Sustaining Social-Ecological Systems: An Ontological Approach

Elinor OstromIndiana University

Karl F. Schuessler Lecture November 6,

2008

Sustaining Social-Ecological Systems is a Struggle A central theme of this talk is Social-

Ecological Systems are complex. Understanding SES’s is a challenge --

BUT IT IS WORTH IT! Without understanding, we can

recommend policies that may things worse rather than better

Two tasks for today A brief overview of recent research that

draws on both ecological and social sciences

A brief overview of a new framework that may help us to integrate our research by providing a common tiered language

Diversity is Important for Sustainability Two types:

Biological diversity – extensive scientific findings – well accepted

Institutional diversity – importance not yet accepted

Simple institutional solutions are frequently recommended as universal panaceas Government ownership Privatize land Co-management

Imposing simple policy blueprints reduces institutional diversity and ecological sustainability

Our research finds variations of all 3 succeed & fail Lets review findings from our multi-country, multi-

disciplinary forestry research network using remote sensing & field studies.

First to Maya Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala

Maya Biosphere ReserveMultitemporal Color Composite (Dietz, Ostrom, Stern, 2003,

Science SOM)

B

Multiple Use Zone

Buffer Zone

Laguna delTigre NP

El Mirador-Rio Azul NP

Naachtun-Dos Lagunas Biotope

Tikal NP

Sierra del Lacandón NP

Laguna delTigre Biotope

El Zotz Biotope

clouds

N0 20 km10

A

B

C D

C

D

Maya Biosphere Reserve Four National Parks (NPs) in

close proximity Tikal NP has large budget to pay

for extensive fences and guards El Mirador protected by nature Laguna del Tigre severely

overharvested Sierra del Lacandón severely

overharvested Same formal institution:

Two are sustainable, but different causal process

Two are vulnerable to massive illegal harvesting

Now to Uganda An example of sustainable

Government Forest Reserves West Mengo region located in

earlier Buganda kingdom In early 1900s, tough negotiations

to settle private land and set up reserves in 1930s

Local forest users use NTFP and participate every two decades in boundary demarcation

Users value the forest and know the boundaries

Very stable from 1936 to 2000 Recent decentralization is

disrupting this stability

Uganda Forest Reserves

N0 5 km2.5

Islands

Now to India Todoba-Andhari Tiger Reserve An under-funded national wildlife

reserve with multiple outcomes Stable forests in the core Park guards are not able to

control harvesting along sections of the borders

Complementary field studies find Consistent harvesting of non-

timber forest products Existence of considerable

conflict between guards and local people Nagendra & Ostrom, PNAS, 2006

TADOBA-ANDHARI TIGER RESERVE

Interior villages

Multi-temporal Landsat color composite, 1972-1989-2001, landscape surrounding Tadoba-Andhari Tiger

Reserve, India.

Regrowth

Clearing

Regrowth

Clearing

Stable forest

Women harvesting thatch grass from within the TATR - while the forest ranger accompanying our research team looks on helplessly.

Cattle entering the TATR boundary (marked by the yellow topped pillar in the background) on their daily foraging beat.

Bicycles and trucks confiscated from timber poachers stealing large logs

Are Protected Areas the “Only Way” to Sustain Forests?

While some Protected Parks are successful in protecting forests, others are not.

Depends on many factors In a large cross-sectional IFRI

study of 163 forests in 12 countries, no difference in forest density (scale assigned by forester on team after doing forest plots) is measured for Protected Parks compared to all other institutional arrangements (Non-Parks)

Comparison of Forester’s Field Evaluation of Vegetation Densities

in 163 Parks and Non-Parks Vegetation density

Very sparse

Sparse About average

Somewhat

abundant

Veryabundant

Officially designated parks (N = 76)

13% 21% 36% 26% 4%

Non-parks (N = 87)

6% 22% 43% 26% 3%

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z score = 0.472, p = .979. No significant difference.

Source: Hayes, Tanya, & Elinor Ostrom, “Conserving the World’s Forests: Are Protected Areas the Only Way?” Indiana Law Review 38(3) (2005): 607.

Findings from Repeat Visits to IFRI Forests 2nd time research visit in 42 IFRI

forests India – 5 forests Kenya – 3 forests Nepal – 10 forests Uganda – 18 forests USA – 6 forests

Not a random sample of forests but based on a random sample of plots inside each forest and first study of this type

Can now assess: Relative strength of formal institution on

changes in DBH, basal area, and stem count

Strength of regular involvement of user groups in monitoring forests on same forest measures

Impact of Formally Designated Tenure and Forest Monitoring on Changes in Forest Condition: Assessment using ANOVA

Independent variables

Change in DBH

Change in basal area

Change in stem count

Ownershipa F = 0.89 F = 2.52 F = 1.00

Involvement of user groups in monitoring rulesb

F = 0.28 F = 10.55** F = 4.66*

a Government, community, private

b At least one user group is involved in regular monitoring of rules of forest use

* Significant at .05 ** Significant at .01

Source: Ostrom, Elinor, & Harini Nagendra, “Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory.” PNAS 103(51) (2006): 19230.

A Puzzle from Field Research: Why Do Users Monitor Others? Voluntary effort to produce a “public good” of rule conformance

Game theoretic predictions – no one will voluntarily contribute to provide a public good

Earlier findings from field studies led to a series of laboratory experiments at IU and now replicated by others

Harvesting Common-Pool Resources in the Lab Baseline experiment of complete

anonymity and finitely repeated game Game theoretical prediction is substantial

over-harvesting Prediction supported in the lab

Adding the capacity to communicate – does not change prediction – in a social dilemma communication is only CHEAP TALK

Subjects make good use of opportunity for cheap talk – especially when repeated

They use it to agree on joint harvesting strategy & for verbal sanctions of unknown over-harvesters

Aggregate Results of CPR Experiments

Experimental Designs using 25 Token Endowments

Average Net Yield as % of Maximuma

Average Net Yield Minus Fees & Fines

Defection Rate (%)

(A) Baseline Experiment:No Communication (3)

21 - -

(B) One-shotCommunication (3)

55 - 25

(C) RepeatedCommunication (6)

73 - 13

(D) Imposed SanctioningInstitution (8)

37

9

_

(E) One-shot Communication & Imposed Sanctioning Institution (3)

85

67

1

(F1) One-shot Communication Endogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution - None Chosen (2)

56

-

42

(F2) One-shot CommunicationEndogenous Choice of Sanctioning Institution – Sanction Chosen (4)

93

90

4

aNash equilibrium for all designs is a net yield of 39% of maximum (Adapted from: Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992: p. 414)

What Have We Learned? No single idealized type of governance structures is successful in all ecological and social settings

We should NOT eliminate institutional diversity to save biodiversity

Danger of Institutional Monoculture Abstract concepts – government

ownership, co-management Tend to impose uniform rules

People living in or around forest frequently not involved in design

Few opportunities for experimentation and learning

Rules-on-paper confused for rules-in-use – don’t really know what rules are being used in field

Self Governance is Feasible

Resources & human uses can be monitored & the info verified & understood at relatively low cost (trees easier to monitor than fish) WHEN Rates of change in key variables are

moderate Communities do have thick networks of

social capital Excluding outsiders is relatively low

costs Users consider rules legitimate &

support monitoring and sanctioning activities

The Challenges Ahead Need further investment in

understanding complex social-ecological systems (SESs)

Developed a multi-tier, multi-disciplinary ontology for analyzing SES’s For a Special Feature of PNAS

September 2007 A core set of 4 variable clusters at a

focal level that together generate interactions and outcomes

Affected by, and affect larger and smaller ecosystems as well as social, economic, and political systems

Let’s look at the first tier

Resource System

(RS)

Resource Units (RU)

Interactions (I ) → Outcomes (O)

Governance System

(GS)

Users (U)

Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)

Related Ecosystems (ECO)

Direct causal link Feedback

A Multitier Framework for Analyzing Sustainable Social-Ecological

Systems

To Analyze Sustainable or Unsustainable Interactions and Outcomes

Need to dig down one or two tiers for several of main first tier variables

Lets dig down one level to an initial listing of 2nd tier variables

But – when you see 50 + variables at second level – do not panic!

Need to identify which second-tier (and potentially 3rd or 4th tier) variables are relevant to a particular question being examined

All 2nd (3rd or 4th) tier variables are not relevant for every theoretical or empirical study

Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)S1- Economic development. S2- Demographic trends. S3- Political stability.

S4- Government settlement policies. S5- Market incentives. S6-Media organization

Resource System (RS) Governance System (GS)

RS1- Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish)RS2- Clarity of system boundaries RS3- Size of resource systemRS4- Human-constructed facilitiesRS5- Productivity of systemRS6- Equilibrium propertiesRS7- Predictability of system dynamicsRS8- Storage characteristicsRS9- Location

GS1- Government organizationsGS2- Non-government organizationsGS3- Network structureGS4- Property-rights systemsGS5- Operational rulesGS6- Collective-choice rulesGS7- Constitutional rulesGS8- Monitoring and sanctioning processes

Resource Units (RU) Users (U)

RU1- Resource unit mobilityRU2- Growth or replacement rateRU3- Interaction among resource unitsRU4- Economic valueRU5- SizeRU6- Distinctive markingsRU7- Spatial and temporal distribution

U1- Number of usersU2- Socioeconomic attributes of usersU3- History of useU4- LocationU5- Leadership/entrepreneurshipU6- Norms/social capitalU7- Knowledge of SES/mental modelsU8- Dependence on resourceU9- Technology used

Interactions (I) - Outcomes (O)

I1- Harvesting levels of diverse usersI2- Information sharing among usersI3- Deliberation processesI4- Conflicts among usersI5- Investment activitiesI6- Lobbying activities

O1- Social performance measures (e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability)O2- Ecological performance measures (e.g., overharvested, resilience, diversity)O3- Externalities to other SESs

Related Ecosystems (ECO)ECO1- Climate patterns. ECO2- Pollution patterns.

ECO3- Flows into and out of focal SES.

Building Theories Based on this Framework to Address 3 Broad Questions First question: What patterns of

interactions and outcomes -- overuse, conflict, collapse, stability -- are likely to result from using one set of rules for the governance and use of a particular resource system and its units in a socioeconomic and political environment?

In other words – which rules generate sustainable outcomes for particular types of resources?

Why were the rules related to forest reserves in Uganda sustainable for many decades and recent changes now leading to deforestation

Hardin did not consider any rules in his analysis

Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)S1 S2 S3- S4- S5- Market Incentives S6

Resource System (RS) Governance System (GS)

RS1- Sector – pastureRS2- RS3- Finite sizeRS4- RS5- Renewable resourceRS6- RS7- RS8- RS9-

GS1- GS2- GS3- GS4- GS5- GS6- GS7- GS8-

Resource Units (RU) Users (U)

RU1- Mobile animals on stationary grassesRU2-RU3-

RU4- Fattened cattle can be sold for cash RU5- RU6- Distinctive markingsRU7-

U1- Large number of usersU2- U3- U4- U5- U6- U7- Maximization of short term gains for selfU8- U9-

Interactions (I) → Outcomes (O)

I1- Maximum harvesting levels of diverse usersI2- I3- I4- I5-I6-

O1- O2- Destruction of ecological system O3-

Related Ecosystems (ECO)ECO1- ECO2- ECO3-

Second Type of Question For a particular resource in a

particular setting, what is the likely endogenous development of different forms of governance, use patterns, and outcomes with or without external imposed rules or financing?

In other words – do national governments need to impose institutions from the outside?

Or, are well tailored rules likely to evolve from within in this type of setting?

May need 3rd or 4th tier variables to build theory to answer this type of question

Third Type of Question How robust and sustainable is a

particular type of configuration of users, resource system, resource units, and governance system to external and internal disturbances?

In other words – what kind of disturbances are likely to lead reduce the resilience of a particular cluster of SES variables? Population change? global warming? changes in prices?

All 3 questions need theoretical development and empirical testing by multi-disciplinary research teams

We all need to work on the challenge of developing this multi-tier framework and related theories and the empirical work to test our theoretical predictions

Questions that We Can Discuss Now?