sufism in yemen.pdf

The "Tariqa" on a Landcruiser: The Resurgence of Sufism in YemenAuthor(s): Alexander KnyshSource: Middle East Journal, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 399-414Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329649 .

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The Tariqa on a Landcruiser: The Resurgence of Sufism in Yemen

Alexander Knysh

The article examines the resurgence of Sufi-oriented religious movements in contemporary Yemen with special reference to the province of Hadramawt. One such movement, centered in the city of Tarim, has become particularly prominent and popular due to the eforts of its able leader, a young sayyid scholar named Habib 'Umar. Habib 'Umar and his followers advocate a modified version of traditional Yemeni religiosity that encourages pilgrimages to the shrines of local saints and prophetic figures, collective recitations of Sufi poetry, celebrations of the Prophet's birthday and ascension to heaven. The movement's educational philosophy emphasizes a total submission of the disciples to the spiritual authority of the mentor and reverence for the descendants of the Prophet, who are represented locally by the Ba 'Alawi family of sada (sayyids). In conclusion, the author addresses some broader theoretical implications of this Sufi resurgence, including the tensions between the "nativist" and "imported" interpretations of Islam promoted by various groups of Yemeni Muslims.

In her recent article, Dr. Ulrike Freitag of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London has predicted "a possible revival of Sufism" in a south-eastern

Alexander Knysh is Professor of Islamic Studies at the Department of Near Eastern Studies, the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He specializes in the history of Islamic religious movements in general and Islamic mysticism (Sufism) in particular. In 1986-89, he conducted field research in the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen as a member of the Soviet-Yemeni Historical and Archeological Mission. The present article was written after his latest visit to Yemen in October-November 1999.

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME NO. 3, SUMMER 2001



400 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

province of the newly unified Yemeni state.' David Buchman of the State University of New York, Stony Brook, has made a much more cautious assessment of Yemeni Sufism's potential as a religious movement, emphasizing the strong opposition to it from many Yemeni religio-political parties and factions.2 As the Yemenis in 2000 celebrated the tenth anniversary of their country's unification in a relatively open and democratic political atmosphere,3 it is appropriate to examine new trends in the country's religious and political life in general, and Sufi-based movements in particular, in order to ascertain the accuracy of these predictions.

Several important caveats are in order here. First, Freitag's and Buchman's observations refer to different parts of Yemen. While Freitag's statement is limited to Hadramawt-a large eastern province of the Republic of Yemen, Buchman's research is somewhat broader in scope. It encompasses the capital Sana'a' and the regions of Ta'izz and al-Hujariyya with occasional excursions into other areas of the country. Second, my own observations rest, for the most part, on my field work in the southern areas of the country, especially in Hadramawt, where I conducted my research both before and after the country's unification in 1990. My data on the north is relatively sketchy and confined mostly to the cities of Ta'izz and Ibb and their environs. I have no field data from such traditional Sufi centers of North Yemen as Zabid and the region of the Tihama, which remain outside the scope of this article. Third, before discussing the vicissitudes of Sufism in Yemen I must point out that the associations that this word invokes in the mind of an average Yemeni citizen do not necessarily correspond to those of a Western Islamicist or even a Muslim from another part of the Islamic world. Since various aspects of Yemeni Sufism will be highlighted in the course of this article, I limit myself here to a few general remarks.

Historically, in Yemen, Sufism was associated primarily with the informal network of groups of disciples aggregating around a reputed Sufi master. The latter could reside in a remote rural/tribal area or in an urban center.4 This is still very much the case in contemporary Yemen. In these circumstances, the direct and unmediated relations between the shaykh and his murids (disciples) have been the mainstay of Sufi training in Yemen until today. In any event, these relations were never as formalized or hierarchical as they were in the large Sufi brotherhoods spread in the rest of the Muslim world, especially in Egypt, the Maghrib, Anatolia, and the Indian Subcontinent. For a number of reasons that are too complex to be addressed here, the large centralized Sufi brotherhoods that were so prominent in these areas have never gained ascendancy in Yemen or, for that matter, in any other part of Arabia, with the possible exception of Mecca-the

1. Ulrike Freitag, "Hadhramaut: A Religious Centre for the Indian Ocean in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries," in Studia Islamica, 89 (1999), p. 183.

2. David Buchman, "The Underground Friends of God and Their Adversaries: A Case Study and Survey of Sufism in Contemporary Yemen," in Yemen Update, 39 (1997), pp. 21-24.

3. For the strengths and limitations of fledgling Yemeni democracy see Sheila Carapico, "Pluralism, Polarization, and Popular Politics in Yemen," in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. 2 vols. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1995-1998), Volume 2. Comparative Experiences, pp. 241-278.

4. See Chapter 9 of my Ibn 'Arabi' in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).



SUFISM IN YEMEN * 401

headquarters of many powerful Sufi brotherhoods (turuq).5 At the same time, in the not so remote past, some of them, namely the Rifa'iyya, the Qadiriyya, the Tijaniyya, the Ahmadiyya-Idrisiyya and the Shadhiliyya, were able to gain a foothold in various parts of Yemen. Yet, even in their heyday, these brotherhoods were nowhere as central to local life as they were in the other areas of the Muslim world, where some Sufi turuq effectively dominated the religious, political and social landscape and occasionally formed virtual states within states.6

Another salient feature of Yemeni Sufism is its intimate association-mainly in the Shafi'i areas of North Yemen, along the Red Sea coast, and in the territories of the former Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen-with the cult of local saints. Its great importance for local religiosity is attested, quite conspicuously, by the numerous well-maintained domed shrines of saints that dot the country's landscape. The shrines have served as the natural foci of such devotional activities as the annual celebrations of the Prophet's birthday (mawlid) as well as seasonal pilgrimages to the holy men and women buried there. These activities are often accompanied by the recitation of mystical and devotional poetry to the accompaniment of drums and flutes-a practice that is strongly condemned by some Muslim scholars and laymen steeped in the puritanical ideology of the neighboring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The shrines also serve as sites of weekly gatherings during which participants study and recite various religious texts, such as, for example, al-Bukhari's (d, 256/870) Sahih or al-Ghazali's (d. 505/1111) Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din. A close link between the cult of saints and what the local population commonly regard as "Sufism" is evidenced by the fact that any verbal attack on the former is automatically perceived by them as an attempt to undermine or discredit the latter.

Bearing in mind these features of Yemeni Sufism, I will now examine how some contemporary Yemeni religious groups of a Sufi slant seek to carve out an ideological niche for themselves within the wide gamut of religious and political associations and trends that have sprouted in a relatively free political atmosphere of the new Yemeni state.7 The status of contemporary Yemeni Sufism is intimately linked to the ongoing vigorous debates around the country's new identity, both religious and political, and the prospects for its future development. One should point out that Yemen's search for a new national identity has been uneven. It has been hampered by a number of obstacles, not least of which is its relatively recent (and at times coercive) formation as a unified country and the wide social, cultural and economic disparity of its constituent parts.8 Yemeni regionalism takes a variety of forms, of which tribalism is just one of the many. The longstanding divide between north and south remains deep. While the northern parts of the

5. Alfred Le Chatelier, Les confr&ries musulmanes de Hedjaz (The Muslim Brotherhoods of the Hejaz, (Paris: E. Leroux, 1887), passim.

6. See my Islamic Mysticism: A Short History (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000), pp. 245-300. 7. For the limits and problems of the Yemeni democratic developments see Sheila Carapico, Civil

Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), passim.

8. See Carapico, "Pluralism," pp. 262-264 and Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, "Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27 (1995): pp. 405-431.




country have been traditionally oriented toward the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, its south-eastern provinces were, until recently, integrated into the South Asian and East Asian economic and mercantile systems and had a long history of emigration to, and intensive contacts with India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Also important were the close economic, religious and cultural ties between the southern areas of the country and the east African coast.9 Therefore, the frequently cited statements by Western political analysts that Yemen had constituted one cultural, ethnical and political entity'0 before it was arbitrarily cut into two pieces by "European imperialism" are not quite accurate. The picture is further complicated by Yemen's diverse confessional situation. The mountain- ous region of Sa'da is home to the warlike tribesfolk who adhere to the Zaydi version of Shi'i Islam. The south-eastern regions adjacent to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, on the other hand, are inhabited primarily by the peasants of tribal background who follow the Sunnism of the Shafi'i legal school. There was also a small Isma'ili community that over the past several centuries has occupied a rather marginal position and will not be discussed here."I

Finally, for more than two decades the southern and southeastern provinces of Yemen were part of the Marxist republic of South Yemen (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). This "Arab maverick," as it was dubbed by some Western analysts, was often in conflict with its larger northern neighbor, whose leaders rejected South Yemen's Soviet-style Socialism in favor of a free market economy. In light of these factors, articulating a viable and generally accepted notion of nationhood proved to be a difficult task for the country' s leadership when its southern and northern parts were united in 1990. It was further complicated by the 1994 civil war between south and north that led to the imposition of northern rule on the resentful and humiliated southerners. The latter, though in principle in favor of unification, soon realized that they got a raw deal and began to hanker nostalgically after their lost independence. Finally, the acuteness of the debates over Yemen's religious and political identity was further aggravated by the dire economic conditions following the 1991 Gulf War, in which Yemen supported Iraq. These facts are well known to specialists and need not be rehearsed here.'2 The aim of this article is to examine how the relatively free political atmosphere of the post-unification period has given rise to intensive public debates over the country's future and religio-political identity and how these disputes are related to the revival of what I shall tentatively describe as the "Sufi movement."

During the first heady years of the post-unification period, nationalist rhetoric played a key role in these debates. However, due to the country's lack of cohesiveness (for all intents and purposes, it was and still remains a motley agglomeration of historically isolated or semi-independent regions and tribal domains), nationalism was gradually

9. For details see Ulrike Freitag and William Clarence-Smith (eds.), Hadhrami Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997).

10. See, e.g., Michael Dunn, "Islamist Parties in Democratizing States: A Look at Jordan and Yemen," in Middle East Policy, Vol. 2 No. 2 (1993), p. 22.

11. See my Ibn 'Arabi in the Later Islamic Tradition, pp. 225-228. 12. For a recent account see Carapico, Civil Society, chapters 1-4.




supplanted by discourses that were couched in a religious idiom.'3 One reason why Islam has become the preferred frame of reference for the disputants is its perceived neutrality as a field of discourse. In other words, many Yemenis consider it to be free from the tribal or regional agendas that insidiously permeate the nationalist rhetoric. Islam has come to serve as a convenient and accepted discursive vehicle in the relatively open public debates around the country's political, social, and religious direction and identity. Here it is important not to fall into the all-too-familiar trap of viewing the religious discourses employed by the parties to the polemic as mere rhetorical trappings that conceal some "real" political agendas. If we choose to pursue this line of inquiry, we shall at best have to content ourselves with the trite conclusion that the religious and the political are closely, if not inextricably, intertwined and interdependent. This conclusion, however, does not carry far. It seems more fruitful to examine carefully the concrete ideological positions advocated by the religio-political groups that emerged in the wake of unification, in order to see how these groups availed themselves of and deployed various discursive strands within the Islamic legacy. Once this task has been accomplished, it will become clearer how the religious positions of the disputants were constituted, contested, articulated, and negotiated in the public sphere.

In the local media, various groups engaged in public debates are often presented as cohesive, monolithic religious parties pursuing incompatible religio-political goals. One such group is routinely depicted by local writers and journalists as comprising the advocates of the pristine Islam of the first Muslim community, who profess some version of Islamic reformism. Referred to by their supporters as salafiyyun, the members of this group are juxtaposed sharply with the adherents of the "traditional" Yemeni religiosity who portray themselves as the resuscitators of the pious ways of their Yemeni forebears and the guardians of their sacred legacy. The former group, sometimes described as "Wahhabis" by their opponents,'4 is quite complex and includes at least three subdivi- sions. The use of the term "Wahhabi" by their opponents is not fortuitous. It hints at their indebtedness to the Saudi state both ideologically and financially. The "Wahhabis," on the other hand, vigorously deny their dependence on the Wahhabi doctrines and Saudi financial help. Acknowledging this would harm the salafis in the eyes of most Yemenis, since this would reduce them to the role of Saudi stooges. Given the longstanding territorial grievances between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and, more recently, the massive expulsion of Yemeni immigrant workers from the kingdom during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, this is an image Yemeni political factions try to avoid. The first subdivision within the salafi camp consists of the moderate salafis/"Wahhabis." They seem to be in the majority, although in the absence of any reliable data this is impossible to ascertain statistically. A more radical wing of the salafi movement is sometimes called ahl al-sunna. Organized in informal discussion and study groups active at the grass root level, they are watched by government officials with some suspicion as potential troublemakers. The

13. Dresch and Haykel, "Stereotypes," p. 415. 14. See, e.g., Shelagh Weir, "A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen," in Middle East

Report (July-September 1997), pp. 22-26.




Muslim Brethren (al-ikhwan) are said to constitute a separate wing of the salafi movement. Viewed with suspicion by the country's leadership, the exact extent of their influence on Yemeni society and the nature of their relations with the other factions of the salafiyya are hard to determine.'5 On the opposite extreme of the religio-political spectrum are the Sufis, the sufiyyun or al-sufiyya. They sometimes portray themselves as "the followers of the pious ancestors" (atba' al-salaJ), which creates some confusion when you encounter an individual whose religious leanings are not immediately evident. Their opponents describe them as "grave worshippers" (al-quburiyyun) and "propagators of innovations and superstitions" (ashab al-bid 'a wa 'l-khurafat).

Now, many adherents of the salafi/Wahhabi movement are loosely affiliated with the Islah ("Reform") political party led by the popular tribal leader Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Ahmar of the Hashid tribal federation. The party advocates a rather vague version of Islamic reformism 'a la Muhammad 'Abdu and Muhammad Rashid Rida and holds 53 seats in the present Yemeni parliament. Despite its apparent cohesiveness and alleged Islamist leanings, the Islah party, as Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel have finely shown'6, is, in fact, all things to all people. Internally heterogeneous, it includes many apparently incompatible constituencies, e.g., the Zaydi tribesmen of the Sa'da region and the Sunni salafiyyun who are virulently anti-Shi'a. In a like vein, many Zaydi tribesmen affiliated with the Islah through their leader Shaykh al-Ahmar have at least a modicum of respect for the families of the northern sada (descendants of the Prophet), who for many centuries were the religious and political leaders of their tribal ancestors. Their favorable attitude toward the sada inevitably puts them at odds with the egalitarian-minded salafiyyun, who vigorously deny any privilege based on ancestry or inherited social status. Strangely, on this issue at least, the Zaydi tribesmen loyal to their sada find themselves in the same camp with the sufiyya, whose leaders often descend from the renowned sada families of Hadramawt. 17 The Islah 's most radical wing, led by the outspoken Islamist 'Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, does not always see eye-to-eye with its tribal leadership and their association often looks like a marriage of convenience aimed at offsetting the power of the ruling General People's Congress, a party of state employees that advocates a nationalist agenda. Suffice it to say that the membership of all these groups and parties is in many cases informal and the lines between them are not as starkly drawn as it may appear from the ways in which they are portrayed in the Arab and Western press as well as analytical works. In fact, ordinary Yemeni Muslims may occasionally cross these lines without necessarily being seen as traitors.

The picture is somewhat different when it comes to the leaders of the opposing groups and their activists. Here the divide is quite stark and practically unbridgeable. The members of the groups often attend different mosques and Friday sermons and their public encounters may occasionally lead to violence. Their disagreements are both serious and many-fold. As far as Sufism is concerned, the salafis consider it to be a gross aberration

15. Dresch and Haykel, "Stereotypes," p. 427 note 8. 16. Dresch and Haykel, "Stereotypes," passim. 17. The Zaydi sada have their own parties, Al-Haqq ("The Truth") and the Federation of Popular Forces;

see Carapico, "Pluralism," p. 247.




of the primeval Islam of the pious ancestors and thus a deplorable religious innovation. As critics of Sufism elsewhere, they hold Sufi leaders responsible for manipulating the ignorant populace for ulterior ends, for fostering all manner of idle superstitions and for diverting the believers' creative energies from essential social and economic tasks to senseless rites and prejudices. 18 Some opponents of the Yemeni sufiyya go as far as seeing them as the main cause of the country's backwardness-an accusation that is totally groundless given the relative weakness of the local Sufi movement, past and present. Among the worst "superstitions" (khurafat) allegedly fostered by the sufiyya, the salafis single out the cult of saints, which they, in agreement with their soul-mates across the Muslim world, view as a radical departure from the sacred principle of monotheism. The differences between the Sufis and their critics are not confined to the debates over the permissibility of the visitation of holy graves and the practices associated therewith. They also come to the fore in their respective attitudes to certain religious holidays, especially the Prophet's birthday (mawlid) and the Prophet's Night Journey and Ascension to Heaven (al-isra' wa'l-mi'raj). Whereas the sufiya observe them by colorful processions and recitations of "Sufi" poetry and litanies (on closer examination these poetic texts do not necessarily contain any distinctly Sufi motifs other than a simple devotion to the Prophet and his family19), the salafiyya strongly condemn these celebrations as "blame- worthy innovations" (bida'). On occasion, the salafi activists may even try to disrupt these activities by harassing or even physically attacking their participants. In many areas, representatives of the Islah party are said to control the nomination of imams of the local mosques. Given the fact that many Islahi activists come from the Zaydi areas whose populations traditionally oppose Sufism (which they associate with the "corrupt" aspects of Shafi'i/Sunni piety), the sufiyya leaders find themselves at a serious disadvantage. Occasionally, they may even be removed from their offices for publicly propagating their views,20 although the situation varies considerably from one region to another. Between 1994 and 1997, the leaders of Islah imposed control on the curriculum in government-run religious educational institutions, which permitted them to put their anti-Sufi critique on a semi-official footing. The situation did not change significantly after the 1997 elections, when the headship of the Ministry of Education was given to a representative of the General People's Congress. Finally, apart from prohibiting or disrupting Sufi chanting in the mosques or at the saints' tombs,2' some radical members of the salafiyya often attempt to destroy physically the shrines of local saints-a practice that oftentimes leads to serious violence and even bloodshed. The tensions between the two groups are thrown into sharp relief by their different understanding of the term al-salaf (ancestors). While the salafis identify them as the upright members of the primeval Muslim community of Medina, the sufiyya take a much broader view of this notion and include in it all popular Yemeni saints

18. See, e.g., Valerie Hoffman, Sufism, Mystics, and Saints in Modern Egypt (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995):5-9; Elizabeth Syrrieh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis (Richmond: Curzon Press: 1999), passim.

19. Cf. Hoffman, Sufism, pp. 50-88. 20. Buchman, "Underground Friends," pp. 22 and 24. 21. Buchman, p. 22.




and scholars, whose tombs serve as objects of popular worship and, in some cases, of massive annual pilgrimages as well. Finally, the Sufi fascination with the saints' exemplary lives and miracles, which are celebrated in countless hagiographic works of a Sufi slant, is viewed with disgust by the salafis, who dismiss them as "fairy tales" and idle "superstitions" (khurafat).

Where primary and secondary schools of different religious orientations are available, supporters of each group tend to send their children to those that represent their religious outlooks. This factor contributed to the rapid proliferation of competing Sufi and salafi educational institutions, particularly in the southern part of Yemen. By offering two distinct types of religious education these schools perpetuate the conflict between the opposing religious parties in the younger generations. Both groups widely use modern propaganda techniques to disseminate their views and to discredit the teachings of their opponents. Their methods range from visual propaganda (slogans, posters, banners, and photographs) to popular religious pamphlets as well as audio and video cassettes and, more recently, the Internet.

Whereas in many cities and towns of North Yemen the salafis have managed to eradicate Sufism or force it underground, in the city of Tarim (eastern Hadramawt) not only has it held its ground but also experienced a full-fledged revival at the hands of the local religious leaders. As Buchman has rightly pointed out, in many areas of Yemen Sufism's potential resurgence is arrested not so much by the adverse religio-political climate as by the lack of strong personalities among its leadership.22 The Sufis of Tarim, however, found a truly charismatic and energetic leader in sayyid 'Umar b. Muhammad b. Hafiz, popularly known as Habib 'Umar. An eloquent preacher, he comes from an ancient sada family of Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Salim of the city of 'Inat. His father, a famous sayyid scholar, disappeared under obscure circumstances during the political purges unleashed by the Socialist regime (around 1972) and is widely believed to have been murdered by its secret police.23 The young 'Umar fled Tarim and was brought up by his relatives in the city of Bayda', near the border between the northern and southern parts of the country. He later emigrated to Saudi Arabia, where he completed his education. Habib 'Umar returned to Hadramawt after the 1990 unification and, in 1996, opened a religious college of "neo-traditional" orientation called Dar al-Mustafa24 on the outskirts of Tarim.

When I met Habib 'Umar in November 1999, he was said to be about 36 or 37 years old.25 Despite his relatively young age, he was treated as the undisputed leader by all the members of his entourage, including some distinguished older scholars of sayyid background as well as the highly respected head (mansab) of his own saintly family. An eloquent public speaker, 'Umar has achieved and sustained his wide popularity by constantly travelling across the country in a new Toyota Landcruiser and giving fiery public sermons and lectures at every stop. The geography of his proselytizing tours is quite

22. Buchman, p. 24. 23. Abu Bakr b. 'Ali al-Mashhur, Qabasat al-Nur (Sparks of Light) (Amman: Dar al-Razi and Tarim:

Dar al-Fiqh, 1998), pp. 144-145. 24. Literally, "The House of the Elect One (that is, the prophet Muhammad)." 25. The author's field notes, taken in al-Mukalla and Tarim on November 2-8, 1999.




impressive. During my three weeks in Hadramawt, he was constantly on the move: presiding over an isra' wa'l-mi'raj26 celebration at the city of al-Shihr, in the coastal area

of Hadramawt; lecturing at a local religious college (ribat); preaching to scholars and students in the port city of al-Mukalla; returning to Tarim via Saywun (the capital city of inner Hadramawt) with lecturing stops along the way; overseeing preparations for the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of the prophet Hud27 in Wadi Masila; and reciting mawlid poetry in several mosques of Tarim. Simultaneously, he performed his duties as the director of Dar al-Mustafa, which was quite a task in itself, with the college enrollment of approximately 300 students at various levels of their studies.28 During his travels, Habib 'Umar was accompanied by busloads of companions and disciples, whose ostentatious display of loyalty to, and admiration for, their leader made a great impression on the masses who flocked to Habib 'Umar's lectures by the hundreds. One may, in fact, speak of nothing short of a new saint cult with the usual paraphernalia described in the local hagiographic narratives: an admiring following, an irresistible personal charisma, and headship of weekly devotional gatherings. Before long, in accord with the hagiographic canon, one should expect the emergence of miracle narratives centered around Habib 'Umar and his retinue. In the streets of Tarim and al-Shihr one can hear people saying that Habib 'Umar has already secured himself a place in the Hadrami saintly pantheon. Some even suggest that in a few years a domed shrine (qubba) will be constructed for him amidst the prestigious cemetery of Tarim, the resting place of many great Hadrami saints.29 With or without the qubba, one can see the recognizable attributes of an emerging personality cult. Habib 'Umar' s photographs and pictures are carried by Tarim' s bookstores, and his recorded public speeches are available on video- and audio-cassettes for rent or purchase. His fame has attracted hundreds of disciples from all over the Muslim

world, especially from Africa, Indonesia, and Malaysia. At least a dozen of his disciples are European and North American converts to Islam. Others hail from the countries of the former Soviet Union and Africa.30 Upon graduation they are expected to return to their countries of residence, where they will proselytize among their compatriots. In particular, they will be spreading word about Dar al-Mustafa's "pure and authentic" Islamic instruction as well as Habib 'Umar's unique qualities as spiritual teacher and director of consciences. All this closely resembles the major stages of the formation of a saint's cult as described in the biographies of the major Hadrami and Yemeni saints.3' The only new elements seem to be the aggressive and assertive nature of Habib 'Umar's propaganda and the extensive use of new information technologies from video and audio cassettes to the Internet.

26. A religious holiday that celebrates the Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey to Jerusalem and subsequent Ascension to Heaven, alluded to in the Qur'an, Sura XVII (Al-Isra'), 1.

27. Hud is a pre-Islamic Prophet mentioned in the Qur'an, Sura XI (Hud). 28. Author's fieldnotes. 29. The author's interviews with three shopkeepers in Tarim, November 9, 1999. 30. Notes taken by the author during his tour of the Dar al-Mustafa compound on November 7, 1999. 31. See, e.g., Esther Peskes, "Der Heilige und die Dimensionen seiner Macht. Abu Bakr al-'Aydarus

(gest. 1509) und die Saiyid-Sufis von Hadramawt," ("The Saint and the Dimensions of His Power. Abu Bakr al-'Aydarus (d. 1509) and the sayyid Sufis of Hadramawt"), in Quaderni di studi arabi 13 (1995): 41-72.




My interviews with Habib 'Umar and his followers revealed a highly selective way in which they appropriate and deploy the traditional Hadrami hagiographic themes in order to legitimize their religious views in general and their educational philosophy in particular. One salient feature of their religious Weltanschauung is the great value they place on devotion to the Prophet and his descendants, who, on the local level, are represented by the Ba 'Alawi sada of Hadramawt.32 The religious pamphlets produced and used in Dar al-Mustafa depict the sada as the religious leaders and educators of Hadramawt, whose presence in the Wadi was ordained by God to guide its people aright, rectify their uncouth and brutal ways, and bring peace to the warring factions and tribes. This concerted campaign to elevate the Hadrami sada led to the revival of the formerly condemned expressions of devotion to the members of the Ba 'Alawi family, such as the symbolic kissing of their hands, public displays of humility in their presence, use of honorific titles, such as habib, sidi, sharifa,33 etc. The revival of these customs, which were officially abolished by the Socialist regime, is particularly obvious in the religious colleges headed by representatives of various sada clans, especially in Habib 'Umar's Dar al-Mustafa and the ribat34 colleges of Tarim and al-Shihr. While under the Socialist regime the sada were consistently marginalized, humiliated and even physically perse- cuted, over the last decade in Tarim and elsewhere in Wadi Hadramawt they have again taken to donning their distinctive white garbs, skullcaps and turbans in order to emphasize their status as the religious leaders of local Muslims. Tours of the Hadrami countryside by Habib 'Umar and his retinue usually include paying respects to the tombs of the famous members of the Ba 'Alawi family. Such visits are intended to restore the status of the tombs as objects of worship-another symbolic gesture aimed at elevating the status of the sada as the pastors and guides of the Hadramis. One can say that Habib 'Umar and his followers are deliberately reviving the sacred geography and pilgrimage calendar of the region, which fell into disuse under the Socialist regime. In the process, new educational institutions along the lines of Dar al-Mustafa are being established in Hadrami cities. The capital of coastal Hadramawt, al-Mukalla, now boasts a university with a predominantly sayyid leadership and faculty (Jami'at al-Ahqaf). A new religious school named Ribat al-Mustafa was recently founded in the city of al-Shihr. It is considered to be a regional branch of the Dar al-Mustafa of Tarim.

Although not all venerated Hadrami tombs belong to the famous sada families of Hadramawt, they are definitely in the majority.35 This fact endows Habib 'Umar's activities with a pronounced genealogical tenor that was not lost on the egalitarian-minded followers of the salafi movement, who resent any notion of hereditary privilege. Confrontations between the devotees of the deceased holy men and women and their puritanically-minded detractors are quite common throughout Yemen. They often follow

32. As mentioned, Habib 'Umar belongs to a renowned sayyid family. 33. These words mean respectively "the beloved [of God]," "[my] master," and "the noble one" [of a

woman]. 34. Depending on the context, the word ribats can be translated as "lodge" or "small college." 35. See my article "The Cult of Saints and Islamic Religious Reformism in Twentieth Century

Hadramawt," in New Arabian Studies, Vol. 4 (1997), pp. 139-167.




the same pattern: a group of salafis, who often come from outside the area or are at least foreign educated, attempt to destroy the tomb of a local saint under the cover of night, while the locals defend the tomb tooth and nail. Even in Tarim, the capital of the Ba 'Alawi sada, whose sumptuous shrines symbolize its status as the citadel of traditional Hadrami Islam, there were several clashes between the opponents and champions of the local saints. As a result, several people lost their lives.36 As I have argued elsewhere,37 violence around saints' tombs is an eloquent manifestation of their status as powerful symbols, both physically and ideologically, of two distinct religious attitudes current among contemporary Yemeni Muslims.

An important feature of the educational project instituted by Habib 'Umar and his companions is their eagerness for the propagation (da'wa)38 of their version of Islam among the population at large. Proselytizing in remote villages and out-of-the-way side-valleys of Wadi Hadramawt has been adopted by the leaders of Tarim's and al-Shihr's religious schools as an essential part of their pedagogical philosophy. Upon reaching a certain stage of their studies, the disciples are dispatched to disseminate "correct" Islam among the peasants and tribesfolk in remote villages and hamlets. A less obvious object of this propaganda, never stated explicitly by the leaders, is to spread Islam among non-Muslims. Never in my life did I receive so many invitations to embrace Islam as during my two-week stay in Tarim, in November 1999. The age of the self-appointed missionaries ranged from 14 to 65. In the process, I was routinely threatened with hell-fire and eternal perdition, which, I must admit, sounded a bit unconvincing from a fourteen-year-old boy, whose life-experience had thus far been confined to the Dar al-Mustafa classroom. Yet, one cannot help being impressed by the evangelic drive and fervid enthusiasm of Tarim's students. From my conversations with them it became clear that they consider Habib 'Umar to be the only human being in possession of "the true meaning" of Islam.39 Any other interpretations, especially those of their salafi critics, are dismissed as misguided or outright erroneous. The students are trained to see themselves as disseminators of Habib 'Umar's "correct belief' among the ignorant masses, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Hence the strong emphasis that the leaders of Dar al-Mustafa and Tarim's ribat place on active da'wa. They present this "kerygmatic" attitude as a natural extension of the da'wa tradition of the renowned Hadrami sada scholars of the past. This tradition is indeed richly attested in Hadrami prosopographical literature from the past four centuries.40 However, there are significant differences as well. While in the traditional

hagiographic narratives proselytizing by individual sayyids or holy men is presented as part of their God-inspired personal mission, in Habib 'Umar's movement we witness a well-orchestrated campaign presided over by a charismatic leader with a large entourage

36. See, e.g., Al-Hayat (London), vol. 11704 (April 27, 1995), pp. 1 and 6. 37. "The Cult of Saints," passim. 38. This term, which literally means "a call" or "summons," usually denotes an active propaganda of

Islamic beliefs and values. 39. The author's field notes taken in Tarim on November 6-14, 1999. 40. See, e.g., 'Abd al-'Aziz Ja'far b. 'Aqil, "Al-Hawta fi tawr al-ta'sis," ("A Hawta at Its Founding

Stage"), in Al-Afaq (Horizons) (Yemeni Writers Union, Al-Mukalla) 3 (March 1987), pp. 22-40.



410 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

of relatives, eminent scholars (mostly of sada background), devoted disciples, and modern propaganda techniques.

While commitment to da' wa is, indeed, an important part of the Sufi tradition, it is not nearly as central to it as the murshid-murid4' discipline, which arguably constitutes Sufism's distinguishing hallmark, at least on the practical and institutional level. In this respect Habib 'Umar's movement comes very close to the notion of Sufism as it is perceived by Western Orientalism.42 Habib 'Umar and the scholars in his retinue command total allegiance of their followers. This allegiance is constantly maintained and renewed in the course of the public sermons and common rituals that are administered by Habib 'Umar and a few of his aides. During these events the eyes of the listeners radiate intense devotion; the words of the masters are received as the ultimate truth; their commands are obeyed instantly and never questioned. Outwardly, this attitude manifests itself in the almost ritualized public displays of humility and reverence towards their masters by all the students of Dar al-Mustafa. Outsiders too are expected to pay similar obeisance to the Dar al-Mustafa spiritual masters.43 Surrounded by such intense admiration, the leaders' hold over their followers is complete; it vividly conjures up the traditional monastic/Sufi image of a dead corpse in the hands of the washer.

A closer look, however, reveals that the movement's affinity with Sufism, understood as a textual tradition, is much more problematic than might appear at first sight. Sufi literature proper occupies a relatively modest place in the Dar al-Mustafa curriculum. It is represented by the major Sufi manuals of al-Qushayri (al-Risala al-Qushayriyya), 'Umar al-Suhrawardi ('Awarif al-Ma'arif) and the inevitable Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din of al-Ghazali, which is held in high regard by all Yemeni Sunnis, Sufis and non-Sufis alike. It is in vain that one looks for works on Sufi metaphysics, epistemology or allegorical exegesis along the lines of Ibn 'Arabi and his followers. This initial impression was confirmed by Habib 'Umar himself, who told me that, in accord with the tenets of the tariqa al-'alawiyya,44 they teach Sufism to their disciples primarily as morals and spiritual self-discipline. Special care is taken not to expose the disciples to Sufi philosophy or any other controversial aspects of the Sufi legacy, such as the ecstatic utterances of al-Bistami (d. 261/875) and the trial and execution of al-Hallaj (d. 309/922). When pressed, Habib 'Umar acknowledged his familiarity with the doctrine of the unity of being (wahdat al-wujud) ascribed to the great Arab mystic Ibn 'Arabi (d. 638/1240) and his followers.45

41. These Sufi terms denote respectively the Sufi master and his disciple. The murshid/murid relations, which are described in meticulous detail in numerous Sufi manuals, constitute the cornerstone of Sufi discipline and pedagogy.

42. See, e.g., Reynold A. Nicholson, The Mystics of Islam (London: Penguin/Arkana, 1989), pp. 32-36; J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, 2d edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 166-193; Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), Vol. 2, pp. 206-210.

43. The author's field notes taken during his visits to the Dar al-Mustafa compound on November 6-10, 1999.

44. The tariqa al-'alawiyya is the major Hadrami Sufi brotherhood that traces its origin to sayyid Muhammad b. 'Ali Ba 'Alawi (d. 653/1256); for details see my article "The sada in History: A Critical Essay on Hadrami Historiography," in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 9 No. 2 (July 1999) pp. 215-222.

45. This doctrine, according to many Muslim scholars, tends to place special emphasis on God's immanent presence in the things and phenomena of the empirical world. It thus goes against the grain of the



SUFISM IN YEMEN E 411

Yet he insisted that their works should not be used in the classroom, since their daring insights might prove detrimental to the unstable and immature minds of the beginners. This educational precept is not limited to the study of the Sufi legacy. It forms the foundation of the teaching philosophy in Dar al-Mustafa, whose students are thoroughly shielded from controversial issues of Islamic history and theology such as the disagreements between the Prophet's companions, thefitna wars, the Sunni-Shi'a animosities and the acute polemics between the Mu'tazili and Ash'ari theological schools.46 According to Habib 'Umar, he and his fellow instructors are wary of exposing students to any conflicts or debates between various Muslim communities, individuals, and schools of thought. This approach makes for a highly sanitized image of the Islamic tradition. Since, upon graduation, the students are expected to embark on individual missionary careers and are normally unable to continue their education at a more advanced level, it is unlikely that they will ever acquire a more nuanced, if less comforting, conception of the Islamic intellectual tradition. However, for the purposes of proselytizing, these nuances are irrelevant anyway.

Many Yemenis see public recitations of poetry in praise of the exemplary virtues of the Prophet (hadra)47 as a typical manifestation of Sufi piety. If participation in the gatherings (hadras) during which this poetry is recited to the accompaniment of drums and flutes is to be used as a measuring stick of one's affinity with a Sufi movement, then the followers of Habib 'Umar should be unreservedly proclaimed Sufis. The inhabitants of Dar al-Mustafa organize and participate in a wide variety of weekly hadras associated with local saints and their shrines (in the popular lore, the saints buried in these shrines are considered to be the initiators of this or that hadra, who determined its "custom" and the texts to be used by the participants). In Tarim, such hadras are spread over the entire week and take place almost daily. The students and teachers of Dar al-Mustafa leave their college after sunset and congregate at a mosque or a saint's tomb, where they perform a hadra in accordance with the rules established by its founder. Collections of homiletic poetry and invocations of the Prophet are widely distributed through Hadrami bookstores. A popular collection, titled Khulasat al-Madad al-Nabawi (The Quintessence of [Spiri- tual] Help from the Prophet) was compiled by Habib 'Umar himself. Published in a convenient pocket format,48 it is carried by every student of Dar al-Mustafa and by many students of the ribats of Tarim and al-Shihr. With a few exceptions, most of the homiletic and liturgical poetry included in this collection belong to the great sada scholars and saints of the past, namely 'Ali al-Habshi, 'Abdallah b. 'Alawi al-Haddad, Shaykh Abu Bakr b. Salim, Abu Bakr al-Saqqaf and 'Umar al-'Attas. Students are encouraged to recite this

notion of God's absolute transcendence, upheld by the majority of Sunni theologians; see William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989). Whether the term wahdat al-wujud accurately represents Ibn 'Arabi's real views is a wholly different issue.

46. For these controversial issues in a historical perspective see Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Reprint: Oxford: Oneworld, 1998), passim.

47. Hadra literally means "session" or "assembly." In Yemen, this term is applied to all manner of Sufi lessons or gatherings, which often take place at the tombs of local saints.

48. Khulasat al-Madad al-Nabawi fi Awrad Al Ba 'Alawi. Jam' wa-Tartib al-Imam al-Da'i ila'llah al-Habib 'Umar b. Muhammad b. Salim b. Hafiz (Tarim: Dar al-Fiqh, 1998).




poetry at all times, although a note at the beginning of each section provides suggestions as to the most appropriate place, time and sequence of such recitations. Interestingly, the last poem in this collection was composed by Habib 'Umar himself, placing him in the venerable company of the semi-legendary sada saints of Hadramawt.

SOME THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS

I will now try to place my loosely strung impressions of the resurgence of Hadrami/Yemeni Sufism into a broader theoretical framework. First, I would argue that, unlike the salafi (reformist) master discourse, which is perceived by many Yemenis as a foreign importation (either from Egypt or Saudi Arabia), the "Sufi" movement of Habib 'Umar and his followers (as well as other Sufi-based movements in contemporary Yemen) cast themselves as resuscitators and protectors of the "native" spiritual tradition. On the physical plane, their claim to authenticity is reinforced by the sacred geography and calendar of the country with its ubiquitous saints' tombs and seasonal pilgrimages associated with them. These tangible, physical manifestations of "nativist" religiosity, along with the movement's vast corpus of hagiographies and miracle narratives, create an entire symbolic universe that lends legitimacy and respectability to the neo-traditionalist project. The powerful symbolic potential of the shrines and pilgrimages is recognized (and resented) by their salafi critics, who derive their inspiration from the reformist agendas and attitudes that originate outside Yemen. Hence their attempts, so far unsuccessful, to undermine it by physically demolishing or desecrating the tombs, attacking the annual festivals associated with them and disparaging the saints buried therein as pagan "idols." The violence that periodically flares up around individual shrines and shrine complexes in the Sunni areas of Yemen can be seen as a radical expression of the underlying discursive/ideological conflict between the Sufi "nativists" and their salafi detractors. In their apologetic polemic, the former often stigmatize the latter as purveyors of a "foreign" religious attitude that has no roots in the local tradition.

At the same time, the "nativists"' strong claim to local "authenticity" is counterbal- anced, and occasionally outweighed, by the salafi spin on themselves as representatives of Islamic "modernity" and a "forward-looking," "progressive" interpretation of Islam. This latter claim is especially attractive to the younger generations of educated Yemenis, whose natural youthful suspicion of traditional authority and behavior is further aggravated by the dire economic conditions of contemporary Yemen, which they attribute to their fathers' blind adherence to the "corrupt" ways of their forebears.

As elsewhere in the Muslim world,49 debates over the "correct" understanding of Islam are fueled, in part, by the proliferation of new educational institutions. Their graduates are eager to use their newly acquired, if often shallow and incomplete, knowledge of the Islamic tradition to bring it in line with the demands of the age.

49. Dale Eickelman, "Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab Societies," in American Ethnologist, Vol. 19 No. 4 (November 1992), pp. 1-13.




In the era of globalization, these demands originate not only outside Yemen, but also outside the Muslim world, creating curious and sometimes exotic discursive combinations that merit closer examination. For now, we can tentatively describe both the "nativist" and the salafi uses of the Islamic tradition as highly selective and eclectic. For instance, despite their professed commitment to the Islamic reform, the Yemeni salafis make relatively little use of the rich legacy of either historical Wahhabism or the reformist programs of Muhammad 'Abdu and Muhammad Rashid Rida that date back to the early decades of the twentieth century.50

Elements of these master discourses are picked up and adjusted, sometimes rather mechanically, to the contemporary conditions and the expectations of prospective audiences. In the context of Hadramawt, for instance, the salafis tend to focus on the reformist condemnation of anthropolatry, grave visitation, Sufism and hereditary privilege (especially marriage parity51), while paying scarce or no attention to such important aspects of the original salafi program as the reform of the language, Qur'an exegesis, technology, administration, charitable institutions, and education. The Yemeni "nativists," on the other hand, tend to focus on the reformist, charitable, and missionary activities of the departed saints, in particular on their role as intercessors on behalf of the poor and downtrodden. At the same time, in response to the salafi critique of "superstitions" (khurafat), they minimize the importance of miracle narratives, ecstatic behavior, and mystical experiences that figure prominently in the medieval Yemeni hagiographic collections. Also discouraged is any mention of controversial Sufi behavior (such as that of al-Hallaj52) or the complex metaphysical speculations of Ibn Arabi and his followers. We are thus dealing here with selective ideological constructs that carry traces of earlier interpretations, while re-imagining and re-shaping them, often decisively. The exact ways in which the elements of the traditions are rearranged and recast and how this process is implicated in both local and global hegemonic discourses current in Yemeni society are the issues that call for further research.

The juxtaposition of the salafi and Sufi/"nativist" ideological constructs and the respective devotional and social attitudes they promote result in a fierce contestation of the Islamic tradition in public spaces (in the media, school and university curricula, the Friday sermons, devotional practices, celebrations of religious holidays, etc.). Although both sides claim to represent the "authentic" Islam of the "pious forebears" (as evidenced by their use of the term salaf), a closer look reveals the apparent commonality of their frame of reference to be an illusion. In reality, both sides appeal to quite different devotional attitudes as well as distinctive social and textual traditions. In the case of the "nativists," legitimacy is derived from their alleged rootedness in the local hagiographic literature, sacred landscape and the traditional life-cycle that is centered around seasonal pilgrimages to, and devotional practices at, the saints' tombs. The salafis, on the other hand, derive

50. For their views see A. Merad, "Islah," in Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: E. J. Brill: 1960-), Vol. 4, pp. 141-156.

51. See, e.g., Weir, "A Clash of Fundamentalisms," p. 26. 52. On this controversial mystic of Baghdad, who was executed in 309/922, see my Islamic Mysticism,

pp. 68-82.




their ideological justification from an outside authority (Islamic reformism), whose legitimacy rests on much broader (if also less locally relevant) discursive formations that transcend the borders of any one country or geographical area. To counter their perceived lack of local roots, the salafis have to demonstrate the relevance of their discourse to the problems faced by their homeland. To this end, they are compelled to couch their views in a pan-Islamic, universalist rhetoric, which, for many Yemenis, still rings hollow. This does not mean that the "nativist" movement is necessarily parochial and anti-global, as the international ramifications of Habib 'Umar's educational and missionary project finely demonstrate. On the other hand, despite the purported international character of the salafi movement in Yemen, it sometimes can be appropriated by tribal leaders seeking to assert their independence (or distinct identity) vis-a-vis the government or their tribal rivals who adhere to a more patriarchal (local) version of the Islamic tradition. As a result, somewhat paradoxically, the pan-Islamic, transnational discourse of the salafiyya becomes "local- ized" through its integration into the parochial politics of Yemeni provinces.

The success of the missionary and educational movement launched by Habib 'Umar and his comrades-in-arms can be attributed, at least in part, to their astute use of new propaganda techniques and multi-media technologies from the printing press to video cassettes and, more recently, also the Internet. The wide dissemination of new editions and recordings of traditional Hadrami texts (from hagiographic discourses to homiletic and devotional poetry) has helped the movement to create and sustain a closely-knit textual community. Its members derive their distinctive identity from participation in and constant repetition of a limited set of authoritative narratives that have become emblematic of their religious Weltanschauung. This sense of being part of a long and glorious religious tradition which, in addition to the texts, is embodied in the ubiquitous holy tombs scattered across the country's landscape provides the followers of Habib 'Umar and other Sufi leaders with a feeling of security and stability in a society adrift, which no longer offers its members the certainties that they enjoyed prior to unification.

Finally, there remains the question of how to define the character of Habib 'Umar's project. From the perspective of Western Orientalist scholarship, its affiliation with Sufism, understood as a grand narrative of the Sufi normative literature, is tenuous at best. However, for the Yemenis, its affinity with the Sufi tradition is obvious and undisputed. The reason for this disparity of perceptions lies in the highly idealized model of Sufism that Western Islamicists borrowed, often uncritically, from the Sufi classics of the tenth-thirteenth centuries C. E. When used as a measuring stick, it is of limited help to the investigators who examine the manifestations of living Sufism in various local contexts. For the Sufism we observe in real life is often dramatically different from its ideal image dutifully assembled for us by the classics of Sufi literature.53

53. See my Islamic Mysticism, 116-140.



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