suppbrief, appendices 1-13, feb-13-2013, petition 12-7747

7/29/2019 SuppBrief, APPENDICES 1-13, Feb-13-2013, Petition 12-7747

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No: 12-7747 _______________________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

____________________ NEIL J. GILLESPIE, ET AL, - PETITIONERS

vs.

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FLORIDA, ET AL, - RESPONDENTS ________________________

PETITIONERS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

IN PETITION NO. 12-7747 FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ________________________

SEPARATE VOLUME APPENDIX

Appendix 1 Hon. Dennis Jacobs, The Secret Life of J udges , 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2855 (2007).

Appendix 2 January 7, 2013 letter, Bar Counsel Annemarie Craft, re. Robert W. Bauer complaint

Appendix 3 January 10, 2013 letter, Neil Gillespie to Bar Counsel Annemarie Craft, re Mr. Bauer

Appendix 4 Email to James Watson, Chief Branch, re. Grievance Committee as Bars grand jury

Appendix 5 January 21, 2013 letter, Robert W. Bauer to Bar Counsel Annemarie Craft

Appendix 6 December 31, 2012 letter, Neil Gillespie to Bar Counsel Leonard Clark, re. records

Appendix 7 January 18, 2013, Bar complaint Catherine Barbara Chapman, violation Rule 4-8.3

Appendix 8 Communication with Gwynne Alice Young, Board of Governors; current President

Appendix 9 Florida Bar Discipline System Chart

Appendix 10 Florida Bar ethics complaints substantially related to Ryan Christopher Rodems

Appendix 11 21 Related legal actions to Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, 05-CA-7205

Appendix 12 April 25, 2012, letter of Chief Judge Anne Conway, U.S.D.C., Middle District, Fla.

Appendix 13 August 30, 2010 letter to J ames Leanheart, Court Operations Supervisor


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Fordham Law Review

Volume 75| Issue 6 Article 4

2007

Te Secret Life of JudgesDennis Jacobs

Tis Article is brought to you for free and open access by Te Fordham Law School Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion inFordham Law Review by an authorized administrator of Te Fordham Law School Institutional Repository. For more information, please [email protected].

Recommended CitationDennis Jacobs,Te Secret Life of Judges , 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2855 (2007). Available at: h p://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ r/vol75/iss6/4

APPENDIX 1


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THE JOHN F. SONNETT MEMORIAL LECTURE

THE SECRET LIFE OF JUDGES

Dennis Jacobs*

Dean Treanor, distinguished faculty, students, alumni, colleagues, andfellow friends of Fordham Law School, I am honored more than I can say tobe invited to deliver this distinguished lecture in the post-centennial year ofthis great law school-now, this venerable law school. I am going toexpress my gratitude by saying some things that matter to me, that are notoften said, and that distill observations that have (increasingly) bemused me

over the fourteen years that I have been a judge.The title of my lecture gives little clue, I suspect, as to what I am going tosay; but it is not a tease. I am going to talk about "The Secret Life ofJudges," by which I mean a habit of mind that, among so many admirablefeatures of the judicial mentality, amounts to a serious and secret bias.There is a social reluctance to talk about this kind of thing. It soundssanctimonious. Then again, a neat thing about giving a lecture is that itdisarms inhibitions about lecturing people. I get to be sanctimoniouswithout worrying about it.

This lecture is about bias, the judge's inbred preference for outcomescontrolled by proceduralism, the adversary system, hearings and experts,representation by lawyers, ramified complexity of doctrines and rules,multiple prongs, and all things that need and use lawyers, enrich them, andempower them vis-A-vis other sources of power and wisdom.

Let me make this bias concrete by example. If you arrived in anappellate court as counsel for a medical-malpractice plaintiff, and the threeindividuals on the bench were wearing white coats instead of black robesand had stethoscopes around their necks, I think your heart would sink. Icould tell you that the three doctors deciding your case have taken an oathto be impartial as between patients and the medical profession and that theyare conscientious, decent individuals who take seriously the obligation to be

neutral. You would not be reassured: You would understand that there is(at least) an internalized bias that the doctors would not acknowledgebecause they would not notice it. A similar dread would come over the

*

Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. These remarks weremade on November 20 , 2006, at the 2006 John F. Sonnett Memorial Lecture held atFordham University School of Law. This transcript of Chief Judge Jacobs's remarks hasbeen lightly edited.

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defendant's lawyer if the three judges each had a limb suspended intraction.

In our courts, judges are lawyers. They are all lawyers. Most of us havenever been, nor want to be, anything else. We are proud of being lawyers.For many of us (like myself), lawyering is our only talent (assuming wehave any talent at all), and it is the source of as much esteem as we enjoy.Our calling says a lot about how our minds work, what we respect, andwhom we trust.

I am not-I repeat, I am not-speaking about a bias based upon politicsor agenda, economic class, ethnicity, or para-ethnicity. When I refer to thesecret life of judges, I am speaking of an inner turn of mind that favors,empowers, and enables our profession and our brothers and sisters at thebar. It is secret, because it is unobserved and therefore unrestrained-bythe judges themselves or by the legal community that so closely surrounds

and nurtures us. It is an ambient bias.The result is the incremental preference for the lawyered solution, the

fee-paid intervention or pro bono project, the lawyer-driven procedure, theappellate dispensation-and the confidence and faith that these thingsproduce the best results. It is an insidious bias, because it is hard to makeout, in the vast maze of judicial work and outcomes, the statutes, doctrines,and precedents that are woven together like an elaborate oriental rug inwhich the underlying image of the dragon emerges only after you stare for awhile. I discern in this jumble a bias in favor of the bar and lawyers: whatthey do; how they do it; and how they prosper in goods and influence. Thisis the "figure in the carpet."'

This bias has several effects and ramifications. Judges all too frequentlyframe legal doctrines without considering the litigants' transaction costs.Considering how many of us conscientiously think hard about the economicconsequences of the outcomes we adopt, it seems strange that our casesreflect an almost complete disregard and ignorance of the costs,uncertainties, and delays inflicted by the judicial process itself. I think thatis because judges as lawyers cannot see as a problem the activity andbusyness from which our brothers and sisters at the bar draw theirlivelihood, their career advancement, their distinction, and (often) theirsense of purpose in life. All of this depends on the ceaseless turning of the

legal machine.Judges tend to assume that the adversary process assures a fair fight and a

just outcome. And judges work hard to be fair as between the adversarialpositions presented. But almost always, the adversaries on all sides arelawyers; so adversariness is no great engine for assuring fairness when itcomes to the allocation of decision-making power between lawyers(adversaries all) and the institutions and populations outside our profession.The result is not that lawyers and the legal profession always win in court

1. See Henry James, The Figure in the Carpet, reprinted in The Figure in the Carpetand Other Stories (Frank Kermode ed., Penguin Books 1986).

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contests (even though they are on both sides); but, there is no doubt thatthey get to punch above their weight.

As I hope I have made clear, I am talking about altruistic litigation aswell as hourly fee-paid work and work on contingency. For all the goodthat public interest lawyers do (and it is a great deal), some of it results inthe short circuit of democratic decision making and coerced policy choices.Thus, the threat of litigation often compels school boards to suppress allorthodoxies except those endorsed by the cadres of constitutional lawyersand constitutional law professors. A school-board member exercisingfiduciary duties will bow to anticipated demands rather than bear the cost ofexercising or testing the board's own rights, if only because the cost oflitigating a flag, a reference to God, a locker search, a dirty word, orsomething like that, can easily cost the school board the annual services of amusic teacher or a teacher of remedial reading.

To my observation, judges are blind to this. I think that is because publicinterest litigation greatly enhances lawyer influence and-not at allincidentally-increases the influence and power of judges. Judges lovethese kinds of cases. Public interest cases afford a judge sway over publicpolicy, enhance the judicial role, make the judge more conspicuous, andkeep the law clerks happy.

Whether fee-paid or pro bono publico, when lawyers present big issues tothe courts, the judges receive the big issues with grateful hands; the barpatrols against inroads on jurisdiction and independence and praises theexpansion of legal authority; and together we smugly congratulate ourselves

on expanding what we are pleased to call the rule of law.Among the results are the displacement of legislative and executivepower, the subordination of other disciplines and professions, and thereduction of whole enterprises and industries to damages. Examples comeready to hand, though, speaking as I do as a judge, I am constrained fromciting specifics of controversies that may come before me. In generalities,let me observe,

* Judicial power over the legislature and the executive is dilated byconstitutional litigation,much of which is lawyer-driven. Often,the plaintiff's standing is made to rest on largely notional,abstract harms (like annoyance or anxiety), and sometimes theexistence of the plaintiff is a recruitment detail that is easilyarranged.

* Through such constitutional litigation, judges get to direct thework of educators, police, child protection officers, and manyother professionals who have training to discharge criticalresponsibilities that require their expertise and experience.

" Class actions and consent decrees allowjudges to operate prisonsand schools, to forceappropriations, and to channel funds.

* In mass tort, judges hold in their hands the fate of vastenterprises and can cause their extinction, with capitalization

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forfeit to distribution between lawyers and plaintiffs and workerslet go.

Judges who issue expansive rulings in these spheres enjoy wide esteem

and reputation. There are judges whose fine reputations rest in part on theability to handle and administer innumerable claims through litigation andsettlement, pretty much without regard to whether the claims themselves arebased on fraud, corrupt experts, perjury, and other things that would bedeplored and persecuted by the legal profession if done within othercommercial fields.

2

The broadest judicial bias I see, and the one I will describe most vaguely,is the bias in favor of legal complexity. The volumes of the third edition ofthe Federal Reporter spread themselves like kudzu vine over the shelves oflaw libraries. I will offer no example, because I would be honor-bound tocite myself as a chief offender, but it is a problem when the complexity ofthe law causes laymen to view the legal process as either political or asessentially random. This phenomenon is made visible in the papers of prose litigants, who rarely bother to read the trial court decisions that rejecttheir claims, and proceed to appeal on the theory (perhaps not altogethermisguided) that the sheer, ramified, sprawling patterns of law will (in thehands of the right judge) yield a substantial payment or a sweet revenge.

It is an observed fact that the complexity of doctrines and opinions (notto mention the discovery of new doctrines) evokes praise and respect fromwithin the profession. But our highly ramified litigation system imposesvast costs on other fields of endeavor, on our democratic freedoms, and on

the unrepresented and the non-litigious.The law reviews seem to have exhausted all topics dealing with bias in

the law and the ethics and infractions of other professions. I asked one ofmy law clerks to check to see how many articles have dealt with the bias ofjudges toward the dominance and control of the legal profession, and myclerk came up dry.3 That does not surprise me, because if judges have thisunconscious bias, so (I think) do law professors, for the same reasons-andstudents, for the same (and other) reasons. Scholarly papers undertake toexpose and demonstrate the institutional and cultural biases of the law inevery direction bu t this one. It is not for me to say whether I am making thepoint of this lecture effectively; but at least I can say that the competition isthin.

2. This point has been made in the asbestos context. See, e.g., Lester Brickman,Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 833, 911 (2005) ("[T]hepervasiveness of the absence of application of ethical rules to asbestos litigation and to alarge extent, to asbestos bankruptcy proceedings as well, can only stand as an indictment ofthe courts, disciplinary authorities and indeed, the legal profession."); Lester Brickman, Onthe Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarshipand Reality, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 33, 37 (2003).

3. Subsequent to this Lecture, Professor Benjamin Barton has posted a paper thatdiscusses this bias. Se e Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests ofthe Legal Profession? (Apr. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available athttp://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftnabstractid=976478

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Why do we not notice this bias that I am talking about? If you are withme so far, and you now agree (or started out believing) that judges have abias in favor of legalism and the legal profession, you may wonder as Ihave, why it is not noticed. Actually, it is a very familiar phenomenon thatwe do not recognize our bias as such. One tends to assume that bias has anasty face, and that decent people shrink away instinctively. But someforms of bias are culturally embedded and are exercised with popular orelite approval.

Bias is not a moral evil. Everyone feels tugs of loyalty; everyone should.The bias I am talking about is more finely characterized as a tropism, aninstinctive turning to follow a source of vital energy. That is what thesunflower does. But it is one thing to turn to follow the sun, and it isanother to follow the American Bar Association (ABA), the law schools,law clerks, and the sound of applause.

Judges are susceptible to the opinions of others in our profession. Butthe bias in favor of more law, more procedure, and more process is in greatmeasure bred in the bone of a lawyer. A judge is trained in the law;virtually all of us have high self-approval and a high regard for ourprofession, its processes, its culture and values, and its judgments-theprofession which (after all) did loft judges to the bench, where wepresumably wanted to go.

The tropism in favor of what lawyers do, and our tendency to expand thespheres of activity in which lawyers act and control, comes clothed invirtue. It is seen by us mainly as respect for due process, as the open door

of the courthouse, as a flowering of the rule of law-and so excesses areviewed with indulgence as a Tocquevillian quirk of the American character.But it is unbecoming for judges to dismiss this phenomenon. It matters thatour conduct as judges is reinforced by the support and praise that we getfrom colleagues, lawyers, bar associations, and law schools. I think fair-minded people should recognize the dangers that arise when judges, as thefinal arbiters for allocating vast power, money, and influence, are allmembers of the same (self-regulating) profession-and often of the sameprofessional groups and social environments. It is a matter of like callingunto like.

Judges adhere to tight ethical constraints that keep us honest in that wayand to that degree; but (ironically) some of those same constraints tend toreinforce our professional bias by insulating us from the influences ofpolitics and (non-law) commerce. Unless we make an effort, we canbecome disconnected from the values and perceptions of the larger public.The more we obey the constraints that isolate us within a circle of legalculture, the more we are left to be judged, evaluated, and flattered (or not)by the nourishing, attentive, knowledgeable circle of lawyers, law students,and professors-which (to make matters worse) includes often the mostcharming and scintillating people in the community.

The mystique of the judicial process, and its power and pretension in this

country, is pretty much all based on the idea of neutrality. If that idea is

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deflated, by puncture or slow leak, it is bad for judges and for the largercommunity. Our work is subject to hostile critiques; and, if we do notacknowledge and restrain our bias, others will notice, and forces willmarshal to rein us in.

These critiques are often classified as attacks on judicial independence,and resisted as interference, or dismissed as ignorant. Thus, a great themeof the legal profession is emphatic support fo r judicial independence. Thatis a good thing, and I enjoy my independence as much as the next judge;but judges should consider and appreciate that one effect (maybe a motive)of the bar's avid support of judicial independence is to make judges"independent" of many influences (good and bad) that compete with thedominant influence over judges that is exerted by fellow lawyers, ba rassociations, and law professors. This support of judicial power by the barmay be a pillar of law, but it can also operate as group loyalty, the

protection of turf, or a reciprocal commitment to the ascendency of judgesand lawyers.

This bias I am talking about keeps us from seeing obvious things. Forexample, bar associations nowadays are chiefly trade groups. It is naive tothink that the legal profession is the only disinterested player in oureconomic life. And bar groups are highly political. The ABA has formallyadopted and announced hundreds of positions on virtually every issue inpolitical dispute: You can look them up . It lobbies for those views inlegislatures; it promotes them in amicus briefs filed in the courts. Yethundreds of federal judges are members; thousands in the state and local

courts. The canons of judicial conduct4

make space fo r that anomaly.The canons broadly warn that "[a] judge should refrain from politicalactivity." 5 But the same canon (7) has a proviso: "this should not prevent ajudge from engaging in the activities described in Canon 4," ' 6 which saysthat "[a] judge may serve as a member, officer, or director of anorganization.., devoted to the improvement of the law."'7 And thecommentary positively "encourage[s]" a judge to "contribute to theimprovement of the law" by various means, expressly including "through abar association." 8 Hospitably, the commentary allows a judge to "receiveas a gift travel expense reimbursement including the cost of transportation,lodging, and meals, fo r the judge and a relative incident to the judge'sattendance at a bar-related function." 9

The legal profession, like all other fields, should be able to tap theexperience and wisdom of its leading members, judges among them. And

4. Code of Conduct for United States Judges (2000), available athttp://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch I.html.

5. Id. Canon 7.6. Id. Canon 7C.7. Id. Canon 4C .8. Id. Canon 4 cmt.9. Id. Canon 5C(4) cmt.

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there are times and places for that; at one time, the organized bar may havebeen such a forum. But now?

Judges who are members of the ABA are technically in an auxiliary forjudges in which they presumably participate in the development of legalideas. But allowing judges to join a trade association so that they cancollaborate with the membership in developing the law seems to me tomake matters much worse rather than better. In any event, the expedient ofa judges' auxiliary would not be tolerated in any other ethical context. Ifthere were a judges' auxiliary to the American Bankers Association or theBrotherhood of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, I am sure they would loveto have us, and would happily work with us on shaping legal improvements.What if there were a judges' auxiliary to the Tobacco Institute or theAmerican Insurance Association that paid my way to their conventions(with my relative), where I could work with them shoulder to shoulder on

beneficial improvements in the law? Why assume that the improvementsfavored by the ABA are less self-serving than the improvements favored byother professional and trade groups?

When the ABA considers improvements in the law, it usually comesdown on the side of punitive damages, attorney's fees, the expansion ofcauses of action, and new areas of regulation that require maintenance bylawyers (such as speech at election time). I do not claim to be any betterthan the next one, but I would be uncomfortable being a guest of the ABAon well-oiled occasions when such improvements are discussed. All of thisis made worse by the fact that the ABA often litigates as amicus curiae (andI will pass over without comment the ABA's evaluation of judicialnominees).

Of course, judges should be involved in the development of the law-case by case, chiefly. No doubt, judges also read some books, go to debatesand forums, and attend seminars. But the idea that judges will develop thelaw under the sponsorship and aegis of a powerful interest group shouldprovoke disquiet-and would, but for the fact that (with some notableexceptions) judges do not see this as an issue.

I sometimes think that the problem at bottom is really a lack of respect bylawyers for other people. Judges live chiefly in a circle of lawyers. Ourcolleagues are lawyers; happily, our friends are lawyers (and I am hoping tokeep some after this lecture); the only outside income a federal judge canearn (aside from royalties) is from teaching in law schools (with the idea, Isuppose, that they furnish a nonpartisan environment); and the only politicaland trade organizations we can join are bar associations.

But outside that circle there are people who are just as fully absorbed byother pursuits that deserve consideration and respect. Judges need aheightened respect for how nonlawyers solve problems, reachcompromises, broker risks, and govern themselves and their institutions.There are lawyers on the one hand; and just about everybody else is thecompetition in the framing of values and standards of behavior.

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In that competition, judicial bias has eroded the independence andinfluence of doctors, medical administrators, insurance underwriters,engineers, manufacturers, the military, the police, wardens and correctionsofficers, the clergy, employers, and teachers and principals.

I think that judges ought to appreciate that they operate under aninternalized conflict of interest when they deal with all of these categoriesof people, and others, and that (as someone observed) divided loyalties arerarely divided down the middle. There is a great danger that, by thesubordination of other professions, callings, and centers of power (and oftheir judgment and discretion), we are losing indispensable influences.

Another consequence of biased vision is the assumption that if somethingis of great importance, it can be safely left to lawyers. That is fine when itcomes to statutory interpretation and such, bu t lawyers lack humility inapproaching great matters. As judges, we tend to assume that adversarial

hearings and expert testimony will render the judge omni-competent and fitto decide the great questions, and that a legal mind is the highest and mostuseful development of mental capacity.

The mind-set is that if something is of great importance-such as speech,thought, and expression; race, identity, and sexuality; life and death-itcannot be safely and properly left chiefly to anyone else. How else doesone account for the fixation on issues such as capital punishment and theright to die, given that capital punishment cases are few (at least in theseparts), and that death is coming for us as a certainty, regardless of whetherwe classify it as an entitlement? As we exercise power over all the basic,ultimate, and transcendent things, I think that judges should

consider howwe inevitably diminish the influence of doctors and juries, clergy and socialworkers, legislatures, and the ordinary citizen.

The legal mind is indispensable to lawyering, and for other purposes it isperfectly okay in its way. But it has its limitations. For example, everyproblem-solving profession-except ours--quickly adopts as preferred thesolution that is simplest, cheapest, and most efficacious, or (as they say)elegant. Also, our legal mind is invasive: It has institutional advantages forsubordinating other modalities of thought, and it presses those advantages.And it is triumphalist about its expansions of influence. The uninitiated,who lack the legal mind, are harnessed to our purposes as jurors or are putto the margins. What nonlegal professionals think can be dismissed asarbitrary and capricious, or (if needed to assist the legal process) can beclassified as expert opinion, to be weighed by us and by our standards.

The legal mind can hold its own with the competition in terms of rigor; Ihave one, and I make no apology for it. But at least I have come to admitthat, depending on the question, the legal mind may be insufficient or maybe inferior to the moral imagination; the scientific method; the practical artsof healing, politics, and entrepreneurship; the promptings of loyalty, faith,and patriotism; and the experience and expertise found elsewhere andamong others.

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If you are not with me this far, you will have little interest in this lastquestion: What can be done to correct this bias and to place the legalprofession again on a footing of parity and fair competition with otherprofessionals and activities that have a right to influence in ourcommunities and our culture? In a nutshell, judges should lead the bar inexercising the self-restraint and self-discipline that is incumbent on aprofession that has a virtual monopoly on legislative power and a monopolyby patent on the power of the judiciary, and that is largely self-regulating.

Other professions, by ethics or honor, exert the imagination and self-possession to avoid exercising all the power they have. Let me give anincendiary example.

When a military force occupies a conquered province, the military hasvast power and may be tempted to run things in a way that best serves thedominance and comfort of the military profession. A military solution can

be found for every challenge; such solutions fit the salient talents and skill-sets of military comm anders. No doubt it is of the greatest convenience tothe military and a great comfort to them to impose early curfews; to censorletters; to close the outspoken newspapers and the satirical magazines; totake over the radio, the police, and the prisons; to shoot looters; to draftstrikers; to favor military justice; and to commandeer all the better hotels. Ithink there is a natural temptation for the military officers in charge to do allthese things because these are measures that subordinate a lot of conductthat undermines military administration, and because no doubt lifelongprofessional military officers might believe that these measures areeffective and fair and constitute the best design for the organization of thesociety under their thumbs. Others in the military might applaud the tidyadministration that results.

We (in the profession of law) recoil from such measures in part becauseit is not our profession; it does not fit our salient talents and skill-sets; itputs to the margin what we do and the sphere in which we operate; and sowe lack faith in it. It seems to us, viscerally illegitimate.

But an enlightened military recognizes that imposition of all thesemeasures on an ongoing or permanent basis improperly subordinates otherspheres of life. The military types (I am not one) seem to controlthemselves through a concept of honor. Maybe judges should consider

their example. I concede that a country could do worse than suffer rule bylawyers: I would prefer a tyranny of law to life under a military regime.But outside our professional sphere, the dominance of the legal professionand the judiciary is resented more than we appreciate.

As a matter of self-awareness and conscience, judges should accept thatthe legal mind is not the best policy instrument, and that lawyer-drivenprocesses and lawyer-centered solutions can be unwise, insufficient, andunjust, even if our friends and colleagues in the legal profession lead us thatway. For the judiciary, this would mean a reduced role, but not adiminished one if the judiciary is elevated by considerations of honor, self-restraint, and respect for other influences.

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Notes & Observations


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THE FLORIDA BAR651 EAST JEFFERSON STREET

JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR . TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-2300 850/561-5600EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WWW.FLORIDABAR.ORG

January 7, 2013

Mr. Neil J. G-illespie8092 S.W. 115th LoopOcala, FL 34481

Re: Robert W. Bauer; The Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

Enclosed is a copy of our letter to Mr. Bauer which requires a response to your complaint.

Once you receive Mr. Bauer's response, you have 10 days to file a rebuttal i f you so desire. I fyou decide to file a rebuttal, you must send a copy to Mr . Bauer. Rebuttals should not exceed25 pages and may refer to any additional documents or exhibits that are available on request. Pleaseaddress any and all correspondence to me. Please note that any correspondence must be sentthrough the U.S. mail; we cannot accept faxed material.

Please be advised that as an arm of the Supreme Court of Florida, The Florida Bar caninvestigate allegations of misconduct against attorneys, and where appropriate, request that theattorney be disciplined. The Florida Bar cannot render legal advice nor can The Florida Barrepresent individuals or intervene on their behalf in any civil or criminal matter. Further, pleasenotify this office, in writing, of any pending civil, criminal, or administrative litigation whichpertains to this grievance. Please note that this is a continuing obligation should new litigationdevelop during the pendency of this matter.

Please review the enclosed Notice on mailing instructions for information on submitting yourrebuttal.

Sincerely,

Annemarie Craft, Bar CounselAttorney Consumer Assistance ProgramACAP Hotline 866-352-0707

Enclosures (Notice of Grievance Procedures, Copy of Letter to Mr. Bauer; Notice - MailingInstructions)

cc: Mr. Robert W. Bauer

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NOTICE OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

1. The enclosed letter is an informal inquiry. Your response is required under theprovisions of The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 4 8.4(g), Rules of Professional Conduct.Failure to provide a written response to this complaint is in itself a violation of Rule 4 8.4(g). If

you do not respond, the matter will be forwarded to the grievance committee for disposition inaccordance with Rule 3-7.3 of the Rules of Discipline.

2. Many complaints considered first by staff counsel are not forwarded to a grievancecommittee, as they do not involve violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct justifyingdisciplinary action.

3. "Pursuant to Rule 3-7.I(a), Rules of Discipline, any response by you in these proceedingsshall become part of the public record of this matter and thereby become accessible to the publicupon the closure of the case by Bar counselor upon a finding of no probable cause, probablecause, minor misconduct, or recommendation of diversion. Disclosure during the pendency of

an investigation may be made only as to statusif

a specific inquiry concerning this case is madeand i f this matter is generally known to be in the public domain."

4. The grievance committee is the Bar's "grand jury." Its function and procedllre are setforth in Rule 3-7.4. Proceedings before the grievance committee, for the most part, are nonadversarial in nature. However, you should carefully review Chapter 3 of the Rules RegulatingThe Florida Bar.

5. If the grievance committee finds probable cause, formal adversarial proceedings, whichordinarily lead to disposition by the Supreme Court of Florida, will be commenced under3-7.6, unless a plea is submitted under Rule 3-7.


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THE FLORIDA BAR651 EAST JEFFERSON STREET

JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR . TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-2300 850/561-5600EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WWW.FLORIDABAR.ORG

January 7, 2013

Mr. Robert W. Bauer2815 NW 13th St Ste 200EGainesville, FL 32609-2861

Re: Complaint by Neil J. Gillespie against Robert W. BauerThe Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)

Dear Mr. Bauer:

Enclosed is a copy of an inquiry/complaint and any supporting docunlents submitted by theabove referenced complainant(s). Your response to this complaint is required under theprovisions of Rule 4-8.4(g), Rules of Professional Conduct of the Rules Regulating The FloridaBar, and is due in our office by January 22, 2013. Responses should not exceed 25 pages andmay refer to any additional documents or exhibits that are available on request. Failure toprovide a written response to this complaint is in itself a violation of Rule 4-8.4(g). Please notethat any correspondence must be sent through the u.s. mail; we cannot accept faxed material.You are further required to furnish the complainant with a complete copy of your written

response, including an y documents submitted therewith.

Please note that pursuant to Rule 3-7 .1 (b), Rules of Discipline, any reports, correspondence,papers, recordings and/or transcripts of hearings received from either you or the complainant(s)shall become a part of the public record in this matter and thus accessible to the public upon adisposition of this file. It should be noted that The Florida Bar is required to acknowledge thestatus of proceedings during the pendency of an investigation, if a specific inquiry is made andthe matter is deemed to be in the public domain. Pursuant to Rule 3-7.1(f), Rules of Discipline,you are further required to complete and return the enclosed Certificate of Disclosure form.Further, please notify this office, in writing, of any pending civil, criminal, or administrativelitigation which pertains to this grievance. Please note that this is a continuing obligation should

new litigation develop during the pendency of this matter.


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Mr. Robert W. BauerJanuary 7, 2013Page Two

Finally, the filing of this complaint does not preclude communication between the attorney and

the complainant(s). Please review the enclosed Notice for information on submitting yourresponse.

Sincerely,

Annemarie Craft, Bar CounselAttorney Consumer Assistance ProgramACAP Hotline 866-352-0707

Enclosures (Certificate o f Disclosure, Notice o f Grievance Procedures, Copy of Complaint,Notice - Mailing Instructions)

cc: Mr. Neil J. Gillespie


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VIA U.P.S. Tracking No. lZ'64589FP296184312 January 10, 2013

Annemarie Craft, Bar CounselAttorney Consumer Assistance ProgramThe Florida Bar - ACAP

651 East Jefferson StreetTallahassee, FL 32399-2300

RE: Robert W. Bauer, The Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)

Dear Ms. Craft:

I received but am confused as to your letter dated January 7, 2013 relative to the above captionedcomplaint. Bar Counsel Mr. Wilhelm dismissed/returned my complaint against Mr. Bauer datedOctober 31,2012, designated RFA No. 13-7675, by letter to me dated November 9,2012. Thecomplaint was then submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States for pendent jurisdiction

December 10, 2012 in Petition No. 12-7747 for writ of certiorari. Kindly explain what is goingon, since your letter makes no reference to this chain of events, or Petition No. 12-7747.

My priority now is Petition No. 12-7747 which is taking all my time. I likely am not able to file arebuttal in this matter until either the conclusion of Petition No. 12-7747, or a break in theworkload. While ACAP central may be adequate to intake this complaint, bias at the local levelis another matter, and recognized by the Special Commission on Lawyer Regulation chaired byHenry Cox ("Cox Report). The Cox Report recommended ACAP style screening of all writteninquiries and complaints so that all questions concerning the conduct of members of the bar areaddressed in a similar fashion. The Commission also recommended a central intake systemutilizing ACAP resources in Tallahassee.

The reason for central ACAP intake is clear: The Commission knew that some complaints, likemy earlier complaint against Mr. Bauer, TFB No. 2011-00,073 (8B), would not be "addressed ina similar fashion" locally where the attorney was favored. The Letter Report issued March 18,2011 by Mr. Watson in 2011-00,073 (8B) did not copy with Rule 3-7.4(k) because it did notexplain why nlY complaint did not warrant further proceedings.

Pursuant to Rule 3-3.4(b), I believe a special grievance committee is needed, located outside theEight Judicial Circuit which includes Alachua County where Mr. Bauer practices, and outsidethe jurisdiction of Mr. Watson, and Carl Schwait, the designated reviewer, to avoid bias. Sendingthis matter to another state in the U.S. Eleventh Circuit may even be required to avoid bias now.

cc: Robert W. Bauer

APPENDIX 3


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Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-TBS Document 58-1 Filed 11/14/11 Page 24 of 50 PageID 1547

APPENDIX 4


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The La w Offices o f

Robert W . Bauer, P .A.2815 NW 13th Street, Suite 200E, Gainesville, FL 32609

www.bauerlegal.com

Rober t W Bauer, Esq. Phone: (352)375.5960Maria Perez Youngblood, Esq.Timothy C. Youngblood, Esq. Fax: (352)337.2518

January 21, 2013

Annemarie CraftFlorida Bar Association615 East Jefferson StreetTallahassee, FL 32399-2300

Re: Complaint by Neil J. GillespieFlorida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B)

Dear Ms. Craft:

This letter is to memorialize our telephone conversation of January 15, 2013. In thatconversation, I requested a copy of Mr. Wilhelm's October 9, 2012 letter to Mr. Gillespie.Additionally, I requested an additional 20 days to respond to the Complaint.

Thank you for your assistance regarding this matter.

clNeal Gillespie8092 SW 115th LoopOcala, FL 34481

APPENDIX 5


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December 31, 2012

VIA U.P.S. Tracking No. 1Z64589FP292488484

Leonard E. Clark, Bar Counsel The Florida Bar, Tampa Branch Office4200 George J . Bean Parkway, Suite 2580

Tampa, FL 33607

Dear Mr. Clark:

This is a records request made under chapter 119 Florida Statutes, Rule 2.420, Florida Rules of

Judicial Administration, and any other applicable law, for records in the following Florida Barcomplaints:

1. Ryan Christopher Rodems, TFB File No. 2013-10,271 (13E). Kindly provide recordssubsequent to your letter dated October 26, 2012 (copy enclosed), including email.

2. Eugene P Castagliuolo, The Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,162 (6D). Kindly providerecords subsequent to your letter dated October 26, 2012 (copy enclosed), including email.

Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration.

Sincerely

Neil J . Gillespie8092 SW 115th LoopOcala, Florida 34481

Telephone: (352) 854-7807Email: [email protected]

Enclosures

APPENDIX


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THE FLORIDA BARTAMPA BRANCH OFFICE

JOHN F . HARKNESS, J R . 4200 GEORGE J . BEAN PARKWAY, SUITE 2580 (813) 875-9821EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR www.FLABAR.ORGTAMPA, FLORIDA 33607-1496

October 26,2012

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie8092 S.W. 115Th LoopOcala, FL 34481

Re: Complaint of Neil J. Gillespie against Ryan Christopher RodemsThe Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,271 (6D)

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

Pursuant to your public records request dated September 15,2012, and October 25,2012, pleasefind attached a letter from Mr. Rodems to the Florida Bar dated September 24, 2012. Inreviewing the file, it appears that all other correspondence from Mr. Rodems has been providedto you. Specifically, Mr. Rodems' response to the fifteen (15) day letter dated September 17,2012. If you require additional information, please contact me at the above referenced number.

Sincerely yours,

Leonard Evans ClarkBar Counsel


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THE FLORIDA BARTAMPA BRANCH OFFICE

JOHN F . HARKNESS, JR . 4200 GEORGE J . BEAN PARKWAY, SlIlTE 2580 (813) 875-9821EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR www.FLABAR.ORGTAMPA, FLORIDA 33607-1496

October 26,2012

Mr. Neil J. Gillespie8092 S.W. 115Th LoopOcala, FL 34481

Re: Con1plaint by Neil J. Gillespie against Eugene P CastagliuoloThe Florida Bar File No. 2013-10,162 (6D)

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

Pursuant to your public records request dated September 15, 2012, I have enclosed additionalcorrespondence received from Mr. Castagliuolo. Please find attached to this letter an email fromMr. Castagliuolo to the Florida Bar dated October 22,2012.

In reviewing the tile, it appears that all other correspondence from Mr. Castagliuolo has beenprovided to you. Specifically, Mr. Castagliuolo's response to the fifteen (15) day letter datedAugust 30, 2012, and his follow up response to the fifteen (15) day letter dated September 19,2012. If you require additional information, please contact me at the above referenced number.

Sincerely yours,

Leonard Evans ClarkBar Counsel


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T HE FLORIDA BAR

INQUIRy/COMPLAINT FORM

PART ONE (See Palfe 1, PART ONE - Required Information.):Your Name: Neil J. Gillespie

Organization: _n/_a _Address: 8092 SW 115th Loop

City: Ocala State: FL

Zip Code: 34481 Phone: 352-854-7807

Email: [email protected]

ACAP Reference No._n_o_ne _

Attorney's Name: Catherine Barbara Chapman

Address: 1983 Centre Pointe Boulevard, Suite 200

City: Tallahassee State: ~ Zip Code: 32308 Telephone: (850) 224-7091

PART TW O (See Palfe 1, PART TW O - Facts/AIle2ations.): The specific thin2 or thin2s I am complainin2 about are:

See accompanying letter and exhibits.

PART THREE (See Page 1, PART THREE - Witnesses.): The witnesses in support of my allegations are: [see attached

sheet].

PART FOUR (See Page 1, PART FOUR-Signature.): Under penalties o f pe r jury, I declare that theforegoingfacts aretrue, correct an d complete.

APPENDIX


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VIA U.P.S. Tracking No. 1Z64589FP290450115 January 18, 2013

Attorney Consumer Assistance Program (ACAP) The Florida Bar651 East Jefferson Street

Tallahassee, FL 323992300

Complaint against attorney Catherine Barbara Chapman, Florida Bar ID: 01488141983 Centre Pointe Boulevard, Suite 200, Tallahassee, FL 32308, (850) 224-7091

This complaint is for Ms. Chapmans violation(s) of Rule 4-8.3, Reporting ProfessionalMisconduct, in connection with her representation of my former lawyer Robert W. Bauer inGillespie v. The Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida, et al., 5:10-cv-503-(DAB)-TBS-WTH, myfederal ADA and civil rights lawsuit in U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida.

Mr. Bauer was referred to me by the Florida Bar Lawyer Referral Service for a case in

Hillsborough County, Florida, Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 05-CA-7205. Duringand after that representation Mr. Bauer violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct, seeRobert W. Bauer, The Florida Bar File No. 2013-00,540 (8B), which complaint does not seekreturn of $19,212 in fees paid to him 1, but his disbarment for a pattern of incompetence and lackof diligence by Mr. Bauer in my case, and toward his other elderly and disabled clients whocontacted me to complain about him. Mr. Bauer is also involved in racketeering to underminecivil litigation and Bar complaints as discussed below.

At the center of this matter, now before the Supreme Court of the United States, Petition No. 12-7747 for writ of certiorari, is Ryan Christopher Rodems, who conspired with my last attorney,Eugene P. Castagliuolo, in a pattern of racketeering activity to undermine Bar complaints,

Florida case 05-CA-7205, federal litigation in 5:10-cv-503, and obstruct justice, seeEugene P Castagliuolo, File No. 2013-10,162 (6D), sent to Tampa October 25, 2012Ryan Christopher Rodems, File No. 2013-10,271 (13E), sent to Tampa October 26, 2012

Mr. Castagliuolo even provided copies of his filings and responses to the Florida Bar in theabove captioned complaint to Mr. Bauer and Mr. Rodems, as indicated by the abbreviation cc:preceding their names, suggesting this racketeering activity is currently ongoing.

Complaint Against Catherine Barbara Chapman, Fla. Bar ID No. 0148814

Ms. Chapman is part of this pattern of racketeering activity to undermine my federal litigation in

5:10-cv-503, and obstruct justice, for failing to report in violation of Rule 4-8.3(a), misconductof Mr. Rodems, who on J une 21, 2011 unlawfully obtained a Settlement Agreement and GeneralMutual Release for the State of Florida, Mr. Bauer, and The Law Offices of Robert W. Bauer, toassign my civil rights and disability claims to Rodems and his partners. Mr. Rodems then entered 1 Mr. Bauer charged me $31,863 in legal fees. Much of the money was wasted or not productive, including costs tore-litigate matters previously decided res judicata, and $5,600 in travel time. Also, Bauer never filed the amendedcomplaint he promised. $19,212 was paid to Bauer from my Social Security disability benefits or borrowed.$12,650 remains unpaid and subject to an improper attorney charging lien.


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The Florida Bar ACAP January 18, 2013Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 2

the agreement in case no. 5:10-cv-503 with a Notice Of Assignment And Motion For DismissalOf Action With Prejudice (Doc. 32) to dismiss my case with prejudice. This representation of theState of Florida in a federal court action by Mr. Rodems was major misconduct because only theAttorney General may represent the State of Florida in a federal court action.

Ms. Chapman violated RULE 4-8.3 - REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

Rule 4-8.3(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer who knows that anotherlawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises asubstantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer inother respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

Rule 4-8.3(b) Reporting Misconduct of Judges. A lawyer who knows that a judge hascommitted a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantialquestion as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

Rule 4-8.3 Comment

Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiatedisciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolatedviolation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover.Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

Mr. Rodems Not Authorized To Represent State of Florida in Federal Litigation

Mr. Rodems is a lawyer in private practice who engaged in a type of unauthorized practice of law when he represented the State of Florida June 21, 2011 in my federal lawsuit. Previously Icomplained in general terms that Mr. Rodems representation of the State of Florida wasimproper. Recently I determined Mr. Rodems violated certain provisions of the Constitution andlaws of Florida. Only the Attorney General of Florida may represent the State of Florida in afederal court action, Fla Const Art IV 4, and FS 16.01. Mr. Rodems conduct is prejudicial to

justice in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) and (d). Mr. Rodems also intentionally mislead severalfederal judicial officers in the performance of their duty in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(c) and (d).

Rule 4-8.4(c), conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.Rule 4-8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Unfortunately Ms. Chapman failed to report Mr. Rodems misconduct as requited by Rule 4-8.3(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. Ms. Chapman also failed to report themisconduct of federal judicial officers under Rule 4-8.3(b) Reporting Misconduct of Judges,which judge and magistrates had a duty to disclose on the record Rodems misconduct. Also, Iasked Ms. Chapman about her duty under Rule 4-8.4 and she stated in an email to me August 13,2012 at 7:03 AM I do not believe [Mr. Rodems] has committed any misconduct. (Exhibit 3).


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Ms. Chapmans Misconduct Related To Doc. 32 Filed June 21, 2011 in 5:10-cv-503

Ms. Chapman was served by electric transmission on June 21, 2011 in Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB, Document 32, Filed 06/21/11 by Mr. Rodems, Notice Of Assignment And MotionFor Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice, (Exhibit 1), according to the Certificate of Service:

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served this21st day of June, 2011 by electronic transmission to Catherine Barbara Chapman, Esquire,[email protected], counsel for Defendants The Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A.,and Robert W. Bauer. No other defendant has been served.

/s/ Ryan Christopher RodemsRYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE

Mr. Rodems Notice Of Assignment And Motion For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice stated:

On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff Neil J . Gillespie assigned all claims in this action to RyanChristopher Rodems, Chris A. Barker, and William J. Cook. See Exhibit "1".

Assignees hereby move the Court for an Order dismissing this action with prejudice,pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).

Ms. Chapman knew Exhibit 1 was a Settlement Agreement and General Mutual Release, andassignment of my claims in federal litigation involving the State of Florida, Mr. Bauer, and TheLaw Offices of Robert W. Bauer, to Mr. Rodems and his law partners.

Ms. Chapman knew the Settlement Agreement and General Mutual Release, and assignment of my claims involved Mr. Bauer, his law firm, and the following State of Florida Defendants:

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, FloridaClaudia Rickert Isom, Hillsborough Florida Judge (Fla. Bar ID 200042)

James M. Barton, II, Hillsborough Florida Judge (Fla. Bar ID 189239)Martha J . Cook, Hillsborough Florida Judge (Fla. Bar ID 242640)David A. Rowland, Court Counsel, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Fla. Bar ID 861987)Gonzalo B. Casares, ADA Coordinator, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Florida

Ms. Chapman knew only the Florida Attorney General can represent the State of Florida infederal litigation, and that Mr. Rodems was not the Florida Attorney General.

Ms. Chapman knew Mr. Rodems had no authority to represent the State of Florida and negotiatea settlement agreement and assignment of my federal claims to himself and his law partnerswhile I was detained and in custody of one of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Florida indepravation of the very rights I sought to enforce in federal court, and enter the settlementagreement in federal litigation on behalf of Florida to dismiss 5:10-cv-503 with prejudice.


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Ms. Chapman knew State ex rel. Shevin v. Weinstein holds that a circuit court judge does nothave authority to appoint counsel to represent the State of Florida:

Only the Attorney General of Florida may represent the State of Florida in a federal courtaction. A circuit court judge was without the authority to appoint an acting state attorneyto represent the state in an action pending before a federal court. State ex rel. Shevin v.Weinstein, 353 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dis1. 1978).

Ms. Chapman knew Section 16.01 Florida Statutes states:

16.01 Residence, office, and duties of Attorney General. The Attorney General:(4) Shall appear in and attend to, in behalf of the state, all suits or prosecutions, civil orcriminal or in equity, in which the state may be a party, or in anywise interested, in theSupreme Court and district courts of appeal of this state.

Ms. Chapman knew The Florida Constitution: Article IV, SECTION 4. Cabinet, states:

(b) The attorney general shall be the chief state legal officer. There is created in the officeof the attorney general the position of statewide prosecutor. The statewide prosecutorshall have concurrent jurisdiction with the state attorneys to prosecute violations of criminal laws occurring or having occurred, in two or more judicial circuits as part of arelated transaction, or when any such offense is affecting or has affected two or more

judicial circuits as provided by general law. The statewide prosecutor shall be appointedby the attorney general from not less than three persons nominated by the judicialnominating commission for the supreme court, or as otherwise provided by general law.

Ms. Chapman knew Mr. Rodems mislead in violation of Rule 11, F.R.C.P., the following threefederal judicial officers in the performance of their duty in case 5:10-cv-503-(DAB)-TBS-WTH.

United States District Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges, Senior Status, Article III federal judge,Presided in case 5:10-cv-503 September 28, 2010 - present. (Fla. Bar ID 36398)

United States Magistrate Judge David A. Baker (Fla. Bar ID 477893)Presided in case 5:10-cv-503 Sepember-28-2010 to July-29-2011

United States Magistrate Thomas B. Smith (Fla. Bar ID 256269)Presided in case 5:10-cv-503 J uly-29-2011 to February-27-2012

Ms. Chapman knew the above federal judicial officers had a duty to stop Mr. Rodems fraud onthe court, a fraud introduced in Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB, when Rodems filed June 21,2011 Doc. 32, Notice Of Assignment And Motion For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice,(Exhibit 1), but that the above federal judicial officers failed to do so, other than U.S. District

Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges did not grant Mr. Rodems motion.


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Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) to report Mr. Rodems misconductdescribed above, but she did not report Rodems misconduct, and choose instead to engage inracketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.

Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(b) to report misconduct of the above federal judicial officers, but she did not report the misconduct, and choose instead to engage inracketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.

Ms. Chapmans Misconduct Related To Doc. 40 Filed July 14, 2011 in 5:10-cv-00503

Ms. Chapman was served by electric transmission on July 14, 2011 in Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 40 Filed 07/14/11 by Mr. Rodems, Response to Plaintiff Neil J .Gillespies Motion To Strike Or Set Aside Mr. Rodems Notice of Assignment Of Claims AndMotion For Dismissal Of Action With Prejudice [DKT 33]. The Certificate of Service states:

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 14, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing wasfiled using the Courts CM/ECF filing system, which will send an electronic notice of filing to: Catherine Barbara Chapman, Esquire, [email protected], counsel forDefendants The Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A., and Robert W. Bauer and anyoneelse registered to receive such filings. No other defendant has been served.


Mr. Rodems Response at Doc. 40 stated in part: (Pages 1 and 2 appear at Exhibit 2)

Gillespie has no standing to make such a motion, and this Court does not have subjectmatter jurisdiction to hear a dispute about a contract the settlement agreement Gillespieasks this Court to set aside -- that is not the subject of this action.

Mr. Rodems violated his duty under Rule 11 on July 14, 2011 when he submitted (Doc. 40).Unfortunately it is Mr. Rodems who lacked standing because he is not the Attorney General of Florida and therefore he cannot represent the State of Florida in federal litigation. Moreover,U.S. Magistrate Judge Thomas Smith indicated in his Order (Doc. 51) that the proper method of challenging evidence is by filing a notice of objection. Morgan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 700F.Supp. 1574, 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1988). Therefore I filed a Notice of Objection (Doc. 63).

The Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges entered Order of Dismissal (Doc. 64) and did not grant RodemsNotice Of Assignment of Claims And Motion For Dismissal With Prejudice (Doc. 32).

Ms. Chapman knew only the Florida Attorney General can represent the State of Florida infederal litigation, and that Mr. Rodems was not the Florida Attorney General, as set forth inmore detail in the above section Ms. Chapmans Misconduct Related To Doc. 32 Filed June 21,2011 in 5:10-cv-00503


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Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) to report Mr. Rodems misconduct andRule 11 violation(s), but she did not report Rodems misconduct, and choose instead to engage inracketeering activity and obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.


Ms. Chapmans Open Defiance of Rule 4-8.3(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers

In an email to Ms. Chapman August 13, 2012 at 6:19 AM I asked her about Rule 4-8.3 ReportingProfessional Misconduct. (Exhibit 3).

Thank you Ms. Chapman. Are there currently any outstanding documents? Also whencan I expect a reply to my November 17, 2011 question to you:

On another matter, I dont see how Mr. Rodems can lawfully or ethically represent yourclient, and my former counsel, Robert W. Bauer, and the Law Office of Robert W. Bauer,in this matter, through the so-called Settlement Agreement and General Mutual Releaseof June 21, 2011. What is your view?

Members of the bar have a duty to report professional misconduct. Have you made acomplaint against Mr. Rodems for his misconduct in this case?

Florida Bar Rule 4-8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct

(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer who knows that anotherlawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raisesa substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as alawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

You know of the misconduct of Mr. Rodems representing his firm and law partneragainst me, a former client, contrary to ethics rules and McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services,Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. That is only one example of Mr. Rodems'misconduct.

Neil Gillespie

Ms. Chapman responded by email August 13, 2012 at 6:58 AM: (Exhibit 3)

The document served last week.

I do not believe Mr. Rosemary has committed any misconduct.

I replied by email August 13, 2012 at 7:03 AM: (Exhibit 3)


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Which document served last week? There were several.

Who is Mr. Rosemary?

Ms. Chapman responded by email August 13, 2012 at 7:19 AM: (Exhibit 3)

The last document.

My apologies. I meant Mr. Rodems.

As set forth above, Ms. Chapman knew only the Florida Attorney General can represent theState of Florida in federal litigation, and that Mr. Rodems was not the Florida Attorney General.

Ms. Chapman knew she had a duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) to report Mr. Rodems misconduct, butshe did not report Rodems misconduct, and choose instead to engage in racketeering activityand obstruct justice to benefit her client, Robert W. Bauer and his law firm.


The foregoing examples are not Ms. Chapman only violations of her duty under Rule 4-8.3(a) toreport Mr. Rodems misconduct. Mr. Rodems has committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct while representing his law firm and partner in civil litigation against me, aformer client on the same or substantially related matter, contrary to Bar Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.9, 4-1.10 and the holding of McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995.

The Florida Bar Discipline Program Is Intended To Protect the Public

A pamphlet Hiring the Right Person to Help Me With My Legal Problems , published by TheFlorida Bar Public Information and Bar Services Department as a service for consumers states:

"The Florida Bar disciplinary program has become the gold-standard for protecting the public."

Background of the Complaint Against Ms. Chapman

Ms. Chapman represented and defended Mr. Bauer in the following lawsuits:

Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, FL, et al., 5:10-cv-503; C.A.11, 12-11213-C

Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, FL, 5:11-cv-539; C.A.11, 12-11028-B

I am a law-abiding consumer of legal and court services affecting interstate commerce. TheFlorida Bar Lawyer Referral Service referred to me Robert W. Bauer, a lawyer who was not


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competent and not diligent in his representation of me. I complained to the Florida Bar in 2010about Mr. Bauer, see File No. 2011-00,073 (8B). The Bar issued a Letter Report Pursuant toRule 3-7.4(k) of No Probable Cause Finding that failed to comply with Rule 3-7.4(k) because itdid not explain why the complaint did not warrant further proceedings. Also, the Letter Reportfailed to include any documentation explaining why the complaint did not warrant furtherproceedings. The Bar opened a second complaint January 7, 2013, File No. 2013-00,540 (8B).

Fraud and misconduct of Tampa attorney Ryan Christopher Rodems, and his partners Chris A.Barker and William J. Cook, of the law firm Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, form the basis of thismatter, and has led to 21 related legal actions (Exhibit 4) and 14 Bar complaints. (Exhibit 5).

Prior to filing any lawsuits I complained to the Florida Bar beginning in 2003. (Exhibit 5). Theearly complaints were considered by the Tampa Branch Office prior to central ACAP intake.

Susan Bloemendaal was then, and is today, Chief Branch Discipline Counsel for the TampaBranch Office of The Florida Bar. Over the period 2004-2010 Ms. Bloemendaal improperlyobstructed my complaints, and aided and abetted Mr. Rodems and his partners in taking 90% of a contingent fee case instead of 45% allowed under Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(f)(4)(B)(i), for anunjust enrichment of $21,431. Ms. Bloemendaals own statements in the matter show she actedas a partner in fraud with Mr. Rodems and his law firm, not an independent discipline counsel.

Mr. Rodems, his partners, and Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA represented me as substitute counselin the AMSCOT case, 99-2795-CIV-T-26C, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT, U.S.District Court, M.D.Fla., Tampa. The case settled on appeal before a decision was entered, U.S.Eleventh Circuit, No. 01-14761-AA, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corp.

Mr. Rodems and his partners concocted a closing statement fraud (Rule 4-1.5(f)(5)), to take$50,000 as a claim for court-awarded fees and costs and thereby steal $7,143 from mysettlement. This was decided by Hillsborough Judge Richard Nielsen by his order January 13,2006 and established res judicata a case of fraud and breach of contract. This ruling was the basisof Robert W. Bauer litigating the case. This was also the basis of Seldon Childers litigationreport of September 16, 2009, who determined $7,143 was stolen, not $6,224 first alleged.

Duty and Authority to Discipline Attorneys: The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar

Rule 13.1. Composition The membership of The Florida Bar shall be composed of all persons who are admittedby the Supreme Court of Florida to the practice of law in this state and who maintaintheir membership pursuant to these rules.

Right to practice law is not a constitutionally protected privilege or immunity. State ex rel.Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 133 U.S.P.Q. 157 (1962), certiorari granted 83 S.Ct.148, 371 U.S. 875, 9 L.Ed.2d 113, 135 U.S.P.Q. 503, vacated 83 S.Ct. 1322, 373 U.S. 379, 10L.Ed.2d 428, 137 U.S.P.Q. 578, on remand 159 So.2d 229.


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Rule 18.1. Responsibility of board of governorsAmong its other duties, the board of governors is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Rules of Discipline and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Rule 110.1. ComplianceAll members of The Florida Bar shall comply with the terms and the intent of the Rules of Professional Conduct as established and amended by this court.

Attorney is an officer of the court and an essential component of the administration of justice, and, as such, his conduct is subject to judicial supervision and scrutiny. State ex rel.Florida Bar v. Evans, 94 So.2d 730 (1957).

Florida Supreme Court has power to authorize investigations of professional conduct forpurpose of determining whether formal charges shall be made against an attorney. Swanson v.

The Florida Bar, 1967, 381 F.2d 730, certiorari denied 88 S.Ct. 468, 389 U.S. 972, 19 L.Ed.2d 463.

Rule 31.1. Privilege to practiceA license to practice law confers no vested right to the holder thereof but is a conditionalprivilege that is revocable for cause.

A lawyer should view his work not as mere money getting but as service of highest order;not as a mere occupation but as a ministry. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Dawson, 111 So.2d427 (1959).

Rule 33.1. Supreme Court of Florida; disciplinary agencies The exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida over the discipline of personsadmitted to the practice of law shall be administered in the following manner subject tothe supervision and review of the court. The following entities are hereby designated asagencies of the Supreme Court of Florida for this purpose and with the followingresponsibilities, jurisdiction, and powers. The board of governors, grievance committees,and referees shall have such jurisdiction and powers as are necessary to conduct theproper and speedy disposition of any investigation or cause, including the power tocompel the attendance of witnesses, to take or cause to be taken the deposition of witnesses, and to order the production of books, records, or other documentary evidence.Each member of such agencies has power to administer oaths and affirmations towitnesses in any matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.

Where state bar and its staff counsel are designated as agencies of Supreme Court for purpose of administering its jurisdiction to regulate admission of persons to practice of law and discipline of persons admitted, state bar is an arm and part of judiciary, one of three co-equal branches of stategovernment; thus, state bar and its agents acting within the scope of their office are protectedfrom liability for publication of defamatory matter by absolute privilege. Mueller v. The FloridaBar, App. 4 Dist., 390 So.2d 449 (1980).

The Supreme Court alone has power to discipline attorneys by grant of exclusive jurisdiction.


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The Florida Bar ACAP January 18,2013Complaint - Catherine Barbara Chapman Page - 10

Pantori v. Stephenson, App. 5 Dist., 384 So.2d 1357 (1980).

Power to render ultimate judgment in attorney's disciplinary proceeding rests in the SupremeCourt. The Florida Bar v. Abramson, 199 So.2d 457 (1967).

Rule 3-4.1. Notice and Knowledge of Rules; Jurisdiction Over Attorneys of Other States andForeign Countries

Every member of The Florida Bar and every attorney of another state or foreign countrywho provides or offers to provide any legal services in this state is within the jurisdictionand subject to the disciplinary authority of this court and its agencies under this rule andis charged with notice and held to know the provisions o f this rule and the standards ofethical and professional conduct prescribed by this court. Jurisdiction over an attorney ofanother state who is not a member of The Florida Bar shall be limited to conduct as anattorney in relation to the business for which the attorney was permitted to practice in thisstate and the privilege in the future to practice law in the state of Florida.

Rule 3-4.2. Rules of Professional ConductViolation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted by the rules governing TheFlorida Bar is a cause for discipline.

Attorney may not hide behind client's instructions in order to perpetrate fraud against thirdparty. The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433 (1992).

Attorney found to have violated disciplinary rules by assisting client in conduct known to befraudulent, failing to reveal fraud to affected person, accepting employment where hisprofessional judgment will be affected by his own personal interest, and accepting employmentwhen he is witness in pending litigation, will be suspended from practice of law for two years.The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 'So.2d 433 (1992).

Conclusion: Reiteration of Rule 4-8.3 Comment

Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiatedisciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.Lawyers have a similar obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolatedviolation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover.Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that the foregoing facts are true, correct and complete.

Sincerely,

Neil J. Gillespie8092 SW 115th LoopOcala, Florida 34481Enclosures: Signed Co


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Case 5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB Document 32 Filed 06/21/11 Page 1 of 4 PageID 600

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,

Plaintiff,Case No.:5:10-cv-00503-WTH-DAB

vs.

THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,FLORIDA, et al.

Defendants. ____________________________________/

RESPONSE T O PLAINTIFF NEIL J. GILLESPIES MOTION TO STRIKE OR SETASIDE MR. RODEMS NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AND MOTION

FOR DISMISSAL OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE [DKT 33]

On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie assigned all claims in this action to Ryan

Christopher Rodems, Chris A. Barker, and William J. Cook. Dkt 32, Exhibit 1. Thereafter, the

Assignees moved the Court for an Order dismissing this action with prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Dkt 32.

Gillespie now moves this Court to set aside the settlement agreement reached wherein he

assigned the claims in this action to Assignees. Gillespie has no standing to make such a motion,

and this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a dispute about a contract -- the

settlement agreement Gillespie asks this Court to set aside -- that is not the subject of this action. 1

1 Notwithstanding the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Gillespie s recitation of theevents surrounding the settlement are belied by the record. The settlement agreement was signed

by Gillespie while sitting next to his attorney. In fact, in deciding whether to sign it, Gillespiestated to his attorney, Ill defer to your judgment on this. Gillespies attorney stated, Ivealready given you judgment in private, and Ill give it to you on the record. I think this is -- this isan agreement you want to enter into, and I think it is in your best interest. (Exhibit 1). Gillespienow claims that he signed under duress, lacked informed consent, and asserts other reasons itshould be set aside, none of which are supported by the record of the settlement conference.


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The C ourt should deny Gillespies motion and grant the Assignees motion to dismiss the action,

Dkt 32.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14 th day of July, 2011.

/s/ Ryan Christopher RodemsRYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIREFlorida Bar No. 947652Attorney for AssigneesBARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A.501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 790Tampa, Florida 33602Telephone: (813) 489-1001Fax: (813) 489-1008

E-mail: [email protected] OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July 14, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was

filed using the Courts CM/ECF filin g system, which will send an electronic notice of filing to:

Catherine Barbara Chapman, Esquire, [email protected] , counsel for Defendants The

Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A., and Robert W. Bauer and anyone else registered to receive

such filings. No other defendant has been served.




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Neil Gillespie

From: "Catherine Chapman" To: "Neil Gillespie" Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 7:19 AMSubject: RE: please see attached, thank you

Page 1of 2

1/17/2013

The last document.

My apologies. I meant Mr. Rodems.

From: Neil Gillespie [mailto:[email protected]]Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 8:04 AMTo: Catherine ChapmanSubject: Re: please see attached, thank you

Which document served last week? There were several.

Who is Mr. Rosemary?----- Original Message -----From: Catherine Chapman To: Neil Gillespie Sent: Monday, August 13, 2012 7:58 AM Subject: Re: please see attached, thank you

The document served last week.

I do not believe Mr. Rosemary has committed any misconduct.

Sent from my iPhone

On Aug 13, 2012, at 7:19 AM, "Neil Gillespie" < [email protected] >wrote:

Thank you Ms. Chapman. Are there currently any outstanding documents? Alsowhen can I expect a reply to my November 17, 2011 question to you:

"On another matter, I dont see how Mr. Rodems can lawfully or ethicallyrepresent your client, and my former counsel, Robert W. Bauer, and the LawOffice of Robert W. Bauer, in this matter, through the so-called SettlementAgreement and General Mutual Release of June 21, 2011. What is your view?"

Members of the bar have a duty to report professional misconduct. Have you madea complaint against Mr. Rodems for his misconduct in this case?

Florida Bar Rule 4-8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct

(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer who knowsthat another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to thatlawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other

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respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.

You know of the misconduct of Mr. Rodems representing his firm and law partner againstme, a former client, contrary to ethics rules and McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995. That is only one example of Mr. Rodems' misconduct.

Neil Gillespie

----- Original Message -----From: Catherine Chapman To: Neil Gillespie Sent: Sunday, August 12, 2012 11:26 PM Subject: RE: please see attached, thank you

Mr. Gillespie- In light of my schedule, I am not able to forward to Mr. Rodems all documentsyou may file. Please make alternative arrangements.

Thank you, Catherine B. Chapman AttorneyGuilday, Tucker, Schwartz & Simpson, P.A. 1983 Centre Pointe Blvd, S-200

Tallahassee, FL 32308Direct Line: 850.701.4341Phone: 850.224.7091 | Facsimile: [email protected] NOTICE: The contents of this e-mail are legally privileged and confidential, and intended only forthe use of the individual(s) and/or entity(ies) named above. I f the reader of this e-mail is not theintended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, disclosure, copying ordistribution of the contents of this e-mail message is strictly prohibited. Review by any individualother than the intended recipient shall not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege, theattorney work-product doctrine, any evidentiary privilege, or any proprietary rights in theinformation. I f you have received this e-mail in error, please immediately notify the sender bytelephone (850/224-7091). Thank you. 3 Think about the environment before printing out this message From: Neil Gillespie [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 6:08 PMTo: Catherine ChapmanSubject: please see attached, thank you

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21 Related legal actions to Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, PA, 05-CA-007205RCR - denotes cases where Ryan Christopher Rodems represented his firm and partner against former client Gillespie

1. RCR Hillsborough Co. 05-CA-7205, Gillespie v. Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A., Aug-11-2005 to Jun-21-2011, (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 through October 1, 2009).

2. RCR Hillsborough Co. 05-CA-7205, Vexatious libel counterclaim, BRC v. Gillespie, Jan-19-2006to Sep-28-2010, (Mr. Bauer appeared for Gillespie April 2, 2007 - October 1, 2009)

3. RCR 2dDCA, 2D06-3803: Gillespie v. BRC, discovery related appeal (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

4. RCR 2dDCA, 2D07-4530: BRC v. Gillespie, voluntary dismissal (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed)

5. RCR 2dDCA, 2D08-2224: Gillespie v. BRC, 57.105 sanctions (Mr. Bauer for Gillespie) (closed)

6. RCR 2dDCA, 2D10-5197: Gillespie v. BRC, appeal final summary judgment (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

7. RCR 2dDCA, 2D10-5529: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition, remove Judge Cook (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

8. RCR 2dDCA, 2D11-2127: Gillespie v. BRC, prohibition/venue, J udge Arnold (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

9. RCR Fla.Sup.Ct. SC11-858: Gillespie v. BRC, habeas corpus, prohibition (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

10. RCR Fla.Sup.Ct. SC11-1622: Gillespie v. BRC, mandamus, other relief (Gillespie pro se) (closed)

11. RCR Federal Ct. 5:10-cv-503: Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights/ADA (closed, appeal)

12. Federal Ct. 5:11-cv-539: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth Jud. Cir., FL., Hobbs Act, Title 15, 1983, ADA, etc.

13. C.A.11, 12-11028-B: Estate/Gillespie v. Thirteenth Jud. Cir., FL., Hobbs Act, Title 15, 1983, ADA, etc.

14. RCR C.A.11, 12-11213-C: Gillespie v. Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Fla., Civil Rights, ADA, (closed, appeal)

15. RCR SCOTUS Rule 22 Application, Justice Thomas May 31, 2011, not docketed. (Gillespie pro se)Emergency Petition for Stay or Injunction, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858

16. RCR SCOTUS Rule 22 Application, Justice Thomas June 11, 2011, not docketed. (Gillespie pro se)Extraordinary Writ of Prohibition, re: Supreme Court of Florida SC11-858

17. RCR SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Certiorari August 20, 2012 review Fla.Sup.Ct. case no. SC11-1622,Returned August 23, 2012 because the petition was determined out-of-time.

18. RCR SCOTUS Rule 13.5 Application to Justice Thomas, docketed August 13, 2012, No. 12A21519. RCR SCOTUS Petition for Writ of Certiorari No. 12-7747, December 10, 2012, C.A.11 12-11028, 12-11213

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------20. Original Case 99-2795-CIV-T-26C, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT, December 9, 1999

21. Original Appeal 01-14761-AA, Clement, Blomefield, Gillespie v. AMSCOT Corp., August 20, 2001

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Florida Bar ethics complaints substantially related to Ryan Christopher Rodems*

*Partners engaged in the practice of law are each responsible for the fraud or negligence of anotherpartner when the later acts within the scope of the ordinary business of an attorney. SmyrnaDevelopers, Inc. v. Bornstein, 177 So.2d 16 (2dDCA, 1965).

1. William J . Cook RFA No. 03-18867 June 12, 2003 (ACAP Central)

2. William J . Cook TFB No. 2004-11,734(13C) June 7, 2004 (Tampa Branch)

3. William J . Cook TFB No. 2006-11,194 (13D) March 6, 2006 (Tampa Branch)

4. William J . Cook TFB No. 2007-10,004 (13D) June 27, 2006 (Tampa Branch)

5. Ryan Christopher Rodems TFB No. 2007-11,162(13D) February 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)

6. Chris A. Barker TFB No. 2007-11,792(13A) J une 18, 2007 (Tampa Branch)

7. Ryan Christopher Rodems File not opened/no number June 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)

8. Troy Matthew Lovell File not opened/no number June 20, 2007 (Tampa Branch)

9. Robert W. Bauer TFB No. 2011-00,073 (8B) July 15, 2010 (ACAP Central)

10. Seldon J. Childers RFA No. 11-4718 August 25, 2010 (ACAP Central)

11. Eugene P. Castagliuolo TFB No. 2013-10,162 (6D) August 17, 2012 (ACAP Central)

12. Ryan Christopher Rodems TFB No. 2013-10,271 (13E) Sep-13, 2012 (ACAP Central)

13. Robert W. Bauer RFA No. 13-7675 October 31, 2012 (ACAP Central); denied Nov-09-12;submitted in SCOTUS Petition no. 12-7747. Reconsidered Jan-07-13, No. 2013-00,540 (8B).

14. Ryan Christopher Rodems, complaint submitted January 4, 2013. Current status unknown.

McPartland v. ISI Inv. Services, Inc., 890 F.Supp. 1029, M.D.Fla., 1995 has been a mandatoryauthority on disqualification in Tampa since entered June 30, 1995 by J udge Kovachevich:

[1] Under Florida law, attorneys must avoid appearance of professional impropriety, and any doubtis to be resolved in favor of disqualification. [2] To prevail on motion to disqualify counsel, movantmust show existence of prior attorney-client relationship and that the matters in pending suit aresubstantially related to the previous matter or cause of action. [3] In determining whether attorney-client relationship existed, for purposes of disqualification of counsel from later representingopposing party, a long-term or complicated relationship is not required, and c

suppbrief, appendices 1-13, feb-13-2013, petition 12-7747

Documents