(for(the(remainder(of(the(term(is(counted(in(the(threeWterm(limit?(Held&'Ratio:'No,'because'he'was'not'elected'to'the'office'of'the'mayor'in'the'first'term'but'simply'found'him'thrust'into'it'by'operation'of'law.''Neither'had'he'served'the'full'term'because'he'only'continued'the'service,'interrupted'by'the'death,'of'the'deceased'mayor.'Additional'Info:'Unlike'in'the'case'of'a'member'of'the'House'of'Representatives'who'succeeds'another,'the'vice,mayor'succeeds'to'the'mayor,ship'by'operation'of'law.'But'the'Representative'is'elected'to'fill'the'vacancy.''In'a'real'sense,'therefore,'such'Representative'serves'a'term'for'which'he'was'elected.''As'the'purpose'of'the'constitutional'provision'is'to'limit'the'right'to'be'elected'and'to'serve'in'Congress,'his'service'of'the'unexpired'term'is'rightly'counted'as'his'first'term.''Therefore,'the'theory'contention'of'the'petitioner'about'Sec.'8'is'applicable'to'HoR'members'and'not'to'a'vice,mayor'who'succeeds'the'mayor,'who'dies,'resigns,'becomes'incapacitated'or'removed'from'office.''


(Section(9.(Legislative(bodies(of(local(governments(shall(have(sectoral(representation(as(may(be(prescribed(by(law.((

so'Borja'now'prays'to'set'aside'the'reversal'of'COMELEC’'decision'to'let'Capco'run.(

B. DAVID(V.(COMELEC(

GR(127116(April(8,(1997(PP(827W828(

Determining(the(term(of(Barangay(Officials(

ALEX'L.'DAVID,'in'his'own'behalf'as'Barangay'Chairman'of'Barangay'77,'Zone'7,'Kalookan'City'and'as'President'of'the'LIGA'NG'MGA'BARANGAY'SA'PILIPINAS.'The'two'petitions'before'us'raise'a'common'question:'How'long'is'the'term'of'office'of'barangay'chairmen'and'other'barangay'officials'who'were'elected'to'their'respective'offices'on'the'second'Monday'of'May'1994?''Is'it'three'years,'as'provided'by'RA'7160'(the'Local'Government'Code)'or'five'years,'as'contained'in'RA'6679?''Contending'that'their'term'is'five'years,'petitioners'ask'this'Court'to'order'the'cancellation'of'the'scheduled'barangay'election'this'coming'May'12,'1997'and'to'reset'it'to'the'second'Monday'of'May,'1999.(

How'long'is'the'term'of'office'of'barangay'officials?'!'3'YEARS'as'provided'under'the'Local'Government'Code.'Under'Sec.'43,c'of'RA'7160,'the'term'of'office'of'barangay'officials'was'fixed'at'"three'(3)'years'which'shall'begin'after'the'regular'election'of'barangay'officials'on'the'second'Monday'of'May'1994."'This'provision'is'clearly'inconsistent'with'and'repugnant'to'Sec.'1'of'RA'6679'which'states'that'such'"term'shall'be'for'five'years."''The'rationale'is'simple:'a'later'law'repeals'an'earlier'one'because'it'is'the'later'legislative'will.'

W/N'the'3,year'term'is'repugnant'to'the'constitution?'Held'&'Ratio:'NO,'the'Constitution'did'not'expressly'prohibit'Congress'from'fixing'any'term'of'office'for'barangay'officials.'MR.'NOLLEDO.'One'clarificatory'question,'Madam'President.'What'will'the'term'of'the'office'of'barangay'officials'be'as'provided'for?'MR.'DAVIDE.'As'may'be'determined'by'law.'MR.'NOLLEDO.'As'provided'for'in'the'Local'Government'Code?'MR.'DAVIDE.'Yes'


A. SUPANGAN,(JR.(V.(

Validity(of(appointments(made(by(the(

Petitioner'Johnny'D.'Supangan,'Jr.,'was'elected'KB'Provincial'Federation'President'of'the'province'of'

Section'9'Article'X'of'the'1973'Constitution'mandates'that'legislative'bodies'of'

W/N(the(designations/appointments(made(by(respondent(Secretary(is(unlawful(and(unconstitutional?(


SANTOS(GR(84663(August(24,(1990(

Secretary(DLG(of(members/(sectoral(representatives('

Pangasinan'in'1985.'On'November'25,'1985,'petitioner'was'appointed'by'then'President'Marcos'as'member'of'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'of'the'province'of'Pangasinan'representing'the'youth'sector.''August'8,'1988!'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'presented'to'the'Presiding'Officer'a'letter'written'by'respondent'Secretary'Luis'T.'Santos'advising'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'that'respondent'"Marissa'Domantay'has'been'named'as'member'thereof'to'replace'Johnny'D.'Supangan,'Jr."''Claiming'that'Sec.'Santos'has'no'legal'authority'to'designate'private'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'as'member'of'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'representing'the'youth'sector'because''(a)'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'has'never'been'elected'as'KB'Provincial'Federation'President'of'Pangasinan,'a'basic'qualification'for'appointment'as'member'representing'the'youth'sector,'and''(b)'respondent'Secretary'of'Dept.'of'Local'Government'has'no'legal'authority'in'issuing'his'letter'dated'August'3,'1988'because'the'term'of'office'of'petitioner'Johnny'D.'Supangan,'Jr.'has'not'yet'expired'nor'

local'governments'shall'have'sectoral'representation'as'may'be'prescribed'by'law.''B.P.'Blg.'337'is'still'operative,'even'after'the'ratification'of'the'1987'Constitution—'Sec.'3.'All'existing'laws,'decrees,'executive'orders,'proclamations,'letters'of'instructions'and'other'executive'issuances'not'inconsistent'with'this'Constitution'shall'remain'operative'until'amended,'repealed'or'revoked.''

Under'the'Local'Government'Code'(BP'337),'the'power'to'appoint'sectoral'representatives'is'conferred'upon'the'President'of'the'Philippines.'But'the'Secretary'of'Local'Government'may,'by'authority'of'the'President'inform'the'sectoral'representatives'of'their'appointments.'Otherwise'stated,'it'is'actually'the'President'who'has'made'the'appointments'in'the'cases'involved'herein,'and'the'Secretary'of'Local'Government'is'only'the'transmitter'or'communicator'of'said'appointments.'HOWEVER,'there'cannot'be'any'appointment'without'enabling'law,'the(B.P.(337(particularly(secs.(146(and(173.'B.P.'Blg.'337'explicitly'requires'that'before'the'President'(or'the'Secretary'of'the'Department'of'Local'Government)'may'appoint'members'of'the'local'legislative'bodies'to'represent'the'Industrial'and'Agricultural'Labor'Sectors,'On'the'question'of'qualification'of'the'appointee,'We'ruled'in'the'cases'of(Ignacio(v.(Banate,(Jr.(and(Reyes(v.(Ferrer((supra)(that'the'appointee'to'the'Sanggunian'who'sits'there'as'a'representative'must'meet'the'qualifications'required'by'law'for'the'position.'As'to'representatives'of'the'youth'sector,'Association'of'Barangay'Councils'and'Kabataang'Barangay'Federation,'Sec.'3'par.'I'of'B.P.'Blg.'51'and'Sec.'173'par.'1'of'B.P.'Blg.'337'(both'earlier'quoted)'require'that'they'must'have'been'presidents'or'officers'of'said'sector'or'barangay.'


(Section(10.(No(province,(city,(municipality,(or(barangay(may(be(created,(divided,(merged,(abolished,(or(its(boundary(substantially(altered,(except(in(accordance(with(the(criteria(established(in(the(local(government(code(and(subject(to(approval(by(a(majority(of(the(votes(cast( in(a(plebiscite(in(the(political(units(directly(affected.((

his'successor,'if'any,'been'elected/appointed'and'qualified.'Held:'(The'appointment'of'respondent'Marissa'Domantay'as'member'of'the'Sangguniang'Panlalawigan'of'Pangasinan'representing'the'youth'sector'is'declared'null'and'void,'and'petitioner'Johnny'Supangan,'Jr.'is'ordered'reinstated.(


A. TAN(V.(COMELEC(

142(SCRA(727((July(11,(1986(PP(833W839(

(((Void(creation(of(New(Province(of(Negros(del(Norte((

December'3,'1985!'Batas'Pambansa'Blg.'885,An'Act'Creating'a'New'Province'in'the'Island'of'Negros'to'be'known'as'the'Province'of'Negros'del'Norte.''December'23,'1985!''TAN'and'other'residents'of'the'Province'of'Negros'Occidental'filed'a'case'for'Prohibition'for'the'purpose'of'stopping'the'respondent'Commission'on'Elections'from'conducting'the'plebiscite'which'was'scheduled'to'be'implemented'on'January'3,'1986.'

Local(Government(Code(((SEC.(197.(Requisites(for(Creation.'A'province'may'be'created'if'it'has'territory'of'at'3,'500'square'kilometers'population'of'at'least'500,000'persons'average'estimated'annual'income,'as'certified'by'the'Ministry'of'Finance,'of'not'less'than'10M'pesos'for'the'last'3'consecutive'years,'Its'creation'shall'not'reduce'the'population'and'income'of'the'mother'province'or'

W/N'Batas'Pambansa'Blg.'885'is'unconstitutional?'HELD:'YES,'therefore,'the'proclamation'of'the'new'province'of'Negros'del'Norte,'as'well'as'the'appointment'of'the'officials'thereof'is'also'declared'null'and'void.'With'constitutional'infirmity'attaching'to'the'subject'Batas'Pambansa'Big.'885'and'also'because'the'creation'of'the'new'province'of'Negros'del'Norte'is'not'in'accordance'with'the'criteria'established'in'the'Local'Government'Code,'the'factual'and'legal'basis'for'the'creation'of'such'new'province'which'should'justify'the'holding'of'another'plebiscite'does'not'exist.'"'This'created'province'does'not'even'satisfy'the'area'requirement'prescribed'in'Section'197'


provinces'at'the'time'of'said'creation'to'less'than'the'minimum'requirements'under'this'section.'The'territory'need'not'be'contiguous'if'it'comprises'two'or'more'islands.'Xxx'Article(XI,(Section(3(of(the(Constitution:(SEC.'3.'No'province,'city,'municipality'or'barrio'may'be'created,'divided,'merged'abolished,'or'its'boundary'substantially'altered,'except'in'accordance'with'the'criteria'established'in'the'local'government'code,'and'subject'to'the'approval'by'a'majority'of'the'votes'in'a'plebiscite'in'the'unit'or'units'affected.'

of'the'Local'Government'Code.'

B. ROY(PADILLA(Jr.((Governor(of(Camarines(Norte)(V.(COMELEC((GR(

The(participants(in(a(plebiscite((

Subject:'The'Creation'of'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa'in'the'Province'of'Camarines'Norte'December'15,'1991!'Result'of'the'plebiscite'throughout'the'Municipality'of'Labo:'only'2,890'votes'favored'its'creation'while'3,439'voters'voted'against'the'creation'of'the'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa.''The'governor'of'Camarines'Norte'seeks'to'set'aside'the'plebiscite'conducted'and'prays'that'a'new'

Rationale(behind(the(deletion'of'the'phrase'"unit'or"'in'Section'10,'Article'X'of'the'1987'Constitution'Mr.'Davide:'I(would(object.(I(precisely(asked(for(the(deletion(of(the(words("unit(or"(because(in(the(plebiscite(to(be(conducted,(it(must(involve(all(the(units(affected.(If(it(is(the(creation(of(a(barangay(plebiscite(because(it(is(affected.'It(

W/N'the'petitioner'can'conduct'a'new'plebiscite?'Held:'NO.'Therefore,'COMELEC'did'not'commit'a'grave'abuse'of'discretion'for'declaring'the'result'of'the'plebiscite'valid.'It'stands'to'reason'that'when'the'law'states'that'the'plebiscite'shall'be'conducted'"in'the'political'units'directly'affected,"'it'means'that'residents'of'the'political'entity'who'would'be'economically'dislocated'by'the'separation'of'a'portion'thereof'have'a'right'to'vote'in'said'plebiscite.'Evidently,'what'is'contemplated'by'the'phase'"political'units'directly'affected,"'is'


103328(October(19,(1992((839W842(

plebiscite'be'undertaken'as'provided'by'RA'7155'because'it'was'a'complete'failure.'Also,'the'results'obtained'were'invalid'and'illegal'because'the'plebiscite,'as'mandated'by'COMELEC'Resolution'No.'2312'should'have'been'conducted'only'in'the'political'unit'or'units'affected,'i.e.'the'12'barangays'comprising'the'new'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa.'Petitioner'stresses'that'the'plebiscite'should'not'have'included'the'remaining'area'of'the'mother'unit'of'the'Municipality'of'Labo,'Camarines'Norte.'

would(mean(a(loss(of(a(territory.((Emphasis'supplied)'(

the'plurality'of'political'units'which'would'participate'in'the'plebiscite.'Logically,'those'to'be'included'in'such'political'areas'are'the'inhabitants'of'the'12'barangays'of'the'proposed'Municipality'of'Tulay,Na,Lupa'as'well'as'those'living'in'the'parent'Municipality'of'Labo,'Camarines'Norte'

C. LEAGUE(OF(CITIES(V.(COMELEC(

GR(176951(December(21,(2009(842W853(

(16(Cityhood(Laws(

Cases'filed'by'League'of'Cities'of'the'Philippines'(LCP),'City'of'Iloilo,'City'of'Calbayog,'and'Jerry'P.'Treñas,'assailing'the'constitutionality'of'the'sixteen'(16)'laws'each'converting'the'municipality'covered'thereby'into'a'component'city'(Cityhood'Laws).'Before'Senate'Bill'No.'2157,'now'R.A.'No.'9009,'was'introduced'by'Senator'Aquilino'Pimentel,'there'were'57'bills'filed'for'conversion'of'57'municipalities'into'component'cities.'''During'the'11th'Congress'(June'1998,June'2001),'33'of'these'bills'were'enacted'into'law,'while'24'remained'as'pending'bills.''Among'these'24'were'the'16'municipalities'

Intent'of'increasing'the'income'requirement:'The'purpose'of'the'enactment'of'R.A.'No'9009'was'merely'to'stop'the'“mad'rush'of'municipalities'wanting'to'be'converted'into'cities”'and'the'apprehension'that'before'long'the'country'will'be'a'country'of'cities'and'without'municipalities.''It'should'be'pointed'out'that'the'imposition'of'the'P100'million'average'annual'income'requirements'for'the'creation'of'component'cities'was'arbitrarily'made.'

W/N'the'cityhood'laws'violate'(1)'Sec.'10.'Art.'X'of'the'Constitution?'NO,'16'municipalities'are'exempted'from'the'amendments'in'the'LGC.'Congress'intended'that'those'with'pending'cityhood'bills'during'the'11th'Congress'would'not'be'covered'by'the'new'and'higher'income'requirement'of'P100'million'imposed'by'R.A.'No.'9009.''When'the'LGC'was'amended'by'R.A.'No.'9009,'the'amendment'carried'with'it'both'the'letter'and'the'intent'of'the'law,'and'such'were'incorporated'in'the'LGC'by'which'the'compliance'of'the'Cityhood'Laws'was'gauged.'


Section(11.(The(Congress(may,(by(law,(create(special(metropolitan(political(subdivisions,(subject(to(a(plebiscite(as(set(forth(in(Section(10(hereof.(The(component(cities(and(municipalities(shall(retain(their(basic(autonomy(and(shall(be(entitled(to(their(own(local(executive(and(legislative(assemblies.(The(jurisdiction(of(the(metropolitan(authority(that(will(thereby(be(created(shall(be(limited(to(basic(services(requiring(coordination.((

that'were'converted'into'component'cities'through'the'Cityhood'Laws.'


A. MMDA(V.(BELWAIR(VILLAGE(ASSOC(

GR(135962((March(27,(2000(853W858(

LIMITS(OF(MMDA(

January'2,'1996!'Respondent'prayed'for'the'issuance'of'a'temporary'restraining'order'and'preliminary'injunction'enjoining'the'opening'of'Neptune'Street'and'prohibiting'the'demolition'of'the'perimeter'wall.'The'trial'court'issued'a'temporary'restraining'order'the'following'day.'January'23,'1996!'The'appellate'court'conducted'an'ocular'inspection'of'Neptune'Street]'and'on'February'13,'1996,'it'issued'a'writ'of'preliminary'injunction'enjoining'the'implementation'of'the'MMDA’s'proposed'action.''January'28,'1997!the'appellate'court'rendered'a'Decision'on'the'merits'of'the'case'finding'that'the'MMDA'has'no'authority'to'order'the'opening'of'Neptune'Street,'a'private'subdivision'road'and'cause'the'demolition'of'its'perimeter'walls.'It'held'that'the'authority'is'lodged'in'the'City'Council'of'Makati'by'

"Section(11.'xxx'The'jurisdiction'of'the'metropolitan'authority'that'will'thereby'be'created'shall'be'limited'to'basic'services'requiring'coordination."(

HAS'THE'METROPOLITAN'MANILA'DEVELOPMENT'AUTHORITY'(MMDA)'THE'MANDATE'TO'OPEN'NEPTUNE'STREET'TO'PUBLIC'TRAFFIC'PURSUANT'TO'ITS'REGULATORY'AND'POLICE'POWERS?'Held:'NO,'MMDA'is'not'a'local'government'unit'or'a'public'corporation'endowed'with'legislative'power.'Under'the'1987'Constitution,'the'local'government'units'became'primarily'responsible'for'the'governance'of'their'respective'political'subdivisions.''The'MMA’s'jurisdiction'was'limited'to'addressing'common'problems'involving'basic'services'that'transcended'local'boundaries.'It'did'not'have'legislative'power.'Its'power'was'merely'to'provide'the'local'government'units'technical'assistance'in'the'preparation'of'local'development'plans.'Any'semblance'of'legislative'power'it'had'was'confined'to'a'"review'[of]'legislation'proposed'by'the'local'legislative'assemblies'to'ensure'consistency'among'local'governments'and'with'the'comprehensive'development'plan'of'Metro'Manila,"'and'to'"advise'the'local'governments'


(Section( 12.( Cities( that( are( highly( urbanized,( as( determined( by( law,( and( component( cities( whose( charters( prohibit( their( voters( from( voting( for(provincial(elective(officials,(shall(be(independent(of(the(province.(The(voters(of(component(cities(within(a(province,(whose(charters(contain(no(such(prohibition,(shall(not(be(deprived(of(their(right(to(vote(for(elective(provincial(officials.((

ordinance.''Petitioner'MMDA'claims'that'it'has'the'authority'to'open'Neptune'Street'to'public'traffic'because'it'is'an'agent'of'the'state'endowed'with'police'power'in'the'delivery'of'basic'services'in'Metro'Manila.'One'of'these'basic'services'is'traffic'management'which'involves'the'regulation'of'the'use'of'thoroughfares'to'insure'the'safety,'convenience'and'welfare'of'the'general'public.'

accordingly.'


A. ABELLA(V.(COMELEC(

GR(100710(September(3,(1991(858W860(

Interpretation(of(Section(12((

A'case'to'detremine'who'is'the'rightful'governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte''1)'petitioner'Adelina'Larrazabal'(G.R.'No.'100739)'who'obtained'the'highest'number'of'votes'in'the'local'elections'of'February'1,'1988'and'was'proclaimed'as'the'duly'elected'governor'but'who'was'later'declared'by'the'Commission'on'Elections'(COMELEC)'"...'to'lack'both'residence'and'registration'qualifications'for'the'position'of'

Sec.'12.'Cities'that'are'highly'urbanized,'as'determined'by'law,'and'component'cities'whose'charters'prohibit'their'voters'from'voting'for'provincial'elective'officials,'shall'be'independent'of'the'province.'The'voters'of'component'cities'within'a'province,'whose'charters'contain'no'such'prohibition,'shall'not'be'deprived'of'their'right'to'vote'for'elective'

1. The'fact'that'the'candidate'who'obtained'the'highest'number'of'votes'is'later'declared'to'be'disqualified'or'not'eligible'for'the'office'to'which'he'was'elected'does'not'necessarily'entitle'the'candidate'who'obtained'the'second'highest'number'of'votes'to'be'declared'the'winner'of'the'elective'office.'!'Because'he'was'not'the'choice'of'the'people''

2. Section'12,'Article'X'of'the'Constitution'is'explicit'that'aside'from'highly,urbanized'cities,'component'cities'whose'charters'


Governor'of'Leyte'as'provided'by'Art.'X,'Section'12,'Philippine'Constitution'and'is'hereby'disqualified'as'such'Governor";''2)'petitioner'Benjamin'Abella'(G.R.'No.'100710),'who'obtained'the'second'highest'number'of'votes'for'the'position'of'governor'but'was'not'allowed'by'the'COMELEC'to'be'proclaimed'as'governor'after'the'disqualification'of'Larrazabal;'or''3)'Leopoldo'E.'Petilla,'the'vice,governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte.'The'position'of'petitioners'was'that'respondent'Larrazabal'is'neither'a'resident'nor'a'registered'voter'of'Kananga,'Leyte'as'she'claimed'but'a'resident'and'registered'voter'of'Ormoc'City,'a'component'city'of'the'province'of'Leyte'but'independent'of'the'province'pursuant'to'Section'12,'Article'X'of'the'Constitution'thereby'disqualifying'her'for'the'position'of'governor'of'Leyte.''Larrazabal'poses'an'alternative'position'that'her'being'a'registered'voter'in'Ormoc'City'was'no'impediment'to'her'candidacy'for'the'position'of'governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte.'COMELEC'found'that'petitioner'Larrazabal'was'neither'a'resident'of'Kananga,'Leyte'nor'a'registered'voter'thereat.'With'these'findings,'

provincial'officials.'''Section'89'of'Republic'Act'No.'179'creating'the'City'of'Ormoc'provides:'Election'of'provincial'governor'and'members'of'the'Provincial'Board'of'the'members'of'the'Provincial'Board'of'the'Province'of'Leyte'—'The'qualified'voters'of'Ormoc'City'shall'not'be'qualified'and'entitled'to'vote'in'the'election'of'the'provincial'governor'and'the'members'of'the'provincial'board'of'the'Province'of'Leyte.''

prohibit'their'voters'from'voting'for'provincial'elective'officials'are'independent'of'the'province.'Necessarily,'component'cities'like'Ormoc'City'whose'charters'prohibit'their'voters'from'voting'for'provincial'elective'officials'are'treated'like'highly'urbanized'cities'which'are'outside'the'supervisory'power'of'the'province'to'which'they'are'geographically'attached.'This'independence'from'the'province'carries'with'it'the'prohibition'or'mandate'directed'to'their'registered'voters'not'to'vote'and'be'voted'for'the'provincial'elective'offices.''

'3. Section'89'of'Republic'Act'179,'

independent'of'the'constitutional'provision,'prohibits'registered'voters'of'Ormoc'City'from'voting'and'being'voted'for'elective'offices'in'the'province'of'Leyte.'We'agree'with'the'COMELECen'banc'that'"the'phrase''shall'not'be'qualified'and'entitled'to'vote'in'the'election'of'the'provincial'governor'and'the'members'of'the'provincial'board'of'the'Province'of'Leyte''connotes'two'prohibitions'—'one,'from'running'for'and'the'second,'from'voting'for'any'provincial'elective'official."'


AUTONOMOUS(REGIONS((

Section(18.(The(Congress(shall(enact(an(organic(act( for(each(autonomous(region(with( the(assistance(and(participation(of( the(regional(consultative(commission(composed(of(representatives(appointed(by(the(President(from(a(list(of(nominees(from(multiWsectoral(bodies.(The(organic(act(shall(define(the(basic(structure(of(government(for(the(region(consisting(of(the(executive(department(and(legislative(assembly,(both(of(which(shall(be(elective(and(representative(of( the( constituent(political(units.( The(organic(acts( shall( likewise(provide( for( special( courts(with(personal,( family,( and(property( law(jurisdiction(consistent(with(the(provisions(of(this(Constitution(and(national(laws.((The(creation(of(the(autonomous(region(shall(be(effective(when(approved(by(majority(of(the(votes(cast(by(the(constituent(units(in(a(plebiscite(called(for(the(purpose,(provided(that(only(provinces,(cities,(and(geographic(areas(voting(favorably( in(such(plebiscite(shall(be( included(in(the(autonomous(region.((

the'COMELEC'disqualified'the'petitioner'as'governor'of'the'province'of'Leyte.'


A. ABBAS(V.(COMELEC(

179(SCRA(287((1989)(861W866(

( ( ( (

B. CORDILLERA(REGIONAL(ASSEMBLY(V.(COMELEC(

GR(93054(

( ( ( (


(Section(20.(Within(its(territorial(jurisdiction(and(subject(to(the(provisions(of(this(Constitution(and(national(laws,(the(organic(act(of(autonomous(regions(shall(provide(for(legislative(powers(over:((((1)(Administrative(organization;(((2)(Creation(of(sources(of(revenues;(((3)(Ancestral(domain(and(natural(resources;(((4)(Personal,(family,(and(property(relations;(((5)(Regional(urban(and(rural(planning(development;(((6)(Economic,(social,(and(tourism(development;(((7)(Educational(policies;(((8)(Preservation(and(development(of(the(cultural(heritage;(and(((9)(Such(other(matters(as(may(be(authorized(by(law(for(the(promotion(of(the(general(welfare(of(the(people(of(the(region.((

December(4,(1990(866W867(C. LEONOR(

V.(CORDILLERA(BODONG(ADMIN(

GR(92649(February(14,(1991(867W868(

( ( ( (


A. PANDI(V.(CA(((GR(

( ( ( (


(

116850(April(11,(2002((869(


ARTICLE(XI:(ACCOUNTABILITY(OF(PUBLIC(OFFICERS(

Case( Keywords( Facts( Applicable/Violated(Provision/s( Issue/s(&(Ratio(Hipolito'v.'Mergas''AM'No.'P3903412''March'11,'1991'

A'deputy'sheriff'may'be'punished'for'moonlighting'

A'deputy'sheriff'may'be'properly'punished'by'this'tribunal'for'an'action'committed'in'violation'of'the'Rules'of'Court,'and'which'impedes'and'detracts'form'a'fair'and'just'administration'of'justice.'(Bareno'v.'Cabauatan'151'SCRA'293,'1987)''A'deputy'sheriff'is'an'officer'of'the'court'whose'duties'form'an'integral'part'in'the'administration'of'justice.''Such'penalty'imposed'on'him'may'be'short'of'dismissal'or'suspension'from'office.''While'“moonlighting”'is'not'normally'considered'a'serious'misconduct,'it'amounts'to'a'wrongdoing'in'office.''By'virtue'of'one’s'office,'one'is'bound'to'the'discharge'of'his'duties,'observing'prudence,'caution,'and'attention.'(Peñalosa'v.'Viscara,'Jr.'84'SCRA'298,'1978)''Public'service'requires'utmost'integrity'and'discipline,'observing'the'highest'sense'of'honesty'and'integrity.''Such'standards'are'found'in'both'the'1973'(Art.'13,'Sec.'5)'and'the'1987'(Art.'11,'Sec.'1)'Constitutions.'

Art.'13,'Sec.'1'of'the'1973'Constitution.'Public'office'is'a'public'trust.''Public'officers'and'employees'shall'serve'with'the'highest'degree'of'responsibility,'integrity,'loyalty,'efficiency,'and'shall'remain'accountable'to'the'people.''(This&was&reiterated&emphatically&in&Art.&11,&Sec.&1&of&the&1987&Constitution,&with&the&addition&of&another&clause&about&acting&with&patriotism&and&justice,&and&leading&modest&lives.)''Art.'11,'Sec.'1'of'the'1987'Constitution.'Public'office'is'a'public'trust.''Public'officers'and'employees'must'at'all'times'be'accountable'to'the'people,'serve'them'with'utmost'responsibility,'integrity,'loyalty,'and'efficiency,'act&with&patriotism&and&justice,&and&lead&modest&lives.'

33'

CONSTITUTIONAL*LAW*1* * FR.*JOAQUIN*BERNAS,*S.J.**Romulo'v.'Yñiguez''141'SCRA'263'(1986)'

The'Court'may'not'review'the'Batasan’s'decisions'

Does'the'Court'have'jurisdiction'to'order'the'Committee'on'Justice,'Human'Rights,'and'Good'Government'(CJHRGG)'to'recall'from'the'Archives'and'report'out'the'resolution'and'complaint'for'impeachment?'Assuming'such'resolution'and'complaint'for'impeachment'are'recalled'from'the'archives,'can'the'Court'order'the'Batasan'to'conduct'a'trial'on'the'charges'contained'in'said'documents?'

33' ISSUE:'WON'the'Court'has'jurisdiction'for'such'recall'of'documents'on'impeachment,'and'if'such'were'granted,'may'order'the'Batasan'to'conduct'a'trial'based'on'such'information.''HELD:'No.''RATIO:'When'the'Batasan'denied'the'motion'of'a'certain'MP'Ramon'Mitra'for'the'recall'from'the'Archives'of'Resolution'No.'644'and'the'complaint'for'impeachment,'it'therefore'confirmed'the'action'of'the'CJHRGG.''A'dismissal'by'the'Batasan'itself'as'a'body'of'the'resolution'and'complaint'for'impeachment'renders'irrelevant'under'what'authority'the'CJHRGG'had'acted.''The'dismissal'of'a'majority'of'the'members'of'the'Batasan'of'the'impeachment'proceedings'is'an'act'of'the'Batasan'as'a'body'in'the'exercise'of'such'powers'given'to'it'by'the'Constitution,'which'is'beyond'the'power'of'this'Court'to'review.''This'Court'cannot'compel'the'Batasan'to'conduct'such'trial'prayed'for'by'the'petitioners.'

In'Re'Gonzales''160'SCRA'771'(1988)'

2'Principles'of'Constitutional'Law''

Important'principles'of'constitutional'law:'A'public'officer'who'under'the'Constitution'is'required'to'be'a'

All&from&the&1987&Consti.''Art.'8,'Sec.'1(2).'xxx''no'person'may'be'appointed'

(Secondary&case&mentioned&in&this&case&in&applicatio&of&such&Principles&of&Constitutional&Law&mentioned)&'


Officers'who'are'members'of'the'PH'Bar'as'a'qualification'for'their'office'may'not'be'charged'with'disbarment'during'their'incumbency,'nor'be'criminally'charged'that'would'result'in'removal'from'office'

Member'of'the'PH'Bar'as'a'qualification'for'the'office'held'by'him'and'who'may'removed'form'office'only'by'impeachment'cannot'be'charged'with'disbarment'during'his'incumbency.'During'the'incumbency'of'such'public'officer'cannot'be'criminally'charged'before'the'Sandiganbayan'or'any'other'court'with'any'offense'or'penalty'service,'which'would'result'in'his'removal'from'office.'

judge'thereof'unless'he'is'a'citizen'of'the'Philippines'and'a'member'of'the'Philippine'Bar.'''Art.'11(2).'xxx'the'Ombudsman'may'be'removed'from'office'on'impeachment'for,'and'conviction'of,'culpable'violation'of'the'Constitution,'treason,'bribery,'graft'and'corruption,'other'high'crimes,'or'betrayal'of'public'trust.'xxx''Art.'11(8).'The'Ombudsman'and'his'Deputies'xxx'members'of'the'Philippine'Bar'xxx''Art.'93C(131).'There'shall'be'a'Commission'on'Elections'composed'of'a'Chairman'and'six'Commissioners'xxx''a'majority'thereof,'including'the'Chairman,'shall'be'members'of'the'Philippine'Bar'who'have'been'engaged'in'the'practice'of'law'for'at'least'ten'years.''Art.'93D(131).'There'shall'be'a'Commission'on'Audit'composed'of'a'Chairman'and'two'Commissioners,'xxx'

ISSUE:'WON'the'complaint'for'disbarment'should'be'dismissed.''HELD:'Yes.''HELD:'Members'of'the'SC'must'be'members'of'the'PH'Bar'and'may'be'removed'from'office'only'by'impeachment,'pursuant'to'Art.'8,'Sec.'1(2).''To'grant'such'complaint'for'disbarment'would'be'to'circumvent'this'constitutional'mandate,'and'also'that'of'Art.'11(2),'which'lists'down'certain'offenses'for'which'such'officers'may'be'convicted'of.''The'same'situation'exists'with'the'ff.'who'are'all'constitutionally'required'to'be'members'of'the'PH'Bar:'The'Ombudsman'and'his'deputies''Art.'11(8)'in'relation'to'Art.'11(2)'A'majority'of'the'members'of'the'COMELEC'Art.'93C'in'relation'to'Art.'11(2)'Members'of'the'COA'who'are'not'certified'public'accountants'Art.'93D'''


members'of'the'Philippine'Bar'who'have'been'engaged'in'the'practice'of'law'for'at'least'ten'years'xxx'

Francisco,'et'al.'v.'House'Speaker,'et.'al.''GR'No.'160261''November'10,'2003'

' ' ' '

Nuñez'v.'Sandiganbayan''111'SCRA'433'(1982)'

The'existence'of'a'special'Court'

In'categorical'and'explicit'language,'the'Constitution'provided'for'but'did'not'create'a'special'Court.'See'Article'13,'Sec.'5'of'the'1973'Constitution.''Such'special'Court'came'into'existence'with'the'issuance'in'1978'of'a'Presidential'Decree.'

Art.'13,'Sec.'5'of'the'1973'Constitution.''The'Batasang'Pambansa'shall'create'a'special'court,'to'be'known'as'Sandiganbayan,'which'shall'have'jurisdiction'over'criminal'and'civil'cases'involving'graft'and'corrupt'practices'and'such'other'offenses'committed'by'public'officers'and'employees,'including'those'in'government3owned'or'controlled'corporations,'in'relation'to'their'office'as'may'be'determined'by'law.''

33'

MAYOR'LECAROZ'VS.'SANDIGANBAYAN'128'SCRA'324'(1984)'p.'888''

Grave'coercion'

Ponente:'Reolva,'J.'October'21,'1980!Petitioner'was'charged'with'the'crime'of'grave'coercion'in'an'information'filed'before'the'respondent'court.''Petitioner''filed'a'motion'to'quash'the'information.'Respondent'court'denied'

Section'5,'Article'XIII'of'the'1973'Constitution.''The'National'Assembly'shall'create'a'special'court,'to'be'known'as'Sandiganbayan,'which'shall'have'jurisdiction'over'criminal'and'civil'cases'involving'

ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'offense'for'which'he'was'charged'is'not'related'to'his'office'as'mayor'!NO.$He$could$not$have$accomplished$the$crimes$for$which$he$was$charged$were$it$not$for$his$position$as$mayor.'!Ratio'1:''


such'motion.'Thus,'the'present'petition'for'certiorari.''

graft'and'corrupt'practices'and'such'other'offenses'committed'by'public'officers'and'employees…'''

o If'petitioner'were'not'the'mayor'he'would'not'have'allegedly'directed'the'policemen'and'the'latter'would'not'have'followed'his'orders'and'instructions'to'sell'Pedro'Par’s'gasoline'and'padlock'the'station.'The'fact'that'he'was'mayor'did'not'vest'him'with'the'legal'authority'to'take'over'the'operations'and'control'of'complainant’s'gasoline'station.'

ISSUE(2:('Whether'the'Sandiganbayan'has'jurisdiction'over'his'case'!YES.$As$clearly$stated$in$Sec.$5,$Article$XIII$of$the$1973$Constitution.$'!Ratio'2:'o It'is'clear'form'Sec.'5,'Article'XIII'of'

the'1973'Constitution'that'respondent'court'has'jurisdictional'competence'not'only'over'criminal'and'civil'cases'involving'graft'and'corrupt'practices'committed'by'public'officers'and'employees'but'also'over'other'crimes'committed'by'them'in'relation'to'their'office,'though'not'involving'graft'and'corrupt'practices,'as'may'be'determined'by'law.''

ISSUE(3:(Whether'Section'4(c)of'PD'1486'as'amended,'is'violative'of'the'provision'of'Section'5,'Article'XIII'of'the'1973'Constitution'because'it'enlarges'what'the'latter'limited'!NO.$It$is$duly$authorized$by$the$


Constitutional$provision$itself.'!Ratio'3:'o The'said'constitutional'provision'

delegates'to'the'lawmaking'body'the'determination'of'such'“other'offenses”'committed'by'public'officers'over'which'the'Sandiganbayan'shall'have'jurisdiction.'Accordingly,'PD'1846,'which'provides'that'“other'crimes'or'offenses'committed'by'public'officees'or'employees,'including'those'employed'in'government3owened'or'controlled'corporation,'in'relation'to'their'office,”''was'enacted'while'the'President'was'exercising'legislative'powers.'The'Court'will'not'review'questions'of'legislative'policy.'

'ZALDIVAR'VS.'SANDIGANBAYAN'160'SCRA'843'(1988)'p.'890'

Tanodbayan' PER'CURIAM'In'a'petition'for'certiorari,'prohibition,'and'mandamus,'petitioner'Enrique'A.'Zaldivar,'governor'of'the'province'of'Antique,'sought'to'restrain'the'Sandiganbayan'and'Tanodbayan'Raul'Gonzalez'from'proceeding'with'the'prosecution'and'hearing'of'criminal'cases'filed'against'him'on'the'ground'that'said'cases'were'filed'by'said'Tanodbayan'without'legal'and'constitutional'authority,'since'under'the'1987'Constitution'which'took'effect'on'February'2,'1987,'it'is'only'

Sec.'7,'Article'XI'of'the'1987'Constitution.'The'existing'Tanodbayan'shall'hereafter'be'known'as'the'Office'of'the'Special'Prosecutor.'It'shall'continue'to'function'and'exercise'its'powers'as'now'or'hereafter'may'be'provided'by'law,'except'those'conferred'on'the'Office'of'the'Ombudsman'created'under'this'Consitution.'''

ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'Tanodbayan'is'without'authority'to'file'the'case'against'petitioner'Zaldivar'and'other'similar'cases'!YES.$The$Tanodbayan$does$not$have$authority.'!Ratio'1:''o Under'the'1987'Constitution,'the'

Ombudsman'(as'distinguished'from'the'incumbent'Tanodbayan)'is'charged'with'the'duty'to:'“investigate'on'its'own,'or'on'complaint'by'any'person,'any'act'or'omission'of'any'public'official,'employee,'office'or'agency,'when'


the'Ombudsman'(not'the'present'or'incumbent'Tanodbayan)'who'has'the'authority'to'file'cases'with'the'Sandiganbayan.''

such'act'or'omission'appears'to'be'illegal,'unjust,'improper,'or'inefficient.”'And'under'Sec.'7,'Article'XI'of'the'1987'Constitution,'the'incumbent'Tanodbayan'(called'Special'Prosecutor'under'the'1987'Constitution'and'who'is'supposed'to'retain'powers'and'duties'NOT'GIVEN'to'the'Ombudsman)'is'clearly'without'authority'to'conduct'preliminary'investigation'and'to'direct'the'filing'of'criminal'cases'with'the'Sandiganbayan,'except'upon'orders'of'the'Ombudsman.'

BIR'VS'OMBUDSMAN'G.R.'No.'115103,'April'11,'2002'p.'890'

Pending'action'

Ponente:'De'Leon,'Jr.,'J.'Petitioner'BIR'insists'that'the'investigative'power'of'the'Ombudsman'is'not'unbridled.'Particularly'on'the'issue'of'tax'refunds,'the'BIR'maintains'that'the'Ombudsman'could'not'validly'exercise'its'power'to'investigate'only'when'there'exists'an'appropriate'case'and'subject'to'the'limitations'provided'by'law.'''

' ISSUE(1:(Whether'or'not'the'Ombudsman'is'precluded'from'conducting'its'own'investigation'without'a'pending'action.'!NO.$As$may$be$seen$in$the$1987$Constitution,$there$is$no$such$prohibition.'!Ratio'1:''o No'less'than'the'1987'Constitution'

enjoins'that'the'“Ombudsman'and'his'Deputies,'as'protectors'of'the'people,'shall'act'promptly'on'complaints'filed'in'any'form'or'manner'against'public'officials'or'employees'of'the'government,'or'any'subdivision,'agency'or'instrumentality'thereof,'including'government3owned'or'controlled'corporations,'and'shall,'in'


appropriate'case,'notify'the'complainants'of'the'action'taken'and'the'result'thereof.'(

o Clearly,'there'is'no'requirement'of'a'pending'action'before'the'Ombudsman'could'wield'it'investigative'power.'The'Ombudsman'could'resort'toits'investigative'prerogative'on'its'own'or'upon'complaint'filed'in'any'form'or'manner.'(

LAUREL'VS.'DESIERTO'G.R.'No.'145368,'April'12,'2002'p.'891'

National'Centennial'Celebrations'

Petitioner,'as'Chairman'of'the'Commission'for'the'National'Centennial'Celebration,'assails'the'jurisdiction'of'the'Ombudsman'on'the'ground'that'he'isnot'a'public'officer.'Neither'the'Constitution'nor'the'Ombudsman'Act'of'1989'defines'who'public'officers'are.'A'definition'of'public'officers'cited'in'jurisprudence'is'that'provided'by'Mechem,'a'recognized'authority'on'the'subject.'The'characteristics'of'a'public'office,'according'to'him,'include'the'delegation'of'sovereign'functions,'its'creation'by'law'and'not'by'contract,'an'oath,'salary,'continuance'of'the'position,'scope'of'duties,'and'the'designation'of'the'position'as'an'office.'''

' ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'petitioner,'as'Chairman'of'the'Committee'for'the'National'Centennial'Celebrations'is'a'public'officer'!YES.$The$position$of$Chairman$of$the$NCC$is$a$public$office.'!Ratio'1:''o Petitioner'submits'that'some'of'

the'characteristics,'as'provided'by'Mechem’s'definition,'are'not'present'in'the'position'of'NCC'Chair,'namely:'(1)'the'delegation'of'sovereign'functions;'(2)'salary,'since'he'purportedly'did'not'receive'any'compensation;'and'(3)'continuance,'the'tenure'of'the'NCC'being'temporary.'The'Court'held'that'the'NCC'performs'executive'functions.'A'perusal'of'AO'225'and'EO'128'–'the'NCC’s'sources'of'its'mandate'and'functions'–'would'show'that'the'NCC'was'precisely'created'to'


execute'and'carry'into'effect'policies'and'objectives'mentioned'in'the'two'executive'orders.'Furthermore,'the'NCC'was'not'without'a'role'in'the'country’s'economic'development,'especially'in'Central'Luzon.'Clearly,'the'NCC'performs'sovereign'functions.'

o That'petitioner'allegedly'did'not'receive'any'compensation'during'his'tenure'is'of'little'consequence.'The'salary'is'a'mere'incident'and'forms'no'part'of'the'office.'Where'a'salary'or'fees'is'annexed,'the'office'provided'for'it'is'a'naked'or'honorary'office,'and'is'supposed'to'be'accepted'merely'for'the'public'good.'Hence,'the'office'of'petitioner'as'NCC'Chair'may'be'characterized'as'an'honorary'office.'It'is'a'public'office.''

AZARCON'VS.'SANDIGANBAYAN'G.R.'No.'116033,'February'26,'1997'p.'893'

Private'individual'

Ponente:'Panganiban,'J.'A'question'is'raised'on'whether'the'Sandiganbayan'has'jurisdiction'over'a'private'individual'who'is'charged'with'malversation'of'public'funds'as'a'principal'after'the'said'individual'had'been'designated'by'the'Bureau'of'Internal'Revenue'as'a'custodian'of'detrained'property.'Did'such'accused'become'a'public'officer'and'therefore'subject'to'the'graft'court’s'jurisdiction'as'a'consequence'of'such'designation'by'the'BIR?'

' ISSUE(1:(Whether'the'Sanidganbayan'has'jurisdiction'over'the'accused'private'individual'charged'as'principal'in'the'crime'of'malversation'of'public'funds!NO.$His$liability$as$principal$is$not$included$in$the$list$of$instances$where$the$Sandiganbayan$may$assume$jurisdiction$over$private$individuals.$'!Ratio'1:''o Only'when'the'private'individual'is'

charged'as'co3principal,'accomplice'or'accessory'of'a'public'


'

officer'or'employee'who'has'been'charged'with'a'crime'within'its'jurisdiction'may'the'Sandiganbayan'assume'authority'over'such'case.'(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

ARTICLE(XII:(NATIONAL(ECONOMY(AND(PATRIMONY(

(

Section(1.(The(goals(of( the(national(economy(are(a(more(equitable(distribution(of(opportunities,( income,(and(wealth;(a( sustained( increase( in( the(

amount(of(goods(and(services(produced(by(the(nation(for(the(benefit(of(the(people;(and(an(expanding(productivity(as(the(key(to(raising(the(quality(of(

life(for(all,(especially(the(underNprivileged.(

The(State(shall(promote(industrialization(and(full(employment(based(on(sound(agricultural(development(and(agrarian(reform,(through(industries(that(

make(full(and(efficient(use(of(human(and(natural(resources,(and(which(are(competitive( in(both(domestic(and(foreign(markets.(However,(the(State(

shall(protect(Filipino(enterprises(against(unfair(foreign(competition(and(trade(practices.(

(

In( the( pursuit( of( these( goals,( all( sectors( of( the( economy( and( all( regions( of( the( country( shall( be( given( optimum( opportunity( to( develop.( Private(

enterprises,(including(corporations,(cooperatives,(and(similar(collective(organizations,(shall(be(encouraged(to(broaden(the(base(of(their(ownership.(

(

(

Section(2.(All(lands(of(the(public(domain,(waters,(minerals,(coal,(petroleum,(and(other(mineral(oils,(all(forces(of(potential(energy,(fisheries,(forests(or(

timber,(wildlife,( flora( and( fauna,( and( other( natural( resources( are( owned( by( the( State.(With( the( exception( of( agricultural( lands,( all( other( natural(

resources(shall(not(be(alienated.(The(exploration,(development,(and(utilization(of(natural(resources(shall(be(under(the(full(control(and(supervision(of(

the(State.(The(State(may(directly(undertake(such(activities,(or(it(may(enter(into(coNproduction,(joint(venture,(or(productionNsharing(agreements(with(

Filipino(citizens,(or(corporations(or(associations(at(least(sixty(per(centum(of(whose(capital(is(owned(by(such(citizens.(Such(agreements(may(be(for(a(

period(not(exceeding(twentyNfive(years,(renewable(for(not(more(than(twentyNfive(years,(and(under(such(terms(and(conditions(as(may(be(provided(by(

law.(In(cases(of(water(rights(for(irrigation,(water(supply(fisheries,(or(industrial(uses(other(than(the(development(of(water(power,(beneficial(use(may(

be(the(measure(and(limit(of(the(grant.(

(

The(State(shall(protect( the(nation's(marine(wealth( in( its(archipelagic(waters,( territorial( sea,(and(exclusive(economic(zone,(and( reserve( its(use(and(

enjoyment(exclusively(to(Filipino(citizens.(

(

The(Congress(may,(by(law,(allow(smallNscale(utilization(of(natural(resources(by(Filipino(citizens,(as(well(as(cooperative(fish(farming,(with(priority(to(

subsistence(fishermen(and(fishN(workers(in(rivers,(lakes,(bays,(and(lagoons.(

(

The( President( may( enter( into( agreements( with( foreignNowned( corporations( involving( either( technical( or( financial( assistance( for( largeNscale(

exploration,(development,(and(utilization(of(minerals,(petroleum,(and(other(mineral(oils(according(to(the(general(terms(and(conditions(provided(by(

law,( based( on( real( contributions( to( the( economic( growth( and( general( welfare( of( the( country.( In( such( agreements,( the( State( shall( promote( the(

development(and(use(of(local(scientific(and(technical(resources.(

(

The(President(shall(notify(the(Congress(of(every(contract(entered(into(in(accordance(with(this(provision,(within(thirty(days(from(its(execution.(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

(


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

A. MINERS(

ASSOCIATION(

V.(FACTORAN,(

Jr.(

(

GR(98332(

January(16,(1995(

!!!949N956(

Validity(of(AO’s(

57(&(82(

because(they(

were(germane(

to(EO’s(211(&(

279(

Petitioners!contest!the!validity!of!2!Administrative(Orders((57(&(82)!issued!by!the!Secretary!of!the!DENR!to!carry!out!the!provisions!by!the!President!in!the!lawful!exercise!of!legislative!powers.!!Such!controversy!started!with!the!changes!made!in!Art.(12,(Sec.(2,(of(the(1987!Constitution!on!(1)!the!system(of(exploration,(

development,(and(utilization(of(the(

country’s(natural(resources,!and!(2)!the!utilization(of(inalienable(lands(of(public(domain(through(“license,(

concession,(or(lease,”!the!practice!of!which!has!been!disallowed!in!the!1987!Constitution.!!July!1987!!!Former!President!Aquino,!in!the!exercise!of!her!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution,!promulgated!Executive(Order(211!(outlining!the!procedures!for!utilizing!mineral!resources!pursuant!to!the!1987!Constitution!in!order!to!ensure!the!continuity!of!mining!activities,!and!to!hasten!the!development!of!mineral!resources.)!and!Executive(Order(279!(giving!the!

Art.(12,(Sec.(2(of(the(

1987(Constitution:(

xxx!With!the!exception!of!agricultural!lands,!all!other!natural!resources!shall!not!be!alienated.!The(exploration,(

development,(and(

utilization(of(natural(

resources(shall(be(

under(the(full(control(

and(supervision(of(the(

State.(The(State(may(

directly(undertake(

such(activities,(or(it(

may(enter(into(coN

production,(joint(

venture,(or(

productionNsharing(

agreements(with(

Filipino(citizens,(or(

corporations(or(

associations(at(least(60(

per(centum(of(whose(

capital(is(owned(by(

such(citizens.(Such(

agreements(may(be(

for(a(period(not(

exceeding(twentyNfive(

years,(renewable(for(

not(more(than(twentyN

ISSUE:!Whether!or!not!Administrative!Orders!57!&!82!are!valid!and!do!not!contravene!Executive!Orders!211!and!279.!!HELD:!Yes.!!RATIO:(

(For%EO%211)%Presidential!Decree!463,!as!amended,!follows!the!old!mining!laws!on!“license,!concession,!or!lease,”!which!had!already!been!changed!in!Art.!12,!Sec.!2!of!the!1987!Constitution.!!As!such,!they!are!deemed!inoperative,!with!the!exception!of!parts,!which!are!still!consistent!with!EO!211,!namely!the!provisions!which!deal!with!all!other!areas!of!administration!and!management!of!mineral!lands.!!(For%EO%279)!There!is!no!clear!showing!that!the!Secretary!has!abused!his!legislative!power.!!EO!279!authorizes!said!Secretary!to!promulgate!such!supplementary!rules!and!regulations!as!may!be!needed!to!effectively!implement!the!provisions!of!such!EO.!!Also,!the!subject!sought!to!be!governed!and!regulated!by!the!questioned!AO’s!are!germane!to!EO279.!!In#conclusion,#the#questioned#Administrative#Orders#are#reasonably#directed#to#the#accomplishment#of#the#purposes#of#the#law#


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

Secretary!of!the!DENR!general!supervision!over!matters!related!to!the!production,!agreements!on!the!exploration,!development,!and!utilization!of!mineral!resources.).!!To#implement!such!acts,!the!Secretary!of!the!DENR!promulgated!such!AO’s!57!and!82,!the!validity!of!which!are!being!challenged!by!the!petitioners.!!Such!AO’s!issued!by!the!Secretary!in!the!exercise!of!his!ruleZmaking!power!are!said!to!be!tainted!with!invalidity!because!they!contradict!EO’s!211!and!279,!because!AO’s!57!and!83!repeal!or!abrogate!Presidential!Decree!463!and!other!mining!laws!already!acknowledged!as!the!principal!law!under!EO’s!211!and!279.#

five(years,(and(under(

such(terms(and(

conditions(as(may(

provided(by(law.!xxx!!The(President(may(

enter(into(agreements(

with(foreignNowned(

corporations(involving(

either(technical(or(

financial(assistance(for(

largeNscale(

exploration,(

development,(and(

utilization(of(minerals,(

petroleum,(and(other(

mineral(oils(according(

to(the(general(terms(

and(conditions(

provided(by(law,(

based(on(real(

contributions(to(the(

economic(growth(and(

general(welfare(of(the(

country.(In(such(

agreements,(the(State(

shall(promote(the(

development(and(use(

of(local(scientific(and(

technical(resources.(

!

under#which#they#were#issued#and#were#intended#to#secure#the#paramount#interest#of#the#public,#their#economic#growth,#and#welfare.#AO’s#57#and#82#must#be#sustained,#and#their#force#and#effect#upheld.#

B. REPUBLIC(V.(

ROSEMOOR(

(

QUARRY/(

MINING(

LICENSE(

!!Petitioners!Pascual,!De!La!Concha,!

Art.(18,(Sec.(3(of(the(

1987(Constitution.!!All!existing!laws,!decrees,!

ISSUE(1:!Whether!or!not!PD!463!is!valid?!(Petitioners#contend#that#LO#33#contravenes#Sec.#69#of#PD#463#because#it#exceeds#the#max#


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

(

(

GR(149927(

March(30,(2004(

(

(

(

(

956N960!

(

(

JURA(REGALIA(

De!La!Concha,!and!De!Guzman,!after!having!been!granted!permission!to!prospect!for!marble!deposits!in!BiakZnaZBato,!discovered!such!deposits!of!high!quality!and!commercial!quantity,!and!sought!a!license!to!exploit!said!marble!deposits!with!the!permission!of!the!Mines!and!Geosciences!Bureau.!!They!were!granted!License(No.(33((LO(33),!but!less!than!3!years!after!the!continuous!operation!of!the!LO!33,!which!had!the!validity!of!25!years,!such!LO!33!was!cancelled!by!DENR(Minister(Maceda!shortly!after!being!appointed!to!his!post!in!a!letter!to!the!respondent!Rosemoor.!!Summary!of!Rulings!by!the!Trial!Court!&!Court!of!Appeals!LO!33!conferred!a!property(right!which!must!be!protected!by!the!Constitution!Such!right!was!violated!when!the!license!was!cancelled(without(notice,!and!it!was!unjustified!because!LO!33!was!embraced!by!4!separate!applications,!which!did!not!exceed!the!limitation!imposed,!so!such!LO!must!be!valid.!(Note:!The!previous!limit!embodied!in!PD!463!said!that!a!quarry!license!should!not!

executive!orders,!proclamations,!letters!of!instructions,!and!other!executive!issuances!not!inconsistent!with!this!Constitution!shall!remain!operative!until!amended,!repealed,!or!revoked.!!!!!Note:!A!mining!lease!that!contravenes!a!manZmade!provision!of!the!law!under!which!it!is!granted!is!void.!!Being!a!mere!privilege,!a!license!does!not!vest!absolute!rights!in!the!holder.!!Thus,!without!offending!the!due!process!and!the!nonZimpairment!clauses!of!the!Constitution,!it!can!be!revoked!by!the!State!in!the!public!interest.!!!

area#that#may#be#granted,#but#respondents#argue#that#the#license#was#validly#granted#because#it#was#covered#by#4#separate#applications#for#areas#of#81#hectares#each.)#!HELD:!Yes!!RATIO:(The!language!of!Sec.!69!of!PD!463!is!clear!that!a!quarry!license!should!cover!a!maximum!of!100!hectares!in!any!given!province.!!It!provides!neither!an!exception!nor!reference!to!the!number!of!applications!for!a!license.!!Such!section!must!be!taken!to!mean!exactly!what!it!says.!!When!the!law!is!clear,!plain,!and!free!from!ambiguity,!it!must!be!given!its!literal!meaning!and!applied!without!attempted!interpretation.!!!ISSUE(2:!Whether!or!not!Proclamation!84!is!valid(!(Petitioners#argue#that#LO#33#was#validly#declared#a#nullity#through#DENR#Minister#Maceda’s#decision#because#it#violated#PD#463.##This#was#confirmed#by#Proclamation#84,#which#said#that#public#interest#would#be#served#by#returning#said#parcel#of#land#to#the#BiakUnaUBato#National#Park.####Respondents#argue#that#as#provided#for#PD#463,#their#right#to#due#process#was#violated#when#LO#33#was#cancelled#without#notice#and#hearing,#also#saying#that#Proclamation#84#is#


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

cover!more!than!100!hectares,!but!since!the!license!in!question!was!covered!by!4!separate!applications!indicating!81!hectares!each,!LO!33!did!not!violate!this!limitation.!!However,!it!must!be!noted!that!PD!43!was!appealed!by!RA!7942!(“The!Philippine!Mining!Act!of!1995”)!which!increased!the!mining!areas!allowed!in!PD!463).!!Proclamation(84,!which!cancelled!LO!33,!was!an!ex(post(facto(law,!violating!Art.!18,!Sec.!3!of!the!1987!Constitution.!!Under!the!clause!in!the!Constitution!dealing!with!the!nonNimpairment(of(

obligations(and(contracts,!the!respondents’!license!must!be!respected!by!the!State.!!Hence,!this!petition.!!

not#valid#because#It#violates#the#clause#on#nonUimpairment#of#contracts,#It#is#an#ex!post!facto#law#and/or#bill#of#attainder,#and#It#was#issued#by#the#President#after#the#effectivity#of#the#1987#Constitition.)#HELD:!Yes.!!RATIO:(

Granting!that!the!respondents’!license!was!valid,!it!can!still!be!validly!revoved!by!the!State!in!the!exercise!of!police!power!in!accord!with!jura#regalia,!which!reserves!to!the!State!ownership!of!all!natural!resources.!!Thus,!Proclamation!84!does!not!violate!the!clause!on!nonZimpairment!of!contracts.!!Proclamation!84!is!not!an!ex#post#facto!law!as!such!proclamation!does!not!fall!under!any!of!the!instances!which!would!make!it!such!a!law,!and!that!said!proclamation!is!not!penal!in!character,!and!thus!cannot!be!considered!as!an#ex#post#facto#law.!!It!is!also!not!a!bill!of!attainder.!When!President!Aquino!issued!Proclamation!84,!she!was!still!validly!exercising!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution!of!1986.!Hence,!her!issuance!of!said!proclamation!is!valid!as!it!was!recognized!and!provided!for!in!Art.!7,!Sec.!6,!of!the!1987!Constitution.!

C.(LA(BUGAL(

B’LAAN(TRIBAL(

ASSOC(V.(DENR(

Regalian(

Doctrine(

Prohibited(

The!petition!assails!the!constitutionality!of!Republic!Act!No.!7942,!otherwise!known!as!the!

!1. SEC.!2!

Paragraph!3!

Issue(1:(Whether(or(not(EO(279(is(valid?(

!Held:!Yes,!E.O.!No.!279!is!an!effective,!and!a!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

GR(127882(

JANUARY(27,(2004(

961N992(

Service(

Contract(

VOID(FTAA(

AGREEMENT(

(

PHILIPPINE!MINING!ACT!OF!1995,!and!of!the!Financial!and!Technical!Assistance!Agreement!(FTAA)!and!WMC!(Philippines),!Inc.!(WMCP),!a!corporation!organized!under!Philippine!laws.!!Also!impleaded!is!private!respondent!WMCP,!which!entered!into!the!assailed!FTAA!with!the!Philippine!Government.!WMCP!is!owned!by!WMC!Resources!International!Pty.,!Ltd.!(WMC),!"a!wholly!owned!subsidiary!of!Western!Mining!Corporation!Holdings!Limited,!a!publicly!listed!major!Australian!mining!and!exploration!company."!!Respondent!WMCP!subsequently!filed!a!Manifestation!dated!September!25,!2002!alleging!that!on!January!23,!2001,!WMC!sold!all!its!shares!in!WMCP!to!Sagittarius!Mines,!Inc.!(Sagittarius),!a!corporation!organized!under!Philippine!laws.!!Petitioners!contend!that!E.O.!No.!279!did!not!take!effect!because!the!supposed!date!of!its!effectivity!came!after!President!Aquino!had!already!lost!her!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution.!

!2. CONCOM!

discussion!on!the!Service!Contracts!dispute!!

!MR.!TADEO.!Xxx!Matapos!suriin!ang!kalagayan!ng!Pilipinas,!ang!saligang!suliranin,!pangunahin!ang!salitang!"imperyalismo."!Ang(ibig(sabihin(nito(ay(ang(

sistema(ng(lipunang(

pinaghaharian(ng(

iilang(monopolyong(

kapitalista(at(ang(

salitang(

"imperyalismo"(ay(

buhay(na(buhay(sa(

National(Economy(and(

Patrimony(na(nating(

ginawa.!xxx!Pangalawa,!naroroon!pa!rin!ang!parity!rights,!ang!service!contract,!ang!60Z40!equity!sa!natural!resources.!Habang!naghihirap!ang!sambayanang!Pilipino,!ginagalugad!naman!ng!mga!dayuhan!ang!ating!

validly!enacted,!statute.!!Ratio!1:!While!the!effectivity!clause!of!E.O.!No.!279!does!not!require!its!publication,!it!is!not!a!ground!for!its!invalidation!since!the!EO!200,!in!a!supplementary!manner,!provides!for!its!application.!!!At!the!time!President!Aquino!issued!E.O.!No.!279!on!July!25,!1987,!she!was!still!validly!exercising!legislative!powers!under!the!Provisional!Constitution.!!Issue(2:(Whether(or(not(WCMP(FTAA(is(

unconstitutional?(

!Held!2:!It!is!unconstitutional!and!void,!specifically:!(1)!The!following!provisions!of!Republic!Act!No.!7942:!The!proviso!in!Section!3!(aq);!Section!23;!Section!33!to!41;!Section!56;!2nd!&!3rd!paragraphs!of!Section!81;!and!Section!90.!(2)!All!provisions!of!Department!of!Environment!and!Natural!Resources!Administrative!Order!96Z40,!s.!1996!which!are!not!in!conformity!with!this!Decision,!and!(3)!The!Financial!and!Technical!Assistance!Agreement!between!the!Government!of!the!Republic!of!the!Philippines!and!WMC!Philippines,!Inc.!!Ratio!2:!Mr.!Tadeo’s!"!!The!idea!and!phrase!"service!contracts"!has!been!deleted!in!the!1987!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

!And!they!likewise!claim!that!the!WMC!FTAA,!which!was!entered!into!pursuant!to!E.O.!No.!279,!violates!Section!2,!Article!XII!of!the!Constitution!because,!among!other!reasons:!(1) It!allows!foreignZowned!

companies!xxx!in!the!exploitation,!development,!and!utilization!of!minerals,!petroleum,!and!other!mineral!oils,!and!even!permits!foreign!owned!companies!to!"operate!and!manage!mining!activities."!!

(2)!It!allows!foreignZowned!companies!to!extend!both!technical!and!financial!assistance,!instead!of!"either!technical!or!financial!assistance."!

likas!na!yaman.!xxx!Ang!solusyon!sa!suliranin!ng!bansa!ay!dalawa!lamang:!ang!pagpapatupad!ng!tunay!na!reporma!sa!lupa!at!ang!national!industrialization.!Ito!ang!tinatawag!naming!pagsikat!ng!araw!sa!Silangan.!Ngunit(ang(mga(landlords(and(big(

businessmen(at(ang(

mga(komprador(ay(

nagsasabi(na(ang(free(

trade(na(ito,(ang(

kahulugan(para(sa(

amin,(ay(ipinipilit(sa(

ating(sambayanan(na(

ang(araw(ay(sisikat(sa(

Kanluran.(Kailan(man(

hindi(puwedeng(

sumikat(ang(araw(sa(

Kanluran.!I!vote!no.(((

MR.!VILLEGAS.!Actually,!the!second(provision(about(the(

President(does(not(

permit(foreign(

investors(to(

participate.!It!is!only!technical!or!financial!assistance!–!they!do!

Constitution's!Article!on!National!Economy!and!Patrimony!INTENTIONALLY.!Therefore,!the!phrase!"agreements!.!.!.!involving!either!technical!or!financial!assistance"!does!not!include!"broad!number!of!possible!services"!as!contended!by!the!respondent.!!Mr.!Villegas’!"!The!constitutional!provision!allowing!the!President!to!enter!into!FTAAs!with!foreignZowned!corporations!is!an!exception!to!the!rule!that!participation!in!the!nation's!natural!resources!is!reserved!exclusively!to!Filipinos.!Accordingly,!such!provision!must!be!construed!strictly!against!their!enjoyment!by!nonZFilipinos.!!!Mr.!Davide’s!"!The!intent!of!this!provision,!as!well!as!other!provisions!on!foreign!investments,!is!to!prevent!the!practice!(prevalent!in!the!Marcos!government)!of!skirting!the!60/40!equation!using!the!cover!of!service!contracts.!!Since!service!contracts!are!antithetical,!TFTA!would!also!run!counter!to!the!constitutional!provision!on!nationalization!or!Filipinization,!of!the!exploitation!of!our!natural!resources.!!FTAA!contractor!warrants!that!it!"has!or!has!access!to!all!the!financing,!managerial,!and!technical!expertise.!.!.!."!!FTAA!contractor!is!bound!to!provide!some!management!assistance!!!assistance(that(has(been(eliminated(by(the(present(Constitution!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

not!own!anything!–!but!on!conditions!that(have(to(be(determined(

by(law(with(the(

concurrence(of(

Congress.!So,(it(is(very(restrictive.!!MR!DAVIDE:!It!is!not!for!them!to!enjoy!our!natural!resources.!Madam!President,!our!natural!resources!are!depleting;!our!population!is!increasing!by!leaps!and!bounds.!Fifty(years(from(now,(if(we(will(

allow(these(aliens(to(

exploit(our(natural(

resources,(there(will(

be(no(more(natural(

resources(for(the(next(

generations(of(

Filipinos.!It!may!last!long!if!we!will!begin!now.!

!This!Court!finds!that!R.A.!No.!7942!is!invalid!insofar!as!said!Act!authorizes!service!contracts.!Although!the!statute!employs!the!phrase!"financial!and!technical!agreements"!in!accordance!with!the!1987!Constitution,!it!actually!treats!these!agreements!as!service!contracts!that!grant!beneficial!ownership!to!foreign!contractors!contrary!to!the!fundamental!law.!

(

(

(

(

D.(

RECONSIDERATION((

GR(127882(

(

(

(

Meaning(of(Full(

Control(and(

Supervision(

(

January!27,!2004!!the!Court!en!banc!promulgated!its!Decision!declaring!the!unconstitutionality!of!certain!provisions!of!RA!7942,!DAO!96Z40,!as!well!as!of!the!entire!FTAA!executed!between!the!government!and!WMCP,!mainly!on!the!finding!

!“Sec.!2.!!x!x!x!The!exploration,!development!and!utilization!of!natural!resources!shall!be!under!the!full!control!

Issue!1:!Whether!or!not!the!alleged!invalidity!of!the!transfer!of!the!WMCP!shares!to!Sagittarius!violates!the!fourth!paragraph!of!Section(2(of(Article(XII(of(the(Constitution?(

(

Held!1:!NO,!it!is!clear!that!the!constitutional!principle!gives!preference!and!priority!to!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

December(1,(2004(

992N1017(

COURT(

REVERSED(

DECISIONS(

that!FTAAs(are(service(contracts(prohibited(by(the(1987(

Constitution.!!Subsequently,!respondents!filed!separate!Motions!for!Reconsideration.!!!Reasons:!o the!FTAA!is!to!be!implemented!

now!by!a!Filipino!corporation!(Sagittarius),!it!is!no!longer!possible!for!the!Court!to!declare!it!unconstitutional!

!o that!a!Filipino!corporation!is!not!

allowed!by!the!Constitution!to!enter!into!an!FTAA!with!the!government!

and!supervision!of!the!State.!!The!State!may!directly!undertake!such!activities,!or!it!may!enter!into!coZproduction,!joint!venture,!or!productionZsharing!agreements!with!Filipino!citizens,!or!corporations!or!associations!at!least!sixty!per!centum!of!whose!capital!is!owned!by!such!citizens.!x!x!x.”!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Filipinos!and!Filipino!corporations!in!the!development!of!our!natural!resources!Ratio!1:!"!Nowhere!in!the!provision!is!there!any!express!limitation!or!restriction!insofar!as!arrangements!other!than!the!three!aforementioned!contractual!schemes!are!concerned.!!Issue(2:(Whether(or(not(the(Court(Can(Still(

Decide(the(Case,(Even(Assuming(It(Is(Moot(

!Held!2:!YES,!the!Court!will!never!digress!from!or!abandon!its!sacred!duty!and!authority!to!uphold!the!Constitution!in!matters!that!involve!grave!abuse!of!discretion!brought!before!it!in!appropriate!cases,!committed!by!any!officer,!agency,!instrumentality!or!department!of!the!government!!Ratio!2:!Remember!the!Requisites!of!Judicial!review!in!Moot!cases!!o VIOLATION!OF!THE!CONSTITUTION:!Where!

an!action!of!the!legislative!branch!is!seriously!alleged!to!have!infringed!the!Constitution,!it!becomes!not!only!the!right!but!in!fact!the!duty!of!the!judiciary!to!settle!the!dispute!

o PARAMOUNT!PUBLIC!INTEREST!involved,!as!well!as!the!necessity!for!a!ruling!to!put!an!end!to!the!uncertainties!plaguing!the!mining!industry!

o CAPABLE!OF!REPETITION,!YET!EVADING!REVIEW!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

!!!!!!!!!!!!Definition!and!Application!!“FULL!CONTROL!AND!SUPERVISION”!as!utilized!in!Section!2!of!Article!XII!enables!the!State!to:!o direct,!restrain,!

regulate!and!govern!the!affairs!of!the!extractive!enterprises!

!o regulate!the!

conduct!of!affairs!in!various!enterprises!based!on!industry!standards!and!similar!measures!

!

o LIS!MOTA:!the!real!issue!in!this!case!is!whether!paragraph!4!of!Section!2!of!Article!XII!of!the!Constitution!is!contravened!by!RA!7942!and!DAO!96Z40,!not!whether!it!was!violated!by!specific!acts!implementing!RA!7942!and!DAO!96Z40!

!Issue(3:(The(Meaning(of(“Agreements(

Involving(

Either(Technical(or(Financial(Assistance”(

!Ratio!3:!The!intent!the!aboveZmentioned!provision!is!to!put!in!place!safeguards!that!would!eliminate!or!minimize!the!abuses!prevalent!during!the!martial!law!regime.!!In!brief,!they!were!going!to!permit!service!contracts!with!foreign!corporations!as!contractors,!but!with!safety!measures!to!prevent!abuses,!as!an!exception!to!the!general!norm!established!in!the!first!paragraph!of!Section!2!of!Article!XII,!which!reserves!or!limits!to!Filipino!citizens!and!corporations!at!least!60!percent!owned!by!such!citizens!the!exploration,!development!and!utilization!of!mineral!or!petroleum!resources.!!The!agreements(involving(either(technical(or(

financial(assistance!referred!to!in!paragraph!4!are!in!fact!service!contracts,!but!such!new!service(contracts(are(between(foreign(

corporations(acting(as(contractors(on!the!one!hand,!and!on!the!other!hand!government!as!principal!or!“owner”!(of!the!works),!whereby!the!foreign!contractor!provides!the!capital,!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

o restrain!activities!deemed!not!desirable!or!beneficial!to!the!economic!development!and!general!welfare!of!the!country!

!o conserve!the!

environment!!!o uplift!the!wellZ

being!of!the!local!affected!communities!

technology!and!technical!knowZhow,!and!managerial!expertise!in!the!creation!and!operation!of!the!largeZscale!mining/extractive!enterprise,!and!government(through(its(

agencies((DENR,(MGB)(actively(exercises(full(

control(and(supervision(over(the(entire(

enterprise.!(

Such!service!contracts!may!be!entered!into!only!with!respect!to!minerals,!petroleum!and!other!mineral!oils.!!The!grant!of!such!service!contracts!is!subject!to!several!safeguards,!among!them:!!(1)!That!the!service!contract!be!crafted!in!accordance!with!a!general!law!setting!standard!or!uniform!terms,!conditions!and!requirements;!!(2)!The!President!be!the!signatory!for!the!government;!and!!(3)!The!President!reports!the!executed!agreement!to!Congress!within!thirty!days.!!COURT(REVERSALS:(

!The(ff.(are(NOW(CONSTITUTIONAL(!(1) Republic(Act(No.(7942((the(Philippine(

Mining(Law),((

Ratio!1:!The!Section!3(aq)!of!RA!7942!is!not!unconstitutional!in!allowing!a!foreign!contractor!to!apply!for!and!hold!an!exploration!permit!.The!exploration!permit!issued!under!Sections!3(aq),!20!and!23!of!RA!7942,!which!allows!exploration!but!not!extraction,!serves!to!protect!the!interests!and!rights!of!the!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

exploration!permit!grantee!(and!wouldZbe!contractor),!foreign!or!local.!!!!!(2) (its(Implementing(Rules(and(Regulations(

contained(in(DENR(Administrative(Order(

(DAO)(No.(9640(NN(insofar(as(they(relate(to(

financial(and(technical(assistance(

agreements(referred(to(in(paragraph(4(of(

Section(2(of(Article(XII(of(the(Constitution;(

and((

Ratio:!DAO!96Z40!vest!in!government!more!than!a!sufficient!degree!of!control!and!supervision!over!the!conduct!of!mining!operations!!(3) the(Financial(and(Technical(Assistance(

Agreement((FTAA)(dated(March(30,(1995(

executed(by(the(government(and(Western(

Mining(Corporation(Philippines(Inc.(

(WMCP)(

Ratio!3:!The!WMCP!FTAA!clauses!vest!the!State!with!control!and!supervision!over!practically!all!aspects!of!the!operations!of!the!FTAA!contractor,!including!the!charging!of!preZoperating!and!operating!expenses,!and!the!disposition!of!mineral!products.!There!is!no!abdication!of!State!Control.!!EXCEPT!Sections!7.8!and!7.9!of!the!subject!FTAA!which!are!hereby!INVALIDATED!for!being!contrary!to!public!policy!and!for!being!grossly!disadvantageous!to!the!government.!

E.(PHILIPPINE( COMPROMISE( September!10,!1971!!the!National! ! Issue:(Whether(or(not(the(Compromise(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

GEOTHERMALV.(

NAPOCOR((

GR(144302(

May(27,(2004(

1017N1019(

AGREEMENT(

IS(

NOT(A(

BUSINESS(OF(

THE(COURT(

Power!Corporation!(NAPOCOR)!entered!into!a!service!contract!with!Philippine!Geothermal,!Inc.!(PGI),!a!corporation!organized!and!existing!under!the!laws!of!California,!United!States!of!America,!for!the!exploration!and!exploitation!of!geothermal!resources!covering!the!Tiwi!and!MakZBan!Geothermal!Fields.!Section!3.1!of!said!contract!which!provides!that!it!shall!be!renewed!for!another!25!years.!!NPC,!however,!was!doubtful!whether!a!renewal!would!be!constitutional!in!light!of!Section!2,!Article!XII!of!the!1987!Constitution.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!July!8,!1996!!PGI!requested!for!arbitration!with!the!International!Court!of!Arbitration!(ICA)!of!the!International!Chamber!of!Commerce!(ICC).!!March!6,!1997!!Quezon!City!RTC!denied!the!motion!for!reconsideration!of!the!PGI!to!dismiss!the!petition!of!the!NAPOCOR!on!the!ground!that!the!legality!or!constitutionality!of!the!renewal!of!the!service!contract!is!an!issue!which!only!a!regular!court!of!justice!may!resolve!or!settle!and!

!SECTION!2.!All!lands!of!the!public!domain,!waters,!minerals,!coal,!petroleum!and!other!mineral!oils,!all!forces!of!potential!energy,!fisheries,!forests!or!timber,!wildlife,!flora!and!fauna,!and!other!natural!resources!are!owned!by!the!state.!With!the!exception!of!agricultural!lands,!all!other!natural!resources!shall!not!be!alienated.!!The(exploration,(

development,(and(

utilization(of(natural(

resources(shall(be(

under(the(full(control(

and(supervision(of(the(

state.!!xxx!

Agreement(filed(by(PGI(and(NAPOCOR(is(a(

valid(settlement?(

(

Held:(Denied,(CA’s(Decision(to(Dismiss(

UPHELD(

(

Ratio:((

It!is!beyond!its!jurisdiction!to!pass!upon!and!approve!the!Compromise!Agreement!of!the!parties,!who!have,!as!therein!stated,!“agreed!to!terminate!the!service!contract!subject!of!the!dispute,!in!favor!of”!a!series!of!agreements!that!start!with!“Provisional,”!followed!by!“Interim,”!then!“Transition,”!and!finally!“Geothermal!Resources!Sales!Contract!(GRSC),”!the!forging!of!which!agreements!is!intended!to!“effectively!erase!any!doubt!as!to!the!legality!of!the!compromise.”!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

NOT!ICA.!!Hence,!this!petition!for!review!on!certiorari!seeking!to!set!aside!and!nullify!the!decision!of!the!RTC.!!AT!THE!SIDE!BAR:!Thus![PGI]!and![NPC]!have!agreed!to!terminate!the!Service!Contract!subject!matter!of!the!dispute,!in!favor!of!a!new!Geothermal!Sales!Contract!and!a!PD!1442!Geothermal!Service!Contract,!and!PGI!has!committed!to!form!a!Philippine!company!for!the!development!and!operation!of!the!Tiwi!and!MakZBan!steamfields!(Sec.!6.1!thereof)!on!a!goingZforward!basis,!thereby!effectively!erasing!any!doubt!as!to!the!legality!of!the!compromise.!!March!24,!2000!!Court!of!Appeals!dismissed!the!petition!of!PGI.!

(

Section(3.(Lands(of(the(public(domain(are(classified(into(agricultural,(forest(or(timber,(mineral(lands(and(national(parks.(Agricultural(lands(of(the(

public(domain(may(be(further(classified(by(law(according(to(the(uses(to(which(they(may(be(devoted.(Alienable(lands(of(the(public(domain(shall(be(

limited(to(agricultural(lands.(Private(corporations(or(associations(may(not(hold(such(alienable(lands(of(the(public(domain(except(by(lease,(for(a(period(

not(exceeding(twentyNfive(years,(renewable(for(not(more(than(twentyNfive(years,(and(not(to(exceed(one(thousand(hectares(in(area.(Citizens(of(the(

Philippines(may(lease(not(more(than(five(hundred(hectares,(or(acquire(not(more(than(twelve(hectares(thereof,(by(purchase,(homestead,(or(grant.(

(

Taking(into(account(the(requirements(of(conservation,(ecology,(and(development,(and(subject(to(the(requirements(of(agrarian(reform,(the(Congress(

shall(determine,(by(law,(the(size(of(lands(of(the(public(domain(which(may(be(acquired,(developed,(held,(or(leased(and(the(conditions(thereforE.(

(

(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*


Provision/s(

Issue(&(Ratio(

Republic(v.(CA(

(

160!SCRA!228!(1988)!!

The!Regalian!Doctrine!was!incorrectly!applied!in!the!cases!at!bar!

These!cases!arose!from!the!application!for!registration!of!a!parcel!of!land!filed!by!Jose!de!la!Rosa!on!his!own!behalf!and!on!behalf!of!his!three!children,!Victoria,!Benjamin!and!Eduardo.!The!land,!situated!in!the!Benguet!Province,!was!divided!into!9!lots.!!According!to!the!application,!Lots!1Z5!were!sold!to!Jose!de!la!Rosa!and!Lots!6Z9!to!his!children!by!Mamaya!Balbalio!and!Jaime!Alberto.!!The!application!was!separately!opposed!by:!

1. Benguet!Consolidated,!Inc.(

2. Atok!Big!Wedge!Corporation(

3. Republic(of(the(Philippines(

!In!support!of!the!application,!Balbalio!claimed!to!have!received!Lots!1Z5!from!her!father!shortly!after!the!Liberation.!She!testified!she!was!born!in!the!land,!which!was!possessed!by!her!parents!under!claim!of!ownership.!!Alberto!said!he!received!Lots!6Z9!1961!from!his!mother!who!declared!that!the!land!was!planted!by!Jaime!and!his!predecessorsZinZinterest.!!

Philippine(Bill(of(1902,(

Sec.(21.(

All!valuable!mineral!deposits!in!public!lands!in!the!philippine!Islands!both!surveyed!and!unsurveyed!are!hereby!declared!to!be!free!and!open!to!exploration,!occupation!and!purchase!and!the!land!in!which!they!are!found!to!occupation!and!purchase!by!the!citizens!of!the!United!States,!or!of!said!islands.!!Article(13,(Sec.(1.(

All!agricultural,!timber!and!mineral!lands!of!the!public!domain,!waters,!minerals,!coal,!petroleum!and!other!mineral!oils,!all!forces!of!potential!energy!and!other!natural!resources!of!the!Philipppines!belong!to!the!State,!and!their!disposition,!exploitation,!

ISSUE:!Whether!or!not!Benguet!and!Atok!have!exclusive!rights!to!the!property!in!question!by!virtue!of!their!respective!mining!claims.!!HELD:!Yes.!!RATIO:(

Yes,!because!such!property!rights!were!validly!acquired!before!the!Constitution!of!1935!prohibited!the!alienation!of!all!lands!of!the!public!domain!except!agricultural!lands,!subject!to!vested!rights!existing!at!the!time!of!its!adoption.!The!land!was!not!and!could!not!have!been!transferred!to!the!private!respondents!by!virtue!of!acquisitive!prescription,!nor!could!its!use!be!shared!simultaneously!by!them!and!the!mining!companies!for!agricultural!and!mineral!purposes.!!

*!!!*!!!*!!DEEPER(EXPLANATION(

The!subject!property!was!indeed!considered!forest!land!and!included!in!the!Central!Cordillera!Forest!Reserve,!but!this!did!not!impair!the!rights!already!vested!in!Benguet!and!Atok!at!that!time.!The!June!Bug!mineral!claim!of!Benguet!and!the!Fredia!and!Emma!mineral!claims!of!Atok!having!been!perfected!prior!to!the!approval!of!the!Constitution!of!the!Philippines!of!1935,!they!were!removed!from!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

She!was!corroborated!by!Felix!Marcos,!67!years!old!at!the!time,!who!recalled!the!earlier!possession!of!the!land!by!Alberto's!father.!!Both!presented!tax!declarations!and!tax!receipts!to!support!their!petitions.!!!!Benguet!opposed!on!the!ground!that!rom!the!date!of!its!purchase,!Benguet!had!been!in!actual,!continuous!and!exclusive!possession!of!the!land!in!concept!of!owner.!!Atok!alleged!the!lots!he!was!claiming!were!covered!by!the!Emma!and!Fredia!mineral!claims!located!by!Harrison!and!Reynolds!in!the!office!of!the!mining!recorder!of!Baguio.!These!claims!were!purchased!from!these!locators!by!Atok,!which!has!since!then!been!in!open,!continuous!and!exclusive!possession!of!the!said!lots.!(The!location!of!the!mineral!claims!was!made!in!accordance!with!Section(21(of(the(Philippine(Bill(of(1902.)!!The!Bureau(of(Forestry(Development(also!interposed!its!objection,!arguing!that!the!land!sought!to!be!registered!was!

development,!or!utilization!shall!be!limited!to!citizens!of!the!Philippines!or!to!corporations!or!associations!at!least!60%!of!the!capital!of!which!is!owned!by!such!citizens,!subject!to!any!existing!right,!grant,!lease!or!concession!at!the!time!of!the!inauguration!of!the!government!established!under!this!Constitution.!Natural!resources!with!the!exception!of!public!agricultural!lands,!shall!not!be!alienated,!and!no!license,!concession,!or!lease!for!the!exploitation,!development!or!utilization!of!any!of!the!natural!resources!shall!be!granted!for!a!period!exceeding!25!years,!except!as!to!water!rights!for!irrigation,!water!supply,!fisheries,!or!industrial!uses!other!than!the!development!of!water!power,!in!

the!public!domain!and!had!become!private!properties!of!Benguet!and!Atok.!!Such!rights!were!not!affected!either!by!the!restriction!in!the!Commonwealth(Constitution!according!to!Article(XIII,(Section(1,!thereof,!which!was!implemented!by!Act(No.(4268.!!The(perfection(of(the(mining(claim(converted(

the(property(to(mineral(land(and(under(the(

laws(then(in(force(removed(it(from(the(public(

domain.(As(the(land(had(become(the(private(

property(of(the(locators,(they(had(the(right(to(

transfer(the(same,(as(they(did,(to(Benguet(and(

Atok.(

!The!Court!of!Appeals!correctly!observed!that!such!private!property!was!subject!to!the!"vicissitudes!of!ownership,"!or!by!acquisitive(prescription.!!HOWEVER,!the!method!invoked!by!the!de!la!Rosas!is!not!available!in!the!case!at!bar,!for!two!reasons:!

1. The!trial!court!found!that!the!evidence!of!open,!continuous,!adverse!and!exclusive!possession!submitted!by!the!applicants!was!insufficient(to(support(their(claim(of(ownership.!

2. Even!if!it!were!assumed!that!the!predecessorsZinZinterest!of!the!de!la!Rosas!had!really!been!in!possession!of!the!subject!property,!their!possession!was!not!in!the!concept!of!owner!of!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

covered!by!the!Central(Cordillera(Forest(Reserve(under!Proclamation(

No.(217.!Moreover,!by!reason!of!its!nature,!it!was!not!subject!to!alienation!under!the!Constitutions!of!1935!and!1973.!!THE(RTC’S(DECISION(

The!trial!court!denied!the!application,!holding!that!the!applicants!had!failed!to!prove!their!claim!of!possession!and!ownership!of!the!land!sought!to!be!registered.!!THE(CA’S(DECISION(

The!applicants!appealed!to!the!CA,!which!affirmed!the!surface!rights!of!the!de!la!Rosas!over!the!land!while!reserving!the!subZsurface!rights!of!Benguet!and!Atok!by!virtue!of!their!mining!claims.!!THE(SC(STEPS(IN(

Both!Benguet!and!Atok!have!appealed!to!this!Court,!invoking!their!superior!right!of!ownership.!The!Republic!has!also!appealed!and!reiterates!its!argument!that!neither!the!private!respondents!nor!the!two!mining!companies!have!any!valid!claim!to!the!land!because!it!is!not!alienable!and!registerable.!!!

which!case!beneficial!use!may!be!the!measure!and!the!limit!of!the!grant.!!Act(No.(4268.(

Any!provision!of!existing!laws,!executive!order,!proclamation!to!the!contrary!notwithstanding,!all!locations!of!mining!claim!made!prior!to!February!8,!1935!within!lands!set!apart!as!forest!reserve!under!Sec.!1826!of!the!Revised!Administrative!Code!which!would!be!valid!and!subsisting!location!except!to!the!existence!of!said!reserve!are!hereby!declared!to!be!valid!and!subsisting!locations!as!of!the!date!of!their!respective!locations.!!Commonwealth(Act(

No.(137:(

!Sec.(3.!All!mineral!lands!of!the!public!

the!mining#claim!but!of!the!property!as!agricultural#land,!which!it!was!not.!The(property(was(mineral(land,(and(

they(were(claiming(it(as(agricultural(

land.((

!The!Court!of!Appeals!justified!this!by!saying!there!is!"no!conflict!of!interest"!between!the!owners!of!the!surface!rights!and!the!owners!of!the!subZsurface!rights.!This!is!rather!doctrine,!for!it!is!a!wellZknown!principle!that!the!owner!of!piece!of!land!has!rights!not!only!to!its!surface!but!also!to!everything!underneath!and!the!airspace!above!it!up!to!a!reasonable!height.!!HOWEVER,(this(Court(feels(that(the(rights(

over(the(land(are(indivisible(and(that(the(land(

itself(cannot(be(half(agricultural(and(half(

mineral.(The(classification(must(be(

categorical;(the(land(must(be(either(

completely(mineral(or(completely(agricultural.(

As!long!as!mining!operations!were!being!undertaken!thereon,!or!underneath,!it!did!not!cease!to!be!so!and!become!agricultural,!even!if!only!partly!so,!because!it!was!enclosed!with!a!fence!and!was!cultivated!by!those!who!were!unlawfully!occupying!the!surface.!What!must!have!misled!the!respondent!court!is!Commonwealth(Act(No.(137.!!The(flaw(in(the(reasoning(of(the(CA(is(in(

supposing(that(the(rights(over(the(land(could(

be(used(for(both(mining(and(nonNmining(


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

! domain!and!minerals!belong!to!the!State,!and!their!disposition,!exploitation,!development!or!utilization,!shall!be!limited!to!citizens!of!the!Philippines,!or!to!corporations,!or!associations,!at!least!60%!of!the!capital!of!which!is!owned!by!such!citizens,!subject!to!any!existing!right,!grant,!lease!or!concession!at!the!time!of!the!inauguration!of!government!established!under!the!Constitution.!!Sec.(4.!The!ownership!of,!and!the!right!to!the!use!of!land!for!agricultural,!industrial,!commercial,!residential,!or!for!any!purpose!other!than!mining!does!not!include!the!ownership!of,!nor!the!right!to!extract!or!utilize,!the!minerals!which!may!be!found!on!or!under!the!

purposes(simultaneously.!!The!correct!interpretation!is!that!once!minerals!are!discovered!in!the!land,!whatever!the!use!to!which!it!is!being!devoted!at!the!time,!such!use!may!be!discontinued!by!the!State!to!enable!it!to!extract!the!minerals!therein!in!the!exercise!of!its!sovereign!prerogative.!The!land!is!thus!converted!to!mineral!land!and!may!not!be!used!by!any!private!party,!including!the!registered!owner!for!any!other!purpose!that!will!impede!the!mining!operations!to!be!undertaken.!!And(so,(the(decision(of(the(CA(! (SET(ASIDE(

and(that(of(the(RTC(! (REINSTATED.(

!*!!!*!!!*!

!Creek(Mining(Corp.(Case!!!For!all!physical!purposes!of!ownership,!the!owner!is!not!required!to!secure!a!patent!as!long!as!he!complies!with!the!provisions!of!the!mining!laws;!his!possessory!right,!for!all!practical!purposes!of!ownership,!is!as!good!as!though!secured!by!patent.!!


┻━┻ ��(°□°) ╯� ┻━┻*

surface.!!Sec.(5.!The!ownership!of,!and!the!right!to!extract!and!utilize,!the!minerals!included!within!all!areas!for!which!public!agricultural!land!patents!are!granted!are!excluded!and!excepted!from!all!such!patents.!!Sec.(6.!The!ownership!of,!and!the!right!to!extract!and!utilize,!the!minerals!included!within!all!areas!for!which!Torrens!titles!are!granted!are!excluded!and!excepted!from!all!such!titles.!!

(

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