summary all readings week 2-week14

8/8/2019 Summary All Readings Week 2-Week14

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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy

Week 2: Theory & History- Isolationism and Exceptionalism

John Winthrops City upon a Hill, 1630

The Lord will be our God and delight to dwell among us, as his own people and will command a blessing upon us in all

our ways, so that we shall see much more of his wisdom, power, goodness, and truth then formerly we have been

acquainted with. We shall find the God of Israel is among us, when 10 of us shall be able to resist a thousand of ou

enemies For we must consider that wee shall be as a City Upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us. .. we shall be

made a story and a byword through the world

Excerpt from Washingtons Farewell Address, 1796

Key points:

-Good policy, through peace, harmony, faith and justice, all nations.

-Avoid antipathies

-Allow commercial relations, less political connection

-Honesty is always the best policy.

Important quotes:

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with themas little political connection as possible

Warning Against the Search for Monster to Destroy. John Quincy Adams 1821

Key points:

-What has America done for the benefit of mankind? Americaproclaimed to mankind the inextinguishable rights of

human nature, and the only lawful foundations of government

-American (should) goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-whiser to the freedom and

independence of all.

-The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from libertyto force She might become the dictatress

of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit.

-Americas) glory is not dominion, but liberty. Her march is the march of the mind. She has a spear and a shield: but the

motto upon her shield is, Freedom, Independence, Peace.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyThomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy. Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson

Key points:

-Building a nation, based in an imaginary; illusions and sharing values as team work, equality in rights, justice and

freedom. To construct a national psyche.

-Jefferson as a common leader or common point.

-A moral statemoral duties- over all

-3 claims that Jefferson reject from a traditional state-reason. (-Government by its own rules, State interest over the

social or civil interest, Legality over necessity)

-A new foreign policy to conquer without war be confident of a free and virtues people

-Isolationism, separate from Europe (Europe is corrupted, and America must escape of Europes vices) Jefferson policy

of Isolation the desire to pursue a political destiny separate from Europe.

-Against the WAR, because brings taxes and debts for Jefferson and Republicans generally, war was the great nemesis.

-Exceptionalism

Important quotes:

The institutions that characterize American public life todaythe ideals of American life remain Jeffersonian.

Whether in relation to the domestic experiment at home or the conduct of the republic toward foreign powers, his most

characteristic utterance was the contrast he drew between the high moral purpose that animated our own national life

and actions, and the low motives of power and expediency that drove other nations.

Jefferson gave the conviction that he the American- was part of a form of civilization higher than the polished societies

of Europe, with their artificial distinctions between social classes, their oppressive restrictions on human freedom, and

their crushing burden of debt and taxes.

Americathe solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rightsthe sole depository of the sacred fire

of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in the other regions of the earth, if other regions of

the earth shall become susceptible to its being influence. (EXCEPTIONALISM)

Jefferson declared in his second inaugural address, that with nations, as with individuals, our interests soundly

calculated will ever be found inseparable of our moral duties

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them

as little political connection as possible.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWeek 3: Theory & History- Manifest Destiny, Expansionism and Imperialism

Monroe Doctrine. James Monroe 1823

Key points:

-Against influence and intervention of European nations in the Americas.

-America as a free and independent to not be considered as subject for future colonization by any European power.

Important quotes:

-as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the

free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects

for future colonization by any European powers.

-It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other power will pursue the

same course.

Manifest Destiny (1845) John L. Sullivan

-Concept of U.S. territorial expansion westward to the Pacific Ocean.

-John L. O'Sullivan, who described the U.S. annexation of Texas and, by extension, the occupation of the rest of the

continent as a divine right of the American people. The term was used to justify the U.S. annexation of Oregon, New

Mexico, and California and later U.S. involvement in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

-Texas incorporation into the Union was not only inevitable, but the most natural, right and proper thing in the

World

The Open Door Note. John Hay 1899

By the late 19th century, Japan and the European powers had carved much of China into separate spheres of influence

inside of which each held economic dominance. The U.S., coming late to imperialism, held no sphere of influence in

China. In 1899 U.S. Secretary of State John Hay proposed an "Open Door" policy in China in which all nations would

have equal trading and development rights throughout all of China. Such a policy would put all the imperialist powerson equal footing in China and would limit the advantages of having ones own sphere of influence.

Transcript of Theodore Roosevelts Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1905)

In his annual messages to Congress in 1904 and 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded the Monroe Doctrine.

The corollary stated that not only were the nations of the Western Hemisphere not open to colonization by European

powers, but that the United States had the responsibility to preserve order and protect life and property in those

countries.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyRoosevelt tied his policy to the Monroe Doctrine, and it was also consistent with his foreign policy of walk soft ly, but

carry a big stick. Roosevelt stated that in keeping with the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was justified in

exercising "international police power" to put an end to chronic unrest or wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere. This

so-called Roosevelt Corollarya corollary is an extension of a previous ideato the Monroe Doctrine contained a great

irony. The Monroe Doctrine had been sought to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, but now

the Roosevelt Corollary justified American intervention throughout the Western Hemisphere. In 1934, Franklin D.

Roosevelt renounced interventionism and established his Good Neighbor policy within the Western Hemisphere.

Roosevelt's extension of the Monroe Doctrine asserted a right of the United States to intervene to stabilize the

economic affairs of small states in the Caribbean and Central America if they were unable to pay their internationa

debts. The alternative was intervention by European powers, especially Britain and Germany, which loaned money to

the countries that did not repay. The catalyst of the new policy was Germany's aggressiveness in the Venezuela Affair of

1902-03.

Week 3

Theory & History: Manifest Destiny, Expansionism and Imperialism

Expansionism

-To advance its interests through investments and business transactions.

-toexpand policies of government and state

-economic and territorial growth

Expansionism

-1830-1840s

-economic factors

-psychological factors-Manifest Destiny

-Advertise the Westfur trade

-Texas, California, Oregon

Manifest Destiny

1845-Democrat leader and influential editor

-righteous destiny of US for expansion e.g. Mexican War

-Religious influence-America as divine providence

-to sustain and guide human destiny

-City upon a hill secularized in Manifest Destiny-a materialistic, religious and utopian destiny.

Examples: 1.North West expansion with fur trade

2. Interest in trade with India 3.fair of foreign intervention in American territory

NATIONAL MANIFEST DESTINY-destroy natives lives INTERNATIONAL MANIFEST DESTINY-purchase Alaska from

Russia

Imperialism of Manifest Destiny

-Business embraced the idea of M.D

-extend the economical, political or military authority to certain countries (Phillipines,Guam,Puerto Rico)

-use navy to control new lands abroad-1883-1890 built new cruisers and battleships

-Take up the white mans burden-take this burden to help inferior people of the world to adjust to Christianity


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyMonroe Doctrine

Statement of U:S policy on the activity and rights of power in the Western Hemisphere during the early mid 1800s as a

message that their political structure was superior

-if Spain would regain colonies trade with Britani would decrease so America favoured the independence of Chili,

Mexico from Spain

-end up European intervention in America but later on justify the American imperialism in Western Hemisphere

Reasons

-Clash with Russia concerning North West coast of North.America

-Fear of Holy Alliance

-G:B wanted open door commerce with Latin American colonies

-Great Britain should not acquire any Spanish territory.As a result Canning made an agreement with

France.Adams thought that G:B should not acquire any Spanish territory

Message was: We would view with displeasure any attempts by European powers to subject the nations of N.W to

their political system...-no colonisation - no intervention

-not ratified until 1850s

Important.

-President Polk in 1845-1848reassert its value when Britain and France influence to prevent U.S annex of Oregon.

-Cold Warused during the Spains reacquisition of Dominican Republic

The Open Door Note

-Open world to American ideals and influence

-advocate imperial policy without war or Russia or China will be the next superpowers

-non discriminatory policy with China

-not interfere with parts under Chinas possession

-trade with China

-protect trade with China

A letter to Mahan

Influence of sea powers upon history- built a huge naval power

-protect Hawaii against Japan

-Get Spain rid of West India

-Germany should not gain power over West India

-Nicaragua canal as a military measure-help to move quicker from coast to coast

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

-policeman of Latin and North America

-protection of U:S or S.A against future wars/not take part in any European affairs or worry about any European

affairs.

-Britain was trying to acquire colonial possession in America as a catalyst for the conflict with Mexico to gain land.

-If G:B breaks the terms of Doctrine and gain control of Pac.Northwest ,America would take land from Mexico.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy-Great Britain should not acquire any Spanish territory.As a result Canning made an agreement with

France.Adams thought that G:B should not acquire any Spanish territory

Message was: We would view with displeasure any attempts by European powers to subject the nations of N.W to

their political system...-no colonisation - no intervention

-not ratified until 1850s

Important.

-President Polk in 1845-1848reassert its value when Britain and France influence to prevent U.S annex of Oregon.

-Cold Warused during the Spains reacquisition of Dominican Republic

The Open Door Note

-Open world to American ideals and influence

-advocate imperial policy without war or Russia or China will be the next superpowers

-non discriminatory policy with China

-not interfere with parts under Chinas possession

-trade with China

-protect trade with China

A letter to Mahan

Influence of sea powers upon history- built a huge naval power

-protect Hawaii against Japan

-Get Spain rid of West India

-Germany should not gain power over West India

-Nicaragua canal as a military measure-help to move quicker from coast to coast

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

-policeman of Latin and North America

-protection of U:S or S.A against future wars/not take part in any European affairs or worry about any European

affairs.

-Britain was trying to acquire colonial possession in America as a catalyst for the conflict with Mexico to gain land.

-If G:B breaks the terms of Doctrine and gain control of Pac.Northwest ,America would take land from Mexico.

-The Corollary end threats in those areas and protect America from foreign influence.-strengthen the validity of American interventions in f.affairs

-justify the occupations of countries being threatened by Europe.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWeek 4: Theory & History- Bipolarity, Realism, and Idealism

1Woodrow Wilson: 14 points Jan. 1918Wilson Profile: democrat, elected in 1912 and reelected in 1916. U.S entered the WWI in 1917. 1918

announced his 14 points for the postwar settlement.

Main provisions:

a. No secret pactsab. Free trade and open-door policyc. Self-determinationd. The seas should be opene. The borders of Italy, France, Germanyf. Countries like Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Austria got independenceg.

Evacuation of Russiah. Reduce arms

i. Most import is the League of Nations, dealing with international peace and conflictsWilson compromised except the last point in the negotiations.

The main reason why the US did not approve the treaty

a. No domestic support. At that time the Republican controlled the Senate, Wilson even did not invite anyRepublicans to attend the peace conference with him

b. Domestic isolationism was still preponderant.

2. Sectional conflict and foreign economic policy, 1914-1940 Jeff Frieden

The purpose of the article is to explain how the US went from being isolationist to being internationalist in the

interwar period. The essay examines the role of international and domestic determinants in the making of

foreign economic policy.

WWI made the US become the economic and political leadership in the world, yet after the WWI, the US

become isolated again. The first WWI strengthened the overseas economic interests of many major US banks

and corporations, who fought hard for more political involvement by the US in world affairs. Yet domestically

oriented economic groups remained a relatively isolated America. Only in the late 1930s and 1940s, after 20years battles between the two coalitions over foreign policy, the US moved to the center stage of world

politics and economics.

There were two groups in tensions at that time.

a. Financial bankers and corporations: saw great opportunities for overseas expansion, and fought for USforeign economic policy to be internationalist; they wanted to become creditors to the EU, low tariffs

and aid for a EU settlement.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policyb. Other US corporations saw the world economy as a competitive threat and fought for protection and

isolationism. Domestic industrialists were also unhappy with American bank loans to foreign

competitors. Farmers: wanted a high tariff, wanted to protect against cheap agricultural things from

overseas; they thought the foreign trade will ruin their profits.

What changes?

The great depression of the 1930s and eventually WWII weakened the economic nationalists, and led to an

internationalist victory that allowed for the construction of the American-led post-world war II international

political economy.

The shock of the 1930s accelerated the demise of Americas economic nationalists. During the first two FDR

administrations, economic internationalism gradually came to dominate USFP. Faced with international and

domestic economic crises of unprecedented scope and dept, FDR retreated into domestic New Deal reforms,

then in the mid and late 1930s came up with a series of international economic initiatives.

3. Rethinking the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, 1997

Gaddiss ideas:

a. No governmental connections between the US and Russiab. Russias transportation development enables Russia to cross Asia to Pacific oceanc. He argues that the Russia Revolution posed a fundamental threat challenge to America

a) Roosevelt tried to rebuild the West as a counter way to Russia to keep Europe in peaceb) Wilson tried to contain Russia by building up Europe; America sought to politically isolate Russia

Why did they lock in the WWII?

The US needed Russia to conquer Germany. There are no major land barriers between the Central Europe and

Eastern Europe. They needed each other and became wartime allies.

The causes for the cold war

a. Soviet Union maintained control over Eastern Europe politically and militarilyb. Different ideology. Liberalism vs. Communismc. 1945-47 Containment policy (Truman Doctrine) catalyzed the cold war


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWeek 5

The national security strategy of the USA

1. Abandon unilateralism; build good relations with great powers.(1) Not to use American strength to press for unilateral advantage; instead, seek to increase a balance of powe

that favors human freedom.

(2) Defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants and preserve the peace by building good relations among thegreat powers.

2. When radicalism and technology meet, they lead to great danger to the U.S. the U.S. must seek preemptive actionbefore emerging threats are fully formed.

3. Poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartelswithin their borders.

Overview of Americas international strategy

1. The U.S. national security strategy will be based on American internationalism that reflects the union of our valuesand our national interests.

2. Our goals: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.3. Our means:

(1) Champion aspirations for human dignity(2) Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends(3) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts(4) Prevent our enemies from threatening us and our friends with WMD(5) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade(6) Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy(7) Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power(8) Transform Americas national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century

Why international primacy matters

1. International primacy: a government is able to exercise more influence on the behavior of more actors with respectto more issues than any other government can. International primacy is relative gains.

2. States pursue primacy in order to be able to insure their security, promote their interests, and shape theinternational environment in ways that will reflect their interests and values.

3. Breakup of coalition: The alliances of the U.S. with Japan and with NATO rested on three fundamentals: (1) sharedpolitical and economic values; (2) common economic interests; and (3) the Soviet security threat. The end of wa

leads to the breakup of the coalition of powers fighting the war.

4. Emerging economic conflicts(1) Economic power will be increasingly important in determining the primacy or subordination of states when

military conflict between major states is unlikely.

(2) The U.S. economic primacy is going to be challenged by Japan and Europe.5. Japan enjoys the asymmetrical interdependence over the U.S. And economic power enables Japan to have more

political influence on the U.S.6. The U.S. should (1) pursue a concerted and consistent course to prevent Japan from exploiting the openness ofAmerican economy and induce Japan to open its own economy; and (2) take measures to renew its economic

health.

7. The maintenance of U.S. primacy matters for the world because (1) no other country can make comparablecontributions to international order and stability; and (2) the collapse of SU leaves the U.S. as the only major power

whose national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values.

The future of the American pacifier

1. Buck-passing: remaining on the sidelines while getting others to bear the burden of deterring or fighting aggressorsuntil it could no longer do so safely.

2. The future of the U.S. military commitments to Europe and Northeast Asia may hinge on whether a potential


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policyhegemon emerges in either region that can be contained only with American help. If not, the U.S. troops based in

each region will probably leave.

3. Northeast Asia scenarios: depends on China(1) If China does not become a potential hegemon, the U.S. is likely to pull its troops and encourage Japan to build

up military capability and become a great power. The regional system would thus remain multipolar and

balanced, while security competition would be somewhat more intense.(2) If China emerges as a potential hegemon, the region will fall into unbalanced Multipolarity and the U.S. wilmove to contain the Chinese threat.

Europes future

4. If the U.S. pulls its troops from Europe, Germany may acquire nuclear weapons, increase the size of its army, andbecome a potential hegemon. Despite of this, the U.S. is still likely to pull its forces out of Europe, because other

European countries should be able to balance Germany.

Chinas challenge

5. Japans weakness: (1) small population (2) power-projection problem as an insular state. Russias weakness: (1inferior economy than Japan (2) smaller population than China

6. Two scenarios:(1) If China stops growing rapidly and Japan remains the wealthiest state, neither would become a potentia

hegemon and the U.S. would bring its troops home. Americas exit wouldnt change the power structure today

but it would leave the region instability.

(2) If China grows so rapidly that it becomes a regional hegemon which is too strong to be balanced by otherNortheast Asian countries, the U.S. stays. But Northeast Asia would become an unbalanced multipolar system.

The Bush revolution

1. Bushs first 30 monthsHe championed: He downplayed:

unilateral exercise of American power international law, institutions

proactive doctrine of preemption reactive strategies of deterrence and

containment

forceful interdiction, preemptive strikes, missile defenses as

means to counter proliferation of WMD

direct negotiations with countries and leaders that he loathed

Americas traditional support for treaty-based

non-proliferation regimes

ad hoc coalitions permanent alliances

exploiting Europes internal divisions Americas decades-long policy of backing

European integration

uniting great powers together to fight terrorism a strategy of balancing one power against

another

2. The Bush revolution rested on two beliefs: (1) in a dangerous world the best way to ensure Americas security was toshed the constraints imposed by allies and international institutions which constrained the ability of the U.S. to

make the most of its primacy; and (2) the U.S. should aggressively go abroad searching for monsters to destroy

These led to (1) a favored unilateralism, which is often easier and more efficient in short term; (2) more possibility of

preemption; and (3) use of American power to produce regime change in rogue states.


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ProcessThe President

1. Snow, United States Foreign Policy1). Presidential Powers

Formal: Chief Executive, Chief of State, Commander in chief, Treaty Negotiator, Nominator of Key

Personnel, Recognizer of Foreign Governments

Informal: Presidential Singularity, Shaping Public Opinion through Media Access, International Diplomacy

and World Leadership, Presidential Doctrines

2). Presidential Constraints

Past policies and programs, Bureaucratic responsiveness, Constriction of policy possibility, Presidential

time and its management, Electoral process

2. Robert Jervis, Hypotheses on MisperceptionTheme: the types of misperceptions of other states intentions which states tend to make.

Important Hypotheses:

1). Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. Namely,

actors tend to perceive what they expect. (e.g. Vietnam Warthe apprehension of domino effect)

2). Actors tend to establish their theories and expectations prematurely, sometimes unconsciously.

3). Actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is.

4). If it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace, it is often even harder for

him to see that issues important to him are not important to others. (oversensitive to possible threats, e.g.

in the Cold War)

3. Michael Nelson, Person and Office: Presidents, the Presidency, and Foreign PolicyModern political scientists tend to agree that the presidency and the presidents who occupy the office are

never more important than in the making of foreign policy, and the presidents background, personality

and leadership skills are consequential as well.

In the 19th

century, presidency was less powerful largely because of US isolationism and the weakness of

presidency in domestic issues.

In the 20th

century, with the development of the national economy and the demand on the national

government to facilitate the spread of the new and massive corporations (by claiming the frontier

overseas and the cross continent management), Presidency became much more powerful (esp. after

9/11). It is more powerful than Congress in terms of foreign policy making because of the secrecy in all

diplomacy decisions, the requirement of quick response and the image of the President as the living

symbol of the country.

As for the president: according to Neustadt, to lead is to persuade; to persuade is to bargain; and to

bargain is to convince members of Congress that their interests and the presidents are (or can be made to

be) the same.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy4. Thomas Preston and Margaret G. Hermann, Presidential Leadership Style and the Foreign Policy Process

Presidential leadership style and the Foreign policy advisory process

Table 25.1 (Need to Control or Be Involved; Sensitivity to Context; Prior Experience or Expertise in Policy

Domain)


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyThe Defense Department

- The largest single agency of the federal government. Before 1990: employed roughly 3 million people. During

Clinton administration: reduced by 1/3. Reinvigoration of an expanding interest in defense within the Bush

administration has not resulted in increased military personnel.

- Budget: Before the end of Cold war: DODs budget: 2nd

largest within Federal Budget (after Social Security

and Medicare). The defense budget declined during 1990s but dramatically reversed during George W. Bush

administration. In 2003, U.S spent more on defense than did the rest of countries of the world combine.

- The size and impact of defense expenditures are of major consequencein terms of both the economic impact

of the dollar spent and the military impact of how that money is spent.

- Like the government in general, the Pentagon has instigated a series of informal checks and balances

representing competing interests and perspectives and assuring the representation of differing viewpoints.

Organization

- At the pinnacle is the secretary of defense, the cabinet official who reports directly to the president and who is

responsible for the overall operation of the DOD.

- The second part is the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which consists of a number of sub-cabinet-levelfunctions that cut across military services.

- The third part is made up of the services themselves, each with its separate bureaucracy and set of interests.

- The fourth is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which has presumptive role of coordinating the military activities of the

various services.

+ Secretary of Defense: is the chief advisor to the president on the defense matters and a policy implementer,

responsible for carrying out the policies mandated by the chief executive and Congress as well as managing the

departments internal affairs.

+ Office of The Secretary of Defense: is a group of agencies, normally headed by an undersecretary or an

assistant secretary. Previously, more than two dozen undersecretaries (USDs) and assistant secretaries (ASDs)

reported directly to the SECDEFbut Clintons first SECDEF reduced the number of people reporting to the

secretary to only 4 USDs and 6 ASDs and altered the titles and functions from previous organizations.

+ Service Departments: Each military service has its own department that attends and administers to the

interests of the individual services. At the top of each of these departments is a service secretary, who is assisted

by the chief of staff of each of service. This chief staff is responsible for the internal operation of his service and

acts as the services representative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

+ Joint Chiefs of Staff: created to help the DOD overcome service rivalries and facilitating interservice

cooperation.

Rivalries within the DOD

+ Rivalries exist between the DOD civilian and military personnel, between the services themselves, between

the services and the JCS. Rivalries also exist in the issue of control of operations and the unified and specified

commands between the JCS and the services.

Effect of Change:

The twin impact of the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11 on the Defense

Department:

+ change in size, structure and roles in a post-Cold War environment (during 1990s: major concern was how

much cutting and restructuring should occur. After Sep 11, Bush doctrines emphasis on maintaining military

power suggests keeping more conventional force)

+ change in international system and the militarys role in it.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy+ create new missions and new conditions for military application.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

- developed during its competition with its former Soviet counterpart, the KGB.

- With the end of the Cold War, the appropriateness of an intelligence structure designed to counter an agency

like the KGB (which no longer exists as such) came into question.

- Two major contemporary problems of the Intelligence Community are the question of competence (E.g. in

1998, CIA failed to predict Indian and Pakistani nuclear test) and the problem deals with politicalization of the

process and has arisen most clearly over justification of the Iraq war (producer-consumer difficulty: The

intelligent agencies are always under some pressure to produce analyses that conform the beliefs of the officials

to whom they report)

- The current Intelligence Community can be grouped into 3 categories by bureaucratic sponsor:

+ The Central Intelligent Agency: an independent agency, is attached to no other cabinet-level agency, led by

the director of central intelligence.

+Defense-Controlled Agencies: controlled by the Department of Defense. There are six such agencies, four of

which are associated with the individual services (army, air force, navy and marines). The other, the NationalSecurity Agency is responsible for intercepting foreign electronic communications and preventing other states

from intercepting U.S government communications. The final agency is the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

which was created to consolidate the information gathered by the various service intelligence agencies.

+ Cabinet-level Agencies: relatively small and specialized efforts. E.g. Department of Energy monitors nuclear

weapon programs internationally; Treasury Department collects information on foreign economic activity, etc.

This multiplicity of agencies is supposedly coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence and the

intelligence community staff but in practice, attaining cooperation in the intelligence field has been rather

elusive.

-Intelligence and Operations:

+ Intelligence: refers to the gathering, by public or clandestine means, and the analysis of information.

+ Operations: refers to actions taken clandestinely to affect politics in foreign countries. The most obvious form

of operations is covert action, or activities secretly undertaken by the U.S government to affect foreign

governments but in such a way that the target does not recognize American action and the U.S government can

deny culpability. Operations is far more controversial than intelligence because it is done in secret and is

obscured not only from the target but also from American public.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Organization

- The smallest of all cabinet-level agencies (its budget: 6% of the Pentagons, its employee: fewer than 1% of

the Defense Department)

- Secretary of State: a presidential appointee, being under pressures of loyalty to the president and of the

secretarys role as advocate of the departments institutional perspective within administration councils. Below

secretary is the deputy secretary (functions as the departments principal day-to-day manager), undersecretaries

of states (e.g one each for political affairs, global affairs, economics, e.g) and counselor (departments principal

legal advisor)

The Bureaus

- There are 24 bureaus, sixteen are referred to as functional (e.g. Bureau of Human Rights and humanitarian

affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Bureau of Legislative affairs, Bureau of Public Affairs) and six are

regional (Europe and Canada, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, the Near East, the Americas, and Africa).


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyEmbassies, Consulates, and Missions

- American embassies are the principal locus of conducting U.S foreign policy overseas. Each embassy is

headed by an ambassador (2/3 are selected from the ranks of Foreign Service Officers)

Foreign Policy Role

Three factors may explain States loss of primacy in foreign policy making: (1) the rise of security, economic,

humanitarian, and environmental issues as well as related rise of institutional players with special expertise in

these policy domains; (2) the trend towards personal presidential dominance of foreign policy making and

conduct, and related centralization of policy making in the White House-based NSC staff; (3) some deeply

ingrained features of the Foreign Services culture that tend to isolate FSOs from other bureaucratic players and

to limit their influence in inter-agency dealings.

THE ECONOMIC AGENCIES

- During 1990s, international economic concerns and promotion rose to the top of the foreign policy agenda.

- Clinton defines himself as economic president. His major foreign policy purpose was widening the circle

of market democracies. There were two major emphases in his international economic policy: (1) to raise the

promotion of globalization as the centerpiece of world reform under the banner of engagement andenlargement; (2) free trade & its institutionalization through a series of regional and universal free trade-

promoting organizations.

The National Economic Council

- Created by Clinton as an executive order in January 1993 with 4 broad purposes: (1) to coordinate the

economic policy-making process with respect to domestic and international economic issues; (2) to coordinate

economic policy advice to the president; (3) to ensure that economic policy decisions and programs are

consistent with the presidents stated goals, and to ensure that those goals are being effectively pursued; (4) to

monitor implementation of the presidents economic agenda.

- Clinton saw the NEC as the prime motor of his foreign policy but Bush was not heavily involved in the

deliberations of the NEC.

The United States Trade Representative

- Created by the Trade Act of 1974 with the role of coordination of U.S participation in various multilateral

trade negotiations, the promotion of American trade, and assistance to other agencies in trade-related matters.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

- The direct consequence of terrorist attacks of September 11 and subsequent efforts to better coordinate

American assets against the recurrence of future attack, the DHS is not, strictly speaking, a foreign policy actor,

because its activities contain both significant international and domestic components but it is, and for some time

will be, very much a work in progress.

Homeland Security Council (HSC) and Director of Homeland Security (DHS)

- Created by President George W. Bush on October 8, 2011 to promote cooperation among agencies within the

executive branch of government in the war on terrorism.

- Legally, like NEC, HSC has no statutory basis or mandate. Structurally, it is very similar to the NSC.

Reading 2: How National Security Advisers See Their Role

National Security adviser and the National Security Council (NSC) staff have become central in foreign policy

players. In early 1960s, NSC staff was a small group of less than 15 people but today it is a fully ensconced,

agency-like organization of 200 people. The reasons for this expansion are many.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy- The foundation has been presidents need for close-in foreign policy support and advisers success in meeting

this need. Beyond this, three developments stand out.

+ First, the NSC has become institutionalized and even bureaucratized. It allows staff to monitor overseas

messages sent to and from the State Department, to have access to major intelligence material, and to

communicate directly and secretly with foreign governments.

+ Second, the kinds of foreign policy issues that need to be addressed have both expanded in number and

become more complex in nature. Therefore, the number and type of players concerned with each issue have

grown as well, placing a premium on effective organization and integration of different interests. Only the NSC

has the demonstrated capacity to do so.

+ Third, U.S politics continues right on into the mainstream of foreign affairs. The necessity to provide political

oversight of executive action naturally falls to the White House and to the NSC acting as its surrogate.

Yet, while the national security adviser and the NSC staff have grown in importance, their specific roles and

significance remain unclear. The discussions centered on three issues: The advisers role in managing the

foreign policy decision-making process, the advisers operational role and responsibility and the advisers

public responsibilities, especially with respect to Congress.MANAGING THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

This process involves three steps:

- First is guiding the policy making process on major foreign and national security issues to ensure both that

those with strong stakes in the issue are involved in the process and that all realistic policy options are fully

considered before these issues reach the president and his senior advisers for decision.

- Second is driving this process to make real choices in a timely manner

- Third is overseeing the implementation of the decisions made by the president and his advisers.

In order to manage this process effectively, the national security adviser must:

- balance the role of adviser and honest broker by both earning the trust of colleagues in presenting their view

fully, fairly, and faithfully to the president and giving the president unvarnished adviceincluding advice he

may not like to hear.

- minimize imposing on the presidents time. The adviser will often seek to forge a consensus on policy among

the different players and interests but he has to ensure not to create a policy process that presents the president

withfaits accomplis on important policy issues. In addition, a decision-making process that is geared toward

consensus will often lead to the lowest rather than the highest common denominator policies. It can result in

delay in decision making in order to allow time for disagreements to be resolved and increase the likelihood that

mistakes will go uncorrected.

- challenge the consensus that has formed around the presidents policy preference to avoid consensus leading

to costly inaction even when the president doesnt want such a challenge.

- coordinate decision-making, particularly at the working level, between the various agencies.

- be able to deal not only with traditional issues of defense and regional diplomacy but also with energy, the

environment, international finance, terrorism, drug trafficking, human rights, disaster relief and so on.

HOW OPERATIONAL SHOULD THE NSC BE?

The consensus view, especially after the Iran-Contra affair, is that the NSC performs a coordinating and

oversight and advisory function but should never become operational. Yet, the national security adviser and

staff have repeatedly been operationally involved in fifteen years since the Iran-Contra affair became public. So

the question is not really whether the NSC should have an operational role but, rather, what kind and to what

extent.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWhy the president might wish the national security adviser to be operationally involved?

- On one level, it is the result of a basic degree of confidence, comfort and trust. Presidents know their national

security advisers and have confidence in the advisers staffs.

- In addition, an operational NSC role is necessary because of the way the governments are structured, as well

as the international governmental evolution (other governments more and more are revolving around

presidencies, prime ministers, etc. and the international contacts between them)

- Another reason is the lack of bureaucratic responsiveness to presidential direction (e.g. Iran-Contra:

Department of State and other departments didnt follow the same direction with the president)

- A further reason why the National Security adviser may become operationally involved is to effect a

fundamental shift in policy that, if left to the State Department to implement, would risk being derailed in

bureaucratic entanglement. (e.g. Henry Kissingers secret diplomacy with China over opening relations, North

Vietnam to negotiate a peace agreement, etc.)

THE PUBLIC ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

There are two reasons for public emergence of the national security adviser:

- First, the increasing politicization of foreign policy has made defense of the presidents policies by the personmost directly associated with the president politically more important.

- Second reason is changes in the media, especially proliferation in the number of media outlets.

One of the consequences of the public emergence of the national security adviser is the demand for increased

accountability, especially on Capitol Hill, where congressmen and senators get to ask questions of the

department heads but are unable to demand answers from the presidents closest policy adviser.

The absence of congressional accountability sometimes leads to the suggestion that the national security adviser

should be confirmed but it was rejected by the Tower Commission.

Reading 3: NATO Expansion

The Anatomy of a DecisionThe article reveals that the administration decided to expand NATO despite widespread bureaucratic opposition

because a few key people wanted it to happen, the most important being the president and his national security

adviser, Anthony Lake. The policy initiative came about through a series of decisions and presidential

statements made during three key phases of the process in 1993 and 1994.

PHASE 1: BUREAUCRATIC DEBATE AND ENDORSEMENT OF THE PFP

There were 3 main sets of opinion in the debate.

- The bureaucracy greatly resisted expanding the alliance because of: (1) their concern about NA TOs future

military effectiveness (from the Pentagons standpoint, it did not make sense to talk about expansion until after

NATO had established the type of military-to-military relationships that would enable new countries to

integrate effectively into the alliance) as well as (2) the fear that expansion would antagonize Russia and bolster

nationalists and communists there.

- A small group at the State Department advocated a fast-track approach to expansion: NATO should lay out

criteria, put forward a clear timetable, and perhaps even offer associate membership to a first set of countries.

The reasons for their proposal were that (1) without the prospect membership in key Western institution,

Central and Eastern Europe would lose the momentum of reform; (2) the new democracies were fragile, ex-

Communist were likely to gain power in Poland, and if NATO helped Poland succeed in carrying out reforms, it

would have huge impact on the rest of the region; (3) NATO could successfully bring in a united Germany in


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy1990 without damaging U.S-Soviet relations so NATO involve Russia in the expansion process rather than

confront its former enemy.

- Another group in the State Department, led by Strobe Tabbott supported a more cautious and gradualist

approach to expansion, which place the policy emphasis on the PFP because they believed that Russia would

not understand a quick expansion, which would impair the U.S-Russia relationship.

In the end, they came to a consensus to put forward the PFP and to say something general about NATOs

eventual expansion

PHASE 2: THE PRESIDENT SPEAKS

- In Brussels, Clinton said that the PFP: set in motion a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO

- To proponents of NATO expansion, this statement laid the basis for moving the process along.

- For expansion skeptics, the expansion was theoretically possible but would not happen soon.

But regardless whether the consensus remained, Clinton had opened the door for expansion.

PHASE 3: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY

- The president endorsed the two-tract plan that Lake and his staff, as well as the State Department pushed,

which led to the May 1997 signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the July 1997 NATO summit inMadrid inviting Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic to begin talks on accession to full NATO membership.

Reading 4: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile crisis (By Graham T. Allison)

Foreign Policy can be explained through 3 conceptual models:

- Rational Policy Model: The nation or government is conceived as a rational unitary decision maker and policy

making is an action of Rational Choice: Rational choice is value-maximizing. The rational agent selects the

alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives.

- Organizational Process Model: considerpolicy as organizational output. The actor is not a monolithic nation

or government but rather a constellation of loosely allied organization on top of which government leaders sit.This constellation acts only as component organizations perform routines.

- Bureaucratic Politics Model: consider policy as political outcome. The actor is neither a unitary nation nor a

conglomerate of organizations but rather a number of individual players. Groups of these players constitute the

agent for particular government decisions and actions. Players are men in jobs.

Soviet Unions and U.Ss foreign policy in Cuban missile crisis can be explained through the use of 3 models

above.

Reading 5: Are Bureaucracies important? (by Stephen D. Krasner)

- Thesis: It is not true that: Important decisions result from numerous smaller actions taken by individuals at

different levels in the bureaucracy who have partially incompatible national, bureaucratic, political, and

personal objective. They are not necessarily a reflection of the aims and values of high officials.

Reasons:

- The strength of bureaucratic web has been distributed to two sources: organizational necessity and

bureaucratic interest (which includes budget allocation, autonomy, morale, and scope which they defend in a

game of political bargaining and compromise within the executive branch)

- The president has strong influence on the strength of bureaucracies because:


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policy+ The president chooses the most of the important players and sets the rules. He selects the men who head the

large bureaucracies. The individuals must share his values. While bureau chief are undoubtedly torn by

conflicting pressure arising either from their need to protect their own bureaucracies or from personal

conviction, he must remain thepresidents men.

+ The most important action-channel in the government is the presidents ear. The president has major role in

determining who whispers to it.

+ The president has important impact on bureaucratic interest (e.g budget, or scope of an organ izations

activities)


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWeek 8 Congress and USFP

1. Snow, Congressional powers

House: 435 members

Senate: 100 members

a. law-making power

b. power of purse

c. confirmation power(the Senate)

d. oversight power

e. war power(declare the war)

f. treaty power(the Senate 2/3 majority)

2. James Lindsay, From deference to activism and back again: Congress and the politics of USFP

He tries to explain how Congress was active or inactive in 1995 versus 2002

a. in 1995, Congress was very active in foreign policyb. in 2002, Congress was not active in foreign policyWhats happened to the attitude of Congress?

a. it depends on how weak or strong the president isb. in times of peace, Congress is active in foreign policy, (more commercially active)c. in times of conflict and security threat, Congress takes the backseat3 Louis Fisher, Presidential Wars

He tries to explain the approach between the two branches to war-making

a: 1879-1950: all wars declared by Congress

b: 1950-today: no declared wars; two without congressional vote: Korea 1950, Yugoslavia1999

c. the nature of Constitution invites struggle with conflicts and interests between EX branch and the Legislative

branch.(Constitutional checks and balance)

d.1973 the War Powers Resolution (lesson from the Vietnam war)

4. Christopher Jones, the V-22 Osprey

He tries to explain why these aircrafts were produced in spite of rejections from DoD

a. Congress: create jobs and for technology advancementb. Marine corps: replace the aging helicoptersc. Contractors: support itBureaucratic model: Where u stand depends on where u sit.


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Snow, United States Foreign Policy

Interest Groups and Think Tanks

1. Iron Triangle: interest groupscongressional committeeexecutive agency2. Military-Industrial Complex: defense industrySASC,HNSCDOD3. Sources of Change

(1) Convergence of foreign and domestic issues(2) Increased transparency of international events(3) The global media as an actor and influence in process(4) The rise of so-called electronic experts(5) Growing public disaffection with the competency of the political leadership

Interest Groups

4. Interest Groups: any organized group of people who share common interests distinct from those of others and whoattempt [to represent their common interests to the political system] and influence public policy in the direction of

that interest.5. Functions of interest groups

(1) Lobbying: seeking to convince individual members of Congress or executive agency officials to support theigroups positions

I. Types of lobbyists(2) Education: seeking to influence the political system by providing expert information in an issue area that can be

used to educate both those in power and the public

(3) Pressure: convincing officials of the negative consequences of opposing their interests or the benefits ofsupport.

Political Action Committee (PAC): Influence elections by collecting money from their membership and using it to

support candidates sympathetic to their causes and to oppose their opponents.

6. Types of Interests Groups(1) General and Specific(2) Permanent and Ad Hoc(3) Groups with Continuous or Occasional Interests(4) Private and public(5) National and international

7. Policy elites and think tanks(1) In not-for-profit, nonpartisan research institutes and organizations that conduct research on policy matters and

share that knowledge ith policy makers

(2) Patterns of function and activityI. ResearchII. PublicationIII.Expert adviceIV.Talent bankV. Focal point for like-minded individualsVI.Media connection

Domestic interests in NAFTA bargaining

1. Three contentious issues in the U.S.-Mexican negotiations: agriculture, labor and environment issues2. Two-level bargaining

Level I: the international level, at which bargaining takes place among representatives of states in order to conclude

an agreement.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyLevel II: the domestic level, at which bargaining involves attempts to gain support from those domestic

constituencies who must concur with the terms of the agreement if it is to be ratified.

3. The Market-Opening Coalition(1) Backers: National Security Council, Department of State, Republicans, Chamber of Commerce, business leaders

grain producers, consumers, some environmentalists

(2) Fast-track authority: requires Congress to consider the treaty in an up or down vote, without amendment, andwithin a specific time period.(3) U.S. trade policy making: Multilayered pyramid of lobbying activity

4. The Status Quo Coalition(1) Components: labor unions, environmental and consumer advocacy groups, some segments of agriculture, Jesse

Jacksons Rainbow Coalition, some religious and civic groups

(2) The U.S. labor unions strongly opposed NAFTA because of the fear of job flows to low-wage Mexico and theunprotected worker rights and workplace standards in Mexico.

5. Structure of Level II ratification process(1) Institutional context of norms, rules and procedures affects the size of win-set. Ex: two-third majority vs. mere

majority

6. Level I negotiating strategies(1) Side payments: targeted to attract swing margin support(2) Generic good will: a chief negotiator whose political standing at home is high can more easily win ratification o

his foreign initiatives

Landmines: Why the Korea Exception should be a rule

1. Korea Exception: because of the nature of the threat and geography on the Korean Peninsula, antipersonnelandmine requirements in Korea must be excluded from any ban until such time as suitable alternatives are

developed and fielded.

2. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL): Well-orchestrated public relations; boldness of its demands


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ProcessPublic Opinion

1. Snow, United States Foreign PolicyMedia is supposed by the law to be the watchdogs against incompetent or corrupt government, but inpractice, there are many difficulties: Control of the Agenda, Secrecy, General Public Ignorance of Foreign

Policy and (Lack of Interest).

The permanent ascendance of the US to a position of world leadership after WWII began the process of

increasing involvement of the public.

Multiple Publics:

1).The uninformed public, 2).The effective public,3). Core decision makers

Sources of Change:1).Greater access to information, 2).Educational reform, 3).Increased relevance of foreign policy, 4).

Mobilizing public opinion

Traditional View of the Media:

1). Collection and Reportage of the News, 2).Investigation or Watchdogging, 3).Interpretation,

4).Influencing public opinion on issues, 5).Agenda setting

Impact of the Telecommunications Revolution:

1).Increased ability to influence events, 2).Impact on the policy process, 3).The media as part of theprocess, 4).The media as publicist, interpreter, and agenda setter

2. Bruce Jentleson and Rebecca Britton, Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War Public Opinion on the Use ofForce

PPO theory (Principal Policy Objective) for using military force

PPOindependent variable

Public Opinion towards using forces abroaddependent variable

Objectives:

HI (humanitarian intervention)ambiguous support (e.g. Somalia)

FPR (foreign policy restraint)highest support (e.g. 1990s Gulf War; to maintain the status quo)

IPC (internal political change)lowest support (e.g. 2003 Iraq War)

3. Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis, Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq WarHow the executive branch mobilize the public to support their using force by media.

The misperceptions: 1). Weapons of Mass Destruction found 2).Iraqs supporting al Qaeda 3). Believing

that world public opinion backed the US going to war

The administration disseminates information directly and by implication.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyGenerally speaking, the misperception has much to do with 1). The source of news 2). Ones education

level 3). Intention to vote for the president

4. Christopher GelpiPeter Feaver, and Jason Reifler, Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War inIraqUS publics tolerance for the human costs of war is primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial

attitudes:

1). Beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war

2). Beliefs about a wars likely success

The beliefs about the likelihood of success matter most in determining the publics willingness to

tolerate US military deaths in combat.


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The future of U.S.-China Relations

1.optimists pessimists

liberals interdependence, institutions, democratization authoritarian PRC regime/insecure, the

perils of transition

U.S. regime is a crusading democracy

realists PRCs limited power and aim, security dilemma muted PRCs rising power and aim, security

dilemma intense

constructivists identities, strategic cultures, norms: flexible and

softening via institutional contact

rigid and hardening via shocks and crises

American hegemony and East Asian Order

1. Three aspects of this regional hegemonic order that need emphasis: (1) the striking way in which the alliance systemhas played a more general role as the basis of regional political architecture; (2) the hub-and-spoke American

security order has been crucial for the emergence of an open regional/global world economy; and (3) the specific

way in which American security relations were established in East Asia reflects the specific postwar power realities

and array of countries in the region

2. Nye Commission: favors a continuation of the U.S. security presence in East Asia.3. American unipolarity appears to reinforce Americas preference for a hub-and-spoke approach to East Asia.4. War on terrorism in favor of coalitions of the willing puts Americas East Asian traditional partners in a difficult

position

Kim Jong-ils Clenched Fist

1. Kims regime has been heavily dependent on support of the armed forces.military-first policy2. Chinas concerns: social disorder and refugee flows if internal upheaval in DPRK occurs.


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Russia and the West:

-Russia needs to assert its position as a great power and self-interest e.g Putin domination in foreign policy imposed

the national interest

-not a confrontation /equal partnership with America.

Power shifts

-Existence of a multipolar world in which Russia is one of the principal poles alongside with U:S;China +existence of an

anarchic world system in which power matters more than norms.

-Oil+gas +increased Russian militarystrengthen the position in relation to US and Europe

A Putin Doctrine?

-Need to make Russia an independent actor in the International affairs

-influenced by multipolarity

-gain global stability by leading powers which serve first to their national interests.

-no unipolarity-seen how U:S didnt manage to influence its close allies in Iraq war

The language of geopolitics

-Need for Russia to gain military, economic, institutional power-national stability +promotion of Russia as a great

Power

-Need for economic expansion+ stability at home-use these for strategic purposes---exert geopolitical influence

-Economic achievement ---military achievement --as a way to stand up Russian interests.

-both US and Russia aim for stability but they have different goals and ideas since each of the country is concerned

about its own national interest first

Misreading the effects of the September 11 attacks

-11 September Attackas a way to recognise Russia as a great pillar in the Post 11 Sep. World order

-so a way for Russia to assert itself as a pivotal state.

Creating its own course

-promoting itself as a power does not necessarily mean as a way of anti-west or anti-Us

-the aim of Russia is to be a stable state

-11 sep .attach reaproachment with US served longstanding Russian foreign policy goals.

The New Battleground

-3 years later after the meeting Putin-Bush on 2001-strategic partnership forged after the 11 sep.attack

-Recently the era of competition between US and Russia for Caucasus and Central Asia

1. The new strategic emphasis the US placed on Caucasus and Central Asia as part of global war against

terrorism

2. Russian domestic economic priorities

3. Putins policymaking authority & new-imperial foreign policy in the Kremlin

The idea of anti-terrorism first accepted by Russia but then the idea of US for an indefinite stay in these partswarn

Russian influence


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWashington Looking East

-After 11 sep-America extend its influence military,econom. And intelligence

-Militaryfrom adversary based model to deterrence and defense against potential adversaries.

Energy imperative

-not want to assert state authority

-shed light on the non-commitment to economic integration to West

Imperial impulse of Russia

Reasons:

1. Educational achievement

2. Expansion of executive powers (Putin monopolize policy-making)

3. Appoint former KGB officers-give support to Putingive Putin neo-imperial aspirations

Doctrine:

Provide expansion of military blocks and alliances

1. use pre-emptive mil.force not only to address military threats but maintain access to regions of vitaleconomic or financial importance

Russias impulse

Caucasus and Asialead to conflicts regarding US and Russia

Nato aims to include countries of Central Asia +Caucasus

Kremlin needs this dominant player as a political prestige +economic necessity

Power & Weakness

-EU used to be what America is now.

-cooperation is possible but EU and America have different sets of ideals and principles regarding morality and

powers.

-power gap

-Europe lost centrality after Cold War

-EU tries to produce multipolar 21 century...but with war in Kosovo proved that Europe is not able to provide

a modern welfare

-it is not ready for a shift from social to military programmes.

-technology and US military force remains unprecedented


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyPsychology

-European weakness made it focus more on law and institutions.

-matter of culture

-same threat different appeal because some are outside Europe

-Europe is not the first target

Origin of European f.policy

-Different perspectives on foreign policy because different historical experience

-Europe is more of peacekeeping rather than military actions

US response

-WW II reduced Europe global power

-end Germanys militarism and reunite Germany with France

-US provided a power without making Europe a monopoly of powers.

New Transatlantic Project

-Moscow cooperate with EU and US

-Europe now at peace..the threat nowadays is from the Middle East

Challenge:

1. go on the offensive

2. adress on the root cause

3. need to change the M:E regimes

4.change the political strategy

Elements

1.threat comes beyond the continent

2.encourage the ME to address these problems by themselves

3.give elements of democratisation but up to them to give the final shape


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWeek 13:

American & Latin America

philip brenner, patrick haney, walter vanderbush "intermestic interests and u.s. policy toward cuba"in recent years the embargo on cuba has been loosened. the authors feel 4 factors have had an effect on the

changes: 1.the realitivly new entry of business and farm interests into cuba policy, 2. the executives constitutionally

based interests, 3. bureaucratic interets and 4. pressure from outside the united states.

Thesis: Ultimatley, we argue, the case demonstrates that the largely discarded concept intermestic policy-

which addresses interests both domestic or international elements- deserve renewed attention.

background: (n)ever changing cuba policy:

helms-burton act codified eisenhower executive sanctions against cuba. thusly, diminishing executive ability to

modulate the embargo. clinton loosened the embargo with out any demands on the cuban government, allowing

culutural exchanges and the sale of food to private restuarants, seed, and farm equipment. the announcement

opened a new pressure from corporations to lobby for relaxation of the embargo. cubans rejected cause of clintons

track 2 rhetoric of hastening a regime change. the momentum had begun to move to dismantling the embargo, but

it had no viable vechile.

aschcroft bill provided a vechile. it lifted medicine and food sales embargos and took away executive authority to do

set embargos. it failed however a similar bill, only prohibiting the extension of credit to cuba to buy food and

medicine, was passed.

then 9/11 happened and the momentum halted cause cuba was on the terror list. however hurrican michelle,

november 2001, devasted cuba's harvest and the bush adminstration offered food aid. the cubans rejected aid butwanted to pay. bush disagreed but a UN vote calling for an end to the U.S. cuban embargo prompted bush to sell;

and 6 month after there were 100 million dollars in u.s. agricultural sales to cuba.

former president jimmy carter visited cuba and members in congress felt the days of the embargo were number.

congressmen jeff flake offered an amendment to end the economic embargo with cuba, but in the senate fearing a

presidential veto the senate dropped the amendment from their bill.

factors shaping cuba policy:

new groups join the fray: the cuban american national foundation (CANF) dominated the formulation of cuban

policy. their credibility dewindled but cuban american politicians picked up the pro-embargo stances where theCANF had left it. however, anti-embargo groups including the pope moved to end the embargo.

the end of the cold war generated a decline in traditional security interests and opened the door to greater interest

groups activism. the farm lobby seeing the decline of cuba as a security risk, former politicians and bureaucrats and

the international institutions moved for an end of the embargo. a temporary set back with 9/11 but that was short

lived an debate on trade with cuba soon entered congressional debate

the executive's interest:

since WW2 presidents have zealously guarded the executives preeminence in foreign policy. the executive was


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policydefending their intrests with the fight against title III taking away executive authority in handling cuba. Cuba was

just intermingled in the debate.

bureaucratic interests:

under both bush and clinton actors with in the executive branch promoted cuba policies that reflected at varyingtimes narrow personal goals, agency interests, or particular constructions of u.s. global interests in the face of

increasing globalization. these constructions in part resulted from accommodations officials made to satisfy bot

domestic and international intersts inside and outside agencies.

external pressures:

several factors undermined the expansion and extraterritorial provisions of the 1992 cuban democracy act

(LIBERTAD) and helms-barton bill, along with the embargo itself. allies traded with cuba. the pope visited cuba

and called for an end to the embargo prompting several south american countries to sign trade pacts. cuba's

economy improved in 96 and the embargo was no longer effective. NAFTA partners traded with mexico and

canada. conflicts with the WTO free trade policy.

understanding cuba policy:

our findings suggest that it is not the issue that is intermestic but rather the factors shaping a policy. the two-level

game doesnt work in analysing cuba cause it lacks the complexity. clinton had to satisfy two groups domestically

and internationally. the cuban case maybe more complex then other foreign policy issues. but the authors argue that

the opening of u.s. foreign policy began before the end of the cold war. with the involvement of congress, and

lobbying groups which sprunge up during the vietnam war and civil rights era. 9/11 may have reconstituted

presidential power but internal groups still argue on presidentail authority in the realm of foreign affairs.

IS WASHINGTON LOSING LATIN AMERICApeter hakim

Drifting Dangerously:

relations between u.s. and latin america are at a low point. u.s. policy in recent years has lacked direction. after 9/11

the u.s. attention to latin america has been sporadic and focused on hot-spots. the result of uni-lateralism has caused

a lost in respect for washington from most of latin-america's leaders and people. latin-america leaders have failed

too. failed to complete the economic and political reform started in the 90s and have mostly neglected economic

and social tensions in the region. instability in the resource rich countries and rising crime may hurt america.

Southern Exposure:

u.s. officials have been disappointed by developments in latin-american: the economy, lately interests rates and

inflation is down, but growth has been slow. political situation: in the last decade nearly a dozen elected presidents

have been forced from office, corruption in social institutions and an unfair judiciay systems, and poor legislative

and party systems. latin-americas disapproval of the iraq war in the u.n.

You Say You Want A Revolution:

Hugo Chavez as a advesary: pro-castro regime, his envolvement in nicaragua bolivia ecuador and guerillas in


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policycolumbia. forming a leftist anti-american coalition to promote his interests in the western hemisphere. other latin-

american countries are unwilling to stop chavez and his growing popularity.

The China Card:

washington is watchful but unalarmed about china's influence in latin-america

At Arm's Length:

anti-americanism has surged, the uni-lateral approach of the bush adminstration, latin-america wants economic ties

but high u.s. standards stop them, immigration policy of the u.s., what troubles latin-americans most is the sense

that washington just does not take the region seriously and still considers it to be its own backyard.

A Very Long Estrangement:

there is little reason to expect that u.s. relations with latin american will improve soon. not all is bad u.s. and latin-

america have similar values. some bilateral relations are strong. but latin-america and the u.s. remain unwilling to

pursue mutually beneficial policies in trade and political ties.

THE HISPANIC CHALLENGE samuel huntington

hispanics are coming to america in an unprecedent levels compared to that of other migrations. this hispanic move could

create a culture divide in america as white and black. the differnce compared to other immigrant populations is the

unwillingness to assimilate.

differences:

contiguity: mexico shares a boarded with the u.s. there is not an ocean seperating the two countries. like no other situtation

in the world does a first world country share the board so large with a third world country.

scale: more mexicans have come to america since 1965 then any other ethnic group in american history. they now out

number blacks and have more children then the other groups. also for the first time half of those entering the u.s. share a

non-english language.

illegality: mexicans enter the country illegaly. a rise in apprehension

regional concentration: hispanics concentrate in regional locations unlike past groups that spread out. transforming the

regions socail dynamics. miami and los angeles

persistance: other migrations have subsided but the influx of mexicans has persisted

historical presence: no other immigrant group besides mexicans could assert a claim to u.s. territory like mexicans can and

do. america annexed large portions of mexican territory, todays american south-west, after the mexican-american war.

spanglish as a second language

the size, persistance and concentration of hispanics make using spanish easier then the past. spanish is becoming americas

second language. bilingual education programs, advertising, etc.

blood is thicker then water


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policythe trend of regional domination and identification as culturally non-american could lead areas to autonomous, culturally

and linguistically distinct, economically self-reliant bloc within the u.s.

bienvenido a miami

miami cuban influence and the following influx of latin-americans led to a hispanic dominated society. where there was

no need and some cases unwillingness to assimilate to anglo culture. leaving whites and blacks on the outside and unable

to communicate with govt. officials.

contempt of culture

mexicans unlike cubans do not have contempt for their past political system, and often have contempt for american

culture.

irreconcilable differences

continued large immigration and failure of assimilation in to the english speaking white society will leave america

divided. a country with two cultures and two languages. reconquista of american southwest

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE AMERICAS Lowenthal

thesis: why has the new administration taken such a strong initial interest in Latin-America and the caribbean? what are

the premises, principles, and priorites for the obama adminstration in the americas? what should be its next step?

why latin america matters

first, transnational issues as energy security, enviromental issues, crime, narcotics, and public health are increasingly

important.

second, borders between u.s. and its closet neighbors have been blurred by sustained and massive migrations.

third, latin america is economically important to the u.s. as a prime source of energy and other key resources, and as a

priority market for u.s.

finally, shared values in western hemisphere as expressed in the inter-american democratic charter. human rights,

effective democratic governance, consistent application of the rule of law, and free political expression.

the troubles state of inter-american relations

western hemisphere summits but little more then photo oppurtunity and rhetoric. hugo chavez took advantage and

started an anti-u.s. campaign with aid and promise to build latin-american infrastructures. while other latin-america

countries have begun to intergrate through institutions and trade.

renewing inter-american cooperation

there are three key principles for obama adminstration in latin-american relations:

first, show the world and american public they can slow and reverse recession, and restore the economy to what it was

before.

second, instead of rhetoric the adminstrations will work with latin-american countries on a few select issues that can be

addressed soon such as bolstering financial institutions, restoring credit and investment flows, energy policy, the

enviroment, and citizen security.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policythird, disaggregate latin-american countries.

changing mindset

the new adminstration is not imprisoned by the damaging mindset imposed by traditional ideology and rhetoric (divide

into good guys and bad guys), can respond better to the reality of latin-america: weak political institutions, low levels of

accountability, and uneven application of the rule of law.

strategic choices: issues and regions

four changes in domestic u.s. policy can help in the americas and inter-american relations. "intermestic" agenda shaping.

immigration: help create stability and jobs in latin american countries to slow the migration to the u.s.

trade: open u.s. market to greater imports from developing countries, in latin-america

energy: conservation, green energy policy and renewable resources

narcotics: prevention, treatment, rehabilation and youth employement programs in u.s. drop the war on drugsterminology

closest neighbor

special attention to mexico, centeral america, and caribbean. and to forge a shared positive vision of the future for the

entire region and explore how best to achieve it.

brazil: the rise of brazil has made obamas amdminstration take a shared interest with brasil and promote mutually

beneficial policies since policy preference aligns

andean ridge: instability caused by or as a symptom of the narcotics trade. u.s. interests and the prospect for inter-american

cooperations in this complex region will take patience, case-by-case treatment and not assertive broad brush policies.

cuba: open communication and expanding private and public relations will lead to cooperation.

further challanges

needs a long-term strategy for hemispheric engagement. end poverty, ethnic exclusion, rising unemployement. do not

have the resources now but should keep these in mind. most improvement will come when u.s. returns to the multilateral

international rule of law pre-bush rule and build confianza or trust.


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign PolicyWeek 14:

america and the middle east

the israel lobby mearsheimer and walt

the domestic politics, the israel lobby, has influenced most if not all of america's diplomatic and milttary support for

israel. since the october war in 1973 has provided economic and military aid to israel dwarfing any other state. it gives

money at the beginning of the year so israel can gain interest on it instead of quarterly installements. israel gets special

treatment.

the geneoristy would be acceptable if israel was a vital strategic asset or if there were a compelling moral case for u.s.

backing, but neither case is convincing.

Strategic:

its more of a burden. it helped some with the cold war but now that is over. and in both gulf wars israel couldnt help

cause of the arab world.

in the 90s and even more after 9/11 the case for support has been made based on the threat of terrorist groups and rogue

states. this argument is no good. saying that israel and the u.s. are united by a shared terrorist threat has the casual

relationship backwards: the u.s. has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with israel. the rogue

states are not so much a threat to vital u.s. interests other then they threaten israel. israel also does not behave like a loyal

ally. it often reneges on promises and spies on the u.s.

Moral:

the argument that israel is the lone democracy in the area and the jews have suffered for a long time. often portrayed as

david v. golaith. but the opposite is true. their forces are better equipped and led then the surronding countries.

the lone democracy is no basis for the unprecedented aid israel recieves. there are lots of democracies around the world.

its american style democracy is in question. it is a jewish state and is based on kinship. refusal of a palastinians state.

jewish suffering in the christian west. the jewish state was needed but it violated another innocent third parties right

palestines.

israel is a peaceful nation that has showed restraint. military conquest and human rights violations equal to that of the

arabs in the first intifada trucheons to brake protesters bones.

the israel lobby:

the reason for all the support is the lobby. american-israel public affairs committee. christian evangelicas pat robertson

jerry falwell. dick armey and tom delay all support israel and its expasion cause if not it would be going against gods will

the lobby pursue two broad strategies: 1. it pressures congress and the executive making israel the smart choice and 2. it

strives to ensure that public discourse portrays israel in a positive light.

the power: israel is virtually immune to critism. jewish senators and congressmen who work to serve israel interests.

pro-israel congressional staffers. AIPAC abilitiy to reward and punish candidates and legislators who support their

agenda. jewish voters in presidential elections helps leverage pressure on the executive branch, critics of israel do not get

foreign policy jobs, and in clinton and bush adminstrations had pro-israelist shaping middle eastern policy. there


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Summary Political Science: U.S. Foreign Policyvirtually no opponents to the israel lobby, arab lobby is does not exist to is not well organized.

the lobby doesn't want a debate. mainstream media is dominated by people who would not critize israel. news reports are

more even handed but the lobby organizes letter writing campaigns. the lobby also dominated think tanks. they police

academia and even tried to get congress to monitor what professors say.

the charge of anti-semitism: new anti-semitism critize israel and you are an anti-semite.

examples of how the israel lobby influenced the iraq war and the opposition ot iran's nuclear programme.

THE NEW ISRAEL AND THE OLD by mead

americans have been pro-israel for the last 60 years. this foreign policy has not been influenced by a small lobby over the

public. it represents the power of public opinion. to understand this pro-israel attitude one must study the source of

nonelite, non-jewish support for the jewish state.

summary all readings week 2-week14

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